6. Control in the Comedia

7/31/2019 6. Control in the Comedia

1/16

Humor and the Metadiscourse of Control in the Comedia

Ted L. L. BergmanCalifornia State University, Fresno

HO GETS TO DETERMINE what is funny in the comedia? Theanswers to this question are varied and will prompt many morequestions before even an initially satisfactory answer can be givento the first one. In order to avoid getting lost in a generalexploration of the nature of humor in the comedia, it seemsnecessary to arbitrarily pick a starting point for a line of

investigation, eschewing other lines for the time being. Factors such as societal norms,circumstances of performance, even the weather, can be as important, if not more so,than the text itself in determining its humorous nature. On the other hand, there are

moments when a comedia critic may simply examine a joke, especially a verbal one,while temporarily leaving aside information that comes from beyond the charactersthemselves. We will use the discussion of humor among characters as a starting point,and examine the debate through the use of two principle theories regarding languageand humor to help illuminate the process as a whole. Ultimately the goal is todemonstrate that the question of Who gets to determine what is funny? is really aquestion of Who is in control?

The first theoretical construct to aid in our investigation relates to the notionof language-games and metadiscourse. I am indebted to Catherine Larsons related

studies for introducing me to the use of the these notions as means of studying thecomedia. Larson is greatly influenced by Keir Elam, whence the term metadiscoursein the context of studying theater. Elam is a Shakespearean scholar who employs thephilosopher Ludwig Wittgensteins idea of language-games in order to explain howmetadiscourse can be framed and thus more easily understood. Wittgenstein writesin his Philosophical Investigations Ithat there is nothing common to all language-games, though they may have similarities, relationships, and a whole series of themat that ... (27) and asks at one point: And is there not also the case were we playandmake up the rules as we go along? (33). Paradoxically and usefully, comments

like these allow Elam, Larson, and now myself to take advantage of the rather flexiblenotion of language-game as a sort of ordering principle. In this case, the language-game in question will be that of telling jokes and responding to them assuming that


2/16

___________________________________________________________ Ted L. L. Bergman

Before going any further, it may be worthwhile to briefly look at speech acttheory as it relates to language-games, and see that particular difficulties crop up whentrying to find an analogue of doing things with words in doing things with jokes.Unfortunately, there is very little mention of joking in foundational speech act theory.J. L. Austin himself was quite suspicious of including jokes within any philosophicalscheme concerning the speech acts most important toindeed, coined byhim. Hewrites:

We may speak of the use of language for something,e.g., for joking. ... These references to use of languagehave nothing to do with the illocutionary act. ... Thereare parasitic uses of language, which are not serious,

not the full normal use. The normal conditions ofreference may be suspended, or no attempt made at astandard perlocutionary act, no attempt to make you doanything. (104)

Of course, one could argue that joking is a perlocutionary act, if effect is anessential ingredient, by affirming that its desired effect is getting the audience tolaugh. However, from the perspective of speech act theory, one would need to listthe conditions necessary for this effect to be realized. Doing this would require ageneralized theory of humor and its effects, something for which there is insufficientspace to explore here. Despite Austins protests to the contrary, while it may also bepossible to argue that jokes are illocutionary acts, the question of conditions still arises.Indeed, the principles behind speech act theory demand that we carefully examineconditions. As jokes are not purely constative, they cannot be described in terms oftrue or false, and we would need to follow Austins lead and determine what isrequired for a joke not to yield a result of infelicity (18). What are the conditions(or rules) for both joke-teller and audience alike? I have chosen Wittgensteins notionof language-games as a guiding principle because of its appealing looseness, in whichthe existence of rules is acknowledged, but relatively (compared to Austin) little effortis made to sort them out in detail. One is reminded of speech act theory when readingWittgensteins original example of primitive language, where a builder commands hisassistant by naming different sorts of stones (3), but it is also worth noting that Austinadmits no debt to Wittgenstein.

Austins most famous follower, John R. Searle, who does refer to Wittgensteinnow and then, seeks to expand upon his predecessors initial observations, and correctone of the most persistent mistakes in the history of Western philosophy (122) alongthe way. Nevertheless, in Searles deep and wide examination of speech acts, there arefew observations that one can easily connect to joking. Stating the conditions for theperformance of a particular illocutionary act and detailing the necessary input andoutput, Searle writes that he will ignore elliptical turns of phrase, hints, metaphors,


3/16

Ted L. L. Bergman ___________________________________________________________

are analogous to examples taken from plays, cover the large and indefinite range ofconditions under which any kind of serious and literal linguistic communication ispossible (57). Until it can be firmly established that jokes lie within the domain ofserious and literal linguistic communication, I feel that it is best to employ the moreflexible constructs of metadiscourse and language-games instead.

Beyond these, we must also consider the notion of controlling discourse in thecontext of humor, and the possibility that language-games may have an agonisticcomponent. Indeed, Jean-Franois Lyotard has insisted that in the context oflanguage-games to speak is to fight, although [t]his does not necessarily mean thatone plays in order to win. Even so, Lyotard concedes that the idea of winning cannotbe eliminated from the equation:

A move can be made for the sheer pleasure of itsinvention: what else is involved in that labor of languageharassment undertaken by popular speech and byliterature? Great joy is had in the endless invention ofturns of phrase, of words and meanings, the processbehind the evolution of language on the level ofparole.But undoubtedly even this pleasure depends on a feelingof success won at the expense of an adversaryat least oneadversary, and a formidable one: the accepted language, or

connotation. (10)This assertion coincides with University of Georgias speech communicationprofessor Charles Gruners bookThe Game of Humor, in which the author sums uphis life-long study of humor wit, and laughter (1) with the following thesis, reallya corollary on the superiority theory of humor: enjoyment of successful humor,like enjoying success in sports and games (including the games of life), must includewinning(getting what we want), and sudden perception of that winning (9). WhileWittgenstein would probably not have agreed upon the importance of perception(33), and perhaps would have insisted that his language-games are infrequently about

winning or losing, in the context of humor, we may lend more credence to Lyotardsinterpretation of Wittgenstein. Keeping in mind Lyotards use of the word pleasureand Gruners enjoyment, we can more easily discover what Susan Purdie adds to theidea:

Joking is valued most obviously because laughter feelspleasurable and is associated with release from external andinternal [note alternate spelling] restraints. I shall suggestthat this increase is only half the storythat funniness

involves at once breaking rules and marking that break,so that correct behaviour is implicitly instated; yet intransgressing and recognizing the rules jokers take power


4/16

___________________________________________________________ Ted L. L. Bergman

Here, Purdie is referring to rules in the Lacanian sense of Symbolic Law, and notin the Wittgensteinian language-game sense. While she distances her own theory

(5). Though it will be necessary to cite some psychological terms (such as tabooand transgression) this investigation mostly seeks ways to better understand thediscussions about humor within the comedia, the metadiscourse of humor, ratherthan study the effects of humor itself. Summing up the combined use of the twotheoretical constructs mentioned above, the implicit discussion of the nature of humor(a metadiscourse) in the comedia can be seen as a discussion about the struggle forcontrol over discourse itself, and this struggle for control can be framed as an agonisticlanguage-game, as detailed by Lyotard. While at times the use of this combinationmay seem to contradict Wittgenstein, and subsequently Elam and Larson to somedegree, it is still helpful in describing what is happening in the comedia. Before citingthe first example taken directly from a comedia, it may be useful to very briefly look athow one early modern theoretician tackled he question of what is funny.

In Luis de Milns El Cortesano: libro de motes de damas y caballeros(firstpublished in 1561), an imitation of Castigliones treatise with a similar title, theaforementioned damas y caballerosenter a brief and witty discussion about risade perro (Miln 1: 184). The Diccionario de Autoridadesstates that perro canmetaphorically refer to someone worthy of scorn or disdain, but for the terms exactuse, we must go to Baltasar Gracins El Criticn, specifically the Crisi Quinta of theSegunda Parte. Here, he describes a mass of human-animal hybrids, some who letforth risa de perro ... mostrando entonces los dientes (Gracin 251). Thus the risade perro can be interpreted as a sort of unrestrained laughter and baring of teeth,with an almost animalistic quality. Returning to Luis Milns work, we see that theauthor, who places himself as a narrator of the book, is accused of laughing like a dogby one of the ladies present. However, another comes to his defense stating: no puedeparecer don Luis Miln a lo que no parece, que no siendo perras sus cosas, haga risa deperro; mas parece a risa de corte, que risas de avisadas reprensiones (Miln 1: 184).Thus we are given a dichotomy between risa de perro and risa de corte in a courtlymanual that offers instruction on the motes de damas y caballeros. Therefore wemay be tempted to think that according to the rules, according to theory, that risade perro is not for nobles. This seems quite logical, acceptable, applicable, and verymuch in line with what we should expect of noble characters, including damasandgalanesin the Spanish comedia. Obviously, since Milns book is (among other things)an explicit treatise on wit, we are not yet at the level of metadiscourse, but there iscertainly a struggle for control over discourse, as the idea of enjoyment of successfulhumor (Gruner) or the sheer pleasure of its invention (Lyotard) in a decorouscourtly setting (where risa de perro would signal unsuccessful humor) is argued

I will mostly be using the abstracted idea of joke tellers as masters of discourse

of humor from that of Freud (6), she still retains some of Lacans teachers ideasabout humor as a form of aggression (8). For the purposes of this essay, however,


5/16

Ted L. L. Bergman ___________________________________________________________

We enter the realm of metadiscourse when the term examined by boththeoreticians Miln and Gracin appears in a piece of pure entertainment, namely inAlonso Jernimo Salas de Barbadillos playEl gallardo Escarramn. In the followingscene, thegracioso Mondego attempts to assuage his master Don Lzaros lovesicknesswith some jokes. Both characters comment on the success of these attempts:

DON LZARO. Al fin fuyste poderosoa hazerme reir confieso,que con manifiesto excessoeres Mondego gracioso.

MONDEGO. Gracias a Dios que los dientesmuestras y das carcaxadasseal de que estn borradasya tus passiones dolientes. (Salas Barbadillo 231)

Apparently the erudite Luis Milns Renaissance courtly decorum concerning risade perro does not apply to the noble Don Lzaro. On the other hand, perhapsMondego is making an ironic joke about Don Lzaros laughter and subtly insultingDon Lzaros stature, a practice granted tograciososfrom time to time. MaybeMondego is calling Don Lzaros behavior less-than-courtly by referring to teeth-baring laughter. Here, there is certainly metadiscourse related to humor, andboth Don Lzaro and Mondego are winners in the sense that the adversary(as Lyotard would put it) is Don Lzaros conventional lovesickness which getsdefeated by Mondegos jokes in this language-game. However, as was the case inMiln, the struggle for control over discourse is still missing. We also find ourselvesunable to apply Milns rules to the comedia characters game, something thatrecalls Wittgensteins observations about making up rules as we go along. Evenif one were able to confront the fictional characters with Milns observations,effectively breaking the fourth wall from the other side, it is unlikely that either DonLzaro or Mondego would concede that they had any treatise in mind when theywere joking with each other.

The theoretical constructs of metadiscourse and the struggle for control overdiscourse meet in an applied fashion when the characters in the comedia themselvesbegin to examine what is funny and what is not, not in dialogued treatise form, asin Miln, but in the course of ordinary conversation. Comedias, known to be self-referential in many ways, are littered with references to the act of joking itself, evenreferring to the ambiguous nature of humor, while also giving cues to the audienceabout what should be taken as a joke and what should be taken seriously. As critics,we may assume certain rules of joking, forming our own internal treatise on thedecorum of humor within the comedia like a modern-day Luis de Miln However


6/16

___________________________________________________________ Ted L. L. Bergman

on humor, regarding what is humorous and what is not, we can see that thedynamism celebrated in the comedia (from shifting gender identities to blurring theline between reality and illusion) also applies to the language-games of jokes. Jokes inthe comedia are as flexible and multiform (Elam 12), as Wittgensteins definitionof language-games. Elam and Larson have used Wittgensteins suggested framesfor different and discretely defined language-games to great advantage while studyingtheater. Here I propose an alternate complementary technique by focusing moreon the elusive nature of both jokes and language-games, especially when the formerjoins with the latter, eventually using ambiguity and elusiveness for dramatic andadditionally comic effect.

Both Lyotard and Elam write of a move within a game. For Lyotard, A movecan be made for the sheer pleasure of its invention. For Elam (citing Renaissancerhetoricians), figures termed by her as strategic movies may be persuasive doingswith words (16). It should be obvious that a single joke, a pun, for example, caneither be made for the sheer pleasure of invention or added (as paronomasia) tothe list of Elams sub-categories (frames) for figural games (16). At the same time,the joke may fit into the subcategory for semantic games, as bringing togetherunrelated words with identical sounds (14). This ability of jokes to elude strictcategorization does not undermine the usefulness of Elams distinctions, but ratherreinforces the notion that jokes are closely related to language-games as Wittgensteinloosely defines them.

A further use of looseness appears if one attempts to frame the language-game in specific contexts, as it becomes apparent that the game in operation mustbe distinguished from other interactions between characters which are more strictlydefined in terms of rules and conditions. As seen in the examples of Miln andlater Salas Barbadillo above, decorum and humor are closely related in the comedia,and they can be seen as both competing and complementary discourses. Breakingdecorum can yield humorous results, and therefore control of one can yield controlover the other. This fact reminds us that for all their abstraction as a philosophical andlinguistic concept, language-games relate to people who are often in social situationsand games can be difficult to separate from social contexts. All the same, one shouldnot necessarily confuse breaking decorum, or offending somebodys sensibilities,with losing control of discourse in a language-game. I have borrowed Susan Purdiesidea of successfully telling jokes as a mastery of discourse without including her useof Lacanian Symbolic Law, but because I bring up the subject of decorum, we maymomentarily relate the classical concept with the twentieth-century ideas of taboo andtransgression. According to Purdie,

The funniest jokes provoke their particular Audience, at

that moment, into a maximum of actual transgression,which is a matter of the particular circumstances andskill of delivery as well as the structure and content of the


7/16

Ted L. L. Bergman ___________________________________________________________

Purdie concludes her chapter as follows:

Whatever sense or truth a joke may conceal, however,

whatever targets and taboos it allows us to attack, howevermany layers of effects it entails, all joking discourse canbe seen to include an ab-use of language throughwhose exchanged marking we claim mastery of Symboliccompetence.

If a joke is a move in a language-game, where the object is to control discourse,breaking decorum can be a way to win. In Yerros de naturaleza y aciertos de lafortuna, a collaboration between Caldern de la Barca and Antonio Coello y Ochoa,

tells a transgressive joke (dealing with the taboo subject of suicide) but gets a sharpresponse from Matildes cousin Rosaura:

Que como huevos murieronEro y Leandro, nos cuentanlas historias, l pasadopor agua, estrellada ella;pero Matilde, ditongo

destas dos muertes, intentahoy morir como los dospues en el agua se estrella.Cay desde un miradoral ro [. . .].

ROSAURA. [. . .] Calla [cese] tu lenguay no pronuncie atrevidatan lastimosa tragedia.(Yerros de naturaleza 89)

This is a struggle for control over the discourse regarding Matildes suicide in whichthe struggle is metadiscursively referenced by Rosaura. If seen as merely a social

Lyotard and Purdies point of view, the opposite is true. Even though Rosaura herself

A typical language-game of jokes is the one that is played between thegaln andhisgracioso sidekick. Primarily, the game consists of each type being contrasted withthe other, and this comic contrast consequently elicits laughter from the audience. The

most typical example of this game is for thegracioso to play the foilsaying/doingthe oppositeof his more serious master. The game is obviously agonistic, as Lyotardould term it and the inner in Gruners terms or master to follo Purdies is

thegracioso Tabaco keeps making rather tasteless jokes about the suicide of the damaMatilde, who died by throwing herself into a deep chasm with a river below. Tabaco

TABACO.

interaction, Tabaco would appear to be the loser, silenced by Rosaura, but from

is not defeated, Tabaco remains a winner or master thanks to his transgression.


8/16


9/16

Ted L. L. Bergman ___________________________________________________________

relates the language-game of the (practical) joke to who has control in the relationshipbetween the two. There may be similar questions of control as are present in the amo-criado relationship, but the typical role of thegracioso as the provocateur of laughter,even in an inversion of roles, is conspicuous in its absence. Whenever a joke appears inthe comedia, there is likely the underlying (perhaps even subconscious) understandingon the part of the audience or reader that a language-game is in process. Even whilethis is the case, it may require some reflection from the audience to designate theplayers, the rules, and who wins, if we follow Lyotards interpretation of Wittgenstein.In Gurdate del agua mansa, also by Caldern, the lovesick Don Juan and DonPedro gaze longingly at the objects of their affection through a window, while theircompanion Don Flixobviously not agraciosodeclares: Vamos a comer, queaunque / tan enamorado est / tengo ms hambre que amor (2: 381). To ensure thateveryone understands that this is a joke, Caldern injects an element of metadiscourseas the nobles respond clearly to the joker upon being shaken from their reverie:Aunque de burlas hablis, / sabed que de mi fortuna / una es la causa and Aunquetan de humor estis / por s o por no, sabed / que una de las dos, por Dios, / es la quesigo [. . .] (381). Don Flix, by cracking a joke, has attempted to seize control overthe discourse regarding the groups (formed of noblemen) roles, that of suitors orpure bon vivants. If the joke is successful, then Don Flix is a winner in an agonisticlanguage-game, where the connotations (to borrow from Lyotard) associated withgalanes de comedia, and not the actual people participating in the roles, become theadversaries.

While the metadiscourse of control as it relates to humor can exist withoutthe presence of agracioso, as a phenomenon it becomes easier to detect when thischaracter type faces off with agaln de comedia. Nevertheless, we must understandthat in terms of a language-game, while rules (especially regarding roles) do exist,Wittgensteins observation that we make up the rules as we go along can beenapplied in what might otherwise appear to be rigid circumstances. Those who haveread or seen at least a fewcomediaswill be familiar with the retort Calla loco! ora similar expression, which thegaln uses to keep his mischievous and wisecrackingservant in line. A simple way to explain Calla loco! and similar expressions is bystating that thegaln represents order and dignity, while the servant/gracioso representsthe opposite. Following this logic, there is a battle between the transgressor and theorder figure, one promoting humor and the other working against it. Nevertheless, thesupposed order figure, or foil for humor, can suddenly take an active role in makingthe audience laugh. The rules of the game may change, be made up as we go along,while the agonistic component and the metadiscourse of control remain constant andpresent. In Calderns Dar tiempo al tiempo, a comediawith many great momentsof farce, the lacayo-gracioso Chacn makes one joke too many at the expense of hismaster Don Juan. The perturbed gentleman shouts back, [. . .] Necio ests, / no meobligues a que haga / un disparate [. . .] (507), thus effectively saying Thats not


10/16

___________________________________________________________ Ted L. L. Bergman

metadiscourse because it comments on the nature of humor as it relates to decorum,but it also comments on who has control of the social situation in terms of who isallowed to perform disparates, which, unless there is literal insanity on-stage, mostlikely refer to comical acts that break decorum. In an attempt to change the rules/roles of the game, without exiting the game itself, Don Juan threatens to performsome unreasonable and possibly ridiculous action that might be considered belowhis station as agaln de comedia. In the end, Don Juan cannot contain himself anylonger, and he pushes Chacn into a mud puddle. It is difficult to conclude thatDon Juan is a winner in the battle of wits against hisgracioso sidekick, but this is notrelevant when the exchange is seen as a language-game. Whether the battle is wonor lost is independent of the struggle for control of discourse that goes on betweenthe two characters. As previously mentioned, it is the discourse of humor that isbeing controlled, and it is Don Juan that controls it. We may never know if theaudience laughed at thegaln pushing his lacayo into a puddle, but there remains ametadiscursive message informing the audience that new control of the status of jokerhad been achieved, a surprising development that may itself have been consideredhumorous.

Metadiscourse for control in the form of language-games need not always havea humorous result. In some cases, metadiscourse may trump the discourse of humoritself, effectively killing any joke, while the struggle for control and the subject of the

unveiling of Doa Mencas murdered corpse, thegracioso Coqun pleads before theking:

[. . .] Aunque me mates,habindote conocido,o seor, tengo de hablarte[......................................]que aunque hombre me considerasde burlas, con loco humor,

llegando a veras, seor,soy hombre de muchas veras. (205)

When thegracioso, supposedly the funniest of all the characters, indicates that thetime for joking has come to an end, the tone must be very somber indeed. The controlremains in his hands, while the humor is gone. One can trace the struggle for controlof discourse in the statements made by Coqun and his adversary, King Pedro,throughout the play. Initially, the king asks him what he does for a living. After helearns that Coquns job is hacer rer, King Pedro (el cruel, among his monikers)explains that he will have all of Coquns teeth ripped out if thegracioso cannot makethe king laugh within a month. Despite Coquns apparent nervousness and beliefthat he will quedar lisiado, he still manages to reflect upon what it means to laugh

discourse remain present. At the end ofEl mdico de su honra, before the final bloody


11/16

Ted L. L. Bergman ___________________________________________________________

metadiscursive reference to the agonistic language-game at play. Yet one should notconfuse the challenge offered by the king, an obvious battle of wits, with the language-game itself, because Coqun has established his role as joker before the challenge, andthis role changes. In the game, Coquns entire capacity to control discourse throughhis jokes, his transgressions, is at stake. The entire existence of the game is threatened,and the king is aided in his attempted extirpation through Don Gutierres murderousactions at the end of the play. Nevertheless, while the original overt challenge remainsunresolved in the final moments, Coqun continues to be metadiscursively in control,as the king thanks him for the terrible news:

REY: Con qu he de poder pagartetal piedad?

COQUN: Con darme aprisalibre, sin ms accidentes,de la accin contra mis dientes.

REY: No es ahora tiempo de risa.

COQUN: Cundo lo fue? (206)

While the king appears to be in control of the social situation, he is in no more controlof the discourse of humor than at any other point in the plot. Coquns question ofCundo lo fue? is rhetorical, and reinforces his previous declaration as an hombrede muchas veras. He will have the final move in this game, determining what isfunny and what is not. In a play such as El mdico de su honra, this contrast betweencontrol and its lack is only appropriate, as the entire work is fraught with confusingand tense moments, fully imbued with a sense of paranoia causing and caused by thereckless behavior of the protagonist Don Gutierre and the king himself.

Thus far, we have seen examples of metadiscursive references that, by way of

jokes, represent a struggle for control over discourse. Also in these examples, regardlessof whether or not discourse could be successfully controlled through jokes, the meansof control is never in dispute, thanks to the comedia characters references to thejokes, successful or not. Humor thrives on ambiguity, but there are times when thisambiguity leads to doubt or confusion about whether a joke is being told at all. If thejoke is a language-game, then, as Wittgenstein writes:

Asking [a question] . . . outsidea particular language-gameis like what a boy once did, who had to say whether theverbs in certain sentences were in the active or passivevoice, and who racked his brains over the questionwhether the verb to sleep meant something active or


12/16

___________________________________________________________ Ted L. L. Bergman

In other words, in the comedia, there are times when a character must ask a questionoutside of a language-game, another form of metadiscourse, before the game forcontrol of discourse can proceed. It appears that the playwrights of the time wereinstinctively aware of the entertaining nature of this type of break up of the game,and found it a rather useful device for entertaining their audiences. Aside fromadding suspense or surprise, the question Are you joking? is a statement equallyuseful as Thats funny or Thats not funny in establishing a tone for a particularscene or rounding out characters who would otherwise seem one dimensional or of asingle dramatic purpose. In El valiente Campuzano, by Fernando Zrate (n AntonioEnrquez Gmez), the protagonist must run from la justicia after killing a few people,including an alguaciland escribano. Nevertheless, he wants to return to Granada inorder to interrupt the wedding of his sister. The ordinarily jovial lackey Pimientoasks: Seor Campuzano, es burla? / Parece que nos da soga (Zrate 578). Pimientois saying, Sir, youve got to be kidding! while including an untranslatable pun ondar soga, which can mean to play a joke or literally give someone rope, in this caseimplying the hangmans noose. In contrast to Pimientos dark humor, Campuzanois deadly serious about his intentions, thus emphasizing that his plan is the purest offolly. That is because even the playsgracioso, surely an expert in the burla, cannotconceive of something as foolish as his masters designs and thus misinterprets themas a joke, albeit dark in nature. If Pimientos words are interpreted without irony, thisis an interruptionwith specific dramatic effectof the game. On the other hand, ifPimientos words are ironic, and simply meant to emphasize his stockgracioso trait ofcowardice, then the game continues, and Pimiento maintains control of the discourseby using his cowardice as a comic foil against Campuzanos bravado. As in previouscases, the game works independently of who wins the argument, as the argumentis not the discourse itself. Pimiento can still be a winner, a master of discourse,through sufficient transgression, to use Purdies terms, or victor over the formidableadversary of accepted language or connotation, to use Lyotards expressionregarding agonistic language-games, even if he loses the argument with his master.

As scholars of the comedia, we are effectively asking questions outside of thelanguage-game, one of which may be our initial question: Who gets to determinewhat is funny in the comedia? The confusion about whether something is funny canbe found within the text and without. In a performative setting, the audience maybe the final arbiter on humor, although opinions among the audience members mayvary, and no final judgment need be made. In the context of one scholar sitting alonewith a book, it is a matter of the scholars discretion. Though he or she is informedby all manner of sources and influences, the determination is ultimately his or hers.Thus, the control of discourse can extend to critical endeavors as well, not by makingjokes, but by studying them and making a determination. As an example, I wish tobriefly contrast my conclusions regarding a play with those ofcomedia scholar MaxOppenheimer, Jr. In simple terms, I find the play very funny, and Oppenheimer


13/16

Ted L. L. Bergman ___________________________________________________________

ignore that there is an attempt to be funny, in effect a struggle for control of discourse(among other things), carried out by the plays protagonist and his collaborator.

In the introduction to his 1994 translation of Calderns El astrlogo fingido,Oppenheimer includes arguments from an earlier article when referring to the burla,something that is admittedly not always associated with humor. In El astrlogo fingido,the main burla consistsof the protagonist Don Diego and two friends fooling Madridinto thinking that he is an astrologer with amazing powers, a trick that leads to hilariousconsequences. For Oppenheimer, the only positive aspect of the burla is the fun it createsfor its puppet master, while everyone else is left frustrated, including the trickster attimes. Nowhere is laughter mentioned by the critic. Instead, expressions like let-down,disappointment, unfulfilled hopes and wishes (El astrlogo fingido 16), isolatedfrom reality, victims, mental pressure, nervous and tormented, suffers from thestrain, painful limits, uneasiness, agonizing (18) are used to describe the play,making the whole comedia seem like a painful experience itself. There is a consequenceof Oppenheimers not mentioning laughter, or Don Antonio, one of Don Diegos fellowjokers. If we conceptualize jokes as language-games that operate as a metadiscourse ofcontrol, we see that the control exercised by Don Antonio and Don Diego is not limitedto being puppet masters who dupe their surrounding peers, but extends to the use ofhumor to control the discourse of the entire play itself. How can we conclude this? Wesimply follow the previous examples and see how the characters conversations reveal ametadiscourse of control.

Like agracioso in spirit, albeit not in social status, the socarrn or smart-aleck DonAntonio is playful and mischievous, and he enjoys a good laugh. When he tells DonDiego how he met a man who claimed to know the astrologer personally and told ofhis many astounding feats, Don Antonio says, No s, por Dios, cmo resisto la risa(138). In another scene, Don Diego had explained to the dama Doa Violante thathe could not transport the suitor Don Juan through the air from Flanders because itwas overseas. However, Doa Violante later responds that Don Juan is in Zaragozainstead, and that it should offer no difficulty, thus leaving Don Diego in a bind.When they recall the situation, Don Diego says to his friend Don Antonio, Y habsvisto otro suceso / ms gracioso? Don Antonio chuckles, answering:

[. . .] Yo os confiesoque ya perdido me vide risa, cuando os cogien lo del mar [. . .] (150)

Lastly, when Doa Violante starts to question Don Diegos ability as an astrologer, andhe finds himself in deeper water than ever, Don Antonio mentions the damas latest visit:

[. . .] Por Diosque si viene a consultaros,que viene a buena ocasin


14/16

___________________________________________________________ Ted L. L. Bergman

The now exasperated astrologer responds, Dejad de burlas. For Don Antonio,every lance, every plot complication offers a reason to laugh. Following the examplescited above from other works, we see, thanks to Don Antonios reactions andcomments, how Don Diego is firmly in control of deciding what is funny and what isnot. It seems quite likely that the audience was being asked to also follow the jocularnoblemans lead and laugh, or not, accordingly. It seems unlikely that the membersof the public were meant to feel any anxiety from watching El astrlogo fingido.Oppenheimer is correct in pointing out Calderns use of a realidad oscilante, butstrain, agony, and unease may not be part of the equation. In the play, thereis not a single sword-fight, not a single hint of danger. Honor, that most serious ofsubjects, is only briefly mentioned at the beginning, and by the end of the first act ithas become a joke unto itself (138).

My interpretation is only made possible by the presence of Don Antonio, anecessary ingredient, as at least two people are necessary for metadiscursive referencesto be made. Don Antonio is kind enough to explain jokes in an indirect manner, notholding forth on the nature of humor like the characters in Luis Milns treatise, butinstead making brief comments to allow the audience to know who is in control. Itis well known that the comediasform a genre that thrives on self reference, and thatjokes (especially those of thegracioso, as Claire Pailler has demonstrated) are a part ofthis phenomenon. I hope to have shown that when jokes are involved, the struggle forcontrol of discourse is ever present, in the form of language-games, and that whoeverwins or loses these games (again citing Lyotards interpretation of the games asagonistic) can be independent of the stock types of each character, whether we findthe joke funny or not. By seeing jokes as this type of struggle for control, we haveyet another tool to assist in the study and enjoyment of humor in the theater of earlymodern Spain.

Works Cited

Austin, J. L. How To Do Things with Words. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1962.

Caldern de la Barca, Pedro. El astrlogo fingido/Pedro Caldern de la BarcasThe Fake Astrologer. Trans.and ed. Max Oppenheimer, Jr. New York: Peter Lang, 1994.. Dar tiempo al tiempo. Comedias de Pedro Caldern de la Barca. Ed. Juan Eugenio Hartzenbusch. 4

vols. Biblioteca de Autores Espaoles 12. Madrid: Atlas, 1945. 2: 507-30.. Gurdate del agua mansa. Comedias de Pedro Caldern de la Barca. Ed. Juan Eugenio Hartzenbusch. 4

vols. Biblioteca de Autores Espaoles 9. Madrid: Atlas, 1945. 2: 377-400..Maanas de abril y mayo. Comedias de Pedro Caldern de la Barca. Ed. Juan Eugenio Hartzenbusch. 4

vols. Biblioteca de Autores Espaoles 9. Madrid: Atlas, 1945. 2: 277-94.. El mdico de su honra. Ed. D. W. Cruickshank. Madrid: Castalia, 1989.Caldern de la Barca, Pedro, and Antonio Coello y Ochoa. Yerros de naturaleza y aciertos de la fortuna.

Madrid: Hernando, 1930.Cotarelo y Mori, Emiliano. Coleccin de entremeses, loas, bailes, jcaras y mojigangas desde fines del siglo XVI a

mediados del siglo XVIII. Nueva Biblioteca de Autores Espaoles 17. Madrid: Bailly-Ballire, 1911.Diccionario de autoridades. Edicin facsmil. Madrid: Gredos, 1963.


15/16

Ted L. L. Bergman ___________________________________________________________

Freud, Sigmund.Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious. Trans. James Strachey. New York: Norton,1960.

Gracin, Baltasar. El Criticn. Ed. Antonio Prieto. Barcelona: Planeta, 1992.

Gruner, Charles R. The Game of Humor: A Comprehensive Theory of Why We Laugh. New Brunswick:Transaction Publishers, 1997.Larson, Catherine. Language Games in the Theater: The Case ofEl Caballero de Olmedo. Language and

theComedia: Theory and Practice. Lewisburg: Bucknell UP, 1991. 78-93.. Metatheater and the Comedia: Past, Present, and Future. TheGolden AgeComedia: Text, Theory,

and Performance. Ed. Charles Ganelin and Howard Mancing. Lafayette: Purdue UP, 1994. 204-21.Lyotard, Jean-Franois. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Trans. Geoff Bennington and

Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1984.Miln, Luis. El cortesano. 2 vols. Valencia: Universitat de Valncia, 2001.Moreto y Cabaa, Agustn. No puede ser. Comedias escogidas de don Agustn Moreto y Cabaa. Ed. Luis

Fernndez-Guerra y Orbe. Biblioteca de Autores Espaoles 39. Madrid: Atlas, 1945.Pailler, Claire. El gracioso y los guios de Caldern: Apuntes sobre autoburla e irona crtica. Risa y

sociedad en el teatro espaol del Siglo de Oro. Ed. Groupe dtudes sur le thtre espagnol. Paris: CentreNat. de la Recherche Scientifique, 1980. 33-48.

Purdie, Susan. Comedy: the Mastery of Discourse. Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1993.Salas Barbadillo, Alonso Gernimo de. El subtil cordovs Pedro de Urdemalas y El gallardo Escarramn. Ed.

Marcel Charles Andrade. Chapel Hill: Dept. of Romance Languages, U of North Carolina P, 1974.Searle, John R. Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. London: Cambridge UP, 1969.Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001.Zrate, Fernando de. El valiente Campuzano. Dramticos posteriores a Lope de Vega. Ed. Ramn de Mesonero

y Romanos. 2 vols. Biblioteca de Autores Espaoles 47. Madrid: M. Rivadeneyra, 1858-59. 1: 569-86.


16/16

Documents

6. Control in the Comedia