54048900 Political Law Review Cases

8/12/2019 54048900 Political Law Review Cases

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/54048900-political-law-review-cases 1/64

CONSTITIONAL LAW I& II

ARCHIPELAGIC DOCTRINE

Reagan v CIR, 30 SCRA 968

Facts: A question novel in character, the

answer to which has far-reaching implications,is raised by petitioner William C. Reagan, atone time a civilian employee of an Americancorporation providing technical assistance tothe United tates Air !orce in the "hilippines.#e would dispute the payment of the incometa$ assessed on him by respondentCommissioner of %nternal Revenue on anamount reali&ed by him on a sale of hisautomobile to a member of the United tates'arine Corps, the transaction having ta(enplace at the Clar( !ield Air )ase at "ampanga.%t is his contention, seriously and earnestlypressed, that in legal contemplation the salewas made outside "hilippine territory andtherefore beyond our *urisdictional power tota$.

Issue + Whether or not the sale was madeoutside the "hilippine territory and thereforebeyond our *urisdictional function to ta$.

Hel : he Court held that nothing is bettersettled than that the "hilippines beingindependent and sovereign, its authority maybe e$ercised over its entire domain. here is noportion there of that is beyond its power. Withinits limits, its decrees are supreme, itscommands paramount. %ts laws govern therein,and everyone to whom it applies must submitto its terms. hat is the e$tent of its

*urisdiction, both territorial and personal.ecessarily, li(ewise, it has to be e$clusive. %f it

were not thus, there is a diminution of itssovereignty.

%t is to be admitted that any state may, by itsconsent, e$press or implied, submit to arestriction of its sovereign rights. here maythus be a curtailment of what otherwise is apower plenary in character. hat is the conceptof sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in thesuccinct language of elline(, /is the property ofa state-force due to which it has the e$clusivecapacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction./ A state then, if it chooses to, mayrefrain from the e$ercise of what otherwise isillimitable competence.

%ts laws may as to some persons found withinits territory no longer control. or does thematter end there. %t is not precluded fromallowing another power to participate in thee$ercise of *urisdictional right over certainportions of its territory. %f it does so, it by nomeans follows that such areas becomeimpressed with an alien character. hey retaintheir status as native soil. hey are still sub*ectto its authority. %ts *urisdiction may bdiminished, but it does not disappear. o it iswith the bases under lease to the Americanarmed forces by virtue of the military basesagreement of 0123. hey are not and cannotbe foreign territory.

FUNDAMENTAL !RINCI!L" AN# STAT"!OLICI"S

$IAA v% C u't ( A))eals4.R. o. 055657, uly 87, 8776

FACTS: he 'anila %nternational Airport Authority9'%AA: operates the inoy Aquino %nternationaAirport 9 A%A: Comple$ in "ara;aque City under<$ecutive =rder o. 17> 9'%AA Charter:, asamended. As such operator, it administers theland, improvements and equipment within the

A%A Comple$. %n 'arch 0113, the =ffice of the4overnment Corporate Counsel 9=4CC: issued

=pinion o. 760 to the effect that the ?ocal4overnment Code of 0110 9?4C: withdrew thee$emption from real estate ta$ granted to '%AAunder ection 80 of its Charter.

hus, '%AA paid some of the real estate ta$already due. %n une 8770, it received !inal

otices of Real <state a$ @elinquency fromthe City of "ara;aque for the ta$able years0118 to 8770. he City reasurer subsequentlyissued notices of levy and warrants of levy onthe airport lands and buildings.



At the instance of '%AA, the =4CC issued=pinion o. 023 clarifying =pinion o. 760,pointing out that ec. 876 of the ?4C requirespersons e$empt from real estate ta$ to showproof of e$emption. According to the =4CC,

ec. 80 of the '%AA Charter is the proof that'%AA is e$empt from real estate ta$. '%AA,thus, filed a petition with the Court of Appealssee(ing to restrain the City of "ara;aque fromimposing real estate ta$ on, levying against,and auctioning for public sale the airport landsand buildings, but this was dismissed for havingbeen filed out of time.

#ence, '%AA filed this petition for review,pointing out that it is e$empt from real estateta$ under ec. 80 of its charter and ec. 8>2 ofthe ?4C. %t invo(es the principle that thegovernment cannot ta$ itself as a *ustificationfor e$emption, since the airport lands andbuildings, being devoted to public use andpublic service, are owned by the Republic ofthe "hilippines. =n the other hand, the City of"ara;aque invo(es ec. 01> of the ?4C, whiche$pressly withdrew the ta$ e$emptionprivileges of government-owned and controlledcorporations 94=CC: upon the effectivity of the?4C.

%t asserts that an international airport is notamong the e$ceptions mentioned in the saidlaw. 'eanwhile, the City of "ara;aque postedand published notices announcing the publicauction sale of the airport lands and buildings.%n the afternoon before the scheduled publicauction, '%AA applied with the Court for theissuance of a R= to restrain the auction sale.

he Court issued a R= on the day of theauction sale, however, the same was receivedonly by the City of "ara;aque three hours afterthe sale.

Issue:

Whether or not the airport lands and buildingsof '%AA are e$empt from real estate ta$

Hel : he "etition is 4RA <@. he airport lands and buildings of '%AA aree$empt from real estate ta$ imposed by localgovernments. ec. 82>9a: of the ?4C e$emptsfrom real estate ta$ any real property ownedby the Republic of the "hilippines. hise$emption should be read in relation with ec.0>>9o: of the ?4C, which provides that the

e$ercise of the ta$ing powers of localgovernments shall not e$tend to the levy ofta$es, fees or charges of any (ind on the

ational 4overnment, its agencies andinstrumentalities.

hese provisions recogni&e the basic principlethat local governments cannot ta$ the nationalgovernment, which historically merelydelegated to local governments the power tota$.

he rule is that a ta$ is never presumed andthere must be clear language in the lawimposing the ta$. his rule applies with greaterforce when local governments see( to ta$national government instrumentalities.'oreover, a ta$ e$emption is construedliberally in favor of national governmentinstrumentalities.

'%AA is not a 4=CC, but an instrumentality ofthe government.

he Republic remains the beneficial owner ofthe properties. '%AA itself is owned solely bythe Republic. At any time, the "resident cantransfer bac( to the Republic title to the airportlands and buildings without the Republic paying'%AA any consideration. As long as the airportlands and buildings are reserved for public use,their ownership remains with the tate. Unlessthe "resident issues a proclamationwithdrawing these properties from public use,they remain properties of public dominion. Assuch, they are inalienable, hence, they are notsub*ect to levy on e$ecution or foreclosure sale,and they are e$empt from real estate ta$.

#owever, portions of the airport lands andbuildings that '%AA leases to private entitiesare not e$empt from real estate ta$. %n such acase, '%AA has granted the beneficial use ofsuch portions for a consideration to a ta$able

person.EXECTUIVE PRIVILEGE

Ne'* vs% Senate

4.R. o. 0B762>, 'arch 85, 877B

?egislative %nquiry in Aid of ?egislation vs?egislative %nquiry during uestion #our<lements of "residential Communications"rivilege





pro$imityF test, petitioner can be considered aclose advisor, being a member of "residentArroyoGs cabinet. And third, there is noadequate showing of a compelling need thatwould *ustify the limitation of the privilege andof the unavailability of the informationelsewhere by an appropriate investigatingauthority.

Respondent Committees failed to show acompelling or critical need+ $$$ presidentialcommunications are presumptively privilegedand that the presumption can be overcomeonly by mere showing of public need by thebranch see(ing access to conversations $$$$#ere, the record is bereft of any categoricale$planation from respondent Committees toshow a compelling or critical need for theanswers to the three 9>: questions in theenactment of a law. %nstead, the questions veermore towards the e$ercise of the legislativeoversight function under ection 88 of Article H%rather than ection 80 of the same Article.

enate v. <rmita ruled that Ethe oversightfunction of Congress may be facilitated bycompulsory process only to the e$tent that it isperformed in pursuit of legislation.F %t isconceded that it is difficult to draw the linebetween an inquiry in aid of legislation and aninquiry in the e$ercise of oversight function ofCongress. %n this regard, much will depend onthe content of the questions and the manner ofinquiry is conducted.

".C"!TION TO "."C+TI-" !RI-IL" ":E@emonstrated, specific need for evidence inpending criminal trialF 9U v. i$on: does notapply --

%n i$on, there is a pending criminal proceedingwhere the information is requested and it is thedemands of due process of law and the fairadministration of criminal *ustice that theinformation be disclosed. his is the reason

why the U Court was quic( to Elimit the scopeof its decision.F %t stressed that it is Enotconcerned here with the balance between the"residentGs generali&ed interest inconfidentiality $$$ and congressional demandsfor information.F Unli(e in i$on, theinformation here is elicited, not in a criminalproceeding, but in a legislative inquiry. %n thisregard, enate v. <rmita stressed that thevalidity of the claim of e$ecutive privilegedepends not only on the ground invo(ed but,also, on the procedural setting or the conte$t in

which the claim is made. !urthermore, in i$on,the "resident did not interpose any claim ofneed to protect military, diplomatic or sensitivenational security secrets. %n the present case,<$ecutive ecretary <rmita categorically claimse$ecutive privilege on the grounds ofpresidential communications privilege inrelation to her e$ecutive and policy decision-ma(ing process and diplomatic secrets.

<$ecutive "rivilege vis-a-vis Right of the "eopleto %nformation on 'atters of "ublic Concern

he right to public information, li(e any otherright, is sub*ect to limitation. he provision9 ection 3, Article %%%: itself provides limitations, i.e. as may be provided by law.

ome of these laws are ec. 3, RA 630>, Art.881, R"C, ec. >9(:, RA >701, and ec. 829e:,Rule 0>7, R=C. hese are in addition to whatour body of *urisprudence clarifies asconfidential and what our Constitutionconsiders as belonging to the larger concept ofe$ecutive privilege. Clearly, there is arecogni&ed public interest in the confidentialityof certain information. We find the informationsub*ect of this case belonging to such (ind.

?egislative %nquiry in Aid of ?egislation vis-a-visRight of the "eople to %nformation on 'atters of"ublic Concern+ 'ore than anything else,though, the right of Congress or any of itsCommittees to obtain information in aid oflegislation cannot be equated with the peopleGsright to public information. he former cannotclaim that every legislative inquiry is ane$ercise of the peopleGs right to information.$$$

he members of respondent Committeesshould not invo(e as *ustification in theire$ercise of power a right properly belonging tothe people in general. his is because whenthey discharge their power, they do so as

public officials and members of Congress. )ethat as it may, the right to information must bebalanced with and should give way, inappropriate cases, to constitutional preceptsparticularly those pertaining to delicateinterplay of e$ecutive-legislative powers andprivileges which is the sub*ect of careful reviewby numerous decided cases.

NON-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER

A/A A#A +RO -% "R$ITA



4.R. o. 06B756, uly 5, 8775

FACTS:'otions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners,A)AIA@A 4uro party ?ist =fficer and et al.,insist that the bicameral conference committeeshould not even have acted on the no pass-onprovisions since there is no disagreementbetween #ouse )ill os. >375 and >555 on theone hand, and enate )ill o. 0157 on theother, with regard to the no pass-on provisionfor the sale of service for power generationbecause both the enate and the #ouse werein agreement that the HA burden for the saleof such service shall not be passed on to theend-consumer. As to the no pass-on provisionfor sale of petroleum products, petitionersargue that the fact that the presence of such ano pass-on provision in the #ouse version andthe absence thereof in the enate )ill meansthere is no conflict because Ea #ouse provisioncannot be in conflict with something that doesnot e$ist.F

<scudero, et. al., also contend that Republic Acto. 1>>3 grossly violates the constitutional

imperative on e$clusive origination of revenuebills under ection 82 of Article H% of theConstitution when the enate introducedamendments not connected with HA .

"etitioners <scudero, et al., also reiterate thatR.A. o. 1>>3Gs stand- by authority to the<$ecutive to increase the HA rate, especiallyon account of the recommendatory powergranted to the ecretary of !inance, constitutesundue delegation of legislative power. heysubmit that the recommendatory power givento the ecretary of !inance in regard to theoccurrence of either of two events using the4ross @omestic "roduct 94@": as a benchmar(necessarily and inherently required e$tendedanalysis and evaluation, as well as policyma(ing.

"etitioners also reiterate their argument thatthe input ta$ is a property or a property right."etitioners also contend that even if the right tocredit the input HA is merely a statutoryprivilege, it has already evolved into a vestedright that the tate cannot remove.

ISS+":Whether or not the R.A. o. 1>>3 or the HatReform Act is constitutional

R+LIN : he Court is not persuaded. Article H%, ection82 of the Constitution provides that Allappropriation, revenue or tariff bills, billsauthori&ing increase of the public debt, bills oflocal application, and private bills shalloriginate e$clusively in the #ouse ofRepresentatives, but the enate may proposeor concur with amendments.

he Court reiterates that in ma(ing hisrecommendation to the "resident on thee$istence of either of the two conditions, the

ecretary of !inance is not acting as the alterego of the "resident or even her subordinate.#e is acting as the agent of the legislativedepartment, to determine and declare theevent upon which its e$pressed will is to ta(eeffect. he ecretary of !inance becomes themeans or tool by which legislative policy isdetermined and implemented, considering thathe possesses all the facilities to gather dataand information and has a much broaderperspective to properly evaluate them. #isfunction is to gather and collate statistical dataand other pertinent information and verify ifany of the two conditions laid out by Congressis present.

%n the same breath, the Court reiterates itsfinding that it is not a property or a propertyright, and a HA -registered personGentitlement to the creditable input ta$ is amere statutory privilege. As the Court stated inits @ecision, the right to credit the input ta$ is amere creation of law. 'ore importantly, theassailed provisions of R.A. o. 1>>3 alreadyinvolve legislative policy and wisdom. o longas there is a public end for which R.A. o. 1>>3was passed, the means through which such endshall be accomplished is for the legislature tochoose so long as it is within constitutionalbounds.

he 'otions for Reconsideration are hereby@< %<@ W% # !% A?% J. he temrestraining order issued by the Court is ?%! <@.

DELEGATION OF POWERS

SO+TH"RN CROSS C"$"NT COR!% -%C"$"NT $AN+FACT+R"RS ASSOCIATIONOF TH" !HILS%, %R% NO% 1282 0, A+ %

4002

9#=?J CRA", C#<CI =U #< % R=KKKK L.L



ECement is hardly an e$citing sub*ect forlitigation. till, the parties in this case havedone their best to put up a spirited advocacy oftheir respective positions, throwing ineverything including the proverbial (itchensin(. At present, the burden of passion, if notproof, has shifted to public respondents@epartment of rade and %ndustry 9@ %: andprivate respondent "hilippine Cement'anufacturers Corporation 9"hilcemcor:,M0Nwho now see( reconsideration of our @ecisiondated B uly 8772 9@ecision:, which granted thepetition of petitioner outhern Cross CementCorporation 9 outhern Cross:.

his case, of course, is ultimately not *ust aboutcement. !or respondents, it is about love ofcountry and the future of the domestic industryin the face of foreign competition. !or thisCourt, it is about elementary statutoryconstruction, constitutional limitations on thee$ecutive power to impose tariffs and similarmeasures, and obedience to the law. ust asmuch was asserted in the @ecision, and thesame holds true with this present Resolution.F

!OW"R OF !R"SI#"NT TO I$!OS" TARIFFRAT"S: Without ection 8B98:, Article H%, thee$ecutive branch has no authority to imposetariffs and other similar ta$ levies involving theimportation of foreign goods. Assuming that

ection 8B98: Article H% did not e$ist, theenactment of the 'A by Congress would bevoided on the ground that it would constitutean undue delegation of the legislative power tota$. he constitutional provision shields suchdelegation from constitutional infirmity, andshould be recogni&ed as an e$ceptional grantof legislative power to the "resident, ratherthan the affirmation of an inherent e$ecutivepower.

UA?%!%<R + his being the case, the qualifiers

mandated by the Constitution on thispresidential authority attain primordialconsideration+ 90: there must be a lawO 98:there must be specified limitsO and 9>:Congress may impose limitations andrestrictions on this presidential authority.

"=W<R <P<RC% <@ )J A? <R <4= =! "R< + he Court recogni&es that the authoritydelegated to the "resident under ection 8B98:,Article H% may be e$ercised, in accordance withlegislative sanction, by the alter egos of the

"resident, such as department secretaries.%ndeed, for purposes of the "residentGs e$erciseof power to impose tariffs under Article H%

ection 8B98:, it is generally the ecretary of!inance who acts as alter ego of the "resident.

he 'A provides an e$ceptional instancewherein it is the @ % or Agriculture ecretarywho is tas(ed by Congress, in their capacitiesas alter egos of the "resident, to impose suchmeasures. Certainly, the @ % ecretary has noinherent power, even as alter ego of the"resident, to levy tariffs and imports.

AR%!! C=''% %= A @ @ % <C A4< + Concurrently, the tas(ing of the ariffCommission under the 'A should be li(ewiseconstrued within the same conte$t as part andparcel of the legislative delegation of itsinherent power to impose tariffs and imposts tothe e$ecutive branch, sub*ect to limitations andrestrictions. %n that regard, both the ariffCommission and the @ % ecretary may beregarded as agents of Congress within theirlimited respective spheres, as ordained in the

'A, in the implementation of the said lawwhich significantly draws its strength from theplenary legislative power of ta$ation. %ndeed,even the "resident may be considered as anagent of Congress for the purpose of imposingsafeguard measures. %t is Congress, not the"resident, which possesses inherent powers toimpose tariffs and imposts. Without legislativeauthori&ation through statute, the "residenthas no power, authority or right to impose suchsafeguard measures because ta$ation isinherently legislative, not e$ecutive.

When Congress tas(s the "resident or hisQheralter egos to impose safeguard measures underthe delineated conditions, the "resident or thealter egos may be properly deemed as agentsof Congress to perform an act that inherentlybelongs as a matter of right to the legislature.%t is basic agency law that the agent may not

act beyond the specifically delegated powers ordisregard the restrictions imposed by theprincipal. %n short, Congress may establish theprocedural framewor( under which suchsafeguard measures may be imposed, andassign the various offices in the governmentbureaucracy respective tas(s pursuant to theimposition of such measures, the tas(assignment including the factual determinationof whether the necessary conditions e$ists towarrant such impositions. Under the 'A,Congress assigned the @ % ecretary and the



ariff Commission their respective functions inthe legislatureGs scheme of things.

here is only one viable ground for challengingthe legality of the limitations and restrictionsimposed by Congress under ection 8B98:Article H%, and that is such limitations andrestrictions are themselves violative of theConstitution. hus, no matter how distasteful orno$ious these limitations and restrictions mayseem, the Court has no choice but to upholdtheir validity unless their constitutional infirmitycan be demonstrated.

What are these limitations and restrictions thatare material to the present case he entire

'A provides for a limited framewor( underwhich the "resident, through the @ % andAgriculture ecretaries, may impose safeguardmeasures in the form of tariffs and similarimposts.

"=W<R )<?= 4 = C= 4R< + the citedpassage from !r. )ernas actually states, E incethe Constitution has given the "resident thepower of control, with all its awesomeimplications, it is the Constitution alone whichcan curtail such power.F @oes the "residenthave such tariff powers under the Constitutionin the first place which may be curtailed by thee$ecutive power of control At the ris( ofredundancy, we quote ection 8B98:, Article H%+E he Congress may, by law, authori&e the"resident to fi$ within specified limits, andsub*ect to such limitations and restrictions as itmay impose, tariff rates, import and e$portquotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and otherduties or imposts within the framewor( of thenational development program of the4overnment.F Clearly the power to imposetariffs belongs to Congress and not to the"resident.

CA$I# -% OFFIC" OF TH" !R"SI#"NT,

"T,AL% FACTS:S his is a petition for Certiorari arguing thee$istence of 'unicipality of Andong in ?anao@el urS his decision have noted the earlier decisionof "elae& where the <$ecutive orders of !ormer"resident 'acapagal creating >> 'unicipalitiesof ?anao @el ur was considerd null and voiddue to undue delegation of legislative powers.

S Among the annulled e$ecutive orders is<=073 creating Andong.S he petitioner herein represents himself asresident of Andong 9as a private citi&en andta$payer:S Camid contendsQargues the following+o 'unicipality of Andong evolved into a fullblown municipality 9since there is a completeset of officials appointed to handle essentialtas(s and sevices, it has ist own high school,)ureau of "ost, @<C office etc. and 03baranggays with chairman:o #e noted agencies and private grousrecogni&ing Andong and also the C< R= and@< R Certification of land area and populationof AndongS %n the Certification of @%?4, there is enumeration of e$isting municipalties including0B 7f the >> 'unicipalities invalidated in "elae&Case. Camid finds this as an abuse of discretionand unequal treatment for Andong.S ?i(ewise, Camid insists the continuing of<=073 arguing that in 'unicipality of an

arciso v. #on.'ende&, the court affirmed inma(ing an Andres a de facto municipalcorporation. an Andres was created throughan e$ecutive order.S hus this petition.

ISS+": 'ay the 'unicipality of Andong berecogni&ed as a de facto municipal corporation

R+LIN :=. 'unicipal corporations may e$ist by

prescription where it is shown that thecommunity has claimed and e$ercisedcorporate functions, with the (nowledge andacquiescence of the legislature, and withoutinterruption or ob*ection for period long enoughto afford title by prescription.- Camid does not have shown factualdemonstration of the continuous e$ercise bythe municipal corporation of its corporation ofits corporate powers as well as acquiescence

by the other instrumentalities of the state li(echarters or the legislatureGs action.'ay the any action on the Certification be anappropriate solution to CamidGs prayer- =. he Certification has no power or it doesnot bear any authority to create or revalidate amunicipality.

hould the case of Andong be treated same asthe case of an Andres- o. for the following reasons+o here are facts found in the an Andres casethat are not present in the case at bar+ 90: he



<$ecutive =rder creating an Andres was notinvalidated in "elae& Case, 98: he municipalitye$isted for >7 years before it was questionedand 9>: he municipality was classified as afifth class municipality and was included in thelegislative district in the #ouse ofRepresentatives apportionment.o Andong did not meet the requisites set by?4C of 0110 ec.2289d: regardingmunicipalities created by e$ecutive orders. %tsays+

'unicipalities e$isting as of the date ofthe effectivity of this Code shall continue toe$ist and operate as such. <$isting municipaldistricts organi&ed pursuant to presidentialissuances or e$ecutive orders and which havetheir respective set of elective municipalofficials holding office at the time of theeffectivity of this Code shall henceforth beconsidered as regular municipalities.o he failure to appropriate funds for Andongand the absence of elections in the municipalityare eloquent indicia 9indicators: that the tatedoes not recogni&e the e$istence of themunicipality.o he =rdinance appended in the 01B3Constitution 9which apportioned seats for the#ouse of Reps to the different legislativedistricts in the "hilippines, enumerates thevarious municipalities encompassed in thevarious districts: did not include Andong.

%s there an unequal treatment since 0B of the>> invalidated municipalities are nowconsidered e$isting- o there was none. he @%?4 Certification andthe =rdinance in the 01B3 Constitutionvalidates them. he fact that there e$istingorganic statutes passed by the legislationrecreating these municipalities is enough toaccord a different treatment as that of themunicipality of Andong.

C @<C% %= + @% '% <@ for lac( of 'erit.R<?<HA C<+

ote the following ections with regards to *uridical personality of corporations in relationto the reasons why an Andres have a differenttreatment with Andong+)atas "ambansa )lg. B+

ection 8. Corporation defined. - A corporationis an artificial being created by operation oflaw, having the right of succession and thepowers, attributes and properties e$presslyauthori&ed by law or incident to its e$istence

ection 2. Corporations created by special lawsor charters. - Corporations created by special

laws or charters shall be governed primarily bythe provisions of the special law or chartercreating them or applicable to them,supplemented by the provisions of this Code,insofar as they are applicable.'oreover, under Art.22 of the ew Civil Codewith relation to Art. 25 of the ew Civil Code,those considered as *uridical person includesthe tate and its political subdivisions and=ther corporations, institutions and entities forpublic interest or purpose, created by lawO theirpersonality begins as soon as they have beenconstituted according to law. hese two aregoverned by the law creating them.

ince Andong has no law recreating it and thatit is not a recogni&ed political subdivision, it isnot also considered a *uridical person.

ote+What happened with the people from Andong- he constituent barrios of the voidedtown returns to its original municipalities9?umbatan, ubig and ubaran: which arerecogni&ed and still e$isting.

he solution to have Andong recogni&ed isthrough legislation and not *udicial confirmationof void title.

!"LA"5 -S A+#ITOR "N"RAL%R% N % L 43842:

!rom ept 72 to =ct 81, 0162, the "resident9'arcos: issued e$ecutive orders creating >>municipalities T this is purportedly in pursuantto ec 6B of the Revised Administrative Codewhich provides that the "resident of the"hilippines may by e$ecutive order define theboundary, or boundaries, of any province, sub-province, municipality, MtownshipN municipadistrict or other political subdivision, andincrease or diminish the territory comprisedtherein, may divide any province into one ormore subprovinces he H" <mmanuel "elae&and a ta$payer filed a special civil action toprohibit the auditor general from disbursing

funds to be appropriated for the saidmunicipalities. "elae& claims that the <=s areunconstitutional. #e said that ec 6B of theRAC has been impliedly repealed by ec > ofRA 8>37 which provides that barrios may /notbe created or their boundaries altered nor theirnames changed/ e$cept by Act of Congress orof the corresponding provincial board /uponpetition of a ma*ority of the voters in the areasaffected/ and the /recommendation of thecouncil of the municipality or municipalities inwhich the proposed barrio is situated./ "elae&



argues, accordingly+ /%f the "resident, underthis new law, cannot even create a barrio, canhe create a municipality which is composed ofseveral barrios, since barrios are units ofmunicipalities / he Auditor 4eneral counteredthat only barrios are barred from being createdby the "resident. 'unicipalities are e$emptfrom the bar and that t a municipality can becreated without creating barrios. <$istingbarrios can *ust be placed into the newmunicipality. his theory overloo(s, however,the main import of "elae&G argument, which isthat the statutory denial of the presidentialauthority to create a new barrio implies anegation of the bigger power to createmunicipalities, each of which consists of severalbarrios. ISS+" + Whether or not Congress has delegatedthe power to create barrios to the "resident byvirtue of ec 6B of the RAC. H"L#: Although Congress may delegate toanother branch of the government the power tofill in the details in the e$ecution, enforcementor administration of a law, it is essential, toforestall a violation of the principle ofseparation of powers, that said law+ 9a: becomplete in itself it must set forth thereinthe policy to be e$ecuted, carried out orimplemented by the delegate and 9b: fi$ astandard the limits of which are sufficientlydeterminate or determinable to which thedelegate must conform in the performance ofhis functions. %ndeed, without a statutorydeclaration of policy, the delegate would, ineffect, ma(e or formulate such policy, which isthe essence of every lawO and, without theaforementioned standard, there would be nomeans to determine, with reasonable certainty,whether the delegate has acted within orbeyond the scope of his authority. %n the case at bar, the power to createmunicipalities is eminently legislative in

character not administrative.TWO TEST OF A VALID DELEGATION

SANTIA O v% CO$"L"C4.R o. 083>85, 'arch 01, 0113

Constitutional ?aw, "eopleVs %nitiative, "olitical?aw

FACTS:

=n @ecember 6, 0116, Atty. esus . @elfinfounding member of the 'ovement for "eopleVs%nitiative, filed with the C='<?<C a /"etition toAmend the Constitution, to ?ift erm ?imits of<lective =fficials, by "eopleVs %nitiative/ citing

ection 8, Article PH%% of the ConstitutioActing on the petition, the C='<?<C set thecase for hearing and directed @elfin to have thepetition published. After the hearing thearguments between petitioners and opposingparties, the C='<?<C directed @elfin and theoppositors to file their /memoranda andQoroppositionsQmemoranda/ within five days. =n@ecember 0B, 0116, enator 'iriam @efensor

antiago, Ale$ander "adilla, and 'aria %sabel=ngpin filed a special civil action for prohibitionunder Rule 65 raising the following arguments,among others+

0.: hat the Constitution can only be amendedby peopleGs initiative if there is an enabling lawpassed by Congress, to which no such law hasyet been passedO and

8.: hat R.A. 63>5 does not suffice as anenabling law on peopleGs initiative on theConstitution, unli(e in the other modes ofinitiative.

ISS+":%s R.A. o. 63>5 sufficient to enablamendment of the Constitution by peopleGsinitiative

H"L#:=. R.A. 63>5 is inadequate to cover the

system of initiative on amendments to theConstitution.Under the said law, initiative on theConstitution is confined only to proposals toA'< @. he people are not accorded the powerto /directly propose, enact, approve, or re*ect,in whole or in part, the Constitution/ throughthe system of initiative. hey can only do so

with respect to /laws, ordinances, orresolutions./ he use of the clause /proposedlaws sought to be enacted, approved orre*ected, amended or repealed/ denotes thatR.A. o. 63>5 e$cludes initiative onamendments to the Constitution.

Also, while the law provides subtitles forational %nitiative and Referendum and for

?ocal %nitiative and Referendum, no subtitle isprovided for initiative on the Constitution. hismeans that the main thrust of the law is



initiative and referendum on national and locallaws. %f R.A. o. 63>5 were intended to fullyprovide for the implementation of the initiativeon amendments to the Constitution, it couldhave provided for a subtitle therefor,considering that in the order of things, theprimacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, theright of the people to directly proposeamendments to the Constitution is far moreimportant than the initiative on national andlocal laws.

While R.A. o. 63>5 specially detailed theprocess in implementing initiative andreferendum on national and local laws, itintentionally did not do so on the system ofinitiative on amendments to the Constitution.W#<R<!=R<, petition is 4RA <@."eopleVs %nitiative

his is probable the best case there is on thequestion of the peopleVs right to directlypropose amendments to the constitutionthrough the system of initiative.

SANTIA O -S CO$"L"C

ature+ "etition for prohibitionO the right of thepeople to directly propose amendments to theconstitution through the system of initiative.

'iriam @efensor antiago, Ale$ander "adilla,'a. %sabel =ngpin T petitioners

esus @elfin, Alberto Carmen "edrosa9"%R'A:, C='<?<C T respondentsRaul Roco, @%I, 'A)% %, %)", ?A)A TpetitionersQintervenors

FACTS:Atty. @elfin filed with the C='<?<C a petition toamend the constitution by "eopleGs initiative.#is proposal is to lift the term limits of electiveofficials and thus amending ections 2 and 3 ofArt H%, ection 2 of Art H%% and ection B of Art Pof the 01B3 "hilippine Constitution. %n his

petition, @elfin as(ed the C='<?<C to issue anorder 90: fi$ing the time and dates for signaturegathering all over the countryO 98: cause thepublication of such order in newspaper ofgeneral and local circulationO and 9>:instructing municipal election registrars in allregions of the "hilippines to assist him and hisvolunteers in establishing signing stations. heC='<?<C then issued an order directing @elfinto cause the publication of the petition and setthe case for hearing.

At the hearing, enator Roco filed a motion todismiss the @elfin "etition on the ground that itis not the initiatory petition properly cogni&ableby the C='<?<C. hereafter, enator antiago,et al., filed a special civil action for prohibitionbefore the upreme Court.

ISS+"S: he issues in the instant petition are thefollowing+

90: Whether it is proper for the upreme Courtto ta(e cogni&ance of the petition when there isa pending case before the C='<?<C.

98: Whether R.A. o. 63>5, entitled An Act"roviding for a ystem of %nitiative andReferendum and Appropriating !unds

herefore, was intended to include or coverinitiative on amendments to the ConstitutionOand if so, whether the Act, as worded,adequately covers such initiative.

9>: Whether that portion of C='<?<CResolution o. 8>77 9%n re+ Rules anRegulations 4overning the Conduct of %nitiativeon the Constitution, and %nitiative andReferendum on ational and ?ocal ?aws:regarding the conduct of initiative onamendments to the Constitution is valid,considering the absence in the law of specificprovisions on the conduct of such initiative.

92: Whether the lifting of term limits of electivenational and local officials, as proposed in thedraft /"etition for %nitiative on the 01B3Constitution,/ would constitute a revision of, oran amendment to, the Constitution.

95: Whether the C='<?<C can ta(e cogni&anceof, or has *urisdiction over, a petition solelyintended to obtain an order 9a: fi$ing the timeand dates for signature gatheringO 9b:instructing municipal election officers to assist

@elfinVs movement and volunteers inestablishing signature stationsO and 9c:directing or causing the publication of, interalia, the unsigned proposed "etition for%nitiative on the 01B3 Constitution.

R+LIN : he upreme Court held that+90: he instant petition is viable despite thependency in the C='<?<C of the @elfin"etition. he C='<?<C has no *urisdiction tota(e cogni&ance of the petition filed by @elfin



and that it becomes imperative to stop theC='<?<C from proceeding any further. he Csaid that despite the pendency of the @elfin"etition in the C='<?<C, the C had *urisdictionover the @efensor- antiago petition becausethe petition may be treated as a special civilaction for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rulesof Court, given the Roco motion filed with theC='<?<C see(ing dismissal of the @elfinpetition on the ground of lac( of *urisdiction.

98: RA 63>5 is inadequate to cover the systemof initiative to amend the constitution becausewhile ec > mentions initiative on theConstitution and ec 5 restates theconstitutional requirements as to thepercentage of registered voters needed for aproposal, the law does not provide for thecontents of a petition for initiative on theConstitutionO while there are subtitles fornational and local initiatives, there is nosubtitle for the initiative on the ConstitutionOthus, the law is incomplete, and thisinadequacy cannot be cured by empoweringthe C='<?<C to promulgate implementingrules and regulations.

9>: %t logically follows that the C='<?<C cannotvalidly promulgate rules and regulations toimplement the e$ercise of the right of thepeople to directly propose amendments to theConstitution through the system of initiative. %tdoes not have that power under R.A. o. 63>5.Reliance on the C='<?<CVs power under

ection 890: of Article %P-C of the Constitution ismisplaced, for the laws and regulationsreferred to therein are those promulgated bythe C='<?<C under 9a: ection > of Article %P-Cof the Constitution, or 9b: a law wheresubordinate legislation is authori&ed and whichsatisfies the /completeness/ and the /sufficientstandard/ tests.

92: antiagoGs petition contend that the

peopleVs initiative is limited to amendments tothe constitution, not to revision thereof.<$tending or lifting of term limits constitutes arevision and is, therefore, outside the power ofthe peopleVs initiative. @elfin in his memorandacontend that the lifting of the limitation on theterm of office of elective officials providedunder the 01B3 constitution is not a /revision/of the constitution. %t is only an amendment./Amendment envisages an alteration of one ora few specific provisions of the constitution.Revision contemplates a re-e$amination of the

entire document to determine how and to whate$tent it should be altered. he =ffice of the

olicitor 4eneral opined that e$tension of termof elected officials constitute a mereamendment to the Constitution, not a revisionthereof. %n its amended petition in intervention@%I and 'A)% % contend that the @elfproposal does not involve a mere amendmentto, but a revision of, the Constitution because,in the words of !r. oaquin )ernas it wouldinvolve a change from a political philosophythat re*ects unlimited tenure to one thataccepts unlimited tenureO and although thechange might appear to be an isolated one, itcan affect other provisions, such as, onsynchroni&ation of elections and on the tatepolicy of guaranteeing equal access toopportunities for public service and prohibitingpolitical dynasties. A revision cannot be doneby initiative which, by e$press provision of

ection 8 of Article PH%% of the Constitution,limited to amendments.

95: C='<?<C acted without *urisdiction or withgrave abuse of discretion in entertaining the@elfin "etition. %t was held that C='<?<C iswithout *urisdiction to entertain the @elfin"etition because it did not contain thesignatures of the required number of voters asrequired by the Constitution.

he petition therefore is grantedO R. A. o.63>5 is declared inadequate to cover thesystem of initiative on amendments to theConstitution, and for failure to providesufficient standard for subordinate legislationO

hose parts of Resolution o. 8>77 of theCommission on <lections prescribing rules andregulations on the conduct of initiative oramendments to the Constitution is declaredvoidO and the Commission on <lections isordered to dismiss the @<?!% petition.Word of the @ay+%nitiative is a form of direct legislation by thepeople consisting of two parts+ petition and

election. %t does not become effective untilpassed by voters and its availability does notremedy the denial of the right to referendum.

SANTIA O v% CO$"L"C4.R. o. 083>85, 'arch 01, 0113

Constitutional provision on "eopleVs %nitiative inot self-e$ecutory"rinciple of on-delegation of "owers,<$ceptions



FACTS:"etitioners in this case sought to amend certainprovisions of the Constitution, specifically liftingthe limit of terms of elective officials, throughpeopleGs initiative. antiago et al. opposed onthe ground that the constitutional provision onpeopleGs initiative to amend the Constitutioncan only be implemented by law to be passedby Congress. here is no law passed yet and RA63>5, which provides for initiative on statuesand local legislation but not initiative on theConstitution.

ISS+":Whether or not RA 63>5 adequately providedfor peopleGs initiative on Constitution

R+LIN +Constitutional provision on peopleGs initiative isnot self-e$ecutory

ec. 8 of Art. PH%% of the Constitution...is notself-e$ecutory. $$$

)luntly stated, the right of the people todirectly propose amendments to theConstitution through the system of initiativewould remain entombed in the cold niche of theConstitution until Congress provides for itsimplementation. tated otherwise, while theConstitution has recogni&ed or granted thatright, the people cannot e$ercise it if Congress,for whatever reason, does not provide for itsimplementation.

#as Congress EprovidedF for theimplementation of the e$ercise of this right

here is, of course, no other better way forCongress to implement the e$ercise of the rightthan through the passage of a statute orlegislative act. $$$

We agree that RA 63>5 was, as its historyreveals, intended to cover initiative to propose

amendments to the Constitution.)ut is RA 63>5 a full compliance with the powerand duty of Congress to Eprovide for theimplementation of the e$ercise of the right FA careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negativeanswer.

!irst. Contrary to the assertion of publicrespondents C='<?<C, ec. 8 of the Act doesnot suggest an initiative on amendments to theConstitution. he said section reads+

<C %= 8. tatement and "olicy. T he powerof the people under a system of initiative andreferendum to directly propose, enact, approveor re*ect, in whole or in part, the Constitution,laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by anylegislative body upon compliance with therequirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,recogni&ed and guaranteed.

he inclusion of the word EConstitutionF thereinwas a delayed afterthought. hat word isneither germane nor relevant to said section,which e$clusively relates to initiative andreferendum on national laws and local laws,ordinances, and resolutions. hat section issilent as to amendments on the Constitution.As pointed out earlier, initiative on theConstitution is confined only to proposals toA'< @. he people are not accorded the powerto Edirectly propose, enact, approve, or re*ect,in whole or in part, the ConstitutionF throughthe system of initiative. hey can only do sowith respect to Elaws, ordinances, orresolutions.F

econd. %t is true that ec. > 9@efinition o erms: of the Act defines initiative onamendments to the Constitution and mentionsit as one of the three systems of initiative, andthat ec. 5 9Requirements: restates theconstitutional requirements as to thepercentage of the registered voters who mustsubmit the proposal. )ut unli(e in the case ofthe other systems of initiative, the Act does notprovide for the contents of a petition forinitiative on the Constitution. ec. 5, paragraph9c: requires, among other things, statement ofthe proposed law sought to be enacted,approved or re*ected, amended or repealed, asthe case may be. %t does not include, as amongthe contents of the petition, the provisions ofthe Constitution sought to be amended, in thecase of initiative on the Constitution.

hird. While the Act provides subtitles forational %nitiative and Referendum 9 ubtitle %and for ?ocal %nitiative and Referendum9 ubtitle %%%:, no subtitle is provided for initiaton the Constitution. his conspicuous silence asto the latter simply means that the main thrustof the Act is initiative and referendum onnational and local laws. %f Congress intendedRA 63>5 to fully provide for the implementationof the initiative on amendments to theConstitution, it could have provided for asubtitle therefor, considering that in the order



of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchyof values, the right of the people to directlypropose amendments to the Constitution is farmore important than the initiative on nationaland local laws.

he foregoing brings us to the conclusion thatRA 63>5 is incomplete, inadequate, or wantingin essential terms and conditions insofar asinitiative on amendments to the Constitution isconcerned. %ts lacunae on this substantivematter are fatal and cannot be cured byEempoweringF the C='<?<C Eto promulgatesuch rules and regulations as may benecessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.F

!'*nc*)le ( n n elegat* n ( ) 7e'

he rule is that what has been delegated,cannot be delegated or as e$pressed in a ?atinma$im+ potestas delegata non delegari potest.

he recogni&ed e$ceptions to the rule are asfollows+

@elegation of tariff powers to the "residentunder ec. 8B98:, Art. H%O@elegation of emergency powers to the"resident under ec. 8>98:, Art. H%O@elegation to the people at largeO@elegation to local governmentsO and@elegation to administrative bodies.

<mpowering the C='<?<C, an administrativebody e$ercising quasi-*udicial functions, topromulgate rules and regulations is a form ofdelegation of legislative authority under no. 5above. #owever, in every case of permissibledelegation, there must be a showing that thedelegation itself is valid. %t is valid only if thelaw 9a: is complete in itself, setting forththerein the policy to be e$ecuted, carried out,or implemented by the delegateO and 9b: fi$es astandard T the limits of which are sufficientlydeterminate and determinable T to which the

delegate must conform in the performance ofhis functions. A sufficient standard is one whichdefines legislative policy, mar(s its limits, mapsout its boundaries and specifies the publicagency to apply it. %t indicates thecircumstances under which the legislativecommand is to be effected.

%nsofar as initiative to propose amendments tothe Constitution is concerned, RA 63>5miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in

subordinate legislation. he delegation of thepower to the C='<?<C is then invalid.

INCORPORATION CLAUSE

TA A#A -% AN ARA 199 ;

FACTS:"etition for certiorari+ tate action to

enter into W =April 05 0112 T @ % ec signed

'orocco the final act embodying the resultsof multilateral negotiations regarding theW =o Aug 08 T enate receives letterfrom "resident submitting the Uruguay !inalActo Aug 0> T presidentG lettsubmitting the Agreement establishing theW =, 'inisterial @eclarations, etco @ec 1 T " 07B>, immediaadoption of the Agreement <stablishing theW =o @ec 02 T enate Resolution o13, senate concurring in the ratification bythe president of the agreement establishingthe W =o @ec 81 T present petition wasfiled

"etitioner argues for theunconstitutionality of the W =+o W = requires the "hilippines toplace nationals and products of member-countries at par with each othero W = limits, intrudes, impairsthe constitutional powers of both Congressand the Co W = violates the constitutionalmandate+ to develop a self-reliant andindependent national economy effectivelycontrolled by !ilipinos, to give preference toqualified !ilipinos and to promotepreferential use of !ilipino labor, domesticmaterials and locally produced goods

"etitioner specifically see(s+o !or the nullification of theconcurrence of the enate with the"residentGs agreement to *oin the W =o !or the prohibition of theenforcement and implementation of theW =

ISS+"<s:W= the petition presents a political

question



W= the members of the enate whoparticipated in the deliberations and votingleading to the enate Reso o. 13 areestopped from impugning the validity of thesame, or the Agreement

W= the provisions of theAgreeement violate the provisions of ec01,Art 8, and ecs 07 and 08, Art 08 of the

01B3 ConstiW= the provisions of the Agreementunduly limit, restrict, and impair thesovereignty of the "hil ?egislature

W= provisions of the Agreementimpair the e$ercise of *udicial power

W= enate acted with a graveabuse of discretion in concurring only in theagreement establishing the W =

SC R+LIN +% U< X 0+ 'A <R =! UR% @%C %= +

political or *usticiableo U %C%A)?< because it see(sthe nullity of a senate resolution on theground that it contravenes the Constitutiono An act of legislature is allegedto have infringed the Constitution+ *udicialreview not *ust a matter of right but a duty9within the courtGs e$panded *urisdiction:o Application of a constitutionalprovisiono udiciary as final arbiter on4A@?<o udicial review for 4A@?< , notreview of the wisdom of a legislative ore$ecutive policy, not upon the merits norpropriety of govt policies, = ?J todetermine W= there has been 4A@?<W = A4R<<'< A @ <C= ='%C

A %= A?% 'o <conomic nationalism+ violatedby the parity provisions and nationaltreatment clauses in the W = Agreemento <conomic nationalism in ec

01, Art 8, ecs 07 and 08, Art 08 of theConstio W =+ places nationals andforeign products on the same footing as!ilipino and domestic products incontravention of the !%?%"% = !%R "=?%CJ

Render meaninglessEeffectively controlled by !ilipinosFW =+ ensures conformity of nationaleconomic laws, regulations, andadministrative procedures with its anne$edagreements and imposed obligations

o egate the preferential treatment accordedto !ilipino labor, domestic materials andlocally produced goodsR< "= @< +

o Constitutional provisions are not self-e$ecuting, merely policies

o uch nationalistic provisions must be read inrelation to+ Art 08, ec 0 and 0>.

o

Read properly, the cited W = provisions donot violate the Constio W = agreement contains sufficient

safeguards for developing countries• @eclaration of "rinciples = <?!-

<P<CU % 4o Article 8 is a mere declaration of principles

and state policies T basic political creed ofthe nation

o ot intended to be self-e$ecutingo Used as aids by the *udiciary in ad*udication,

or legislature in lawma(ingo ot self-e$ecuting provisions, a disregard ofwhich cannot give rise to a cause of action

in the courtso Iilosbayan, %nc v. 'orato+ @o not embody

*udicially enforceable constitutional rightsbut guidelines for legislation

o )asco v. "agcor+ broad constitutionalprinciples need legislative enactments toimplement them

• W#J )ecause of basic considerations ofdue process and the lac( of *udicialauthority to wade into the uncharteredocean of social and economic policy ma(ing9R<A@ ="= A- !elicianoGs concurring:

• % U< X 8+ <C= ='%C A %= A#=U?@ = )< R<A@ W% # = #

C= % U %= A? 'A @A < = A)A?A C<@ @<H<?="'< =! <C= ='J

o ec 07 and 08 of Article 08 should be readwith relation to ec 0 and 0> of the sameArticle+ ideals of economic nationalism doesnot espouse an isolationist economy but aself-reliant and competent economy, able to

compete in foreign mar(ets, and tradepolicies that uphold equality and reciprocity,protection of !ilipino enterprises from unfairtrade practices and overbearing foreigncompetitions

o A @ !UR #<R, there are enough balancingprovisions in the Constitution that allow the

enate to ratify the concurrence with theW = agreement

• eed fore business e$change on the basesof equality and reciprocity



• "rotectionist policy only against unfair tradepractices

@oes not encourage entry of foreign goodsservices, but does not prohibit them either

W = R<C=4 %D< <<@ = "R= <CW<AI <C= ='%<o W = has some built-inadvantages to protect wea( and developing

countrieso <ach vote by a member isequal to one, equal to any otherGs vote,unli(e in the ecurity Council where ma*orstates have permanent seats and vetopowerso "oor countries can protect theireconomies through one-on-one negotiationswith developed countrieso ot mere practical alliances,but real negotiations rooted in law

"<C%!%C "R=H% = = "R= <C@<H<?="% 4 C=U R%<o Amount of tariff reduction,period within which the reduction is to bespread out 9page 60:o <$port subsidy for agriculturalproduction 94A :o Anti-dumping measures,countervailing measures and safeguardsagainst import surges

C= % U %= @=< = RU?< =U!=R<%4 C='"< % %=o "olicy of self-reliance does notnecessarily mean no foreign e$changeallowedo ot economic seclusion normendicancy in the international communityo %ndependence refers tofreedom from undue foreign control of thenational economyo W = rules on most favorednation, national treatment, and tradewithout discrimination T rules of equalityand reciprocity applying to all members

C= % U %= !AH=R C= U'<R= % @U R%< =R < <R"R% <o W= the W =Q4A will favorconsumers is a political questionO wisdom oflegislative policy

C= % U %= @< %4 <@ = '<<!U UR< <H< A @ C= % 4< C%<

% U< X >+ W = A4R<<'< A @?<4% ?A %H< "=W<Ro "etitioners+ because eachmember-country is required to conform to

the laws and regulations of the W =, thelawma(ing body of Congress is limited tothis conformityo <specially as W = infringes onthe ta$ation power of Congress+ when W =fi$es tariff rates

=H<R<%4 J ?%'% <@ % <R A %= A? ?AW A @ R<A % <o All government authority iinherently limited by the fact that it is amember of a family of nationso @octrine of incorporation+ thcountry is bound by generally acceptedprinciples of international law, which areconsidered to be automatically part of thecountryGs lawso Authority limited by principleof international law and treaty stipulations

U C#AR <R A @ = #<R R<A?%'% =H<R<%4 J

% U< X 2+ W = A @ U@"=W<R+o %n question+ W = R%" T Related Aspects of %ntellectual "ropertyRights intrudes on the power of the C topromulgate rules concerning pleading,practice and procedureso )urden of proof on proving theauthenticity of a patent similar to somethingelse by another country

C upholds said R%" , similar to RA 06"atent ?aw

% U<X5+ C= CURR< C< = ?J #< W = A4R<<'< A @ = % = #<@=CU'< C= A% <@ % #< !% A? o Assailed enate Resolutione$pressed concurrence in what the !inal Actrequired, concurrence of the enate in theW = agreemento 'inisterial @eclarations weredeemed accepted without being ratified, byvirtue of Article 85+ ec 0 of 4A

U@4'< + he validity of the assailedresolution is upheld.

LI$ - "."C+TI-" S"CR"TAR=, R NO%121 2, A!RIL 11, 4004

Facts: his case involves a petition forcertiorari and prohibition as well as a petition-in-intervention, praying that respondents berestrained from proceeding with the so-called/)ali(atan 78-0/ and that after due notice andhearing, that *udgment be rendered issuing apermanent writ of in*unction andQor prohibition



against the deployment of U. . troops in)asilan and 'indanao for being illegal and inviolation of the Constitution.

)eginning anuary of this year 8778, personnelfrom the armed forces of the United tates ofAmerica started arriving in 'indanao to ta(epart, in con*unction with the "hilippine military,in /)ali(atan 78-0./ hese so-called /)ali(atan/e$ercises are the largest combined trainingoperations involving !ilipino and Americantroops. %n theory, they are a simulation of *ointmilitary maneuvers pursuant to the 'utual@efense reaty, a bilateral defense agreemententered into by the "hilippines and the United

tates in 0150.

he entry of American troops into "hilippine soilis pro$imately rooted in the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by "resident4eorge W. )ush in reaction to the tragic eventsthat occurred on eptember 00, 8770.

=n !ebruary 0, 8778, petitioners Arthur @. ?imand "aulino ". <rsando filed this petition forcertiorari and prohibition, attac(ing theconstitutionality of the *oint e$ercise. heywere *oined subsequently by A ?AIA and"AR %@= 4 'A 44A4AWA, both party-%istorgani&ations, who filed a petition-in-intervention on !ebruary 00, 8778.

Hel : he Court held that no doubt that the Uforces are prohibited Q from engaging in anoffensive war on "hilippine territory. Jet anagging question remains+ are American troopsactively engaged in combat alongside !ilipinosoldiers under the guise of an alleged trainingand assistance e$ercise he Court cannot ta(e

*udicial notice of the events transpiring downsouth, as reported from the saturationcoverage of the media. As a rule, it does notta(e cogni&ance of newspaper or electronicreports per se, not because of any issue as to

their truth, accuracy, or impartiality, but for thesimple reason that facts must be established inaccordance with the rules of evidence. %tcannot accept, in the absence of concreteproof, petitionersV allegation that the Arroyogovernment is engaged in /doublespea(/ intrying to pass off as a mere training e$ercise anoffensive effort by foreign troops on native soil.

he petitions invite the Court to speculate onwhat is really happening in 'indanao.Wherefore, the petition and the petition-in-intervention were dismissed.

LI$ vs% "."C+TI-" S"CR"TAR= Facts:)eginning anuary of year 8778, personnel fromthe armed forces of the United tates ofAmerica started arriving in 'indanao to ta(epart, in con*unction with the "hilippine military,in E)ali(atan 78-0.F hey are a simulation of

*oint military maneuvers pursuant to the 'utual@efense reaty a bilateral defense agreemententered into by the "hilippines and the United

tates in 0150. %ts aim is to enhance thestrategic and technological capabilities of ourarmed forces through *oint training with itsAmerican counterpartsO the E)ali(atanF is thelargest such training e$ercise directlysupporting the '@ Gs ob*ectives. %t is this treatyto which the H!A adverts and the obligationsthereunder which it see(s to reaffirm.=n !ebruary 0, 8778, petitioners Arthur @. ?imand "aulino ". <rsando filed this petition forcertiorari and prohibition, attac(ing theconstitutionality of the *oint e$ercise.

Issue:Whether E)ali(atan 78-0F activities covered bythe Hisiting !orces Agreement

Rul*ng: o resolve this, it is necessary to refer to theH!A itself. he H!A permits United tatespersonnel to engage, on an impermanent basis,in Eactivities,F the e$act meaning of which wasleft undefined. he sole encumbrance placedon its definition is couched in the negative, inthat United tates personnel must Eabstainfrom any activity inconsistent with the spirit ofthis agreement, and in particular, from anypolitical activity.

he Hienna Convention on the ?aw of reaties,Articles >0 and >8 contains provisos governinginterpretations of international agreements. %tclearly provides that the cardinal rule of

interpretation must involve an e$amination ofthe te$t, which is presumed to verbali&e thepartiesG intentions. he Convention li(ewisedictates what may be used as aids to deducethe meaning of terms, which it refers to as theconte$t of the treaty, as well as other elementsmay be ta(en into account alongside theaforesaid conte$t.

%t appeared farfetched that the ambiguitysurrounding the meaning of theword .GactivitiesF arose from accident. %t wa



deliberately made that way to give both partiesa certain leeway in negotiation. %n this manner,visiting U forces may so*ourn in "hilippineterritory for purposes other than military. Asconceived, the *oint e$ercises may includetraining on new techniques of patrol andsurveillance to protect the nationGs marineresources, sea search-and-rescue operations toassist vessels in distress, disaster reliefoperations, civic action pro*ects such as thebuilding of school houses, medical andhumanitarian missions, and the li(e.Under these auspices, the H!A gives legitimacyto the current )ali(atan e$ercises. %t is onlylogical to assume that .G)ali(atan 78-0,F aEmutual anti- terrorism advising, assisting andtraining e$ercise,F falls under the umbrella ofsanctioned or allowable activities in the conte$tof the agreement.

LAO ICHON -S >AI$" H"RNAN#"5

reaties 'ay )e uperseded by 'unicipal ?awsin the <$ercise of "olice "ower

?ao %chong is a Chinese businessman whoentered the country to ta(e advantage ofbusiness opportunities herein abound 9then: Tparticularly in the retail business. !or sometime he and his fellow Chinese businessmenen*oyed a EmonopolyF in the local mar(et in"asay. Until in une 0152 when Congresspassed the RA 00B7 or the Retail rade

ationali&ation Act the purpose of which is toreserve to !ilipinos the right to engage in theretail business. %chong then petitioned for thenullification of the said Act on the ground that itcontravened several treaties concluded by theR" which, according to him, violates the equalprotection clause 9pacta sund servanda:. #esaid that as a Chinese businessman engaged inthe business here in the country who helps inthe income generation of the country he shouldbe given equal opportunity.

ISS+": Whether or not a law may invalidate orsupersede treaties or generally acceptedprinciples.

H"L#: Jes, a law may supersede a treaty or agenerally accepted principle. %n this case, thereis no conflict at all between the raised generallyaccepted principle and with RA 00B7. he equalprotection of the law clause Edoes not demandabsolute equality amongst residentsO it merelyrequires that all persons shall be treated ali(e,

under li(e circumstances and conditions bothas to privileges conferred and liabilitiesenforcedFO and, that the equal protectionclause Eis not infringed by legislation whichapplies only to those persons falling within aspecified class, if it applies ali(e to all personswithin such class, and reasonable grounds e$istfor ma(ing a distinction between those who fallwithin such class and those who do not.F!or the sa(e of argument, even if it would beassumed that a treaty would be in conflict witha statute then the statute must be upheldbecause it represented an e$ercise of thepolice power which, being inherent could not bebargained away or surrendered through themedium of a treaty. #ence, %chong can nolonger assert his right to operate his mar(etstalls in the "asay city mar(et.

ICHON - H"RNAN#"5, 101 !HIL% 112

Facts: "etitioner, for and in his own behalf andon behalf of other alien residents, corporationsand partnerships adversely affected by theprovisions of Republic Act o. 00B7, broughtthis action to obtain a *udicial declaration thatsaid Act is unconstitutional, and to en*oin the

ecretary of !inance and all other personsacting under him, particularly city andmunicipal treasurers, from enforcing itsprovisions. "etitioner attac(s theconstitutionality of the Act, contending amongothers that+ it denies to alien residents theequal protection of the laws and deprives themof their liberty and property without dueprocess of lawO it violates international andtreaty obligations of the Republic of the"hilippinesO and its provisions against thetransmission by aliens of their retail businessthru hereditary succession, and those requiring077Y !ilipino capitali&ation for a corporation orentity to entitle it to engage in the retailbusiness, violate the spirit of ections 0 and 5,Article P%%% and ection B of Article P%H

Constitution.Republic Act o. 00B7 is entitled /An Act toRegulate the Retail )usiness./ %n effect itnationali&es the retail trade business. he mainprovisions of the Act are+ 90: a prohibitionagainst persons, not citi&ens of the "hilippines,and against associations, partnerships, orcorporations the capital of which are not whollyowned by citi&ens of the "hilippines, fromengaging directly or indirectly in the retailtradeO 98: an e$ception from the above



prohibition in favor of aliens actually engagedin said business on 'ay 05, 0152, who areallowed to continue to engage therein, unlesstheir licenses are forfeited in accordance withthe law, until their death or voluntaryretirement in case of natural persons, and forten years after the approval of the Act or untilthe e$piration of term in case of *uridicalpersonsO 9>: an e$ception therefrom in favor ofciti&ens and *uridical entities of the United

tatesO 92: a provision for the forfeiture oflicenses 9to engage in the retail business: forviolation of the laws on nationali&ation,economic control weights and measures andlabor and other laws relating to trade,commerce and industryO 95: a prohibitionagainst the establishment or opening by aliensactually engaged in the retail business ofadditional stores or branches of retail business,96: a provision requiring aliens actuallyengaged in the retail business to present forregistration with the proper authorities averified statement concerning their businesses,giving, among other matters, the nature of thebusiness, their assets and liabilities and theiroffices and principal offices of *uridical entitiesOand 93: a provision allowing the heirs of aliensnow engaged in the retail business who die, tocontinue such business for a period of si$months for purposes of liquidation.

Hel : he Court held that the Act wasapproved in the e$ercise of the police power. %thas been said that police power is so far-reaching in scope, that it has become almostimpossible to limit its sweep. As it derives itse$istence from the very e$istence of the tateitself, it does not need to be e$pressed ordefined in its scopeO it is said to be co-e$tensive with self-protection and survival, andas such it is the most positive and active of allgovernmental processes, the most essential,insistent and illimitable. <specially is it so undera modern democratic framewor( where the

demands of society and of nations havemultiplied to almost unimaginable proportionsOthe field and scope of police power has becomealmost boundless, *ust as the fields of publicinterest and public welfare have becomealmost all- embracing and have transcendedhuman foresight. =therwise stated, as wecannot foresee the needs and demands ofpublic interest and welfare in this constantlychanging and progressive world, so we cannotdelimit beforehand the e$tent or scope ofpolice power by which and through which the

tate see(s to attain or achieve public interestor welfare. o it is that Constitutions do notdefine the scope or e$tent of the police powerof the tateO what they do is to set forth thelimitations thereof. he most important ofthese are the due process clause and the equalprotection clause.

he equal protection of the law clause isagainst undue favor and individual or classprivilege, as well as hostile discrimination orthe oppression of inequality. %t is not intendedto prohibit legislation, which is limited either inthe ob*ect to which it is directed or by territorywithin which it is to operate. %t does notdemand absolute equality among residentsO itmerely requires that all persons shall betreated ali(e, under li(e circumstances andconditions both as to privileges conferred andliabilities enforced. he equal protection clauseis not infringed by legislation which applies onlyto those persons falling within a specified class,if it applies ali(e to all persons within suchclass, and reasonable grounds e$ists forma(ing a distinction between those who fallwithin such class and those who do not.

he due process clause has to do with thereasonableness of legislation enacted inpursuance of the police power, %s there publicinterest, a public purposeO is public welfareinvolved %s the Act reasonably necessary forthe accomplishment of the legislatureVspurposeO is it not unreasonable, arbitrary oroppressive %s there sufficient foundation orreason in connection with the matter involvedOor has there not been a capricious use of thelegislative power Can the aims conceived beachieved by the means used, or is it not merelyan un*ustified interference with privateinterest hese are the questions that we as(when the due process test is applied.

he conflict, therefore, between police power

and the guarantees of due process and equalprotection of the laws is more apparent thanreal. "roperly related, the power and theguarantees are supposed to coe$ist. hebalancing is the essence or, shall it be said, theindispensable means for the attainment oflegitimate aspirations of any democraticsociety. here can be no absolute power,whoever e$ercise it, for that would be tyranny.

Jet there can neither be absolute liberty, forthat would mean license and anarchy. o the

tate can deprive persons of life, liberty and



property, provided there is due process of lawOand persons may be classified into classes andgroups, provided everyone is given the equalprotection of the law. he test or standard, asalways, is reason. he police power legislationmust be firmly grounded on public interest andwelfare, and a reasonable relation must e$istbetween purposes and means. And ifdistinction and classification has been made,there must be a reasonable basis for saiddistinction.

he disputed law was enacted to remedy a realactual threat and danger to national economyposed by alien dominance and control of theretail business and free citi&ens and countryfrom such dominance and controlO that theenactment clearly falls within the scope of thepolice power of the tate, thru which and bywhich it protects its own personality andinsures its security and futureO that the lawdoes not violate the equal protection clause ofthe Constitution because sufficient groundse$ist for the distinction between alien andciti&en in the e$ercise of the occupationregulated, nor the due process of law clause,because the law is prospective in operation andrecogni&es the privilege of aliens alreadyengaged in the occupation and reasonablyprotects their privilegeO that the wisdom andefficacy of the law to carry out its ob*ectivesappear to us to be plainly evident as amatter of fact it seems not only appropriate butactually necessary and that in any case suchmatter falls within the prerogative of the?egislature, with whose power and discretionthe udicial department of the 4overnment maynot interfereO that the provisions of the law areclearly embraced in the title, and this suffersfrom no duplicity and has not misled thelegislators or the segment of the populationaffectedO and that it cannot be said to be voidfor supposed conflict with treaty obligationsbecause no treaty has actually been entered

into on the sub*ect and the police power maynot be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty orany other conventional agreement. he reatyof Amity between the Republic of the"hilippines and the Republic of China of April0B, 0123 is also claimed to be violated by thelaw in question. All that the treaty guaranteesis equality of treatment to the Chinesenationals /upon the same terms as thenationals of any other country./ )ut thenationals of China are not discriminated againstbecause nationals of all other countries, e$cept

those of the United tates, who are grantedspecial rights by the Constitution, are allprohibited from engaging in the retail trade.)ut even supposing that the law infringes uponthe said treaty, the treaty is always sub*ect toqualification or amendment by a subsequentlaw , and the same may never curtail or restrictthe scope of the police power of the tate.

ICHON -S% H"RNAN#"5 ?101 !HIL 1122@L 992@ 31 $A= 192

unday, !ebruary 70, 8771 "osted byCoffeeholic Writes?abels+ Case @igests, "olitical ?aw

FACTS: Republic Act 00B7 or commonly (nownas EAn Act to Regulate the Retail )usinessF waspassed. he said law provides for a prohibitionagainst foreigners as well as corporationsowned by foreigners from engaging from retailtrade in our country. his was protested by thepetitioner in this case. According to him, thesaid law violates the international and treaty ofthe "hilippines therefore it is unconstitutional.

pecifically, the reaty of Amity between the"hilippines and China was violated according tohim.

ISS+": Whether or ot Republic Act 00B7 is avalid e$ercise of police power.

H"L#: According to the Court, RA 00B7 is avalid e$ercise of police power. %t was also thenprovided that police power can not bebargained away through the medium of atreaty or a contract. he Court also providedthat RA 00B7 was enacted to remedy a real andactual danger to national economy posed byalien dominance and control. %f ever the lawinfringes upon the said treaty, the latter isalways sub*ect to qualification or amendmentby a subsequent law and the same may nevercurtain or restrict the scope of the police powerof the state.

STATE IMMUNITY

R"!+/LIC vs% LI$4R no. 060656, une 81, 8775

FACTS: %n 01>B, the Republic instituted special civil action for e$propriation of a land in?ahug, Cebu City for the purpose ofestablishing a military reservation for the"hilippine Army. he said lots were registeredin the name of 4ervasia and <ulalia @en&on.



he Republic deposited "1,577 in the " ) thentoo( possession of the lots. hereafter, on 'ay0127, the C!% rendered its @ecision orderingthe Republic to pay the @en&ons the sum of"2,768.07 as *ust compensation. he @en&onsappealled to the CA but it was dismissed on'arch 00, 012B. An entry of *udgment wasmade on April 5, 012B.

%n 0157, one of the heirs of the @en&ons,filed with the ational Airports Corporation aclaim for rentals for the two lots, but it /denied(nowledge of the matter./ =n eptember 6,0160, ?t. Cabal re*ected the claim bute$pressed willingness to pay the appraisedvalue of the lots within a reasonable time.

!or failure of the Republic to pay for thelots, on eptember 87, 0160, the @en&onsGsuccessors-in-interest, Haldehue&a and "anerio,filed with the same C!% an action for recoveryof possession with damages against theRepublic and A!" officers in possession of theproperty.

=n ovember 0160, itles of the saidlots were issued in the names of Haldehue&aand "anerio with the annotation /sub*ect to thepriority of the ational Airports Corporation toacquire said parcels of land, ?ots 1>8 and 1>1upon previous payment of a reasonable mar(etvalue/.

=n uly 0168, the C!% promulgated its@ecision in favor of Haldehue&a and "anerio,holding that they are the owners and haveretained their right as such over lots because ofthe RepublicGs failure to pay the amount of"2,768.07, ad*udged in the e$propriationproceedings. #owever, in view of theannotation on their land titles, they wereordered to e$ecute a deed of sale in favor ofthe Republic.

hey appealed the C!%Gs decision to theC. he latter held that Haldehue&a and "anerio

are still the registered owners of ?ots 1>8 and1>1, there having been no payment of *ustcompensation by the Republic. C still ruled

that they are not entitled to recover possessionof the lots but may only demand the paymentof their fair mar(et value.

'eanwhile, in 0162, Haldehue&a and"anerio mortgaged ?ot 1>8 to -*cente L*B ,herein respondent, as security for their loans.!or their failure to pay ?im despite demand, hehad the mortgage foreclosed in 0136. he lottitle was issued in his name.

=n 0118, respondent ?im filed acomplaint for u*et*ng ( t*tle with the R Cagainst the petitioners herein. =n 8770, the

R C rendered a decision in favor of ?im,declaring that he is the absolute and e$clusiveowner of the lot with all the rights of anabsolute owner including the right topossession. "etitioners elevated the case to theCA. %n its @ecision dated eptember 0B, 877>it sustained the R C @ecision saying+ E... his iscontrary to the rules of fair play because theconcept of *ust compensation embraces notonly the correct determination of the amount tobe paid to the owners of the land, but also thepayment for the land within a reasonable timefrom its ta(ing. Without prompt payment,compensation cannot be considered /*ust/...F

"etitioner, through the = 4, filed withthe C a petition for review alleging that theyremain as the owner of ?ot 1>8.ISS+": Whether the Republic hasretained ownership of ?ot 1>8 despite itsfailure to pay respondentGs predecessors-in-interest the *ust compensation thereforpursuant to the *udgment of the C!%rendered as early as 'ay 02, 0127.H"L#: =ne of the basic principlesenshrined in our Constitution is that no personshall be deprived of his private propertywithout due process of lawO and ine$propriation cases, an essential element ofdue process is that there must be *ustcompensation whenever private property ista(en for public use. 3 Accordingly, ection 1Article %%%, of our Constitution manda/ Private property shall not be taken for publicuse without just compensation. / he Republdisregarded the foregoing provision when itfailed and refused to pay respondentGspredecessors-in-interest the *ust compensationfor ?ots 1>8 and 1>1.

he Court of Appeals is correct insaying that RepublicGs delay is contrary tothe rules of fair play. %n *urisdictions similarto ours, where an entry to the e$propriatedproperty precedes the payment ofcompensation, it has been held that if the

compensation is not paid in a 'eas naDlet*Be , the party may be treated as atrespasser ab initio.

As early as 'ay 01, 0166, in Valdehuezathis Court mandated the Republic to payrespondentGs predecessors-in-interest the sumof "06,82B.27 as /reasonable mar(et value ofthe two lots in question./ Unfortunately, it didnot comply and allowed several decades topass without obeying this CourtGs mandate. %t istantamount to confiscation of private property.While it is true that all private properties are

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jun2005/gr_161656_2005.html#fnt7

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jun2005/gr_161656_2005.html#fnt7



sub*ect to the need of government, and thegovernment may ta(e them whenever thenecessity or the e$igency of the occasiondemands, however from the ta(ing of privateproperty by the government under the powerof eminent domain, there arises an impliedpromise to compensate the owner for his loss.

here is a recogni&ed rule that title tothe property e$propriated shall pass fromthe owner to the e$propriator only upon fullpayment of the *ust compensation. o, howcould the Republic acquire ownership overLot 9 ! when it has not paid its owner the

just compensation" required by law" formore than #$ years% Clearly, without fullpayment of *ust compensation, there can beno transfer of title from the landowner tothe e$propriator.

C ruled in earlier cases thate$propriation of lands consists of two stages.&irst is concerned with the determination of theauthority of the plaintiff to e$ercise the powerof eminent domain and the propriety of itse$ercise. he second is concerned with thedetermination by the court of /the *ustcompensation for the property sought to beta(en./ %t is only upon the completion of thesetwo stages that e$propriation is said to havebeen completed %n Republic v. 'alem (nvestment )orporation " we ruled that, /theprocess is not completed until payment of *ustcompensation./ hus, here, the failure of theRepublic to pay respondent and hispredecessors-in-interest for a period of 53years rendered the e$propriation processincomplete.

hus, C ruled that the specialcircumstances prevailing in this case entitlerespondent to recover possession of thee$propriated lot from the Republic.

While the prevailing doctrine is that /thenon-payment of *ust compensation does notentitle the private landowner to recoverpossession of the e$propriated lots, however, in

cases where the government failed to pay *ustcompensation 7*tE*n (*ve 2; ea's (' B tEe(*nal*t ( tEe Gu gBent *n tEee )' )'*at* n )' cee *ngs , the ownersconcerned shall have the right to recoverpossession of their property. After all, it is theduty of the government, whenever it ta(esproperty from private persons against their will,to facilitate the payment of *ust compensation.%n)osculluela v. )ourt of *ppeals , we defined

*ust compensation as not only the correctdetermination of the amount to be paid to the

property owner but also the payment of theproperty within a 'eas naDle t*Be . Withoprompt payment, compensation cannot beconsidered /*ust./

CIVILIAN SUPREMACY

SANLA AS -S% "."C+TI-" S"CR"TAR=

R"="S

M4R 0517B5, > !ebruary 8772NO also 'ocial +ustice 'ociety ,'+'- fficers/0ember 12R

3#93$ 4" 'uplico" et al." vs. 0acapa5al6*rroyo"et al. 12R 3#937#48 Pimentel et al. vs. Romulo

et al. 12R 3#939 4<n )anc, inga 9 :+ > concur, > concur in result,0 concurs in separate opinion to which 8 *oin, 8

file own separate opinions, 0 dissents inseparate opinion, 0 on leave

FACTS:

hey came in the middle of the night. Armedwith high-powered ammunitions ande$plosives, some three hundred *unior officersand enlisted men of the Armed !orces of the"hilippines 9A!": stormed into the =a(wood"remiere apartments in 'a(ati City in the weehours of 83 uly 877>. )ewailing the corruptionin the A!", the soldiers demanded, amongother things, the resignation of the "resident,the ecretary of @efense and the Chief of the"hilippine ational "olice 9" ":. %n the wa(e ofthe =a(wood occupation, the "resident issuedlater in the day "roclamation 283 and 4eneral=rder 2, both declaring Ea state of rebellionFand calling out the Armed !orces to suppressthe rebellion. )y the evening of 83 uly 877>,the =a(wood occupation had ended. Afterhours-long negotiations, the soldiers agreed toreturn to barrac(s. he "resident, however, didnot immediately lift the declaration of a state ofrebellion and did so only on 0 August 877>,

through "roclamation 2>5. %n the interim,several petitions were filed before the upremeCourt challenging the validity of "roclamation283 and 4eneral =rder 2.

ISS+":

Whether the petitions have been renderedmoot by the lifting of the declaration.

H"L#:

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_137569_2000.html






=. he Court agrees with the olicitor 4eneralthat the issuance of "roclamation 2>5,declaring that the state of rebellion has ceasedto e$ist, has rendered the case moot. As a rule,courts do not ad*udicate moot cases, *udicialpower being limited to the determination ofEactual controversies.F evertheless, courts willdecide a question, otherwise moot, if it isEcapable of repetition yet evading review.F hepresent case is one such case. =nce before, the"resident on 0 'ay 8770 declared a state ofrebellion and called upon the A!" and the " "to suppress the rebellion through "roclamation>B and 4eneral =rder 0. =n that occasion, EZanangry and violent mob armed with e$plosives,firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones andother deadly weaponsG assaulted andattempted to brea( into 'alaca;ang.F "etitionswere filed before the upreme Court assailingthe validity of the "residentGs declaration. !ivedays after such declaration, however, the"resident lifted the same. he mootness of thepetitions in ?acson v. "ere& and accompanyingcases precluded the Court from addressing theconstitutionality of the declaration. o preventsimilar questions from reemerging, the

upreme Court sei&ed the opportunity to finallylay to rest the validity of the declaration of astate of rebellion in the e$ercise of the"residentGs calling out power, the mootness ofthe petitions notwithstanding

RA$ON ON5AL"S -S "."C S"C R+FINOH"CHANO-A

4.R. o. ?-80B13 reaty vs <$ecutive Agreements T tatutes CanRepeal <$ecutive Agreements

hen "resident @iosdado 'acapagal enteredinto two e$ecutive agreements with Hietnamand )urma for the importation of rice withoutcomplying with the requisite of securing acertification from the atGl <conomic Councilshowing that there is a shortage in cereals.

#ence, #echanova authori&ed the importationof 63777 tons of rice from abroad to thedetriment of our local planters. 4on&ales, thenpresident of the %loilo "alay and Corn "lantersAssociation assailed the e$ecutive agreements.4on&ales averred that #echanova is without

*urisdiction or in e$cess of *urisdiction/,because RA >258 prohibits the importation ofrice and corn by /the Rice and CornAdministration or any other governmentagency.

ISS+": Whether or not RA >258 prevails overthe 8 e$ecutive agreements entered into by'acapagal. H"L#: Under the Constitution, the mainfunction of the <$ecutive is to enforce lawsenacted by Congress. he former may notinterfere in the performance of the legislativepowers of the latter, e$cept in the e$ercise ofhis veto power. #e may not defeat legislativeenactments that have acquired the status oflaws, by indirectly repealing the same throughan e$ecutive agreement providing for theperformance of the very act prohibited by saidlaws. %n the event of conflict between a treatyand a statute, the one which is latest in point oftime shall prevail, is not applicable to the caseat bar, #echanova not only admits, but, also,insists that the contracts adverted to are nottreaties. o such *ustification can be given asregards e$ecutive agreements not authori&edby previous legislation, without completelyupsetting the principle of separation of powersand the system of chec(s and balances whichare fundamental in our constitutional set up. As regards the question whether an e$ecutiveor an international agreement may beinvalidated by our courts, suffice it to say thatthe Constitution of the "hilippines has clearlysettled it in the affirmative, by providing thatthe C may not be deprived /of its *urisdictionto review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm onappeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law orthe rules of court may provide, final *udgmentsand decrees of inferior courts in EAll cases inwhich the constitutionality or validity of anytreaty, law, ordinance, or e$ecutive order orregulation is in question/. %n other words, ourConstitution authori&es the nullification of atreaty, not only when it conflicts with thefundamental law, but, also, when it runscounter to an act of Congress.

ON5AL"S -S% H"CHANO-A 9 SCRA 430FACTS:Respondent e$ecutive secretary authori&edimportation of 63,777 tons of foreign rice to bepurchased from private sources. Ramon A.4on&ales, a rice planter and president of ilo-ilopalay and corn planters asso., filed andaverring that in ma(ing or attempting to ma(eimportation of foreign rice are acting without

*urisdiction or in e$cess of *urisdiction becauseRA 8873, e$plicitly prohibits the importation of





of ec. >, Art. %% of the Constitution. hedeployment of the 'arines does not constitutea breach of the civilian supremacy clause. hecalling of the 'arines constitutes permissibleuse of military assets for civilian lawenforcement. he local police forces are theones in charge of the visibility patrols at alltimes, the real authority belonging to the " "

'oreover, the deployment of the 'arines toassist the " " does not unma(e the civiliancharacter of the police force. he real authorityin the operations is lodged with the head of acivilian institution, the " ", and not with themilitary. ince none of the 'arines wasincorporated or enlisted as members of the" ", there can be no appointment to civilianposition to spea( of. #ence, the deployment ofthe 'arines in the *oint visibility patrols doesnot destroy the civilian character of the " ".

I/! -S% 5A$ORA, %R% NO% 1 148 %R% NO% 1 148 % A+ +ST 12, 4000%

Facts: At bar is a special civil action forcertiorari and prohibition with prayer forissuance of a temporary restraining ordersee(ing to nullity on constitutional grounds theorder of "resident oseph <*ercito <stradacommanding the deployment of the "hilippine'arines 9the 'arines: to *oin the "hilippine

ational "olice 9the /" "/: in visibility patrols

around the metropolis. !ormulated ?etter of%nstruction 78Q8777 0 9the /?=%/: which detailedthe manner by which the *oint visibility patrols,called as( !orce ulungan, would beconducted. 8 as( !orce ulungan was placedunder the leadership of the "olice Chief of'etro 'anila through a sustained streetpatrolling to minimi&e or eradicate all forms ofhigh-profile crimes especially those perpetratedby organi&ed crime syndicates whose membersinclude those that are well-trained, disciplinedand well-armed active or former " "Q'ilitary

personnel.Issue:0. Whether the deployment of soldiers for lawenforcement is in derogation of Article 8,

ection > of the ConstitutionO8. Whether the deployment constitutesincursion in a civilian function of lawenforcementO>. Whether the deployment creates adangerous tendency to rely on the military to

perform civilian functions of the government2. Whether the deployment gives more powerto the military than what it should be under theConstitution.

he issues raised in the present petition are+90: Whether or not petitioner has legalstandingO 98: Whether or not the "residentVsfactual determination of the necessity of callingthe armed forces is sub*ect to *udicial review,and, 9>: Whether or not the calling of thearmed forces to assist the " " in *oint visibilitypatrols violates the constitutional provisions oncivilian supremacy over the military and thecivilian character of the " ".

Hel : W#<R<!=R<, premises considered, thepetition is hereby @% '% <@. = =R@<R<@Rat* : he question of deployment of the'arines is not proper for *udicial scrutiny sincethe same involves a political questionO that theorgani&ation and conduct of police visibilitypatrols, which feature the team-up of onepolice officer and one "hilippine 'arine soldier,does not violate the civilian supremacy clausein the Constitution.

In v*e7 ( stan *ngApart from this declaration, however, the %)"asserts no other basis in support of its locusstandi he mere invocation by the %)" of itsduty to preserve the rule of law and nothingmore, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficientto clothe it with standing in this case.

ational "resident of the %)" who signed thepetition, is his alone, absent a formal boardresolution authori&ing him to file the presentaction. %ndeed, none of its members, whom the%)" purportedly represents, has sustained anyform of in*ury as a result of the operation of the

*oint visibility patrols.

evertheless, the Court does not automatically

assume *urisdiction over actual constitutionalcases brought before it even in instances thatare ripe for resolution. =ne class of caseswherein the Court hesitates to rule on areVVpolitical questions./ he reason is that politicalquestions are concerned with issues dependentupon the wisdom, not the legality, of aparticular act or measure being assailed.'oreover, the political question being afunction of the separation of powers, the courtswill not normally interfere with the wor(ings ofanother co-equal branch unless the case shows

http://nonamalum.weebly.com/1/post/2010/07/ibp-vs-zamora-gr-no-141284-gr-no-141284-august-15-2000.html






a clear need for the courts to step in to upholdthe law and the Constitution.

In v*e7 ( aDuse ( *sc'et* n he "resident did not commit grave abuse ofdiscretion in calling out the 'arines.

"resident as stated in ection 0B, Article H%% ofthe Constitution, specifically, the power to callout the armed forces to prevent or suppresslawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Callingthe armed forces is not proper for *udicialscrutiny since it involves a political questionand the resolution of factual issues which arebeyond the review powers of this Court.)y grave abuse of discretion is meant simplycapricious or whimsical e$ercise of *udgmentthat is patent and gross as to amount to anevasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal toperform a duty en*oined by law, or to act at allin contemplation of law, as where the power ise$ercised in an arbitrary and despotic mannerby reason of passion or hostility. When the"resident calls the armed forces to prevent orsuppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion,he necessarily e$ercises a discretionary powersolely vested in his wisdom.

In v*e7 ( Du' en ( )' ( n (actual Das*s%t is incumbent upon the petitioner to show thatthe "residentVs decision is totally bereft offactual basis. he present petition fails todischarge such heavy burden as there is noevidence to support the assertion that theree$ist no *ustification for calling out the armedforces. here is, li(ewise, no evidence tosupport the proposition that grave abuse wascommitted because the power to call wase$ercised in such a manner as to violate theconstitutional provision on civilian supremacyover the military.

he present petition is anchored on fear thatonce the armed forces are deployed, the

military will gain ascendancy, and thus place inperil our cherished liberties. %ndeed, whether itis the calling out of the armed forces alone inorder to suppress lawless violence, invasion orrebellion or also the suspension of the privilegeof the writ of habeas corpus or theproclamation of martial law 9in case of invasionor rebellion:, the e$ercise of the "residentVspowers as commander-in-chief, requires proof

not mere assertion. 2 As has been pointedout, / tanding is not Van ingenious academice$ercise in the conceivableV . . . but

requires . . . a factual showing of perceptibleharm./

)ecause of the absence of such recordevidence, we are left to guess or evenspeculate on these questions. hus, at onepoint, the ma*ority opinion says that what isinvolved here is not even the calling out of thearmed forces but only the use of marines forlaw enforcement. We need to have evidence onthese questions because, under theConstitution, the "residentVs power to call outthe armed forces in order to suppress lawlessviolence, invasion or rebellion is sub*ect to thelimitation that the e$ercise of this power isrequired in the interest of public safety.

'oreover, under ection 0B, Article H%% of theConstitution, in the e$ercise of the power tosuspend the privilege of the writ of habeascorpus or to impose martial law, two conditionsmust concur+ 90: there must be an actualinvasion or rebellion and, 98: public safety mustrequire it. hese conditions are not required inthe case of the power to call out the armedforces. he only criterion is that /whenever itbecomes necessary,/ the "resident may callthe armed forces to prevent or suppresslawless violence, invasion or rebellion./ heimplication is that the "resident is given fulldiscretion and wide latitude in the e$ercise ofthe power to call as compared to the two otherpowers.

In v*e7 ( tEe C u'ts c ncu''enceWe do not doubt the veracity of the "residentVsassessment of the situation, especially in thelight of present developments. he Court ta(es

*udicial notice of the recent bombingsperpetrated by lawless elements in theshopping malls, public utilities, and other publicplaces. hese are among the areas ofdeployment described in the ?=% 8777. hedeployment of the 'arines does not constitute

a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. hecalling of the 'arines in this case constitutespermissible use of military assets for civilianlaw enforcement. Under the ?=%, the policeforces are tas(ed to brief or orient the soldierson police patrol procedures. >B %t is theirresponsibility to direct and manage thedeployment of the 'arines.Considering the above circumstances, the'arines render nothing more than assistancerequired in conducting the patrols. As such,there can be no /insidious incursion/ of the



military in civilian affairs nor can there be aviolation of the civilian supremacy clause in theConstitution."olitical questions are defined as /thosequestions which under the Constitution, are tobe decided by the people in their sovereigncapacity, or in regard to which full discretionaryauthority has been delegated to the legislativeor e$ecutive branch of government./ 8 heyhave two aspects+ 90: those matters that are tobe e$ercised by the people in their primarypolitical capacity and 98: matters which havebeen specifically delegated to some otherdepartment or particular office of thegovernment, with discretionary power to act. >

he e$ercise of the discretionary power of thelegislative or e$ecutive branch of governmentwas often the area where the Court had towrestle with the political question doctrine.

ON5AL"S et% al v% "N% A/A=A4.R. o. 062773, Aug. 07, 8776

he nature of the military *ustice systemCoup dVetat vis-a-vis violation of the Articles ofWar

FACTS:=n uly 83, 877> at around 0+77 a.m., morethan >77 heavily armed *unior officers andenlisted men of the A!" entered the premisesof the =a(wood "remier ?u$ury Apartments onAyala Avenue, 'a(ati City, where theydisarmed the security guards and plantede$plosive devices around the building. heythen declared their withdrawal of support fromtheir Commander-in-Chief and demanded thatshe resign as "resident of the Republic.

After much negotiation, the group finally laiddown their arms. ubsequently, an %nformationfor coup dGetat was filed against them with theR C, at the same time that they were tried atcourt martial for conduct unbecoming an

officer. hey question the *urisdiction of thecourt martial, contending that the R C orderedthat their act was not service-connected andthat their violation of Art. 16 of the Articles ofWar 9RA 3755: was absorbed by the crime ofcoup dGetat.

ISS+":Whether the act complained of was service-connected and therefore cogni&able by courtmartial or absorbed by the crime of coup dVetatcogni&able by regular courts

R+LIN : he military *ustice system is disciplinary innature, aimed at achieving the highest form ofdiscipline in order to ensure the highest degreeof military efficiency. 'ilitary law is establishednot merely to enforce discipline in times of war,but also to preserve the tranquility and securityof the tate in times of war, but also topreserve the tranquility and security of the

tate in time of peaceO for there is nothingmore dangerous to the public peace and safetythan a licentious and undisciplined militarybody. he administration of military *ustice hasbeen universally practiced. ince timeimmemorial, all the armies in almost allcountries of the world loo( upon the power ofmilitary law and its administration as the mosteffective means of enforcing discipline. !or thisreason, the court martial has become invariablyan indispensable part of any organi&ed armedforces, it being the most potent agency inenforcing discipline both in peace and in war.

he Court held that the offense is service-connected. $$$ %t bears stressing that thecharge against the petitioners concerns thealleged violation of their solemn oath asofficers to defend the Constitution and theduly-constituted authorities. uch violationallegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to themilitary profession. %n short, the charge has abearing on their professional conduct orbehavior as military officers. <qually indicativeof the Eservice-connectedF nature of theoffense is the penalty prescribed for the same Tdismissal from the service T imposable only bythe military court. uch penalty is purelydisciplinary in character, evidently intended tocleanse the military profession of misfits and topreserve the stringent standard of militarydiscipline.

+#ANI v% S"N A

4.R. o. 037065, Aug. 05, 8776 he ability of the "resident to prevent militaryofficers from testifying before Congress doesnot turn on e$ecutive privilege, but on theChief <$ecutiveGs power as commander-in-chiefto control the actions and speech of membersof the armed forces. he "residentGsprerogatives as commander-in-chief are nothampered by the same limitations as ine$ecutive privilege.



FACTS:=n ept. 88, 8775, en. )ia&on invited severalsenior officers of the A!", including 4en.4udani, to appear at a public hearing beforethe enate Committee on ational @efense and

ecurity concerning the conduct of the 8772elections wherein allegations of massivecheating and the E#ello 4arciF tapes emerged.A!" Chief of taff 4en. enga issued a'emorandum, prohibiting 4en. 4udani, Col.)alutan and company from appearing beforethe enate Committee without "residentialapproval. evertheless, 4en. 4udani and Col.)alutan testified before said Committee,prompting 4en. enga to order them sub*ectedto 4eneral Court 'artial proceedings forwillfully violating an order of a superior officer.%n the meantime, "resident Arroyo issued <=262, which was subsequently declaredunconstitutional.

ISS+":Whether or not the "resident can preventmilitary officers from testifying at a legislativeinquiry

R+LIN :We hold that the "resident has constitutionalauthority to do so, by virtue of her power ascommander-in-chief, and that as aconsequence a military officer who defies suchin*unction is liable under military *ustice. At thesame time, we also hold that any chamber ofCongress which see(s the appearance before itof a military officer against the consent of the"resident has adequate remedies under law tocompel such attendance. Any military officialwhom Congress summons to testify before itmay be compelled to do so by the "resident. %fthe "resident is not so inclined, the "residentmay be commanded by *udicial order to compelthe attendance of the military officer. !inal

*udicial orders have the force of the law of theland which the "resident has the duty to

faithfully e$ecute.Ability of "resident to prevent military officersfrom testifying before Congress is based onCommander-in-chief powersAs earlier noted, we ruled in enate that the"resident may not issue a blan(et requirementof prior consent on e$ecutive officialssummoned by the legislature to attend acongressional hearing. %n doing so, the Courtrecogni&ed the considerable limitations one$ecutive privilege, and affirmed that theprivilege must be formally invo(ed on specified

grounds. #owever, the ability of the "residentto prevent military officers from testifyingbefore Congress does not turn on e$ecutiveprivilege, but on the Chief <$ecutiveGs power ascommander-in-chief to control the actions andspeech of members of the armed forces. he"residentGs prerogatives as commander-in-chiefare not hampered by the same limitations as ine$ecutive privilege.RATIONAL": =ur ruling that the "residentcould, as a general rule, require militaryofficers to see( presidential approval beforeappearing before Congress is based foremoston the notion that a contrary rule undulydiminishes the prerogatives of the "resident ascommander-in-chief. Congress holds significantcontrol over the armed forces in matters suchas budget appropriations and the approval ofhigher-ran( promotions, yet it is on the"resident that the Constitution vests the title ascommander-in-chief and all the prerogativesand functions appertaining to the position.Again, the e$igencies of military discipline andthe chain of command mandate that the"residentGs ability to control the individualmembers of the armed forces be accorded theutmost respect. Where a military officer is tornbetween obeying the "resident and obeying the

enate, the Court will without hesitation affirmthat the officer has to choose the "resident.After all, the Constitution prescribes that it isthe "resident, and not the enate, who is thecommander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Remedy is *udicial relief

At the same time, the refusal of the "residentto allow members of the military to appearbefore Congress is still sub*ect to *udicial relief.

he Constitution itself recogni&es as one of thelegislatureGs functions is the conduct ofinquiries in aid of legislation. %nasmuch as it isill-advised for Congress to interfere with the"residentGs power as commander-in-chief, it is

similarly detrimental for the "resident to undulyinterfere with CongressGs right to conductlegislative inquiries. he impasse did not cometo pass in this petition, since petitionerstestified anyway despite the presidentialprohibition. Jet the Court is aware that with itspronouncement today that the "resident hasthe right to require prior consent frommembers of the armed forces, the clash maysoon loom or actuali&e.We believe and hold that our constitutional andlegal order sanctions a modality by which



members of the military may be compelled toattend legislative inquiries even if the "residentdesires otherwise, a modality which does notoffend the Chief <$ecutiveGs prerogatives ascommander-in-chief. he remedy lies with thecourts.

he fact that the e$ecutive branch is an equal,coordinate branch of government to thelegislative creates a wrin(le to any basic rulethat persons summoned to testify beforeCongress must do so. here is considerableinterplay between the legislative and e$ecutivebranches, informed by due deference andrespect as to their various constitutionalfunctions. Reciprocal courtesy ideali&es thisrelationshipO hence, it is only as a last resortthat one branch see(s to compel the other to aparticular mode of behavior. he *udiciary, thethird coordinate branch of government, doesnot en*oy a similar dynamic with either thelegislative or e$ecutive branches. Whateverwea(ness inheres on *udicial power due to itsinability to originate national policies andlegislation, such is balanced by the fact that itis the branch empowered by the Constitution tocompel obeisance to its rulings by the otherbranches of government.

CONSTIT+TIONAL LAW II

CA <

WHO EXERCISES THESE GOV’T POWER

cases:

"R$ITA $ALAT" HOT"L & $OT"LO!"RATORS ASSOC%, INC -S $A=OR OF$ANILA

4.R. o. ?-8261>

"olice "ower T @ue "rocess Clause

=n 0> une 016>, the 'anila 'unicipal )oardenacted =rd 2367 and the same was approvedby then acting mayor Astorga. =rd 2367 soughtto regulate hotels and motels. %t classified theminto 0st class 9ta$ed at 6(Qyr: and 8nd class9ta$ed at 2.5(Qyr:. %t also compellehotelsQmotels to get the demographics ofanyone who chec(s in to their rooms. %tcompelled hotelsQmotels to have wide openspaces so as not to conceal the identity of theirpatrons. <rmita-'alate impugned the validity ofthe law averring that such is oppressive,arbitrary and against due process. he lowercourt as well as the appellate court ruled infavor of <rmita-'alate.

%SS+" + Whether or not =rd 2367 is against thedue process clause.

H"L#: he C ruled in favor of Astorga. hereis a presumption that the laws enacted byCongress 9in this case 'un )oard: is valid. WQoa showing or a strong foundation of invalidity,the presumption stays. As in this case, therewas only a stipulation of facts and such cannotprevail over the presumption. !urther, theordinance is a valid e$ercise of "olice "ower.

here is no question but that the challengedordinance was precisely enacted to minimi&ecertain practices hurtful to public morals. hisis to minimi&e prostitution. he increase inta$es not only discourages hotelsQmotels in

doing any business other than legal but alsoincreases the revenue of the lgu concerned.And ta$ation is a valid e$ercise of police poweras well. he due process contention is li(ewiseuntenable, due process has no e$act definitionbut has reason as a standard. %n this case, theprecise reason why the ordinance was enactedwas to curb down prostitution in the city whichis reason enough and cannot be defeated bymere singling out of the provisions of the saidordinance alleged to be vague.



"=?%C< "=W<R=n the legislative organs of the government,whether national of local, primarily rest thee$ercise of the police power, which, it cannotbe too often emphasi&ed, is the power toprescribe regulations to promote the health,morals, peace, good order, safety and generalwelfare of the people. "olice power is basedupon the concept of necessity of the tate andits corresponding right to protect itself and itspeople.2> "olice power has been used as

*ustification for numerous and varied actions bythe tate. hese range from the regulation ofdance halls,22 movie theaters,25 gasstations26 and coc(pits.23 he awesome scopeof police power is best demonstrated by thefact that in its hundred or so years of presencein our nationGs legal system, its use has rarelybeen denied.

'ay Courts %nquire Upon the <$ercise of "olice"ower

%n view of the requirements of due process,equal protection and other applicableconstitutional guaranties, however, thee$ercise of such police power insofar as it mayaffect the life, liberty or property of any personis sub*ect to *udicial inquiry. Where suche$ercise of police power may be considered aseither capricious, whimsical, un*ust orunreasonable, a denial of due process or aviolation of any other applicable constitutionalguaranty may call for correction by the courts.

T7 t )es ( #ue !' cess

"rocedural @ue "rocess+ "rocedural dueprocess refers to the procedures that thegovernment must follow before it deprives aperson of life, liberty, or property.21 "roceduraldue process concerns itself with governmentaction adhering to the established processwhen it ma(es an intrusion into the private

sphere. <$amples range from the form of noticegiven to the level of formality of a hearing.

ubstantive @ue "rocess+ ubstantive dueprocess completes the protection envisioned bythe due process clause. %t inquires whether thegovernment has sufficient *ustification fordepriving a person of life, liberty, or property.

CH+RCHILL vs% RAFF"RT= ,4.R. =. ?-07538, @ecember 80, 0105 9 >8 "hil5B7:

!AC + he case arises from the fact that defendant,Collector of %nternal Revenue, would li(e todestroy or remove any sign, signboard, orbillboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for thesole reason that such sign, signboard, orbillboard is, or may be offensive to the sight.

he plaintiffs allege otherwise. Was there valide$ercise of police power in this case

#<?@+ Jes. here can be no doubt that the e$ercise ofthe police power of the "hilippine 4overnmentbelongs to the ?egislature and that this poweris limited only by the Acts of Congress andthose fundamentals principles which lie at thefoundation of all republican forms ofgovernment. An Act of the ?egislature which isobviously and undoubtedly foreign to any ofthe purposes of the police power and interfereswith the ordinary en*oyment of property would,without doubt, be held to be invalid. )ut wherethe Act is reasonably within a properconsideration of and care for the public health,safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed bythe courts./ he power vested in the legislature by theconstitution to ma(e, ordain, and establish allmanner of wholesome and reasonable laws,statutes, and ordinances, either with penaltiesor without, not repugnant to the constitution,as they shall *udge to be for the good andwelfare of the commonwealth, and of thesub*ects of the same.// he police power of the tate, so far, has notreceived a full and complete definition. %t maybe said, however, to be the right of the tate,or state functionary, to prescribe regulationsfor the good order, peace, health, protection,comfort, convenience and morals of thecommunity, which do not ... violate any of theprovisions of the organic law.//%t Mthe police powerN has for its ob*ect t

improvement of social and economicconditioned affecting the community at largeand collectively with a view to bring about /hegreatest good of the greatest number./Courtshave consistently and wisely declined to setany fi$ed limitations upon sub*ects calling forthe e$ercise of this power. %t is elastic and ise$ercised from time to time as varying socialconditions demand correction.//%t may be said in a general way that the policepower e$tends to all the great public needs. %tmay be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by





@ate+ 'arch 83, 8777"etitioner+ 'etropolitan 'anila @evelopmentAuthorityRespondent+ )el Air Hillage Association %nc

!AC +''@A is a government agency tas(ed with thedelivery of basic services in 'etro 'anila. )el-Air Hillage Association, %nc. is a non-stoc(, non-profit corporation whose members arehomeowners in )el-Air Hillage, a privatesubdivision in 'a(ati City. )AHA is theregistered owner of eptune treet, a roadinside )el-Air Hillage.=n @ecember >7, 0115, respondent receivedfrom petitioner, through its Chairman, a noticedated @ecember 88, 0115 requestingrespondent to open eptune treet to publicvehicular traffic starting anuary 8, 0116. )AHAwas apprised that the perimeter wallseparating the subdivision from the ad*acentIalayaan Avenue would be demolished.=n anuary 8, 0116, )AHA instituted againstpetitioner before the R C a civil case forin*unction. Respondent prayed for the issuanceof a R= and preliminary in*unction en*oiningthe opening of eptune treet and prohibitingthe demolition of the perimeter wall. he trialcourt issued a temporary restraining order thefollowing day. After due hearing, the trial courtdenied the issuance of preliminary in*unction.=n appeal, the CA rendered a @ecision on themerits of the case finding that the ''@A hasno authority to order the opening of eptune

treet, a private subdivision road and cause thedemolition of its perimeter walls. %t held thatthe authority is lodged in the City Council of'a(ati by ordinance.

ISS+":W= the ''@A has authority to open eptuneRoad to the public

H"L# + o

Ratio+ ''@A claims that it has the authority toopen eptune treet to public traffic because itis an agent of the state endowed with policepower in the delivery of basic services in 'etro'anila. =ne of these basic services is trafficmanagement which involves the regulation ofthe use of thoroughfares to insure the safety,convenience and welfare of the general public.%t is alleged that the police power of ''@A wasaffirmed by this Court in the consolidated casesof angalang v. %AC. !rom the premise that ithas police power, it is now urged that there is

no need for the City of 'a(ati to enact anordinance opening eptune street to the public."olice power is an inherent attribute ofsovereignty. %t has been defined as the powervested by the Constitution in the legislature toma(e, ordain, and establish all manner ofwholesome and reasonable laws, statutes andordinances, either with penalties or without, notrepugnant to the Constitution, as they shall

*udge to be for the good and welfare of thecommonwealth, and for the sub*ects of thesame. he power is plenary and its scope isvast and pervasive, reaching and *ustifyingmeasures for public health, public safety, publicmorals, and the general welfare.%t bears stressing that police power is lodgedprimarily in the ational ?egislature. %t cannotbe e$ercised by any group or body ofindividuals not possessing legislative power.

he ational ?egislature, however, maydelegate this power to the "resident andadministrative boards as well as the lawma(ingbodies of municipal corporations or localgovernment units. =nce delegated, the agentscan e$ercise only such legislative powers asare conferred on them by the nationallawma(ing body.'etropolitan or 'etro 'anila is a bodycomposed of several local government units -i.e., twelve 908: cities and five 95:municipalities, namely, the cities of Caloocan,'anila, 'andaluyong, 'a(ati, "asay, "asig,

ue&on, 'untinlupa, ?as "inas, 'ari(ina,"aranaque and Halen&uela, and themunicipalities of 'alabon, , avotas, , "ateros,

an uan and aguig. With the passage of RA3182 in 0115, 'etropolitan 'anila wasdeclared as a /special development andadministrative region/ and the Administrationof /metro-wide/ basic services affecting theregion placed under /a development authority/referred to as the ''@A.

he implementation of the ''@AGs plans,programs and pro*ects is underta(en by the

local government units, national governmentagencies, accredited peopleGs organi&ations,non-governmental organi&ations, and theprivate sector as well as by the ''@A itself.!or this purpose, the ''@A has the power toenter into contracts, memoranda of agreementand other cooperative arrangements with thesebodies for the delivery of the required serviceswithin 'etro 'anila.Clearly, the scope of the ''@AGs function islimited to the delivery of the seven 93: basicservices. =ne of these is transport and traffic





%ts power was merely to provide the localgovernment units technical assistance in thepreparation of local development plans. Anysemblance of legislative power it had wasconfined to a /review MofN legislation proposedby the local legislative assemblies to ensureconsistency among local governments and withthe comprehensive development plan of 'etro'anila,/ and to /advise the local governmentsaccordingly./When R.A. o. 3182 too( effect, 'etropolitan'anila became a /special development andadministrative region/ and the ''@A a /specialdevelopment authority/ whose functions were/without pre*udice to the autonomy of theaffected local government units./ he characterof the ''@A was clearly defined in thelegislative debates enacting its charter.%t is thus beyond doubt that the ''@A is not alocal government unit or a public corporationendowed with legislative power. %t is not even a/special metropolitan political subdivision/ ascontemplated in ection 00, Article P of theConstitution. he creation of a /specialmetropolitan political subdivision/ requires theapproval by a ma*ority of the votes cast in aplebiscite in the political units directly affected.R. A. o. 3182 was not submitted to theinhabitants of 'etro 'anila in a plebiscite. heChairman of the ''@A is not an official electedby the people, but appointed by the "residentwith the ran( and privileges of a cabinetmember. %n fact, part of his function is toperform such other duties as may be assignedto him by the "resident, whereas in localgovernment units, the "resident merelye$ercises supervisory authority. hisemphasi&es the administrative character of the''@A.Clearly then, the ''C under ". @. o. B82 isnot the same entity as the ''@A under R. A.

o. 3182. Unli(e the ''C, the ''@A has nopower to enact ordinances for the welfare ofthe community. %t is the local government

units, acting through their respective legislativecouncils, that possess legislative power andpolice power. %n the case at bar, the

angguniang "anlungsod of 'a(ati City did notpass any ordinance or resolution ordering theopening of eptune treet, hence, its proposedopening by petitioner ''@A is illegal and therespondent Court of Appeals did not err in soruling. We desist from ruling on the otherissues as they are unnecessary. <smsoWe stress that this decision does not ma(e lightof the ''@AGs noble efforts to solve the chaotic

traffic condition in 'etro 'anila. <veryday,traffic *ams and traffic bottlenec(s plague themetropolis. <ven our once sprawlingboulevards and avenues are now crammedwith cars while city streets are clogged withmotorists and pedestrians. raffic has becomea social malaise affecting our peopleGsproductivity and the efficient delivery of goodsand services in the country. he ''@A wascreated to put some order in the metropolitantransportation system but unfortunately thepowers granted by its charter are limited. %tsgood intentions cannot *ustify the opening forpublic use of a private street in a privatesubdivision without any legal warrant. hepromotion of the general welfare is notantithetical to the preservation of the rule oflaw.

ART. 3 Sec. 1 SCOPE OF PROTECTED LIFE,LIBERTY AND PROPERTY

cases:

#+NCAN ASSOC% OF #"TAIL$AN !T WO-S% LA.O W"LLCO$" !HILS%, INC%

38 SCRA 3 3

FACTS:

ecson was hired by 4la$o as a medicalrepresentative on =ct. 82, 0115. Contract ofemployment signed by ecson stipulates,among others, that he agrees to study andabide by the e$isting company rulesO todisclose to management any e$isting futurerelationship by consanguinity or affinity withco-employees or employees with competingdrug companies and should management findthat such relationship poses a prossible conflictof interest, to resign from the company.CompanyVs Code of <mployee Conduct providesthe same with stipulation that managementmay transfer the employee to another

department in a non-counterchec(ing positionor preparation for employment outside of thecompany after 6 months.

ecson was initially assigned to mar(et 4la$oVsproducts in the Camarines ur-Camarines ortearea and entered into a romantic relationshipwith )etsy, an employee of Astra, 4la$oVscompetition. )efore getting married, ecsonVs@istrict 'anager reminded him several times ofthe conflict of interest but marriage too( placein ept. 011B. %n an. 0111, ecsonVs superior



informed him of conflict of intrest. ecsonas(ed for time to comply with the condition9that either he or )etsy resign from theirrespective positions:. Unable to comply withcondition, 4la$o transferred ecson to the)utuan- urigao City-Agusan del ur sales area.After his request against transfer was denied,

ecson brought the matter to 4la$oVs4rievance Committee and while pending, hecontinued to act as medical representative inthe Camarines ur-Camarines orte sales area.=n ov. 05, 8777, the ational Conciliation and'ediation )oard ruled that 4la$oVs policy wasvalid...

ISS+" +Whether or not the policy of a pharmaceuticalcompany prohibiting its employees frommarrying employees of any competitorcompany is valid

R+LIN :=n <qual "rotection

4la$o has a right to guard its trade secrets,manufacturing formulas, mar(eting strategies,and other confidential programs andinformation from competitors. he prohibitionagainst pesonal or marital relationships withemployees of competitor companies upon4la$oVs employees is reasonable under thecircumstances because relationships of thatnature might compromise the interests of thecompany. hat 4la$o possesses the right toprotect its economic interest cannot be denied.

%t is the settled principle that the commands ofthe equal protection clause are addressed onlyto the state or those acting under color of itsauthority. Corollarily, it has been held in a longarray of U upreme Court decisions that theequal protection clause erects to shield againstmerely privately conduct, however,discriminatory or wrongful.

he company actually enforced the policy afterrepeated requests to the employee to complywith the policy. %ndeed the application of thepolicy was made in an impartial and even-handed manner, with due regard for the lot ofthe employee.

=n Constructive @ismissal

Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting,an involuntary resignation resorted to when

continued employment becomes impossible,unreasonable or unli(elyO when there isdemotion in ran(, or diminution in payO or whena clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdainby an employer becomes unbearable to theemployee. one of these conditions are presentin the instant case.

H"L#: he challenged policy has been implementedby 4la$o impartially and disinterestedly for along period of time. %n the case at bar, therecord shows that 4la$o gave ecson severalchances to eliminate the conflict of interestbrought about by his relationship with )etsy,but he never availed of any of them.

/W#<R<!=R<, the petition is @< %<@ for lac( omerit./

TWO INDS OF DUE PROCESS

cases:

/ANCO "S!ANOL FILI!INO v% !ALANCA4.R. o. ?-00>17, 'arch 86, 010B

UR% @%C %= , #=W AC U%R<@+ over the property which is the sub*ect of thelitigation may result either from a sei&ure of theproperty under legal process, whereby it isbrought into the actual custody of the law, or itmay result from the institution of legalproceedings wherein, under special provisionsof law, the power of the court over the propertyis recogni&ed and made effective.

he action to foreclose a mortgage is said to bea proceeding quasi in rem, by which ise$pressed the idea that while it is not strictlyspea(ing an action in rem yet it parta(es ofthat nature and is substantially such.#+" !ROC"SS IN FOR"CLOS+R"!ROC""#IN S: "roperty is always assumed tobe in the possession of its owner, in person or

by agentO and he may be safely held, undercertain conditions, to be affected with(nowledge that proceedings have beeninstituted for its condemnation and sale.!AC +<ngracio "alanca anquinyeng y ?imquingcomortgaged various parcels of real property in'anila to <l )anco <spanol-!ilipino. Afterwards,<ngracio returned to China and there he diedon anuary 81, 0B07 without returning again tothe "hilippines. he mortgagor then institutedforeclosure proceeding but since defendant is a





$$$

%t is true that in proceedings of this character, ifthe defendant for whom publication is madeappears, the action becomes as to him apersonal action and is conducted as such. his,however, does not affect the proposition thatwhere the defendant fails to appear the actionis quasi in remO and it should therefore beconsidered with reference to the principlesgoverning actions in rem.

=n @ue "rocess

$$$ As applied to a *udicial proceeding,however, it may be laid down with certaintythat the requirement of due process is satisfiedif the following conditions are present, namelyO90: here must be a court or tribunal clothedwith *udicial power to hear and determine thematter before itO 98: *urisdiction must belawfully acquired over the person of thedefendant or over the property which is thesub*ect of the proceedingO 9>: the defendantmust be given an opportunity to be heardO and92: *udgment must be rendered upon lawfulhearing.

"assing at once to the requisite that thedefendant shall have an opportunity to beheard, we observe that in a foreclosure casesome notification of the proceedings to thenonresident owner, prescribing the time withinwhich appearance must be made, iseverywhere recogni&ed as essential. o answerthis necessity the statutes generally provide forpublication, and usually in addition thereto, forthe mailing of notice to the defendant, if hisresidence is (nown. hough commonly calledconstructive, or substituted service of processin any true sense. %t is merely a meansprovided by law whereby the owner may beadmonished that his property is the sub*ect of

*udicial proceedings and that it is incumbent

upon him to ta(e such steps as he sees fit toprotect it.

%t will be observed that this mode of notificationdoes not involve any absolute assurance thatthe absent owner shall thereby receive actualnotice. he periodical containing thepublication may never in fact come to hishands, and the chances that he should discoverthe notice may often be very slight. <venwhere notice is sent by mail the probability ofhis receiving it, though much increased, is

dependent upon the correctness of the addressto which it is forwarded as well as upon theregularity and security of the mail service. %twill be noted, furthermore, that the provision ofour law relative to the mailing of notice doesnot absolutely require the mailing of noticeunconditionally and in every event, but only inthe case where the defendantVs residence is(nown. %n the light of all these facts, it isevident that actual notice to the defendant incases of this (ind is not, under the law, to beconsidered absolutely necessary.

he idea upon which the law proceeds inrecogni&ing the efficacy of a means ofnotification which may fall short of actualnotice is apparently this+ "roperty is alwaysassumed to be in the possession of its owner, inperson or by agentO and he may be safely held,under certain conditions, to be affected with(nowledge that proceedings have beeninstituted for its condemnation and sale.

@id the failure of the cler( to send notice todefendantGs last (nown address constitutedenial of due process

he observations which have *ust been madelead to the conclusion that the failure of thecler( to mail the notice, if in fact he did so failin his duty, is not such an irregularity, asamounts to a denial of due process of lawO andhence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved,would not avoid the *udgment in this case.

otice was given by publication in a newspaperand this is the only form of notice which the lawunconditionally requires. his in our opinion isall that was absolutely necessary to sustain theproceedings.

%t will be observed that in considering the effectof this irregularity, it ma(es a differencewhether it be viewed as a question involving

*urisdiction or as a question involving due

process of law. %n the matter of *urisdictionthere can be no distinction between the muchand the little. he court either has *urisdictionor it has notO and if the requirement as to themailing of notice should be considered as astep antecedent to the acquiring of *urisdiction,there could be no escape from the conclusionthat the failure to ta(e that step was fatal tothe validity of the *udgment. %n the applicationof the idea of due process of law, on the otherhand, it is clearly unnecessary to be sorigorous. he *urisdiction being once



established, all that due process of lawthereafter requires is an opportunity for thedefendant to be heardO and as publication wasduly made in the newspaper, it would seemhighly unreasonable to hold that failure to mailthe notice was fatal. We thin( that in applyingthe requirement of due process of law, it ispermissible to reflect upon the purposes of theprovision which is supposed to have beenviolated and the principle underlying thee$ercise of *udicial power in these proceedings.

udge in the light of these conceptions, wethin( that the provision of Act of Congressdeclaring that no person shall be deprived ofhis property without due process of law has notbeen infringed.

S"C OF >+STIC" -S >+# " RAL!H LANTION@ue "rocess 'ar( imene& was charged of multiple crimesranging from ta$ evasion to wire tapping toconspiracy to defraud the U A. imene& wasthen wanted in the U . he U government,pursuant to the R"-U e$tradition treatyrequested to have imene& be e$tradited there.

imene& requested for a copy of the complaintagainst him as well as the e$tradition requestby the U A. he @= sec refused to provide himcopy thereof advising that it is still prematureto give him so and that it is not a preliminaryinvestigation hence he is not entitled to receivesuch copies. imene& sued the @= ec and thelower court ruled in favor of imene&.ISS+":Whether or not imene& is deprived of dueprocess.

H"L#: he C affirmed the ruling of the lowercourt. he case against imene& refer to animpending threat of deprivation of oneGsproperty or property right. o less is this true,but even more so in the case before us,involving as it does the possible deprivation of

liberty, which, based on the hierarchy ofconstitutionally protected rights, is placedsecond only to life itself and en*oys precedenceover property, for while forfeited property canbe returned or replaced, the time spent inincarceration is irretrievable and beyondrecompense.

S"CR"TAR= OF >+STIC" v% LANTION>88 CRA 067 98777:

ature+ "etition for review of a decision of the'anila R C

FACTS:=n une 0B, 0111 the @epartment of usticereceived from the @epartment of !oreignAffairs a request for the e$tradition of privaterespondent 'ar( imene& to the U. . he 4rand

ury %ndictment, the warrant for his arrest, andother supporting documents for said e$traditionwere attached along with the request. Chargesinclude+0. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraudthe U8. Attempt to evade or defeat ta$>. !raud by wire, radio, or television2. !alse statement or entries5. <lection contribution in name of another

he @epartment of ustice 9@= :, through designated panel proceeded with the technicalevaluation and assessment of the e$traditiontreaty which they found having matters neededto be addressed. Respondent, then requestedfor copies of all the documents included in thee$tradition request and for him to be givenample time to assess it.

he ecretary of ustice denied request on theff. grounds+0. #e found it premature to secure him copiesprior to the completion of the evaluation. Atthat point in time, the @= is in the process ofevaluating whether the procedures andrequirements under the relevant law 9"@ 0761

"hilippine <$tradition ?aw: and treaty 9R"-U<$tradition reaty: have been complied with bythe Requesting 4overnment. <valuation by the@= of the documents is not a preliminaryinvestigation li(e in criminal cases ma(ing theconstitutionally guaranteed rights of theaccused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.8. he U. . requested for the prevention ofunauthori&ed disclosure of the information in

the documents.>. !inally, country is bound to Hiennaconvention on law of treaties such that everytreaty in force is binding upon the parties.

he respondent filed for petition of mandamus,certiorari, and prohibition. he R C of CRruled in favor of the respondent. ecretary of

ustice was made to issue a copy of therequested papers, as well as conducting furtherproceedings.



ISS+"S:0. W= private is respondent entitled to thetwo basic due process rights of notice andhearing

Jes. [89a: of "@ 07B6 defines e$tradition asEthe removal of an accused from the"hilippines with the ob*ect of placing him at thedisposal of foreign authorities to enable therequesting state or government to hold him inconnection with any criminal investigationdirected against him in connection with anycriminal investigation directed against him orthe e$ecution of a penalty imposed on himunder the penal or criminal law of therequesting state or government.F Although theinquisitorial power e$ercised by the @= as anadministrative agency due to the failure of the@!A to comply lac(s any *udicial discretion, itprimarily sets the wheels for the e$traditionprocess which may ultimately result in thedeprivation of the liberty of the prospectivee$tradite. his deprivation can be effected attwo stages+ he provisional arrest of theprospective e$tradite pending the submissionof the request the temporary arrest of theprospective e$tradite during the pendency ofthe e$tradition petition in court. Clearly, thereGsan impending threat to a prospectivee$traditeeGs liberty as early as during theevaluation stage. )ecause of suchconsequences, the evaluation process is a(in toan administrative agency conducting aninvestigative proceeding, the consequences ofwhich are essentially criminal since suchtechnical assessment sets off or commencesthe procedure for ultimately the deprivationof liberty of a prospective e$tradite. %n essence,therefore, the evaluation process parta(es ofthe nature of a criminal investigation. here arecertain constitutional rights that are ordinarilyavailable only in criminal prosecution. )ut theCourt has ruled in other cases that where theinvestigation of an administrative proceedingmay result in forfeiture of life, liberty, or

property, the administrative proceedings aredeemed criminal or penal, such forfeitureparta(es the nature of a penalty. %n the case atbar, similar to a preliminary investigation, theevaluation stage of the e$tradition proceedingswhich may result in the filing of an informationagainst the respondent, can possibly lead to hisarrest, to the deprivation of his liberty. hus,the e$traditee must be accorded due processrights of notice hearing according to A>[0290: 98:, as well as A> [3 the right of thepeople to information on matters of public

concern the corollary right to access toofficial records documents

he court held that the evaluation processparta(es of the nature of a criminalinvestigation, having consequences which willresult in deprivation of liberty of theprospective e$tradite. A favorable action in ane$tradition request e$poses a person toeventual e$tradition to a foreign country, thuse$hibiting the penal aspect of the process. heevaluation process itself is li(e a preliminaryinvestigation since both procedures may havethe same result T the arrest and imprisonmentof the respondent.

he basic rights of notice hearing areapplicable in criminal, civil administrativeproceedings. on-observance of these rightswill invalidate the proceedings. %ndividuals areentitled to be notified of any pending caseaffecting their interests, upon notice, mayclaim the right to appear therein presenttheir side.

Rights to notice and hearing+ @ispensable in >cases+a. When there is an urgent need for immediateaction 9preventive suspension in administrativecharges, padloc(ing filthy restaurants,cancellation of passport:.b. Where there is tentativeness ofadministrative action, the respondent isnGtprevented from en*oying the right to notice hearing at a later time 9summary distraint levy of the property of a delinquent ta$payer,replacement of an appointee:c. win rights have been offered, but the rightto e$ercise them had not been claimed.

8. W= this entitlement constitutes a breach ofthe legal commitments and obligation of the"hilippine 4overnment under the R"-U reaty

o. he U. . and the "hilippines share mutual

concern about the suppression and punishmentof crime in their respective *urisdictions. )othstates accord common due process protectionto their respective citi&ens. he administrativeinvestigation doesnGt fall under the threee$ceptions to the due process of notice andhearing in the ec. > Rules 008 of the Rules ofCourt.

>. W= thereGs any conflict between privaterespondentGs basic due process rights provisions of R"-U <$tradition treaty



R+LIN :o. @octrine of incorporation under

international law, as applied in most countries,decrees that rules of international law are givenequal standing with, but are not superior tonational legislative acts. reaty can repealstatute and statute can repeal treaty. oconflict. Heil of secrecy is lifted during trial.Request should impose veil at any stage.

udgment+ "etition dismissed for lac( of merit.

Iapunan, separate concurring opinion+ Whilethe evaluation process conducted by the @= isnot e$actly a preliminary investigation ofcriminal cases, it is a(in to a preliminaryinvestigation because it involves the basicconstitutional rights of the person sought to bee$tradited. A person ordered e$tradited isarrested, forcibly ta(en from his house,separated from his family and delivered to aforeign state. #is rights of abode, to privacy,liberty and pursuit of happiness are ta(en awayfrom him a fate as harsh and cruel as aconviction of a criminal offense. !or this reason,he is entitled to have access to the evidenceagainst him and the right to controvert them.

"uno, dissenting+ Case at bar does not involveguilt or innocence of an accused but theinterpretation of an e$tradition treaty where atsta(e is our governmentGs internationalobligation to surrender to a foreign state aciti&en of its own so he can be tried for analleged offense committed within that

*urisdiction.

ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS!

cases:

S"RRANO -S NLRC

FACTS:errano was a regular employee of %setann@epartment tore as the head of ecurityChec(er. %n 0110, as a cost-cutting measure,%setann phased out its entire security sectionand engaged the services of an independentsecurity agency. "etitioner filed a complaint forillegal dismissal among others. ?abor arbiterruled in his favor as %setann failed to establishthat it had retrenched its security section toprevent or minimi&e losses to its businessO thatprivate respondent failed to accord due process

to petitionerO that private respondent failed touse reasonable standards in selectingemployees whose employment would beterminated. ?RC reversed the decision andordered petitioner to be given separation pay.

ISS+":Whether or not the hiring of an independentsecurity agency by the private respondent toreplace its current security section a validground for the dismissal of the employeesclassed under the latter.

R+LIN :An employerGs good faith in implementing aredundancy program is not necessarily put indoubt by the availment of the services of anindependent contractor to replace the servicesof the terminated employees to promoteeconomy and efficiency. Absent proof thatmanagement acted in a malicious or arbitrarymanner, the Court will not interfere with thee$ercise of *udgment by an employer.%f termination of employment is not for any ofthe cause provided by law, it is illegal and theemployee should be reinstated and paidbac(wages. o contend that even if thetermination is for a *ust cause, the employeeconcerned should be reinstated and paidbac(wages would be to amend Art 831 byadding another ground for consideringdismissal illegal.%f it is shown that the employee was dismissedfor any of the causes mentioned in Art 8B8, thein accordance with that article, he should notbe reinstated but must be paid bac(wages fromthe time his employment was terminated untilit is determined that the termination ofemployment is for a *ust cause because thefailure to hear him before he is dismissedrenders the termination without legal effect.

AN TI/A= -S CO+RT OF IN#+STRIALR"LATIONS

@ue "rocess T Admin )odies T C%R

eodoro oribio owns and operates Ang ibay aleather company which supplies the "hilippineArmy. @ue to alleged shortage of leather,

oribio caused the lay off of members ofational ?abor Union %nc. ?U averred that

oribioGs act is not valid as it is not within theC)A. hat there are two labor unions in Ang

ibayO ?U and ational Wor(erGs )rotherhood. hat W) is dominated by oribio hence he



favors it over ?U. hat ?U wishes for a newtrial as they were able to come up with newevidenceQdocuments that they were not able toobtain before as they were inaccessible andthey were not able to present it before in theC%R.

ISS+": Whether or not there has been a dueprocess of law.

H"L#: he C ruled that there should be a newtrial in favor of ?U. he C ruled that alladministrative bodies cannot ignore ordisregard the fundamental and essentialrequirements of due process. hey areO

90: he right to a hearing which includes theright of the party interested or affected topresent his own case and submit evidence insupport thereof.

98: ot only must the party be given anopportunity to present his case and to adduceevidence tending to establish the rights whichhe asserts but the tribunal must consider theevidence presented.

9>: While the duty to deliberate does notimpose the obligation to decide right, it doesimply a necessity which cannot be disregarded,namely, that of having something to support itsdecision. A decision with absolutely nothing tosupport it is a nullity, a place when directlyattached.

92: ot only must there be some evidence tosupport a finding or conclusion but theevidence must be Esubstantial.F ubstantialevidence is more than a mere scintilla %t meanssuch relevant evidence as a reasonable mindmight accept as adequate to support aconclusion.

95: he decision must be rendered on the

evidence presented at the hearing, or at leastcontained in the record and disclosed to theparties affected.

96: he Court of %ndustrial Relations or any ofits *udges, therefore, must act on its or his ownindependent consideration of the law and factsof the controversy, and not simply accept theviews of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

93: he Court of %ndustrial Relations should,in all controversial questions, render its

decision in such a manner that the parties tothe proceeding can (now the vario issuesinvolved, and the reasons for the decisionsrendered. he performance of this duty isinseparable from the authority conferred uponit.

$ACIAS -% CO$"L"C

FACTS:"etitioners are four members of the #ouse ofRepresentatives from egros =riental, 'isamis=riental and )ulacan, and the provincial4overnor of egros =riental. hey arerequesting that the respondent officials beprevented to implement RA >727, an act thatapportions representative districts in thecountry. hey alleged that their respectiveprovinces were discriminated because theywere given less representation. !urthermore,they allege that RA >727 is unconstitutionaland void because+0. %t was passed without printed final copieswhich must be furnished to the members of the#=R at least > calendar days prior to passage8. %t was approved more than > years after thereturn of the last census of the population>. %t apportioned districts without regard to thenumber of inhabitants of the several provinces.

Respondents Comelec and Hicente 4ella9 ational reasurer: contend that they0. were merely complying with their dutiesunder the statute which they presume andallege to be constitutional8. petitioners have no personality to bring suchaction

ISS+"S:0. Whether or not the petitioners have thepersonality to bring such action.8. Whether or not the act conformed to theprinted form and > day requirement.>. Whether or not the act of apportionment is

within the > year requirement.2. Whether or not the apportionment ofmembers of the #=R is valid.

H"L#: he petitioners as voters and as congressmenand governor of the aggrieved provinces havethe personality to sue. he passage of the actdid not conform to the printed-form and the >day requirement, and that there is nocertificate of urgency from the "resident wasreceived by the #=. he requirement that the



apportionment must be done within > yearfollowing the last census is complied with. heapportionment of members of the #=R is notvalid because it is not based on the number ofinhabitants a province has. ome provinceswere given more representation despite theinferior in number of inhabitants. he Courtheld that RA >727 infringed the provisions ofthe Constitution and is therefore void.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

cases:

+NIT"# STAT"S -S% L+IS TORI/IO

"olice "owerometime in the 0177s, oribio applied for a

license to have his carabao be slaughtered. #isrequest was denied because his carabao isfound not to be unfit for wor(. #e neverthelessslaughtered his carabao without the necessarylicense. #e was eventually sued and wassentenced by the trial court. #is counsel in oneway or the other argued that the lawmandating that one should acquire a permit toslaughter his carabao is not a valid e$ercise ofpolice power.

ISS+" + Whether or not the said law is valid.

H"L#: he C ruled against oribio. he Ce$plained that it Eis not a ta(ing of the propertyfor public use, within the meaning of theconstitution, but is a *ust and legitimatee$ercise of the power of the legislature toregulate and restrain such particular use of theproperty as would be inconsistent with orin*urious to the rights of the publics. Allproperty is acquired and held under the tacitcondition that it shall not be so used as toin*ure the equal rights of others or greatlyimpair the public rights and interests of thecommunity.F

CIT= OF $ANILA $A=OR ALFR"#O LI$ v% >+# " LA +IO & $T#C

FACTS: he petitioners see( to reverse the ruling

of the ruling of the R C regarding theunconstitutionality of =rdinance o. 33B>which is entitled- A =R@% A C< "R=#%)% % 4

#< < A)?% #'< =R ="<RA %= =!)U % < < "R=H%@% 4 C<R A% !=R' =!A'U <'< , < <R A% '< , <RH%C< A @

!AC%?% %< % #< <R'% A-'A?A < "R< CR%)% 4 "< A? %< !=R H%=?A

#<R<=!, A @ !=R = #<R "UR"= < .

"rivate respondent, 'alate ourist@evelopment Corporation 9' @C:, contendsthat the City Council has no power to prohibitthe operation of motels and that the =rdinancedoes not constitute a proper e$ercise of policepower as the compulsory closure of the motelbusiness has no reasonable relation to thelegitimate municipal interests sought to beprotected.

he petitioners, on the other hand, argues thatthe City Council had the power to /prohibitcertain forms of entertainment in order toprotect the social and moral welfare of thecommunity/ M ection 25B 9a: 2 9vii: of the ?oca4overnment CodeN and that the =rdinance wasenacted by the City Council of 'anila to protectthe social and moral welfare of the communityin con*unction with its police powers MArticle %

ection 0B9((: of Republic Act o. 271N. udge ?aguio issued an e$-parte temporaryrestraining order against the enforcement ofthe =rdinance. #e also granted the writ ofpreliminary in*unction prayed for by ' @C.#ence, the appeal by the petitioners.

ISS+": Whether or not the =rdinance o.33B> is constitutional

H"L#: = here is a clear invasion of personal or propertyrights, personal in the case of those individualsdesirous of owning, operating and patroni&ingthose motels and property in terms of theinvestments made and the salaries to be paidto those therein employed. %f the City of 'anilaso desires to put an end to prostitution,fornication and other social ills, it can insteadimpose reasonable regulations such as dailyinspections of the establishments for any

violation of the conditions of their licenses orpermitsO it may e$ercise its authority tosuspend or revo(e their licenses for theseviolationsO and it may even impose increasedlicense fees. %n other words, there are othermeans to reasonably accomplish the desiredend.

"olice power legislation of such characterdeserves the full endorsement of we reiterateour support for it. )ut inspite of its the

*udiciary virtuous aims, the enactment of the



=rdinance has no statutory or constitutionalauthority to stand on. ?ocal legislative bodies,in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibitthe operation of the enumeratedestablishments or order their transfer orconversion without infringing the constitutionalguarantees not even under the guise of dueprocess and equal protection of laws of policepower.

he petition is @< %<@ and the decision of theRegional rial Court declaring the ordinancevoid is A!!%R'<@.

=NOT -S% IAC

4.R. o. 32253, 'arch 87, 01B3

'% %'U' R< U%R<'< =! "R=C<@URA?@U< "R=C< + 90: noticeO 98: hearingOe$ceptions

U) A %H< @U< "R=C< + 90: public interestrequires government interferenceO 98:reasonable means necessary for theaccomplishment of the purpose

FACTS:"etitionerGs 6 carabaos were confiscated by thepolice for having been transported from'asbate to %loilo in violation of <= 686-A. #ebrought an action for replevin, challenging theconstitutionality of said <=. he trial courtsustained the confiscation of the animals anddeclined to rule on the validity of the law on theground that it lac(ed authority to do so. %tsdecision was affirmed by the %AC. #ence thispetition for review.

ISS+":Whether or not the confiscation of the carabaosamounted to arbitrary confiscation of propertywithout due process of law

R+LIN :'inimum Requirements of @ue "rocess+ otice

and #earing he minimum requirements of due process arenotice and hearing which, generally spea(ing,may not be dispensed with because they areintended as a safeguard against officialarbitrariness. %t is a gratifying commentary onour *udicial system that the *urisprudence ofthis country is rich with applications of thisguaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule oflaw and the ancient rudiments of fair play. Wehave consistently declared that every person,

faced by the awesome power of the tate, isentitled to /the law of the land,/ which @anielWebster described almost two hundred yearsago in the famous @artmouth College Case, as/the law which hears before it condemns, whichproceeds upon inquiry and renders *udgmentonly after trial./ %t has to be so if the rights ofevery person are to be secured beyond thereach of officials who, out of mista(en &eal orplain arrogance, would degrade the dueprocess clause into a worn and emptycatchword.

<$ceptions to otice and #earing

his is not to say that notice and hearing areimperative in every case for, to be sure, thereare a number of admitted e$ceptions. heconclusive presumption, for e$ample, bars theadmission of contrary evidence as long as suchpresumption is based on human e$perience orthere is a rational connection between the factproved and the fact ultimately presumedtherefrom. here are instances when the needfor e$peditions action will *ustify omission ofthese requisites, as in the summary abatementof a nuisance per se, li(e a mad dog on theloose, which may be (illed on sight because ofthe immediate danger it poses to the safetyand lives of the people. "ornographic materials,contaminated meat and narcotic drugs areinherently pernicious and may be summarilydestroyed. he passport of a person sought fora criminal offense may be cancelled withouthearing, to compel his return to the country hehas fled. !ilthy restaurants may be summarilypadloc(ed in the interest of the public healthand bawdy houses to protect the public morals.%n such instances, previous *udicial hearing maybe omitted without violation of due process inview of the nature of the property involved orthe urgency of the need to protect the generalwelfare from a clear and present danger.

@ue "rocess is a Restraint on "olice "ower he protection of the general welfare is theparticular function of the police power whichboth restraints and is restrained by dueprocess. he police power is simply defined asthe power inherent in the tate to regulateliberty and property for the promotion of thegeneral welfare. )y reason of its function, ite$tends to all the great public needs and isdescribed as the most pervasive, the leastlimitable and the most demanding of the three



inherent powers of the tate, far outpacingta$ation and eminent domain. he individual,as a member of society, is hemmed in by thepolice power, which affects him even before heis born and follows him still after he is deadfrom the womb to beyond the tomb inpractically everything he does or owns. %tsreach is virtually limitless. %t is a ubiquitous andoften unwelcome intrusion. <ven so, as long asthe activity or the property has some relevanceto the public welfare, its regulation under thepolice power is not only proper but necessary.And the *ustification is found in the venerable?atin ma$ims, alus populi est suprema le$ and

ic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which callfor the subordination of individual interests tothe benefit of the greater number.

!irst Requisite of ubstantive @ue "rocess+%nterests of the "ublic 4enerally Require%nterference

$$$ we hold with the oribio Case that thecarabao, as the poor manVs tractor, so to spea(,has a direct relevance to the public welfare andso is a lawful sub*ect of <$ecutive =rder o.686. he method chosen in the basic measureis also reasonably necessary for the purposesought to be achieved and not undulyoppressive upon individuals, again followingthe above-cited doctrine. here is no doubt thatby banning the slaughter of these animalse$cept where they are at least seven years oldif male and eleven years old if female uponissuance of the necessary permit, the e$ecutiveorder will be conserving those still fit for farmwor( or breeding and preventing theirimprovident depletion.

Sec n Re u*s*te ( SuDstant*ve #ue!' cess + Reasonable 'eans ecessary for theAccomplishment of "urpose, not Unduly=ppressive Upon %ndividuals

)ut while conceding that the amendatorymeasure has the same lawful sub*ect as theoriginal e$ecutive order, we cannot say withequal certainty that it complies with the secondrequirement, vi&., that there be a lawfulmethod. We note that to strengthen theoriginal measure, <$ecutive =rder o. 686-Aimposes an absolute ban not on the slaughterof the carabaos but on their movement,providing that /no carabao regardless of age,se$, physical condition or purpose 9sic: and nocarabeef shall be transported from one

province to another./ he ob*ect of theprohibition escapes us. he reasonableconnection between the means employed andthe purpose sought to be achieved by thequestioned measure is missingWe do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can preventtheir indiscriminate slaughter, considering thatthey can be (illed anywhere, with no lessdifficulty in one province than in another.=bviously, retaining the carabaos in oneprovince will not prevent their slaughter there,any more than moving them to anotherprovince will ma(e it easier to (ill them there.As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made toapply to it as otherwise, so says e$ecutiveorder, it could be easily circumvented bysimply (illing the animal. "erhaps so. #owever,if the movement of the live animals for thepurpose of preventing their slaughter cannot beprohibited, it should follow that there is noreason either to prohibit their transfer as, notto be flippant dead meat.

<ven if a reasonable relation between themeans and the end were to be assumed, wewould still have to rec(on with the sanctionthat the measure applies for violation of theprohibition. he penalty is outright confiscationof the carabao or carabeef being transported,to be meted out by the e$ecutive authorities,usually the police only. %n the oribio Case, thestatute was sustained because the penaltyprescribed was fine and imprisonment, to beimposed by the court after trial and convictionof the accused. Under the challenged measure,significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and theproperty being transported is immediatelyimpounded by the police and declared, by themeasure itself, as forfeited to the government.

"O 646 A *s unc nst*tut* nal

%n the instant case, the carabaos were

arbitrarily confiscated by the police stationcommander, were returned to the petitioneronly after he had filed a complaint for recoveryand given a supersedeas bond of "08,777.77,which was ordered confiscated upon his failureto produce the carabaos when ordered by thetrial court. he e$ecutive order defined theprohibition, convicted the petitioner andimmediately imposed punishment, which wascarried out forthright. he measure struc( atonce and pounced upon the petitioner withoutgiving him a chance to be heard, thus denying



him the centuries-old guaranty of elementaryfair play.%t has already been remar(ed that there areoccasions when notice and hearing may bevalidly dispensed with notwithstanding theusual requirement for these minimumguarantees of due process. %t is also concededthat summary action may be validly ta(en inadministrative proceedings as procedural dueprocess is not necessarily *udicial only. %n thee$ceptional cases accepted, however, there isa *ustification for the omission of the right to aprevious hearing, to wit, the immediacy of theproblem sought to be corrected and theurgency of the need to correct it.

%n the case before us, there was no suchpressure of time or action calling for thepetitionerVs peremptory treatment. heproperties involved were not even inimical perse as to require their instant destruction. herecertainly was no reason why the offenseprohibited by the e$ecutive order should nothave been proved first in a court of *ustice, withthe accused being accorded all the rightssafeguarded to him under the Constitution.Considering that, as we held in "esigan v.Angeles, <$ecutive =rder o. 686-A is penal innature, the violation thereof should have beenpronounced not by the police only but by acourt of *ustice, which alone would have hadthe authority to impose the prescribed penalty,and only after trial and conviction of theaccused.

We also mar(, on top of all this, thequestionable manner of the disposition of theconfiscated property as prescribed in thequestioned e$ecutive order. %t is thereauthori&ed that the sei&ed property shall /bedistributed to charitable institutions and othersimilar institutions as the Chairman of the

ational 'eat %nspection Commission may seefit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving

farmers through dispersal as the @irector ofAnimal %ndustry may see fit, in the case ofcarabaos./ 9<mphasis supplied.: he phrase/may see fit/ is an e$tremely generous anddangerous condition, if condition it is. %t is ladenwith perilous opportunities for partiality andabuse, and even corruption. =ne searches invain for the usual standard and the reasonableguidelines, or better still, the limitations thatthe said officers must observe when they ma(etheir distribution. here is none. heir optionsare apparently boundless. Who shall be the

fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity andby what criteria shall they be chosen =nly theofficers named can supply the answer, theyand they alone may choose the grantee as theysee fit, and in their own e$clusive discretion.@efinitely, there is here a /roving commission,/a wide and sweeping authority that is not/canali&ed within ban(s that (eep it fromoverflowing,/ in short, a clearly profligate andtherefore invalid delegation of legislativepowers.

o sum up then, we find that the challengedmeasure is an invalid e$ercise of the policepower because the method employed toconserve the carabaos is not reasonablynecessary to the purpose of the law and,worse, is unduly oppressive. @ue process isviolated because the owner of the propertyconfiscated is denied the right to be heard inhis defense and is immediately condemned andpunished. he conferment on theadministrative authorities of the power toad*udge the guilt of the supposed offender is aclear encroachment on *udicial functions andmilitates against the doctrine of separation ofpowers. here is, finally, also an invaliddelegation of legislative powers to the officersmentioned therein who are granted unlimiteddiscretion in the distribution of the propertiesarbitrarily ta(en. !or these reasons, we herebydeclare <$ecutive =rder o. 686-Aunconstitutional.

=NOT v% IAC

"olice "ower T ot Halidly <$ercised here had been an e$isting law whichprohibited the slaughtering of carabaos 9<=686:. o strengthen the law, 'arcos issued <=686-A which not only banned the movement ofcarabaos from interprovinces but as well as themovement of carabeef. =n 0> an 01B2, Jnotwas caught transporting 6 carabaos from

'asbate to %loilo. #e was then charged inviolation of <= 686-A. Jnot averred <= 686-Aas unconstitutional for it violated his right to beheard or his right to due process. #e said thatthe authority provided by <= 686-A tooutrightly confiscate carabaos even withoutbeing heard is unconstitutional. he lower courtruled against Jnot ruling that the <= is a valide$ercise of police power in order to promotegeneral welfare so as to curb down theindiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.



ISS+": Whether or not the law is valid.

H"L#: he C ruled that the <= is not valid as itindeed violates due process. <= 686-A ctreateda presumption based on the *udgment of thee$ecutive. he movement of carabaos from onearea to the other does not mean a subsequentslaughter of the same would ensue. Jnotshould be given to defend himself and e$plainwhy the carabaos are being transferred beforethey can be confiscated. he C found that thechallenged measure is an invalid e$ercise ofthe police power because the methodemployed to conserve the carabaos is notreasonably necessary to the purpose of the lawand, worse, is unduly oppressive. @ue processis violated because the owner of the propertyconfiscated is denied the right to be heard inhis defense and is immediately condemned andpunished. he conferment on theadministrative authorities of the power toad*udge the guilt of the supposed offender is aclear encroachment on *udicial functions andmilitates against the doctrine of separation ofpowers. here is, finally, also an invaliddelegation of legislative powers to the officersmentioned therein who are granted unlimiteddiscretion in the distribution of the propertiesarbitrarily ta(en.

L+!AN O v% CA

FACTS:"RC issued a resolution directing that noe$aminee for the C"A )oard <$am shall attendany review class, briefing, conference or theli(e conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from anyschool, college or university, or any reviewcenter or the li(e or any reviewer, lecturer,instructor official or employee of any of theaforementioned or similars institutions during

the > days immediately proceeding everye$amination day including e$amination day.

H"L#:uch resolution is unreasonable. he

unreasonableness is more obvious in that onewho is caught committing the prohibited actseven without any ill motives will be barred fromta(ing future e$aminations conducted by therespondent "RC. !urthermore, it isinconceivable how the Commission canmanage to have a watchful eye on each and

every e$aminee during the three days beforethe e$amination period.

Administrative authorities should not actarbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance ofrules and regulations. o be valid, such rulesand regulations must be reasonable and fairlyadapted to the end in view. %f shown to bear noreasonable relation to the purposes for whichthey are authori&ed to be issued, then theymust be held to be invalid.

"RC has no authority to dictate on thereviewees as to how they should preparethemselves for the licensure e$aminations, asthis will infringe n the e$amineesG right tolibery.

uch resolution also violates the academicfreedom of the schools concerned. heenforcement of Resolution o. 075 is not aguarantee that the alleged lea(ages in thelicensure e$aminations will be eradicated or atleast minimi&ed. What is needed to be done bythe respondent is to find out the source of suchlea(ages and stop it right there.

/ALAC+IT v% CFI

FACTS:At issue in the petition for review before Us is

the validity and constitutionality of =rdinanceo. 627 passed by the 'unicipal )oard of the

City of )utuan on April 80, 0161, the title andte$t of which are reproduced below=R@% A C< "< A?%D% 4 A J "<R = , 4R=! "<R = , < % J =R C=R"=RA %< 4A4<@ % #< )U % < =! <??A@'% %= %CI< = A J '=H%< =R ="U)?%C <P#%)% %= , 4A'< , C= <= #<R "<R!=R'A C< = R< U%R< C#%?@R)< W<< <H< 93: A @ W<?H< 908: J<A=! A4< = "AJ !U?? "AJ'< !=R %CI<% < @<@ !=R A@U? )U #=U?@ C#A= ?J = <-#A?! =! #< A%@ %CI<

"etitioners are Carlos )alacuit ?amberto an,and ergio Ju Carcel managers of the theatersand they attac( the validity andconstitutionality of =rdinance o. 627 on thegrounds that it is ultra vires and an invalide$ercise of police power.

ISS+":@oes this power to regulate include theauthority to interfere in the fi$ing of prices ofadmission to these places of e$hibition andamusement whether under its general grant of









TRILLAN"S I- -S% !I$"NT"L

4.R. o. 031B03, une 83, 877B

<lection to Congress is not a reasonableclassification in criminal law enforcement asthe functions and duties of the office are notsubstantial distinctions which lift one from theclass of prisoners interrupted in their freedomand restricted in liberty of movement.

ustification for confinement with its underlyingrationale of public self-defense applies equallyto detention prisoners li(e petitioner orconvicted prisoners-appellants li(e alos*os.

FACTS:

"etitioner rillanes %H is on trial for coup dGetatin relation to the E=a(wood %ncident.F %n the8773 elections, he won a seat in the enatewith a si$-year term commencing at noon on

une >7, 8773. "etitioner now as(s the Courtthat he be allowed to attend all officialfunctions of the enate, alleging mainly that hiscase is distinct from that of alos*os as his caseis still pending resolution whereas that in the

alos*os case, there was already conviction.

ISS+":Whether or not valid classification betweenpetitioner and alos*os e$ists

R+LIN : he petition is bereft of merit.%n attempting to stri(e a distinction between hiscase and that of alos*os, petitioner chieflypoints out that former Rep. Romeo alos*os9 alos*os: was already convicted, albeit hisconviction was pending appeal, when he filed amotion similar to petitionerVs =mnibus 'otion,whereas he 9petitioner: is a mere detentionprisoner. #e asserts that he continues to en*oycivil and political rights since the presumptionof innocence is still in his favor.

!urther, petitioner illustrates that alos*os wascharged with crimes involving moral turpitude,i.e., two counts of statutory rape and si$ countsof acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indictedfor coup dVetat which is regarded as a /politicaloffense./

!urthermore, petitioner *ustifies in his favor thepresence of noble causes in e$pressinglegitimate grievances against the rampant and

institutionali&ed practice of graft and corruptionin the A!".

A plain reading of alos*os suggests otherwise,however.

he distinctions cited by petitioner were notelemental in the pronouncement in alos*os thatelection to Congress is not a reasonableclassification in criminal law enforcement asthe functions and duties of the office are notsubstantial distinctions which lift one from theclass of prisoners interrupted in their freedomand restricted in liberty of movement.

%t cannot be gainsaid that a person chargedwith a crime is ta(en into custody for purposesof the administration of *ustice. o less thanthe Constitution provides+

All persons, e$cept those charged with offensespunishable by reclusion perpetua whenevidence of guilt is strong, shall, beforeconviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, orbe released on recogni&ance as may beprovided by law. he right to bail shall not beimpaired even when the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus is suspended. <$cessive bailshall not be required. 9Underscoring supplied:

he Rules also state that no person chargedwith a capital offense, or an offense punishableby reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guiltis strong, regardless of the stage of the criminalaction.

hat the cited provisions apply equally to rapeand coup dVetat cases, both being punishableby reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Withinthe class of offenses covered by the statedrange of imposable penalties, there is clearlyno distinction as to the political comple$ion ofor moral turpitude involved in the crime

charged.%n the present case, it is uncontroverted thatpetitionerVs application for bail and for releaseon recogni&ance was denied. hedetermination that the evidence of guilt isstrong, whether ascertained in a hearing of anapplication for bail or imported from a trialcourtVs *udgment of conviction, *ustifies thdetention of an accused as a valid curtailmentof his right to provisional liberty. hisaccentuates the proviso that the denial of the



right to bail in such cases is /regardless of thestage of the criminal action./ uch *ustificationfor confinement with its underlying rationale ofpublic self-defense applies equally to detentionprisoners li(e petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants li(e alos*os.

"etitioner goes on to allege that unli(e alos*oswho attempted to evade trial, he is not a flightris( since he voluntarily surrendered to theproper authorities and such can be proven bythe numerous times he was allowed to traveloutside his place of detention.

ubsequent events reveal the contrary,however. he assailed =rders augured wellwhen on ovember 81, 8773 petitioner wentpast security detail for some reason andproceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotelto issue certain statements. he account,dubbed this time as the /'anila "en %ncident,/proves that petitionerVs argument bites thedust. he ris( that he would escape ceased tobe neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the causefor foreboding became real.

'oreover, circumstances indicating probabilityof flight find relevance as a factor inascertaining the reasonable amount of bail andin cancelling a discretionary grant of bail. %ncases involving non-bailable offenses, what iscontrolling is the determination of whether theevidence of guilt is strong. =nce it isestablished that it is so, bail shall be denied asit is neither a matter of right nor of discretion.

ART. 3 Sec. # RIGHTS OF UNREASONABLESEARCHES AND SEI$URE

cases:

-AL$ONT" -S% #" -ILLA

FACTS:

=n 87 anuary 01B3, the ational CapitalRegion @istrict Command 9 CR@C: wasactivated pursuant to ?etter of %nstruction78QB3 of the "hilippine 4eneral #eadquarters,A!", with the mission of conducting securityoperations within its area of responsibility andperipheral areas, for the purpose ofestablishing an effective territorial defense,maintaining peace and order, and providing anatmosphere conducive to the social, economicand political development of the ationalCapital Region. As part of its duty to maintain

peace and order, the CR@C installedchec(points in various parts of Halen&uela,'etro 'anila. "etitioners aver that, because ofthe installation of said chec(points, theresidents of Halen&uela are worried of beingharassed and of their safety being placed atthe arbitrary, capricious and whimsicaldisposition of the military manning thechec(points, considering that their cars andvehicles are being sub*ected to regularsearches and chec(-ups, especially at night orat dawn, without the benefit of a searchwarrant andQor court order. heir alleged fearfor their safety increased when, at dawn of 1

uly 01BB, )en*amin "arpon, a supply officer ofthe 'unicipality of Halen&uela, )ulacan, wasgunned down allegedly in cold blood by themembers of the CR@C manning thechec(point along 'cArthur #ighway at 'alinta,Halen&uela, for ignoring andQor refusing tsubmit himself to the chec(point and forcontinuing to speed off inspire of warning shotsfired in the air.

ISS+": W= the installation of chec(points violatesthe right of the people against unreasonablesearches and sei&ures

R+LIN :"etitionerVs concern for their safety andapprehension at being harassed by the militarymanning the chec(points are not sufficientgrounds to declare the chec(points per se,illegal. o proof has been presented before theCourt to show that, in the course of theirroutine chec(s, the military, indeed, committedspecific violations of petitionersVV rights againstunlawful search and sei&ure of other rights. heconstitutional right against unreasonablesearches and sei&ures is a personal rightinvocable only by those whose rights havebeen infringed, or threatened to be infringed.

ot all searches and sei&ures are prohibited.

hose which are reasonable are not forbidden. he setting up of the questioned chec(pointsmay be considered as a security measure toenable the CR@C to pursue its mission ofestablishing effective territorial defense andmaintaining peace and order for the benefit ofthe public. Chec(points may not also beregarded as measures to thwart plots todestabili&e the govt, in the interest of publicsecurity. )etween the inherent right of thestate to protect its e$istence and promotepublic welfare and an individualGs right against



a warrantless search wQc is, however,reasonably conducted, the former shouldprevail. rue, the manning of chec(points bythe military is susceptible of abuse by themilitary in the same manner that allgovernmental power is susceptible of abuse.)ut, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,discomfort and even irritation to the citi&en, thechec(points during these abnormal times,when conducted wQin reasonable limits, arepart of the price we pay for an orderly societyand a peaceful community.

PROBABLE CAUSE! %&e'()(*(+)

cases:

H+/"RT >% !% W"//, -S% HONORA/L" RA+L"% #" L"ON

4.R. o. 0808>2, August 8>, 0115

FACTS:=n une 01, 0112, the ational )ureau of%nvestigation 9 )%: filed with the @epartment of

ustice a letter-complaint charging petitioners#ubert Webb, 'ichael 4atchalian, Antonio .?e*ano and si$ 96: other persons with the crimeof Rape and #omicide of Carmela . Hi&conde,her mother <strellita icolas-Hi&conde, and hersister Anne 'arie ennifer in their home at

umber B7 W. Hin&ons, t., )! #omes"aranaque, 'etro 'anila on une >7, 0110.!orthwith, the @epartment of ustice formed apanel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief

tate "rosecutor ovencio R. Duno to conductthe preliminary investigation.

AR +$"NTS:

"etitioners fault the @= "anel for its finding ofprobable cause. hey assail the credibility of

essica Alfaro as inherently wea( anduncorroborated due to the inconsistencies

between her April 8B, 0115 and 'ay 88, 0115sworn statements. hey critici&e the procedurefollowed by the @= "anel when it did note$amine witnesses to clarify the allegedinconsistencies."etitioners charge that respondent udge Raulde ?eon and, later, respondent udge Amelita

olentino issued warrants of arrest againstthem without conducting the requiredpreliminary e$amination."etitioners complain about the denial of theirconstitutional right to due process and violation

of their right to an impartial investigation. heyalso assail the pre*udicial publicity thatattended their preliminary investigation.

ISS+"S:0. Whether or not the @= "anel li(ewisegravely abused its discretion in holding thatthere is probable cause to charge them withthe crime of rape and homicide8. Whether or not respondent udges de ?eonand olentino gravely abused their discretionwhen they failed to conduct a preliminarye$amination before issuing warrants of arrestagainst them>. Whether or not the @= "anel denied themtheir constitutional right to due process duringtheir preliminary investigation2. Whether or not the @= "anel unlawfullyintruded into *udicial prerogative when it failedto charge essica Alfaro in the information as anaccused.

R+LIN :0. =.8. =.>. =. here is no merit in this contentionbecause petitioners were given all theopportunities to be heard.2. =.R<A = +0. he Court ruled that the @= "anel did notgravely abuse its discretion when it foundprobable cause against the petitioners. Aprobable cause needs only to rest on evidenceshowing that more li(ely than not, a crime hasbeen committed and was committed by thesuspects. "robable cause need not be based onclear and convincing evidence of guilt, neitheron evidence establishing guilt beyondreasonable doubt and definitely, not onevidence establishing absolute certainty ofguilt.8. he Court ruled that respondent *udges didnot gravely abuse their discretion. %n arrest

cases, there must be a probable cause that acrime has been committed and that the personto be arrested committed it. ection 6 of Rule008 simply provides that Eupon filing of aninformation, the Regional rial Court may issuea warrant for the accused. Clearly the, our lawsrepudiate the submission of petitioners thatrespondent *udges should have conductedEsearching e$amination of witnessesF beforeissuing warrants of arrest against them.>. he @= "anel precisely ed the parties toadduce more evidence in their behalf and for





are probably guilty thereof, which was affirmedupon review by the "rovincial "rosecutor whoproperly filed with the Regional rial Court fourseparate informations for murder. Consideringthat both the two competent officers to whomsuch duty was entrusted by law have declaredthe e$istence of probable cause, eachinformation is complete in form and substance,and there is no visible defect on its face, thisCourt finds it *ust and proper to rely on theprosecutorVs certification in each information F-"etitioners question the *udgment of udge!eli$ 9statement immediately preceding thisparagraph, italici&ed:.ISS+":W= a *udge may issue a warrant of arrestwithout bail by simply relying on theprosecutionVs certification and recommendationthat a probable cause e$ists.

R+LIN : he questioned =rder of respondent udge

emesio . !eli$ of )ranch 56, Regional rialCourt of 'a(ati dated uly 5, 0117 is declared

U?? and H=%@ and < A %@<.As held in oliven v. 'a(asiar, the udge doesnot have to personally e$amine thecomplainant and his witnesses. he "rosecutorcan perform the same functions as acommissioner for the ta(ing of the evidence.#owever, there should be necessarydocuments and a report supporting the !iscalVsbare certification. All of these should be beforethe udge.We cannot determine beforehand how cursoryor e$haustive the udgeVs e$amination shouldbe. Usually, this depends on the circumstancesof each case. he udge has to e$ercise sounddiscretionO after all, the personal determinationis vested in the udge by the Constitution.#owever, to be sure, the udge must go beyondthe "rosecutorVs certification and investigationreport whenever necessary.As mentioned in the facts 9stated above:, the

?ims presented documents of recantations ofthe witnesses. Although, the general rule isthat recantations are not given much weight inthe determination of a case and in the grantingof a new trial the respondent udge beforeissuing his own warrants of arrest should, atthe very least, have gone over the records ofthe preliminary e$amination conducted earlierin the light of the evidence now presented bythe concerned witnesses in view of the/political undertones/ prevailing in the cases.

%n ma(ing the required personal determination,a udge is not precluded from relying on theevidence earlier gathered by responsibleofficers. he e$tent of the reliance depends onthe circumstances of each case and is sub*ectto the udgeVs sound discretion. #owever, the

udge abuses that discretion when having noevidence before him, he issues a warrant ofarrest.%ndubitably, the respondent udge 9!eli$:committed a grave error when he relied solelyon the "rosecutorVs certification and issued thequestioned =rder dated uly 5, 0117 withouthaving before him any other basis for hispersonal determination of the e$istence of aprobable cause.

CONDUCT OF CHEC POINTS!

cases:

-AL$ONT" -S% #" -ILLA

FACTS:=n 87 anuary 01B3, the ational CapitalRegion @istrict Command 9 CR@C: wactivated pursuant to ?etter of %nstruction78QB3 of the "hilippine 4eneral #eadquarters,A!", with the mission of conducting securityoperations within its area of responsibility andperipheral areas, for the purpose ofestablishing an effective territorial defense,maintaining peace and order, and providing anatmosphere conducive to the social, economicand political development of the ationalCapital Region. As part of its duty to maintainpeace and order, the CR@C installedchec(points in various parts of Halen&uela,'etro 'anila. "etitioners aver that, because ofthe installation of said chec(points, theresidents of Halen&uela are worried of beingharassed and of their safety being placed atthe arbitrary, capricious and whimsicaldisposition of the military manning the

chec(points, considering that their cars andvehicles are being sub*ected to regularsearches and chec(-ups, especially at night orat dawn, without the benefit of a searchwarrant andQor court order. heir alleged fearfor their safety increased when, at dawn of 1

uly 01BB, )en*amin "arpon, a supply officer ofthe 'unicipality of Halen&uela, )ulacan, wasgunned down allegedly in cold blood by themembers of the CR@C manning thechec(point along 'cArthur #ighway at 'alinta,Halen&uela, for ignoring andQor refusing t



submit himself to the chec(point and forcontinuing to speed off inspire of warning shotsfired in the air.

ISS+": W= the installation of chec(points violatesthe right of the people against unreasonablesearches and sei&ures

R+LIN :"etitionerVs concern for their safety andapprehension at being harassed by the militarymanning the chec(points are not sufficientgrounds to declare the chec(points per se,illegal. o proof has been presented before theCourt to show that, in the course of theirroutine chec(s, the military, indeed, committedspecific violations of petitionersVV rights againstunlawful search and sei&ure of other rights. heconstitutional right against unreasonablesearches and sei&ures is a personal rightinvocable only by those whose rights havebeen infringed, or threatened to be infringed.

ot all searches and sei&ures are prohibited. hose which are reasonable are not forbidden. he setting up of the questioned chec(pointsmay be considered as a security measure toenable the CR@C to pursue its mission ofestablishing effective territorial defense andmaintaining peace and order for the benefit ofthe public. Chec(points may not also beregarded as measures to thwart plots todestabili&e the govt, in the interest of publicsecurity. )etween the inherent right of thestate to protect its e$istence and promotepublic welfare and an individualGs right againsta warrantless search wQc is, however,reasonably conducted, the former shouldprevail. rue, the manning of chec(points bythe military is susceptible of abuse by themilitary in the same manner that allgovernmental power is susceptible of abuse.)ut, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,discomfort and even irritation to the citi&en, the

chec(points during these abnormal times,when conducted wQin reasonable limits, arepart of the price we pay for an orderly societyand a peaceful community.

!"O!L" -S% #"L ROSARIO8>2 CRA 826O 4.R. =. 0716>>O 87 U? 0112

FACTS:Accused was charged and convicted by the trialcourt of illegal possession of firearms andillegal possession and sale of drugs, particularly

methamphetamine or shabu. After the issuanceof the search warrant, which authori&ed thesearch and sei&ure of an undeterminedquantity of methamphetamine and itsparaphernaliaGs, an entrapment was plannedthat led to the arrest of del Rosario and to thesei&ure of the shabu, its paraphernaliaGs and ofa .88 caliber pistol with > live ammunition.

ISS+" +Whether or ot the sei&ure of the firearms wasproper.

H"L#:o. ec 8 art. %%% of the constitution specifica

provides that a search warrant mustparticularly describe the things to be sei&ed. %nherein case, the only ob*ects to be sei&ed thatthe warrant determined was themethamphetamine and the paraphernaliaGstherein. he sei&ure of the firearms wasunconstitutional.

Wherefore the decision is reversed and theaccused is acquitted.

$ANALILI -% CO+RT OF A!!"ALS8B7 CRA 277

FACTS:arcotics officers were doing surveillance and

chanced upon the accused in a cemetery whoseemed to be high on drugs. #e tried to resistthe police officers and upon inquiry, foundthat the accused was possessing whatseemed to be crushed mari*uana leaves.

H"L#:A stop-and-fris( was defined as the vernaculardesignation of the right of a police officer tostop a citi&en on the street, interrogate him,and pat him for weapons. %t has been held asone of the e$ceptions to the general ruleagainst searches without warrant.

!"O!L" -S% AR+TA8BB CRA 686

4.R. =. 087505O 0> A"R 011B

FACTS:=n @ec. 0>, 01BB, "Q?t. Abello was tipped off byhis informant that a certain EAling RosaF will bearriving from )aguio City with a large volume ofmari*uana and assembled a team. he ne$tday, at the Hictory ?iner )us terminal theywaited for the bus coming from )aguio, when





b: !or compelling reasons stated in theapplication, any court within the *udicial regionwhere the crime was committed if the place ofthe commission of the crime is (nown, or anycourt within the *udicial region where thewarrant shall be enforced.

#owever, if the criminal action has alreadybeen filed, the application shall only be made inthe court where the criminal action is pending.

ection 3. Right to brea( door or window toeffect search. he officer, if refusedadmittance to the place of directed search aftergiving notice of his purpose and authority, maybrea( open any outer or inner door or windowof a house or any part of a house or anythingtherein to e$ecute the warrant or liberatehimself or any person lawfully aiding him whenunlawfully detained therein.

ection 08. @elivery of property and inventorythereof to courtO return and proceedingsthereon.

9a: he officer must forthwith deliver theproperty sei&ed to the *udge who issued thewarrant, together with a true inventory thereofduly verified under oath.9b: en 907: days after issuance of the searchwarrant, the issuing *udge shall ascertain if thereturn has been made, and if none, shallsummon the person to whom the warrant wasissued and require him to e$plain why noreturn was made. %f the return has been made,the *udge shall ascertain whether section 00 ofthis Rule has been complained with and shallrequire that the property sei&ed be delivered tohim. he *udge shall see to it that subsection9a: hereof has been complied with.9c: he return on the search warrant shall befiled and (ept by the custodian of the log boo(on search warrants who shall enter therein thedate of the return, the result, and other actions

of the *udge.A violation of this section shall constitutecontempt of court

SILAHIS INT"RNATIONAL HOT"L, INC% vs%SOL+TA

FACTS:?oida omacera 9?oida:, a laundrywoman of thehotel, stayed overnight at the female loc(erroom at the basement of the hotel. At dawn,

she heard pounding sounds outside, she sawfive men in barong tagalog whom she failed torecogni&e but she was sure were notemployees of the hotel, forcibly opening thedoor of the union office. %n the morning, asunion officer oluta was trying in vain to openthe door of the union office, ?oida narrated tohim what she had witnessed at dawn.

oluta immediately lodged a complaint beforethe ecurity =fficer. And he fetched aloc(smith. At that instant, men in barongtagalog armed with clubs arrived and startedhitting oluta and his companions. "anliliothereupon instructed Hillanueva to force openthe door, and the latter did. =nce inside,"anlilio and his companions began searchingthe office, over the ob*ection of )abay whoeven as(ed them if they had a search warrant.A plastic bag was found containing mari*uanaflowering tops.As a result of the discovery of the presence ofmari*uana in the union office and after thepolice conducted an investigation of theincident, a complaint against the 0> unionofficers was filed before the !iscalGs =ffice of'anila. R C acquitted the accused. =n appeal,the CA affirmed with modification the decisionof the trial court.

ISS+":Whether respondent individual can recoverdamages for violation of constitutional rights.

R+LIN :Article >8, in relation to Article 880196: and907: of the Civil Code, allows so.

AR . >8. Any public officer or employee, or anyprivate individual, who directly or indirectlyobstructs, defeats, violates or in any mannerimpedes or impairs any of the following rightsand liberties of another person shall be liable tothe latter for damages+

%n the present case, petitioners had, by theirown claim, already received reports in late01B3 of illegal activities and 'aniegoconducted surveillance. Jet, in the morning of

anuary 00, 01BB, petitioners and theircompanions barged into and searched theunion office without a search warrant, despiteample time for them to obtain one.

he course ta(en by petitioners and companystin(s in illegality. "etitionersG violation ofindividual respondentsG constitutional right



against unreasonable search thus furnishes thebasis for the award of damages under Article>8 of the Civil Code. !or respondents, being thelawful occupants of the office had the right toraise the question of validity of the search andsei&ure.

Article >8 spea(s of an officer or employee orperson /directly or indirectly/ responsible forthe violation of the constitutional rights andliberties of another. #ence, it is not the actoralone who must answer for damages underArticle >8O the person indirectly responsible hasalso to answer for the damages or in*urycaused to the aggrieved party. uch being thecase, petitioners, together with 'aniego andHillanueva, the ones who orchestrated theillegal search, are *ointly and severally liable foractual, moral and e$emplary damages toherein individual respondents in accordancewith the earlier-quoted pertinent provision ofArticle >8, in relation to Article 880196: and907: of the Civil Code which provides+

Art. 8801. 'oral damages may be recovered inthe following and analogous cases, amongothers, 96: %llegal search and 907: Acts andaction referred to in Articles 80, 86, 83, 8B, 81,>7, >8, >2 and >5.@<C% %= + @enied.

!ACIS -S% !A$ARAN4.R. o. ?-8>116 'arch 05, 0132

# ct'*ne:%t is a well-settled principle that for violations ofcustoms laws, a warrant issued by the Collectorof Customs is conceded. %t is not necessary, inthese cases, that the warrants be issued by a

*udge, as what is required in the Constitution.

FACTS:

Respondent Ricardo antos is the owner of a

'ercury automobile, model 0153. %t wasbrought into this country without the paymentof customs duty and ta$es, its original owner@onald ames #atch being ta$-e$empt. =n

une 85, 0162, respondent paid ">00.77 forcustoms duty and ta$es.

"etitioner "acis, on uly 88, 0162 received fromthe Administrator, 4eneral AffairsAdministration of the @epartment of ational@efense, a letter to the effect that the ?and

ransportation Commission reported that such

automobile was a /hot car./ )y virtue thereof,petitioner, through his subordinates, loo(edinto the records of his office and ascertainedthat the amount collectible on said car shouldbe "8,577.77, more or less. )ased on suchdiscrepancy, petitioner instituted sei&ureproceedings and issued a warrant of sei&ureand detention and thus the sub*ect automobilewas ta(en. Respondent requested for thewithdrawal or dissolution of the warrant ofsei&ure but petitioner denied it.

hereafter, respondent antos filed a criminalcomplaint for usurpation of *udicial functionswith the City !iscal of 'anila. As therespondent !iscal "amaran was bent onproceeding with the charge against petitioner,an action for prohibition was filed with the

upreme Court.

ISS+":Whether or not the Constitutional provisionwhich states that only a *udge could issue asearch warrant applies to warrants issued inlieu of violations of customs laws.

H"L#:%n a recent decision of this Court, "apa v. 'ago,where the sei&ure of alleged smuggled goodswas effected by a police officer without asearch warrant, this Court, through usticeDaldivar, stated+ /"etitioner 'artin Alagao andhis companion policemen had authority toeffect the sei&ure without any search warrantissued by a component court. he ariff andCustoms Code does not require said warrant inthe instant case. he Code authori&es personshaving police authority under ection 887> ofthe ariff and Customs Code to enter, passthrough or search any land, inclosure,warehouse, store or building, not being adwelling house and also to inspect, search ande$amine any vessel or aircraft and any trun(,pac(age, bo$ or envelope or any person on

board, or stop and search and e$amine anyvehicle, beast or person suspected of holdingor conveying any dutiable or prohibited articleintroduced into the "hilippines contrary to law,without mentioning the need of a searchwarrant in said cases. )ut in the search of adwelling house, the Code provides that said/dwelling house may be entered and searchedonly upon warrant issued by a *udge or *usticeof the peace ... ./ %t is our considered view,therefore, that e$cept in the case of the searchof a dwelling house, persons e$ercising police



authority under the customs law may effectsearch and sei&ure without a search warrant inthe enforcement of customs laws./

he plenitude of the competence vested incustoms officials is thus undeniable. o suchconstitutional question then can possibly arise.

o much is implicit from the very language ofection 8875 of the ariff and Customs Code. %t

spea(s for itself. %t is not susceptible of anymisinterpretation. he power of petitioner isthus manifest. %t being undeniable then that thesole basis for an alleged criminal act performedby him was the performance of a dutyaccording to law, there is not the slightest

*ustification for respondent Assistant City !iscalto continue with the preliminary investigationafter his attention was duly called to the plainand e$plicit legal provision that did not sufferat all from any constitutional infirmity.

W#<R<!=R<, the writ of prohibition prayed foris granted and the successor of respondent'anuel R. "amaran, now a criminal circuit court

*udge, or any one in the City !iscalVs =ffice ofthe City of 'anila to whom the complaintagainst petitioner for usurpation of *udicialfunctions arising out of the issuance of thewarrant of sei&ure and detention, sub*ect-matter of this litigation, has been assigned, isperpetually restrained from acting thereone$cept to dismiss the same. o costs.

STO! AN# FRIS R+L":

cases:

$ALACAT -S% CO+RT OF A!!"ALS4R 08>515, 08 @ecember 0113

FACTS:=n 83 August 0117, at about 6+>7 p.m.,allegedly in response to bomb threats reportedseven days earlier, Rodolfo Ju of the Western

"olice @istrict, 'etropolitan "olice !orce of the%ntegrated ational "olice, "olice tation o. >,uiapo, 'anila, was on foot patrol with three

other police officers 9all of them in uniform:along ue&on )oulevard, uiapo, 'anila, nearthe 'ercury @rug store at "la&a 'iranda. heychanced upon two groups of 'uslim-loo(ingmen, with each group, comprised of three tofour men, posted at opposite sides of thecorner of ue&on )oulevard near the 'ercury@rug tore. hese men were actingsuspiciously with Etheir eyes moving very fast.F

Ju and his companions positioned themselvesat strategic points and observed both groupsfor about >7 minutes. he police officers thenapproached one group of men, who then fled indifferent directions. As the policemen gavechase, Ju caught up with and apprehended

ammy 'alacat y 'andar 9who Ju recogni&ed,inasmuch as allegedly the previous aturday,85 August 0117, li(ewise at "la&a 'iranda, Jusaw 'alacat and 8 others attempt to detonatea grenade:. Upon searching 'alacat, Ju founda fragmentation grenade tuc(ed inside thelatterGs Efront waist line.F JuGs companionpolice officer Rogelio 'alibiran, apprehendedAbdul Casan from whom a .>B caliber revolverwas recovered. 'alacat and Casan were thenbrought to "olice tation > where Ju placed anEPF mar( at the bottom of the grenade andthereafter gave it to his commander. Ju did notissue any receipt for the grenade he allegedlyrecovered from 'alacat. =n >7 August 0117,'alacat was charged with violating ection > of"residential @ecree 0B66. At arraignment on 1=ctober 0117, petitioner, assisted by counselde officio, entered a plea of not guilty. 'alacatdenied the charges and e$plained that he onlyrecently arrived in 'anila. #owever, severalother police officers mauled him, hitting himwith benches and guns. "etitioner was onceagain searched, but nothing was found on him.#e saw the grenade only in court when it waspresented. %n its decision dated 07 !ebruary0112 but promulgated on 05 !ebruary 0112,the trial court ruled that the warrantless searchand sei&ure of 'alacat was a(in to a Estop andfris(,F where a Ewarrant and sei&ure can beeffected without necessarily being preceded byan arrestF and Ewhose ob*ect is either tomaintain the status quo momentarily while thepolice officer see(s to obtain moreinformationFO and that the sei&ure of thegrenade from 'alacat was incidental to a lawfularrest. he trial court thus found 'alacat guiltyof the crime of illegal possession of e$plosives

under ection > of "@ 0B66, and sentenced himto suffer the penalty of not less than 03 years,2 months and 0 day of Reclusion emporal, asminimum, and not more than >7 years ofReclusion "erpetua, as ma$imum. =n 0B!ebruary 0112, 'alacat filed a notice of appealindicating that he was appealing to the

upreme Court. #owever, the record of thecase was forwarded to the Court of Appeals9CA-4R CR 051BB:. %n its decision of 82 anua0116, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial



court. 'analili filed a petition for review withthe upreme Court.

ISS+":Whether the search made on 'alacat is valid,pursuant to the e$ception of Estop and fris(.F

H"L#: he general rule as regards arrests, searchesand sei&ures is that a warrant is needed inorder to validly effect the same. heConstitutional prohibition against unreasonablearrests, searches and sei&ures refers to thoseeffected without a validly issued warrant,sub*ect to certain e$ceptions. As regards validwarrantless arrests, these are found in ection5, Rule 00> of the Rules of Court. A warrantlessarrest under the circumstances contemplatedunder ection 59a: has been denominated asone Ein flagrante delicto,F while that under

ection 59b: has been described as a EhotpursuitF arrest. urning to valid warrantlesssearches, they are limited to the following+ 90:customs searchesO 98: search of movingvehiclesO 9>: sei&ure of evidence in plain viewO92: consent searchesO 95: a search incidental toa lawful arrestO and 96: a Estop and fris(.F heconcepts of a Estop-and-fris(F and of a searchincidental to a lawful arrest must not beconfused. hese two types of warrantlesssearches differ in terms of the requisitequantum of proof before they may be validlyeffected and in their allowable scope. %n asearch incidental to a lawful arrest, as theprecedent arrest determines the validity of theincidental search. #ere, there could have beenno valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuitarrest preceding the search in light of the lac(of personal (nowledge on the part of Ju, thearresting officer, or an overt physical act, onthe part of 'alacat, indicating that a crime had

*ust been committed, was being committed orwas going to be committed. "lainly, the searchconducted on 'alacat could not have been one

incidental to a lawful arrest. =n the other hand,while probable cause is not required to conducta Estop and fris(,F it nevertheless holds thatmere suspicion or a hunch will not validate aEstop and fris(.F A genuine reason must e$ist,in light of the police officerGs e$perience andsurrounding conditions, to warrant the beliefthat the person detained has weaponsconcealed about him. !inally, a Estop-and-fris(Fserves a two-fold interest+ 90: the generalinterest of effective crime prevention anddetection, which underlies the recognition that

a police officer may, under appropriatecircumstances and in an appropriate manner,approach a person for purposes of investigatingpossible criminal behavior even withoutprobable causeO and 98: the more pressinginterest of safety and self-preservation whichpermit the police officer to ta(e steps to assurehimself that the person with whom he deals isnot armed with a deadly weapon that couldune$pectedly and fatally be used against thepolice officer. #ere, there are at least three 9>:reasons why the Estop-and-fris(F was invalid+!irst, there is grave doubts as to JuGs claim that'alacat was a member of the group whichattempted to bomb "la&a 'iranda 8 daysearlier. his claim is neither supported by anypolice report or record nor corroborated by anyother police officer who allegedly chased thatgroup. econd, there was nothing in 'alacatGsbehavior or conduct which could havereasonably elicited even mere suspicion otherthan that his eyes were Emoving very fastF an observation which leaves us increduloussince Ju and his teammates were nowherenear 'alacat and it was already 6+>7 p.m., thuspresumably dus(. 'alacat and his companionswere merely standing at the corner and werenot creating any commotion or trouble. hird,there was at all no ground, probable orotherwise, to believe that 'alacat was armedwith a deadly weapon. one was visible to Ju,for as he admitted, the alleged grenade wasEdiscoveredF Einside the front waistlineF of'alacat, and from all indications as to thedistance between Ju and 'alacat, any telltalebulge, assuming that 'alacat was indeedhiding a grenade, could not have been visibleto Ju. What is unequivocal then are blatantviolations of 'alacatGs rights solemnlyguaranteed in ections 8 and 0890: of Article %%of the Constitution.

WARRANTLESS ARREST

cases:!"O!L" OF TH" !HILI!!IN"S -S%

SAN#I AN/A=AN

9 U) <C + @<?<4A %= =! UA % U"=W<RO < =""<?.

FACTS:

= 0B 'ARC# 01B6, A J. RA'%R<D AA J. A)<??A, "C44 A4< , % U<@



< U< RA %= =R@<R A4A% #<R< #=U #< =?< % U< "R< < <@ %W#< #<R =R = #< 'ARC# 0B, 01B6

< U< RA %= =R@<R A4A% "R="<R %<=! %'<?@A % ?<J < % C?U@% 4 #<R< #=U < A =?= . #<%R =R@<R WA =

%4 <@ )J A J "C44 C=''% %= <R .

ISS+": % #<%R =R@<R HA?%@

R+LIN : =. U@%C%A? =R UA %- U@%C%A? "=W<R 'AJ

= )< @<?<4A <@. % "C44 H. U@4< "<\A,M0NM03N #< C=UR #<?@ #A #< "=W<R ,!U C %= A @ @U %< =! #< "C44A'=U = #< <P<RC% < =! UA %- U@%C%A?!U C %= , A @ #< <P<RC% < =! UC#!U C %= CA = )< @<?<4A <@ )J #<C=''% %= = % R<"R< < A %H< =R

U)=R@% A < =R A I !=RC< )<CAU < =! #< W<?? < A)?% #<@ "R% C%"?< #A U@%C%A? =R UA %- U@%C%A? "=W<R 'AJ =)< @<?<4A <@. "< % %= <R R<"U)?%C AR4U< #A 'R .'ARC= #=U?@ )< @<<'<@ < =""<@ !R='

U< %= % 4 #< < U< RA %= =! #<R=?= R< #=U < )J #<R AC %= % R<4AR@

= #< A'<. )U A H=%@ =R@<R "R=@UC<= <!!<C A @ CA = )< HA?%@A <@

U @<R #< @=C R% < =! < =""<?. !=R #<A'< R<A = , #< C=UR CA = ACC<"

"< % %= <RG H%<W #A 'R . 'ARC=#=U?@ #AH< !%R =U4# #< ?%! % 4 =!

#< < U< RA %= =R@<R #R=U4# A'= %= = UA # !%?<@ W% # #< "C44.)<% 4 H=%@, #< A @%4A )AJA #A #<"=W<R = R%I< % @=W = %4# .

R+LIN OF TH" CO+RT: he CourtGs RulingUnder ection 86, Article PH%%% of theConstitution, an order of sequestration mayonly issue upon a showing Eof a prima facie

caseF that the properties are ill-gotten wealthunder <$ecutive =rders 0 and 8.M8NM00N Whena court nullifies an order of sequestration forhaving been issued without a prima facie case,the Court does not substitute its *udgment forthat of the "C44 but simply applies the law.M>NM08N%n )ataan hipyard <ngineering Co, %nc. v."C44,M2NM0>N the Court held that a prima faciefactual foundation that the propertiessequestered are Eill-gotten wealthF is required.

he power to determine the e$istence of a

prima facie case has been vested in the "C44as an incident to its investigatory powers. hetwo-commissioner rule is obviously intended toassure a collegial determination of such fact.M5NM02N#ere, it is clear that the "C44 did not ma(e aprior determination of the e$istence of a primafacie case that would warrant the sequestrationof the =lot Resthouse. he Republic presentedno evidence before the andiganbayan thatshows differently. or did the Republicdemonstrate that the two "C44representatives were given the quasi-*udicialauthority to receive and consider evidence thatwould warrant such a prima facie finding."arenthetically, the RepublicGs supposedevidence does not show how the 'arcosesacquired the sequestered property, whatma(es it Eill-gotten wealth,F and how former"resident 'arcos intervened in its acquisition.

a(ing the foregoing view, the resolution of theissue surrounding the character of the propertysequestered T whether or not it could primafacie be considered ill-gotten T should benecessary. he issue in this case is not new. he factsare substantially identical to those in the caseof Republic v. andiganbayan 9@io %slanResort, %nc.:.M6NM05N here, the same ARamire& issued a sequestration order on April02, 01B6 against @io %sland Resort, %nc. and aits assets and properties which were thought tobe part of the 'arcosesG ill-gotten wealth.Alerted by a challenge to his action, the "C44passed a resolution Eto confirm, ratify andadopt as its own all the Writs of equestrationFthat Attys. Ramire& and Abella issued Etoremove any doubt as to the validity andenforceabilityF of their writs. till, the Courtstruc( them down as void+%t is indubitable that under no circumstancescan a sequestration or free&e order be validlyissued by one not a Commissioner of the "C44. he invalidity of the sequestration order was

made more apparent by the fact that Atty.Ramire& did not even have any specificauthority to act on behalf of the Commission atthe time he issued the said sequestrationorder. $ $ $ <ven assuming arguendo that Atty. Ramire&had been given prior authority by the "C44 toplace @io %sland Resort under sequestration,nevertheless, the sequestration order he issuedis still void since "C44 may not delegate itsauthority to sequester to its representatives



and subordinates, and any such delegation isinvalid and ineffective.Under <$ecutive =rder os. 0 and 8, "C44 isthe sole entity primarily charged with theresponsibility of recovering ill-gotten wealth. $$ $ he power to sequester, therefore, carrieswith it the corollary duty to ma(e a preliminarydetermination of whether there is a reasonablebasis for sequestering a property alleged to beill-gotten. After a careful evaluation of theevidence adduced, the "C44 clearly has to useits own *udgment in determining the e$istenceof a prima facie case.

he absence of a prior determination by the"C44 of a prima facie basis for thesequestration order is, unavoidably, a fataldefect which rendered the sequestration ofrespondent corporation and its properties voidab initio. )eing void ab initio, it is deemed non-e$istent, as though it had never been issued,

he Court is maintaining its above ruling inthis case.Although the two "C44 lawyers issued thesequestration order in this case on 'arch 0B,01B6, before the passage of ec. > of the "C44Rules, such consideration is immaterialfollowing our above ruling.%n "C44 v. udge "e;a,MBNM03N the Court heldthat the powers, functions and duties of the"C44 amount to the e$ercise of quasi-*udicialfunctions, and the e$ercise of such functionscannot be delegated by the Commission to itsrepresentatives or subordinates or tas( forcesbecause of the well established principle that

*udicial or quasi-*udicial powers may not bedelegated.%t is the RepublicGs theory of course thatCommissioner @a&aGs letter, directing Attys.Ramire& and Abella to search and sequester allproperties, documents, money and other assetsof respondents, should be considered as thewrit of sequestration while the order issued byAttys. Ramire& and Abella should be treatedmerely as an implementing order.

)ut the letter did not have the tenor of asequestration order covering specific propertiesthat the lawyers were ordered to sei&e and holdfor the "C44. Actually, that letter is of thesame (ind issued to Attys. Ramire& and Abellain @io %sland Resort. Consequently, there is noreason to depart from the CourtGs ruling in thelatter case where it said+

he invalidity of the sequestration order wasmade more apparent by the fact that Atty.Ramire& did not even have any specificauthority to act on behalf of the Commission at

the time he issued the said sequestrationorder. hus, the respondent Court noted+ Contrary to plaintiffGs representation, nothinge$ists to support its contention that the as(!orce had been given prior authority to place@%= under "C44 control. =n the contrary, asthe te$t of the above letters clearly show,Attys. ose an Ramire& and )en Abella, hadacted on broad and non-specific powers+ Z)yauthority of the commission and the powersvested in it. $ $ $.GFM1NM0BN "etitioner Republic argues that 'rs. 'arcosshould be deemed estopped from questioningthe sequestration of her =lot Resthouse by heractions in regard to the same. )ut a void orderproduces no effect and cannot be validatedunder the doctrine of estoppel. !or the samereason, the Court cannot accept petitionerGsview that 'rs. 'arcos should have first soughtthe lifting of the sequestration order through amotion to quash filed with the "C44. )eingvoid, the andiganbayan has the power tostri(e it down on sight.)esides, the lifting of the sequestration orderwill not necessarily be fatal to the main casesince it does not follow from such lifting thatthe sequestered properties are not ill-gottenwealth. uch lifting simply means that thegovernment may not act as conservator or maynot e$ercise administrative or house(eepingpowers over the property.M07NM01N %ndeed, Republic can be protected by a notice of lispendens.W#<R<!=R<, the Court @% '% < the petitiofor lac( of merit and A!!%R' the challengedresolutions of the !ourth @ivision of the

andiganbayan dated !ebruary 8B, 8778 andAugust 8B, 8778 in Civil Case 7778, whichgranted respondent %melda R. 'arcosG 'otionto uash the 'arch 0B, 01B6 equestration=rder covering the =lot Resthouse.!urther, the Court @%R<C the Register o@eeds of ?eyte to immediately annotate anotice of lis pendens on the certificate of title of

the =lot Resthouse with respect to the Republicof the "hilippinesG claim over the same in CivilCase 7778 of the andiganbayan.

o pronouncement as to costs.= =R@<R<@.

!A#ILLA -% CA081 55B 90117:

Where in the complaint for 4rave Coercionagainst the mayor and policemen, they wereacquitted on the ground that their guilt has not



been proven beyond reasonable doubt, suchacquittal will not bar a civil case for damagesarising from the demolition of petition]erVsmar(et stalls. he acquittal on the ground thattheir guilt has not been proven beyondreasona]ble doubt refers to the element of4rave Coercion and not to the fact of that thestalls were not demolished.Under the Rules of Court, the e$tinction ofpenal action carries with it the e$tinction ofcivil only if there is a declaration that facts fromwhich civil may arise did not e$ist. Also, Art. 81of the Civil Code does not state that civilliability can be recovered only in a separatecivil action. he civil liability can be recoveredeither in the same or a separate action. hepurpose of recovering in the same action is todispense with the filing of another civil actionwhere the same evidence is to be presented,and the unsettling implications of permittingreinsti]tuttion of a separate civil action.#owever, a separate civil action is warrantedwhen 90: addition]al facts are to beestablishedO 98: there is more evidence to beadducedO 9>: there is full termina]tion of thecriminal case and a separate complaint wouldbe more efficacious than a remand. #ence, CAdid not err in awarding damages despite theacquittal.

!"O!L" -S% #"L ROSARIO8>2 CRA 826O 4.R. =. 0716>>O 87 U? 0112

FACTS: Accused was charged and convicted by the trialcourt of illegal possession of firearms andillegal possession and sale of drugs, particularlymethamphetamine or shabu. After the issuanceof the search warrant, which authori&ed thesearch and sei&ure of an undeterminedquantity of methamphetamine and itsparaphernaliaGs, an entrapment was plannedthat led to the arrest of del Rosario and to thesei&ure of the shabu, its paraphernaliaGs and of

a .88 caliber pistol with > live ammunition.ISS+":Whether or ot the sei&ure of the firearms wasproper.

H"L#:o. ec 8 art. %%% of the constitution specifically

provides that a search warrant mustparticularly describe the things to be sei&ed. %nherein case, the only ob*ects to be sei&ed thatthe warrant determined was the

methamphetamine and the paraphernaliaGstherein. he sei&ure of the firearms wasunconstitutional.

Wherefore the decision is reversed and theaccused is acquitted.

VALIDITY OF A WARRANT ISSUED BY THE UDGE

cases:

!"O!L" v% T""

/rights of the accused to speedy trial/

FACTS: he case involves an automatic review of *udgment made against ee who was convictedfor illegal possession of mari*uana andsentenced to death. he defense assailed thedecision of the court for ta(ing admissible asevidence the mari*uana sei&ed from theaccused by virtue of allegedly general searchwarrant. hey further contend that the accusedwas deprived of his right to speedy trial byfailure of the prosecution to produce theirwitness who failed to appear during the 87hearing dates thereby slowing down the trialprocedure.

ISS+":Whether or not the substantive right of theaccused for a speedy trial pre*udiced during thehearing of the case.

R+LIN : he court ruled that the substantive right of theaccused for a fair and speedy trial was notviolated. %t held that the peedy rial Act of011B provides that the trial period for thecriminal cases should be in general 0B7 days.#owever, in determining the right of anaccused to speedy trial, courts should do more

than a mathematical computation of thenumber of postponements of the scheduledhearings of the case. he right to a speedy trialis deemed violated only when+ 90: theproceedings are attended by ve$atious,capricious, and oppressive delaysO or 98: whenun*ustified postponements are as(ed for andsecuredO or 9>: when without cause or

*ustifiable motive a long period of time isallowed to elapse without the party having hiscase tried.



%t was shown by the records that theprosecution e$erted efforts in obtaining awarrant to compel the witness to testify. heconcept of speedy trial is necessarily relativewhere several factors are weighed such as thelength of time of delay, the reason of suchdelay, and conduct of prosecution and theaccused and the pre*udice and damagedcaused to the accused of such delay. he courtdid not find the 87 days of delayed hearingunreasonable length of time as to constitutedeprivation of the constitutional rights of theaccused for a speedy trial in addition to the factthat court trial may be always sub*ected topostponement for reasonable cause of delay. %nthe absence of showing that the reason fordelay was capricious or oppressive, the tatemust not be deprived of reasonable opportunityin prosecuting the accused.

!AN AN#A$AN -% CASAR

FACTS: he case originated in ?anao. he offendedparty was ambushed in ?anao, but he survived.)ased on his description, there were around 57persons who staged the ambush from bothsides of the hill. #owever, he could notrecogni&e anyone of the 57. )ut he filed a caseagainst all 57 ambushers, all E =# @=< F. othe court issued a warrant of arrest against the57 ohn @oes.

ISS+":WQ the warrant of arrest is valid Can a courtissue a warrant of arrest against an un(nownaccused

H"L#:= it is not valid. %t is of the nature of a general

warrant, one of a call of writs long prescribedas unconstitutional and once anathemati&ed astotally subversive of the liberty of the sub*ect.Clearly violative of the constitutional in*unction

that warrants of arrest should particularlydescribe the person or persons to be sei&ed. he warrant as against unidentified sub*ectswill be considered as null and void.

EXAMINATION OF BAN ACCOUNTSDEPOSITS

cases:

!N/ -S% ANCA=CO4.R. o. ?-0B>2> eptember >7, 0165

!AC +@efendants <milio 4ancayco and !lorentino!lor, as special prosecutors of the @epartmentof ustice, required the plaintiff "hilippine

ational )an( to produce at a hearing therecords of the ban( deposits of <rnesto

imene&, former administrator of theAgricultural Credit and CooperativeAdministration, who was then underinvestigation for une$plained wealth. %ndeclining to reveal its records, the plaintiff ban(invo(ed ection 8 of Republic Act o. 0275.

=n the other hand, the defendants citedection B of the Anti-4raft and Corrupt

"ractices Act 9Republic Act o. >701: in supportof their claim of authority,which allegedlyprovides an additional ground for thee$amination of ban( deposits.

ISS+":Whether ection B of Republic Act o. >701provides an additional ground for thee$amination of ban( deposits.

H"L#: Jes. he truth is that these laws are sorepugnant to each other than no reconciliationis possible. $ $ $. he only conclusion possibleis that section B of the Anti-4raft ?aw isintended to amend section 8 of Republic Act

o. 0275 by providing additional e$ception tothe rule against the disclosure of ban(deposits.

WNhile section 8 of Republic Act 0275 declaresban( deposits to be /absolutely confidential,/ itnevertheless allows such disclosure in thefollowing instances+90: Upon written permission of the depositorO98: %n cases of impeachmentO9>: Upon order of a competent court in cases ofbribery or dereliction of duty of public officialsO

92: %n cases where the money deposited is thesub*ect matter of the litigation. Cases ofune$plained wealth are similar to cases ofbribery or dereliction of duty.

$ARJ+"5 -S% #ISI"RTO4.R. o. 0>5BB8 une 83, 8770

FACTS:Respondent =mbudsman @esierto orderedpetitioner 'arque& to produce several ban(documents for purposes of inspection in



Documents

54048900 Political Law Review Cases