5-YEAR EVALUATION OF THE CENTRAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE … · 2017-02-06 · 5-YEAR EVALUATION OF THE CENTRAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND COUNTRY REPORT: SOMALIA An independent Evaluation

5-YEAR EVALUATION OF THE CENTRAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND COUNTRY REPORT: SOMALIA

An independent Evaluation commissioned by OCHA

10 July 2011 Authors: John Cosgrave Cécile Collin

This document has been prepared by Channel Research as part of the 5-‐‑Year Evaluation of the CERF, commissioned by OCHA.

This document is public and can be disseminated.

Please address all correspondence to:

Cecile Collin,

E-‐‑mail: [email protected]

Tel: +32 2 633 6529

Fax: +32 2 633 3092

1. The team gratefully acknowledge the assistance provided by the OCHA Somalia office in conducting this evaluation. In particular we would like to thank Patricia Agwaro for setting up interviews and making contacts for the team.

2. We would also like to thank all of those who took the time to answer our questions, or let us sit in on various process meetings. We are also grateful to those who have commented on the initial draft of this report.

UN General Assembly Resolution 60/124 sets the objective of the upgraded CERF “to ensure a more predictable and timely response to humanitarian emergencies, with the objectives of promoting early action and response to reduce loss of life, enhancing response to time-‐‑critical requirements and strengthening core elements of humanitarian response in underfunded crises, based on demonstrable needs and on priorities identified in consultation with the affected State as appropriate.”

Route des Marnières 45A, 1380 Ohain, Belgium

Tel +32 2 633 65 29 Fax +32 2 633 30 92

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VAT No 864 560 703

CERF 5-Year Evaluation Country Report: Somalia

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................ 2 ACRONYMS ......................................................................................................................... 3 MAP OF SOMALIA ............................................................................................................... 5 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 6 CONTEXT ............................................................................................................................. 9 UTILISATION ...................................................................................................................... 11 PROCESSES ...................................................................................................................... 16 OUTPUTS ........................................................................................................................... 19 OUTCOMES ....................................................................................................................... 23 EFFECTIVENESS, EFFICIENCY AND RELEVANCE ........................................................ 26 CONTRIBUTION ................................................................................................................. 29 CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................. 31 ANNEX I. LINKS TO THE TERMS OF REFERENCE AND THE INCEPTION REPORT ... 33 ANNEX II. CERF PROCESS DESCRIPTION ..................................................................... 34 ANNEX III. BIOGRAPHICAL NOTICE OF THE MAIN WRITERS ...................................... 36 ANNEX IV. METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................. 39 ANNEX V. PERSONS MET ................................................................................................ 51 ANNEX VI. DETAILS FOR ALL CERF FUNDED PROJECTS IN SOMALIA ...................... 53 ANNEX VII. SELECTED PROJECTS ................................................................................. 60 ANNEX VIII. ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................... 68


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ACRONYMS Acronym Details

CAP Consolidated Appeals Process

CAR Central African Republic

CERF Central Emergency Response Fund

CHF Common Humanitarian Fund

DAC Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)

DFID Department for International Development (of the UK)

DRC Democratic Republic of Congo

ERC Emergency Relief Coordinator (the head of OCHA)

ERF Emergency Response Fund or Expanded Humanitarian Response Fund

EU European Union

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization

FMU Fund Management Unit (UNDP)

FTS Financial Tracking Service

GA General Assembly (of the United Nations)

GHD Good Humanitarian Donorship

HC Humanitarian Coordinator

HCT Humanitarian Country Team

HDI Human Development Index

HDPT Humanitarian and Development Partnership Team

HQ Head Quarters

HRF Humanitarian Response Fund

IDP Internally Displaced People

IASC Inter-‐‑Agency Standing Committee

INGO International Non Governmental Organisations

IOM International Organisation for Migration

LoU Letter of Understanding

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MDTF Multi Donor Trust Fund

NGO Non Governmental Organisations

NNGO National Non Governmental Organisations

OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs


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Acronym Details

OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

PAF Performance and Accountability Framework

PPBD Planning, Programme Budget Department of the UN Secretariat

PBF Peace Building Fund

RC Resident Coordinator

RR Rapid Response (CERF funding window)

TFG Transitional Federal Government

ToR Terms of Reference

UFE Under-‐‑funded emergency (CERF funding window)

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

UNCT United Nations Country Team

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNHAS United Nations Humanitarian Air Service

UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services

USD United States Dollar

WASH Water Sanitation and Hygiene

WFP United Nations World Food Programme

WHO World Health Organization


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MAP OF SOMALIA

3. Note: The team did not travel to Somalia as almost all agency headquarters for Somalia are located in Nairobi, Kenya.


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INTRODUCTION

Overview

4. This is one of the 16 country studies undertaken for the five-‐‑year evaluation of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). The CERF was founded in 1991 as a $50 million loan fund as was revamped in 2006 with the addition of a $450 million grant fund. All UN agencies, as well as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), can have access to the CERF.

5. The General Assembly mandated the evaluation and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) evaluation section managed the evaluation. OCHA commissioned Channel Research to conduct it. OCHA also established a Steering Group of evaluation specialists (to advise on evaluation quality issues) and a reference group of stakeholders (to advise on humanitarian sector issues). Both groups were drawn from across the humanitarian community with representatives from UN agencies1, donors, and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The evaluation is examining the CERF from 2006 to 2010 inclusive.

Methodology

6. This report is based on a mix of methods. The full methodology is described in the methodology Annex.

7. After initial document research, a team of two evaluators visited Nairobi in January 2011 and conducted key informant interviews as well as directly observing CERF and other coordination processes. The list of interviewees is contained in Annex. The headquarters for all of the UN agencies working in Somalia, and the headquarters of almost all the international NGOs working in Somalia, are based in Nairobi. The team did not visit Somalia.

8. The team were fortunate in finding staff in Nairobi who had dealt with CERF funding over several years, some from the very start. They were able to give a perspective on how the CERF had changed over time. However, the team still faced the issue of staff turnover and they found that interviewees could tell them more about the CERF process in other countries where they had more experience of it.

9. The team analysed numerical data from the CERF Secretariat, from the CERF Website, from the UN’s Financial Tracking Service (FTS), and from the statistics of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC). This analysis allowed the team to establish the pattern for CERF use and the

1 The term agency will be used in the report to refer to all aid agencies, including Non-‐‑Governmental

Organisations (NGOs) and the Red Cross movement, the term UN agency will be used to refer to those agencies eligible for CERF Funding, including IOM (even though IOM is not a UN agency).


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differences between CERF allocations for Somalia and the other 78 countries that received CERF grants. Please note that the team defined the year of the grant based on the disbursement date rather than the approval date (which the CERF secretariat uses as reference). This was done to facilitate comparison with other funding.

10. The team examined twenty four randomly selected proposals for funding submitted to the CERF from the country and examined the extent to which the proposals paid attention to gender, vulnerability, and cross cutting issues. The methodology annex describes the gender marker and other tools used in detail2.

Constraints 11. The evaluation team faced a number of constraints. Project proposals are quite brief and give

few details of the projects. This brevity is appropriate for a mechanism such as the CERF.

12. The monitoring of CERF projects depends on UN agencies own monitoring system and there is no centralised monitoring of the projects funded by CERF. UN agencies do not share their monitoring report with OCHA on their CERF funded projects. This means that there is a lack of monitoring data on what has been concretely achieved by each CERF project. Although the reports from Somali are of better quality than CERF reports from some other countries they still do not address major issues such as the limits that the CERF rapid response timeframes (three months) place on a context where it can take six months to get supplies into the country.

13. There was a lack of clear documentation (through minutes or records of telephone calls and email exchanges) about how CERF allocation decisions were made and what kind of discussion took place about this, both in the field and at HQ (CERF Secretariat and agencies).

Structure and Definitions

14. This report is structured along the lines of the Performance and Accountability Framework (PAF) for the CERF3, following comments by the steering and reference groups on the first country study.

15. The indicators to determine if the CERF is appropriate and relevant include: a) whether an inclusive an transparent process has been made in deciding and requesting inputs by the UN country team; b) whether the requests are aligned with the life saving criteria and whether they are related to critical time bound responses; and, c) that predictability is

2 The gender markers were piloted in 2010 and were not launched officially until 2011 after the CERF

evaluation period was concluded. Even though the CERF application template was only revised in 2010 in order to obtain this type of information, the evaluation team has used the markers as a framework for analytical purpose. The vulnerability marker was designed by Channel for this evaluation.

3 Further details on the framework can be found in the methodology annex.


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enhanced and allows for a more rapid response (based on funds that can be relied upon) and operations are deployed in a more timely manner.

16. In this regard, the team has broadly defined “effectiveness” as meaning that CERF made a positive difference in the emergency response (thereby saving lives) and efficiency as to whether any other mode of funding or process could have been better, and the extent that CERF was used effectively. (For additional information, please refer to the CERF Performance and Accountability Framework itself at: http://ochaonline.un.org/OCHA2007ar/html/part3.htm. )

17. The report is structured under the following chapters:

• Context: a descriptive chapter that sets out the overall and the humanitarian context of the country.

• Utilisation: a largely a descriptive chapter drawing heavily on tables and charts to describe how the CERF was used in Country with some comments on the funding pattern.

• Processes both descriptive and analytical and looks at the submission process for CERF and the prioritisation and selection of projects.

• Outputs: this looks at the overall timeless and contribution to the country programme, timeframes, the level of donor support, and the interaction with other funds.

• Outcomes: this examines the outcomes of the CERF process, including to extent to which CERF projects have addressed, gender, vulnerability, and cross-‐‑cutting issues.

• Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Relevance: this looks at issues of efficiency, effectiveness, and relevance that are not addressed in the other chapters.

• Contribution: a largely analytical section examines the evidence for the extent to which CERF has contributed to the objectives set for it by the General Assembly.

• Conclusions: presents the conclusions of the evaluation team.


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CONTEXT 18. Somali is the archetypal failed state4. Somalia has been a cockpit for conflict since even

before the collapse of the Barre Government in 1991. Despite more than a dozen attempts to restore central authority in the last twenty years, all have ended in failure. The north of the country has seceded as the states of Somaliland and Puntland, the centre and South are mostly controlled by the radical Islamist group al Shabab. The internationally recognised Transitional National Government controls only a few districts of Mogadishu, and this only with the assistance of an international force.

19. Lawlessness in Somalia has given a free hand to pirates who cost the international community $5-‐‑$7 billion a year (The Economist, 2011). International staff face the risk of kidnap or murder while national staff face the risk of murder. Somalia is a very dangerous environment and almost no UN staff operate in the centre and South of the country.

20. This catalogue of political woes has provided the backdrop for repeated humanitarian crises, driven not only by conflict, but also by a fragile environment and the impact of climate change. This has led to repeated displacement and food security crises.

21. Somalia is the third largest source of refugees in the world with over 560,000 refugees and over 1.5 million IPDs. One in five Somali babies die before reaching five years of age. The life expectancy at birth is only 50.4 years. Less than one in ten children attends school, and 81.2% of the population are living in poverty.

4 Somalia has stopped the Foreign Policy’s Failed State Index for the last three years (2008, 2009, 2010)

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings

Figure 1: Support for Consolidated and Flash appeals for Somalia 2000-2010


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22. Figure 1 shows that the scale of UH appeals for Somalia has increased more than the average for all UN appeals5 which increased with a 12-‐‑fold increase for Somalia against a 6-‐‑fold increase overall. Assistance to Somalia has reduced noticeably since the circulation of the draft Monitoring Group Report in late 2009 prior to its publication in March 2010. This UN report alleged that significant amounts of aid (especially WFP food-‐‑aid) to Somalia were being diverted (Monitoring Group on Somalia, 2010).

23. UN appeals for Somalia have generally received somewhat lower support than other UN appeals (Figure 2), but this has been reversed in the last four years, with Somalia bettering or almost equalling the average level of support for other appeals.

24. The UN is effectively not present in South Central Somalia, apart from in Mogadishu, but there are staff in the North of the country. Programmes in Somalia are remotely managed from Nairobi.

5 The term “UN appeal” is used to refer to Flash Appeals, CAP appeals, and other Appeals managed by the

UN and listed on the FTS website. While Flash appeals are generally for UN agencies, CAP appeals may also include requests for funding from NGOs. From 2006-‐‑2010 about 22% of CAP contributions for Somalia went to NGOs, with one, CARE receiving 9.5% of the CAP contributions.

Figure 2: Support for UN appeals in Somalia by year


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UTILISATION

Figure 3: Timeline for CERF grants in Somalia. Details of all of these grants are shown in Annex 3.


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25. The CERF has been a significant source of funding for the UN in Somalia, rising to 9% of all appeal funding in 2010, when other donor funding was affected by the Channel 4 documentary alleging diversion of aid in Somalia (Rugman, 2009). Somalia was the third largest recipient of CERF funding from 2006 to 2010, outstripped only by DRC and Sudan.

Table 1: CERF funding as a proportion of all humanitarian appeal funding for Somalia (Sources: CERF Secretariat data and FTS)

Year CERF funding

$million As % of all non-CERF UN

humanitarian appeal funding for Somalia

2006 13.8 7.4% 2007 18.5 6.4% 2008 11.7 2.5% 2009 27.3 5.3% 2010 33.2 9.0% Total 104.5 5.7%

26. It should be noted that the decision on the grants for 2010 were in fact made in late December 2009. This has led to OCHA in Somalia and the CERF Secretariat treating these as 2009 grants, with no CERF grants for Somalia in 2010. The Somali CERF report for 2009 reports on these grants. The team have followed the practice of using the year of disbursement to classify CERF grants, as this allows comparison with other funding.

27. Somalia has received 52 CERF grants in total, of which 88% (46/52) have been from the Rapid Response window. This reflects both the slightly above average support for the CAP in recent years (making underfunded emergency allocations less likely), and the unstable situation in Somalia. Somalia is one of the 22 countries that has had funding every year, but it has only had underfunded funding in two years out of five.

Table 2: Number of CERF grants for Somalia. Source: CERF Secretariat data)

Number of CERF grants by window, agency, and year for Somalia Window Agency 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total RR WFP 5 4 2 2 1 14 UNICEF 2 3 1 2 2 10 WHO 3 2

2 1 8

FAO 3

1 2 1 7 UNHCR

1

2 1 4

UNDP 1 1 1 3 RR Total 14 11 5 10 6 46 UFE UNICEF 2 2 WFP

1

1

UNOPS

1

1 UNDP

1

1

FAO 1 1 UFE Total 1 5 6 Both Windows 14 12 5 15 6 52

28. This same instability is illustrated by the variations in the sectoral funding for Somalia from year to year (Figure 4). Some major humanitarian sectors do not appear in some years at all, and the allocations vary by whether the emergency responded to was a flood, drought, or


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conflict. The CERF sectoral allocations varied not only in response to the type of crisis, but also to the funding gaps.

29. The specific context of Somalia is illustrated by the differences between CERF sectoral funding in Somalia compared with elsewhere. The proportion of the CERF grant value allocated for UNHAS air operations is nearly five times higher in Somalia than elsewhere. Security allocations were over 18 times higher (Figure 5).

30. As usual, WFP has the largest average grant size with the largest ever CERF grant being made to WFP in 2010. Although the average grant-‐‑size overall was $2.0mn, this rose to

Figure 4: Sectoral allocation of CERF funding by year

Figure 5: CERF allocations in Somalia compared with elsewhere.


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$5.5mn in 2010 due to the large WFP grant (Table 3). This was the largest grant ever made by the CERF.

Table 3: Average size of CERF grants by agency and year. Source: CERF Secretariat data.

Average value of CERF grants by window, agency, and year for Somalia (US$mn) Window Agency 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Overall RR WFP 1.3 2.6 2.8 2.7 25.0 3.8 UNICEF 1.6 1.1 3.0 1.9 0.9 1.5 UNDP 2.1 1.1 1.0

1.4

FAO 0.5

2.0 1.6 2.5 1.3 UNHCR

1.0

1.2 1.5 1.2

WHO 0.3 0.9 1.4 2.5 1.0 RR Total 1.0 1.6 2.3 1.7 5.5 2.0 UFE FAO 2.5 2.5 WFP

2.5

2.5

UNICEF

2.0

2.0 UNDP

1.0

1.0

UNOPS 1.0 1.0 UFE Total 1.0 2.0 1.8 Both Windows 1.0 1.5 2.3 1.8 5.5 2.0

31. The bulk of CERF funding for Somalia was for rapid response grants, with just over 10% for the underfunded emergency window (Table 4). This has reflected the pattern of continuing and overlapping crises in what is a very fragile ecological zone overlain with repeated unresolved conflicts.

Table 4: Total value of CERF grants by agency and year. Source: CERF Secretariat data.

Value of CERF grants by window, agency, and year for Somalia (US$mn) Window Agency 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total RR WFP 6.3 10.4 5.7 5.4 25.0 52.8 UNICEF 3.1 3.3 3.0 3.7 1.7 14.9 FAO 1.4 2.0 3.1 2.5 9.0 WHO 0.9 1.7 2.8 2.5 7.8 UNHCR 1.0 2.3 1.5 4.8 UNDP 2.1 1.1 1.0 4.2 RR Total 13.8 17.5 11.7 17.3 33.2 93.5 UFE UNICEF 4.0 4.0 WFP 2.5 2.5 FAO 2.5 2.5 UNDP 1.0 1.0 UNOPS 1.0 1.0 UFE Total 1.0 10.0 11.0 Both Windows 13.8 18.5 11.7 27.3 33.2 104.5

32. The pattern of grants for Somalia was slightly different from the overall pattern of CERF grants (Figure 6):

• WFP accounted for 53% of the value of grants, against 35% globally.

• UNHCR only got 5% of CERF funding. It was ranked sixth against 11% and the third rank globally.


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• IOM was not a recipient of CERF grants in Somalia.

Figure 6: The agency share of CERF grants globally (left) and for Somalia (right).


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PROCESSES 33. For Somalia, the CERF is managed by the funding coordination unit in the OCHA country

office. Most of the work of this unit is focused on managing local pooled funding. Somalia had an Emergency Response Fund for Somalia. This fund has now been transformed into a Common Humanitarian Fund for Somalia. Interviewees were very positive about the support they had from the funding coordination unit. The unit has been under the same management for the last four years.

34. Inclusion here refers to the extent to which stakeholders are involved in the CERF processes. Inclusion can refer to the extent to which country teams are involved in the allocation of CERF funding to local priorities, to the extent to which national governments, UN agencies, and NGOs are involved in the preparation of applications for CERF funding. It can also refer to the extent to which the different stakeholders are involved in actions funded by the CERF.

35. In the first few years, decisions on the CERF in Somalia were taken by the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC)6 together with the big three UN agencies (WFP, UNHCR, and UNICEF), but now decisions are channelled in a more inclusive and transparent way through the clusters, the inter-‐‑cluster working group, and the humanitarian country team.

36. Somalia has not one, but several governments, including the UN-‐‑recognised Transitional Federal Government which controls, with international assistance, a few districts of Mogadishu. The Somaliland and Puntland governments control their respective parts of Somalia, while emerging proto-‐‑governments aspire to control other slices of the national territory as well as emerging polities. In addition to these “governments” most of south-‐‑central Somalia is under the de-‐‑facto control of the al Shabab Islamism insurgent group. In these circumstances it is not surprising that CERF processes have not really included government actors.

37. One government expressed an interest in being involved in allocation decisions, however OCHA considered that it would be better if the government concerned was fully involved in cluster coordination, and not just when financial decisions were being taken.

38. The inclusion of NGOs in the CERF process was previously very limited. It has increased with the involvement of the clusters in discussions on CERF allocations. The depth and quality of the discussion has varied by cluster with NGOs in the agriculture and livelihoods cluster reporting the greatest involvement.

6 Strictly speaking, in countries where a Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) has been appointed to a country

they are responsible for coordinating the CERF process in country. However, all of the 50 HCs on the UN Development Group List in January 2011 (UNDG, 2011) were also Resident Coordinators (RCs). The RC/HC reports to the UNDP Administrator (the head of UNDP) for the RC function and to the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC – the head of OHCA). In this report the position will be referred to as RC/HC even though it is the HC function that deals with the CERF. Confusingly, dealing with the CERF falls to the RC where no HC has been appointed.


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Table 5: Estimate of the amount of CERF funding for Somalia that was passed-on as grants to NGOs.

Sector Grants in 2009-2010

NGO funding from RC/HC Report

Estimated NGO Funding

% of CERF grant passed on to NGOs

Agriculture 8,142,023 1,498,623 - 18% CS - Logistics 1,000,000 - 0 0% CS - UNHAS 2,500,000 - 0 0% Food 29,996,192 - 899,886 3% Health 6,725,561 150,000 - 2% Health - Nutrition 1,600,000 290 - 0% Protection/H Rights 276,053 - 67,844 25% Security 385,200 - 0 0% Shelter and NFI 3,808,053 1,381,827 - 36% Water and sanitation 6,100,944 3,451,677 - 57% Total 60,534,026 6,482,417 967,730 12%

39. Approximately 12% of CERF funding was passed on to NGOs in 2009-‐‑2010 (Table 5). See the methodology annex for a description of the method used to obtain the estimate. The reasons that this is so low is that almost more than half the allocation is for food, for which the amount of cash passed through to partners is very low, and for common services for which no funds are normally passed-‐‑through to partners.

40. Agency interviewees reported that they were aware of the CERF criteria and that they tailored their CERF applications to meet what they though the CERF was more likely to fund. This meant that, for example: UNHCR applied for funding for shelter materials and non-‐‑food items rather than for protection; UNICEF applied for support for water trucking rather than for borehole repair even though the latter would have been more cost-‐‑effective. The CERF secretariat make the point that they are always available to discuss applications, and that these choices are driven by agency perceptions rather than by CERF decisions. OCHA in Somalia make the point that they have often sought informal consultations with the CERF Secretariat, and received useful input for potential applications.

41. Agencies also reported tailoring their proposals to meet the requirements of what was then a three month expenditure period. For example, UNICEF normally used CERF funding to pay the tranches of existing partnership agreements, because negotiating a new project cooperation agreement, said to be typically two to four months, would not fit into the

BOX 1. WHY IS NGO INCLUSION IMPORTANT?

B1. NGO inclusion is important when the CERF is regarded as one of the elements of the humanitarian reform. The humanitarian reform is intended to address four critical factors for humanitarian performance: leadership, finance, coordination, and partnership.

B2. The CERF clearly addresses the financial factor. However, including the clusters in discussions about planned CERF applications increases attention to coordination and builds partnership. Control of the CERF process in-‐‑country supports the leadership role of the RC/HC. The different elements of the humanitarian reform are self supporting, and thus inclusion not only helps to improve the quality of project selection but also builds partnership and strengthens coordination and the leadership role of the UN.


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timeframe. Of all the agencies, UNICEF passes the largest proportion of CERF funding through to NGOs.

42. The recent changes to the CERF process, which brought in the clusters, has led to a more transparent process where (in the best functioning clusters, such as agriculture or water and sanitation) cluster members provide input on the projects. This is not the case with all clusters. However, interviewees pointed out that funding from the common humanitarian fund were better aligned with cluster priorities than CERF funding. Given that cluster priorities are developed through a consultative strategic process and form the basis for the common appeal process, it is clearly appropriate that CERF funding be aligned with them.

43. The life-‐‑saving criteria were seen as favouring some sectors, such as food, over others, such as education. This is a complex issue far wider than the Somalia case and will be addressed in the synthesis report. Some interviewees characterised the life-‐‑saving criteria as more a matter of presentation in the proposal than of fundamental substance.

44. Somalia is fortunate in having an RC with a great deal of experience of humanitarian action who is respected by NGOs, donors, and UN agencies. The RC is seen as being fair and has for example, removed UNDP projects from the CAP when they were not of adequate quality, despite being the Resident Representative for UNDP. The RC is widely respected and interviewees were very positive about his role.

45. The RC/HC made the point that the CHF is more reliable, faster, and more flexible than the CERF and that while the CERF was useful and welcome, the CHF was even more useful and welcome. Both funds complement each other. Figure 7: CHF and CERF funding for Somalia. The ERF was transformed into a CHF in July 2010 and the balance of US$10.4 million was transferred to the new CHF. This amount has been subtracted from the total of CHF and ERF funding for 2010 above to avoid double counting.

46. Both the CHF and CERF are parts of the same effort to address predictability and reliability in the funding of humanitarian action. Both are intended to ensure that the needs of affected populations are met in a timely manner. Both now use the same broad prioritisation mechanism at country level. The CHF operates at the country level and the CERF globally. However, at the country level the CHF is a more flexible mechanism as it can channel funds to NGOs as well as to UN agencies.


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OUTPUTS

47. UN agency interviewees repeatedly stated that, apart from internal funding and local managed pooled funds, the CERF was the quickest funding available to them. Internal funding included internal emergency response funds and internal loan mechanisms. However, the average duration from initial submission to disbursement was 36 days for 2006 to 2010 inclusive for rapid response grants (Figure 8). 2010 was the quickest year yet with an average of 27 days between application and disbursement for Rapid Response grants.

48. The time taken for the processes is not critical as the largest UN agencies have internal advance mechanisms that they can use to begin operations in advance of funding7. This is the case with WFP which accounts for over 56 per cent of rapid response funding in Somalia. Agencies can also use the likelihood of CERF funding to make internal advances, this is the case with WFP and also with UNICEF, the second largest recipient of rapid response funding in Somalia (16 per cent). However, although the third largest recipient, FAO (with just under 10 per cent of rapid response funding), has an internal advance mechanism, this can normally only triggered by a written confirmation of funding such as that provided by the LoU. FAO in Somalia have not used this for CERF Funding as the internal mechanism is no faster than disbursement of CERF funds once the LoU is signed. UNDP has country-‐‑based funding and UNDP CERF Funded projects can only begin once the disbursed funds have been passed by UNDP headquarters to the country office account.

7 This issue is discussed in greater depth in the synthesis report.

BOX 2. HOW FAST DOES HUMANITARIAN FUNDING NEED TO BE?

B3. The CERF Brochure produced by the OCHA regional office for the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia says that “In natural or man-‐‑made crises, whether earthquakes, floods or political conflicts, the first 72 hours are critical for life-‐‑saving activities” and that the CERF means that humanitarian workers would no longer have to wait for days or weeks for funding to arrive (OCHA ROMENACA, 2008).

B4. The OCHA on Message document re the CERF says: “Two thirds of CERF allocations go to rapid response allocations (for a sudden-‐‑onset emergency or a significant deterioration in an existing crisis) within 72 hours of an application being received from a Resident Coordinator.”

B5. The 2005 audit of the Central Emergency Revolving Fund regarded the average processing time of 15.8 days form application to disbursement as too long and suggested that a processing time for such emergency funding should be no more than 2 days.

B6. The Disaster Relief Emergency Fund averages seven days from application to approval for small-‐‑scale disasters and one day for large scale disasters (IFRC, 2011).

B7. Based on these examples, timescales of a few days from application to disbursement can be considered fast for rapid response to humanitarian needs. Timescales of over one week must be considered slow.


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49. The processing of CERF applications consists of the following steps.

• Prior to the application, OCHA in Somalia, or the agency concerned may engage in informal discussions on a potential application (within an overall application for either rapid response or underfunded emergency funding).

• After the initial submission the application is reviewed by the CERF Secretariat. This review may include a review by the regional desk or even informal queries to the OCHA country office. This review is intended to ensure that the activity for which the grant is made complies with the CERF criteria, and that the budget is sufficiently detailed to pass the UN Secretariat’s Programme Planning and Budget Department (PPBD).

• If there are queries about the application, the application is referred back to the applicant agency and a revised version submitted. The time taken by this is shown by the “First submission to final” in Figure 8.

• The USG then reviews the application and approves it or otherwise. This process took less than two days on average for grants disbursed in 2010, the fastest ever average review and approval time for rapid response grants to Somalia.

• After approval, the agency then signs a Letter of Understanding (LoU) with the UN Secretariat, and a request is made for payment to the Programme, Planning Budget Division.

• The UN Secretariat then disburses the funds to the agency.

Figure 8: Durations for the CERF process in Somalia from first submission to disbursement


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50. Underfunded grants are processed more slowly than rapid response grants (52 days against 36 for 2006-‐‑2010). The underfunded emergency grant in 2007 was anomalous – it was a single grant for security. The CERF secretariat only directly controls a small part of this timeline, the period from the final submission to approval by the Under Secretary General (USG). The speed of the initial phase from the first to final submission depends very much on how long agencies take to respond to queries, and the speed from approval to disbursement depends on the speed at which the UN agency and the UN Secretariat sign the letter of agreement.

51. The data in Figure 8 only refers to the process from the initial formal application. This formal application may follow a process at the country level that can last several weeks. Some agencies will only submit their CERF requests to the joint application after consultation with headquarters. The CERF process is a collaborative process. Collaborative processes bring many advantages, including the development of a common appreciation of priorities. Having an inclusive and consultative approach takes more time.

52. Disbursement is only the first step. There may be a further delay if agency HQ are slow to allocate the disbursed funds to the field programme. While only a small part of the CERF funds are passed to NGOs, NGOs are still needed for implementation. Even where the bulk of the grant has gone on the purchase of seeds, an NGO is still needed to select the beneficiaries, arrange the distribution, and implement it.

53. The available data shows that, on average, in 2009-‐‑2010 UN agencies in Somalia made the first payment to NGOs 50 days after disbursement for rapid response grants, or 97 days after underfunded emergency grants were disbursed. The fastest payment to an NGO was 36 days after disbursement and 90% of payments took more than 50 days. This means that the first average duration from the initial proposal to funding for NGOs was 154 days for underfunded applications in 2009, and 79 days for rapid response grants in 2009-‐‑2010. It is difficult to see how such funding can be meeting “time-‐‑critical” needs.

54. Despite these time-‐‑scales CERF funding was, for UN Agencies, still the most rapid funding apart from internal resources or local managed pooled funds. Time-‐‑critical needs are met not through the CERF but through agency internal resources the emergency reserve window of the Common Humanitarian Fund.

55. Even though it is not fast on a humanitarian timescale, the CERF has made a significant contribution to humanitarian action in Somalia. This is illustrated by the extent to which different sectors depended on CERF funding. For example, in 2008, CERF provided 88% of the funding for the UN humanitarian air service appeal in Somalia – on average, CERF only provides 6% of such funding. This vital common service facilitated humanitarian operations throughout Somalia.

56. CERF also provided 29% of the appeal funding for FAO in Somalia, twice the average level of support for this agency. FAO used the funding to demonstrate that it could implement appropriate programmes to prevent displacement in drought, and to ameliorate the impact of drought. This led to later funding for the same types of projects from other donors.

57. There is fair integration between the different UN humanitarian funds in Somalia – a benefit of the common management of the pooled funds by OCHA’s humanitarian financing unit.


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However, there is scope for greater integration along the lines of the pooled funding unit in DRC8. In DRC the pooled funding unit (jointly staffed by UNDP and OCHA) produces common reports for all pooled funding.

58. Agencies said that CERF generally, with the exception of one FAO project, had not enabled them to leverage other donor funding. WHO stated that the opposite was true, that it was only because they had other funding to pay for vaccination staff that they were able to make use of CERF funding for vaccines. Similarly, there was only one instance where an agency said that CERF had enabled them to access an internal advance. Where agencies had jump-‐‑started urgent responses they had done so from their own internal resources.

59. One impact of the RC/HC control of pooled funds has been much better interaction with donors. Previously OCHA had difficulty in getting details of donor grants from some donors, now that the RC/HC controls significant funding (between the CHF and CERF), donors are interested in sharing information to ensure that there is no risk of double funding.

8 Please see the DRC country report for details.


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OUTCOMES 60. CERF has provided additional funding equivalent to 5.7% of other non-‐‑CERF funding for

appeals for Somalia for 2006-‐‑2010. CERF funding is therefore significant even in terms of the funding alone. Interviewees identified two ways in which CERF has added value in addition to its monetary value: funding for difficult to fund sectors, and support for humanitarian reform.

61. Several interviewees, from the UN and from donors, commented that it is difficult to fund common services. Common services were said to be unattractive to donor headquarters as they support overall operations rather than targeting beneficiaries directly. Common services are not life-‐‑saving in themselves, but they do support other humanitarian action which can be life-‐‑saving.

62. Over one fifth of CERF funding for Somalia has been for common services with the UN humanitarian air services getting the largest part of this9. One interviewee suggested that a more reliable and predictable method is needed to fund common services such as a levy on other funding. The CERF secretariat and WFP have finalised a guidance note clarifies when CERF will fund UNHAS with rapid response grants.

63. Interviewees also referred to their experience with the CERF in West Africa where it as critical in keeping the humanitarian air service operating there. The 2007 grants for security, another common service, was also said to be critical. Thus the CERF added value by providing funding for critical but difficult to fund common services.

64. Another added value of the CERF was the support that it provided for the overall humanitarian reform process. Interviewees compared their experience of flash appeals in other countries with their experience of the CERF applications. With flash appeals, interviewees said that, even though the process is nominally coordinated by the RC/HC, every agency prepares its own statement of needs without regard to other agencies. With CERF applications, the predetermined envelope for the application10 means that agencies have to sit down together and discuss overall priorities.

65. CERF funding was also said to empower cluster coordination although this was mixed in with the impact of other pooled funding. Cluster coordinators said that money brought people into the coordination system. It provided a tangible focus for coordination. Attendance at coordination meetings goes in waves, with the highest attendance around periods when funding is being discussed.

9 It is not possible to compare this level of funding with the global situation as appeals for common services

are sometimes included within the overall appeal for the sponsoring agency.

10 In theory, there is a predetermined envelope only for underfunded emergency allocations. Rapid response applications are limited only by the guidance that any one emergency should not normally get more than $30 million. Interviewees stated that in practice, the CERF Secretariat provides an early indication of the likely size of envelope even for rapid response allocations. This is sensible as it discourages inflated applications and encourages a more disciplined approach at the country level.


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66. The outcome of the CERF that was most commonly and convincingly cited was its overall impact on humanitarian reform. The CERF was seen as reinforcing all elements of the humanitarian reform. The discussion of CERF allocations at the clusters was seen as strengthening the cluster system and promoting partnership. The potential availability of funding was seen as increasing interest in coordination. The need for UN agencies to submit an agreed application to the CERF was seen as driving a strategic approach. However several interviewees stated that this was only possible because the RC/HC was very experienced and was respected across the range of humanitarian actors.

67. Twenty-‐‑four projects were randomly selected for analysis of the level of attention they paid to gender, vulnerability, and cross-‐‑cutting issues11. Of these, one sixth was found to have insufficient documentation to make an assessment. These dated from 2006 when the CERF Secretariat was just starting and had far fewer resources than at present. Another six projects were excluded because they were for common services and therefore these markers are of little relevance.

68. Of the remaining 14 projects, the majority (eight projects with 73% of funding) did not pay any attention to gender issues. Four (9% of funding) were considered to have the intent to make some contribution to gender, and two (representing 17% of funding) were intended to make a significant contribution (Figure 9). Interviewees typically paid more attention to gender, probably because the piloting12 of the Gender Marker in 2010 for the common appeals process had focused a lot of attention on the topic. UNICEF has also adopted the Gender Marker for internal project planning. Both of these changes can be expected to increase attention to gender.

11 See the methodology annex for a description of the approach used for sampling and analysis.

12 As mentioned in the introduction, the Gender Marker was piloted in 2010 and was launched officially in 2011 after the end of the evaluation period.

Figure 9: Scoring for Gender, Vulnerability, and Cross-cutting markers


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69. Attention to vulnerability was much stronger, with only two project proposals not reflecting a focus on vulnerability. There was even less attention to other cross-‐‑cutting issues than there was to gender.

70. Interviewees reported that while CERF funding allowed them to increase the size of their projects, it has no other specific impact on coverage.


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EFFECTIVENESS, EFFICIENCY AND RELEVANCE

71. With one exception, every UN staff member interviewed regarded the CERF application process as being easier or on a par with the simplest other funding application processes. The one issue that was raised by some agency interviewees was the detail demanded in the budget. The CERF Secretariat prefers that, for example, if an agency includes the purchase of generators in a proposal, that it also includes the number and size of the generators to be purchased rather than providing just a single line item for generators.

72. Agency staff also referred to the reporting requirement as non-‐‑demanding. The RC/HC for Somalia has to prepare a report each year on the use of CERF in the previous year. The reports for Somalia are quite good, but again they are the type of reporting that is normally prepared for UN public information. They take a positive view and do not subject the difficulties to any detailed analysis.

73. However, OHCA staff reported that they had difficulty getting details from some agencies, and the partial details of payments to NGOs illustrates that the OCHA team’s view is the correct one. This requirement was introduced in the 2009 CERF reporting format.

74. The RC/HC has no mandate to monitor what agencies do with CERF funding. Neither is the funding coordination unit staffed to monitor what agencies do with their CERF funding. This leads to the situation where the funding coordination unit have no formal information on the progress of projects or on the likelihood that the agency will need a budget extension.

75. In December 2009, CERF made the largest single grant ever ($25 million) to WFP. This is shown as a 2010 grant (as it was disbursed in 2010) in this report. At the time, WFP was facing a funding crisis due to the impact of a Channel 4 documentary (Rugman, 2009) alleging diversion of WFP food in Somalia. Some donors suspended support for WFP Somalia (Channel 4 News, 2010) and have yet to resume support13.

76. The CERF Secretariat made the grant, despite only lukewarm support from the RC/HC, and despite concerns raised about the need for the grant in the light of WFP being expelled from South Central Somalia by Al Shabaab. WFP headquarters lobbied hard for the grant. Several interviewees commented that the end of year cash balances for WFP Somalia in 2009 were over $100 million, suggesting that WFP overstated its case.

77. However, WFP make the point that lead times for food aid to Somalia are over six months, and that they were facing a complete break in the food pipeline in January 2010. The CERF grants and other were made late in 2009 and WFP had no opportunity to programme these

13 Some of the same allegations were repeated in a Security Council report from the Monitoring Group in

Somalia. (Channel 4 News, 2010). This report was leaked in March 2010 prior to its official issuance by the Security Council. The report stated that the delivery of WFP food in Somalia had been dominated by three named individuals and their family members or close associates. It went on to say that irregularities in the contracting environment and deficiencies in the certification of deliveries facilitated opportunities for large scale diversion (Monitoring Group on Somalia, 2010).


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funds before the end of the year. WFP further argue that needs were not overstated as the overall programme for 2010 had a 20% shortfall14.

78. Nevertheless, this case raised questions about the extent to which agency lobbying influences what is meant to be a country-‐‑led process.

79. However, WFP make the point that lead times for food aid to Somalia are over six months, and that they were facing a complete break in the food pipeline in January 2010. The CERF grants and other were made late in 2009 and WFP had no opportunity to programme these funds before the end of the year. WFP further argue that needs were not overstated as the overall programme for 2010 had a 20% shortfall.

80. Three UN agencies, WFP, UNHCR, and Unicef conducted a study of transaction costs in pooled funding arrangements (Salomons et al., 2009). This study argued that pooled funding arrangements had significantly increased workloads at the field level. However, not one agency interviewee complained about the costs of accessing CERF funds, and most regarded the transaction costs as trivial compared with other funding sources.

81. The transaction cost study noted that there is an irreversible interdependency between pooled funding and cluster coordination. Interviewees did not raise the issue of the transaction costs of pooled funding, but they did comment on the demands that the cluster coordination system puts on them for staff time and resources. However, any effective coordination system would be equally demanding. Coordination takes time to get right.

82. In principle, underfunded emergency grants are for common appeal projects, and rapid response grants are for needs that were not envisaged at the time the common appeal was drawn up. In Somalia, all CERF grants, whether for rapid response or the underfunded window, are reported as contributions against the common appeal. This reflects the reality that for the agencies on the ground, the CERF grants are contributions to their general programmes. The team considered this to be wholly appropriate.

83. The ways in which individual agencies used the CERF reflect capacity limits within the agency. Because of the time it would take to negotiate new partnership cooperation agreements, UNICEF generally uses CERF funding to pay funding tranches to existing partners. FAO avoids items which are not procurable regionally to avoid the procurement delays associated with international procurement. UNHCR prefers to submit application for non-‐‑food items rather than protection as protection is seen as being unlikely to be funded. Agencies tailor their CERF applications to things that CERF will fund and which can be executed in what was then the implementation window of three months.

84. Several interviewees commented that even the extension of the rapid response expenditure period to six-‐‑months was inadequate for Somalia. They point out that even if goods are procured quickly, it can take several months to arrange for them to be delivered to Mogadishu, and several more months to negotiate for their distribution inside Somalia.

14 WFP continues to face serious problems in resourcing its operations in Somalia. Donor interviewees

ascribed this to the impact of the Channel 4 documentary and the monitoring group report.


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85. The Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) provides good data on the changing pattern of needs in Somalia and this allows the effective targeting of assistance. There was general agreement among all types of interviewee that the data from the unit represents a reasonably comprehensive big-‐‑picture of needs in Somalia.


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CONTRIBUTION 86. Needs are enormous in Somalia. The lack of an effective central government, the fragile

ecosystem, the legacy of years of conflict, and the impact of continuing conflict all lead to enormous humanitarian needs. The general lack of basic services and the hostile environment means that almost any intervention in Somalia has the potential to be life-‐‑saving.

87. Somalia is the second largest recipient per capita of CERF funds with $11.17 being allocated per head in Somalia for 2006 to 2010. The team considered this to be entirely appropriate given the scale of needs in Somalia.

88. The context in Somalia changes frequently in response to environmental and political changes. These changes in the context mean that there are related changes in vulnerability. This means that agencies working in Somalia have to be flexible to respond to changes in the context, whether it is an outbreak of measles, floods, drought, or conflict-‐‑driven displacement.

89. While CERF is faster than other funding, the timeline from first application to eventual payments to implementing partners is quite long. Thus the CERF’s main contribution in Somalia is not fast funding, but flexible funding that can be allocated to the greatest priorities. CERF enables the UN in Somalia to nudge the overall programme towards meeting the most critical needs, even if those needs are not a donor priority.

90. The initial concept for the CERF appears to have been based on the idea that humanitarian action needs to be fast to save lives. This is certainly true at the start of acute crises where the most useful assistance is that provided in the first few hours or days. However, the scale of such acute needs is generally small and they represent only a small part of humanitarian action overall. For a complex chronic emergency like Somalia, what kills people is not a single factor like a drought, but a drought overlain on chronic poverty, the inaccessibility of basic services, political constraints on potential coping mechanisms etc.

91. Although the CERF is not fast in terms of acute emergencies, its rhythm is well suited to a chronic crisis like Somalia. Here what is most important is not the speed of the CERF (although a faster CERF would be more useful) but the fact that the Rapid Response Window of the CERF can be relied upon as a source of funding when new needs arise.

92. As noted earlier (Figure 5) CERF grants in Somalia for security and the humanitarian air service are far higher, as a proportion of CERF allocations, than the global average. This is entirely appropriate as these are the sectors which are hardest to fund.

93. Although the CHF in Somalia is more predictable, faster, and more flexible than the CERF, the CERF has been a bigger source of flexible funding for Somalia that can be channelled to meet the changing priority needs as defined by the humanitarian country team.

94. It is this flexibility that makes the CERF funding so useful in Somalia. It is this flexibility that allows agencies to change their focus to meet emerging needs.

95. CERF has contributed to saving lives in Somalia through:


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• Its support for common services. Common services such as security, logistics, and the humanitarian air service are critical for humanitarian operations in Somalia.

• Support for sectors that have not been as successful at resource mobilisation as others. This is particularly the case for sectors like livelihoods which have had nearly one third of their budget from the CERF.

• General funding for agency operations in Somalia. The CERF allocations in Somalia are made taking into account the latest data on vulnerability from the widely-‐‑respected Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit.


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CONCLUSIONS 96. The CERF has been a significant source of funding for Somalia, providing over $100 million

from 2006 to 2010. This funding has played a particularly useful role in Somalia. It has strengthened the role of the RC/HC and reinforced coordination.

97. The CERF is well managed in-‐‑country by the funding coordination unit. The local management of the CERF has benefited from having consistent leadership over four years.

98. CERF processes are not inclusive of government, and have only recently become more inclusive of NGOs through the cluster coordination system. NGOs are estimated to have received approximately 12% of the CERF funding as sub-‐‑grants in 2009-‐‑2010.

99. Agencies are generally aware of the CERF life-‐‑saving criteria and tailored their applications to meet these. The life-‐‑saving criteria were seen as favouring some sectors over others.

100. While CERF projects may be monitored by agencies, the resulting monitoring reports are not shared with HC or the Fund Management Unit.

Recommendation 1. UN agencies should attach monitoring report to their submissions for the annual report on the CERF by the HC.

101. The CHF is more predictable than the CERF in terms of annual planning, but the CERF has been a reliable source of funding for new emergencies in Somalia – this is appropriate given the frequent crises that trouble this failed state.

Recommendation 2. The CERF and the CHF should be more closely integrated to allow a single prioritisation mechanism to serve for both.

102. Somalia also has a common humanitarian fund (previously the humanitarian response fund). This fund, though smaller on average than CERF contributions to Somalia, is more predictable, and is characterised by the very experienced RC/HC as being faster and more flexible.

103. Apart for internal resources such as internal advances or emergency funds, CERF is the fasted funding available to UN agencies. However, the average duration from first application to disbursement in 2010 (the fastest year so far) was four weeks. However, in 2009-‐‑2010, it took on average another 11 weeks for UN agencies to make the first payment from rapid response grants to their NGO partners.

Recommendation 3. Within 18 months, UN Agencies should conduct evaluations of their use of the CERF funds and in particular what actions could be taken to speed up the granting of sub-‐‑grants.

104. FAO has drawn nearly one third of its overall funding (29%) in Somalia from the CERF. This is twice the normal level of CERF support for FAO as a proportion of all other funding for FAO. This is particularly important in Somalia given the lack of alternatives to agricultural livelihoods for survival. CERF has also been a critical supporter for common services. Both of these have been particularly good uses of CERF Funding.


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105. The majority of projects sampled in Somalia paid no attention to gender issues. This is disappointing after more than two decades of agency commitments to gender. While the absence of UN staff on the ground may explain some of this, one would still expect to see attention to gender in the project proposals at least. However this is expected to change in Somalia due to the adoption of the Gender Marker for the CAP process, and by UNICEF for their own project portfolio.

Recommendation 4. The CERF Secretariat should apply the Gender Marker to all funding applications.

106. CERF funding is easier for agencies to use than almost any other funding source. The only difficulty is that the budget is sometimes requested in a great deal of detail. Changes are only to be expected in an unstable situation like Somalia especially with the time it takes to implement projects. These changes then require budget revisions15.

Recommendation 5. The CERF secretariat should allow more flexibility in budgets for equipment, with broad description in the budget and detailed lists in the narrative.

107. The RC/HC has no mandate to monitor agency use of CERF funds.

Recommendation 6. The RC/HC should be given a broad mandate to monitor the uses of all humanitarian pooled funding.

108. The data from the food security and nutrition analysis unit has provided a good basis for prioritisation in Somalia. This has allowed the effective prioritisation of needs in a context where humanitarian needs are widespread.

109. The CERF in Somalia has notably strengthened the humanitarian reform, especially in the recent past, with a more inclusive approach. While the CERF has not really been the rapid response fund that was initially envisaged, it has helped the humanitarian community to meet the needs of affected populations through providing a reliable source of funding for new emergencies.

110. Although the CERF in Somalia has not been quite what seems to have been envisaged at the start – a rapid response fund – this function is fulfilled in Somalia by the CHF. The CERF, particularly the Rapid Response window, has been a reliable source of funding for a changing context in Somalia, in a complementary fashion with local pooled funds.

15 The CERF secretariat points out that budget revisions are only required if there is a cumulative budget

change of more than 15% or if resources are switched to staff. However, the issue here was that the tight specification of materials and equipment in the budget meant that any change in these triggered the need for a budget revision if they formed a substantial part of the budget.


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ANNEX I. LINKS TO THE TERMS OF REFERENCE AND THE INCEPTION REPORT

The Terms of Reference and the Inception Report are not annexed here due to their length. They can be found at:

Terms of reference:

http://www.channelresearch.com/file_download/294/CERF_5YREVAL_Final_TOR_07.11.2010.pdf

http://www.channelresearch.com/file_download/294/CERF_5YREVAL_Final_TOR_Appendix_V_07.11.pdf

Inception report:

http://www.channelresearch.com/file_download/297/CERF-‐‑5-‐‑yr-‐‑Evaluation-‐‑Inception-‐‑Report-‐‑v200.pdf


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ANNEX II. CERF PROCESS DESCRIPTION RAPID RESPONSE GRANT PROCESS B8. Although there is a preference for applications from a country team, a UN agency can

make a request for CERF rapid response window funding at any time (e.g. WFP did so in December 2009 in Kenya). The only requirement, checked by the CERF Secretariat, is that the request be endorsed by the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) or the Resident Coordinator (RC) in the absence of an HC. Such one-‐‑off requests are relatively rare, and the bulk of CERF rapid response funding goes to joint requests by several UN agencies.

B9. The Emergency Relief Coordinator may also take the initiative of suggesting to the HC or RC the possibility of requesting CERF rapid response funding (OCHA 2006; 2011). This happens only rarely, for example after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti when many UN staff, including top ranking ones, died and most UN buildings were destroyed, in Pakistan at the onset of the 2010 floods, and in DRC for Equateur Province in 2010.

B10. If requested by the UN country team, an informal indication may be given by the CERF Secretariat as to the likely scale of the CERF envelope for the particular crisis. There is normally a maximum limit of US$30 million for any one emergency or crisis (United Nations Secretariat, Secretary-‐‑General’s bulletin, 2006, 2010) but it is extremely rare that the full amount is allocated. The 2010 Pakistan floods are an example. Three RR allocations were made, the first two of which at the initiative of the ERC in August 2010. The initial allocation, at the onset of the floods, was revised up from an initial US$10 million to US$16.6 million in consultation with the HC and rapidly followed by a second one of US$13.4 million (i.e. a total of US$30 million). The CERF finally provided close to US$42 million for the response to the floods.

B11. The CERF Secretariat prefers to see a draft request prior to agreeing informally on an envelope. At a minimum, the CERF Secretariat has to be aware of the beneficiary numbers, justification, funding levels, and types of projects, before discussing the size of a submission. The CERF Secretariat often consults with the ERC on potential envelopes.

B12. Joint applications are prepared by the country team with the UN agencies discussing the amount to be allocated to each cluster (or agencies where clusters do not exist), and each cluster lead agency preparing proposals in consultation with cluster members. The level of formality of this process varies a lot, depending on how the HC manages the prioritisation process.

B13. The CERF Secretariat reviews the proposals, frequently leading to adjustments relating to budget issues. The CERF can make substantive comments, but it is assumed that the HC and HCT/clusters have the technical expertise to determine what the urgent needs are as well as the capacities of the agencies on the ground. Once the Secretariat signs off, the grants are reviewed and authorised by the Emergency Relief Coordinator and the agency in question signs a Letter of Understanding16 with the UN Secretariat for the release of the funds.

16 From second quarter of 2011 an umbrella LoU has been introduced and agencies will counter-‐‑sign an

approval letter from the ERC, instead of signing a LoU for each grant.


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UNDERFUNDED EMERGENCY GRANT PROCESS

B14. Allocations from the CERF underfunded emergencies window (UFE) are made twice a year, and the two rounds coincide with the global Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) launch and the CAP mid-‐‑year review. Allocations are made to both CAP and non-‐‑CAP countries with no predefined division between these. The criteria for selection of countries for UFE funding are the degree of funding shortfall, the severity of humanitarian needs, and type of activities and the implementation capacity. The ERC selects between 17 and 24 countries a year for underfunded emergency support with the bulk of funds (typically two thirds) allocated during the first round.

B15. For CAP countries, the CERF Secretariat undertakes an analysis of humanitarian indicators combined with an analysis of the level of funding support for the CAP (analysis at sector level for each CAP). For the first underfunded round the previous year’s CAP funding data is used for the analysis whereas the funding levels at the CAP mid-‐‑year review serve as reference for the second allocation.

B16. For non-‐‑CAP countries, UN agencies’ headquarters are invited to vote on which non-‐‑CAP emergencies they regard as the most underfunded. The voting process is supplemented with details from each agency on their ongoing humanitarian programmes in the proposed countries and the funding levels of these.

B17. The CERF Secretariat combines analysis of CAP and non-‐‑CAP countries and, based on the UFE criteria, prepares a ranked list of country candidates for the ERCs consideration and decision. The ERC decides of the list of countries for inclusions and on the funding envelope for each. The selected countries and proposed allocation envelopes are discussed with agency headquarter focal points.

B18. The amount decided by the ERC is notified to the RC/HC in a letter in which the ERC may direct the allocation, or parts of it, to particular underfunded sectors or regions in order to facilitate prioritisation and speed up the process. The RC/HC will have to confirm that the funds are needed and can be implemented according to the stipulated timeline and against the proposed activities.

B19. At the country level, the allocation process is similar for the preparation of a rapid response allocation. The only other differences for underfunded emergencies is that the grants for the first annual round must be implemented by 31 December of the same calendar year and for the second annual round by 30 June of the next calendar year (OCHA 2010). Again, agencies can ask for a no-‐‑cost extension.


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ANNEX III. BIOGRAPHICAL NOTICE OF THE MAIN WRITERS

John Cosgrave is an independent evaluator based in Ireland. He has more than 30 years of experience of humanitarian action and development in nearly 60 countries. His initial academic training was in engineering, and he holds three masters level degrees (in engineering, management, and social science).

After two decades managing projects and programmes for NGOs in the aftermath of natural disasters and complex political emergencies John became a freelance consultant specialising in the evaluation of humanitarian action in 1997. Since 1997 John has led a great many evaluations, mostly of humanitarian action, and including many joint evaluations of humanitarian action and several funding studies, for a wide variety of clients including the UN, Donors, and NGOs.

John was the Evaluation Advisor and Coordinator for the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition and is used to working on politically complex evaluations. He has well developed evaluation skills and trains on humanitarian evaluation both for ALNAP and for the World Bank supported International Program for Development Evaluation Training (IPDET). John combines training with evaluation and brings examples from evaluation practice into the classroom, including for ALNAP and the IPDET. John’s writing includes the ALNAP pilot guide for Real-‐‑Time Evaluation.

Recent writing by John include: Responding to earthquakes: Learning from earthquake relief and recovery operations. (ALNAP and Provention, 2008) and the ALNAP Real-‐‑Time Evaluation pilot guide.

Mrs Marie Spaak is an independent consultant since 2008 who has worked in the humanitarian field since 1992, mostly with DG ECHO and OCHA. She has been based in the field (former Yugoslavia, Great Lakes emergency, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Russian Federation, Haiti in 2009 notably) and worked in both Brussels (ECHO) and Geneva (OCHA). She has in-‐‑depth knowledge of the UN humanitarian reform process, disaster preparedness and response, field coordination mechanisms and inter-‐‑agency processes, and direct experience of different types of pooled funding mechanisms (Indonesia, Indian Ocean tsunami, Somalia, Haiti). She is also familiar with donor perspectives due to her experience with DG ECHO and more recently, an independent mapping of humanitarian donor coordination at the field level carried out with Channel Research in 2009, for which DRC and Sudan were a case study.

She is a Belgian national and fluently speaks and writes French, English and Spanish. She holds a B.A. in Anthropology from Bryn Mawr College, USA, and subsequently studied international development cooperation (Belgium) and project cycle management (Spain).


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M. Jock Baker began working as an independent consultant in 1999 following a career of over fifteen years in a series of field-‐‑based assignments with the United Nations, including the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Program (WFP), and the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA). Mr. Baker works part-‐‑time as CARE International’s Programme Quality & Accountability Coordinator at the CARE International Secretariat in Geneva, Switzerland where he is the focal point for CARE’s accountability, program quality, disaster risk reduction and transition programming. Mr. Baker has led a number of thematic reviews of organizational policy in addition to participating in and leading a number of assessments, appraisals, participatory reviews and evaluations and he is skilled in workshop design and facilitation. He holds a BSc in Biological Sciences from the University of Edinburgh and a MSc degree in Economics from the London School of Economics & Political Science. Mr. Baker’s assignments as an independent consultant include Team Leader for and Evaluation of UNHCR’s Kosovo Women’s Initiative, Senior Evaluator for an Interagency Real-‐‑Time Evaluation of Cyclone Nargis commissioned by UNOCHA, Micro-‐‑Finance Specialist & Conflict Analyst for an Asian Development Bank appraisal in eastern Sri Lanka, contributing author/editor for the Sphere Handbook, technical reviewer for the World Bank’s Post-‐‑Conflict Trust Fund, Transition Adviser in Rwanda for the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, disaster management technical adviser for CBS Film Productions Inc., IDP Relief & Reintegration Adviser for the Government of the Philippines and Local Integration Specialist for UNHCR in Indonesia. Mr. Baker has also managed or led a number of humanitarian evaluations for CARE International, including an interagency evaluation for INGO tsunami responses, an interagency evaluation following hurricane Stan in Guatemala in 2005 and an evaluation of CARE Bangladesh’s response following Cyclone Sidr. Mr. Baker is also CARE International’s representative to ALNAP and was a member of the OECD-‐‑DAC team which peer reviewed WFP’s evaluation function in 2007.

Angela Berry-‐‑Koch brings 34 years of humanitarian experience to this evaluation. She has worked as a staff member for over twenty years with UNHCR , UNICEF and OCHA. This consultant brings a wealth of experience in nutrition, food security and child protection issues, and has authored numerous important guidelines and manuals for the UN system at large. She has also provided consultancy services in reproductive health and HIV/AIDS to UNDP, UNFPA and UNIFEM in various country offices, primarily in Latin America. With a Masters in Science in Human Nutrition from London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, she is an expert in areas of food security and food aid as well as nutrition in humanitarian situations, having forged the first consultations on human dietary requirements and standards of food aid in emergencies in the 1980’s. In the past years she has revised various guidelines for the UN system, including the UNHCR/WFP food assessment guidelines in emergencies. Ms. Berry-‐‑Koch has authored many publications, including those related to use of famine foods used in the Horn of Africa, deficiency disease syndromes in refugee populations, and human rights of displaced


38

populations in Latin America.

Mrs Cécile Collin is a permanent area manager of Channel Research for 5,5 years in charge of Francophone clients and the UN. She is experienced in undertaking complex consultancies missions, evaluations, mid term review and impact assessments related to international assistance, emergencies and post disaster support. She has been a consultant in more than 16 missions, most of them in Africa, notably the Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic including governance, interventions in unstable context, peace building, protection and human rights. She has practical experience of developing and implementing policies and strategies in the areas of multi-‐‑sectoral initiatives.

In 2006, she created Channel Research Burundi, subsidiary of Channel Research Belgium in the Great Lakes with the aim to promote African expertise and local capacity building. She took part notably to the CHF evaluation in Central African republic, evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peace Building Programme for 11 donors, bilateral and multilateral in Eastern DRC, evaluation of post-‐‑disaster programmes of the AFD (Agence Française de Développement), a fact finding mission in Central African Republic and evaluation of rapid humanitarian assistance using Norwegian 6x6 military trucks for NORAD.

As a consultant, Mrs Collin benefits from a good knowledge of different evaluation and impact assessment methodologies as well as of general skills in organizational and financial analysis, economics, communication and management, as a graduated in Social sciences and economics (BA) and business administration, performance monitoring (MA). Mrs Cécile Collin is a French national and speaks English, French, Italian and German.

Mrs Annina Mattsson is a full-‐‑time area manager and evaluator at Channel Research. She has experience in the evaluation of humanitarian aid, peace building and development programmes in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. Working for Channel Research, Mrs Mattsson has gained experience of large multi-‐‑donor, multi-‐‑sector and multi-‐‑country evaluations. She was a key team member in the Sida commissioned follow-‐‑up evaluation of the linkages between relief, rehabilitation and development in the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami, the joint donor evaluation of conflict prevention and peace building initiatives in Southern Sudan and has just finished managing and working on the OCHA funded evaluation of the CHF. A part from being an evaluator, she is also advising organizations on their monitoring and evaluation systems.

Mrs Mattsson has carried out short-‐‑ and longer term missions to Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kosovo, Liberia, Maldives, Palestinian Territories, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates. She is a Finnish citizen, based in Dubai, and speaks fluent Finnish, Swedish, English, Spanish and French, while she is conversational in colloquial Arabic.


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ANNEX IV. METHODOLOGY

The framework for the evaluation 111. The Terms of Reference sets out the framework for the evaluation in line with the logic

model presented in the Performance and Accountability Framework (CERF Secretariat, 2010). As always, frameworks developed for monitoring need to be treated with care when used for evaluation.

Figure 10: The CERF Logic Model as presented in the Project Accountability Framework

112. The Programme and Accountability Framework structure is inherent in the structure of the evaluation criteria and questions as presented in the Terms of Reference. The inception report proposed a structure set out on the basis of the Terms of Reference, with sections on Inputs, Output, Outcomes, and three of the five17 standard evaluation criteria of the

17 The standard five criteria are relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact. The last two of

these and the additional criteria for humanitarian evaluation set out in (OECD/DAC, 1999) have not been considered directly in this evaluation, although some of the analysis may speak to them indirectly.


40

Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/DAC, 1991, 1999).

Numerical data analysis 113. The team engaged in a great deal of numerical analysis principally of the CERF database,

but also on broader sources of information on humanitarian funding. These broader sources will include data from the OCHA Financial Tracking System (FTS) and from the CERF Website.

114. Some of the numerical analyses already conducted were presented in the inception report, but the team have undertaken further analyses based on issues raised in research, in interviews, and in comments on the first Kenya draft report.

115. Databases from various websites and from the CERF secretariat were imported into a spread sheet. Where necessary, data from different years was collated into a single database. Additional columns, based on look-‐‑up tables, were added to assist with the analysis. The resultant data was then analysed using filtered pivot tables, and the inbuilt database functions of the spread sheet package.

Key informant interviews 116. All interviews were conducted under a modification of the Chatham House Rule (Chatham

House, 2007). Under this rule, nothing that interviewees say is directly or indirectly attributed to them without their express permission.

Documentary research 117. While the fund document set for the evaluation has over 8,000 documents, only a fraction of

these apply to this study. All of the key documents collected are being annotated and entered in an online bibliographic database for use by the whole team and which is presented with the main report.

Analysis of project proposals. 118. The team conducted an analysis of a randomly selected sample of 24 project proposals for

their attention to gender, vulnerability, and cross cutting issues. The reason for focusing on the proposals is simple; this is the information that the CERF Secretariat evaluates projects on.

119. Of course the fact that a proposal does pays attention to gender or some other issue is not a guarantee that the project implemented will do so, nor is the absence of such attention a guarantee that it will also be absent in project implementation.

120. However, the team considered that it is more likely that projects where such issues are raised in the proposal will address them in practice, and less likely that those which don’t will do so.


41

SELECTION OF PROJECTS FOR ANALYSIS 121. There were too many project proposals for Somalia to consider all of them. Instead, the team

used a stratified random sample from the population of project proposals for Somalia. This was stratified:

• By CERF Window

• By Agency. Agency was selected rather than sector to avoid making some of the groups too small (as there are 20 different sectors or sub-‐‑sectors in the database) and because some project have unspecified sectors.

122. A nominal sampling rate was chosen to limit the number of projects to be examined to between 20 and 30. The number of projects for each agency and window was calculated by applying the nominal sampling rate to the number of projects for each agency and window. The calculated number was rounded to the nearest whole number and subject to a minimum of one (so that all agencies were included in the sample).

123. This number provided the size of the sample to be drawn for each agency under the two windows. The sample was drawn by assigning a random number between 1 and 10,000 to each project in the database. The database was then searched and the projects for the country were then listed by CERF window and agency together with the random number assigned to that project. The sample was then drawn off in order of decreasing random number size.

124. The random number assigned to projects in Somalia was weighted to increase the chance that more recent projects would be assessed. This was because it was considered unlikely that much information would be available at the field level on the older projects.

Table 6: Weighting table for random number scores

Year Weight 2006 0.5 2007 0.6 2008 0.8 2009 1 2010 1.5

APPROACH TO ANALYSIS 125. The team used analysis of the project portfolio in an approach similar to that used by

HelpAge in their recent study of humanitarian funding for the elderly (HelpAge International, 2010). Essentially, this approach examined the extent to which the topic of interest has been considered in the project portfolio and reflects this as a percentage of projects and of funding.

126. The team used either existing tools such as the IASC Gender Marker, or used ad hoc tools developed for this evaluation.

GENDER ANALYSIS 127. The team used the IASC Gender Marker (IASC, 2010b) to score the projects using the

marking strategy set out in the coding tip sheet (IASC, 2010a). However, it should be noted


42

that the gender marker is intended to be used proactively, to encourage attention to gender, rather than retroactively as the team are planning.

128. The IASC gender marker employs four codes (Table 7) to classify the gender content of projects. While recent applications for CERF funding may already include a gender marker this will not be the case for the majority of the portfolio, and the team will have to review the project document to assign a gender marker. This will be done for all projects in both the desk-‐‑study and field visit countries.

Gender Marker Description Gender Code 0 Gender is not reflected in any component of the project.

Gender Code 1 The project is designed to contribute in some limited way to gender equality. Gender dimensions are meaningfully included in only one or two of the three essential components: needs assessment, activities and outcomes.

Gender Code 2a Gender Mainstreaming

The project is designed to contribute significantly to gender equality. The different needs of women/girls and men/boys have been analysed and integrated well in all three essential components: the needs assessment activities and outcomes.

Gender Code 2b Targeted Actions

The principal purpose of the project is to advance gender equality. The entire project either:

a) Targets women or men, girls or boys who have special needs or suffer from discrimination. b) Focuses all activities on building gender-‐specific services or more equal relations between women and men.

Table 7: The IASC Gender Marker

129. As with the following two tools, it is proposed to conduct this analysis on a subset of CERF projects. The analysis should show the extent to which these issues have been considered at the design stage. It will not provide a thorough analysis of how well these issues have been addressed in implementation.

APPROACH TO VULNERABILITY 130. The following vulnerability marker has been developed from the Gender Marker and

incorporates the same scoring system. One difference is that targeted actions on vulnerability are only scored as such if they address more than one aspect of vulnerability. Thus a livelihood programme for all widows, without regard to the existing livelihood status would be scored 2a rather than 2b.

131. Vulnerability may be related to many factors, including the following:

• Age, particularly children under five and the elderly.

• Gender (specifically addressed under the gender marker).

• Income status and economic status.

• Physical or mental disability.

• Ethnicity (in a particular social context).


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• Land tenure.

• HIV/AIDS status or Health status.

• Social status or caste.

• Livelihood.

132. Depending on the context, other factors may influence vulnerability.

Vulnerability Marker Description Vulnerability Code 0 The special needs of vulnerable persons or groups are not reflected in

any component of the project. Vulnerability Code 1 The project is designed to contribute in some limited way to

addressing the needs of vulnerable individual or groups. Vulnerability status is meaningfully included in only one or two of the three essential components: needs assessment, activities and outcomes.

Vulnerability Code 2a Vulnerability Mainstreaming

The project is designed to contribute significantly to addressing the needs of the vulnerable. The needs of the vulnerable have been analysed and integrated well in all three essential components: the needs assessment activities and outcomes. This category includes projects which only target one aspect of vulnerability, while being blind to others.

Vulnerability Code 2b Targeted Actions

The principal purpose of the project is to address the needs of the vulnerable and considers multiple sources of vulnerability. The entire project either:

a) Targets specific vulnerable groups paying attention to at least one other aspects of vulnerability (i.e. a project for children under-‐five would pay particular attention to those who are also disabled or for one-‐parent families etc.). b) Focuses all activities on reducing vulnerability and exclusion.

CROSS CUTTING ISSUES 133. The team used a similar approach to cross cutting issues, again using a ranking system

similar to the gender marker. Again, as with vulnerability, there is some overlap with gender and vulnerability. The main cross-‐‑cutting themes18 (other than Gender and Vulnerability) that were considered were:

• Protection (which is also a cluster on its own)

• Participation of the affected population

• Environment

• Coping strategies and resilience

• Disaster Risk Reduction

• Capacity building of local staff

18 The list is drawn in part from the ALNAP guide to evaluation using the OECD/DAC Criteria (Beck, 2006).


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• HIV/AIDS (assistance for those living with HIV/AIDS will be covered under vulnerability, this addresses topics such as awareness and prevention)

• Human resources (because evaluations of humanitarian action have repeatedly highlighted human resource issues as a constraint in humanitarian action)

134. This list is drawn from the list of crosscutting issues presented by Beck in the ALNAP guide to evaluation using the OECD/DAC Criteria (2006), with the exclusion of gender and local context. The only addition is the building of local capacities. This is a cross cutting issue that was identified by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition report (Telford et al., 2006).

Cross-‐cutting Marker Description Cross-‐cutting Code 0 Cross-‐cutting issues are not reflected in any component of the project.

Cross-‐cutting Code 1 The project is designed to contribute in some limited way to addressing one or more cross-‐cutting issue. Cross-‐cutting issues are meaningfully included in only one or two of the three essential components: needs assessment, activities and outcomes.

Cross-‐cutting Code 2a Cross-‐cutting Mainstreaming

The project is designed to contribute significantly to addressing one of the cross-‐cutting issues. At least one cross-‐cutting issue has been analysed and integrated well in all three essential components: the needs assessment activities and outcomes. This category includes projects which target only one cross-‐cutting issue without regard to the others.

Cross-‐cutting Code 2b Targeted Actions

The principal purpose of the project is to address two or more cross-‐cutting issues. The entire project is focused around two or more cross-‐cutting issues which have been well analysed and addressed in all three components: the needs assessment activities and outcomes.

Estimating the amount of funding passed through to NGOs 135. Somalia is one of the countries where the RC/HC has provided data (in 2009 after the CERF

secretariat changed the reporting format) on grants made to NGOs by agencies with the CERF funds that they received.

136. Now the proportion of a grant that is passed through to implementing partners depends on the context. UN agencies spend their funds on their own costs, including staff costs and overhead, on procurement, on contracted services, and as payments to implementing partners. The actual cash payments made to implementing partners is only part of the picture. Coordination and common services may also support the activities of partners.

137. UN agencies may also provide non-‐‑cash resources to partners. UN Agencies may procure food (WFP), seeds and tools (FAO), non-‐‑food relief items (UNHCR or UNICEF), special nutritional materials (UNICEF), or medicines (WHO) that they then pass on to implementing partners for distribution. The reason why WFP passes such a small percentage of its total budget as cash to partners is that the bulk of WFP expenditure goes on the purchase and transport of food, which it passes to partners is in the form of food-‐‑aid for distribution.

138. Some agencies, such as FAO, have provided fairly comprehensive information, but others such as WFP and UNHCR provided none. For example, although the Health-‐‑Nutrition


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sector got US$1.6mn in funding from the CERF, only US$290 or 0.02% was reported as having been granted to NGOs. The Food sector got US$30mn, half of the total, but WFP did not report any funding to NGOs, even though WFP’s 2009 annual report on partnership lists 147 NGO partners in Somalia (WFP, 2009). WFP state that this funding was not reported because such expenditures were for carrying out distribution activities in the past.

139. Thus, of the US$60.5mn in CERF funding for Somalia in 2009-‐‑2010, only US$6.5mn (or 11%) is shown in the RC/HC’s report as having been passed to NGOs. This is very clearly an underestimate. In order to improve the estimate, we estimated that:

• No funds were passed-‐‑through to NGOs for common services. Typically coordination and common services are executed by UN agencies directly or through commercial contractors. The percentage passed through for these sectors was therefore set to 0%. Common services include communications, logistics, security and flights.

• WFP is the largest recipient of CERF funds and we needed to be able to estimate the percentage of funding for food aid that was passed through to NGOs as WFP normally does not publish the tonnage rates it pays to partners. WFP regards this information as being commercially sensitive as, in the effort to maximise the use of donor resources, it strives to negotiate even lower rates with implementing partners. However the 2006 WFP-UNHCR Joint Evaluation of the Pilot Food Distribution Projects (WFP, 2006a, 2006b) provides details of the rates paid to partners in five countries. The rates for Sierra Leone are higher in 2002-‐‑2003 as partners were also managing the import of food.

Table 8: WFP Payments to NGO partners (US$ per tonne) in five countries from 2002 to 2006

Payments to partners - US$ per tonne Kenya Uganda Sierra Leone Zambia Pakistan 2002 17.29 87.95 14.40 2003 19.71 19.09 86.00 21.00 11.70 2004 11.04 19.09 20.03 20.02 12.93 2005 11.04 22.92 2006 22.92

• The average overall cost per tonne of WFP food was calculated and then the Special Operations element was excluded. Special Operations were excluded as many of them, such as UNHAS air operations or bridge repair, are either common services or include elements of common service. We exclude these to provide a better estimate of the size of WFP’s food operations.

Table 9: Overall costs of food delivered by WFP

Overall cost per tonne of WFP food from 2002-2009

Tonnage Total direct

costs Including

ISC Cost per

tonne Special

Ops Excluding

Sp Ops Cost per

tonne ex SO

Millions t US$ Mn US$ Mn US$/t US$ Mn US$ Mn US$/t 2002 3.7 1,592 1,712 463 37 1,673 452 2003 6 3,255 3,500 583 83 3,411 568 2004 5.1 2,900 3,118 611 61 3,053 599 2005 4.2 2,892 3,110 741 197 2,899 690


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2006 4 2,665 2,866 716 236 2,611 653 2007 3.3 2,753 2,961 897 166 2,782 843 2008 3.9 3,536 3,802 975 200 3,587 920 2009 4.6 3,986 4,286 932 176 4,096 890

From WFP Annual Reports for 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008, and 2009.

• Combining the overall cost per tonne (less special operations) with the fees paid to implementing partners provides an estimate of the percentage of the Food-‐‑Aid sector grants that are passed on to NGOs.

Table 10: Percentage of nominal tonnage cost paid to partners

Payments to partners as a % of nominal cost per tonne Kenya Uganda Sierra Leone Zambia Pakistan

2002 3.8%

19.5%

3.2%

2003 3.5% 3.4% 15.1% 3.7% 2.1%

2004 1.8% 3.2% 3.3% 3.3% 2.2%

2005 1.6% 3.3%

2006

3.5%

Based on data presented in the 2006 WFP-UNHCR Joint Evaluation of the Pilot Food Distribution Projects (WFP, 2006a, 2006b).

• WFP paid partners (as a percentage of the estimated overall cost per tonne) from 1.8% to 3.8% for management and distribution. WFP paid up to 19% of the overall cost per tonne where partners were also managing the food pipeline. The mean value of the rates where the partner was not managing the pipeline was 3.0% and the median was 3.3%. Globally WFP distributes about half of its food through NGOs (WFP, 2007, 2009)19, but food-‐‑aid in Somalia is almost exclusively distributed through NGOs. We have therefore assumed that WFP passes 3% of its funding for Somalia through NGO implementing partners. It should again be emphasised that this is an estimate – in some cases CERF funding paid for the local costs associated with food-‐‑aid in kind, so a greater proportion of the CERF grant may have been passed on to NGOs.

• For other sectors we have taken the average level of pass-‐‑through to NGOs for those sectors for which we have data, except for the special cases of Food and of Common Services. This value of the amount passed through ranges from 0.02% for Health and Nutrition, to 57% for water and sanitation. The average value (calculated as the total amount passed through divided by the sum of the grants for those sectors) was 25%.

140. This gives an overall estimate that 12% of CERF Funding for Somalia has been passed through to NGOs

19 Other distribution channels include government ration systems, but these arrangements are more common

in Asia and Latin America.


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Triangulation 141. The team have used triangulation to the extent possible to ensure the accuracy and

reliability of the evaluation research.

• Source triangulation. Comparing information from different sources.

• Method triangulation: We will compare information collected by different methods, e.g. numerical analysis and the project proposal analysis.

Evidence Tool 142. The team used a simple evidence tool20 (Table 11) to record evidence on a spread sheet from

the different desk and country studies. The use of this tool enables the team to ensure that the findings are well grounded in evidence, and that conclusions are based on findings, and recommendations on conclusions. The tool is internal to the team to ensure compliance with the Chatham House rule.

Table 11: Evidence Tool

Prepared in advance

Filled in during fieldwork Filled in during analysis

Evaluation Topic

Details of piece of evidence

Source Date Initials Finding Conclusion Recommendation

What is the evaluation question to

be answered or the issue

that has arisen?

Evidence about this issue (this

could be a note of a specific point

from a document, an interview, a

focus group, or an observation).

Source of

evidence

Date of entry

Initials of person

recording this piece

of evidence

Based on

several pieces

of evidence

Based on several findings

Based on one or more conclusions

143. The team entered 457 pieces of evidence from 24 sources in the evidence tool.

Internal coherence 144. The core members of the evaluation team held a two-‐‑day meeting in Brussels at the end of

March 2011 to discuss the emerging findings and to review the evidence base for them. This has helped to ensure that this report is broadly coherent with the other country studies, other than for local contextual issues, and that issues of non-‐‑coherence are explained.

145. Coherence is an important issue for this evaluation as the evaluation team found a very wide range of mechanisms for dealing with the CERF at the country level.

20 This tool was developed by the team leader in 2007. An earlier version of the tool was recently described in

New Directions in Evaluation (Brusset et al., 2010).


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Constraints and limitations 146. The biggest constraint for the evaluation was the lack of data about the extent to which

CERF projects met their objectives. There is no central monitoring of CERF projects and OCHA has no mandate to monitor the funding that the CERF provides to UN agencies.

147. A particular constraint in Somalia is the extent to which the work of UN Agencies and their partners in Somalia is carried on though “remote control” without any physical presence or direct oversight by international staff.

Interview guides 148. The following shows the interview question matrix. Not all questions were asked of all

interviewees. The actual questions asked depended on the answers to previous questions and on whether the interviewee was field or HQ based.

Evaluation question

CERF

Secretariat

RC/HCs

CERF

Recipients

NGOs and other

non-‐‑UN actors

Major donors

Host

Governments

Total Number of questions for this category of interviewee: 15 23 27 23 23 6

To what extent is the preparation of CERF proposals at field level inclusive and transparent?

To what extent are Host Governments engaged with the CERF? Is this level of engagement appropriate and sufficient, what are their perceptions of the CERF?

To what extent are the greatest needs being prioritised, and what data are prioritisation decisions based on?

To what extent is the vetting process thorough and based on good quality criteria including the life-‐‑saving criteria? Do these processes represent due diligence?

To what extent do CERF processes and projects consider the need of vulnerable groups?

How does the timeliness of CERF Funding compare with other funding sources?

To what extent does CERF reporting meet the needs of users?

To what extent is the CERF accountable -‐‑ upwards or downwards? What mechanisms exist?

What is the typical timeline for CERF funding, and to what extent have CERF funds facilitated timely action?

To what extent has CERF contributed to better overall funding for under-‐‑funded emergencies?


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Evaluation question

CERF

Secretariat

RC/HCs

CERF

Recipients

NGOs and other

non-‐‑UN actors

Major donors

Host

Governments

How has CERF affected agencies’ ability to respond, at both HQ and field?

What type of projects, and what components of projects are funded by the CERF, and what did agencies do that they would not otherwise have been able to do? What do agencies avoid using CERF funds for?

To what extent has the availability of CERF contributions enabled agencies to use internal advance mechanisms and leverage donor funds?

To what extent has CERF contributed to better coverage? How?

To what extent do CERF processes and projects consider the differing needs of women, boys, girls, and men? (Gender)

To what extent has CERF supported prevention and the transition to early recovery? Is this coherent with the objectives of CERF?

To what extent has the CERF reinforced other elements of the humanitarian reform, and has this contributed to timely responses to new needs and underfunding?

How do the CERF transaction costs compare with the transaction costs for other funding? If higher, why do agencies apply for CERF funding?

How well is the CERF being managed by the CERF Secretariat, is it adequately supported and resourced?

To what extent have previous evaluation recommendations been implemented, and what impact has any such implementation had?

To what extent has CERF contributed to a more effective humanitarian system?

To what extent does the AG contribute to the CERF process? How could this be improved?

To what extent are CERF processes, in the field and in NY, perceived to be transparent?

How does the CERF interact with other pooled funding mechanisms? How do they affect each other?

How has the CERF adapted to changing needs and what further changes may be needed to make the CERF more appropriate and relevant?

To what extent are the current fund scale and window arrangements (RR, UFE, and loans) appropriate?

To what extent are NGOs engaged with the CERF? Is this level of engagement appropriate and sufficient, what are NGOs'ʹ perceptions of the CERF?


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Evaluation question

CERF

Secretariat

RC/HCs

CERF

Recipients

NGOs and other

non-‐‑UN actors

Major donors

Host

Governments

To what extent do the current humanitarian architecture and agency procedures and capacities limit the potential impact of the CERF?

How well managed are CERF processes at the field level? Are HCTs and country OCHA offices adequately resourced?

To what extent has the CERF met the objectives set out for it in the GA resolution 60/124?


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ANNEX V. PERSONS MET Summary of Interviews by category of person of which Category of person interviewed Cat No as % ♀ ♀ as % Other OCHA Staff O 7 18% 5 71%

Donors D 7 18% 1 14%

Other UN staff U 23 59% 5 22%

NGOs and Red Cross N 2 5% 1 50%

Total 39 100% 12 31%

Summary of Interview Methods of which Type of interview method Type as % ♀ ♀ as % General meeting gm 0 0% 0

Semi-structured Interview (Individual interviewee) ssi 10 26% 4 40%

Semi-structured Interview (Group - two or more interviewees) ssg 29 74% 8 28%

Total 39 100% 12 31%

149. In addition to these meetings the team also met with the Donor Working Group, the Humanitarian Forum, the Inter-‐‑cluster working group and others.

Surname, Forenames

Org. and function ♂♀ M Cat Place Date

Agwaro, Patricia Nyimbae

OCHA Somalia, CHF Donor Liaison Officer ♀ ssg O Nairobi Mon 17 Jan

Al-Iaham, Abdallah

UNDP Programme Manager, recovery and sustainable livelihoods sector

♂ ssg U Nairobi Wed 26 Jan

Baldo, Francisco FAO Emergency Programme Monitoring Officer ♂ ssg U Nairobi Wed 26 Jan Balfour, Nancy Unicef Somalia, Wash Specialist ♀ ssg U Nairobi Wed 19 Jan Barbadoro, Clelia Unicef Somalia, Information Management ♀ ssg U Nairobi Wed 19 Jan Barre, Mohamed UNDP Programme specialist, recovery and sustainable

livelihoods sector ♂ ssg U Nairobi Wed 26 Jan

Bowden, Mark Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator, Somalia

♂ ssi U Nairobi Thu 27 Jan

Bowers, Deborah Unicef Somalia, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, Formerly Donor Relations Specialist responsible for CERF

♀ ssg U Nairobi Wed 19 Jan

Chapman, Regis WFP Somalia, Co-Chair of Food Aid Cluster ♂ ssg U Nairobi Thu 20 Jan Conte, Marco UNHCR Somalia, Associate Programme Officer ♂ ssi U Nairobi Tue 18 Jan Cornaro, Francesco Nicolo

WFP Somalia, Logistics Officer ♂ ssg U Nairobi Thu 20 Jan

Gari, Solomon Canadian High Commisison, Canadian International Development Agency, Humanitarian Affairs Officer

♂ ssg D Nairobi Mon 24 Jan

Gbeho, Kiki OCHA Somalia, Head of Office ♀ ssi O Nairobi Mon 17 Jan Gitongori, Beatrice UNDP Projects Officer, recovery and sustainable livelihoods

sector ♂ ssg U Nairobi Wed 26 Jan

Ismail, Afifa OCHA Somalia, CHF Donor Liaison Officer ♀ ssg O Nairobi Mon 17 Jan Kebede Tessema, Assegid

WHO Somalia, EPI/Measles Technical Officer ♂ ssg U Nairobi Thu 20 Jan

Khan, Jumma Unicef, Education Cluster Coordinator ♂ ssi U Nairobi Mon 24 Jan Klansoe, Peter DRC Somalia, Country Director ♂ ssi N Nairobi Thu 20 Jan Mannhardt, Harold WFP Somalia, Donor Relations ♂ ssg U Nairobi Thu 20 Jan Mizra, Imran raza Unicef Somalia, Immunisation specialist ♂ ssg U Nairobi Wed 19 Jan Mwangi, Geoffrey WFP Somalia, UNHAS Coordinator ♂ ssg U Nairobi Thu 20 Jan Ng'inja, Sarah Embassy of Sweden, Nairobi, Officer for Development

Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance, Somalia ♀ ssi D Nairobi Tue 18 Jan

Opyio, Dan FAO Project Manager ♂ ssg U Nairobi Wed 26 Jan

O'Regan, Nicholas Operations Centre Director and Representative, Kenya Operations Centre

♂ ssi O Nairobi Wed 26 Jan

Patenaude, Serge Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, Counsellor for Humanitarian and Development Affairs (Ethiopia/Djibouti)

♂ ssg D Nairobi Thu 27 Jan

Porter, Chris DFID Kenya and Somalia, Humanitarian Advisor ♂ ssi D Nairobi Wed 19 Jan


52

Surname, Forenames

Org. and function ♂♀ M Cat Place Date

Rono, Dan Unicef Somalia, Child Protection Specialist ♂ ssg U Nairobi Wed 19 Jan

Rost, Micholas OCHA Somalia, CHF Donor Relations Officer ♂ ssg O Nairobi Mon 17 Jan

Saleh, Omar WHO Somalia, EHA Coordinator and Emergency Surgical Tutor

♂ ssg U Nairobi Thu 20 Jan

Sanmartin, Gemma

Coopi, Regional Adviser, Somalia, Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda

♀ ssi N Nairobi Tue 25 Jan

Solari, Giacomo Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, Counsellor for Humanitarian and Development Affairs (Horn of Africa)


Suleiman, Hannan Unicef Somalia, Deputy Director ♀ ssg U Nairobi Wed 19 Jan Unulova, Ivana OCHA Somalia, Head of Funding Coordination Unit ♀ ssg O Nairobi Mon 17 Jan Ursel, Kieth WFP Somalia, Programme Advisor, External Relations and

Food Aid Cluster Chair ♂ ssg U Nairobi Thu 20 Jan

van Praag, Clara Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, Programme Assistant (Horn of Africa)


von Dohren, Godela

WHO Somalia, Project Officer, Liason and Partnership ♂ ssg U Nairobi Thu 20 Jan

Waaigman, Gabriella

OCHA Sub-Regional office for Eastern Africa, Head of Office ♀ ssi O Nairobi Mon 24 Jan

Weaver, Stephen Canadian High Commisison, Canadian International Development Agency, Head of Development Cooperation


Whitbread, Kari-Ann

Unicef Somalia, Donor Relations Specialist responsible for CERF

♀ ssg U Nairobi Wed 19 Jan

Chapman, Regis WFP Somalia, Co-Chair of Food Aid Cluster ♂ ssg U Nairobi Thu 20 Jan Conte, Marco UNHCR Somalia, Associate Programme Officer ♂ ssi U Nairobi Tue 18 Jan Cornaro, Francesco Nicolo

WFP Somalia, Logistics Officer ♂ ssg U Nairobi Thu 20 Jan

Gari, Solomon Canadian High Commisison, Canadian International Development Agency, Humanitarian Affairs Officer



53

ANNEX VI. DETAILS FOR ALL CERF FUNDED PROJECTS IN SOMALIA Please note that spelling errors and typos in the database descriptions have not been corrected. Surplus carriage returns have been removed.

Project

Disb

urse

men

t ye

ar

Days

to

disb

urse

men

t

Title Activities

Revie

wed

UNICEF - RR - Multi-sector - US$1,128,026 (06-CEF-015) -

2006 28 Drought response in Somalia Purchase,delivery and distributuion of the blended foods, cold chain equipment, essential drugs and vaccines to the drought affected populations; - - Assessing coverage and reporting; - - Polio vaccination campaign; - - Supervision and on the job training for surveillance and strenghtening of lab services.

N

UNICEF - RR - Shelter and NFI - US$2,000,000 (06-CEF-312) -

2006 11 Provision of essential NFIs to flood affected populaiton

Procurement, delivery and distribution of the NFI items to the flood affected populations; - - Coordination of activities and assessments through the cluster system at both field and Nairobi levels.

N

FAO - RR - Agriculture - US$600,000 (06-FAO-010-E) -

2006 32 Immediate support to pastoral communities as a drought mitigation response

Increase chances of survival for 977,000 more productive animals. - - Maintain purchasing power of 13,000 pastoralist households. - - Increase the availability of fodder for livestock.

N

FAO - RR - Agriculture - US$287,664 (06-FAO-042) -

2006 30 Immediate support to pastoral communities as a drought mitigation response

To address the immediate humanitarian needs of vulnerable populations as well as targeting the root causes of vulnerability, in order to increase drought resilience

N


2006 25 Emergency Livelihood support to flood-affected riverine farmers

Delivery of agricultural livelihood support inputs within one month of initiation

Y

UNDP - RR - Multi-sector - US$2,080,000 (06-UDP-311) -

2006 30 Somalia Humanitarian Flood Response Fund

Enhanced, rapid access to funds by NGOs and UN agencies to facilitate a timely responses; Enhanced delivery of NFIs and other relevant flood emergency response

N

WFP - RR - Food - US$852,000 (06-WFP-009) -

2006 14 Somalia PRRO 10191.0 Food aid for relief and recovery

Food assistance to save lives and protect livelihoods and prevent mass migration of communities affected by the drought; Ensuring access to a sufficient diet for all vulnerable populations with special attention to women and other groups at high risk; Improvement of nutritional status and restoration of self-relience.

N

WFP - RR - Food - US$500,000 (06-WFP-043-A) -

2006 90 Emergency School Feeding for the Drough-Affected Population of Southern and Central Somalia

Providing two meals each day for 100 schooldays in four months, train implementing partners and communities in food handling, project implementation and managment, mobilize and sensitize community members, community education committees and local authorities on the importance of education and keeping children in school, monitoring and reporting of ESFP in 51 schools

N

WFP - RR - CS- Telecomms - US$499,984 (06-WFP-043-B) -

2006 108 Inter-Agency Security Telecommunications Support for Drought Operations in Somalia

Installing telecommunication equipment in the 24/7 Inter-agency radio rooms to become MOSS/MISTS compliant; Training of all UN and (I)NGO staff, based or working in Central or South Somalia in the use of security telecommunication equipment and procedures; Update and implement the Inter-Agency frequency plan in Somalia

N

WFP - RR - CS - Logistics - US$1,450,000 (06-WFP-043-C) -

2006 77 Logistics for Somalia Drought Operation

Provision of prepaid airspace on existing UNCAS services flying into parts of Gedo, Bay, Lower and Middle Juba; Upgrading and implementation of safety and security measures at selected airstrips in the same regions; Identify and recommend necessary repair and construction work at UN common premises in Wajid and Baidoa

N

WFP - RR - Multi-sector - US$2,837,000 (06-WFP-287) -

2007 68 Air operations in support of inter-agency flood response in Somalia - Food and non-food relief

Food and NFIs would be flown into Hiran and Middle Shabelle regions N

WFP - RR - CS - UNHAS - US$3,011,841 (06-WFP-310) -

2006 19 Air Drops of Food aid in support of Flood Response in Somalia

Provision of 4,500-6,000MT of food aid in Lower Juba region N

WHO - RR - Health - US$404,540 (06-WHO-006) -

2006 9 Health and Nutrition Improve household nutrition by providing fortified blended foods highly beneficial to most as risk members of households; Improve quality of polio SIAs and significantly reduce number of children missed and

N


54

Project

Disb

urse

men

t ye

ar

Days

to

disb

urse

men

t

Title Activities

Revie

wed

strengthen cold chain for measles and polio immunization; Improve surveillance and access to essential drugs; improved monitoring and coordination with health partners


2006 46 Health Improve Basic health sevices coverage and delivery in affected areas. N


2006 50 Water quality monitoring for the drought affected population in South/Central Somalia

Provide technical guidelines to emergency preparedness and response related to water; Technical supervision for Wat/San needs assessments of drought affected areas in the South Central zone of Somalia; Prepare technical specifications, carry out communications for arranging supply of chemicals, equipment and sanitation monitoring; Technical support on the design, development and execution of community mobilization and health education campaigns.

N

UNICEF - RR - Shelter and NFI - US$1,716,548 (07-CEF-041) -

2007 16 Provision of essential NFIs to displaced and evicted Affected population

Procurement, delivery and distribution of the NFI items to the affected population; - - coordination of activities and assessment through the cluster system at both field and Nairobi levels; - - supervision and monitoring of NFI distribution with implementing partners

Y

UNICEF - RR - Water and sanitation - US$1,353,919 (07-CEF-081-A) -

2007 36 Emergency Provision of Safe Water and Sanitation and Hygiene Services

• Ensure water trucking as an emergency response (essentially focusing along the Mogadishu-Afgoye road but also in other areas should this be required/possible) - - • Rehabilitate fully 3 high yielding boreholes in order to implement five mini water supply systems (distribution network, water tanks, water kiosks etc.) - - • Provide water bladders and chlorine for those agencies involved in water trucking - - • Support the chlorination of seven existing wells being used by IDPs - - • Construct 2,000 latrines to IDP population - - • Continue hygiene promotion and training, as well as IEC materials and soap distribution - - • Procurement and distribution of 300 sets of sanitation tools and related IEC material in all IDP camps; mobilize youth in the IDP camps to conduct clean-up campaigns - - • Provide 50 latrines for schools (two per school) and one set of sanitation tools per school - - • Provide sanitation and ensure safe drinking water in the supported health facilities

Y

UNICEF - RR - Health - US$246,100 (07-CEF-081-B) -

2007 36 Improved access to lifesaving health services, including measles vaccination

In response to the rapidly deteriorating situation in Central and Southern Somalia - and the Shabelles in particular - UNICEF will support partners to: - - - reduce excess mortality through both fixed and mobile basic health care provision, and a specific vaccination campaign to prevent measles mortality among children under five in IDP settlements - - - ensure integration with water and sanitation programmes in health facilities lacking access to safe clean water; - - - underpin increased access to emergency health care services with social mobilisation on malaria, immunization, etc.

Y

UNHCR - RR - Shelter and NFI - US$1,000,000 (07-HCR-014) -

2007 39 Provision of Emergency and Temporary Shelter to IDPs and Improvement of Living - - Conditions in Their Major Settlements in Somalia

Provision of emergency shelter, non-food items and support to basic services infrastructure.

N

UNDP - UFE - Security - US$1,000,000 (07-UDP-001) -

2007 34 Enhanced Security for UN Personnel in Somalia

The acquisition, through rental agreement and rehabilitation of the Paradise Hotel, of an additional UN Guest House in Mogadishu capable of providing accommodation to 50 UN and NGO personnel at any one time and to ensure it meets all MORSS requirements per UNDSS regulations. - - Construction of additional structures including a safety room and bunkers. - - Establishment of a communications hub, including internet, fax, telephone centre within Paradise Hotel accessible to UN and NGO staff. - - The installation of the IAET network in 2 other locations to be identified in South-Central (locations considered: Kismayo, Jowhar, Merka, or Beletwyne) to ensure EMOSS compliance - - Technical upgrades of existing communications equipment in the 2 above-mentioned locations. - - Comprehensive training in all aspects of telecommunications equipment and radio procedures to all UN and NGO radio operators and staff. - - Conducting of related electrical upgrades. - - Support from a Communications expert to improve and run the communications system.

N

UNDP - RR - Multi-sector - US$1,091,400 (07-UDP-017) -

2007 56 Somalia Humanitarian response fund

The project will aim to assist an estimated 400,000 IDPs in South Central and IDPs and urban poor within Mogadishu by ensuring: - - ? Rapid access to emergency funds by NGOs and UN agencies to facilitate timely humanitarian response; and - - ? Increased delivery of non-food items, water and sanitation and other relevant emergency

Y


55

Project

Disb

urse

men

t ye

ar

Days

to

disb

urse

men

t

Title Activities

Revie

wed

response.


2007 36 Air transport support for Humanitarian Operation in Somalia.

Delivery of Humanitarian assistance in Somalia via air transport. N


2007 39 Air support of Drought, flood and conflict response activities

Air support of Drought, flood and conflict response activities N

WFP - RR - Food - US$2,025,308 (07-WFP-069) -

2007 21 Food Aid for Relief and Recovery

- Procurement of 2,250mt of Corn Soya Blend urgently within the region; - - - Transportation of the food commodity from Kenya to the Extended Delivery Points in Somalia. - - - Storage, handling and internal transport of the commodities; - - - WFP and partners will coordinate and manage the distribution of food and its monitoring.

Y


2007 76 Communicable disease/Cholera outbreak response

- Set up efficient system among different health partners for outbreak alert, to rapidly investigate and respond to ongoing outbreaks - - - Preposition Cholera kits and other medical supplies and equipment for outbreak response, and distribute to health partners where needed - - - Provide critical life-saving supplies for rapid AWD case confirmation in strategic locations. - - - Provide critical life-saving skills to staff in the appropriate use of diagnostic supplies. - - - Provide water quality supplies (Chlorine tablets, Chlorometers and H2S meters) to health partners and water supply companies in the field to ensure the availability of sufficient quality and quantity of safe drinking water to the vulnerable population - - - Provide life-saving skills to the staff of health agencies and water supply companies in required for ensuring and sustaining safe water supply - - - Conduct life saving health education and hygiene promotion activities on treatment and prevention of AWD among the affected population

Y


2007 76 Basic life saving health services for IDPs and host communities

- Provide critical services: fuel, drugs, incentives, medical equipment and supplies to those key health facilities that do not yet receive support from others and support these facilities and their staff with life saving skills and technical advice. - - - Continue the support already provided to 12 mobile clinics run by NGO partners in the affected areas (i.e. fuel, drugs, incentives, medical equipment and supplies). - - - Provide all supported health care facilities including mobile clinics with WHO guidelines for recommended treatment and other critical health information available. - - - Set up a monitoring and evaluation system to ensure adequate coverage of the affected population as well as sufficient quality of health care provided

N

UNICEF - RR - Health - Nutrition - US$3,038,800 (08-CEF-042) -

2008 29 Management of Acute Malnutrition in Children Under-Five Years Amongst IDPs and Vulnerable Host Populations in Somalia - - - - SOM-08/H33-AS

The emergency nutrition RUSF project is designed to increase access, increase coverage and diminish high prevalences of acute malnourishment in the identified project site areas of high nutrition vulnerability. UNICEF expects that the RUSF commodities purchased with CERF funds will save lives amongst an age group of children highly vulnerable to the affects of under-nutrition. - - Funds from the CERF contribution would provide 43% of the required food commodities to reach 122,000 children as a preventive measure against acute malnutrition with services during a 6-month period. In addition to the food commodity (Plumpy’doz) that will be procured and delivered using this contribution, UNICEF will complement CERF funding with other secured funding to ensure the necessary resources for the remainder of RUSF procurement, freight and delivery costs, training for partners and provision of essential materials and measuring equipment and tools, as well as the integration of WASH elements which underpin the nutrition intervention. These will include the provision of Aquatabs for household drinking water treatment.

N

FAO - RR - Agriculture - US$2,000,001 (08-FAO-020) -

2008 34 OSRO/SOM/XXX/CHA : Integrated Cash and Food for Work in Support of Populations in Food Security Crisis in Middle and Lower Shabeelle Regions of Southern Somalia.

1. Stabilisation of the current food security crisis in the Middle and Lower Shabeelle regions as evidenced through population nutritional status indicators (GAM and SAM). - - 2. Protection of the most vulnerable from nutritional deprivation or from resorting to harmful coping strategies such as asset stripping (eg. sale of productive assets), forced migration, sexual exploitation, and from a reduction in their real purchasing power. - - - - 3. 53,300 poor households in the

N


56

Project

Disb

urse

men

t ye

ar

Days

to

disb

urse

men

t

Title Activities

Revie

wed

Middle and Lower Shabeelle regions will have benefited through access to cash and food for work programmes. - - - - 4. 800 km irrigation canals in the Middle and Lower Shabeelle regions will be rehabilitated through cash or food for work in time for use in the 2008 “Der” cropping season - -

UNDP - RR - Agriculture - US$1,000,450 (08-UDP-017) -

2008 31 Income and Employment generation for Food security in Middle Shabeelle and Hiran.

1. Contribute to the alleviation of the current food security and livelihood crisis in the project target areas (Middle Shabeelle and Hiran). - - - - 2. Protection of the most vulnerable from nutritional deprivation or from a reduction in their real purchasing power, as well as from resorting to harmful coping strategies such as asset stripping (eg. sale of productive assets), forced migration, sexual exploitation, engaging in violent/armed activities, etc. - - - - 3. The quality of life of 13,000 poor households in Middle Shabeele and Hiran will be improved through expanded livelihood opportunities (access to employment and cash). - - - - 4. 10,000 hectares will be protected from flood and 2,500 hectares will benefit from water harvesting activities, thus creating a solid base for recovery of agricultural production. - -

N


2008 19 Humanitarian Air Service in support of relief operations in Somalia. - - - - SOM-08/CSS11-AS

The project outcome is to maintain and increase safe air access to Somalia for humanitarian personnel, at a subsidised cost, from Kenya to and within Somalia. In addition staff will be safely evacuated or relocated during an emergency.

N

WFP - RR - Security - US$2,972,300 (08-WFP-107) -

2008 35 Enabling Humanitarian Relief Operations in Somalia by Improving Security Support Capabilities

• 1,400 staff working in or on mission to Somalia are able to be rapidly relocated and medically evacuated by UNDSS, with a dedicated plane for this purpose that counts with the necessary medical equipment for MEDEVACs. - - • 1,400 staff working in or on mission to Somalia are able to be relocated and medically evacuated at night through any of 9 airstrips throughout the country that have the necessary capabilities for night-time landing of aircrafts. - - • Staff working in south and central Somalia will be less vulnerable to attacks with all staff in south and central Somalia having necessary security-related equipment including a minimum of a VHF radio, and BR4 level ballistics vest and helmet. - - • 1,400 staff working in or on mission to south and central Somalia are able to be medically stabilized before being evacuated in any of the 5 Medical Stabilization Centres throughout south and central Somalia.

N

UNICEF - UFE - Water and sanitation - US$2,399,999 (09-CEF-008-A) -

2009 40 Water, sanitation and hygiene assistance for populations in Somalia affected by conflict and disaster (natural and economic). - - - - SOM-09/WS/23289/124

Expected Outcomes - - The CERF funded project will ensure the provision of safe drinking water and sanitation services to 300,000 IDPs and emergency affected populations in the Central and Southern Zone.

Y

UNICEF - UFE - Health - Nutrition - US$1,600,000 (09-CEF-008-B) -

2009 40 Emergency nutrition response - saving children's lives from death and disability due to malnutrition - - - - SOM-09/H/23286/124

Expected Outcomes - - The CERF funded project will reduce the high prevalence of acute malnutrition among children aged 6-36 months through provision of RUF commodities. - - Indicators: - - • 90,000 children benefiting from RUF products (one pot of plumpy doz per week) - - • 20,008 cartoons of plumpy doz distributed for 7 weeks.

N

UNICEF - RR - Water and sanitation - US$1,200,000 (09-CEF-037) -

2009 25 Water, sanitation and hygiene assistance for populations in Somalia affected by conflict and disaster - - SOM-09/WS/23289/124

Outcome/Result - - - an increase in the number of functioning sources and storage facilities - - - an increase in the number of people accessing safe water - - - an increase in the number of sources chlorinated - - - an increase in the number of people accessing chlorinated water - - - an increase in the number of active water committees - - - an increase in the number of communal latrines - - - an increase in the number of people receiving key hygiene messages - - - correct usage and maintenance of water and sanitation facilities

N

UNICEF - RR - Water and sanitation - US$2,500,945 (09-CEF-057) -

2009 21 Water, sanitation and hygiene assistance for populations in Somalia affected by conflict and disaster - - SOM-09/WS/23289/R

- an increase in the number of functioning sources and storage facilities - - - an increase in the number of people accessing safe water - - - an increase in the number of sources chlorinated - - - an increase in the number of people accessing chlorinated water - - - an increase in the number of communal latrines - - - an increase in the number of people receiving key hygiene messages - - - correct usage and maintenance of water and sanitation facilities - - - an increase in the number of people receiving sanitation items (e.g. soap and household water treatment supplies) - - - an increase in the number of

N


57

Project

Disb

urse

men

t ye

ar

Days

to

disb

urse

men

t

Title Activities

Revie

wed

people receiving hygiene promotion messages

UNICEF - RR - Health - US$1,473,866 (09-CEF-067-A) -

2010 27 Child Health Days (CHDs) in Central and Southern Somalia (CSZ) - - SOM-09/H/22308/122 and 124

Upcoming rounds of CHDs conducted successfully in accessible regions in CSZ, reaching 90% coverage for children under five and 70% coverage for women of childbearing age. Specific outcomes are: - - • 90% of children 9-59 months received measles vaccination that results in the 6-12 months following the campaign no measles outbreak in the locations CHDs were conducted and reported >80% coverage. - - • 90% of children 6-59 months received Vit A capsules that contributes to better protection and increased immunity against diseases. - - • 90% of children received de-worming treatment that contributes to better protection and increased immunity against diseases. - - • 70% of women of CBA received TT vaccination and therefore have better protection against Tetanus, both maternal and neonatal. - - • Families are aware of the CHDs and demand for it.

N

UNICEF - RR - Protection/H Rights - US$276,053 (09-CEF-067-B) -

2010 27 Protection of Children Affected by Armed Conflict in Central and Southern Somalia - -

• Communities under the control of AGEs where child recruitment is reported to be particularly high have increased capacities to mobilize themselves (families, religious and traditional leadership) to prevent or at least reduce the incidence of child recruitment. - - • Grave child rights violations, including recruitment and use of children in the conflict, are identified, systematically documented and addressed; emergency referral and response mechanisms at community level are reinforced to ensure greater protection of children. - - • Basic institutional mechanisms are set up within the TFG to put an immediate halt to new recruitment of any person under 18 into the armed forces and to identify, verify, document and facilitate the immediate release of those already recruited. - - • Increased awareness among senior military commanders from TFG armed forces and associated militias around child recruitment, the requirements of international law and the possible legal consequences of violations of such requirements.

Y

FAO - UFE - Agriculture - US$2,500,000 (09-FAO-004) -

2009 57 Integrated Cash for Work & Productive Assets Rehabilitation/transfer in Support of Populations in Food Security Crisis in Mudug & Galgaduud Regions of Central Southern Somalia. - - SOM-09/A/23258/123

Expected Outcomes - - FAO anticipates that the implementation of the proposed CERF-funded project will have the following outcomes: - - 1. Stabilisation of the current humanitarian crisis in Mudug, Galgaduud and Hiran regions and protection of the most vulnerable from nutritional deprivation or from resorting to harmful coping strategies. - - 2. Improved household incomes for 6,011 poor pastoralist households in the central regions of Mudug and Galgaduud who will have benefited through access to cash for work programmes, rehabilitating water sources. - - 3. 9,000 weak sheep and goats will have been culled with fair prices paid to pastoralists, the households of 300 female butchers will have benefited from access to cash for work and 11,250 households with malnourished children will have benefited from distribution of 90,000 kg of free meat (2 kg per household per week for one month)

Y


2009 22 Time-Critical Emergency Livestock Vaccination and Treatment Project for the Protection of Productive Livestock Assets (...) in Gedo and Lower Juba Regions of Southern Somalia.

FAO anticipates that the implementation of the proposed CERF-funded project will have the following outcomes: - - 1. Increase awareness amongst at-risk pastoralists concerning the devastating livestock disease, PPR. - - 2. Halt the spread of PPR from Kenya into southern Somalia. - - 3. Protect the productive assets of vulnerable and chronically food insecure populations in southern Somalia. - - 4. Maintain or improve the productive capacity of small stock improving the food security of vulnerable pastoralists in chronically food-insecure Kenya border regions of southern Somalia. - - 5. Improve outcomes for women and women-headed households. - - 6. Contribute to reducing civil insecurity and improving economic and political stability.

N


2009 21 Pastoralists emergency response (PER) - - - - CAP 2009 Project Code: SOM-09/A/23256/123

FAO anticipates that the implementation of the proposed CERF-funded project will have the following outcomes: - - 1. Increase awareness among at-risk pastoralists about the devastating livestock disease. - - 2. Protect the productive assets of vulnerable and chronically food insecure populations in Central and North-eastern of Somalia. - - 3. Maintain or improve the productive capacity of livestock thereby improving the food security of vulnerable pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in chronically food-insecure Central and North-eastern regions of Somalia. - - 4. Improve outcomes for women and women-

N


58

Project

Disb

urse

men

t ye

ar

Days

to

disb

urse

men

t

Title Activities

Revie

wed

headed households. - - 5. Contribute to reducing civil insecurity and improving economic and political stability.


2010 34 Integrated cash-for-work and productive assets rehabilitation in support of populations in food security crisis in Gedo Region of Central Southern Somalia - - SOM-10/A/28904

FAO anticipates that the implementation of the proposed CERF-funded project will have the following outcomes: - - 1. Stabilization of the current humanitarian crisis in north Gedo region and protection of the most vulnerable from increased debts or from resorting to harmful coping strategies. - - 2. Improved household incomes for 3,300 poor pastoralist households in north Gedo region districts of Bulla-Hawa, Dollow, Luuq, Burdhubo and Garbaharey - - 3. 1.2 million animals treated and vaccinated by the five mobile veterinary teams. This will translate to increased livestock productivity and market prices Healthy with better body conditions animals would fetch better prices in the livestock market - - 4. Improved food security through increased household crop production - - 5. Some small-scale riverine farmers in Gedo region will have benefited from the sale of crop residues.

N


2009 22 Emergency provision of Non Food Items (NFIs) - - - - SOM-09/S-NF/22306/120

- 120,000 displaced individuals are provided with NFIs - - - Improved living conditions for 20,000 IDP families

N


2009 22 Provision of fire-retardant temporary shelters for IDPs - - SOM-09/S-NF/22305/120

- 2,500 IDP families are provided with temporary shelter - - - Improved living conditions of a minimum 15, 000 individuals

Y


2010 34 Emergency provision of Non Food Items (NFIs) - - - - SOM-10/S-NF/29003

- 198,000 displaced individuals are provided with NFIs - - - Improved living conditions for 33,000 IDP families

Y

UNOPS - UFE - CS - Logistics - US$1,000,000 (09-OPS-003) -

2009 56 Rehabilitation of Airstrips - - - - SOM-09/ER/23315

Expected Outcomes - - The completion of the project shall result in: - - • sustained access of the region by the international community and commercial air traffic through the airfield use, - - • securer safety of aircrafts and passengers, - - • enhanced logistical support for humanitarian assistance delivery - - • capacity building of the local authorities - - • enhanced local aviation capacity

N

WFP - UFE - CS - UNHAS - US$2,500,000 (09-WFP-011) -

2009 86 Provision of subsidised humanitarian air-bridge for passengers from Kenya to Somalia and within Somalia. - - - - SOM-09/LOG(1490)

The project’s outcome is to maintain and increase access to Somalia by ensuring subsidised UNHAS scheduled flights from Kenya to and within Somalia. - - The key performance indicators are: - - 1. Flight safety and schedules to/from and within Somalia maintained for three months. - - 2. Passenger trend of 1,350 pax/month maintained for three months. - - 3. Passengers’ flight costs subsidised at USD 500 for three months. - - 4. UNDSS BE-200aircraft maintained for three months use at 80 mgh per month. - - 5. One aviation security specialist recruited for three months.

N

WFP - RR - Food - US$4,997,088 (09-WFP-065) -

2009 56 Emergency Operations 10812.0 Food Aid for Emergency Relief and Protection of Livelihoods - - SOM-09/F/23317/R561

• 3,601of cereals and 3,000mt of Corn Soya Blend (non-GMO) distributed to 100,000 beneficiaries. - - • 72,000 children under five years and pregnant and nursing mothers (43,200 females) screened for malnutrition - - • 2,850 children under five (1,425 females) discharged from OTP included for family ration to prevent them from relapsing into moderate or severe malnutrition - - • 24,800 children under 2 years and pregnant and nursing mothers (14,880 females) attending Mother and Child Health clinics reached through institutional feeding support. - - • Improved and/or stabilized nutritional status for up to 100,000 targeted beneficiaries.

N

WFP - RR - Security - US$385,200 (09-WFP-066) -

2009 34 Enabling Humanitarian Relief Operations in Somalia by Improving Security Support Capabilities - - SOM-09/S/23294/5139 - - - -

• 1,400 staff working in or on mission to Somalia can be rapidly relocated by UNDSS if required. - - • Security assessments undertaken as necessary.

N

WFP - RR - Food - US$24,999,104 (09-WFP-079) -

2010 26 Emergency Operations 10812.0 Food Aid for Emergency Relief and Protection of Livelihoods - -

Specific expected outputs for proposed project would include: - - • 22,085 MT of cereals 5,836 MT of Corn-Soya Blend and 1,589 MT of vegetable oil is distributed to 2 million beneficiaries. - - • 796,000 IDPs, 85,000 Mogadishu residents under wet feeding are reached with

N


59

Project

Disb

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men

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ar

Days

to

disb

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men

t

Title Activities

Revie

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SOM-10/F/27084 relief rations and hot meals. - - • 495,000 pregnant and breastfeeding mothers, malnourished children are assisted with nutritious rations and those admitted are discharged. - - • 103,000 school children in targeted schools are proved school meals. - - • 523,000 drought affected in central Somalia are assisted with daily rations. - - • Key personnel from 100 partners trained - - - - The following outcome level results are expected: - - • Stabilized acute malnutrition in children under 5 in targeted, emergency-affected populations in Somalia through general food assistance, supplementary feeding and mother-and-child health and nutrition (MCHN) programmes. The actual performance process indicators for the nutrition programmes would include ensuring recovery/curing rate of above 70% for children under supplementary feeding programmes and keeping default rates below 15%;

WHO - RR - Health - US$2,000,000 (09-WHO-037) -

2009 29 Provision of emergency life-saving health care services to the displaced and host population in areas affected by conflict and natural disaster - - Linked to SOM-09/H/22313/122 & /H/23307/122

1. Emergency health services, including mobile clinics and outreach and vaccination activities, provided and accessible for IDPs, conflict-affected populations, and most vulnerable groups. - - 2. Trauma services in emergency care hospitals available and accessible. - - 3. Outbreak alerts are investigated, confirmed and responded to in a timely and appropriate manner; and outbreak control interventions provided - - 4. Coordination activities of health interventions are efficient and supported by assessing and monitoring the health situation and needs of vulnerable population groups and by health information management and sharing among partners and with other clusters - -

Y


2009 29 Emergency response to measles outbreaks among children in Mogadishu particularly in internally displaced communities - - Linked to 22313/R/122

1. More than 85% coverage of children under five in Mogadishu and surrounding IDP displaced communities. - - 2. Prevention of measles outbreaks and avoidable deaths among children from 6 to 59 months. - - Indicators used in assessing the achievement of project outcomes: - - 1. 85% of targeted children vaccinated with measles (total of 300,000 children). - - 2. 85% of targeted children receive vitamin A supplementation. - - 3. Production of complete outbreak response report. - - 4. Downward trend in the number of cases of measles reported in targeted areas

Y

WHO - RR - Health - US$2,465,022 (09-WHO-074) -

2010 15 Child Health Days (CHDs) in Central and Southern Somalia (CSZ) - - SOM-09/H/22308/122 and 124

Upcoming rounds of CHDs conducted successfully in accessible regions in CSZ, reaching 90% coverage for children under five and 70% coverage for women of childbearing age. Specific outcomes are: - - • 90% of children 9-59 months received measles vaccination that results in the 6-12 months following the campaign no measles outbreak in the locations CHDs were conducted and reported >80% coverage. - - • 90% of children 6-59 months received Vit A capsules that contributes to better protection and increased immunity against diseases. - - • 90% of children received de-worming treatment that contributes to better protection and increased immunity against diseases. - - • 70% of women of CBA received TT vaccination and therefore have better protection against Tetanus, both maternal and neonatal. - - • Families are aware of the CHDs and demand for it.

N


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ANNEX VII. SELECTED PROJECTS 24 projects were randomly selected for analysis. Please see the methodology section for a description of the random selection process and rating process.

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06-FAO-010-E-RR. FAO: Agriculture - $600,000

Increase chances of survival for 977,000 more productive animals. Maintain purchasing power of 13,000 pastoralist households. Increase the availability of fodder for livestock.

None n/i No documents available

n/i No documents available

n/i No documents available.

06-FAO-042-RR. FAO: Agriculture - $287,664

To address the immediate humanitarian needs of vulnerable populations as well as targeting the root causes of vulnerability, in order to increase drought resilience

None n/i No documents available

n/i No documents available

n/i No documents available.

06-FAO-282-RR. FAO: Agriculture - $508,200

Delivery of agricultural livelihood support inputs within one month of initiation

Proposal of 16 November 2006

0 No reference to gender issues

1 Beneficiaries said to be vulnerable due to prior droughts. Project is to target the worst-affected

0 No reference to cross-cutting issues of any type, even though the description of the floods raise the question of climate change adaptation.

07-UDP-017-RR. UNDP: Multi-sector - $1,091,400

The project will aim to assist an estimated 400,000 IDPs in South Central and IDPs and urban poor within Mogadishu by ensuring: Rapid access to emergency funds by NGOs and UN agencies to facilitate timely humanitarian response; and Increased delivery of non-food items, water and sanitation and other relevant emergency response.

Proposal of 6 July 2007 and of 29 May 2007.


1 Reference to urban poor as a target group in addition to IDPs

0 No reference to cross-cutting issues.

09-HCR-040-RR. UNHCR: Shelter and non-food items - $1,050,740

- 2,500 IDP families are provided with temporary shelter - Improved living conditions of a minimum 15, 000 individuals

Project proposal, initial and final. Correspondence on budget modification, Narrative report, overall package document (10 documents in total)


1 Vulnerable families to be targeted, but nature of vulnerability not identified.



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09-HCR-044-RR. UNHCR: Shelter and non-food items - $1,503,671

- 198,000 displaced individuals are provided with NFIs - Improved living conditions for 33,000 IDP families

Original, revised and final proposals. Narrative Report, and overall application (6 documents)

1 Gives breakdown by gender of target population. Plan for gender aware post-distribution monitoring.

0 No specific reference to vulnerability


09-CEF-067-B-RR. UNICEF: Protection/Human Rights/Rule of Law - $276,053

• Communities under the control of AGEs where child recruitment is reported to be particularly high have increased capacities to mobilize themselves (families, religious and traditional leadership) to prevent or at least reduce the incidence of child recruitment. • Grave child rights violations, including recruitment and use of children in the conflict, are identified, systematically documented and addressed; emergency referral and response mechanisms at community level are reinforced to ensure greater protection of children. • Basic institutional mechanisms are set up within the TFG to put an immediate halt to new recruitment of any person under 18 into the armed forces and to identify, verify, document and facilitate the immediate release of those already recruited. • Increased awareness among senior military commanders from TFG armed forces and associated militias around child recruitment, the requirements of international law and the possible legal consequences of violations of such requirements.

Original, revised and final proposals. Narrative Report, NCE and reprogramming correspondence, and overall application (8 documents)

0 The proposal talks about child recruitment without making a single reverence to the fact that only boys are recruited in Somalia (in other contexts children of both sexes may be recruited).

1 The target group are by definition, vulnerable to child-recruitment. However, there is no attention to factors which might leave particular children vulnerable to child recruitment.

2a Protection is a cross-cutting issue in itself and this is the focus of the project. However, there is no reference to other cross cutting issues.

07-CEF-041-RR. UNICEF: Shelter and non-food items - $1,716,548

Procurement, delivery and distribution of the NFI items to the affected population; coordination of activities and assessment through the cluster system at both field and Nairobi levels; supervision and monitoring of NFI distribution with implementing partners

Application template, Extension letter, summary and annual report (5 documents). Note: A Unicef nutrition project also bears the same project number in the files.

1 The bulk of those to be assisted are identified by gender (female) due to the men having re3mained while women fled.

0 Although some specific aspects of vulnerability are identified it is not clear that the planned project activities have any bearing at all on these vulnerabilities.

1 Some cross cutting issues are identified, (e.g. protection), but it is not clear how this NFI project is going to impact them.


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07-CEF-081-A-RR. UNICEF: Water and sanitation - $1,353,919

• Ensure water trucking as an emergency response (essentially focusing along the Mogadishu-Afgoye road but also in other areas should this be required/possible • Rehabilitate fully 3 high yielding boreholes in order to implement five mini water supply systems (distribution network, water tanks, water kiosks etc.) • Provide water bladders and chlorine for those agencies involved in water trucking • Support the chlorination of seven existing wells being used by IDPs • Construct 2,000 latrines to IDP population • Continue hygiene promotion and training, as well as IEC materials and soap distribution • Procurement and distribution of 300 sets of sanitation tools and related IEC material in all IDP camps; mobilize youth in the IDP camps to conduct clean-up campaigns • Provide 50 latrines for schools (two per school) and one set of sanitation tools per school • Provide sanitation and ensure safe drinking water in the supported health facilities

initial and final proposals, summary and annual report (4 documents common for both sub-projects 081-A and 081-B)

0 Number of school children and children under five identified, but no gender breakdown or gender specific interventions.

1 Children and those in health-care facilities are specifically identified as beneficiaries.

0 No specific reference to cross-cutting issues.

07-CEF-081-B-RR. UNICEF: Health - $246,100

In response to the rapidly deteriorating situation in Central and Southern Somalia - and the Shabelles in particular - UNICEF will support partners to: - reduce excess mortality through both fixed and mobile basic health care provision, and a specific vaccination campaign to prevent measles mortality among children under five in IDP settlements - ensure integration with water and sanitation programmes in health facilities lacking access to safe clean water; - underpin increased access to emergency health care services with social mobilisation on malaria, immunization, etc.

initial and final proposals, summary and annual report (4 documents common for both sub-projects 081-A and 081-B)

2a Targeting of women of child-bearing age for vaccination

2a Project specifically targets several vulnerable groups ( pregnant women, children under five etc)

0 No specific reference to cross-cutting issues.


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07-WFP-035-RR. WFP: Coordination and Support Services - UNHAS - $2,939,195

Air support of Drought, flood and conflict response activities

Project proposal, annual report, and summary (3 documents)

n/a As this is a common enabling service rather than a direct service to the affected population.



07-WFP-069-RR. WFP: Food - $2,025,308

- Procurement of 2,250mt of Corn Soya Blend urgently within the region; - Transportation of the food commodity from Kenya to the Extended Delivery Points in Somalia. - Storage, handling and internal transport of the commodities; - WFP and partners will coordinate and manage the distribution of food and its monitoring.

Project proposal, summary, and annual report (3 documents).

1 Project announces intention of monitoring the number of men and women assisted.

1 The project identifies a number of vulnerable groups to be targeted.

2a Project refers to the needs to support coping strategies.

06-WFP-009-RR. WFP: Food - $852,000

Food assistance to save lives and protect livelihoods and prevent mass migration of communities affected by the drought; Ensuring access to a sufficient diet for all vulnerable populations with special attention to women and other groups at high risk; Improvement of nutritional status and restoration of self-reliance.

No proposals. This was one of the very first CERF allocations. There was an evaluation of PRRO 10191 in 2006, but this addressed the first three years of the project, not the period covered by the grant. The grant is referred to in the annual report from the RC/HC but there is not enough information on the grant to make an assessment

n/i Insufficient information available


n/i Insufficient information available.

06-WFP-043-A-RR. WFP: Food - $500,000

Providing two meals each day for 100 schooldays in four months, train implementing partners and communities in food handling, project implementation and management, mobilize and sensitize community members, community education committees and local authorities on the importance of education and keeping children in school, monitoring and reporting of ESFP in 51 schools

No proposals. This was one of the very first CERF allocations. There was an evaluation of PRRO 10191 in 2006, but this addressed the first three years of the project, not the period covered by the grant. The grant is referred to in the annual report from the



n/i Insufficient information available.


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RC/HC but there is not enough information on the grant to make an assessment

06-WFP-287-RR. WFP: Multi-sector - $2,837,000

Food and NFIs would be flown into Hiran and Middle Shabelle regions

Proposal, Annual Report. This project was for common support services.

n/a Marker not applicable for a common support service


n/a Marker not applicable for a common support service.

06-WFP-310-RR. WFP: Coordination and Support Services - UNHAS - $3,011,841

Provision of 4,500-6,000MT of food aid in Lower Juba region

Proposal, Annual Report. This project was for common support services.




09-WHO-037-RR. WHO: Health - $2,000,000

1. Emergency health services, including mobile clinics and outreach and vaccination activities, provided and accessible for IDPs, conflict-affected populations, and most vulnerable groups. 2. Trauma services in emergency care hospitals available and accessible. 3. Outbreak alerts are investigated, confirmed and responded to in a timely and appropriate manner; and outbreak control interventions provided 4. Coordination activities of health interventions are efficient and supported by assessing and monitoring the health situation and needs of vulnerable population groups and by health information management and sharing among partners and with other clusters

Proposal, supporting documents, annual report (5 documents)


1 Specific reference to greater vulnerability of children to acute watery diarrhoea.



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09-WHO-060-RR. WHO: Health - $786,673

1. More than 85% coverage of children under five in Mogadishu and surrounding IDP displaced communities. 2. Prevention of measles outbreaks and avoidable deaths among children from 6 to 59 months. Indicators used in assessing the achievement of project outcomes: 1. 85% of targeted children vaccinated with measles (total of 300,000 children). 2. 85% of targeted children receive vitamin A supplementation. 3. Production of complete outbreak response report. 4. Downward trend in the number of cases of measles reported in targeted areas

Original, revised and final proposals, overview and annual report. (5 documents)

0 No references to gender (for example, there is no indication of sex-specific coverage rates)

2b Children specifically targeted (as most vulnerable to measles)


07-WHO-026-RR. WHO: Health - $900,405

- Set up efficient system among different health partners for outbreak alert, to rapidly investigate and respond to ongoing outbreaks - Preposition Cholera kits and other medical supplies and equipment for outbreak response, and distribute to health partners where needed - Provide critical life-saving supplies for rapid AWD case confirmation in strategic locations. - Provide critical life-saving skills to staff in the appropriate use of diagnostic supplies. - Provide water quality supplies (Chlorine tablets, Chlorometers and H2S meters) to health partners and water supply companies in the field to ensure the availability of sufficient quality and quantity of safe drinking water to the vulnerable population - Provide life-saving skills to the staff of health agencies and water supply companies in required for ensuring and sustaining safe water supply - Conduct life saving health education and hygiene promotion activities on treatment and prevention of AWD among the affected population

Original and revised response, overview, and annual report. (4 documents).

0 No references to gender (e.g. are men or women to be targeted for health education etc. or are different mobilisation approaches to be used for different genders)

1 Reference to children being the most vulnerable group

2a Project includes the building of staff capacity to use diagnostic supplies.


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09-FAO-004-UFE. FAO: Agriculture - $2,500,000

Expected Outcomes FAO anticipates that the implementation of the proposed CERF-funded project will have the following outcomes: 1. Stabilisation of the current humanitarian crisis in Mudug, Galgaduud and Hiran regions and protection of the most vulnerable from nutritional deprivation or from resorting to harmful coping strategies. 2. Improved household incomes for 6,011 poor pastoralist households in the central regions of Mudug and Galgaduud who will have benefited through access to cash for work programmes, rehabilitating water sources. 3. 9,000 weak sheep and goats will have been culled with fair prices paid to pastoralists, the households of 300 female butchers will have benefited from access to cash for work and 11,250 households with malnourished children will have benefited from distribution of 90,000 kg of free meat (2 kg per household per week for one month)

Annual report, various versions of proposals, budget modification request etc (14 documents)

2a Effort to train partners in the used of gender targeting and the use of female butchers to ensure that female headed households have access to the project.

2a Focus on vulnerability

1 Reference to HIV/Aids.

07-UDP-001-UFE. UNDP: Security - $1,000,000

The acquisition, through rental agreement and rehabilitation of the Paradise Hotel, of an additional UN Guest House in Mogadishu capable of providing accommodation to 50 UN and NGO personnel at any one time and to ensure it meets all MORSS requirements per UNDSS regulations. Construction of additional structures including a safety room and bunkers. Establishment of a communications hub, including internet, fax, telephone centre within Paradise Hotel accessible to UN and NGO staff. The installation of the IAET network in 2 other locations to be identified in South-Central (locations considered: Kismayo, Jowhar, Merka, or Beletwyne) to ensure EMOSS compliance Technical upgrades of existing communications equipment in the 2 above-mentioned locations. Comprehensive training in all aspects of telecommunications equipment and radio

Proposal and revisions, overview, extension letter, cover letter, checklist and annual report (8 documents).





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procedures to all UN and NGO radio operators and staff. Conducting of related electrical upgrades. Support from a Communications expert to improve and run the communications system.

09-CEF-008-A-UFE. UNICEF: Water and sanitation - $2,399,999

Expected Outcomes The CERF funded project will ensure the provision of safe drinking water and sanitation services to 300,000 IDPs and emergency affected populations in the Central and Southern Zone.

Annual report, various versions of proposals, budget modification request etc (14 documents)

1 Proposal shows some awareness of the gendered nature of water collection. Expectation that quicker water collection will improve attendance by girls.

1 Focus on vulnerable populations in general, but no specific targeting

0 No reference to cross cutting issues, although one would have expected some attention to environmental factors and climate change risks in this context.

09-OPS-003-UFE. UNOPS: Coordination and Support Services - Logistics - $1,000,000

Expected Outcomes The completion of the project shall result in: • sustained access of the region by the international community and commercial air traffic through the airfield use, • securer safety of aircrafts and passengers, • enhanced logistical support for humanitarian assistance delivery • capacity building of the local authorities • enhanced local aviation capacity

Annual report, various versions of proposal, extension request, justification for extension etc (13 documents)

n/a Marker not applicable for action in support of a common support service

n/a Marker not applicable for action in support of a common support service

n/a Marker not applicable for action in support of a common support service.

09-WFP-011-UFE. WFP: Coordination and Support Services - UNHAS - $2,500,000

The project’s outcome is to maintain and increase access to Somalia by ensuring subsidised UNHAS scheduled flights from Kenya to and within Somalia. The key performance indicators are: 1. Flight safety and schedules to/from and within Somalia maintained for three months. 2. Passenger trend of 1,350 pax/month maintained for three months. 3. Passengers’ flight costs subsidised at USD 500 for three months. 4. UNDSS BE-200aircraft maintained for three months use at 80 mgh per month. 5. One aviation security specialist recruited for three months.





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ANNEX VIII. ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY Beck, T. (2006). Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD-‐‑DAC criteria. London: ALNAP.

Last viewed on 8 June, 2008. URL: www.odi.org.uk/alnap/publications/eha_dac/pdfs/eha_2006.pdf

Notes: This clearly-‐‑written guide provides practical support on how to use the OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) criteria in evaluation of humanitarian action (EHA). It covers the following areas: 1) key themes and issues current in EHA, particularly lesson-‐‑learning, accountability and evaluation; 2) clear definitions for the OECD DAC criteria with explanation, issues to consider, and examples of good practice; 3) very brief guidelines for good practice in methods for the evaluation of humanitarian action. This short book provides the clearest definitions of the DAC evaluation criteria available anywhere.

Brusset, E., Cosgrave, J., & MacDonald, W. (2010). Real-‐‑time evaluation in humanitarian emergencies. New Directions for Evaluation, 2010(126), 9-‐‑20. Last viewed on 23 June 2010. URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ev.326

Notes: The authors describe real-‐‑time evaluation (RTE) as a specific tool in disaster management and within the literature on formative evaluation, monitoring, and impact assessment. RTE offers the possibility of exploring innovative ways to empower frontline disaster response staff, possibly even beneficiaries of assistance. The authors describe conditions for the success of RTE, including field credibility, organization, and rapid analysis.

CERF Secretariat. (2010). Performance and Accountability Framework (PAF) for the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). New York: Central Emergency Response Fund, OCHA. Last viewed on 11 December 2010. URL: http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docId=1175641

Notes: THe CERF Advisory Group, at its first meeting, called for the development of a Performance and Accountability Framework (PAF). This was in order to meet the requirement of an appropriate reporting and accountability mechanism as set pout in the General Assembly Resolution establishing the revamped CERF. This is a revision of the 2009 draft of the PAF. The PAF is based around a logic model for the CERF where: funding for critical humanitarian needs is the input; humanitarian actors better equipped to respond is the output; stengthened humanitarian performance is the outcome; and the operational impact are resources to jumpstart responses for rapid response, and coverage of core humanitarian needs for underfunded emergencies.

Channel 4 News. (2010, 10 March 2010). UN backs Channel 4 News Somali aid probe. Retrieved 13 June, 2011, from http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/politics/international_politics/un%2Bbacks%2Bchannel%2B4%2Bnews%2Bsomali%2Baid%2Binvestigation/3575762.html

Notes: This is a Channel 4 News item about the Monitoring Group report. It notest that a Security Council investigation finds that up to half of food aid sent to Somalia is diverted from those in need to corrupt business leaders, militants and local UN officials. The report, shown to Channel 4 News, suggests that the entire food distribution programme be rebuilt in order to break what it describes as a corrupt cartel of Somali distributors. "ʺSome humanitarian resources, notably food aid, have been diverted to military uses,"ʺ the UN investigation says. This report was leaked as it was not due to be circulated to the Security Council until the following Wednesday. DFID said that "ʺWe are not currently providing


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funding to the World Food Programme in Somalia following previous allegations of corruption in their programme."ʺ The previous allegations referred to were the Channel 4 documentary broadcast on 15 June 2009.

Chatham House. (2007). Chatham House Rule. Retrieved 23 October 2009, from http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/about/chathamhouserule/

Notes: The Chatham House Rule reads as follows: "ʺWhen a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed"ʺ. The world-‐‑famous Chatham House Rule may be invoked at meetings to encourage openness and the sharing of information. It was first devised in 1927 and revised in 1992 and 2002.

HelpAge International. (2010). A study of humanitarian funding for older people. London: HelpAge international. Last viewed on 18 November 2010. URL: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/retrieveattachments?openagent&shortid=VVOS-‐‑8AULKW&file=Full_Report.pdf

Notes: This study quantifies the humanitarian aid explicitly directed at older people through the UN Consolidated Appeals Process and Flash Appeals in 12 humanitarian crises since 2007, covering a total of 1,912 projects. The study found a significant disparity between the needs of older people as a vulnerable group and the humanitarian assistance funded to meet that need. There remains minimal reference to older people within proposals compared with reference to other vulnerable groups. In five of the crises studied (Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, OPT 2007 and 2008 and Honduras), not one project in any sector explicitly referred to or provided targeted assistance to older people. Only 93 (4.9 per cent) of the 1,912 projects analysed made any explicit reference to older people as a vulnerable group (compared with 619 or 32.0 per cent for women and children). Of the 93 projects that mention older people, only 18 projects of the total of 1,912 (0.94 per cent) included activities that targeted older people and of these only 5 were funded. In financial terms, The CAP and Flash appeals raised a total of US$4.2 billion in the 12 crises. Of this, US$8.2 million (0.2 per cent) was allocated to projects that included an activity that specifically targeted older people.

IASC. (2010a). Gender Marker: How-‐‑to-‐‑Code Tip Sheet. New York: IASC. Last viewed on 16/11/2010. URL: http://oneresponse.info/crosscutting/gender/publicdocuments/Gender%20Marker%20-‐‑%20coding%20tip%20sheet.pdf

Notes: This tip sheet is designed to assist clusters and their project teams in assigning a gender code to their humanitarian projects using the IASC Gender Marker. Each project is awarded a gender code of 0, 1, 2a or 2b. oding is based on the three elements: needs assessment, activities and outcomes: gender analysis of needs >> gender needs addressed in activities >> gender outcomes.

IASC. (2010b). Guidance Note for Clusters to implement the IASC Gender Marker: Creating Gender-‐‑responsive Projects and Tracking Gender-‐‑related Allocations in Humanitarian Appeals and Funding Mechanisms. New York: IASC taskforce on Gender and Humanitarians Assistance. Last viewed on 16/11/2010. URL: http://oneresponse.info/crosscutting/gender/publicdocuments/Cluster%20Guidance%20Note%20Gender%20Marker%20FINAL%20100810.pdf

Notes: The purpose of this guidance note is to assist clusters to use the IASC gender marker. The gender marker will be used to help clusters design their humanitarian projects to respond


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to the distinct needs and interests of women, girls, boys and men. This guidance note provides clear user-‐‑friendly steps so clusters can: 1) Integrate gender issues in their cluster/sector response plans; 2) Build capacity of cluster partners to design projects that better meet the needs of women, girls, boys and men in affected populations; 3) Assign a gender code to each cluster project sheet on the On-‐‑line Project System (OPS). This will allow the Financial Tracking System (FTS) to track gender-‐‑related investments in each cluster; 4) Monitor implementation to ensure women, girls, boys and men participate and benefit according to the project design.

IFRC. (2011). Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) Annual Report (01 January 2010 to 31December 2010). Geneva: Internation Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Last viewed on 13 June 2011. URL: http://www.ifrc.org/docs/appeals/annual10/MAA00010-‐‑10ar.pdf

Notes: This is the annual report for the IFRC Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) for 2010. In 2010 the DREF made 138 grants totalling 22,6 million Swiss francs. The average response time from the disaster to the DREF approval, calculated from 85 sudden onset or small-‐‑scale disasters in 2010, was 7 days. For large-‐‑scale sudden onset disasters such as the earthquakes in Haiti and Chile, the request for DREF was generated and approved within one day.

Monitoring Group on Somalia. (2010). Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1853 (2008). New York: United Nations. Last viewed on 21 January 2011. URL: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/91

Notes: This is the report of the monitoring group on Somalia. While the report concentrates on the arms trade, one section addresses the impact of humanitarian assistance on the war economy. The report was very controversial and led to several donors suspending assistance to WFP. This UN report states that some humanitarian resources, notably food aid, have been diverted to military uses. A handful of Somali contractors for aid agencies have formed a cartel and become important powerbrokers -‐‑ some of whom channel their profits -‐‑ or the aid itself -‐‑ directly to armed opposition groups. The Adaani family, one of the three largest contractors for the World Food Programme in Somalia, has long been a financier of armed groups, and a close ally of the Hizbul Islam leader. When the Adaani family failed to secure concessions from the Transitional Federal Government in exchange for the closure of the private port at Eel Ma’aan -‐‑ a move that would have deprived the government of vital revenue -‐‑ it turned to Hizbul Islam to reopen the facility. Other members of the business cartel that dominates food aid deliveries in Somalia have been involved in more subtle, but no less harmful, manipulation of humanitarian resources. The report recommended that the Security Council urge the Secretary-‐‑General to initiate a genuinely independent investigation of the WFP Somalia country office.

OCHA ROMENACA. (2008). The Central Emergency Rsponse Fund. Dubai: The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs -‐‑ Regional Office for the Middel East, North Africa and Central Asia. Last viewed on 13 June 2011. URL: http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docId=1093004

Notes: Brochure on the CERF which emphasises the speediness of the CERF. It states that in natural or man-‐‑made crises, whether earthquakes, floods or political conflicts, the first 72 hours are critical for life-‐‑saving activities. In the past, the humanitarian community had to wait for days or weeks for donor pledges to arrive following the launch of a UN appeal. Today, the CERF allows humanitarian workers to begin saving lives on day one.


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OECD/DAC. (1991). Principles for evaluation of development assistance [OCDE/GD(91)208]. Paris: Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Last viewed on 16 June 2008. URL: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/31/12/2755284.pdf

Notes: The following set of principles state the views of DAC Members on the most important requirements of the evaluation process based on current policies and practices as well as donor agency experiences with evaluation and feedback of results. This report was endorsed at the DAC High-‐‑Level Meeting held on 3 and 4 December 1991. It is made available to the public on the responsibility of the Secretary-‐‑General of the OECD.

OECD/DAC. (1999). Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies (1999) (Evaluation and aid effectiveness: 1). Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-‐‑operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee. Last viewed on 09 July 2009. URL: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/50/2667294.pdf

Notes: This Guidance is aimed at those involved in the commissioning, design and management of evaluations of humanitarian assistance programmes principally within donor organisations but is also likely to be of use to UN agencies, NGOs and other organisations involved in the provision of humanitarian assistance. It is not intended as an exhaustive guide as specialised texts are available, but to complement the existing DAC Principles on Aid Evaluation by highlighting those areas which require special attention, the nature of the activities undertaken and the multi-‐‑actor, highly interconnected system by which the international community provides humanitarian assistance. The research for this publication was conducted by ODI and almost the identical text was publised by ODI as (Hallam, 1998).

Rugman, J. (2009, 15 June 2009). UN probe after aid stolen from Somalia refugees. Retrieved 13 June, 2011, from http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/world/africa/un%2bprobe%2bafter%2baid%2bstolen%2bfrom%2bsomalia%2brefugees/3208557.html

Notes: The head of the UN'ʹs £580m aid operation in Somalia has launched an inquiry after Channel 4 News revealed that thousands of sacks of food have been diverted from refugees and sold by Somali businessmen on the open market. An investigation by tonight'ʹs programme shows piles of maize, wheat and cooking oil -‐‑ clearly marked "ʺnot for re-‐‑sale"ʺ and bearing the UN World Food Programme (WFP) logo -‐‑ for sale from 10 warehouses and 15 shops in the main market of the capital, Mogadishu. The documentary was broadcast on 15 June 2009.

Salomons, D., Lith, M. V., & Vartan, T. (2009). Study of Transaction Costs Associated with Humanitarian Pooled Funds. New York: The Praxis Group Ltd

Notes: The challenges posed by the pooled humanitarian funds are intricately linked to those created by the humanitarian reform process in its entirety, particularly the creation of the cluster approach, the evolution of the consolidated appeals and work plans, and the strengthened role of the Humanitarian Coordinator – thus, it is extremely difficult to isolate those transaction costs that can exclusively be attributed to the pooled funds, rather than to the reform process as a whole. Yet, this study identified several trends that may be indicative, as well as concrete issues that need to be addressed. The study was percieved as having been weakened by the inclusion in the team of persons from agencies that had raised lots of concerned about such transaction costs. At the end of the day, the question is whether the advantages of pooled funding outweight the transaction costs.

Telford, J., Cosgrave, J., & Houghton, R. (2006). Joint Evaluation of the international response to the Indian Ocean tsunami: Synthesis Report. London: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition.


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Last viewed on 8 June 2008. URL: http://www.tsunami-‐‑evaluation.org/NR/rdonlyres/2E8A3262-‐‑0320-‐‑4656-‐‑BC81-‐‑EE0B46B54CAA/0/SynthRep.pdf

Notes: This report synthesised the whole TEC evaluation effort. The four main findings were as follows: 1) It was local people themselves who provided almost all immediate life-‐‑saving action and the early emergency support, as is commonly the case in disasters.2 Thus, it is often local capacities that determine how many survive in the immediate aftermath of a sudden onset natural disaster. The TEC studies found that international agencies experienced major problems in scaling up their own responses. Those agencies that had invested (before the disaster) in developing their emergency response capacity had the potential to be more effective. Pre-‐‑existing links, and mutual respect, between international agencies and local partners also led to better use of both international and local capacities. 2) International action was most effective when enabling, facilitating and supporting local actors. International agencies often brushed local capacities aside, even though they subscribe to norms and standards that call for engagement with and accountability to local actors such as governments, communities and local NGOs. International agencies often ignored local structures and did not communicate well with local communities nor hold themselves accountable to them. 3) There were many examples of poor quality work in the response to the tsunami, not only in the relief phase (largely from inexperienced agencies) but also in the recovery phase. Different parts of the international humanitarian response community have, over the last decade, launched several initiatives to improve the quality of humanitarian work. These initiatives typically set up norms or standards, but none of them has an effective mechanism to sanction agencies for failing to meet them. 4) The tsunami highlighted the arbitrary nature of the current funding system for humanitarian emergencies. This system produces an uneven and unfair flow of funds for emergencies that neither encourages investment in capacity nor responses that are proportionate to need. Despite the commitment to Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) by some donors, the TEC studies found that donors often took decisions on funding the response based on political calculation and media pressure.

The Economist. (2011, 3 February). Piracy: No stopping them: r all the efforts to combat it, Somali piracy is posing an ever greater threat to the world’s shipping [Electronic Version], Feb 3rd 2011. Retrieved 28 Feberuary 2011, from http://www.economist.com/node/18061574

Notes: Last year, pirates took 1,181 people hostage off the Somali coast. About half were released after the payment of ransoms, a few have died of abuse or neglect and around 760 are currently in captivity. They are usually held prisoner on their own hijacked vessels, some of which are employed as mother-‐‑ships from which the pirates stage further raids. So far this year, there have been 35 attacks, seven of them successful. In March, when the monsoon abates and the Arabian Sea grows calmer, the pace of the attacks will quicken. The problem has worsened sharply in recent years. There were 219 attacks last year compared with 35 in 2005. Ransoms paid last year climbed to $238m, an average of $5.4m per ship, compared with $150,000 in 2005. At the end of last month Jack Lang, a former French minister who advises the UN on piracy, warned the Security Council that Somali pirates were becoming the “masters” of the Indian Ocean. He puts the economic cost of piracy at $5 billion-‐‑7 billion a year. The price in human misery is unquantifiable.


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UNDG. (2011). Humanitarian Coordinators. Retrieved 9 January 2011, from http://www.undg.org/unct.cfm?module=CountryTeams&CountryID=&page=CustomizedCountryList&ListType=HumanitarianCoordinator&fuseaction=Humanitarian%20Coordinators

Notes: Lists the 50 current Humanitarian Coordinators. WFP. (2006a). WFP-‐‑UNHCR Joint Evaluation of the Pilot Food Distribution Projects: Full Report -‐‑

Volume 2: Five Country Case Studies. Rome: World Food Programme. Last viewed on 30 April 2011. URL: http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/reports/wfp086131.pdf

Notes: These are the five country studies which form the basis for an evaluation of a new MoU between the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The revised Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in July 2002 agreed that WFP would take over, on a pilot basis and at its own expense, the responsibility for the entire food distribution programme in five countries, namely Kenya, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia. The pilot projects in each country were to be evaluated after one year of implementation. These country studies evaluation pilot project in each of the five countries.

WFP. (2006b). WFP-‐‑UNHCR Joint Evaluation of the Pilot Food Distribution Projects: Full Report -‐‑Volume 1. Rome: World Food Programme. Last viewed on 30 April 2011. URL: http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/reports/wfp086131.pdf

Notes: This is the main evaluation report on a new MoU between the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The revised Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in July 2002 agreed that WFP would take over, on a pilot basis and at its own expense, the responsibility for the entire food distribution programme in five countries, namely Kenya, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia. The pilot projects in each country were to be evaluated after one year of implementation. This evalution report examines the pilot project.

WFP. (2007). WFP'ʹs operational relationship with NGOs: Annual Report 2007. Rome: World Food Programme. Last viewed on 30 April 2011. URL: http://one.wfp.org/aboutwfp/partners/ngos/Annual_reports/Annual_Report_2007.pdf

Notes: Reports on WFP'ʹs relationship with partners in 2006. There is not one mention of money or the level of financial support to partners in the report. in 2006 WFP had 230 International NGO partners and 2,585 local NGO partners. Of these 2,815 NGO partners, 2,627 implemented activities for WFP. 54% of all WFP food aid was passed through NGO partners.

WFP. (2009). WFP'ʹs operational relationship with NGOs: Annual Report 2009. Rome: World Food Programme. Last viewed on 30 April 2011. URL: http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/newsroom/wfp207674.pdf

Notes: Reports on WFP'ʹs relationship with partners in 2008. There is not one mention of money or the level of financial support to partners in the report. in 2008 WFP had 230 International NGO partners and 2,607 local NGO partners. Of these 2,837 partners 2,577 implemented activities for WFP. 48% of all food aid was passed through NGO partners.

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5-YEAR EVALUATION OF THE CENTRAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE … · 2017-02-06 · 5-YEAR EVALUATION OF THE CENTRAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND COUNTRY REPORT: SOMALIA An independent Evaluation