48 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA - Marines.mil Hope In Somalia... · 48 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA ... Belet Weyne, as a Canadian C- 130 Hercules cargo plane from Canadian Forces Base,

48 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

OVIC DD-SD-QO-00700

Pvt Andrew Schnaubelt, USA, of the 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, takes a covering position on the airfield atBelet Weyne, as a Canadian C- 130 Hercules cargo plane from Canadian Forces Base, Petawawa, Ontario, lands.

headed north on one of the few hard-surfacedroads. This was the old "Strada Imperiale," orImperial Way, built by the Italians during the1930s. As the task force left the city, the light ofdawn revealed a verdant countryside where theroad paralleled the Shebelle. Armed sentriesguarded large tracts of sorghum and other crops.Helicopter gunships would occasionally fly lowover the length of the convoy. Interesting histori-cal monuments were located every 10 kilometersalong the roadside; these were markers of stone,bearing the Fascist insignia and noting the dis-tance from the city. The condition of the road wasas bad as had been reported. Years of neglect andbattle damage from the civil war had taken theirtoll. The road was frequently cratered fromartillery rounds, and in some places the paved sur-face was entirely gone for long stretches. Theconvoy, already slowed by the presence of therelief trucks, frequently had to drive through rut-ted tracks on the side of the road. Speeds averagedonly about 10 kilometers per hour. By 1800, theassault forces in armored personnel carriers and

trucks entered the town. Crowds of waving,singing and smiling people greeted the remainderof the convoy. The Italian forces proceeded on tothe airfield, setting security around it for the nightwith the convoy in the center, close to the landingstrip. The next day, they set up platoon-sizeddefensive positions around the town and oversawthe unloading of the grain supplies at the distribu-tion center.131

The last of the originally planned relief sectorsto be secured was Belet Weyne. Planning for thisoperation had initially called for Army ForcesSomalia to have the responsibility for the mis-sion.'32 During this time, the Army troop build-upwas continuing. Major General Steven L. Arnold,commanding general of Army Forces Somalia,arrived on 22 December. At the same time, theCanadian forces were also preparing to enter thetheater in large numbers. Fragmentary Order 14,issued on 23 December, placed the Canadianforces under the tactical control of Army ForcesSomalia for the operation. Upon release from tac-tical control, the Canadians would assume respon-

COMING ASHORE 49

sibility for the entire sector.ation was set for 28 December.

The date for the oper-

The city of Belet Weyne is 320 kilometersnorth of Mogadishu, and only 32 kilometers fromthe Ethiopian border. Et also is situated closest ofall the relief sectors in the northern portion ofSomalia, which were outside LFNITAF's area ofoperations. For these reasons, a U.S. SpecialOperations Forces team would also be a part ofthe operation. They would patrol along the bound-ary to keep the competing factions apart.'33 iiistaff meetings, the city was described as flat andsituated on the Shebelle River, which was the onlyobstacle in the area. There were two bridges intown and one C-130 capable airfield. There wasonly one road into the city, but it was assessed asgood for handling traffic. The Hawadle clan con-trolled the city with a small security force armedwith some crew-served weapons and antiaircraftailIery.'34

General Arnold gave command of the opera-tion to the 2d Brigade (Commando Brigade) ofthe 10th Mountain Division. The task force wouldbe composed of the 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry,and a battalion of the Canadian AirborneRegiment Battle Group. The plan was to seize theairfield with an air assault. On the 28th, the Armyflew the assault units on board Sikorsky UH 60A"Blackhawk" helicopters, while MarFor providedadditional support with four helicopters. Almostimmediately following the securing of the air-

field, Canadian C-130 aircraft began to land,bringing additional troops and vehicles. In lessthan two days, about 1,000 soldiers had beenbrought to Belet Weyne. On 30 December, theCanadians assumed sole responsibility for therelief sector. The contingent from Army ForcesSomalia departed for Bale Dogle, to prepare foranother mission.'35

The successful completion of the Belet Weyneoperation on 28 December marked the end of thesecond phase of Operation Restore Hope)36 Thepurpose of this phase had been to secure theremaining five objectives as points from which toprovide security throughout the area of operationsto allow the unimpeded distribution of relief sup-plies. This was four to six weeks ahead of sched-ule, reflective of the amount of fast paced workaccomplished by UNITAF and component levelplanners, and in execution by the multinationalforces involved, It also was indicative of the flex-ibility of the command in the ability to prepareeach operation even as forces were arriving in the-ater. Logistics challenges were daunting andrequired close monitoring of the time-phasedforce deployment data, but it worked.

There was to be no letup in tempo and no timefor self-congratulation. As soon as the 2dBattalion, 87th Infantry, arrived back in BaleDogle, they were tasked with an additional mis-sion: to secure the port of Merka, located about 70kilometers southwest of Mogadishu. It was a

OVIG DD-SD-OO-00793

On 31 December 1992, soldiers of the 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, jump from a tfl-!-60 Blackhawk helicop-

ter in an air assault to take control of the airfield at Merka.

50 R€STORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

place where a corrupt mayor was acting in coacertwith local bandits to prevent relief supplies fromgetting to the humanitarian relief organizationsfor distribution to outlying towns. The relieforganizations in the city had not received any sup-plies for six months. For these reasons, and also tosecure another port, Merka was added toUINITAF's objectives and an operation to secure itwas planned)37

The original plan called for an amphibiousoperation, using the San Marco Battalion of theItalian forces. The date was set for 27 December.Unfortunately, the only good landing beacheswere 22 kilometers south of the city. Those nearthe city were unsuitable, with a berm at the high-tide mark and rocky ledges on both flanks.'38 Thelack of adequate landing beaches close to theobjective caused a change in the initial concept ofoperations. By 28 December, Fragmentary Order19 directed the Italian forces to place the SanMarco Battalion under the tactical control ofArmy Forces Somalia for the operation, whichwas scheduled for the 31st. The operation wouldbe a combined ground and air assault with theItalian forces proceeding in trucks while U.S.Army forces seized the airfield. The road leadingto the city was described as poor and very dustywith a possible travel time of four to six hours. Inaddition, there were at least five bandit-run check-points on the road, each generally watched by oneman armed with an AK-47 rifle; machine gunpositions were also reported on the town mosqueand along the road.'39

Control of the operation was again given to the10th Mountain Division's 2d Brigade. The multi-national task force was composed of one compa-ny of the San Marco Battalion attached to the 2dBattalion, 87th Infantry. Supported by the 10thMountain Division's organic 10th AviationBrigade, the American soldiers conducted an airassault to secure the airfield, and then immediate-ly secured the port. They then linked up with theItalian forces that were proceeding overlandescorting a convoy of relief supplies. TheAmerican soldiers and the Italians escorted theconvoy to the outlying town of Qoryooley, the siteof a refugee camp where the food was needed.'4°

Thus, by the end of the year, and barely withinthree weeks of the initial landings, all the human-itarian relief sectors had been secured by thecoalition forces. Convoys were running smoothly,but there was already a need to improve commu-nications between all the major cities. One answer

to this was the establishment of an intra-theaterflight schedule. Another was to establish a roadnetwork throughout the theater that could providefor quicker movement of convoys bearing sup-plies and troops. UNITAF Fragmentary Order 9,issued on 19 December, set up a network of ninemain supply routes connecting the sectors. Eachwas named for a different color. Subsequentorders tasked particular forces with the inspec-tion, clearance and repair of the roads. Of specialconcern were landmines that were so oftenencountered, thousands had been laid throughoutthe country, and now they had to be found andremoved from the roads.

The UNTTAF structure was largely in place atthe end of the second phase. Its rapid success wasundoubtedly assisted by two factors. The first wasthe heavy reliance on psychological operationsthat General Johnston had emphasized in his ini-tial orders. The visits by Ambassador Oakley, theuse of radio broadcasts, leaflet drops, and the pub-lication of a Somali-language newspaper all keptthe populace informed of what was happening andwhy. The second factor was the quiet reaction ofSomali clan-based factions. While all claimed towelcome the arrival of TJNTTAF, the coalitionforces' presence inserted an unknown quantityinto their political and military calculations. Therewas some testing of UNITAF resolve in the earlydays, but those incidents were quickly and deci-sively resolved. The rules of engagement allowedfor protection of the coalition forces, and Somalifaction leaders would be presented with an unac-ceptable loss of men, arms, and prestige if theyprovoked UNITAF security elements. Such les-sons kept the Somali leadership relatively quietand receptive to the requests of UNITAF.

As the third phase of the operation began, itwas recognized there was still much work to bedone, and many more important decisions had tobe made. In this phase, the operations were toexpand the security of the interior of the countrythrough the use of convoy security and the cre-ation of additional distribution sites. This phasewould set the stage for the delicate hand-off to theUnited Nations force, generally know as UNO-SOM. As with a relay race, the smooth passing ofthe baton is critical to success, and this is no lesstrue in military operations other than war. TheUNITAF staff wanted to ensure the baton waspassed without difficulty.

Chapter 5

Politics, Peace Talks, and Police

Military-Political Cooperation

The military aspects of the operation were pro-ceeding smoothly by the end of December 1992.The long hours of planning, bringing together astaff, and forming the coalition were producingrapid success. But there were considerations thatwent beyond occupying and controlling territory.There were times when military commanders, aswell as the Marines and soldiers in the field, hadto act as diplomatists, negotiators, and statesmen."1 suppose if there is a blueprint for how the diplo-matic and political side should work with the mil-itary on an operation like this, it was perfect,"noted Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston."We recognized very early that this was a very,very complex environment."

Carl von Clausewitz, a 17th century Prussiansoldier and philosopher, defined war as "merely acontinuation of policy by other means." WhileOperation Restore Hope was not truly a war, asCtausewitz understood it, his maxim wasnonetheless true. Even in this operation other thanwar, the commanding general and his staff offi-cers had to keep in mind that "the political objectis the goal ... and means can never be consideredin isolation from their purpose."41 Matching mil-itary means to political objectives drove much ofwhat the coalition did and how it continued tostructure itself. Brigadier General Anthony C.Zinni, the operations officer, summed this up in aninterview: "Operations such as this become lessclear as far as military objectives. They becomemore politically driven. The humanitarian needsforce the military to work differently. Terms mustchange to suit the mission; military terms will notwork. Marines quickly and clearly moved to thehumanitarian side. The key to the operation is thepeople; we must respond to their hope."42

American Ambassador Robert B. Oakley rec-ognized at the start that one of his greatest respon-sibilities would be to assist the military com-manders with the myriad political issues this oper-ation brought. Accordingly, he and GeneralJohnston established a coordinating committee inwhich they met daily or more frequently as neces-

sary. General Johnston saw the commiUee's rolewas "to tie the diplomatic-political considerationswith our military power, which allows us to pres-sure the factions to ... decrease violence." Thetwo sides of the committee got along very well,with their mutual work seeming to progress froma quick understanding of each other's needs. "Wesimply ... didn't sit down and say 'here is our jointstrategy.' It just seemed like I knew when I wasgoing to do something militarily thnt I neededdiplomatic support. He [Ambassador Oakleyjseemed to have the instincts of knowing whatneeded to be done up front. We talked a lot andthat was the important thing. It was a very coop-erative effort, helped a great deal by Mr. JohnHirsch, who was my political advisor, and de

nv,c DD-SD-OO-00755

LtGen Robert B. Johnston, commander of the joint taskforce, stands on the tarmac of Mogadishu airport withAmbassador Robert B. Oakley.

52 RESToRING HOPE IN SOMALIA

facto he became Ambassador Oakley's DCM[deputy chief of mission]."44 Another importanttask for the committee was to present a clear mes-sage to the factions by ensuring the coalitionspoke with one voice.'45 The faction leaderswould take advantage of any confusion in aims ormethods.

The two sides of the committee brought dualpressures against the factious. Diplomatic initia-tives were begun to get the sides talking to resolvetheir differences, while the military might of theUnified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF) made theSomali factions take these steps seriously. Toreduce the violence and bring the nation together,a series of reconciliation talks were scheduled inAddis Ababa, Ethiopia. It was hoped these talks,held on neutral ground, would thstill the factionleaders with a sense of responsibility for thefuture of their country. Only those who were will-ing to put down their arms and control their fol-lowers would take part in these talks; those whodid not would have neither voice in the talks nor aplace in the Somalia to come. As AmbassadorOakley later said about General Morgan: "Myofficers and UNITAF officers have met with himon several occasions and told him that the waySomalia is going today, the way to get into thefuture is not by using the gun. As a matter of fact,those who persist in taking the political power [byforce] are losing out in the political future ofSomalia. Nothing bars him from participating inthe peace process except his own behavior."46Getting the faction leaders to accept their respon-sibilities and to give up their weapons would takea deliberate plan and a lot of coercion. Ultimately,there was a long and logical process of thoughtand action by which all of these ends were to beaccomplished. It involved the issue of disarma-ment; defining the secure environment requiredby the mission; the use of overwhelming forcewhen necessary; the assistance to the humanitari-an organizations; the furtherance of the peaceprocess among the faction leaders; and therebuilding of Somali civil institutions. Each ofthese was a thread in a tapestry of peacemaking.

Weapons Control and the use of Force

One of the first points that had to be settled wasthe issue of disarmament. As explained earlier,disarmament of Somalia was neither a specifiedpart of the mission nor an implied task. However,something had to be done to reduce the number of

arms. The program decided on was one ofweapons collection or weapons control rather thantotal disarmament.' Of course, from the point ofsecurity, there were so many weapons inMogadishu and elsewhere that their very presenceposed a threat. General Johnston turned his atten-tion to this matter immediately on his arrival. "Atthat point [II December] we were trying to reduceany threat to the U.S. forces. My primary missionwas security of the force ... and clearly, it wasrequired to disarm those elements that woulddirectly threaten our forces; i.e., the 'technicals'that were in Mogadishu or Baidoa or Bardera oranywhere on the road map."47 In a meeting withAmbassador Oakley, the start of the weapons con-trol program was laid out. "There were so-calledtechnicals in almost every block and this wasobviously a serious threat to the Somali people. Itis a significant threat to our forces and it symbol-izes the power of the warlords, both military andpolitical, in the eyes of the Somali people. Wedecided the number one objective was to get thesedangerous things out of town and at the first meet-ing between [General Mohamed Farah Hassan]Aideed and Ali Mahdi [Mohamed] that took placehere with General Johnston and myself present wegot them to agree and to issue a public statementthat they would remove their heavy weapons fromMogadishu."48 By 22 December, reports at staffmeetings noted the turn-in of technicals and heavyweapons was proceeding well; Aideed hadalready moved his, and Ali Mahdi was in theprocess of moving his to a site east of the city. Theactual cantonment of all these weapons took manydays to complete, but was undoubtedly hurried bythe knowledge that coalition forces would consid-er the weapons fair game.'49

This initial agreement by the two major factionleaders was used by UNTTAF as the lever to getall heavy weapons and technicals in the countryout of circulation. The initial ceasefire agreement,

* The correctness and efficacy of this decision mr control asopposed to disarmament is made in Somalia Operations:Lessons Learned by Colonel Kenneth Allard, published bythe National Defense University Press in January 1995. Tndiscussing UNITAF and its successor, UINOSOM It, ColonelAllard states: "There is a basic conceptual differencebetween arms control and disarmament. Removing or limit-ing the major weapons of an inferior or defeated militaryforce can be thought of as a form of arms control, but to com-mit military forces to the mission of forcibly disarming apopulace is to commit those forces to a combat situation thatmay thereafter involve them as an active belligerent."

POLITICS, PEACE TALKS, AND POLICE 53

signed by all faction leaders in early January,specified these weapons would be voluntarilyimpounded in cantonmentsi5° The owning factionwould identify these cantonments for UNITAF somovement of weapons into or out of them couldbe monitored. These were known as authorizedweapons storage sites. There was a noticeable ini-tial reluctance by some elements, especiallyColonel Ahmed Omar Jess and Mohamed SaidHirsi, known as General Morgan, in Kismayo, toparticipate. Eventually, even they complied,spurred on by pressure applied by Belgian para-troopers and American soldiers in the city. Thesecoalition forces in Task Force Kismayo confiscat-ed several technicals, demonstrating the seriousintent and strong resolve of UNITAF.'51

The actions against the heavy weapons andtechnicals soon noticeably decreased their num-bers? There was still, however, a large number ofsmall arms available in the country that had to becontrolled. Again, there were no simple solutionsto the issue. The sheer volume of weapons madetotal disarmament impossible. There also weresome legitimate organizations that needed to beable to protect themselves. In many towns and vil-lages, local militias were formed for the protec-tion of the populace from bandits. To disarm thesegroups would leave them prey to the lawless ele-ments or rival factions. Also, as General Johnstonrecognized, disarming them would convey theerroneous assumption that IJNITAF would pickup the burden of their security.152 He emphasizedthis point to his commanders in a meeting on 5January, when Canadian forces in Belet Weynevoiced concern about taking weapons from a validmilitia brigade. General Johnston responded therewas no intent to disarm legitimate militias. Theweapons should be inventoried and local com-manders should work with the militias, butUNITAF could not undertake the full securityresponsibility for the relief sectors.'53

Similarly, the various relief organizations hadarmed guards for the protection of their personnelor work sites. These were often moonlighting sol-diers of one of the factions, which presented asource of extra income for the faction leaders.Simply disarming these guards posed severalproblems. First of all, to take away their rifles and

* This was especially true in Mogadishu. There continued tobe reports, however, that technicals had been sent to outlyingdistricts, where they were out uf sight but ready for use asneeded.

machine guns and dismiss them would causerelief personnel to be uneasy, as they couldbecome targets of their former guards.* Second,the relief organizations did have legitimate securi-ty requirements in their work places and whiletraveling. Finally, as with the local militias,UNITAF did not have the resources to take up thislarge security mission, not withstanding the polit-ical pressure to protect these organizations.'54 **

The question of small arms thus came down toauthorized versus unauthorized weapons. GeneralJohnston recognized that with the elimination ofthe technicals and other heavy weapons, relieforganizations' security personnel did not have topossess heavy machine guns or similar armament.Rifles, such as the ubiquitous AK-47s, would nowbe adequate protection against the bandits, butwould not give the guards so much firepower theywould become a threat to others.

A system of identity cards was developed.'55These were permits to carry firearms. Their pur-pose was to ensure that only those who wereemployed as guards could openly carry suchweapons. The cards would be issued to the relieforganizations, not to the Somalis who were intheir employ. The card system went into effect on8 January 1993.

The first cards were colored pink, with no pro-vision for photographs. This led to attempts to cir-cumvent the system by some Somalis. A secondset of blue cards, with photographs, was put intoplace by late February. These cards providedgreater access for the Somalis for whom theywere issued, but there were still some problems.Soldiers or Marines who interpreted the rules toostringently sometimes still confiscated weaponsfrom legitimate guards, much to the discomfort ofthe relief staff and their guards. In April, UNITAFaddressed this problem by issuing a card to allcoalition troops that explained the weapons con-fiscation policy and the identification card sys-tem.'56

The most effective instrument to get the factionleaders to cooperate with UNITAF's demands was

* During the course of the operation there were instances ofmembers of humanitarian relief organizations being wound-ed or killed by guards over disagreements about employmentor pay.

** UNITAF provided security to food convoys, coordinatingsuch work with relief organizations. These actions werewithin UNITAF's explicit mission.


the willingness to use force when necessary. Fromthe earliest days of the operation, the coalitionpartners demonstrated they would meet anyaggression or threat with an overwhelmingresponse. UNITAF controlled the skies and theseas along the coast, and the patrols and convoysof its Marines and soldiers demonstrated a strongand professional presence. Coalition leaders weretherefore taken seriously, and if a local coalitioncommander said he would take a certain action, hewas believed. This credibility allowed GeneralJohnston to implement the policy of arms controlin a more gradual way than might have been oth-erwise possible; as he later stated: "We haveincrementally ratcheted up what we've beenremoving to get every weapon off the streets. Totry to take them all right away was unrealistic. Wecould have imposed this militarily, but it wouldhave impaired the important role of getting theSomali people to take charge of their own sys-tem."57 Ambassador Oakley also saw the advan-tages of this system of credibility throughstrength: "We've been remarkably successfulbecause we come from a position of force. It's anarea [ml which you have to figure what, in ourjudgment is fair, and then tell them ... what theyshould do. If you negotiate, you quite frequentlyfind yourself ending up at a disadvantage becausethey're very good at negotiations, twisting itaround different ways."58

The diplomatic negotiations and the reductionof weapons on the streets began to make Somaliarelatively safer, but there was a need to be able tosay just how much more secure the country actu-ally was. Nearly every Marine serving withUNITAF had also served in Operation DesertStorm: the same was true for many of theAmerican soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and someof the other coalition troops. A concept that hadbecome familiar during that earlier conflict wasthe definition of the end state. The internal exam-ination that had occurred in the American armedforces during the 1 980s reinforced the idea thatcommanders had to know how an operationshould come to its conclusion and what the result-ing dynamic between the opponents should belike. The Marine Corps' FMFM 1-1,Campaigning, published in 1989, defined the endstate as "the military conditions we must realize inorder to reach that destination, those necessaryconditions which we expect by their existencewill provide us our established aim." It also stat-ed: "in the main, the more general the conflict, the

more predominant are the military factors, and theeasier it is to translate aims into military terms.But the more limited the aims of conflict, the lesspredominantly military is the conduct of the war,and the more difficult it is to translate those aimsinto military conditions." UNITAF was engagedin one of these limited operations, with all of theuncertainty that could entail.

The need to define this end state was recog-nized from the earliest days. If the mission was toproduce a secure environment, how could that bemeasured? In the original Joint Task ForceSomalia operation order, issued 6 December, thecommander's intent stated: "The end state desiredis to create an environment in which the U.N. and[nongovernmental organizations] can assume fullresponsibility for the security and operation of theSomali humanitarian relief efforts." As militaryforces spread throughout the area of operations,UNITAF planners sought a quantifiable definitionof security. General Johnston saw the definitionand refinement of the end state as an implied task,although a difficult one. As he said: "[We] nowneed a precise measure for success; how do youknow when a secure environment is established?[We] need an objective measure." By ChristmasDay, the UINITAF staff was still searching for thisprecise measurement of security, recognizing thatreducing the number of technicals and other armswas certainly a contributing factor.'6°

Discussion of the secure environment tumed toan appreciation of the relativity of the term. Somemembers of the staff noted there were cities in theUnited States that had problems with violentcrime. Did that mean they were not secure? Atwhat point was violence at an acceptable level?When was any place secure for its citizens?Taking that line of thought, could Mogadishu beconsidered secure if its level of violent crime metthat of a major American city, such as Detroit?Interesting as these discussions were, they led tothe recognition that the problem in Mogadishuand throughout Somalia was unique in beingtwofold. Here, violence was brought to the peopleby both the warring factions and by renegadecriminal elements. The first could be controlled,because it was organized and its leaders had theirown political goals that could be addressed. Theother was a problem of the greater society, andwhile that problem might be reduced, it wouldalways exist. Ultimately, then, the end state ofestablishing the secure environment would be

reached with the end of organized, as opposed tocriminal, violence.'6'

By 7 January 1993, UNITAF planners, led byColonel Peter A. Dotto, had developed a transitionmatrix, which included indicators of the stabilityof relief sectors. This matrix was presented to thecommanders and published in a letter of instruc-tion on the 15th. The indicators included quantifi-able criteria in five categories. These were resist-ance, humanitarian relief, infrastructure, popu-lace, and transition actions. The objective criteriaincluded such concepts as the numbers of techni-cals and crew-served weapons in the sector; thenumbers of roadblocks encountered and the visi-bility of weapons; breaches of agreements andactions against UNITAF; conditions of airfields,ports, and main supply routes; the establishmentof local councils and civil-military coordination

teams; food shortages and numbers of unescortedconvoys; and the state of security for relief ware-houses. With each sector commander reporting onthese indicators each week, UNITAF could takean objective view of how its actions were aidingthe accomplishment of the mission.'62

Reconciliation Conferences

The weapons control policies and the actions ofthe commanders in the relief sectors were some ofthe building blocks to secure the environment.The series of peace conferences was another. TheUnited Nations sponsored these with the supportof UNITAF leaders. If the faction leaders could bekept talking to each other, with a purpose ofreconstructing their nation, they would be lessinclined to fight each other. Of course, such a plan

PoLITIcS, PEACE TALKS, AND POLICE 55

ovic Do-SD-oo-00863

Representatives of the Magadishu c/an leaders dismantle a roadblock along the "Green Line," the border that sep-arated both the city's north and south sections and members of opposing clans.


presupposed the willingness of these leaders toaccept the diminution of their power to secure thecommon good. Such a proposition was tenuous atbest, as events eventually showed. Nevertheless,the talks were necessary and proper if peacefulprogress was to be made.

Only two days after the arrival of UNITAFheadquarters, General Johnston and AmbassadorOakley had already begun a first round of talksand achieved some agreements among the factionleaders. At that time, General Aideed and AllMahdi "met face to face for the first time, andreached an agreement to respect the ceasefire towhich they had agreed earlier in the year, and toremove their heavy weapons from the streets ofMogadishu."63 Two weeks later, in a dramaticand well-publicized event, these two leaders metalong the "Green Line" that divided the city intofactional areas, pledging, "on this occasion theabolition of the artificial demarcation lines in thecity that resulted from the civil war will bedeclared."64

To help with these kinds of issues, and to pre-pare for the more formal talks that would comelater at Addis Ababa, Ambassador Oakley and theUNITAF staff formed two committees. The firstwas strictly political. It was headed by Ambas-sador Oakley himself, and was intended to bringthe faction leaders together so they could go overtheir differences point by point. In this manner,they moved incrementally along toward a peace-ful political resolution. The second committeewas for security. It was essentially a military-to-military organization headed by General Zinni,the UNITAF operations officer. Its membersincluded the leaders of the factional militias.General Zinni described the committee's work:"We worked security issues and concerns. ... Wetried to prevent problems and confrontations. Itwas our way of issuing ultimatums and that sort ofthing. It was a good forum for military-to-militarykinds of issues. We were working toward a ceasefire, disarmament, cantonment of weapons, al.lthat kind of thing ... and laying the ground workfor a bigger discussion."65

The bigger discussion was a series of nationalreconciliation talks. On 11 December 1992, theSecretary General of the United Nations, BoutrosBoutros-Ghali, formally invited 11 political fac-tion leaders to "participate in an informal prepara-tory meeting for a conference of national recon-ciliation and unity in Somalia. This preparatorymeeting, which I will personally chair, will be

held at the headquarters of the United NationsEconomic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababaon 4 January 993•" * Also invited were repre-sentatives of the Organization of African Unity,the League of Arab States, the Organization of theIslamic Conference, and the Standing Committeeof the Countries of the Horn of Africa. Membersof UNITAF and United Nations OrganizationSomalia (UNOSOM I) also attended. The settingin the capitol of Ethiopia was a good choice fortwo reasons. First, it was close enough that partic-ipants could travel there quickly with UNITAFand UNOSOM support. Also, Ethiopia had justcome out of its own civil war, and its president,Meles Zenawi, was an advocate of the peaceprocess. The talks would receive his strong sup-port.

Three additional factions eventually joinedthese first rounds of talks.' Although intelligenceassessments indicated not all faction leaders wereenthusiastic about the talks, none wanted to be leftout. This was especially true of Aideed, who wasat first reluctant to attend because of a mistrust ofthe United Nations and Boutros-Ohali, but heeventually realized the only way to further hisown aims and protect his political agenda was bytaking part in the discussions. Perhaps becauseof mutual jealousy and mistrust, and perhaps part-ly from a desire by each faction to not be seen asthe spoiler of national unity, surprising progresswas made at these initial talks. Another factor was

* The original invitees were Mohamed Farah Abdullahi ofthe Somali Democratic Alliance; Mohamed Qanyare Afrahof the United Somali Congress; Abdurahman Dualeh Au ofthe United Somali Front; General Mohamed Farah Aideed ofthe Somali National Alliance; Haji Mahmoud Barbar of theSomali Democratic Movement; Mahmud Khalif-Shire of theSomali National Front; Haji Aden Hussein Mohamed of theSomali Africans Muki Organization; General MohaniedAbshir Musse of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front;General Aden Abdillahi Moor of the Somali PatrioticMovement; Ibrahim Meigag Samatar of the Somali NationalMovement; and Abdi Dahir Warsame of the United SomaliParty.

** These were Ali Jsmael Abdi of the Somali NationalDemocratic Union; Mohamed Ragis Mohamed of the SomaliNational Union; and Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess of theSomali Patriotic Movement.

Boutros-Ghali worked under a triple suspicion in theeyes of General Aideed; he was not only the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, he also was Egyptian and aCoptic Christian.


Photo courtesy of Col Frederick M. Lorenz

Go! Peter Dotto, UNITAF operations future plans officer, along the Green Line in Mongadishu during a route recon-naissance for a food convoy.

American determination. "Most Somali factionsappeared ready to take the disarmament processseriously, in large part because they understoodthe U.S. expectation that the process would moveforward. At General Johnston's insistence, theU.N. organized and convened early February fol-low-up meetings in Mogadishu with representa-tives of all the factions, who were asked to identi-fy specific cantonment and transition sites and toestablish a time table for implementation."t67

Between 8 and 15 January 1993 all participantssigned three sets of agreements. These werebroad, far-reaching, and significant. The first setcalled for "an immediate and binding ceasefire inall parts of the country under the control of theconcerned warring factions;" for "the immediatecessation of all hostile propaganda against eachother;" for "cooperation with all internationalorganizations working inside and outside Somalia

to distribute humanitarian relief;" and for "thefree movement of Somali people throughout theentire country as a measure of confidence-build-ing." Of equal importance was the call for anational reconciliation conference to be held inAddis Ababa on 15 March. The second set, signedon 15 January, provided specific agreements ondisarmament. First, all heavy weapons under thecontrol of the political factions were to be handedover to a ceasefire-monitoring group. The militiasof the factions were themselves to be encamped inareas outside the cities and towns where theywould not threaten the peace. There they would bedisarmed, and with the help of the internationalcommunity they would be retrained in civilianskills in preparation for demobilization. Theceasefire-monitoring group would be comprisedof troops from UNITAF and UNOSOM andwould have a committee made up of representa-


tives of all the warring factions. Finally, in a sep-arate agreement, the factions agreed to establishan ad hoc committee to prepare for the conferencein March. 168

There were some issues in these agreementsthat would have a tremendous impact onUNITAF. The ceasefire was not the first one thefactions had agreed to; but it was the first in whichthey had voluntarily agreed to disarm and demo-bilize.169 This was a large task to which UNITAFand the United Nations were now committed asmembers of the ceasefire-monitoring group. Theonly United Nations presence in Somalia was the500-man Pakistani brigade, so the work of prepar-ing the plans for cantonment and encampment andmonitoring the factions' activities fell primarily tothe UNITAF staff. Colonel Dotto explainedUNITAF's participation in the planning: "GeneralJohnsi:on told Brigadier General Imtiaz Shaheen[the commander of the UNOSOM I force, thePakistani brigade] that he would provide his plan-ning cell, [that is] us, future plans, and we'd helphim in any way to come up at least with a plan togo back to the U.N. with."7° As General Zinnisaid: "Probably the vast majority of the work inthis area is done by our staff since it was muchmore robust."7' The future plans section ofColonel Dotto's operations unit formed a cellcomposed of four IJNITAF planners, plus five orsix liaison officers from coalition countries andtwo planners from UNOSOM. The cell was aug-mented by the arrival of Colonel Mark Hamilton,USA, and Ms. Katie Sullivan, a political officer,both of whom had just come from El Salvador,where a similar peace process had occurred.'72 liiian effort to further the progress of the talks,General Johnston and General Shaheen issued ajoint letter to all of the signees of the accords of 8January. The letter called upon them to "begin thedisarmament process [W]e request that youprovide the commanders of UNOSOM/UNITAF adetailed list of all weapons heavy and light, underthe control of your political movements.Additionally, to begin the planning for transitionof armed combatants to Somalian society, werequest the general geographic locations and num-bers of all forces under your control." This letterwas issued on 8 February, and the informationwas requested by the 15th.'73

The problem now faced by UNITAF was todeterniine how much of this work was within itsproper sphere. "We were asked if we could partic-ipate in the disarmament process and we felt that

our participation could only be limited to conductof tasks that were within our mission statementand our mission constraints or parameters, andalso within our area of operations. If cantoningweapons, if supporting transition sites, if pickingup weapons, if all these sorts of things happenedin our area and happened so that they coincidedwith our current mission we would be glad toaccommodate within the system in doingthem."74 UNITAF would not be monitoring theceasefire. That task would remain a mission of theUnited Nations, for which it would have to comein quickly to take advantage of the cooperativeattitude evident at that time.'75 As General Zinnisaid in March, there was a window of opportunityfor the United Nations that they could not affordto lose, but getting the U.N. to act with resolutionand dispatch was an issue that would confront theUNTTAF staff until May.176

The Addis Ababa talks needed more than agood sense of timing if they were to succeed.National reconciliation, like a fragile flower,required the careful nurturing of trust if it was tobloom. The United Nations would have to ensurethat trust among all players and be an impartial

the end, this was a majormoderator itself. Instumbling block.

Somali Police Forces

While national reconciliation among thenumerous factions received great attention, therebuilding of national structures was also impor-tant. Within a month of the initial landings,UNITAF encouraged the rebuilding of the Somalipolice force. Before the civil war, the Somalipolice were a respected national force of 40,000men and women.'77 Since they were not alignedwith any clan, they also were trusted to be impar-tial. But the police had left their posts with theanarchy that came with the civil war and the riseof bandits who were often better armed than thepolice. A few did stay on at their precinct houses,usually to try to protect the property itself, butthey performed no real police duties except in theimmediate area. Faction comrades usually liberat-ed apprehended criminals from the Mogadishuprison)78

The arrival of UNITAF provided these officersa chance to regain their positions and once againto serve a meaningful purpose. There was as yetno government to back them, or even to pay them,but the interest and desire to serve were still evi-


Photo courtesy of the author

Two Somali policemen, wearing their old uniforms, vol-untarily returned to their posts to provide security at theairport in Kismayo.

dent. General Johnston used one telling exampleto illustrate this point. "Early in the game, this old,gray-haired policeman showed up He wasasked, 'Who do you work for?' because we knewthere was no government, no police force, nothingin uniform. 'I'm working for the government.''There is no government.' 'Well, then I must beworking for the people.' So you could see somespontaneous interest on the part of the Somalis, oftrying to get hold of their own city again."79

* In travels throughout the area of operations, the author alsonoticed Ihe emergence of the police. The first time was on atrip to Kismayo in early January where Iwo Somali police-men were on duty at the airporl. The men were workingwithout official sanction but were highly visible in theirkhaki uniforms with blue berets and silver badges. WhenArmy officers at Kismayo were asked about them, no onecould say much. They had simply shown up and kept awaythe crowds of curious and especially kept an eye on the ado-lescent boys to ensure they did not cause trouble.

But it was more than just individual policemenwho wanted to resurrect the police force. Thesecurity committee that worked closely withGeneral Johnston and Ambassador Oakley alsosaw an opportunity to establish a police force withits former reputation as an impartial agency. "Thedefined Security Committee ... came to see meand said the day after the first Marine had beenkilled [13 January 1993], 'We want to assumeresponsibilities for our own security. You are alldoing things in the city that we should be doingand we'd like to help.' I said 'What kind?' "Hesaid 'We want some material assistance, but wewant assistance in fending off the political andclan influences that would try to turn such a forceinto their [instrument] rather than something thatis relatively independent and national."5°

This particular interest of some Somalis coin-cided with the interest of the leaders of IJNITAFin the creation of a structure by which the Somaliscould start to reclaim responsibility for their ownsecurity. The recreation of a police force wouldmake it easier for UNITAF to accomplish its over-all security mission and prepare for the hand-offto the United Nations. Also, it would weaken thefaction leaders. As General Johnston said: "Wefelt that [the recreation of a police force] washealthy to the extent that you can get somebodyother than the warlords providing security, thenyou enfeeble the warlords. ... It is as effective astaking away their weapons, if there's anotherauthoritarian figure that the Somalis recog-nize."t8' Of course, this effect would also assistUNITAF by relieving the members of the coali-tion forces of some duties. "We'd been aroundlong enough to know that if you have a Somaliwho is a figure of authority, then he'll take care ofthe rock-throwing kids better than a Marine witha machinegun."1t2

There were, of course, problems in the recre-ation of the Somali police that had to be addressedand resolved before any work on the project couldbegin. First, such an action was far beyond1.JNTTAF's mission. It clearly fell into the catego-ry of nation building. This broad and vague termcovered several kinds of projects that could easilybecome long-term and expensive measures moreproperly performed by the United Nations.However, it was recognized this project, so usefulto all parties involved with Operation RestoreHope (UNITAF United Nations, humanitarianrelief organizations, and Somali people) should beactively supported and encouraged. In a staff


Photo courtesy of the Italian Armed Forces

An Italian soldier provides weapons training to a member of the Somali auxiliary security force in the Italian campat Ba/ad.

meeting held on 1 February, General Johnstondescribed this as the "most important thing rightnow, even more important than the reconstitutionof the government."83

But how far could that support go? UnitedStates law was very explicit about assistance toforeign nations for the training and establishmentof police forces. Section 2420, Chapter 32 of theUnited States Code, "Foreign Assistance;Miscellaneous Provisions," states: "On and afterJuly 1, 1975, none of the funds made available tocarry out this chapter, and none of the local cur-rencies generated under this chapter, shall be usedto provide training or advice, or provide anyfinancial support, for police, prisons, or other lawenforcement forces for any foreign government orany program of national intelligence or surveil-lance on behalf of any foreign government withinthe United States or abroad." Even more specifi-cally, the 1991 Appropriations Act prohibited aforeign military financing program or intemation-al military education and training programs forSomalia, among other countries)84

as the IINITAF staff and Ambassadorworked to define the basic structure ofthat could be provided under U.S. law,

contact was made with senior officers of the oldnational police. The coalition's representative wasLieutenant Colonel Stephen M. Spataro, USA,UNTTAF's provost marshal. By 27 January 1993,he had met six times with the subcommittee of 10,an informal group of senior police officials, crim-inal investigation division officers, and lawyers.At these meetings, the subcommittee presentedtheir views on the rebuilding of the police force;its size, transportation and communications needs,logistics requirements, and pay and food allot-ments for the officers and their families. They alsotook Lieutenant Colonel Spataro on a tour of allMogadishu police stations and the prison. Fromthem he learned about Somali police operatingprocedures and the rules for the use of force.

Initially, the Somalis sought a national force of6,000 to 7,000 men. Lieutenant Colonel Spatarodetermined the national force was too difficult atthat time, but that a 3,000-man auxiliary securityforce for Mogadishu was an appropriate andworkable start. He also noted their logistical

EvenOakleysupport

* A subcommittee of the Security Committee discussed ear-her.

PoLrrrcs, PEACE TALKS, AND POLJCE 61

request was bare bones, listing only 15 trucks, 42hand-held radios, two unifonns per man (two pairof trousers, two shirts, one pair of boots, one pairof low-quarter shoes, two pair of socks, one pistolbelt, canteen, handcuffs, beret with rank insignia,and nightstick) and small arms. LieutenantColonel Spataro noted the old Somali police were"armed more like soldiers with rifles and in factcalled their personnel soldiers, NCOs [noncom-missioned officers] and officers." He determinedthat "we need to change that. Rifle carrying per-sonnel connote soldiers not police officers or aux-iliary forces. Probably need to look at giving riflesto selected and trained personnel for very specificmissions."85

These meetings also provided informationabout the judicial and prison systems. Two judgeswere still working in Mogadishu, along with twoprosecutors. This rudimentary judicial systemtook care of criminals unlucky enough to beapprehended and actually brought to justice. Theywere sent for incarceration in the prison by theport, a facility described as "built around 1905-1910, and is really in need of repair, however, itwas really kept well ... [and] operated very pro-fessionally."86

With needs and basic structures recognized,UNITAF could now get down to practical assis-tance. The new force would be called an auxiliarysecurity force, and senior Somalis would vet theofficers applying for positions. There were sever-al criteria for appointment. Candidates must havebeen a member of the old force for two years priorto 26 January 1991, and would be reinstated attheir old rank. They had to be Somali nationalsand could not have been involved in any "tangibleoffenses against ... Somali society." They also hadto be in good physical condition. Pay was a mat-ter of some concern, and originally the new auxil-iary force would be paid with food. This was morepractical than it might at first seem; in a land offamine, it not only provided sustenance for thepolice and their families, but they could sell orbarter any surplus to fill other needs.

There was an advantage to working with aninternational coalition with respect to establishingthis auxiliary force. Foreign nations or organiza-tions that did not have the same proscriptions asthe U.S. forces could provide what the Americanscould not. Thus, the United Nations providedmost of the funds for the program; the World FoodProgram gave the food that was the initial pay; theItalians were among the most generous of the

OVIC OA-ST-96-01221

Two Somali military policemen man a roadside check-point nearBuurhakaba. The men are armed with a vari-ation of the AK-47 and FAMAS rifles.

allies, providing uniforms, money, and training inpolice duties. The Australians in Baidoa alsohelped with training and created an excellent pro-gram with support from their lawyers. In Oddur,the French also participated by providing training.The Americans provided advice to the auxiliarysecurity force through liaison officers. VeryspecificaUy, there was no doubt about the limits ofAmerican involvement with the force. "We're notcommanding the police. We have neither theresponsibility nor the authority to command andcontrol."87 *

The work of Lieutenant Colonel Spataro andUNETAF proceeded quickly. By 30 January 1993,3,000 officers were ready to work at 14 stationsaround the city. Pending the fmal decision to start

* General Johnston emphasized this in a staff meeting heldon 1 February 1993. "We are facilitating, assisting and advis-ing. We cannot, by law, train a national police force; there-fore, we have oversight, not control. We are fulfilling thisrole in UNITAF because there is no one else to take it up."(Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 1Feb93.)


the program, coalition engineers worked onrepairs to the stations and the auxiliary securityforces were uniformed, equipped, and trained. Itwas initially expected they would begin theirduties by 14 February. These would be standardpolice duties, such as would be found anywhereelse in the world. Their mission was to protectlives and property and maintain public order. Thiswould be accomplished through basic lawenforcement, traffic and crowd control, neighbor-hood patrols, and security at food distributionsites.

By the first week in February, the new officerswere receiving refresher training in the use offorce and how to handle their batons. Their firstreal test came when UNITAF and the humanitari-an relief organizations implemented a mass-feeding program, whereby food would be dis-

tributed at several sites throughout the city. Theauxiliary security force was needed to providecrowd control and these officers performed well.The program was successful and was soon feed-ing up to a million people a week, a number thatcould not have been reached without the policepresence. Neighborhood patrols started soon afterand were not without their own dangers; twopolice officers were killed in the line of duty with-in two weeks)88

By the end of February, UNJTAF was makinggreat progress on several lines. The reconciliationtalks were taking place, the auxiliary securityforce was coming back into existence inMogadishu, and weapons were being removedfrom the streets. In the relief sectors, localUN1TAF commanders were also successfully pur-suing their own missions.

Chapter 6

Moving to the Third Phase

Settling In and DaÜy Work

As the members of Unified Task Force Somalia(UNITAF) moved throughout the area of opera-tions, they found themselves in a part of the worldthat was at once foreign and exciting, forbiddingand enticing. Except for some of the French sol-diers stationed in Djibouti or the members of thecontingents from the African countries, nearlyevery one of the coalition's Marines, sailors, air-men, and soldiers was a stranger to this part of theworld. In spite of the harshness of the country,many were attracted by this unfamiliar landscape.

When they traveled outside of Mogadishu,what they saw in equatorial Africa seemed tomatch the picture that existed in everyone's imag-ination. Roads were often no more than tracksacross flat, barren terrain of dust and brokenstone. The beige colors of the land contrasted withthe deep blue of the sky, across which a few small,stark, white clouds might wander.

The monotony of the landscape was broken byan occasional grove of scrub bushes, thorn trees,and acacias. Some of these trees grew to a heightof about 25 feet and spread their branches wide,providing shade for the passing herders or peoplewalking along the roads. Convoys frequentlypassed herds of camels, cattle, or goats moving tograzing lands or to market in some remote village.

Donkeys pulled two-wheeled carts laden withfirewood or drums of water. In the early morninghours, women would be interspersed with thepedestrian traffic, walking in small groups or bythemselves and carrying large jugs of water orbundles of wood on their backs. Frequently theywould be encountered miles from the nearest vil-lage, leaving one to wonder about where theywere coming from or going to.

* There were a few Marines who had been to Somalia before.In the days of the Muhammad Siad Barre regime's ties to theWest, the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit participated inExercise Eastern Wind in August 1987 in the area ofGeesalay. Other Marines who served in Somalia includedthose attached to the embassy or who performed securityinspections.

The villages themselves were often small col-lections of huts fashioned of upright poles stuck inthe ground and covered with daub. The roofs werethatched, held in place with poles forming a sim-ple dome. The huts might be round or square,depending on the traditions of the resident clan. Inlarger settlements, houses were bigger and moreelaborate, often constructed of stone and plasteredand painted in soft colors.

Where the roads drew close to one of the rivers,farmlands were encountered, and the resultantgreen of growing crops was a relief to the eyes.Large trees such as sycamores grew in these loca-tions and gave welcome shade to the local inhab-itants.

These areas were also the locations for largertowns and cities. Here the buildings were of stoneor mud brick, plastered and whitewashed or paint-ed in pastel colors. As in Mogadishu, two years ofcivil war had relieved many of these structures oftheir roofs and windows. The main streets of thesecities were usually tree-lined and shady andcrowded with people. In the center of town, themarkets were coming back into life, with vendorsoffering such wares as were available. Often thesewere limited to locally produced cigarettes, bitsand pieces of unrelated merchandise, fixtures sal-vaged from vehicles or buildings, small amountsof local farm produce, surprisingly large quanti-ties of laundry detergent, parts of rations from allof the coalition allies (the small bottles of Tabascosauce from the meal ready-to-eat packet wereespecially popular), and numerous bolts of bril-liantly colored cloth. The women used these lastitems to make their colorful dresses. Vivid reds,blues, greens, yellows, and other bright huessplashing against the dull brown backgroundmade them look, as one Marine put it, "like exot-ic birds." The women usually did not wear a veil.

But occasionally some women were seen whokept their faces covered, leaving only their eyesvisible, which only increased the attraction. Themen dressed much more plainly, with simple but-toned shirts or tee shirts over trousers (often ofmilitary camouflage) or the traditional sarong-likeskirt, called "ma-awis," extending from waist to


Somali women, in typical brillantly colored dresses, carrysive role in both family and political spheres.

anides. Leather shoes were sometimes seen, butfootwear was usually leather sandals or rubbershower shoes. Local elders generally dressed tra-ditionally, in the ma-awis with colorful shins andheaddress. They also wore beards, which the oldermen dyed with henna.

Inland, as water grew scarce, communitiesmight center on ancient wells. There, women andherdsmen would gather to draw up buckets of thelife-giving liquid for their families or thirsty ani-mals. Even farther afield, solitary houses might beencountered. Zaribas enclosures made of inter-woven branches of thorn trees and bushes protect-ed the houses and also were used as corrals for theherds. In these isolated places, deep pits wereoften dug to hold the precious rainwater from thewet seasons. After many dry weeks, these pitswere muddy enclosures containing pools ofgreen-topped liquid. Unappetizing as it appeared,these bits of water were necessary for survival.

Nomad camps were very simple. Zaribas werequickly set up for the protection of herds and peo-ple. The huts of these herdsmen and their familiesconsisted of structures about five feet in height,made of bent poles covered with hides or sheets ofgreen plastic. Similar huts were seen in everyrefugee camp.

Pholo courtesy of Itatian Armed Forces

firewood on a donkey cart. Traditionally, they play a pas-

The climate was particularly harsh, and thenative people had to be equally hard to survive init. For the coalition's troops, the heat posed a realchallenge, especially before they became accli-mated. During the hot, dry months, the tempera-tures climbed and the arid air sucked the moistureright out of the coalition soldiers. The sun at mid-day felt, as one Marine later said, "like it was 10feet over your head." For safety reasons, soldierson patrol or other duty outside the compoundswore their full utility uniforms with protectivevests, helmets and other gear. This increased thedehydrating effects of the climate. Everyone wassupposed to drink at least five liters of water aday. When out on patrol, or doing heavy work,this might have to be increased. Providing thismuch bottled water to the thousands of Marinesand soldiers and allies scattered throughout thearea of operations was one of the most importantlogistics functions of UNITAF.

In contrast to the brilliance and heat of the dayswere the dark and cool of the nights. On a moon-less night the desert sky assumed a deep black thatwas set off by the lustrous stars, giving them abrilliance rarely seen except at sea. Marines orsoldiers who had sweated while on patrol or whilestanding guard at some sun-beaten post would

MOVING 1D THE Ti-nun PsE 65

shiver when the desert sand gave up its heat aftersundown. This was especially noticeable at thosesites near the coast, where there was a continuoussea breeze, which added to the cooling effect. hithe various tent areas, the constant blowing of thewind also produced a steady flapping of canvas.This rhythmic accompaniment to daily lifebecame so much a part of existence that itsabsence was noticeable and a cause for comment.The strong breezes kept tugging at the lines of thetents, requiring the residents to pull them tautevery day, lest a sudden gust lift their canvashomes off their poles. The same wind alsobrought an unending drift of sand, which infiltrat-ed every nook and cranny of tents, bedding, andequipment. Weapons had to be cleaned two orthree times a day to keep them in proper order.

Native animals were sometimes encounteredalong the tracks or in the compounds. Di/c-dik, atiny antelope, would occasionally be seen runningthrough the brush. More rarely, gazelles or boarsmight be spotted from convoys heading to the out-

lying relief sectors. Large storks would alight inthe villages near the rivers, standing with equa-niniity close to the people passing by. In the pre-dawn hours, flights of silver-colored ibis would beseen noiselessly flying just a few feet overhead.There were rare encounters with poisonoussnakes, such as the spitting cobra and the puffadder. At night, a flashlight might freeze a tinyjerboa, a small rodent, in its beam, or a scorpionmight be seen scuttling across the sand.

This was the world in which UNITAF conduct-ed its daily work. For all its exotic attraction, itwas still a dangerous place, as events would soonprove. Sniping and harassing fire continued, withcompounds and convoys being the usual targets.The large cities of Mogadishu and Kismayo, inparticular, were especially troublesome, sincethese were the scenes of frequent factional fight-ing and general banditry. The 1st MarineExpeditionary Force (I MEF) command chronolo-gy for this period notes: "Mogadishu remainedvolatile. The [Marine Forces Somalial elements


The village chief of El Berde, Abdil Ugas Husen, poses with elders after meeting with French officers. Husen's inter-preter, Abdil Kader Abdilahi Ali, is in the center.

66 REST0RThJG HoPE IN Soru&


Hastily constructed for the protection of herdsmen and thefr herds of cattle, camels, or goats, zaribas were oftenencountered far from any village.

which moved into northern Mogadishu foundthemselves constantly harassed by minor inci-dents of deliberate but inaccurate sniping andspillover fire from factional fighting. Theseattacks were particularly frequent at the newlyoccupied soccer stadium and along the 21 OctoberRoad."'89

However, while these incidents were annoying,they were not the most serious threats.Occasionally, a grenade would be rolled into thepath of a vehicle, causing casualties and damageand increasing the need for being always on thealert. As dangerous as these incidents were, in theearly days of the operation the greatest threat wasmore passive. During the civil war and resultantfactional fighting, land mines had been sown inscores of thousands all across the splintered coun-try. These silent killers were placed on roads andtracks or in areas the unwary might stumble into.Efforts to report and clear these weapons beganimmediately. But they soon had their deadlyeffect.

The first two weeks of the operation had passedwith no fatalities, a happy circumstance for all.But this good fortune was offset by an unspokenquestion; how long would it last? It ran out on 23December. On that day, a UNITAF vehicle struckan old Soviet land mine near Bardera. Three peo-ple were injured and one was killed. Lawrence N.

Freedman, a United States government civilianemployee and retired U.S. Army sergeant major,was the first member of UNITAF to be killed inthe performance of duty.t9°

Mogadishu

A more serious and direct threat to IJNITAFpersonnel and mission accomplishment came twoweeks later. On 6 January 1993, a convoy movingthrough Mogadishu was fired on from two of theauthorized weapons storage sites belonging toGeneral Mohamed Farah Hassan Aideed's fac-tion. Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston knewhe had to take strong and immediate actionagainst such an egregious and violent threat.

Throughout the remainder of that day, a planwas developed by Marine Forces Somalia(MarFor) and coordinated with the UNTTAF staff.

The plan was simple but effective, and by usingall the types of firepower available, it was also adramatic demonstration of UNITAF power.Company K, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, andCompany C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, wouldsurround the two weapons storage sites. Lightarmored vehicles from the 3d Light ArmoredInfantry Battalion were to screen the area, andsnipers would be positioned to overlook the targetareas. A reserve force was formed from a compa-

MOVING TO THE THino PHASE 67

fly of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (SpecialOperations Capable) (MEU (SOC)) and posi-tioned at the embassy compound. The two riflecompanies (Team Alpha and Team Bravo) werestrengthened by the attachment of M1A1 Abramstanks and amphibious assault vehicles, as well ashigh mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles(humvees) mounting tube-launched, opticallytracked, wire-guided (TOW) missiles and heavymachine guns. Team Alpha, Company K, also hadfour light armored vehicles. Seven helicopterswere assigned to the operation, three AH-lWswith Hell Fire missiles and four UH-lNs with20mm guns.191

At 2200, Colonel Michael W. Hagee of theUNITAF staff met with Brigadier General AliMohamed Kedeye Elmi, one of Aideed's chiefsubordinates. Colonel Hagee informed GeneralElmi that because of the recent violations, theauthorized weapons storage sites were invalidatedand were surrounded by UNITAF troops. TheMarines would enter the compounds at dawn ofthe next day, 7 January, and confiscate all theequipment and weapons located there.'92

* At the time, General Aideed was in Addis Ababa for thepreliminary reconciliation talks.

By 2300, the two storage sites were surroundedand kept under surveillance throughout the night.Psychological operations teams from the U.S.Army's Company B, 9th PsychologicalOperations Battalion, were attached to each of therifle companies. At 0553, they began to broadcastwarnings to the Somali fighters that they weresurrounded, and that if they came out with theirhands up, they would not be hurt. At about thesame time, the helicopters appeared in the sky.'93

The Somalis in weapons storage site Number 8surrendered. But those in the other site, Number 2,chose to resist. The helicopter crews and snipersreported that one of the tanks in the compoundwas manned and two Somalis were also preparingto fire a heavy antiaircraft machine gun. The com-manding officer of the task force, Colonel Jack W.Klimp ordered a sniper to shoot the crew of themachine gun. The sniper did so, and also fired around against the barrel of the weapon, renderingit unserviceable. This opened the engagement,which was short, sharp, and one-sided. Initially,the Marines came under a heavy volume of firefrom recoilless rifles, machine guns, and smallarms, but this was quickly suppressed. At 0615,the helicopters were cleared to fire their rocketsagainst targets in the compound. They continuedto fire for about 30 minutes, interrupting their fireonly once for another psychological operations

68 RESTORING HOPE IN 5orau.&

OVIC DN-ST-93-02880

Early in the multinational relief effort, Operation Restore Hope, Marines in a humvee patrol the streets of Mogadishu.

broadcast. At 0647, the tanks entered the com-pound, followed 14 minutes later by the Marinesof Company K.

Resistance ended except some sporadic snipingat the aircraft. The riflemen cleared the buildingsthat had not been destroyed by the helicopters.Major General Charles E. Wilhelm declared thearea secured at 0926, by which time additionaltrucks were enroute to help cany off the confis-cated. weapons. In addition to numerous smallarms and ammunition, there were 4 M47 tanks, 9howitzers of various calibers, 13 armored person-nel carriers, 3 antiaircraft guns, Ii mortars, and Irecoilless rifle)94 All was accomplished at thecost of only one casualty, a corporal wounded byan accidental discharge.

'K Colonel Klimp referred to this part of the action as a"bluff." The tanks had no ammunition for their main guns,although they did have rounds for their machine guns. It wasbelieved the armor of the M1A1 Abrams tanks would beproof against anything the Somalis had, and the machineguns would be firepower enough.

The action was a blow to General Aideed 'sprestige and pride. At a staff meeting later thatday, General Johnston mentioned that Aideed"was embarrassed by his lack of control [over hissoldiers] and regrets what happened."

The commanding general also told his staff that"[we] told Aideed we view his initiating clanfighting to be destabilizing. ... [We] want all toknow how we regard what they do. ... We com-municated with the faction involved. They acceptresponsibility and we don't expect to see it again."More importantly, UNITAF had demonstrated toall factions that "our reach is long."95

This strong action did reduce the more blatantattacks against UNITAF forces by factionalforces, although the sniping continued at about thesame levels. The spot reports received every dayat the headquarters contained the tally of suchincidents. Generally, these were just random shotsinto compounds, most likely fired by individualswho were seeking to prove something. AsBrigadier General Anthony C. Zinni said: "I thinkit's in the Somali nature to test you. I think it'spart of the warrior ethic; maybe it's part of the

M0WNC TO 1ThW THIRD PHASE 69

DVIC DD-SD-OO-00737

As Marines take cover behmd a wall, a UH-IN Huey helicopter supports the assault on one of Gen Aideed'sweapons storage sites.

proof of manhood and bravery, and of course fortwo years around here the rule of the gun had goneabout unchallenged. I think that the [reduction ofthe cantonment] sent a strong message andshowed them that we weren't to be messed withand I think that test worked well in our favor."96

The streets remained dangerous, however, pre-cisely because the threat was random. Marines orsoldiers on patrol or at checkpoints could never becertain when they would walk into a factionalfirefight, come upon a violent criminal act, or justbe a ready target for someone's need to assert hisauthority or manhood. Such an incident occurredon 12 January and resulted in the death ofUNITAF's first serviceman. That night, a securitypatrol was making a routine sweep along thesouthwest border of the airport. At about 2147, thepatrol was ambushed and engaged iii a firefightwith several Somalis. In the course of the fightPrivate First Class Domingo Arroyo was hit bysmall arms fire. He died of his wounds about twohours later.'

Private First Class Arroyo was a veteran of thePersian Gulf War and was a field wireman withHeadquarters Battery, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines,at the time of his death. His service on a securitypatrol was in the Marine Corps' tradition of"every Marine a rifleman." Although a communi-cator by military occupational specialty, he wasserving as a rifleman with Task Force Mogadishu,which had been formed specifically to providesecurity within the city.

By the end of December, the MarFor com-mander, Major General Wilhelm, recognized thecity needed to be stabilized to carry out the over-all security mission. He instructed Colonel Klimpto devise an aggressive plan that would putMarFor ahead of the factions in terms of knowingwhat was happening in the city and in prepared

* The units participating in the seizure of the weapons stor-age sites on 7 January were also part of Task ForceMogadishu.

70 RESTORING HoPE IN SOMALIA

actions that may be necessary. Colonel Klimpcame up with a four-phased plan in which eachphase would "turn at the same time" as the others,like 1.he gears in a clock, as opposed to beingsequential. The first phase was for the collectionof information; "information on the city; whereare the different clans located, where are thegangs headquartered." The next phase establishedMarFor presence by conducting foot patrols, man-ning checkpoints, and basically getting into thecity and being seen by the people. The third phasewas for direct action when necessary, such aswhen an important target like a weapons cachewas identified. The fourth phase was for the eval-uation of actions taken, assessment of new infor-mation, and formulating new tactics)98 TaskForce Mogadishu was the instrument created toundertake this stabilization mission. It wasformed at the beginning of January from the 3dBattalion, 11th Marines; 3d Amphibious AssaultBattalion; 3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion;Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines; andCompany K, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. ColonelKlimp was assigned as the commanding officer ofthe task force.'99

Task Force Mogadishu numbered about 2,000Marines. It moved to the sports stadium in thenorthern part of the city, where criminal activityand fighting among factions were common, andsoon began its operations. The main activity waspatrolling, which helped Marines gather informa-tion from the local populace and provided thepresence envisioned in Colonel Klimp's originalplan. Like a cop on a beat in the United States, thisvery presence helped reduce violence and reas-sured the majority of citizens of UNITAF'sbenign intent.200 Another important task wasreducing the number of weapons on the streets byraiding the infamous arms markets operating inthe city.

The word market cannot convey a true imageof what these bazaars were like. Set into crowdedsections of the city, the shops were little more thanhuts of wood and corrugated metal inside a mazeof twisting, unpaved streets and alleys.

The ramshackle appearance of the businesslocations belied the richness of types and amountsof arms available. Rocket propelled grenades andlaunchers and AK-47 assault rifles were the mostfrequently encountered weapons. Machine guns,

DVIC DD-SD-OO-00731

Two Marines run for cover while being fired on by clansmen snipers protecting the weapons storage site. The Marinein the foreground is care'ying an M16A2 rifle with a M203 grenade launcher attached.

MOVING TO TFIE THIRD PHASE 71

Supporting the Marine assault, an M1AI Abrams tankempty but there was ammunition for the machine guns.

mortars, missiles, and even rounds for a tank'smain gun were available. Arms of every majorweapons-producing nation could be found there;American, Soviet, Czechoslovakian, British,French, and Chinese weaponry were available.The two large markets in the city, the Argentineand the Barkera, were soon targeted by TaskForce Mogadishu. The truckloads of weaponsconfiscated in these sweeps were hauled away fordestruction.

The first of these raids was against theArgentine Market on 8 January, followed by a raidon the Barkera Market on the 11th. Although

* Fortunately, these two markets were on opposite sides ofthe green line, which divided Mogadishu into sections loyalto Aideed orAli Mahdi. A raid against one could be balancedwith a raid against the other, thus showing UNITA.F's impar-tiality.

DVIC DD-SD-ooo0736

approaches the weapons storage site. Its main gun was

more than 1,500 weapons were confiscated, it wasno secret that many others had been removedfrom the markets before the arrival of theMarines.201 Both markets, and other identifiedarms caches, were the targets of subsequent raids.

The patrols, raids, and checkpoints did have aneffect. As the I MEF command chronology forthis period noted, MarFor's increased presencedrove weapons off the streets, transformingMogadishu into a much safer city.202 However,there was still cause for concern and coalition sol-diers could not afford to drop their guard. liii lateFebruary, violent events in the Kismayo relief sec-tor were reflected in Mogadishu.

When the Somali Patriotic Movement forces ofMohamed Said Hirsi, known as General Morganand allied to Au Mahdi Mohamed, attacked thefollowers of Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess in a fiercefight for the control of Kismayo, General Aideed

72 RESTORING HOPE rr'i SOMALIA

Patrolling the mean streets of Mogadishu near a possiblewatch from the bed of a 5-ton cargo truck.

was quick to respond in Mogadishu. On 23February, the day alter the attacks in Kismayo,Aideed used his own propaganda services, such ashis radio station, leaflets, and loudspeaker broad-casts to spread the story that Morgan had onlybeen able to succeed because of the complicity ofUNITAF. He also called upon his followers toattack UNITAF forces in the city.

That evening, thousands of people took to thestreets, erecting barricades, starting fires, peltingconvoys with stones, impeding the progress ofUNTTAJ2 vehicles, and noisily demonstrating. Asannoying as these activities were, the crowds weremade up mostly of women and children and rep-resented no real threat to the coalition forces.Nonetheless, as MarFor units attempted to clearthe roadblocks and keep traffic lanes open, theywere subjected to rock throwing that seriouslyinjured several Marines, sailors, and coalition sol-diers. But the main roads were reopened and thecity quieted down by about 2300.203

The crowds were back the next morning.Again, roadblocks were put up and fires started.Again, Major General Wilhelm ordered MarFor to

ovic oo-So-oo-o0729

weapons storage area, well-armed Marines keep a sharp

keep the main roads open. On this day, the maindisturbances were centered near the United StatesEmbassy compound and the important traffic cir-cle known as K-4. This circle, at the intersectionof two major roads, controlled traffic leading toIJNITAF headquarters, the airport, and the port. Itwas considered a key point and was the site of aheavily maimed checkpoint. Rocks and Molotovcocktails were thrown at Marines in these areas.'Two Somali auxiliary security policemen werekilled during the disturbances and three Marinesand one Somali policeman were wounded. To pro-vide his men all possible support, Major GeneralWilhelm ordered every available MarFor attackhelicopter to provide reconnaissance and supportto the forces on the ground. He also requested,and received from Lieutenant General Johnston,

* These are gasoline-filled glass bottles, stopped with asoaked rag as a wick. When thrown against a vehicle or in thearea of troops, the bottles break, spreading flames. They arean inexpensive and easy lo make incendiary device, namedfor Vyacheslav M. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Commissarduring World War II.

MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE 73

DVIC DN-ST-93-02402

Marines man a checkpoint in Mogadishu on New Year's Day 1993. The presence of coalition troops often drewcrowds of curious Somalis, usually composed of young men and boys.

permission to distribute CS riot control agents, anon-lethal tear gas. As an additional measure, hecalled out a P-19 aviation crash fire truck from theair base at Bale Dogle. The truck's high-pressurehose would be useful in dispersing rioting crowds,if necessary. In the end, these extraordinary meas-ures were not needed. The crowds dispersed byabout noon.204 But more trouble was brewing.

On 25 February, the K-4 traffic circle was againthe center of tension. There, at about 0900, someSomalis began to fire at the most availableUNTTAF targets: Marines and Nigerian soldiers ofthe 245th Reconnaissance Battalion who wereresponsible for the security of the traffic circle andsurrounding area? The Marines returned fire, andthe Nigerians also began to fire rocket propelledgrenades at the buildings where the Somali gun-men were hiding. The heavy firing continuedthroughout the day. Major General Wilhelm

* At the time, and later, Aideed claimed these gunmen werebandits attempting to use the unresl of the past two days fortheir own purposes, and that he had no control over them.

ordered the area sealed off and swept within twohours. A strong force of Marines and coalitionsoldiers was called out for the mission. With theMarines of the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, and theNigerians as a blocking force, two companies ofthe 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, and soldiers of theBotswana Defense Force Contingent acted as themaneuver element. Shortly after 1400, theMarines and Botswana soldiers began their sweepdown three main approaches toward their com-rades at the traffic circle, converging with themshortly before sunset. The action had a salutaryeffect: the firing ceased and quiet returned to thearea. Three Marines and two Nigerian soldierswere wounded during the action.205

Valuable lessons were learned from theseevents, and changes were made to better protectcoalition forces should anything similar occuragain. Some active measures, short of the use ofdeadly force, were put into place. While MarForhad received permission to distribute tear gas toits units, this riot control agent is non-specific,blanketing an area and affecting the innocent aswell as those engaged in hostile acts. It can also


linger. Cayenne pepper spray was determined tobe a better agent because it comes in an aerosolcan and can be directed against a specific target.Begirtning on 1 March, pepper spray was issued toMarFor units, although control of its use remainedwith Lieutenant General Johnston and only per-sons trained in its use were to employ it. At aboutthe same time, two P-19 crash fire trucks weremoved to Mogadishu to support MarFor. One ofthese was placed at the port and the other at thestadium. A third truck was ordered for use inMogadishu and was available by 10 March.

More passive measures also were taken to pro-tect troops from rocks and other thrown items.Protective visors that attached to the Kevlar hel-mets were issued and combat service support per-sonnel created wire mesh shields to be attached tohumvees to protect the windows and occupants.These resourceful Marines also created anotherspecial piece of gear to attach to amphibiousassault vehicles. During the February distur-bances, crowds of Somalis had effectivelystopped these vehicles by simply lying down infront of them. The drivers were naturally loath to

run over these people and risk injuring or killingthem. Service support Marines made cowcatchersthat attached to the front of the amphibious assaultvehicles and allowed them to move throughcrowds or barricades with minimal harm todemonstrators.206

With these measures in place, MarForincreased its activities in the city and the numberof patrols was boosted to create a greater pres-ence. MarFor officers continued to meet regularlywith neighborhood representatives and a greaterdegree of order and safety was achieved in thecity. Operations to clear the streets of trafficobstructions and debris and distribute food wererestarted as soon as possible after the Februaryriots. When the forces of General Morgan andColonel Jess again clashed in Kismayo in themiddle of March, coalition units braced for trou-ble, but nothing of significance occurred.Throughout the remainder of March and April, theefforts of MarFor and coalition allies continued tostabilize the city. The demonstrations that tookplace during this time were described as peacefuland some were even held in support of UNTTAF.

DVIC 00-80-00-00770

As Somali civilians watch, U.S. Marines walk single file down a small alley in the capital's Bekara Market TheMarines swept the market looking for arms and munitions as part of Operation Nutcracker.

Documents

48 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA - Marines.mil Hope In Somalia... · 48 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA ... Belet Weyne, as a Canadian C- 130 Hercules cargo plane from Canadian Forces Base,