Summary

With the famous phrase, "man is born free, but he is everywhere in chains," Rousseau asserts that modern states repress the physical freedom that is our birthright, and do nothing to secure the civil freedom for the sake of which we enter into civil society. Legitimate political authority, he suggests, comes only from a social contract agreed upon by all citizens for their mutual preservation.

Rousseau calls the collective grouping of all citizens the "sovereign," and claims that it should be considered in many ways to be like an individual person. While each individual has a particular will that aims for his own best interest, the sovereign expresses the general will that aims for the common good. The sovereign only has authority over matters that are of public concern, but in this domain its authority is absolute: Rousseau recommends the death penalty for those who violate the social contract.

The general will finds its clearest expression in the general and abstract laws of the state, which are created early in that state's life by an impartial, non-citizen lawgiver. All laws must ensure liberty and equality: beyond that, they may vary depending on local circumstances.

While the sovereign exercises legislative power by means of the laws, states also need a government to exercise executive power, carrying out day-to-day business. There are many different forms of government, but they can roughly be divided into democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, depending on their size. Monarchy is the strongest form of government, and is best suited to large populations and hot climates. While different states are suited to different forms of government, Rousseau maintains that aristocracies tend to be the most stable.

The government is distinct from the sovereign, and the two are almost always in friction. This friction will ultimately destroy the state, but healthy states can last many centuries before they dissolve.

The people exercise their sovereignty by meeting in regular, periodic assemblies. It is often difficult to persuade all citizens to attend these assemblies, but attendance is essential to the well-being of the state. When citizens elect representatives or try to buy their way out of public service, the general will shall not be heard and the state will become endangered. When voting in assemblies, people should not vote for what they want personally, but for what they believe is the general will. In a healthy state, the results of these votes should approach unanimity. To prove that even large states can assemble all their citizens, Rousseau takes the example of the Roman republic and its comitia.

Rousseau recommends the establishment of a tribunate to mediate between government and sovereign and government and people. In cases of emergency, brief dictatorships may be necessary. The role of the censor's office is to voice public opinion.

While everyone should be free to observe their personal beliefs in private, Rousseau suggests that the state also require all citizens to observe a public religion that encourages good citizenship.Terms

Social contract - The agreement with which a person enters into civil society. The contract essentially binds people into a community that exists for mutual preservation. In entering into civil society, people sacrifice the physical freedom of being able to do whatever they please, but they gain the civil freedom of being able to think and act rationally and morally. Rousseau believes that only

by entering into the social contract can we become fully human. Freedom or Liberty - The problem of freedom is the motivating force behind The Social Contract. In the state of nature people have physical freedom, meaning that their actions are not restrained in any way, but they are little more than animals, slaves to their own instincts and impulses. In most contemporary societies, however, people lack even this physical freedom. They are bound to obey an absolutist king or government that is not accountable to them in any way. By proposing a social contract, Rousseau hopes to secure the civil freedom that should accompany life in society. This freedom is tempered by an agreement not to harm one's fellow citizens, but this restraint leads people to be moral and rational. In this sense, civil freedom is superior to physical freedom, since people are not even slaves to their impulses.Sovereign - Strictly defined, a sovereign is the voice of the law and the absolute authority within a given state. In Rousseau's time, the sovereign was usually an absolute monarch. In The Social Contract, however, this word is given a new meaning. In a healthy republic, Rousseau defines the sovereign as all the citizens acting collectively. Together, they voice the general will and the laws of the state. The sovereign cannot be represented, divided, or broken up in any way: only all the people speaking collectively can be sovereign.Government - This is the executive power of a state, which takes care of particular matters and day-to-day business. There are as many different kinds of government as there are states, though they can be roughly divided into democracy (the rule of the many), aristocracy (the rule of the few), and monarchy (the rule of a single individual). The government represents the people: it is not sovereign, and it cannot speak for the general will. It has its own corporate will that is often at odds with the general will. For this reason, there is often friction between the government and the sovereign that can bring about the downfall of the state.Law - An abstract expression of the general will that is universally applicable. Laws deal only with the people collectively, and cannot deal with any particulars. They are essentially a record of what the people collectively desire. Laws exist to ensure that people remain loyal to the sovereign in all cases.General will - The will of the sovereign that aims at the common good. Each individual has his own particular will that expresses what is best for him. The general will expresses what is best for the state as a whole.Will of all - The sum total of each individual's particular will. In a healthy state, the will of all is the same thing as the general will, since each citizen wills the common good. However, in a state where people value their personal interests over the interests of the state, the will of all may differ significantly from the general will.State of Nature - When Rousseau talks about the state of nature, he is talking about what human life would be like without the shaping influence of society. So much of what we are is what society makes us, so he suggests that before society existed, we must have been very different. In a different book, Discourse on Inequality, he speaks very highly of this prehistoric state, but in The Social Contract he is more ambivalent. In the state of nature, we are free to do whatever we want, but our desires and impulses are not tempered by reason. We have physical freedom but we lack morality and rationality. Still, Rousseau believed that this state of nature was better than the slavery of his contemporary society.Civil society - Civil society is the opposite of the state of nature: it is what we enter into when we agree to live in a community. With civil society comes civil freedom and the social contract. By agreeing to live together and look out for one another, we learn to be rational and moral, and to temper our brute instincts.Common good - The common good is what is in the best interests of society as a whole. This is what the social contract is meant to achieve, and it is what the general will aims at.Analytical Overview

Rousseau's principal aim in writing The Social Contract is to determine how free

dom may be possible in civil society, and we might do well to pause briefly and understand what he means by "freedom." In the state of nature we enjoy the physical freedom of having no restraints on our behavior. By entering into the social contract, we place restraints on our behavior, which make it possible to live in a community. By giving up our physical freedom, however, we gain the civil freedom of being able to think rationally. We can put a check on our impulses and desires, and thus learn to think morally. The term "morality" only has significance within the confines of civil society, according to Rousseau.

Not just freedom, then, but also rationality and morality, are only possible within civil society. And civil society, says Rousseau, is only possible if we agree to the social contract. Thus, we do not only have to thank society for the mutual protection and peace it affords us; we also owe our rationality and morality to civil society. In short, we would not be human if we were not active participants in society.

This last step determines the heavily communitarian perspective that Rousseau adopts. If we can only be fully human under the auspices of the social contract, then that contract is more important than the individuals that agree to it. After all, those individuals only have value because they agree to that contract. The contract is not affirmed by each individual separately so much as it is affirmed by the group collectively. Thus, the group collectively is more important than each individual that makes it up. The sovereign and the general will are more important than its subjects and their particular wills. Rousseau goes so far as to speak of the sovereign as a distinct individual that can act of its own accord.

We might react to these arguments with serious reservations, and indeed, Rousseau has been accused of endorsing totalitarianism. We live in an age where individual rights are considered vitally important, and it is insulting to think that we are just small parts of a greater whole. Rather than make freedom possible, it would seem to us that Rousseau's system revokes freedom.

Rousseau would not take these charges lying down, however. Looking at us in the new millennium, he might suggest that we are not free at all. On the whole, we may lack any kind of personal agency or initiative. We often have difficulty interacting with one another in any meaningful way, and it could be argued that our decisions and behavior are largely dictated to us by a consumer culture that discourages individual thought.

His system, he might claim, only seems unattractive to us because we have totally lost the community spirit that makes people want to be together. Citizens in his ideal republic are not forced into a community: they agree to it for their mutual benefit. He might argue that the citizens of ancient Greece and Rome were very active and capable of achievements that we have not come close to emulating since. The community spirit that united them did not intrude upon their individuality; rather, it gave individuality an outlet for its fullest expression.

The best response to Rousseau (aside from pointing out that those societies relied on slavery and exploitation) might be to say that the world has changed since then. We could borrow from social theorist Jurgen Habermas the distinction between the public sphere and the private sphere, and suggest that Rousseau does not give careful enough attention to the latter. Though Rousseau does permit citizens to do whatever they please so long as it does not interfere with public interests, he still seems to assume that human personality is in some way public. He doesn't seem to perceive a distinction between who we are in public and what we are in private. By demanding such active citizenship, he is demanding that our public persona take precedence over our private self.

Book I, Chapters 1-5

SummaryThe first chapter opens with the famous phrase: "Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains." These "chains" are the constraints placed on the freedom of citizens in modern states. The stated aim of this book is to determine whether there can be legitimate political authority--whether a state can exist that upholds, rather than constrains, liberty.

Rousseau rejects the idea that legitimate political authority is found in nature. The only natural form of authority is the authority a father has over a child, which exists only for the preservation of the child. Political thinkers--particularly Grotius and ##Hobbes##--have asserted that the relationship between ruler and subject is similar to that between father and child: the ruler cares for his subjects and so has unlimited rights over them. This kind of reasoning assumes the natural superiority of rulers over the ruled. Such superiority is perpetuated by force, not by nature, so political authority has no basis in nature.

Nor is legitimate political authority founded on force. The maxim that "might makes right" does not imply that the less strong should be obedient to the strong. If might is the only determinant of right, then people obey rulers not because they should, but because they have no choice. And if they are able to overthrow their ruler, then this also is right since they are exercising their superior might. In such circumstances, there is no political authority; people simply do whatever is within their power.

Rousseau's suggested answer is that legitimate political authority rests on a covenant (a "social contract") forged between the members of society. He has a number of predecessors in theorizing a social contract, including Grotius, who proposes that there is a covenant between the king and his people--a "right of slavery"--where the people agree to surrender their freedom to the king. Grotius is less clear what the people get in return for their freedom. It is not preservation: the king keeps himself fed and contented off the labor of the people, and not the other way around. It is not security: civil peace is of little value if the king makes his people go to war, and desolates the country by stockpiling all its goods for his own consumption. Yet it must be something, because only a lunatic would give up his freedom for nothing, and a covenant made by a lunatic would be void. Besides, even if people were able to surrender their own freedom, they could not justifiably surrender the freedom of their children as well.

It is impossible to surrender one's freedom in a fair exchange. By surrendering their freedom to their ruler, people surrender all their rights, and are no longer in any position to ask for something in return. More importantly, Rousseau links freedom with moral significance: our actions can only be moral if those actions were done freely. In giving up our freedom we give up our morality and our humanity.

Rousseau also objects to the suggestion that prisoners of war could become slaves through an even exchange, where the conqueror spares the life of the vanquished in exchange for that person's freedom. Wars have nothing to do with individuals. Wars are conducted between states for the sake of property. When an enemy surrenders, he ceases to be an enemy, and becomes simply a man.

The people in an absolute monarchy are slaves, and slaves have no freedom and no rights. A people only become a people if they have the freedom to deliberate amongst themselves and agree about what is best for all.

Commentary

The concept of nature is very important throughout Rousseau's philosophy. He is famous for countering the common Enlightenment position that reason and progress were steadily improving humankind with the suggestion that we are better off in our state of nature, as "noble savages." This opinion is expressed more forcefully in his earlier work, the Discourse on Inequality; in The Social Contract Rousseau is more ready to accept the possibility that modern society can potentially benefit us.

It is not entirely clear what Rousseau means when he talks about "nature" or our "natural state." In his Discourse on Inequality, he seems to be alluding to a prehistoric state of affairs where people had no government, law, or private property. However, he makes no effort to support the historicity of this claim, and later denied that he intended the Discourse to refer to an actual former state of affairs.

Rousseau is not interested in history or archaeology so much as he is interested in understanding human nature as it exists in the present. His political philosophy is driven by the conviction that the political associations we participate in shape our thoughts and behavior to a great extent. His interest in a "natural state," then, is an effort to determine what we would be like if political institutions had never existed. Whatever is not a part of this "natural state" has come about as a result of human society, and is thus "unnatural."

In the Discourse on Inequality, Rousseau paints a very rosy picture of this natural state: without property to quarrel over and governments to enforce inequality, our fundamental human nature is compassionate and free of strife. This view contrasts sharply with most of Rousseau's predecessors. In the ##Leviathan##, Thomas Hobbes famously asserts that human life without political institutions is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." Hobbes and Grotius both claim that human society comes about in order to improve this unpleasant natural state. Rousseau suspects that Hobbes gives such a negative portrayal of our natural state out of an assumption that human nature remains unchanged with or without political institutions. If human beings today were suddenly to find themselves without political institutions, they would indeed lead unpleasant lives because they would have all the selfishness and greed that society has bred in them without any of the safeguards and protections of that society. Rousseau's hypothetical natural state is pre-societal: before we were corrupted by politics, we had none of the unpleasant characteristics that Hobbes identifies. It is important to understand that Rousseau believes it is impossible to return to this natural state.

It should be clear that Rousseau intends a sharp contrast between nature and civil society. Human society is not a part of our natural state; rather, it is formed artificially. Rousseau's suggestion is that it is formed by a "social contract": people living in a state of nature come together and agree to certain constraints in order that they might all benefit. The idea of a social contract is not original to Rousseau, and could even be traced as far back as Plato's ##Crito##. More significantly, Rousseau is drawing on the ideas of Hobbes, Grotius, and Pufendorf, among others, who used the idea of a social contract to justify absolute monarchy. These thinkers suggested that people consent to be governed by an absolute monarch in exchange for the protection and elevation from the state of nature that this affords them.

Rousseau's own social contract theory is meant to overturn the theories of these predecessors, suggesting that no legitimate social contract can be forged in an absolute monarchy. His arguments are diverse, but they rest on the fundamental assertion that in surrendering their liberty to their monarch, people surrender the freedom and authority to consent to a social contract, and so render void any contract they make with the monarch. According to Rousseau, our freedom and our humanity are closely tied to our ability to deliberate and make choices. If a monarch has absolute power over us, we lose both our freedom and humanity, and b

ecome slaves.Book I, Chapters 6-9

SummaryThere reaches a point in the state of nature, Rousseau suggests, when people need to combine forces in order to survive. The problem resolved by the social contract is how people can bind themselves to one another and still preserve their freedom. The social contract essentially states that each individual must surrender himself unconditionally to the community as a whole. Rousseau draws three implications from this definition: (1) Because the conditions of the social contract are the same for everyone, everyone will want to make the social contract as easy as possible for all. (2) Because people surrender themselves unconditionally, the individual has no rights that can stand in opposition to the state. (3) Because no one is set above anyone else, people don't lose their natural freedom by entering into the social contract.

The community that is formed by this social contract is not simply the sum total of the lives and wills of its members: it is a distinct and unified entity with a life and a will of its own. This entity, called a "city" or "polis" in ancient times, is now called a "republic" or a "body politic." Some further definitions: in its passive role it is a "state," in its active role a "sovereign," and in relation to other states a "power"; the community that forms it is "a people," and individually they are "citizens"; they are "subjects" insofar as they submit themselves to the sovereign.

Because the sovereign is a distinct and unified whole, Rousseau treats it in many respects as if it were an individual. Since no individual can be bound by a contract made with himself, the social contract cannot impose any binding regulations on the sovereign. By contrast, subjects of the sovereign are doubly bound: as individuals they are bound to the sovereign, and as members of the sovereign they are bound to other individuals. Though the sovereign is not bound by the social contract, it cannot do anything that would violate the social contract since it owes its existence to that contract. Further, in hurting its subjects it would be hurting itself, so the sovereign will act in the best interests of its subjects without any binding commitment to do so.

Individuals, on the other hand, need the incentive of law to remain loyal to the sovereign. Self-interested individuals might try to enjoy all the benefits of citizenship without obeying any of the duties of a subject. Thus, Rousseau suggests that unwilling subjects will be forced to obey the general will: they will be "forced to be free."

In contrast to the Discourse on Inequality, Rousseau here draws a distinction between nature and civil society that heavily favors the latter. While we lose the physical liberty of being able to follow our instincts freely and do whatever we please, we gain the civil liberty that places the limits of reason and the general will on our behavior, thereby rendering us moral. In civil society, we take responsibility for our actions, and become nobler as a result.

Rousseau concludes Book I with a discussion of property. He suggests that ownership of land is only legitimate if no one else claims that land, if the owner occupies no more land than he needs, and if he cultivates that land for his subsistence. In the social contract, each individual surrenders all his property along with himself to the sovereign and the general will. In doing so, he does not give up his property since he is also a subject of the sovereign.

Commentary

Fans of the Transformers may recall the "Constructicons," a group of smaller rob

ots who could join together to form one, large robot: one Constructicon would be the left arm of this larger robot, another would be the right leg, and so on. This is the same sort of principle that Rousseau is applying here. Individual citizens have a life and a will of their own, but in binding themselves to the social contract, they also become a part of the larger life and will of the sovereign. Like the large robot formed by the individual Constructicons, the sovereign is not simply the sum total of its individual members, but is treated by Rousseau as an individual itself.

Just as each part of the body is responsible for working with the rest of the body and ensuring that it functions smoothly, every individual is committed to the sovereign. However, the sovereign owes nothing to its subjects in the same way as a person owes nothing to his pinky finger or his left knee. We try to keep our fingers and knees from harm not because we are bound by some sort of contract, but because our fingers and knees are a part of our body, and in harming them we would be harming ourselves. Similarly, the sovereign owes nothing to its subjects, but will nonetheless work to ensure their well-being.

Rousseau's communitarian point of view can be understood by referring to his contrast between the state of nature and civil society. The freedom we have in the state of nature is the freedom of animals: unconstrained and irrational. By entering into civil society we learn to restrain our instincts and to act rationally. By leaving our natural state of do-as-you-please, we come to recognize that we need reasons to justify our actions. This rationality is what defines our actions as moral. Rationality and morality distinguish us from animals, according to Rousseau, so it is only by becoming a part of civil society that we become human. The community is superior to the individual because it is a community of humans and the individual is just a solitary animal.

Rousseau contrasts the physical freedom of following our instincts with the civil freedom of acting rationally. In civil society, we learn the freedom of self-control. Thus, according to Rousseau, we do not give up our freedom by binding ourselves to the social contract; rather, we fully realize it.

This background may help us understand Rousseau's disturbing claim that recalcitrant citizens should be "forced to be free." If we only gain civil freedom by entering into civil society and binding ourselves to the social contract, any violation of that contract will also violate our civil freedom. We undermine our very rationality and morality by violating the contract that made us rational and moral. By forcing its subjects to obey the social contract, the sovereign essentially forces its subjects to maintain the civil freedom that is part and parcel of this social contract.

If you find yourself uncomfortable with all this, you are not alone. Some commentators have gone so far as to accuse Rousseau of totalitarianism, though this is a bit far-fetched. However, his notion that the community comes first and the individuals in it second is contrary to the notions of individual liberty that characterize most modern democracies, the United States in particular.

To a large extent, Rousseau is motivated by the fear that in modern states where citizens are not actively involved in politics, they become passive witnesses of the decisions that shape them rather than active participants. The civil freedom that comes through active political participation is largely the freedom to determine one's own fate.

Still, if the ##French Revolution##, is any indication, Rousseau's doctrines can be misused. Rousseau's ideas formed an ideological backbone for the French Revolution, but as the evolving chaos of the Revolution so clearly indicates, it may not always be clear how the general will is determined, and in such instances terror and the guillotine can become an attractive means of forcing people to be

"free." Though to lay all the extreme excesses of the French Revolution at the feet of Rousseau is unfair, some critics have noted that while Rousseau is usually quite careful in distinguishing between force and right, he blurs that distinction dangerously in saying that people must be "forced to be free."Book II, Chapters 1-5

SummarySociety can only function to the extent that people have interests in common: the end goal of any state is the common good. Rousseau argues that the common good can only be achieved by heeding the general will as expressed by the sovereign. The sovereign is inalienable: it cannot defer its power to someone else, or be represented by a smaller group. It expresses the general will, which will never coincide exactly with any particular private will. As the will of the people, the sovereign can only exist so long as the people have an active and direct political voice.

Nor is sovereignty divisible: the sovereign always and necessarily expresses the will of the people as a whole, and not of some part. An expression of the general will takes the form of law, whereas the expression of a particular will is at best an application of law. Rousseau accuses other philosophers of failing to understand this distinction. They take particular acts (administration, declarations of war, etc.) to be acts of sovereignty, and since these acts are not undertaken by the people as a whole, they conclude that sovereignty is divisible. This conclusion permits thinkers such as Grotius to then invest sovereign power in the particular will of a single monarch, thus robbing the people of their rights.

Though the general will always tends toward the common good, Rousseau concedes that the deliberations of the people do not always necessarily express the general will. He draws an important distinction between the general will and the will of all, stating that the latter is simply the sum total of each individual's desires. These particular interests usually balance each other out unless people form factions and vote as a group. Rousseau insists that no factions form within a state, and that each individual should think for himself.

While he claims that the sovereign has absolute power over all its subjects, Rousseau is careful to carve out a space for private interests as well. A citizen must render whatever services or goods are necessary to the state, but the state cannot demand more than what is necessary from the citizen. Furthermore, the sovereign is only authorized to speak in cases that affect the body politic as a whole. Cases that deal only with individuals or particularities do not concern all citizens, and so do not concern the sovereign: the sovereign deals only with matters that are of common interest. As a result, each citizen is free to pursue private interests, and is only bound to the sovereign in matters that are of public concern.

Rousseau supports the death penalty, arguing that the sovereign has the right to determine whether its subjects should live or die. His strongest reason for this position is the claim that wrongdoers, in violating the laws of the state, are essentially violating the social contract. As enemies of the social contract, they are enemies of the state, and must either be exiled or put to death. It is possible to pardon criminals, but both pardons and punishments are signs of weakness: a healthy state has few criminals.

CommentaryThe concepts of the sovereign and of the general will had currency before Rousseau, but not in the form that Rousseau gives them. A sovereign is the ultimate authority with regard to a certain group of people. It is the voice of the law, and all people under its authority must obey it. It is also independent of any outside influences.

In Rousseau's time, the sovereign was generally an absolute monarch. These rulers assumed absolute control over their states, both property and inhabitants. Louis XIV, the archetypal absolute monarch, is rumored once to have said, "I am the state." Within France, whatever the king said was law and had to be obeyed, and no outside force could exert any influence either on Louis or his state.

Rousseau holds on to the essential notion of sovereignty--that it is a power with absolute and inalienable influence over its subjects--but rejects the idea that a single person or elite group can act as sovereign. His goal in The Social Contract is to determine how people can maintain their freedom within the confines of political association, so the idea of a single monarch with absolute power over his subjects runs totally contrary to his ideal. The only way people can be subjected to a sovereign power without losing their freedom is if they themselves are this sovereign power. Thus, Rousseau turns the idea of sovereignty on its head, asserting that the people, and not the king, are sovereign.

In the case of absolute monarchy, sovereign authority is expressed in the will of the king. In Rousseau's ideal republic, sovereign authority is expressed in the general will. Just as a king uses authority to gain what is best for him, the people acting together use authority to gain what is best for all.

The general will, unlike the will of a king, is not the will of any particular individual. In fact, Rousseau thinks it is impossible that any single person's will should coincide with the general will in all cases. Rousseau draws an important distinction between the general will and the "will of all." The will of all is simply what we get when we add up everything that each individual wants. The general will aims at the common good. Rousseau suggests that citizens should vote with the general will, and not their private interests, in mind. In modern democracies, voters tend to pursue their own interests: the rich favor tax cuts, the poor favor social programs, and so on. In Rousseau's ideal republic, each person will vote with the interest of achieving what is best for all: the rich will recognize that taxation for social programs will help those in need, the poor will recognize that lower taxes can spur the economy, and so on.

The general will and the will of all often coincide to a great extent, and Rousseau even seems to suggest that private ballot is the best means of determining both. This raises the question of how we can distinguish one from the other. The only clear indication we get is that the general will is free of factionalism. If a significant number of people band together because of shared private interests and agree to promote these interests by voting as a block, they will manage to unbalance the general will. Rather than aiming evenly toward the common good, the state will begin aiming unevenly toward the good of the most powerful faction.

In a state free of factions, the difference, it seems, rests entirely in the attitude with which citizens vote. In a healthy republic, each citizen votes with the interest of securing what is best for the state. Paradoxically, this requires that each citizen think for himself rather than consult with fellow citizens on what they think is best. A private ballot is essential to avoiding factionalism.

We should not take Rousseau's insistence that citizens disregard their private interests when voting as a sign that he disregards private interests altogether. He is quite clear that the sovereign only has authority in matters that affect and are of interest to the body politic as a whole. In these matters, it is important that citizens think of the common good rather than their own interests. However, the sovereign has no authority over matters that affect only a portion of the body politic. When dealing with matters outside sovereign authority, it is o

bviously important that each citizen do what he thinks is best for himself.Book II, Chapters 6-7

SummaryThe earlier discussion of the social contract and the sovereign explain how the body politic comes into being; the question of how it maintains itself calls for a discussion of law. Rousseau suggests that there is a universal and natural justice that comes to us from God, but that it is not binding. Evil people will not obey God's law, and so we must set up positive, binding laws within society, or else those who obey God's law will suffer at the hands of those who disobey it.

Rousseau defines law as an abstract expression of the general will that is universally applicable. All laws are made by the people as a whole and apply to the people as a whole: the law does not deal with particularities. The law can never deal with individual people or groups, so while it can say that a certain group should have certain privileges or that a certain person should be the head of state, it cannot determine which particular individual or group should receive these privileges.

The law is essentially a record of what the people collectively desire. A law can only be enacted if the people collectively agree on it, and it must apply to all of them. A declaration of the sovereign that applies only to certain people or certain objects is not a law, but a decree.

The existence of civil society hinges on the existence of laws. However, Rousseau acknowledges the problem of how laws should be laid down. How can a people as a whole sit down together and write up a code of law? There is not only the problem of how such a large number could write up such a document together, but also the problem that the people do not always know what they want or what is best for them. Rousseau's proposed solution comes in the form of a lawgiver.

An ideal lawgiver is not easy to find. He must be supremely intelligent, and willing to work selflessly on behalf of a people. Because the laws shape the character and behavior of the people to a great extent, the lawgiver must exhibit great insight. In order for the laws to be unbiased, the lawgiver should not himself be a citizen of the state to which he gives laws. He is outside and above the authority of the sovereign. Remarking on the difficulty of finding such a person, Rousseau notes: "Gods would be needed to give men laws."

Not only is there the difficulty of finding a lawmaker of genius who does not himself wish to govern; there is also the difficulty of making the people obey the laws. People are unlikely to simply accept the laws given to them by a particular person. Rousseau notes that throughout history, lawgivers have used the authority of God or some other divine power to support them. Moses, for instance, claims that God gave him the Ten Commandments. An appeal to the supernatural origins of the laws is generally a good means of ensuring that they are obeyed.

Commentary

To a large extent, the agreement to live under certain established laws is what defines the social contract. In the ##Commentary section for Book I, Chapters 6-9##, we distinguished between civil and physical freedom, suggesting that we give up the latter and gain the former by entering into civil society. Physical freedom is characterized by the unbounded freedom to do whatever we like, following our instincts and impulses. Civil freedom places a check on our instincts and impulses, teaching us to think and behave rationally, and opening us up to the freedom of thinking for ourselves.

Rousseau is by no means the only philosopher to define "real" freedom not as an unbounded do-as-you- please, but as the ability to deliberate rationally. If our behavior is not restrained by laws of some sort, we are not free, but are rather slaves to our instincts and impulses. If our behavior is restrained by the laws of some outside force, then we are not free, but are slaves to that outside force. The only solution, then, is to define freedom as behavior that is restrained only by the laws of our own making. When we extend this solution to society as a whole, the only laws that can maintain the freedom of citizens are those laws that the citizens as a whole agree upon.

Rousseau is careful to distinguish between laws and decrees. Decrees are matters of day-to-day business: a leader appointing an attorney general, or the decision to condemn a traitor to death, or anything that deals with individuals or particular groups is a decree. Laws are made for the people as a whole by the people as a whole. They are the general guidelines under which a people chooses to live. As the restraints a people places upon itself, laws are what define their civil freedom.

Because laws represent the restraints of civil freedom, they represent the leap made from humans in the state of nature into civil society. In this sense, law is a civilizing force upon us, so it is no surprise that Rousseau believes that the laws that govern a people define their character to a great extent. In the Discourse on Inequality, he asserts that it is bad government, and not human nature, that is the source of our evil. Here, he suggests that good government, or rather good laws, can make good people. People who agree voluntarily and as a group to abide by certain restrictions that will benefit all of them will likely become better people as a result.

Rousseau gives no practical solution as to how a code of laws is to be formed. On the contrary, he remarks at length as to how difficult it is to find someone who is up to the task. Because a set of laws largely defines the people who live under these laws, the lawgiver is responsible for determining what kind of people a certain state will produce. Thus, a lawgiver is neither what we might understand as a judge or legislator, nor even a political leader or dictator. The lawgiver should be understood as someone who invents a moral code. If we recall, morality is defined by rationality, rationality (according to Rousseau) comes into being with civil society, and civil society comes into being thanks to a lawgiver. We might even think of the lawgiver as a saint or prophet of sorts: it is no wonder that Rousseau associates the creation of laws with the supernatural.

Despite all his talk about the difficulties of lawmaking, Rousseau himself undertook to write two constitutions: one for Poland and one for Corsica, at the invitation of those states. Poland was partitioned and Corsica was annexed before either constitution could be implemented. In both of these cases, Rousseau was playing the role of the impartial lawgiver who stands outside the law: he was neither Corsican nor Polish, and was giving these people laws without any personal interest or hope for gain.Book II, Chapters 8-12

SummaryIt is not only difficult to find a good lawgiver, but also difficult to find a people who are suitable for good laws. Rousseau suggests that a state must receive laws relatively early in its existence. If the attempt to give laws is made too soon, the people will not be ready to receive guidance. If the attempt is made too late, the people will have become stuck in their prejudices and will resist the improving influence of good laws. In rare cases, a revolution may permit an older state to regain its freedom under new laws, but such revolutions can only occur once.

Rousseau also remarks that a state must be of moderate size--neither too big nor too small--if it is to do well. In a large state, administration becomes burdensome and costly. Rather than one central government, there will have to be many levels of regional government, with each additional level costing the people. Furthermore, a large government will be less swift and precise in maintaining law and order, and a state spread out over a great area with different customs and climates will be hard-pressed to create one law that is fair to all. On the other hand, a state that is too small is constantly in danger of being swallowed up by neighbors who are in constant friction with it.

There must also be a balance between the number of people and the extent of territory in a state. If a small number of people own a great territory, they will not be able to maintain it all, and will be in constant danger of invasion. If a great number of people own a small territory, they will need to rely on goods from other states to sustain them, and will constantly be tempted to invade their neighbors. There is no magic number to determine the right ratio of population to territory since a great deal hinges on the kind of land, the kind of people, and so on.

The final condition Rousseau lists for the establishment of laws within a state is that it must be enjoying a period of peace and plenty, since the formation and establishment of laws leaves it momentarily vulnerable.

Bearing in mind all the above recommendations, Rousseau notes that there aren't many states fit to receive laws. One case of particular note, however, is Corsica. Rousseau remarks: "I have a presentiment that this little island will one day astonish Europe."

All laws should pursue the principles of freedom and equality. By "equality," Rousseau does not mean that everyone should be exactly the same, but that differences in wealth should not unbalance the state. Within the guidelines of these general principles, however, there is a lot of room for maneuvering. Each state has different needs and interests, and there is not one "right" way that all states must follow. Each state should have laws that harmonize with its natural circumstances.

Rousseau distinguishes four different classes of law. (1) Political Laws, or Fundamental Laws, which are the main subject of The Social Contract. These determine the relationship the body politic has with itself, the fundamental structure of the state. (2) Civil Laws, which deal with individuals in relation with each other or with the body politic as a whole. (3) Criminal Laws, which deal with cases where the law is broken. And most importantly, (4) the morals, customs, and beliefs of the people. These determine the quality of the people and the success of the more rigid, written laws.

CommentaryThe end of Book II deals primarily with the people that make up a state. Rousseau is wise not to be overly dogmatic in the recommendations he makes. Instead, he notes that different people will have different needs and will require different laws. A people living in the mountains might be better off setting up a pastoral way of life, while a people living by the sea might do better with seafaring and naval trade. Throughout The Social Contract, Rousseau's recommendations are meant only on a general, and not a particular, level. For instance, the sovereign and the laws only have authority on those matters that affect the body politic as a whole. In Chapter 11, he suggests that the only absolute requirement for good laws is that they should in all cases preserve liberty and equality.

Liberty (or freedom) is the basic premise around which The Social Contract is structured: Rousseau's principal question is how people can preserve their liberty

in a political union. Equality, it seems to him, is a necessary condition for the preservation of liberty. The Discourse on Inequality hammers on the idea that property, and material inequality, are the root cause of human misery and evil. And again, in Chapter 11 of The Social Contract, he argues that gross material inequality can put liberty up for sale. The poor would be willing to sell their freedom and the rich would be capable of buying it. Both the very rich and the very poor would value money more than liberty. Thus, Rousseau asserts that some level of material equality is necessary to ensure that liberty comes before profit.

Nonetheless, Rousseau is equally insistent on defending our right to private property. While he is against overly eager capitalism, he does not join socialist or communist thinkers in recommending the abolition of private property altogether. If everything we did were for the benefit of the state, we would no longer be free. Rousseau would presumably accuse communist states (there were none around during his time) of pursuing equality to such an extent that it takes precedence over liberty. Equality is important as a necessary condition for liberty, and it works against itself if it enslaves the people it is meant to liberate.

There seems to be an interesting tension in Rousseau's discussion of law and its impact on people. Though he insists that laws are a defining characteristic of the social contract, and are thus necessary to ensure human freedom, he also concedes that very few states are ready for such laws. Does this mean that very few states are ready for freedom? He explains that some states are not yet civilized enough to receive laws and some states are too deeply set in old prejudices to adapt to new laws. In Chapter 12, he asserts that morality is more important for ensuring the well-being of a state than any of its explicit laws. However, he also suggests that morality is something that comes about with the creation of laws: laws and life in civil society are what make a person moral. Thus we run into a paradox of sorts: a people needs to be moral to some extent in order to receive laws, but they can only become moral when they have laws.

When Rousseau talks about laws and civil society making a person moral, he is contrasting civil society with the state of nature, where we exist in a pre-moral, instinctive manner. It is not entirely clear how things stand with barbarian civilizations or people living in absolute monarchies. They are not in the state of nature, nor do they enjoy civil freedom. Because they live in society and must be rational, they must have some sort of moral life, but Rousseau is not clear how this morality manifests itself. Clearly, though, it is rarely sufficient to raise them up into the civil freedom of a republic.

One of these rare cases Rousseau mentions is Corsica, and it is an interesting case. In 1764, two years after he wrote The Social Contract, Rousseau was invited to draw up a constitution for Corsica. This constitution was never implemented, since France invaded and annexed the island in 1769. In that same year, ##Napoleon## was born in Corsica. Though hardly as Rousseau had envisioned it, Corsica did indeed "astonish Europe," as this little man became Emperor of France and marched his armies all the way to Moscow. And though not of the sort Rousseau might have imagined or esteemed, Napoleon made himself into a lawgiver, and his Code Napoleon remains a vital legal precedent from parts of Europe to once French-controlled Louisiana.Book III, Chapters 1-2

SummaryRousseau opens Book III with an explanation of government and the executive power that it wields. The actions of a state, just like those of a person, can be analyzed into will and strength. To walk around the block, I must decide to walk around the block (will), and I must have the power in my legs to do it (strength). The will of the body politic is expressed in the laws, which are discussed at length in Book II. The strength that puts these laws into practice is found in t

he executive power of the government. Because the government deals with particular acts and applications of the law, it is distinct from the sovereign, which deals only with general matters. A great many dangers arise when government and sovereign are confused or mistaken for one another.

There is no kind of social contract between a government and the rest of the people, since the people do not surrender their power or will to the government in the way that they do to the sovereign. The government is an intermediary body that can be modified or disbanded according to the sovereign will (or general will).

In a large state, each individual will be only a small part of the sovereign, and so each individual will be less inclined to follow the general will and more inclined to follow his or her own particular will. In order to keep so many people in line, the government will need to be able to exercise a great deal of power. Thus, the larger the population, the greater force the government must have relative to each individual.

On the other hand, the more powerful the government is, the more tempted the magistrates in the government will be to abuse their power and take advantage of their position. Thus, just as a strong government is needed to control a large population, a strong sovereign is needed to control a strong government.

While there is obviously no precise mathematical relationship that can determine the proportionate power of government, Rousseau suggests the following ratio as a good formula. The ratio of the power of the government to the power of the people should be equal to the ratio of the power of the sovereign to the power of the government.

Rousseau proposes that the government, like the sovereign, can be considered a unified body, the main difference being that the sovereign acts according to its own interests, while the government acts according to the interests of the sovereign, or general, will. Nonetheless, the government still has a life and ego of its own, and has its own assemblies, councils, honors, and titles, as well as a supreme magistrate or chief that acts as its leader. The difficulty lies in arranging matters so that the government never acts solely on its own behalf, making the general will subordinate to its own will.

Any magistrate in government will have to exercise three different kinds of will: his individual will that pursues his own interests, the corporate will that expresses the will of the government, and the general will that expresses the will of the people as a whole. The fewer magistrates there are, the more the corporate will shall resemble particular wills, and the stronger and more active relative to the people it will be. With a great many magistrates, the corporate will shall resemble the general will, but it will also be relatively weaker and less active. In a large state, where a strong government is needed, fewer magistrates are desirable.

CommentaryThe first two books of The Social Contract deal with the abstract level of political right. In those books, Rousseau explains the principles according to which a republic that upholds freedom and equality might exist. He concerns himself there with the sovereign and with laws, both of which apply generally to all people equally and at all times.

In Book III Rousseau makes the transition from abstract to practical and from legislative to executive, discussing how a republic should be governed rather than the principles on which it should be founded. Instead of discussing a sovereign

or laws that are general and apply to all, he discusses a government that is made up of a select group of magistrates and that exercises power in particular cases.

Rousseau's distinction between will and strength is closely linked to the distinction between force and right. In the first two books, he deals with will and right: he discusses simply how things ought to be, how we should will them to be. Now he discusses strength and force: how we can make things be the way we want them to be, how we can put matters into effect. On the whole, Rousseau is very careful to distinguish between force and right. A failure to do so leads to a confusion between government and sovereign, and such confusions lead thinkers like Grotius or ##Hobbes## to assert that there is a social contract binding subjects to a government of one person, who is also the sovereign. A proper distinction between force and right is necessary to grasp the subtleties of legitimate government. The importance Rousseau normally places on this distinction further highlights his own confusion of this distinction when, in Book I, Chapter 7, he insists that people who do not obey the social contract must be "forced to be free."

The discussion of the relative strengths of sovereign, government, and people can be a bit confusing. Rousseau tries to explain himself in terms of mathematical analogies whose clarity can be helpful. But, as he himself acknowledges, we won't find the precision of mathematics in moral calculations, and such precise ratios can be misleading, especially since there is no precise numerical measure for political power.

Rousseau's calculations are based on the assumption that every citizen exercises more than one kind of will. I act first and foremost in my own interests, as a single individual, and exercise a particular will. However, as a member of the sovereign, I also think and act with the general will in mind. If I am a magistrate in government, I also think and act with a corporate will, in concert with my fellow magistrates.

In a state with just one hundred people, I will constitute 1 percent of the sovereign. In a state with ten thousand people, I will constitute only one one-hundredth of 1 percent of the sovereign. The larger the state becomes, the less I constitute the sovereign. Rousseau concludes that the larger the state becomes, the more my particular will shall take precedence over my participation in the general will. Thus, in a large state, each individual will care less about the well-being of the state, and will care more about himself. To prevent selfish anarchy, Rousseau argues that a large population needs a strong government to keep it in line.

A strong government does not mean a large government. On the contrary, Rousseau asserts that the smaller a government is the stronger it is. In a large state, each individual's particular will is so much stronger than his general will because his particular will concerns only himself, while his general will concerns a large group of which he is only a small part. Similarly, in a large government, the corporate will of each magistrate will be weak, and he will be more interested in his own particular will. In a small government, the corporate will of each magistrate will be stronger.

The larger the population, the smaller the government that controls them should be. The danger, then, is that the corporate will of a small government will be so much stronger than the general will that the general will shall be ignored. The danger, it seems, of large states, is that each individual will feel less committed to the general will, and so the general will might be neglected. Rousseau's ideas are deeply indebted to Greek political philosophers, especially Aristotle, and so he thinks of the ideal political unit as a small city-state, like Athens or Sparta, or the Geneva that he grew up in. A large country is ill suited to his recommendations.

Book III, Chapters 3-7

SummaryRousseau roughly distinguishes three forms of government. When all or most of the citizens are magistrates, the government is a democracy. When fewer than half the citizens are magistrates, the government is an aristocracy. When there is only one magistrate (or in some cases a small handful of magistrates), the government is a monarchy. There is not one form of government that is best for all. Rather, as Rousseau has already noted, the larger the population, the fewer magistrates there should be. Thus, large states are well suited to monarchy, small states to democracy, and intermediate states to aristocracy.Rousseau is very skeptical about the viability of democracy. He claims that "there has never been a true democracy, and there never will be." States, by their nature, tend toward having a smaller number take charge of the affairs of government. When the government and the sovereign are the same body, there is a great danger that the combining of legislative and executive functions will corrupt the laws and lead to the ruin of the state. A successful democracy would need to be small, with simple and honest citizens who have little ambition or greed. Because it is so unstable, democracy is also very susceptible to civil strife.

There are three main kinds of aristocracy. (1) Natural aristocracy, frequently found in primitive civilizations, where elders and heads of families govern a village or tribe. (2) Elective aristocracy, which Rousseau considers the best kind of aristocracy, where those with power or riches, or those who are best suited to govern, are placed in charge. (3) Hereditary aristocracy, which Rousseau considers the worst kind of aristocracy, where certain families govern everybody else. As long as the magistrates can be trusted to govern justly, Rousseau believes that aristocracy is an excellent form of government. It is better to have a select group of the best men govern than to have everyone try to govern together regardless of qualifications. Rousseau expresses serious reservations about monarchy, just as he does about democracy. Monarchy is tremendously efficient, since all power rests in the hands of one man. However, this can be dangerous, as the corporate will becomes nothing more than a particular will. If a king wants his power to be absolute, it is in his best interests to keep the people he governs in harsh subjection so that they can never revolt. Monarchies are best suited to large states, where a number of ranks of princes and underlings can be assigned. However, a monarch will rarely assign these positions wisely, and few monarchs have the strength to govern large states single-handedly. There is also a problem of succession: if kings are elected, these elections are prone to serious corruption, and if there is a hereditary succession, there is the constant risk of incompetent rulers. Rousseau also notes that each successive king will have a different agenda, meaning that the state will not keep a fixed course. For all these reasons and more, it is difficult to find a good king.

No government is strictly one of these three forms: all are mixed to some extent. A monarchy needs to assign power to lesser magistrates and a democracy needs some sort of leader to direct it. On the whole, Rousseau prefers simple forms of government, but recommends mixing forms in order to maintain a balance of power. For example, if the government is too powerful relative to the sovereign, dividing the government into different parts will dissipate its powers.

CommentaryIn reacting against the philosophers of the previous generation who support absolute monarchy, such as ##Hobbes## or Grotius, Rousseau looks even further back, to ancient Greek and Roman thinkers. In particular, he owes a tremendous debt to Aristotle's ##Politics##. In that work, Aristotle makes a similar distinction between democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, depending on whether government is by the many, the few, or by a single person. Aristotle also concedes that different forms of government suit different people, but tends to favor aristocracy. P

erhaps, however, the differences are more interesting than the similarities. While Rousseau values freedom above all, Aristotle values the "good life," and sufficiently disregards the value of freedom to endorse slavery.

Rousseau's main reason for preferring aristocracy--or rather, his main reason for having reservations about democracy and monarchy--is that he is deeply concerned about cordoning off executive power and the corporate will as distinct entities. In a democracy, the corporate will and the general will are liable to be confused, while in a monarchy, the corporate will is nothing other than the particular will of the monarch.

We should recognize that when Rousseau talks about democracy and the dangers it entails, he does not mean democracy in the sense that we experience it today. Much of the modern world is made up of representative democracies, where the people are involved in politics only to the extent of electing officials to represent them in government. When Rousseau talks about "democracy," he means direct democracy, where the people are the officials who sit in government. According to this scheme, every citizen would be required to sit in assembly together and deliberate on matters of state. If we imagine trying to do this in a country like the United States, we can understand why Rousseau recommends democracy only to small states.

The main problem with direct democracy, as Rousseau perceives it, is that it fails to distinguish between the executive and the legislative. The idea of forming the social contract is to ensure the freedom of each citizen. This freedom would be seriously curtailed if each citizen had to devote as much time to government as elected officials normally do. The people as a whole are needed only as a legislative body, to agree upon the laws and to agree to observe them. This is enough to ensure the mutual freedom of all citizens. Freedom does not rely on the executive work of carrying out day-to-day matters of state, and Rousseau discusses the formation of government precisely so that only a select group will have to deal with such matters.

The dangerin a government of a select few, of course, is that the executive body may become corrupt and no longer serve the people. This danger is especially present in a monarchy. Because the executive body is reduced to a single person, there is no objective standard to distinguish the monarch's particular will from his corporate will as representative of the people. As a result, every monarch will face the temptation to govern in his own interests, and not in the interests of the people.

It might seem odd that a philosopher who so ardently defends liberty and equality should favor aristocracy. This term has been taken in modern times to mean an undeserving and ineffectual upper class, but Rousseau intends it in the Greek sense, as employed by Aristotle. "Aristocracy" literally means "rule of the best," which Rousseau contrasts with the literal meaning of "democracy": "rule of the many." In a perfect world, a select group of magistrates will take on executive duties, and these magistrates will be skilled, efficient, and will serve the interests of the people. Rousseau acknowledges that this is not always the case in an aristocracy, but seems to think that the dangers of aristocracy are fewer and more easily avoided than those either of democracy or monarchy.

We should reiterate, however, that Rousseau does not insist that aristocracy is always the best form of government. Democracy is better suited to small states and monarchy to large states. His preference for aristocracy is based, if anything, on a sense that moderate-sized city-states, such as his home city of Geneva, are ideal. While monarchy is the best form of government for large states, large states are hard to govern regardless of the form of government.

Book III, Chapters 8-11

SummaryThough freedom is desirable, Rousseau agrees with Montesquieu that it is not possible in every environment. The government of a state does not produce any goods itself, and so must live off the surplus produced by the people. The closer the relationship between the government and the people, the less the taxes levied by the government will hurt the people. Democracy can survive where there is little surplus and monarchy thrives where there is a great surplus. Thus, Rousseau suggests that climate determines government to a great extent. Colder, northern countries have little surplus and can support democracy, while hotter, southern countries have great surplus and support monarchy. In hot climates, people tend to eat less, have more fertile soil, and need fewer people to work the land. Because fewer people are needed, the population will be more spread out, making them easier to govern. All these considerations serve as evidence that monarchical government thrives in hot climates.

Considering the many disputes regarding what makes a good government, Rousseau suggests that the objective and easily calculated factor of population is the best measure. Political associations exist in order to ensure the protection and prosperity of their members. A growing population is a sign of prosperity, and so a sign of good government. Peace, culture, and other factors are nowhere near as important.

The government is inevitably at odds with the sovereign, and the friction between the two can cause the government to degenerate. Either the government will contract--going from democracy to aristocracy or from aristocracy to monarchy--or the state itself will dissolve. The state dissolves into anarchy when the government usurps sovereign power. Such usurpation breaks the social contract so that citizens become free of their social obligations only to be subjected by force.

The friction between government and sovereign is bound to destroy all states eventually. States, like humans, are only mortal, and Rousseau notes that even Sparta and Rome (his two favorites) devolved after a time. The longevity of a state relies on its legislative power: if the laws are upheld for a long time, they become strong with tradition.

CommentaryRousseau's peculiar analysis of the effect climate holds on government rests on a certain picture of production and consumption. Each individual needs to consume a certain fixed quantity of goods--food, clothing, etc. However, each individual does not produce these goods equally. While farmers and tailors produce food and clothing, government magistrates produce nothing of the sort. According to Rousseau, then, the farmers and the tailors are responsible not only for producing sufficient food and clothing for themselves, but also producing enough to take care of the government.

Rousseau is a bit vague in his formulation, and we could read this as a simple endorsement of capitalism: magistrates get paid a certain sum for serving in government, and they can use this money to buy food and clothing for themselves. Magistrates get paid taxpayers' money, each citizen paying taxes that are proportional to the profit he makes from whatever business or trade he undertakes.

However, Rousseau tends to speak negatively about finance and profit motives, so it is more likely that he is thinking along the lines of the Marxist slogan: "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need." Farmers will give up a certain amount of their food, not for the sake of profit, but simply because they produce more food than they need and they recognize that their surplus food is needed to feed government magistrates.

If this is what Rousseau means, he is making the rather naive assumption that th

e quantity of goods produced will remain fixed regardless. History suggests that workers who have nothing to gain personally from producing a surplus will be less diligent in producing that surplus. Capitalism and consumerism have had such astonishing success (we will leave aside the question of whether this is for the better or worse) because everyone has the direct incentive of profit to increase productivity. When no such incentive exists, productivity tends to decline, and the surplus becomes smaller. Rousseau lists a number of factors that determine the size of a surplus, but does not seem to consider that productivity depends heavily on how the goods are distributed.

Rather than discuss economics, Rousseau discusses climate, and the kinds of soil and people found in different lands. Rousseau concedes that there is obviously no direct correlation between what degree of latitude a state occupies and the kind of government it has, but he also interestingly asserts that the actual facts of the matter have little bearing on the truth of his theory. Even if the south were filled with democracies and the north with monarchies, his theory that hotter climates tend to produce monarchies would still hold: it would just mean that the other factors he discusses outweigh the considerations of climate. This bold assertion raises two questions: How, then, could his theory be proved wrong? And what kind of theory is it? It would seem that he considers this theory to be a self-evident truth. However, it is rather unsatisfying that those of us who might dispute it are given no grounds to raise an objection. His discussion of climate seems to be less like a theory and more like blind dogmatism.

One might also think it odd that Rousseau claims that democracy thrives on a small surplus, but monarchy relies on a large surplus. If there are more magistrates in a democracy, there would be more mouths to feed in government, and so a larger surplus would be needed. However, in this case, Rousseau is quite astute, noting that the determining factor is not the size of government, but how efficiently goods are cycled through society. In an absolute monarchy, the king consumes all the surplus, and the people receive nothing in return. In a democracy, the people who work are the same people who enjoy the benefits of the surplus, so even if this surplus is small, they still do well.

Lastly, one might be puzzled by Rousseau's assertion that population growth is the best and only means of determining good government. Throughout the Social Contract, Rousseau goes on and on about the importance of freedom and equality, and yet here he suggests that prosperity as reflected in population growth is more important. We should note, though, that he is talking about what makes a good government, not what makes a happy society. In fact, he goes on immediately afterward to point out that government and sovereign are in constant conflict and will ultimately pull the state apart. If the population is healthy and the state is prosperous, the government in power is likely to remain happily in power whether it ensures the freedom of its people or not.

Book III, Chapters 12-18

SummaryIn order that sovereign power may maintain itself, it is important that all citizens meet in periodic assemblies. This may seem unrealistic, but Rousseau points out that in ancient times, even cities as large as Rome managed the feat. If it seems unrealistic today, that is because of the laziness of the people and not because of logistical difficulties. Generally, a state should not be larger than a single town, so assembling the citizens should not be difficult. In the unstable case where several towns are united, Rousseau suggests not having a fixed capital, but rotating the seat of government and popular assembly from town to town.

Though there is no set period of time, Rousseau suggests that the more powerful

the government is, the more frequently all citizens should assemble. In such assemblies, the lowliest citizen has as much of a voice as the most powerful magistrate. As a result, these assemblies are a danger to the government, and the government will often try to dissuade the people from assembling. When the citizens are too lazy or reticent to exercise their freedom the government may succeed in undermining sovereign authority.

Often, a population that does not want to assemble to exercise legislative power elect representatives to do their work for them. Rousseau remarks that a state begins to dissolve when the people value comfort over freedom, and pay representatives and mercenaries rather than serve the state themselves. Rousseau derisively speaks of "finance" as the practice of letting one's wallet replace one's duty as a citizen. Representation is a modern idea that evolved from feudalism, and Rousseau re-asserts that sovereignty cannot be represented.

Rousseau notes that the ancient Greeks were able to assemble regularly largely because slaves did most of their work. In the modern world, the people have enslaved themselves by electing representatives to exercise their freedom for them.

Rousseau addresses the institution of government, claiming contrary to the assertion of other theorists that government is not instituted by means of a contract between people and magistrates. First, sovereign power cannot modify itself like that. Second, such a contract would be a particular act, and therefore not a sovereign act. Third, there would be no higher power to ensure that the contract is honored. The decision to institute a government is indeed an act of sovereignty, but the act of assigning certain magistrates is not. Rousseau explains that, momentarily, the sovereign becomes a democracy--a government where every citizen is a magistrate--and the decision to name certain magistrates is a particular act of government. Once magistrates have been named, the sovereign ceases to act like a government, and the government and sovereign become two distinct bodies.

Thus, government is instituted not by contract, but by law, and magistrates are not rulers, but officers. A regular assembly of all the people is the best means of ensuring that the government never usurps sovereign power. At every assembly, the people must vote as to whether the present government and magistrates should be kept in power.

Commentary

The distinction between government and popular assemblies is absolutely crucial to Rousseau's system. He has already remarked on the friction between government and sovereign: the government that wields power will naturally want to act on its own behalf, and not on behalf of the people as a whole. While in a healthy, happy state, the government can be more or less trusted, some sort of check must exist to keep the government at bay.

This check is the exercise of popular sovereignty. From the beginning of the book, Rousseau has spoken about the sovereign as the expression of the general will and the true voice of the people, but only here does he state explicitly how the general will is to make itself heard. There should be an agreed-upon period of time, written into the constitution, where all citizens must gather together in an assembly and voice their concerns collectively. During this time, government is disbanded. After all, the government as executive is meant to represent the people, and when all the people are present, there is no need for representation. One of the matters discussed at every assembly is the performance of the government and whether it should be allowed to continue. This allows the people collectively to place a check on the government, preventing it from acting against their interests.

Rousseau probably got this idea of checks and balances between executive and leg

islative from Montesquieu, whose influence he acknowledges at other points in The Social Contract. Montesquieu's idea of dividing government into executive, legislative, and judicial functions, and establishing a system of checks and balances between them, is most famously put into practice in the American constitution.

The demand that all citizens should participate in popular assemblies is unique to Rousseau in the modern world. It is a very tall order, but one that is essential, Rousseau believes, to maintaining a healthy state. He has already stressed the importance of liberty and equality, and with the idea of the popular assembly he stresses the importance of fraternity. "Liberty, equality, fraternity" was to be the motto of the ##French Revolution##, which drew a great deal of inspiration from his ideas.

Naturally, it is in the government's best interests to discourage popular assemblies: without them, the government's power is almost unlimited. For this reason, Rousseau insists that it be written in law that the people must assemble on a regular, periodic basis. Though this law can combat the selfish designs of the government, it cannot combat the laziness of the people itself. (We need only look at the voter turnout in most modern democracies to have an idea of how low the likelihood that every citizen would show up to deliberate on matters of state in a large assembly.) The survival of the social contract depends to a large extent on the enthusiasm of the people with regard to this contract. Those who have no interest in exercising their civil freedom are guaranteed to lose it, according to Rousseau.

Looking at Rousseau's hated terms--"representation" and "finance"--will help us understand what is lost when people do not exercise popular sovereignty as a group. The first temptation, representation, undermines Rousseau's concept of fraternity. The general will can only be expressed by the people as a whole, and they cannot elect representatives to express this will for them. If the sovereign is represented it ceases to be the sovereign.

The temptation toward finance undermines Rousseau's concept of equality. If those with enough money can buy their way out of service to the state, the state itself can ultimately be bought. We might find something similar in modern democracies, where hefty campaign contributions from wealthy interest groups and politically biased journalism can do a great deal to sway an election.

When the people undermine equality and fraternity, liberty will not be able to stand alone. If we recall, Rousseau believes that people can find civil freedom only by entering into the social contract and exercising popular sovereignty. If people try to buy their way out of their duty to the state, they are essentially buying their enslavement. They will no longer have a voice in how the state is run, and they will become the slaves of those in charge.

This claim might seem a bit outlandish: most of us who live in modern representative democracies are not "slaves" to the government. However, Rousseau would suggest that we lack the initiative and agency we would have if we lived in a true republic. In the modern world, we may lack a certain degree of agency from falling too much under the sway of consumer culture. While "representation" may not inhibit our freedom too much, we might say that "finance" has enslaved us to an extent that Rousseau could not have imagined.Book IV, Chapters 1-4

SummaryThough the general will can be silenced or sold to the highest bidder in states that lack the simplicity of peace, unity, and equality, it can never be annihilated. The general will cannot be changed, but it can be subordinated to other wills, notably the particular wills of each individual citizen. Even when the will

of all ceases to express the general will, the general will continues to exist, however little it is heeded.

Unanimity in popular decisions is a sign of a healthy state. That is a sign that the general will is agreed upon by all. When everyone is expressing only his own particular will, there are bound to be disagreements. In a worst case scenario, unanimity reappears when people vote in accordance with a tyrant either out of fear or flattery.

While the social contract itself must be agreed upon unanimously, and all who dissent from it must be expelled from the state, all other acts of sovereignty may be decided by a majority vote. In matters of great importance, a vote should need something close to unanimity in order to pass, and in unimportant administrative matters, only a majority of one should be needed. Those who take the losing side of a vote are not having their wills counteracted so much as they are found to be mistaken in determining the general will. When acting as a sovereign, people must not vote for what they personally desire but for what they perceive to be the general will.

Rousseau distinguishes between election by lot (choosing at random) and election by choice. The former suits a democracy, where the only fair method of determining who should bear the responsibility of office would be a random one. Election by choice suits aristocracy, since the government should be free to choose its own members. Generally speaking, election by choice is better for filling offices that require a certain degree of expertise (such as military offices), and election by lot is better for filling offices (such as political offices) that require only the common sense, justice, and integrity that should be common to all citizens.

Chapter 4 launches a lengthy discussion of the Roman comitia to show how a large city was able to maintain the sovereignty of the people for such a long time. There were three different popular assemblies. The comitia curiata was made up of only the inhabitants of the city, and not the wealthier citizens in the outlying countryside, and was generally quite corrupt. The comitia tribunata was an assembly of the people that excluded senators and wealthy patricians, thus favoring the voice of the people. The comitia centuriata was an assembly of all citizens, but the vote was weighted heavily in favor of the wealthy. Rousseau particularly admires this last comitia, and notes that, in spite of Rome's immense size, all the people collectively exercised the sovereign powers of enacting laws and electing officials, taking on some executive duties as well.

CommentaryIf we recall, the general will is the will that aims at the common good. As a result, the general will continues to exist even if it is totally disregarded. If we recall, Rousseau draws an important distinction between the general will and the particular will of each citizen. Insofar as Rousseau treats the sovereign as one collective individual, the general will is the particular will of this sovereign. Just as the particular will of each individual aims toward that individual's best advantage, the general will aims toward the best advantage of the sovereign, which is the common good.

In a healthy state, citizens see themselves as only a small part of this more important whole. They recognize the general will and they aim for it. In an unhealthy state, citizens lose their sense of civic duty, ignore the general will, and pursue their own interests instead. Even in an unhealthy state, the general will continues to exist so long as the sovereign exists, but the sovereign is in poor shape when no one looks out for its interests.

Decisions of the sovereign are made in the assembly by means of popular vote. When citizens assemble to act as the sovereign, they are expected to place their vote in accordance with what they believe the general will to be. Thus, citizens are expected to vote against their own private interests sometimes if they think that will benefit the state as a whole. In a healthy state, these votes will almost always be unanimous, because all citizens will be intimately aware of the general will and will want nothing more than to vote in accordance with it. If a citizen votes for a losing cause, this should not reflect that his desires are unpopular so much as it reflects that he was mistaken. If he, just like everyone else, votes in accordance with what he believes the general will to be, he will simply have made a mistake and thought that the general will was other than what it is.

There are two related problems with this view. The first is how the citizens are meant to know what the general will is. Suppose the sovereign has to vote on whether Swiss cheese or cheddar should be the official cheese of the state. Not only do most citizens prefer cheddar, but for whatever reasons, cheddar cheese is closer to the common good and so expresses the general will. However, there is a very vocal and very powerful minority that supports the Swiss cheese movement. This minority manages to persuade the people that in fact most people prefer Swiss cheese and that it is in the common interest to vote for Swiss cheese. Even supporters of cheddar cheese will feel obliged to vote in favor of Swiss cheese if they feel this is the expression of the general will.

In Rousseau's system, people don't vote for what they want, but for what they think is best for all. If they can be deceived into thinking that an unpopular and unhealthy choice is in fact in the interests of all, they will be duty-bound to vote for that choice even if it is against their interests. Because citizens in the assembly are not meant to voice personal interests, there is no sure way of finding out that the unpopular choice is in fact unpopular. Rousseau provides no criteria beyond honest intuition for how citizens might determine what they think the general will is.

The second, related problem, has to do with distinguishing between the general will and the will of all. In modern democracies, elections voice the will of all: we add up what each person wants and we go with the most popular choice. In a healthy republic, the will of all and the general will are identical: everyone wants what is in the best interests of the state. However, when people's particular wills start taking precedence over the general will, there will be a great disparity between the two. The problem (which has been mentioned in the ##Commentary section for Book II, Chapters 1-5## is that both the general will and the will of all are determined by popular vote. If both are determined in the same way, how can we distinguish between the two? There seems to be no criteria for how we can look at the results of an election and determine whether the general will was indeed expressed or not. Thus, our nefarious Swiss cheese supporters can pass their law and there will be no objective means of showing that this vote did not express the general will.Book IV, Chapters 5-9

SummaryIn certain cases, Rousseau recommends the establishment of an additional body called the "tribunate," whose business is to maintain a steady balance between sovereign and government and between government and people. It has no share in executive or legislative power, and is outside the constitution. Its only purpose is to defend and ensure the safety of the laws.

In rare cases, dictatorship may be necessary to save the state from collapse. The laws are inflexible, and there may be circumstances under which they must be suspended for the safety of all. A dictator does not represent the people or the

laws; he acts in concert with the general will only to the extent that it is in the interests of all that the state should not collapse. Obviously dictatorship is volatile and can descend into tyranny, so dictators should only be appointed for a short term.