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F CRICKMORE is the

acknowledged expert

SR-71, having written

on thesub jec t since

His contacts within one

the most secret military

programmes of all

test pi lotsand

50 USAF pilots

Reconnaissance

s Off icers IRSOs).

acknowledgmentof his

, he was invi t ed t o

come an honorary member

tho BlackbirdAssociat ion

1993.This is Paul 's second

l um o n t h e SR-71 i n the

Aircraf t series.

OSPREY COMBAT AIRCRAFT • 80

LOC){HEED SR-71

OPERATIONS IN

EUROPE AfJD THE

MIDDLE EAST



SERIES EDITOR: TONY HOLMES

I OSPREY COMBAT AIRCRAFT • 80 I

LOC)(HEED SR-71

OPERATIONS IN

UROPE AND THE~ r----.r..:r. .. MIDDLE EAST

PAUL FCRICKMORE





THAT NEVERWAS

THE DEPLOYMENTCJ

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7

Record breakers It Cols Tom Estes

andDewainVick receive the 1972

Harmon International Trophyf rom

SenatorBarryGoldwater and

PresidentRichard Nixon (USAA

As with all frontl ine SR-71 missions,

the 9th SRW'sdedicated KC-135Q

fleet playeda p ivota l ro le in the

Giant Reach/BusyPilot operation

(via Paul F Crickmore)

and rhe Sea of Galilee. The Sovier

reconnaissance effort was srrengrh

enedon8 Octoberwhen Cosmos597

was launched, rhis newsarellire being

more ver sa ril e rha n Cosmos 596

rhanks to irs ability to change orbirs

using rockers. Despire rhe resulranr

increase in r he sar el li re's speed

because of rhe weighr associared wirh

rhe rockers , rhe perigee improved

photographic resolurion. Wirh irs

parh nowinclined65°to rhe Equator,

Cosmos 597 was a lign ed a cross

borh barrlefronrs.

On 9 October Cosmos.596 .was recovered after returning to earm. By

~ h e n , however, rheground SlruarlOn hadrurnedin favour of rhe Israelis. Syr

Ian efforrs in rhe norm had ground toa hairafrera furious barrie andGen

Ariel Sharon's forces i.n rile sourll had successfullyarracked me Egyprians

and reraken a second-llIlefortificarion rharhad fallen rileday before.

Cosmos598 was launched on 10 October to improve surveillance of

~ h warzone. Pirchedslighrlyhigherrhan rheprecedingCosmos sarellires

Ir w.as already in orbir when 597 returned irs film casserres to earth. T h Sovlers were.alsoreceivingreal-rime imageryfrom 598 viarhe Yevpatoriyarraclangsranon in rheCrimea.

In response to rheSovier reconnais

sance effor r, rile US go ver nmen r

deci ded to sr ep u p irs inrelligence

garhering operarion. Having proven

irs worm in Vietnam, rhe Lockheed

SR-71A of rhe 9rh Srraregic Recon

naissanceWing (SRW) offered rhe besr

quick reacrion, hor-sporreconnaissance

capability. Plans were duly drafted to

fly missions from rhe aircraft's home

ar Beale AFB, in California, to Egypr,

a fter which rhe jer would recover a r

RAPMildenhall, in Suffolk. This long

range concepr had been validared two

years before when Lr Cols Tom Esres

andDewainVickcomplereda gruelling15,000-mile proving flighr.

Commander in Chief Srraregic Air

Command (CINCSAC, pronounced

'sink-sac'), Gen john Meyer, ordered

rhe CO of rhe 9rh SRW , Col Par

Halloran, topreparefor rhesemissions.

The larrer immediarely realised rhar

his unir's performance when carrying

our rhis tasking would am·acr wide

ranging arrenrion from wirhin borh

US milirary and governmenr circles.

SR-71A64-17955was used

extensively by Air Force Systems

Command (AFSC) and lockheed for

test and developmentprogrammes

throughout the aircraft'sfrontl ine

career. I t was opera t ing from Gri ff i ss

AFB on A-2 DEF evaluation fl ights,

code named BlackKnight, when the

9th SRW wastaskedwith overflying

the YomKippurWar batt le fronts in

October 1973. The wing used the

AFSC operation as coverfor i ts

secretfl ights over the Middle

East. lockheed ' tech reps' and

USAF personnel supporting 64

17955 were also ca lledon by the

9th SRW when it came t imeto

prepare its two f ron tl inea i rcraft fo r

Giant Reach/BusyPilot missions.

Note the famous lockheed 'Skunk

Works' motif on theta i l of 64-17955

(Lockheed)

TheSix Day War in early June 1967 had seenArab armed forces

humiliared by rheIsraelis. Sixyears on, PresidenrAnwar al-Sadar

of Egypr had dec ided rhar anorher confl ic r wirh Israe l was

necessaryborh to re-esrablishhis narion'sclaimson formerEgyprian land

easr of rheSuez Canal and to restoreArab pridein rhe region. Presidenr

Hafez ai-Assad of Syria had agreed wirh rhe Egyprians to mounr a

simulraneous arrack on rhe jewish srare from rhenorth, and ar 1400 hrs

on 6 October 1973 (Yom Kippur Day - rhe jewish Day ofAtonemenr),

Egyprian and Syrian forces began rhe coordinared arrack wirhan hourlong barragefrom 2000 artillerypieces positioned alongIsrael's wesrern

border. Some 240 Egyprian aircrafr also hir rhree Israeli airfields and

orher importanr rargers in rheSinai.

The aggressor s we re s oon advan cing a long a l30 -mil e f ron r,

employing five infanrry divisions rhar were in turn supported by mree

mechanised and two armoured divisions.As Israelisoldiers prayed in rheir

bunkersin celebrarion ofYomKippur, rheEgyprianwarmachinerumbled

over ren ponroon bridges rhar had been rhrown across me Suez Canal,

stormed me supposedlyimpregnable'Bar-LevLine' and esrablished bridge

headson rheEasr Bank.To rhenorrh,rheSyrianphase of rhearrackopened

wirh anorher massive 30-minure artillery bombardment. This barrage

preagedme advance of threeinfanrry divisionsan d two armoured divisions,

and was rimed to coincidewirhan independenrarrack,mounred bySyrian

helicoprer-borne commandos, on rhe viral Israeli observation posr ar

Mounr Hermon, in theGolan Heighrs.

Poor inrelligence, togerher with rhe speed and ferocity of rhe Arab

arrack, caughr me Israe lis off guard . Troops were mobil ised from

synagogues and radio srarions brokerheir rradirional silenceduring Yom

Kippur to broadcasr insrrucrions to rhe

rhrearened popularion. Mosr Wesrern

inrelligence agencies were also surprised

by rhejoinr arrack. However, mreedays

prior to rhe onslaughr, me Soviets had

launched rhe camera-equipped sarellire

cosmos 596 from Plesersk, in southwesr

ernUSSR,which allowedrhem towarch

rhe barrie on behalfof rheirArab allies.

The Israelis regrouped wirhin twO

days and a rrac ked rhe pontoon

bridges over rhe Suez Canal . In rhe

north, however, rhe Syrians conrinued

rhe ir p us h toward rhe R ive r Jordan

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SR-71 pilot and CO of t he 9th SRW,

Col PatHalloran headed thewing's

detach mentat Griffiss AFB

(TomPughl

The 9th SRW despatched SR-71As

64-17979 and 64-17964 to Griffiss

AFB to conduct Giant Reach/Busy

Pilot f l igh ts.They are seen here

together within a hangar at the

New York base, wi t h t he t a il o f

T-38 'Toxon 01' just in shot to the

right. The latter served as 64

17955'schase aeroplane during

the Black NightA- 2DEF trials

(TomPughl

Indeed, Halloran felr rhar rhe furure of his wing, and rhe enr ir e Senior

Crown programme (rhe SR-71 programme'sclassifiedUSAF codename),

hinged on rhesuccessful execurion of rhismission.

Due co irs imporrance, Halloran asked rhe new Fifreenrh Air Force

commander, Lr Gen Bill Pins, for permissionco 'run rheshow' himself.

Having received rhe approval of rhe larrer, Halloran pur cogerher

a mainrenance recovery ream and headed co Mildenhall from Beale on a

ranker. He would larerrecall;

'I was scheduled co go srraighr co London co brief seniorMinisrry of

Defence (MoD) officials on rheplan, bur upon my arrival ar Mildenhall

I wasinformed rhar rheBrirish governmenrhadhad secondrhoughrs and

was denying us aurhoriry co operare from rhe UK. I was rhen cold rhar

Griffiss AFB, in New York s ra re , would be our operaring locarion.

Wirhour resr, we rurned rhe ranker around and rhe full complemenr of

planners and mainrenancepersonnel were reloadedfor aquick rerurn rrip

co rheUS. Undoubredly, rhar wasrhe shonesr overseas TOY (remporary

dury) in rhehiscoryof rhe 9rhSRW!'

Ir larer became clear rhar rhe Conservarivegovernmenr,underPrime

Minisrer EdwardHearh, had denied rhe USAF rhe use ofMildenhall as a

sop co rhe Arabs in rhe bel i ef rhar rhi s would guaranree conrinued oil

supplies co rhe UK. Thi s move singularly failed, however, and larer

produced hearedexchanges becween Europeand rheUS governmene.

Fonunarely for rhe 9 rh SRW, Lockheed's Palmdale-based flighr

resr SR-7IA 64-17955 had a lr ea dy been s ch edul ed co conducr

evaluarion flighrs wirh irs newA-2 DefensiveElecrronic Sysrems(DEF)

from Griffiss AFB from mid-Occober onwards. By srarioning Beale's

derachmenr rherear rhe same rime, Halloran could draw on addirional

suppon from Lockheed's rechnical field suppon personnel and have a

convenienrcoverscory for rheir secreroperarions inro rheMiddle Ease.

As rhe 9rh SRWs newoperaring locarion was firmed up, and higher

headquarrers approved rhe overall rransadanric plan, crews began serious

fl ig hr p la nn ing for rh e firsr mis si on . Lr Col Jim Shelcon and Maj

Gary Coleman gor a irborne f rom Beale in 64-17979 ar 2200 hrs on

II Occober and headed for Griffiss. They were mer by an ang ry base

commanderand rhree Lockheed rech reps afrerlaying 'a heavy lare-nighr

sonic boom r rack ' across me US and down inro New York srare as

mey made rhe ir descenr f rom a1r irude. A phone call fr om Lr Col

Shelcon co Majs AI Joersz and John Fuller (whowould fly a second SR-71

inro Griffiss) advised rhem co make rheirdescenr profi le over rhe Grear

Lakes so as co minimise rheeffecrsof rheboom on rhe urban easrernsrares.

Forrunarely, rhere were no boom complainrs when rhesecond crew made

rheircrossing. The nexr day's newspapers reponeda srrange phenomenon

mar wasdescribed by one scienrisras a probable'mereoricshockwave'.

The second aircrafr, 64-17964, developed a hydraul i c problem in

flighr rhar forced an engine-change upon i rs arrival ar Griffiss, rhus

leaving rhe new derachmenrdown co one mission-readyaeroplaneunril

specialised equipmenr could be f lown i n f rom Bea le . An hour afrer

64-17964 had l anded, rhe f ir sr r anker f lew in car ry ing Tom Esres

(9rh SRW operarions officer), rhree mission planners and Beale's

besr inrelligence and mainrenance personnel. Ar 0600 h rs a s ecur e

rele-prinrer clarreredour derails of rhe firsr sonie. Ie was co beflown jusr

22 hours larer.

The firsr majorproblemco arisewhen rheaircrewmer wirh rhe mission

planners cenrred on rhe pauciry of diversionary fields available co rhe

SR-7!. Larer rhar morning, rhe Mildenhall ranker reached Griffiss, and

rhe unir 's rechnicians began preparing 64-17979 for rhe jer 's longesr

operarional sorrie co dare. By mid-afrernoon someone suggesred rhar rhecrewshould ger some sleep since rheyhad been up for 36 hours, and rhey

would soon beairborneforanorher16 hoursduring rhesorrie irself. They

were direcred co an old Base Officers ' Quarrers, where rhey found rheir

rooms co be hor and rhe beds uncomforrable. Gary Coleman recalled,

'No onecould snore likeJim Shelcon, and Igor nosleep arall, bur1con

soled myselfwirh rherhoughrmar my pilor wasgerringsomesolidresr!'

The belligerenr arrirude of usually helpful European allies required

JP-7 fuel and rankercrews co be hasrily re-posirioned from Mildenhall

and IncirIik, in Turkey, co Zaragoza, in Spain. The lack of emergency

landingsireswasalsoprovingco bea problem rharappeared impossibleco

solve. Neverrheless,Jim Shelcon cranked 64-17979's engines on cue and

cook off from Griffiss ar0200 hrs on 13Occoberon rhe firsr of nine Giant

Reach/BusyPilotmissions. He successfullycomplered rhe firsrof sixaerial

refuellings (cwo rankers in each air refuell ing rrack) off rhe Gulf of

Sr Lawrence ('Old Barge Easr'). Having copped-off, 64-]7979 rhen

acceleraredand climbedeasr, en roure forrhe nexrcellof rankers awairing

rhe rhirsry 'Habu'off rhe coasrofPorrugal ('Rora Easr').

'Habu' was me name given co rhe SR-71 by irs crews, rhis moniker

having originared when rhe jer firsr deployedoperarionallyco Kadena air

base, on rheJapanese island of Okinawa. The Habu is a long, dark and

poisonouspir viper indigenous co rhe island.

Rerurning again co speed and alrirude, rhe crewmade a high-Mach

dash rhrough rhe Srrairs of Gibralrar and ler down for a rhi rd aer ia l

refuelling sourh of Crere ( 'Crere Easr ') . Due co rhe ranker rrack's

proximiry co rhe war zone and Libya , rh e US Navy p rovi ded a CAP

(Combar Air Parrol) from carrier-based Phanrom IIs on srarion in rhe

Medirerranean. 64-17979 rhen resumed irs climb and accelerarion co

coasr in over Porr Said. GaryColeman recalled;

'There was no indicarion of anyrhinglaunched againsr us, bur every

one was painringus on rheir radars as we made our rurn inbound. The

DEF panellir up l ike a pinball machine, and I said co Jim, "Thisshould

be inreresring".'9

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l ined-up ready for a n e a r l y morning

take-off, 64-17979 completed the

first non-stop mission from Griffiss

t o t h e M i dd l e Ea st a n d b a ck on

13 October 1973. This aircraft

completed nofewer th a n si x

o f t h e nine SR-71 endurance

sorties undertakenduring Giant

Reach/Busy Pilot (PaulF Crickmore)

WAR CONTINUES

The Syrian military situation was swinging in favour of the Istaelis by

14 Ocrober. The Sovietshad stepped up an airlift of military equipment

and were aware that theSytianfronrwascollapsing. Washingron hadalso

begunsupporting Israelwith a hugeairlift ofUS warmaterials. President

Richard Nixon had requested $2.2 bil lion in emergency aid for the

Israelis, and this movehad in turn incensedAbu Dhabi, Libyaand Qatar,

who, as members of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting

Countries (OPEC), had been meeting with oil companies in Vienna

since 12Ocrober. They immediately imposed a complete oilembargoon

the US, and this movewas quickly followed byother OPEC members.

To fur ther warn other nat ions against suppor ting Israel, OPEC

unilaterallyannounced a 70 percenr rise in oilpricesand a five percenrper

monrh cur in production. The decision caused panic in Western Europe,

which depended on theArabstatesfor 80 percent of itsoil supply.

Meanwhile, in theSinai desertthe Egyptianslaunched a 100,000strong

offensive toward theeaston 14Ocrober- theresultof thisattackwas one of

the biggesttank battles in hisrory. As Istaeli fotces tepelled the offensive and

gained ground, they established a bridgehead west of the Suez Canal

that threatened ro cut offthe Egyptian army. With the Egyptian military

situation becomingmote and moreprecarious, PresidenrNixon announced

thatUS forces across theglobe had been placedon military alert following

receipt of infotmation indicating that the Soviet Union was planning 'ro

senda very subsranrial fotce ro theMiddle East ro relieve the beleaguered

Egyptian ThirdArmy, now completelyencitcled in theSinai'.

This tense period in superpowet

relations was somewhat defused

when Soviet SecretaryLeonid Brezh

nev support ed a Uni ted Nat ions

mot ion on 24 Ocrober that would

evenrually end theYomKippurWar.

Meanwhi le , SR-71 surveil lance

missionscontinued.

At0200hrs on 25 Ocrober, Capt

Al Joersz and Maj John Fuller got

airborne from Griffiss in 64-17979

and overflew the Yom Kippur wat

zone for a second t ime. However ,

due ro pro te st at ions f rom the

Spanish government, the second

and fifthaerial refuelling ttackswere

re-positioned off the coast of the

Azores (and thus out of range of

Spanish radars) and renamed 'Lajes

East and 'LajesWest.

Concerned that the USSR might

deploy personnel and equipmenr in

suppOrt of their Arab allies, the US

inrelligence community tasked this

SR-71 mi ss ion w it h the p ri ot it y

In all 64-17979spent 25 minutes

over 'denied ter ri rory ', enrer ing

Egyptianairspace at 1103hrs GMT.

Duting this time the crew covered

the Israeli battlefronts with both

Egypt and Syria, before coasting

out and lerring down for their fourth

aetial refuelling ('Crete West), the

trackforwhich wasstill beingcapped

by t he US Navy . The crew's next

'hot l eg ' was punctuated by a f if th

refuelling again off Portugal ('Rota

West'), but the tankets from

Zaragoza had dif ficulty get ting a

clearance through the busy offshote

airway that was filled with civilian airliners - they could not request a

priority c1eatance because of the secrecy of their mission. When approval

was at last received, theair traffic controllers hesitated clearing the tanker

cell on their requested trackbecause'unidentified high speedtraffic, height

unknown', was approachingfrom their '12 o'clock' position.The tankets

could not revealthat the'ttaffic'wasactuallytheir ttade.

Soon after completing his mid-ocean refuelling, Shelton climbed and

accelerated in 64-17979 for his final high-speed run across the western

Atlantic rowards New York. Mindful of his own fatigue, Gary Coleman

was in awe of his pilot, who completed a textbook sixth aetial refuelling

('Old Barge West'), befote 'greasing' the SR-71 backdown at Griffiss

after a combat sortiethathad lasted 10hoursand 18 minures (morethan

five hours of which was spenr at Mach 3 or above). 64-17979 had been

support ed i n its endeavour s by no f ewer t han 14 eve r- dependab le

KC-135Qs - four f rom Goose Bay, in Canada, two from Gri ff iss and

eightfrom Torrejon,in Spain.

The crew's reconnaissance 'take' wasof'high quality', and it provided

intelligence and defence analysts with much needed infotmation

concerningthe disposition ofArab forces (andSovietequipment) in the

region,which was in turn made available ro the Istaelis.

The fourth operational sortie f lown

by the 9 th SRWd u ri n g the Yom

Ki p pu rWa r was completed by this

aircraft, SR-71A 64-17964. The jet

susbequently f lewi ts second, and

fi n al , mi ss io n o ve r the Middle East

battlefields on 2 December 1973

(paul F Crickmore)

Th e Su n mo ves a cro ss the face of

the e a rth a t about 1 0 00 mp h .So i f,

during a west bound f l ightat Mach

3.2, an SR-71 wasturned to the

n o r th o r south, causing the sun toset, it co u ld b e ma d e to reappear

again - thus rising in t h e w e s t

once t h e c r e w resumed their

westbound heading! (lockheed)



13

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ColPat Ha l lo ran hada lso init ially

led the9th SRW detwhen it moved

from Griffiss to Seymour Johnson

in early November 1973. He i s seen

hereposing with his t roops for an

official detachmentphotograph

soonafte rarr iv ing at t he Nort h

Carolina base (USAf)

ColDon Walbrecht( fron t, third

from left) headed-up the SR-71

detachment that f lew sorties into

the Middle East from Seymour

Johnson AFB, North Carolina.

The three crews in the second

row consist of Capt BruceDouglass

(RSO), Maj Jim Wilson (p i lo t) ,Capt

AI Joersz(p i lo t), Ma j John Fuller

(RSO), Maj RandyHertzog (pilot)

andMaj John Carnochan (RSO)

(USAF via Don Walbrecht)

separat ion agreement was s igned

betweenEgyptian and Israeli defence

officials t ha t led to t ro op w it h

drawals. By mid-February the peace

process was beg inning to go into

overdrive, andon the 18th fourArab

na ti on s pr op os ed a t ruce in t he

Golan Heights. To verify the pull

back, 64-17971 was dispa tched to

theSuezCanalon 25january.

The re h ad been a g re at deal of

suspi ci on o n b ot h sides t ha t t he

op pos in g forces woul d n ot pull

back their troops. Consequently, the

SR-71 's imagetybecamethe instrument ofverification, and thiswas shown

at tilepeacenegotiations as proof.With theevidence in hand, diplomatic ties

were restored between Egypt and the USaftera break lastingseven years.

As troop withdrawals continued Maj s T Y judkins and G T Morga n

flew 64-17979 on the penultimate sortie to the region. Appropriately,

thisevergreen aircraft also flew the final mission on 6 April 1974. It had

undertaken two-thirds of thenine 'ten-hour' GiantReach/Busy PiLotsor-

ties, chalking up a remarkable rate of success despite the very demanding

nature of the missions.

Indeed, the 9th SRW as a wholehad managed to perform all the tasks

demanded of it without its highly complex aircraft suffering ground or

air aborts or diversions. These nine missions represented a pinnacle of

operational professionalism for the wing. Theywere a tribute not onlyto

the dedication of the aircrews involved, but a lso to that of the s taff

planners and thesmall group of ground technicians who maintained the

SR-71s away from home. These sorties stood as a t es tame nt t o t he

long reach of the a ircraft , and its abili ty to operate with impunity in a

sophisticated, high threatenvironment.

objective of monitoring port facilities at Latakia and Tartus, in Syria, and

PortSaidand Alexandria,in Egypt.

A th ird mission was cha lked up bythe samea ircraft e igh t days later

when, on 2 November, Majs Bob Helt and Larry Elliott secured more

photography of the ports for national intelligence users. The crew also

targeted Cairo International airport and the nearby Tura cave facilities,

which it was believed might contain Soviet'Scud-B' mobilesurface-to

surface ballistic missiles and theirlaunchers.

Maj jim Wilson andRSO Capt Bruce Douglass performed their first

Mediterranean sortie in 64-17964 on 11 November, the 10 hou r 49

minute flight departing from Griffiss but terminating as planned a t

Seymour johnson AFB, in North Carolina. The 9th SRW detachment

had migrated to the south so as to avoid theworseningNew Yorkwinter

weather. Col Don Walbrecht headed up the new detachment that had

been pre-arrangedwith HQ Tactical AirCommand byCol Harlan Hain

from the SACStrategic ReconnaissanceCenter (SRC).

With theshooting war in theMi ddleEast nowover, SR-71reconnaissance

flights were used to verifY compliance with the ceasefire agreement, and

provide irrefutablephotographic evidence of thisto Secretaryof State Henry

Kissinger and his team,who wereleading the delicately balanced withdrawal

negotiationsbetween deeply distrusting Israelisand Arabs.

Fierce fighting broke out along the ceasefire line o n 3 0 November,

and this threatened to destroy the fragile agreement brokered by the US

government. Two days later, Majs jim Sullivan and NoelWiddifield flew

64-17964 across the A tl an ti c to look a t the s it ua tion on the g round.

It provedto bea well-timedmove as fighting had also begun thatsame day

in the Golan Heights. Furtherdiplomatic pressures put an end to the new

ski rm is he s b efore Maj s Pat B le dso e and Reg B lackwe ll wen t our in

64-17979 on 10 Dec embe r for a no th er look a t the

positions held by the belligerents. They flew their

' clockwork' ten-hour mission and arrived back at

Seymour johnson 'on theminute' of their flight plan.

Thereafter, thingswere quiet for the next five weeks,

so the 'BealeTroops' wenthome for Christmas. They

returned to North Carolina in january to continue

with their Sinaisurveillanceactivities,however.

On 25 j an ua ry , Majs B uc k Adams a nd Bill

Machorek flew anotller perfect ten-hour sortie, but

when they returned to Seymour johnson they were

faced withvery low ceilingand visibilitycondition that

'mandated' adiversion toGriffiss. Thiswould have put

theurgentlyneeded photographic'take' out of position

for processing. ColWalbrecht remembered;

'W e had Buckgrab some fue l from the standby

tanker and jacked the ceiling up a bit - d es pi te the

protestationsofHarlon lai n at A headqua rt er s.

Buck snuck in and made a perfect l andi ng a t

Seymour johnson undcr th lowe t ceiling an

SR-71 has e ve r l a nd cd b n alh.'

The success f intcrna li nal p a c efforts soon

beg an to s how. 11 18 J anua ry 1974 a mil it ary

On 2 December 1973, Maj Jim

Sullivan, with his RSO Maj Noel

Widdifield, f lew 64-17964 across

the At lant ic to look at the si tuat ion

on the ground inthe Middle East. It

proved to be a well-timed flight, as

f ighting had also begun that same

day i n t he Golan Heights between

Syrianand Israeli troops (USAF)



GIANTREACH

15

Majs Jim Sullivan (left) and RSO

Noel Widdifield (right) were the

crewof 64-17972 on 1 September

1974 - the day thef i rst SR-71landedon Br i t ish so il (USAF)

CaptHaro ldAdamsand MajWi l l iam

Machorek were scheduled to fly

64-17972 back to BealeAFB on

12 September 1974, bu t a

technical malfunction with

the aircraft delayed their

departure from Mildenhall

by one day (BobArcher)

With all systems 'codeone', Adams

andMachorek depart Mildenhall on

13 September.They established the

current world speed record between

London andLos Ange les of 3 hours

47 minutes and 35 secondsduring

the return f light to Beale (USAF via

Art-Tech/Aerospace)

governmem refusing ro allow me 9m

SRW ro operare from RAF bases ar

me rime, irwas nor umil1 Seprember

1974 mar rhe fi rsr 'Habu' visired

Brirain. On rhar hisroric dare, Majs

J im Sullivan and Noel Widdifie ld ,

in SR-71A 64-17972, esrablished a

rransadamicworld speedrecord from

NewYork ro Londonoflessrhan rwo

hours - a record rhar sril l s rands ro

misday. Fourdays larer, Capr 'Buck'

Adams and Maj Bill Machorek

also ser a record during rhe aircraft's

rerurn rrip ro LosAngeles ofless rhan

four hours.

To underline rhe partne rsh ip

srarus of any furure SR-71 deploymenrs ro rhe UK, Secrerary of Srare

Henry Kissinger insrrucredMrs AnneArmsrrong, rheUS Ambassador ro

Brirain, ro inform Her Majes ry 's Governmenr rhar rhe US 'would of

course be prepared ro share wirh rhe Brirish informarion produced by

suchSR-71 missions'.

Derailedroure planning forany fueureSR-71 deploymems ro rhe UK

was conducred byrheSRC. Iewouldsend derailsof rhreeproposed rracks

ro rhe98rh SrraregicWing (SW) arTorrejon, as rhis unir was responsible

fordirecringSAC operarions fromMildenhall. Derachmenr 1 of rhe98rh

SW, s ra rion ed ar rhe UK base, rhen coordinared all necessary prior

acrions, norificarions and clearanceswirh rheappropriare Bririshofficials.

On 20 April 1976, rwo KC-135Qs and rhesame SR-71 (64-17972)

rhar had esrab lished rhe rransadamic speed records a lmosr rwo years

On 1 September 1974, SR-71

64·17972 established a new

transatlantic world speed

record from London to New

York of j us t 1 hour 54 minutes

and 56 seconds - it stands to

this day.Having completed the

speedrun, t hecrew recovered

into Farnborough, where t he je t

wasthe star at t ract ion at that

year's airshow (BobArcher)

Operarion Giant Reachwas rra regicAirCommand's codename

for Europ e-ba se d con ring en cy p la nn ing for SR-71 Pho ro

Inrelligence (PHOTINT) and ElecrronicImelligence (ELINT)

reconnaissancegarheringmissions. SAC'soriginal plan had been ro splir

rhis coverage and conducr borh PHOTINT and ELINT of rhe Middle

Easr and purely ELINT of Easrern Europe. Ie was rhoughr rhar rhe

PHOTINT mission would be vireually impossible ro conducr on a

regular basis in rhelaner region because of rhe rradirionally poorwearher

condirions rharorren blighred nonhern larirudes.

In o rd er ro validare mese conringency plans, which were inirially

publishedby HQSAC on6 April 1970, five KC-135Qswould firscly have

ro be deployed ro Incirlik air base. Once rhey were in p lace , an SR-71 ,

rogemer wirh rhree more KC-135Qs carry ing bom fuel and supporrpersonnel, would beassigned ro Torrejonon a30-dayTDY basis. However,

rheSpanish governmenr prohibired oven reconnaissance flighrsoriginaring

from or recoveringinro bases in rheir coumry. Consequendy, mar elemenr

of me proposal was a1rered so mar rhe SR-71 would be based ar RAF

Mildenhall insread.

During rheearly planning phase of Giant Reach ir was rhoughr rhar

rhe SR-71 would conducr berween six and eighr sonies during each

deploymenr, and rhe phoro-producrgenerared by rhe aircrafr would be

processed by rhe 497rh Reconnaissance Technical Group (RTG) ar

Shiersrein, in Wesr Germany. ELINT and High Resolurion Radar

(HRR) 'rake' would be ferried back ro Beale a nd ana ly se d by rhe

9rh Reconnaissance Technical Squadron (RTS). The addirional funds

required ro supporrsuch operarionswere nor iniriallyavailable, however.

Despire rhis, HQ USAF direcred SACro spend a modesr $50,000 from

irs Operarion and Mainrenance budger on a1rerarions ro rhe apron

adjacenr ro Hanger 538ar Mildenhall as a precaurionarymeasureshould

rheJoinr Chiefs of Sraff OCS) direcr rhar such sonies should go ahead.

Thisconsuucrionworkwas complered in 1971.

As nored in rhe previous chaprer, rhe firsr operarional requiremenr

generared for a series of European-based SR-71 sonies occurred on

6 Ocrober 1973 wirh rhe ourbreak ofmeYom KippurWar. Wim me UK



ear lier returned to the UK, but t hi s t ime t he t ri p was madc without

the attendant media coverage that had accompanied its prcvious brief

visit . Using thecall sign 'Burns 31', Majs 'Pat' Bledsoeand John Fuller

completed theflight from Beale toMildenhall in4 hoursand 42 minutes.

The key objective of this deployment was for the aircraft to complete

twO training sorties, the first of which was to be f lown over both the

North Sea and t he Norwegian Sea, and the second over the Engli sh

Channel and the Bay of Biscay. These flights would both exercise the

aircraft's base support facilities and help to shape the SR-71's f light

profile and operating procedures that would need to be adopted when

flying i n t he c ramped and congested airspace of Northern Europe.

Such missions would then pave the wayfor future SR-71 participation

in NATO training exercises, the first of which was scheduled for later

that sameyear.

Three days after the aircraft's arrival, the first evaluation sortie got

undelway when Capts MauryRosenberg and Don Bulloch engaged both

'burners and depatted the base. However, as they cruised along the west

coast of Norway at an alt itude of 72,000 ft, Bulloch noticed that the

outsideair temperaturewas 30°C warmer than had been anticipated.After

quickly re-calculating the aircraft's performance values in this sub-Arctic

environment by cross-correlating exhaust gas temperatute (EGT) against

engine airinletdoor position, and interpolatingthe aircraft's trueairspeed

from the astro-inertial navigation system, the crew were alarmed to learn

thattheir computed fuelspecifics were way offthe mark.

In fact theiractual fuel burn was so much higherthan that calculated

by the nav-planners back at Mildenhall that 64-17972 was going to be

8000 lbslighter onJP-7 than hadbeenscheduled bythe time itarrived at

its air refuelling control point (ARCP). This in turn meant that the jet

would barely beable to reach the two KC-135Qs. The crew prudenrly

decided to abort themission and returnto Mildenhallinstead.

The second, and final, southerly-orientated training sortie was

completedby Bledsoeand Fulleron 28 April,and rwo days later, using the

call sign 'Kabab31', Rosenbergand Bulloch returned64-17972 ro Beale.

EXERCISES

Five months later, two large NATO exercises commenced in Western

Europe. Cold Fire 76 was a l and and a ir ope ra ti on t han ran f rom 7 ro

10 Septemberin West Germany, whilst Teamwork 76 involved land, sea

and air assets exercising in the North and NOlwegian Seas from 10 ro

23 September. HQ European COlllmand was keen that the SR-71 should

participate in both exercises, pointing out that not onlywould this provideinvaluable training and logistical experience for the 9th SRW, but that it

would also demonstrate 'positiveUS resolve in supportof NATO'.

Such participation would of course requireauthorisation from several

command authorities, as well as the UKMoD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

OCS), United Sta te sA ir For ce s u rope (U AFE) and NATO member

nations. Luckily, negotiations ro obtain prior approval for theSR-71 to

overfly NATO countriesand enter thcirairspacehad alreadybegun.As it

turned out, the processwas far from straightrorward, and it rookseveral

months to complete- Denmark rook ilrighl 1 the wire, beingthe final

country to grant its approval inearly eplcmbcr.

The deployment of aircraft

64-17962 beg an on 2 Sep tember

1976, but Majs AI Cirino and Bruce

Liebman (RSO) had ro divert into

Goose Bay air base, in Labrador, en

r ou te when t he jet suffered engine

trouble overthe central UnitedStates.

An emergencymaintenanceteam was

hastily despatched from Beale and the

flightto Mildenhallwascompletedby

Cirino and Liebman four days later.

Majs Rich Grahamand Don Emmons

flew the aircraf t the fol lowing day

in suppOrt of Teamwork 76, the crew

incorporating lessons learned from the

previous deployment in April. They

successfully completed their mission

over the North and Norwegian Seas,

bef or e r ecover ing safely back to

'The Hall ' . Cirino and Liebman then

flew a sor tie inro West Germany in support of Cold Fire 76, which

64-17962 completed satisfactorily.

Six missions were undertaken in roral, and HRR imagery, standard

phoros and ELINT were collected from theexerciseareas beforeGraham

and Emmons flew the aircrafthome aftera European rourlasting 19days.

Prior tothe next 'Habu' deployment ro the UK taking place,a change

in SAC's European report ing structure rook place fol lowing Senate

ratification of a newtreary with theSpanishgovernment inJanuary 1976.

The agreement stipulated a reduced American military presence in the

country,whichin turnmeant deactivationof the 98th SW on 31 Decem

ber1976. Command of SAC assets based in Europewasduly transferred

ro the 306th SW, which had been act ivated four months earlier and

co-locatedwith HQ USAFE at Ramsteinair base, in West Germany.

Gen Richard Ellis, Commander in Chief USAFE, and Cl NCSAC,

Gen Russell Dougherty (whom Gen Ellis would succeed as the SAC

commander on 1 August 1977), had had extensive discussions in the

months leading up to this command re-structure, and had formulated a

plan thatwould havea profound impact on thebuild up of SACassets in

Europe. It had been decided that the 306 th SW commander would

repor t directly to CINCSAC

a nd his staff, an d t hat he had

'delegated authority' to exercise the

CrNCSAC's command responsibil

ities for allpresent and future SAC

European operations. The larrer

i nc luded t he European Tanker

Force, the RC-135s that were TDY

with the306th SW'sdetachments at

Mildenhall and Hellenikon airbase,

in Greece, and any future B-52 or

U-2R/ SR-71 deployments.

A numbero f t he crews that f lew

the early SR-71 missions from

Mildenhall in t he la t te rha l f o f

the 1970s arevis ible in thisphoto,

takenafte r Lt Col JackRogers had

made his last f light in the 'Habu'.

From t he t op rowdown, f rom le ft

to right, are JohnMurphy,Joe Vida,

DonEmmons,AI Ci r ino ,Tom

Allison, John Fuller,Rich Graham

(on his own), 'Buzz' Carpenter, Bil l

Groninger and BruceLeibman.

Standingat lef t areBil l Keller,

ChuckSober, Joe Kinego (in

pressure suit to le f t) andRoger

Jacks. In the bot tom row are

Jim Sullivan, Jay Reid andTom

Keck. Standing to the right are

B C Thomas, Pat Bledsloe and

John Storrie (USAF)

64-17972 againvisited the UK

for a ten-day TDYon 20 April

1976 (Paul F Crickmore)

17



64-17962 f irst deployed to

Mildenhallbetween 6-18

September 1976. It is seenhere during i ts second, and

final, deployment, which saw

theaircraf tassigned to Det 4

from 19 October 1984 through

to mid-October1985. The SR-71

is f lankedby tw o RAF Jaguars

from RAF Coltishall-based No 41Sqn (Crown Copyright)

The desire to increase SAC's presence in Europe had i ts roots in the

changing nature of the Soviet/Warsaw Pacr threat facing NATO. Gen

Ellis wanted B-52s to deploy periodicallyto England, togetherwith their

support tankers, inorderto trainsucha force toa level thatwas capable of

performing awartime tactical mission. This, he envisaged, wouldconsist

of interdiction both in the vicinity of the bartle area and beyond its

forward edge, airfield attack, defence suppression, sea surveillance and

anti-shipping. It followed, therefore, that ifB-52sweretaskedto perform

amissionsimilarin natureto thatwhich rhey had flown foreightyears in

SoutheastAsia,the U-2R and SR-71 would again be required to provide

complementatypre-strikeand bomb damage assessmenr (BDA) imagery,

in addition to Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) warninginformarion.

An additional issue of par ticular concern to Gen Ell is was the

unprecedented level of sophistication thataccompanied the twice-yearly

Soviet/Warsaw Pact exercises that had began on 31 December 1976.

Specifically he noted, 'O f particular interest to us ar SAC is their

coordinated and extensive use of airborne command posts as alrernate

command centres, and their ability to control forces when required,

par ticularly during/af ter a global nuclear exchange' . On balance,

therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that as far as Gen Ellis was

concerned, it was 'most desirous' that the SR-71 andU-2R deploy to

RAF Mildenhall to monitor these exercises.

The third SR-71 training deployment to the UK was completed by

64-17958, which arrived as 'Ring 21' on 7January 1977again with Maj

Rich Graham at th e he lm a nd Maj Don Emmons 'in t he back' . I n

support, twoKC-135Qs flewin 65 maintenance,operations and logistics

specialists, together with 80,000 Ibs of equipment. 9th SRW CO Col

John Storrie also accompanied the deployment in o rder t o i nspect

Mildenhall's support facilities for himself.

This ten-daydeployment was timed tocoincidewith theapproximate

date of President Jimmy Carter's inauguration, and it would thereby

underline the United States' continued support of itsNATO allies.

Two trainingsorties wereagain £lown bythe R-71, covering thesame

areas as theApril1976 deployment. MajsT m Allison andJ T Vida(RSO)

madeup thesecondcrewon thisdet, and they repositioned theaircraftback

to Beale as 'Paver86' on 17Januaty.

InlateFebruary1977,HQ SACproposedto theJCSthat itseekapproval

forthe SR-71'sfirsteveroperationaldeployment toEurope. It was proposed

that the 17-day tour should consist of one rraining sortie, similar to the

twocompleted in JanuaIY 1977, and two PeacetimeAerial Reconnaissance

Programme (PARPRO) missions. The first of thesewouldbe acoordinated

sortiewith a Mildenhall-based RC-135Valong the Barents Sea periphery,

whi le the second mission would be f lown over West Germany. SAC

requested that both of thePARPRO missionsbe approvedto collectELINT

and HRR imagery,since theywere particularlyaI1Xious to demonsrratethe

unique characteristics of the latter to other potential national inrelligence

users - specificallytheUS Army and USNavy.

Whilst the proposal navigated its way through the ]CS evaluation

process, the SRC worked on preparingthe aircraft's tracks in anticipation

of receivingan affirmative for the deployment. The]CS duly issued SAC

with the necessary authori sation to proceed on 6 May 1977. It also

instructed thatthe SR-71 was toadhereto tracks preparedearlier in theyear

bytheSRC, as these had been used by theStateDepartmenr tocoordinateand obtain the necessaryclearancesfrom the five NATO nations through

whose airspace the SR-71 would fly. The]CS alsowenron to directHQ

SACto deploya Mobile ProcessingCenter (MPC),held in storage at Beale,

toMildenhall. This lastinstructionwas issued inresponseto a requestfrom

Gen Ellis,and as such had been anticipared bySAC.

MPC

In 1977, twoMPCs existed. Inaddition tothe one alluded toby the]CS,

the other (MPC I) was in caretaker s tatus at Kadena air base. Each

MPC consistedof24 trailer-likevans that measured8 ft x 8 fr x40 ft, andcollectively they conrained all the equipmenr necessary to process raw

intelligence data collected by the SR-71's HRR and cameras. MPC I

was also equipped with an Electro-Magnetic Reconnaissance (EMR)

formatter that processed the ELINT tapes. However, at a cost of over a

million dollars each (mid-I960s values), it had been decided that only

one MPC would have thisadditional EMR capability.

TheMPC could be deployed overseas in various tailored packages or

van combinations to support differentlevelsand types of reconnaissance

operation. The complete package was designed to suppOrt one SR-71

missionper day, and requiredan operaringsraffof60officers,airmen and

civilian contractors. Depending on rhe amounr of data collected,

typicallyphotographyand HRR imagerywasavailable to the interpreters

four hours after the 'Habu' had landed. MPC 1 also afforded top-line

ELINT signals ready forfirst stage analysis in about three hours.

The entire 24-van package of MPC II, destined for Mildenhall,

weighed in at 290,000 Ibs,and was transported to theUK in two C-5s

and four C-141s. Transportation costs were picked-up by USAFE, but

manpower and paymenrfor expendablesuppliescame from SACmonies

already allocated. On arrival in the UK, MPC I I was located ins ide a

secure compound within Hangar 538 at thebase,and atgreatcredit to all

involved, the facil ity was operational when 'Indy 69' (64-17958)

touched-down at Mildenhall on 16 May 1977. Majs 'Buzz' Carpenter 19



21

MajsTom Al l isonand J T Vida

made history on 20 May 1977

whenthey performed thef i rst

operational missionundertaken

by a Mildenhall-based SR-71.

They f lew 64-17958 on this

occasion (USAF)

FIRST OPERATIONALMISSION

On 20 May 1977, SR-71 64-17958 made history when it undertook the

firsr operarional mission by a Mildenhall-based 'Habu'. I ts p i lo t for the

flighr was Maj Tom Allison, who recalled;

'J T Vida - my RSO - and 1arrived a t Mildenhall v ia a KC-135Q,

along with the TOY DetachmentCommander, ColWillieLawson, and

rheNav/Planner, LrCol Red Winters.This particular mission was tasked

ar theTop Secrer level using HRR imagery and ELINT sensors against

rheSoviet submarine base at Murmansk, on the Barents Sea. It was also

scheduled as acoordinated mission wirh an RC-135V "RivetJoint".

'It was a lir tle unusual for a PARPRO mission to be classified Top

Secrer, but J T and I thought that this was because it was a coordinated

sortie, andone of rhe firsr togo in to the area around Murmansk. It may

also have been due to rhe facr thar rheSoviets had deployed SA-5 SAMs

around Murmansk, rhus making this mission one of the first occasions

that the SR-71 had been used in an

areawherethere wereknown SA-5s.

The larrer was a much more capable

SAM rhan rhe earlier SA-2, which

was a lso widely deployed in the

USSR, and was not considered to

poseanygreatthreatto the "Habu".

'During rhe mission planning

session on 19May, itwasdiscovered

rhat theSovietshad issued a Norice

To Airman (NOTAM) warning of

SAM resrfiring to altitudes in excess

of 100,000 ft. The coordinares

for the NOTAM area were off rhe

coasr ofMurmansk, and they nicely

bracketed theonly patch of sky that

we would fly rhrough twice during

England at subsonic speed. Proceeding south and east to Mildenhall, we

madecontact wirh our mobilecrew for recovery- Majs Tom Allison and

J T V ida - ab ou r 5 0m iles o ut . They advised us of the wea ther, and to

look for the "birdwatchers". Initially John a nd 1 we re pu zz le d by the

"birdwatchers" remark. A s ir turned out, about half-an-hour before our

arrival, a couple of hundred aircraft "birdwarchers" showed up with their

cameras and zoom lenses to photograph our arrival - aga in , so much for

rhesecrerive nature of our flightover. The "birdwatcher"net suretrumped

our securityplan.

'Arrival was uneventful, andaftera precisionapproach I choseto take

theaircraftaround for one visualapproach.I couldseethe "birdwatchers"

withrheircamerasar all the choice spots around theairfield fence - some

even waved to LIS as wetaxied to our parkinghangar!'

On 18 M ay 64-17958 satisfactorily completed the JCS-directed

rraining sortieover rhe North Sea. The aircraft was configured with the

samesensor packagerhar ir would carry aloftduring the two operational

missions, namelythe nose-mounted HRR, ELlNT sensors in thetwo afr

mission bays (bays SandT) anda full DEF system.

64-17972 visited the UKo n n o

fewer t h an s i x occasions between

September 1974and July 1983. It

is seen here in low-vis markings

during i ts final deployment to Det

4, which ran from 18 December

1982 through to 6 July 1983

(Paul F Crickmorel

and John Murphy had taken off from Beale a t0200 hrs, refuelled twice

and flown rwo hot legs during rheir four-hour flight, prior to arriving

safely at the UK basein themiddle of theafternoon.

These missions were supposedly secret, and t he re fo re h ad to b e

coordinated ahead of time through various Federal Aviation Agency(FAA) offices and regional Air Traffic Control Cen tres (ATCCs) - a

process also replicated through Canadian ATCCs. By following such

procedures,SAC hoped tosafeguard theSR-71's intendedroute and keep

the jet 's u lt ima te des t inat ion a secre t from those not dia lled in to the

mission. Maj Carpenter recalled;

'About 150 miles from Beale, out over theNevadadesert, wehooked

up with our awaiting tankers at 25,000 ft. During rherefuellingwe took

on about 60,000 Ibs of fuel and dropped off the tanker over northern

Utah, a t which point we started our climb and acceleration. Passing

through 60,000 f t, we would rou tinely call the ATCC, as we usually

turned off our electronic altitude reporting equipment at rhis point.

Salt Lake Center replied to our call with"Roger 'Indy 69 '. Have a great

timein Jolly Old England". So much for mission security!

'The cruise legwas uneventful as wepassed over the northern United

Statesandinto Canadianairspaceat Mach3.0 andabove 75,000 ft. It was

a moonlessnight, whichwhen flyingoverareasthinly populatedgave you

an opportunity toseea vastarray of twinklingstars that you don't usually

see on the ground because of their lack of intensity and filteringby the

atmosphere.

'As weapproachedthe east coast ofCanada nearGoose Bay, Labrador,

t he s un was s ta rt in g to ri se as we were descending and decelerating.

This was wonderful to view from 75,000 f t, yet i t made for a d ifficu lt

refuellings, because as youwere under the tanker ar 25,000 f t, t lying to

maintainyour position and monitor the refuelling directorlights on the

belly of the KC-135, thesun wasjust above thehorizon and right in your

eye-line. It blindedyou, even wirh your helmetsun visordown.

'With the refuelling done, we thenseparared from the tanker again and

started our climb and acceleration eastwardover the Atlantic and on into

Scotland.As wecrossed, Greenland was partlyvisible anda couple of huge

icebergswere seen slowlyfloating south. Iceland was completely shrouded

in cloud as usual, and the weather in England was going to be overcasr

and wet. Our descent and decelerationwas normal, and ir brought us over



themission - going in andcomingout.We werealwaysconc erned about

the Soviet military having inrelligence pertaining to our missions prior

to them actually being flown, and the issuing of rhis SAM NOTAM on

the eve of our first operational sorrie seemed like a highly improbable

coincidence. Maybe,somehow,word about our mission had leakedout.

'Althoughat thetimeJT andI werenot reallyaware of it, itseems that

in somequarters this possible securityleak caused quite a bit of concern.

Apparently, there were several secure telephone conference calls made

between RAF Mildenhall and theSACSRC, and the discussion centred

on whether ornot tocancel themission basedon theNOTAM.

'It should be noted that the mission t rack was planned so that the

SR-71 remained in international airspace at all times. If we stayed on

the"blackline"we wouldneverenter Sovietairspace.However, thatsaid,

the mission objective was to obtain maximum information concerning

the submarine activities and area defences in this region. At one point

during the second pass through the area the "Habu" was planned to be

heading directlyat thesubmarine base, perpendicularto the coastline, at

Mach 3.15. We would then commencea high banking turn that would

put us parallel to the coastline but headed out of the area. That pointwas

rightin thecentre of the"missile-firingbox" outlined by theNOTAM!

'The concern at SAC HQ centred on whether the Soviets would

actuallyfire an SA-5 againstan aircraftin internationalairspace. "Intent"

was alwaysa key wordin a situation like this. Another concernwas that

the SA-5 was new and relatively unknown in terms of radio frequency

(RF) indications and performance.We were later told that Kelly Johnson

(the design genius behind the Lockheed SR-71) actually participated in

the telephone conference, and his posirionwas thatweshould not fly the

mission.In theend, however, itwas determined that thesortiewould be

flown as scheduled.

'The following day we all gotai rborne on t ime- the RC-135V, the

KC-135Qs andthe "Habu". Ou rmission profilewasnormal through the

refuellings, but as webegan our climb and acceleration to Mach 3+cruise

prior to entering the targetarea, it becameobvious that the outside air

temperature was much higher than we expected, and were used to. This

caused theclimb/accelerarionto beslower than normal. It was sohot, and

The S-200 (NATO designation

SA-5 'Gammon')was a medium-

to high-altitudemobile SAM

designed, manufactured and

deployed bythe USSR from

1967asa replacement forthe

highly successful SA-2. The

S-200 system was designed to

opera te in coordination with

Soviet interceptors, the latter

guarding the approaches to

SAM si tes.The system was

deployed in la rge numbers

during the late 1970s and early

1980s. Indeed, by the mid-1980s,

some 130 si tes and 1950 mobile

launchers were operational

throughout the USSR and the

Eastern Bloc. The S-200 hadbeen

replaced in Russian service by more

modern SAM systems by 2001 (FAS)

Majs 'Buzz' Carpenter (left) and

his RSO John Murphy conducted

the SR-71's second operational

mission f rom Mildenhall on24 May

1977 (USAF via 'Buzz' Carpenter)

our performance so degraded, that at the point where we should have

beenlevelat Mach 3.15 and75,000 ft, wewerejust passing60,000 ft and

still climbingat Mach2.8. As J T and I were discussing our situation, he

mentioned that the radar sensorhad justcome on.We hadnever hadi t

come on while we were still climbing before. Additionally, the slower

performance caused us to bewell below the plannedfuel curve.We had

todecide whetherto continuewirh themission.

'In theevent,we pressed on and finally levelled off at our desiredcruise

speed. We actually pushed theMach up a little to try and help ourselves

getback on the fuel curve - alrhough I knew we would never be able to

make up all of i t, I was comfortable that we would be able to get back

tothe tankers for thenextair refuelling if nothingelsewent wrong. And,

in fact, that is justwhat happened.We completed both passes rhrough the

target area, and rhe missile firing warningarea, with very little reaction

noted onour defensive systems.The lastair refuellingand rhetrip backto

Mildenhall were uneventful, whichwas just rheway we liked it.

'During the debriefingfollowing the flight we received word that we

had already had a very successful mission, and our "radar take" had not

even been processed yet. It seemed thatthe RC-135V "RiverJoint" that

was in thetargetareaforsome time beforewearrivedhad hadquitea bit

of Soviet company in the form of interceptors.Just a sw e were beginning

toenter thearea, the RC-135V crew became aware thatthe fighters had

abruptlydeparted,and the linguists monitoringthe radiosoverheard the

Soviet ground control intercept controller trying to vectorthe intercep

tors onto theSR-71. At leasr one fighter pilotwasheardto say,"I can see

thecontrail aboveand ahead.It is climbing ara very highspeed and I will

notbe ableto catch it". Heck, we alreadyknew rhat!

'Further adding to theinitial success of the missionwas the first ever

capture ofRF signals associated with theSA-5, which were pickedup by

borh our systems and the SIGINTequipment in the RC-135V.J T and

I hadspent45 minutesin the"denied area", most of i tat alitt le inexcess

ofMach3 - justanotherday atthe office. '

Four days later , Majs 'Buzz ' Carpenter and John Murphy (RSO)

performed the second operational mission to originate from Mildenhall

in 64-17958. Carpenter recalled;

'John and I were tasked with flying the tricky German mission. Like

the Balticsortie, one could not fly the aircraftat Mach 3 and still hopeto

make the turns that allowed the jet to s tay within the count ry border

l imit s imposed upon us. In both case s, whi le f ly ing a t Mach 2 .8 a

maximum 45-degree bank high-angle turn was required to stay within

the confines of the mission ground track. Because of aircraft energy

management, a slight descent was sometimes required to maintain the

45° of bank and Mach2.8.Theseturnswere planned for 42°, which gave

youan addit ional rhree degrees should this norbe enough to maintain

your critical ground tracle However, thesteeperthe bank,the morelikely

the loss of altitudein theturn. If youwere flying in warmer thanstandard

air temperatures, this energy management balance was aggravated still

further. Often, wewoulddescend a couple of thousand feetjust prior to

commencing theturning in orderto give ourselvesan energy advantage.

'In an effortto keep the mission as secret as possible, rhemobile crew

would reaffirm our take-off time and physically tell us when our flight 23



25

64-17958 stayed at Mildenhall for

15 days in May 1977. beforebeing

returned to Beale ascall sign 'Resay

35' atmonth end. The jet's high

visibility tit ling and national

insigniacontrast markedly with

those worn by 64-17958 in the

photograph opposite, whichwas

taken a decade later (BobArcher)

'Once clear of the coast , we s ra rred a 30° descending turn t o rhe

sourhwesr. Ir took over 200 nautical miles to start a descent, decelerare

and level off a t 25 ,000 ft, inbound to England. There was not much

margin forerror, or any type of delay, in rhe close confines rhar wewere

operaringin. This all happenedvery quickly, and descents were anorher

high acrivity rime period for rhecrew as we made sure thar rhe a ircraft

maintained those narrow Aighr paramerers to allow for a safe descent.

Engine compressor stallscould occurwirh engineAameouts if your righr

descent profile wasnor maintained.

'Once below Mach2.4 rheprofilebecame moreAexible, andat Mach

1.8, wirh the inlet spikes full forward, rhere was even morelaritude. The

profile of the descent was precisely planned so rhar rhe jer c rossed over

rhecoastlineof the UKa t subsonic speed.

'As we approached England , we would break rad io s ilence for the

firsr rime during theentire mission andcontact Northern Radar. We duly

followed rheir guidanceforan insrrument recovety back ar Mildenhall. UK

ATC sector radar controllers and, when required, their precision radar

approach controllers, were superb. This is probably because of all rhe

pracrice rheyreceive handling aircrafr in England's notorious wearher!

'Ar rhe end of an opera t iona l mission , a s ingle approach full s tOp

landing was a lways p lanned . Afrer land ing and deploying our huge

orangedrag 'chure, slowing was closely monitored. Once our speed was

below 80 knors, rhe drag 'chure would be jertisoned if rhe re was nor a

severe crosswind. As we rax ied in in front of our parking hangar, rhe

sensor crews were already in place to immediately download rhe recce

equipmentand process wharwe had collecred as soon aswe hadstopped.

As rheengines were shut down, sensor crews began opening up rhejer's

harches, and byrhe rime Johnand I srepped from thecockpir mostof the

recording equipment had already beendownloaded.

'We were usually debriefed planeside abour rheaircrafr's sysrems and

anyrhingunusual thar had arisen during rhecourse of rhe mission, before

we were d rive n b ack to rhe Phy siolog ic al Supporr Division (PSD)

building and de-suired. This was followed byextensivedebriefs, and rhen

ir was ourrum to assume rhe mobile back-up position for Tom and J T

for rheir nexr scheduled mission.'

On 31 May 1977, MajsAllison and Vidaredeployed 64-17958 back

to Beale using rhe callsign'Resay 35'.

clearancewas ready, rather than theMildenhall Control Tower radioing

us. With these checks complete, 30 minutes prio r to tak -offwe would

initiate our engine start and aircraft systems checks, withour any radio

calls. The tower would Aash a ligh t to s igna l our clearance to raxi and

to enter rhe runway for rake-off. Wirh UK airspace deconAicrion

complered , a g re en l ig ht wou ld b e Aashed to us f rom the tower a nd a

radio-silent rake-offwould rhen occur.

'Traffic had been cleared from our path and we climbed unresrricred

to 25,000 ft a nd headed out over rhe North Sea to meer our rankers.

When rhe refue ll ing was complered, we execured a righr turn t o rhe

southeast and iniriated our climb and accelerarion.

'Our entry targer was to cross the German coasr nearWilhelmshaven

a tMach 2.8 above 70,000 fr. We wereheadingalmost duesouth, towards

Kaiserslaurern, avoiding overAying major population areas. Below us

most of rhe ground wascovered with lowclouds.This rrack wasfollowed

by a 30° bank r um to the sourheasr, passing sourhwest of Sruttgart

and headinginto Bavaria. Here, rhe cloud coverbroke and rhe landscape

was a wonderfu l pa tchwork of lirtle villages, agriculrural fields and

mountainous terrain. Now came the difficult manoeuvre to ensure rhat

we maintained our rrack insideWesrGermany while Ayingsourh around

Munich as weexecuteda 45° high-bank rum. Luckily, rhere weresome

clouds below us, and rhe cooler rhan srandard upper air remperarures

enabledus to maintain our alrirude.

'During these rums, as much as I

wouldhaveliked to haverakenadvantage

of the spectacularviews out of our down

side rum window, full concentrarion was

required to make sure that I execured

rhis high-bank rum exactly as planned.

Maintenance of the ground rrack was

paramount, as rhis hadbeen promised to

America's Narional Securiry leadership.

Bank angles, Mach srabi li ty , e ng in e

performance, absolute ground track and

all orher a ircrafr sys tems had to be

intensely monitOred to start correcrive

actions if deviarions became apparent.

Nothing would besaid in the rum unless

ir was essential to rhis turning process.

The 180°+ rum placed us norrh of

Nuremberg, Aying northwesr beside rheinnerEast/WestGerman border.

'Basically, our sensors ran rhewhole

t ime along rhe inner German border

objecrive area. Once abeam Frankfurt,

passing to rhe north, a rum north was

t hen completed to a lign us with our

departure track our of Germany rhat

w ou ld see us Ayi ng acr oss t he s ame

srrerch of coasr rharwe had enreredover

lessrhan an hour earlier.

Seen here dur ing a training flight

from Beale towardsthe end of i t s

career, 64-17958 undertook tw o

deployments to Mildenhallin

1977. It was in-country f rom

7 to 17 Januaryand 16 to 31 May.

The aircraftsubsequently returned

to Det 4 in 1981 and 1984 (USAF)



MORE

DEPLOYMENTS

In an effortto improve command and control of its forces in Europe,

and to further strengthen liaison between CINCSAC and US and

All ied commanders in Europe, HQ SAC act ivated the 7th Air

Divis ion atRamstein air baseon 1July 1978 as a direct reporting unit.

It also moved 'on paper' the 306th SW from Ramstein to Mildenhall.

Up until thisdate,the latterhad been referredto as Detachment1 of the

306th SW when operating from theUK base.

Ev en befo re t he SR-71 h ad c ommenc ed its first o pe ra ti on al

deployment to Europe, planning was already undetway for a second,

whichwasscheduledfor the autumn of 1977. Both NATO and USAFE

commanders were anxious that the aircraft should again participate in

exercise Cold Fire. However, reconnaissance specialists at HQ SACwere

sceptical as to the value of such an exercise, mindful of the limitations

imposed upon thejet 'ssensors when forced to adopt a restrictive flight

profi le in order to conform with pol it ical considerations based upon

Switzerland, Austria and France'sdecision to deny it clearance to overfly

their airspace.

However, the success of the first deployment ensured that the request

made byMaj GenEarl Peak (SACDeputyChiefofStaffforOperations) to

theJCS foran October/Novemberdeploymentwas approved. The year's

secondPARPRO detwould record anotherfirst for the9th SRW, as the

'Habu'wasscheduled toconduct an operationalsortieduringthe course of

its positioning flight to Mildenhall. Takingoff from Beale on 20 October

1977, theSR-71 would fly eastward over theArcticCircleand perform a

coordinated intelligencegathering sortiewith RC-135U 'Combat SentII'

64-14849in theBarents Sea, beforelandingat Mildenhall. This particular

RC-135U would fly 30 operational missions over the Balticand Barents

Seas during this, its second,or 'Papa', deployment, to Mildenhallin 1977.

An RC-135V 'Rivet Joint ' aircraft

is seen at Mildenhallsupportingan SR-71 detachment in the late

1970s. All eight RC-135Vs were

assigned to the 55th SRW, which

called Offutt AFB, Nebraska, home.

This aircraft was one of seven RC

135Cs upgraded to 'Rivet Joint 5'

configurationin 1974-75 as part

of the 'B igSafari' modification

programme. 64-14845 is still in

service with the 55th Wing today.

Visible directly behind the RC-135V

is EC-135H61-0282 of the 10th

Airborne Coml)1and and Control

Squadron,which provided

USCINCEUR with a survivable

AirborneCommand Post. Unlike

the RC-135V and SR-71, this

aircraftwas permanently based

at Mildenhall. I twas retired from

activeservice and redesignated a

ground maintenance trainer in

November 1991

(BobArcher)

At this juncture,it mightbe useful to provide an overviewconcerning

t he v ita l ro le p layed by t he RC-135V 'Rivet Joinr ' and RC-135U

'Combat Senr'platformswhen operating in conjunctionwith theSR-71.

The gathering of intelligencegleaned fromthe electromagneticspectrum

is known as Signals Intelligence, or SIGINT fo r sho rt . Thi s can be

divided into two sub-categories, namely Communications Intelligence

(COMINT), which is defined as the 'interception and processing of

foreign communications passed by radio, wire or other electromagnetic

means', and ElectronicIntelligence (ELINT), which is the collection of

'information derivedfrom foreign non-communicationselectromagnetic

radiations emanatingfrom other than atomicdetonations or radioactive

sources. This includes frequencies, signal strength, pulse lengths, pulse

ratesand other details of radarsand electronicwarfareequipment'.

Once such detai ls have been col lected, col la ted, ident if ied and

disseminated, it becomes possible to establish a potential adversary's

Electronic Order ofBatcle (EOB). Then, once specific signal characteristics

have been identified as belonging to particular radar types or electronic

warfare equipment, it becomes possible to develop forms of Electronic

Countermeasures (ECM), or indeed Electronic Counter-Countermeasures

(ECCM), equipment that can jam the signal characteristics upon which

suchequipment is dependent, therebydegrading its effectiveness.

EOB data was gathered by a small fleet of highly sophisticated, air

refuellable platforms specially developed by the USAF and designated

RC-135s. By thelate 1970s, the two principle variants performing this

workwere the 'hog-nosed' RC-135V 'RivetJoint ' ,which'hoovered up'a

vastarray of data thatenabledthe types and locationsofvarioussensors to

be established, and the RC-135U 'Combat Sent'. The latter utilised its

principal sensor- the power pattern measurementsystem - to perform

fine grain analysis of radarsignalsfrom pre-determinedlocations.

This detailed intelligencewas in turn supplied to agencies such as the

Joint StrategicTargetPlanning StaffOSTPS),which was co-located with

HQ SAC. Both organisat ions would use the SIGINT to updat e t he

S ingl e I nt eg ra ted Ope ra ti onal P lan (SlOP) and to devel op ECM

equipment to counter Soviet radar threats.

Having an RC-135 fly a coordinated sortie with an SR-71 offered

several benefits when it came to SIGINT collection. Firstly, thanks to

the 'Habu's' high altitude performance, its sensors had the abi li ty to

gather SIGINT f rom sources operat ing up to 350 miles away from i ts

position- well inside deniedterritory.Additionally,SAC reconnaissance

specialists believedthat the appearance of an SR-71 would stimulatethe

electromagnetic environment by eliciting an unusual response from

Sovietdefensivesystems, provoking many more radars to beswitched on

to monitor thesituation and more communication channels to beused.

The scheduled 20 October mission was, in theevent, delayed for four

days due to bad weather at Thule air base, in Greenland - the SR-71's

nominated emergency recovety base for this deployment. Finally, on

24 October Capt Joe Kinego and his RSO Maj LarryElliottcompleted

t he 5 hour 49 minute mission to Mildenhall in 64-17976. During the

sor tie, Kinego ini tial ly conducted a post take-off fuel top-up near

Edmonton, in Saskatchewan, followed by a second aerial refuelling near

Greenland and a thirdafterthe BarentsSea'take' off thecoastofNorway.

so:JJ

m

om..."

.-o-<SmZ---(f)

27



s:0

:0

m

0m"1Jc-O

-<s:mZ-lC/)

On its 24 October 1977 f light to the

UK from Beale,64-17976 conducted

a coordinatedreconnaissance

gatheringmission with an RC-135U

'Combat Sent I\' aircraft over the

Barents Sea. Notethe Playboy

bunnieemblem chalked onto

the SR-71's tai l- a logo usually

associated with SR-71 64-17978,

which was christened'The Rapid

Rabbit' (Bob Archer)

After departing Mildenhall

on a monitoringsort ieinto

West Germany, the SR-71

crewwould f i rst head for

the initial Air Refuelling

Control Po int (ARCPI over

The Washand ta keon

additional JP-7 from an

everreliableKC-1350 tanker.

(via Paul F Crickmore)

The 9th SRW planned to fly several more sorties than had previously

been undertaken on UK deployments up to that point, and two

additional 'Habu' crews arrived accordingly via KC-135Q tanker. The

men selec ted to gain valuable operat iona l experience in this unique

environmentwereMajs BobCrowder and Jack Veth, together with their

respective RSOs John Morganand Bill Keller. Between the threecrews,

eight round-robin sorties were flown into Germany, these occurringon

27and 29 Octoberand 1,3,6,7, 10 and II November.

The average mission time for thesesorties was 2 hours and 38 minutes,

and involved one air refuelling shortly after take-off over The Wash

alargebaylikearea, located off thenorthern coast ofEastAnglia.The route

consisted of justa singlepass alongtrackX-027, whichwasaligned parallel

to the East German/Czechoslovakian borders specifically to monitor the

Sovier/Warsaw Pac autumn troop rotation. HQ Europe Command

(EUCOM) requested that SAC direct the SR-71 to collect as varied an

ELINT/HRR sampling as possible. Consequently , the 3 November

mission saw theSR-71 launch after sunset and comple tea n ight sortie - a

practiceseldom undertaken due to noiseconsiderations.

Yet anothermilestone wasachieved during the 'Habu's' redeployment

back to Bea le when , on 16November, as 'Dew 49', Majs Bob Crowder

and John Morgan took 64-17976 onan outbound intelligence-gathering

mission. Having leftMildenhall,Crowder topped-offoverthe North Sea

and then conducted another coordinatedsortiewith RC-135U 'Combat

Sent 11' 64-14849. The 'Habu ' spent 45 minutes collecting intelligence

in the constrained geography of the Baltic Sea , before a second aeria l

refuelling was completed off the north coast of Scotland and a th ird off

theeastcoastofNorthAmerica. The jet evenruaIly toucheddownat Beale

aftera flight lasting 6 hours and 11 minutes.

To optimise the full potential of this mission, the SRC had provided

the 'Combat Sent 11' crew with specific instructions as to the SR-71 ' s

a l ti tude, track , speed and targe t t imings so that the RC-135U could

complement the SR-71 's track profile. Although the crew manoeuvred

their aircraft precisely in accordance with the SRC's collection plan, one

particularly sought after s igna l - the iden ti ty of which is still classified

today- unfortunatelyremained elusive.

On 24 Apr il 1 978, Maj s J ay Murphy a nd RSO John Billingsley

deployed 64-17964 t o Mi ld enha ll t o c ov er the Sov ie t s pr in g t ro op

rotations. During its16-daystay, twocrewsflew theaircraft prior toMajs

Bob Crowderand John Morgan ferrying itbackto Beale on 12 May.

US NAVY INTEREST

Bordered by Finlandand Norwayto thewest, theKolaPeninsulaextends

ina southeasterlydirection intothe Barents Sea.This area wasof intense

interest to Adm J ames L Hol loway I II , Chief of Naval Operations

(CNO), because the five naval bases a t Zapadnya Litsa, Vidyayevo,

Gadzhievo, Severomorsk and Gremikha were home to the largest and

MajsJay Murphy and John

Bill ingsley deployed 64-17964 to

Mildenhall on 24Apr i l 1978. This

'opena i r ' scene i s typ ica lo f ear ly

deployments beforededicated

hangerage forthe SR-71 had been

constructed at the base. Note the

darkgreen Buick start cartused to

crank the engine parked under the

aircraft's lef twing (BobArcher)

Photographedon 24 October 1977,

RC-135U 64-14849 climbs out f rom

Mildenhall en route to the Barents

Sea for a coordinatedsortie with

Capt Joe Kinegoand Maj Larry

Elliott in 64-17976. This same

ai rcra fta lsopart ic ipa ted in '976's '

coordina ted sort ie over the Baltic

on 16 November. Again assigned

t o t he 55th SRW, 64-14849 was the

last of just threeRC-135Us created

forthe USAF through the

modificationof a t r io o f RC-135Cs

under the 'Big Safari ' programme

in 1971. A veteran of t he Vietnam

War, it too is still serving wi t h t he

55th Wing today (BobArcher)

29



most powetful of theSoviet Union's three fleers- theNorrhern Fleer. It

conrrolled cwo-thirdsof theenrire Sovietnuclearsubmarine force - over

100 vessels in all- the majorityofwhich werebased in theKolaGulfarea

because the warming influenceof the Norrh Adanric Drift meanr that

these imporranrporrs remained ice-freeall year round.

By thespring of 1978, a group of US Navy Inrelligence analystshad

become increasingly concerned at what appeared ro be a fundamenral

shift in Soviet naval strategy. Virruallysince the starrof the Cold War,

when the 'Soviet Bear began ro swim', American planners believed that

the Soviet Navy was benr on challenging the United States on the high

seas, and that should war break out Soviet arrack submarines would

arrempt ro sink US shipping re-supplying Europe, justas the German

U-boat fleet haddone in WorldWar 2.

However, it now seemed increasinglylikelyro these analysts that the

Soviets were on the cusp of knocking over a cornersrone of US nuclear

srrategy, as they believed that Soviet 'boomers'werenow beingprotected

by attack submarines and surface vessels. They also believed that the

powerful Norrhern Fleetwasinrenron establishing the entireBarenrsSea

as a 'no go'areaforUS andNATO navies. From their ice-freeenclave, thesubmarines could slip from their berthsat anytime of theyear and move

inro the BarenrsSea. Once here, they could take up firing positionsand

l aunch the ir l etha l 4800-mi le range Submarine-Launched Bal li st ic

Missiles (SLBMs) over the Arricat targets which includedWashingron,

DC and any others wi th in an arc drawn f rom South Carolina through

Oklahoma ro Oregon. It was for this very reason that President Ronald

Reagan's Secretary of t he Navy, john F Lehman, b ec ame f ond of

describing Murmansk and the res t of the Kola Peninsula as 'the most

valuable pieceof real estateon earrh'.

But surveillance of the ports from where these powerful submarines

wouldsailwasparticularlydifficult even forsatellites duero the prevailing

weather conditionswhich,for the most part,consistedof persistenr cloud

cover, rain, fog and, of course, the long, darkArtic winrers. Even on clear

days, thesun angle in theBarenrs Sea was often roo lowforthe collection

of high-resolution phorographydue ro high reflectivity.

I n M ay 1978, mindful of the SR-71's HRR Radar Intelligence

(Radlnr) gathering capabil i ties, Adm Hol loway request ed that the

Defense Inrelligence Agency (DIA)

validatesuch a mission requiremenr

over Murmansk and t he Kola

Peninsula. The DIA's evaluation

indicated that seven such flights per

monrh would be required ro fulfil

the US Navy's requirement, but it

concluded that t he SR-71 should

first fly threeevaluation sorties.

I n 1978 t he number of Primary

Authorised Aircraft ( jets for which

funds were available ro operate)

availablero the 9thSRWsroodat just

eight SR-71s.With commitmentsin

theWestern Pacific, ro the SlOP, the

Unt il work began on the

construction of a pair of

bespoke 'barns' in 1985,

Mildenhall-based SR-71s

util ised a lessthan ideal

hangarcomplexon the

airfield'ssouth side

(Paul F Crickmorel

StrategicProjection Force, cwo or threeannual deploymenrs ro Mildenhall

and t ra in ing opera tions a t Bea le, i t was r ighdy thought that thelevel of

coveragerequired by theCNO was well beyond whatwas possiblewith the

assets thenavailable,so thematterwasput on hold.

On 16 Ocrober 1978,64-17964 returned ro Mildenhall, beingferried

inby Majs RichGrahamand Don Emmons - the 9th SRW'sStandards

and Evaluation crew. The jet stayed for 16 days, and Maj BC Thomas

and his RSO Maj jay Reid rook turns with the'Stan/Eval ' crewro collect

Radlnt and ELINT of the Soviet rroop rotat ion, bur neither venrured

inro the Barenrs Sea. Instead Kadena-based SR-71s collectedRadlnr of

the Soviet PacificFleet, basedaroundVladivosrok, forthe CNO.

YEMEN

In early 1979, the established cycleof SR-71 deployments ro Mildenhall

during the spring and autumn ro participate in NATO exercises and

moniror the Sovier/Warsaw Pact troop rotat ions was interrupted by the

threat of yet anotherwar in theMiddle Easr.

S it ua te d on t he t ip of the Arabian Peninsula a nd a t the southern

approach ro t he Red Sea , North and South Yemen bordered oil-rich

Saudi Arabia. One of the few Arab nations sti ll friendly ro the United

States,Saudi Arabiawasits largest foreign supplierof oil.Throughout the

1970s South Yemen had received mili tary aid from bothChina and the

SovietUnion. In addit ion,i t hadrepeatedlytriedro underminethe more

moderategovernment ofNorth Yemen. SaudiArabiahad close tieswith

the larrer country, but not with the left winggovernmenr ro thesouth.

On 24 February 1979,whilst the foreignminister from SouthYemen was

in Riyadh, pledging that his governmenr would support Arab League

arbitrat ion over the problems thatexisted becween thenorth and south,

hisgovernmenrordered the invasionof their northern neighbour.

This action caused considerable consternarion wirhin the Saudi royal

family, who feared rha t a uni t ed Yemen under a Marxist governmenr

would infilrrate theircounrryand destabilise it politically.So,in response

ro a Saudi request made through the DIA, thejCS directed HQ SAC

ro deploy an SR-71 ro Mil de nh al l o n 12 M ar ch 1 97 9 - o ne month

before the due date ro cover thespringWarsawPact troop rotat ion.The

9th SRW had been tasked with conducting a single Giant Reach special

mission inro theMiddle Eas t in order ro secure surveillance relating ro

eventsthat had developed in this latesthot spor.

Des pi te a 3 March ceasefire that had supposedly come inro effect

becween North and South Yemen, inrelligence sources advised theDIA

that fighting was conrinuing, part icularlyin the regionsof Qatabah and

Harib. As a result of this news, the jCS's earlier decision ro deploy on

12 March remained in effect.

One of cwo crews ro cover the deployment consistedof Majs 'Buzz'

Carpenrer and john Murphy, andthe formernow takes upthe srory from

Sunday, 11 March - theday before thescheduled departure from Beale;

' john and I looked over the mission paths , as the package called for

three sorties ro beflown inro theMiddle East cworo threedays apartfrom

Mildenhall.We knew our preferred routes inrothe Middle East from the

UK, bur onceagain the Frenchrefused ro let the SR-71 Ay through their

airspace for quick access inro the Mediterranean Sea - heading across

om-u,a-<

mZ-j

(I )

31



France would have reduced rhedurarion of rhis almosr ren-hour mission

by two-and-a-halfhoursand one air refuelling.

'Orher quesrions focused on lookingforsuirablebases forour rankers.

The special JP-7 fuel was sroredar Mildenhall , Incirl ik and Moron air

base, near Seville in Spain. Turkey and Israel said rhe rankers would

not be allowed to operate from their airfields,and Saudi Arabia was not

chosen either. Finally,CairoWest airbase inEgyptwas selected, and the

tankerswould haveto transport the JP-7 there from Turkey, as they could

not directly support us from Incirlik.

'As one can imagine, the most crit ical aspect for uswhen i t c ame t o

working out mission timingswas for the tanker crews to determine their

besr basing sires and rhen ger rhe KC-135Qs, rheir aircrews and rheir

mainrenance suppOrtpersonnel inrorhoselocarions.The SR-71 mighrbe

able to fly arMach 3+ ar highalrirude, burwirhour the tankers operaring

from rheir fOlward-deployed locarions, rhe "Habu" was s impl y nor

mission-capable.

' John and I wer e ro ld t ha rwe wou ld be part of rhe advanced parry

heading ro Mildenhall ro receive rhe SR-71 deploying from Beale, which

was beingflown inbyone of our mosrexperienced and seniorcrews,Majs

Rich Graham and Don Emmons. We took a quick t r iphome, picked up

our bags and said goodbye to our families-wedidn'rknow whenwe'd be

back - then sropped by t he squadron to pick-up our checklisrs and

various deploymentmarerials.We had to secure aspecial UHF radio and

o rh er i rems t o be u sed by the mobi le c rew ro launch and recover rhe

SR-71 from our deploymenr base ar Mildenhall.

'A lasr minure delay meal1C rhar our ranker didn't depart Beale unril

nearly 1800 hrs. Time would be really righr now.We flew to PeaseAFB,

New Hampshire,arrhe KC-l35's topspeed.A scheduledquick refuelling

ar Pe as e wa s a mus r, s o r he r anke r c rew cal le d ahe ad and r ri ed to

ensurerhareveryrhingwould beready togo for our high-prioriry mission.

Fortunately,everythingwent accordingto plan,with fuel trucksstanding

by to refuel rhe aircraft and box lunches on hand for rhe ranker aircrew

and all of us passengers. John and I wenr into base operarions and made

a few essenti al r el ephone cal ls to updare rhe overa ll mission s ra rus,

derermine a revised arrival rimefor rheSR-71 into Mildenhall and receive

funher instrucrions. We rhen rushed back ro the tanker, and shortly

afrelwards wewere back in rheair headingacross rheNonh Atlantic.

'Upon landing arMildenhall , we hadar most jusr 30 minures before

rhe SR-71 touched-down. We leapr into rhe Mobile car, hor-wired rhe

special radio inro its electrical sysrem,mounred irs external anrennaand

proceeded immediarely towards rhe runway ro complete our recovelY

checklisrs. The larterincluded gainingclearancefrom the rower ro access

rhe runway and carry our a visible inspecrion for any possible Foreign

Objecr Damage irems rhar could puncrure rheSR-71's ryres.

'As we were checking rhe runway for screws, bolrs erc., John made

conracr wirh Rich and Don - affecrionarely known as "Snake" and

"Nape". They were ren minures ourand abour t o go over to approach

conrrol for recovery.We rhen playedabour a minure of"Darl'n" (a David

Allen Coesong rhar had almosr become rhe rheme song for rhe SR-71

programme ar rhi s poinr i n r ime) ove r r he r ad io . I r wa s l ar e in rhe

afternoon as '972, usingrhe call sign "Awry26", toucheddown.

'Tankers were still getting into posirion, and t he mission planning

ream wirh usworked intorhe nighr finalising the rhree mission objecrive

roures overrheArabian Peninsula, focusingon rheSaudi-Yemeniborder.

Refuelling rracks had bynow been established, wirh rhe firsroff Land's

End, rhe second over rhe Medirerranean Sea, a rhird over the Red Sea

going in and a f ou rr h aga in ove r r he Red Se a coming our. The final

refuellingwould be a longdrag over rhecentral Medirerranean, abeam

Libya, to getus home. Because wewerebanned from flyingover France,

rhelasrleg would bea criricalone for fuel.

'ByTuesday afternoon rhe tankers were in place, and if the wearher

permirred we would launch rhe first mission Wednesdaymorning (14

March). Early deparrurewas required ro place the SR-71 overrheArabian

Peninsula wirh oprimum daylighr for the cameras. We mer ar 1500 hrs

on Tuesday for a briefing, and rhere were represenrarives from many

organisarionsrharwe did nornormallysee.This arrested ro rhe imporrance

of rhe mission. We had arraches from our embassy, senior Narional

SecuriryAgency reps, rhe "two srar" USAFDirector of Operarions from

SAC and many orhers. The "twosrar" hadquesrions abourour operarions,

being "inrerested in rhe roure wewereabour ro f ly, porenrial diven bases

and rhe rulesof engagemenrwe weregiven ro operarewirhin".'

To ensure tharrheygor adequare resr, rhe SR-71 crewsrerired ro bed at

1800 hrs. They would bewokenar 0100 hrs fora physiCo'll examinarion, ear

a high prore in , low res idue breakfasr of sreak and eggs and then be

kirred our in rheirpressuresuitsand driven ro rheaircrafL Meanwhile, Majs

Rich Graham andDon Emmons would conducr a pre-flighr inspecrionof

rhe 'Habu' so rharall would beready for rhescheduled0400 hrsengine srarL

Wirh everything 'good ro go' as planned, the weather in the rarger area

inrervenedand the mission was placedon holdfor 24 hours. Unforrunarely,

wearheragain delayed theoperarionat 0400 hrs on Thursday.

Enjoyingan earlyseafood dinner ar rheMildenhall Officers'Club rhar

evening, Majs Carpenter and Murphy again retired, hopeful that rhe

fol lowing day 's wearher would ar l as r enable rhem ro perform rheir

imporranr mission. MajCarpenrer conrinues hissrory;

'Ar l as r we were off on this advenrure. Everyrhing wenr as per the

schedule and we blasred off i nro rhe nighr ar 0430 hrs, heading across

Englandar 25,000 ft towards rhesouthwesrand our rankers near Land's

End. This was quire achangeforus, as we normallyheaded easr our over

rhe Norrh Sea and hooked up wirh our rankers fairly quickly.As we flew

wesr I seemed ro have more intesrinal gas rhan normal. I f igured rhar ir

would pass as we climbedand rhecabin pressurerose ro 28,000 fr. Irwas

very common for usto work on relievingour gas build up as weclimbed.

' I r t ook almosr 30 minures before we were hooked up wirh rhe firsr

of our rankers. By now I was feeling really uncomforTable. John and I

discussed our oprions. We couldn't proceed if I was sick, bur I d id n or

wanr rhemission scrubbed and have ir reponed ro rhe Narional Securiry

Council (NSC) thar afrer two nighrs of slippage rheoperarion was again

posrponed because rhe pilot was sick!On rhesecondranker I hada quick

diarrhoea arrack (rhe"seafood special" we figured), but afrelwards I felr

much better. Then came rhe nextquesrion- was rhereany adverseeffecr

from"sirting on rhis srufP' forrhe nexr nine hours?! John and I discussed

thiswirh rhe ranker crew, and I felrrharI was fine ro proceed.

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33



Prior to launch, t hep i l o twou ld

l ine the aircrafton the runway

centreline, whereupon i ts wheels

were chocked (as seenhere at

Miidenhalll.The pi lotwould then

increase power one engine at a

t ime and fine-tune the exhaust gas

temperature (EGTI. before engaging

the automatic engine trim to ensure

maximum eng ineeff ic iencyon take

off (Paul F Crickmore)

A typical viewfrom the cockpit of an

SR-71 cruising at speedand altitude

- the curvature of t he earth is no t

t oowe l l definedbecause water

moleculesin the troposphere often

create a layer of haze. But as the

Sun goes up ordown through the

terminator ( the l ine dividingthe

illuminated and darkpart o f t he

planet), it is possible to see the

curvature - it is accentuatedhere

by a wide-angle lens (B C Thomas)

'We droppedoff the tanker over theAtlanticOcean, and with a full

load of fuel began our climb and acceletation whilst heading due south.

The sunhad bythencomeup,and wearrived at our cruising altitude of

74,000 ft at Mach 3.0.A turn eastwas executed, taking us through the

Straits ofGibraltar and intothe Mediterranean. Bynow I feltprettygood,

and we set up to i ni ti at e our descent and deceleration for our second

refuelling. Allproceeded as normalwith the tankers from Spain, and they

were glad to see us at las t after a thi rd day of flying in support of this

mission. As directed, at the end of the refuelling we called"operationally

notmal"over the radio and started our nextaccelerationand climb. So far

therehas been no reaction from anypotentiallyhostile areas.

'Now departing the Mediterranean, the view of the Pyramids and the

Sphinxwasspectacular! It was timeto startdown once more.John said that

we wete not getting the normal ranging information from the tankers to

adjust our rendezvous profile. Unbeknownst to us, the tanker radioswere

not working, and they actually saw our contrails as we started down.

Through pastexperience, they set-up their turnsto rollout infront of us at

therightspacing and speed.This wasoutstanding teamwork, and typical of

the"can-do"attitude thatmade it all happenwithin the9th SRW.

Th e refuelling went without a

hitch, but wewete unaware that two

EgyptianMiG-23s hadfollowedour

tankers out on this thi rd day to see

"what was going on". Unknown to

us, a p ic tu re was taken from th e

second tanker, which was above us,

as we refuelled. Months later, John

and I s igned a copy of the photo,

whi ch was t hen pre sent ed to t he

Egyptian Embassy and EgyptianAir

Force to thank them for their great

support. The picturewas wonderful,

showing three tankers in formation,

us refuelling underthe second tanker

and thepair ofMiGs about 200-300

yards in trail.

'With full tanks, wewere now off for acceleration and climb number

three, but this onewould take us into our objectivearea. Defensivesystems

were again checked, and all other aircraft systems were functioning

normally. Aircraft "972" was performing exceedinglywell.

'As we passed through 45,000 ft a t M ac h 2 .4 we got a fi gh ter

attack radar indication coming from our right forward quadrant. We

determined that a Middle Eastern fighter would not bea threat to us at

this speedand altitude- afterreturningto California, I talkedwith Kelly

Johnson about this event, as he'd been cleared into any of the missions

and occurrences we might see or experience. I turned left as we reached

Mach 3.0 at 75,000 ft. What a view- sand for as far as I could see,with

the occasional interspersedoasis. It was incredibleto think that theywere

fighting overcontrol of this open desert.There was sand blowing around

belowus, makingfor ahazyscene. Above, theskywas as black as ever.

'As we flewover theYemeni-Saudi border area, I prepared to make a

leftturn for asecondloopoverthisobjective. Hardly aword was spoken

between John and I during these intense, high-activitytime periods.Just

as everythingseemed to beworking as planned, theaircrafttried to make

a right instead of theplannedleft turn. I disconnected the autopilot and

got us turning left. John was working tosee ifhe could locate the source

of the problem, as well as checking the rest of theobjective area to ensure

thatwe had maintained route integrity. We were on thatmythical black

line, swingingthrough foranother pass.

'Aswe left the objectivearea, we were in a rightdescending, decelerating

turn,lookingforour fourth setof tankers. Wewerea little lowon fuel by this

time because of the extra manoeuvring, but again the refuelling went

without a hitch. Once off the tankers, we climbed for the return leg to

the UK. Mter this extended cruising leg, we started our last refuelling _

number five. Thi s one wou ld be d if fe rent f rom the rest as a normal

refuellinglasted 15-20 minutesand transferred80,000+ lbs offuel.The goal

was to reach your end ARCP with full t anks, re ady to begin your

acceleration. However, forthis last refuellingwe'd staybehind the tankerfor

50 minutes,dragging alongsubsonically to give us a closer endARCP. This

would ensure that we had the extra fuel needed on board to deal with the

potentially bad British weather.The refuellingwas carried out inthe middle

of the Mediterranean, north of Libya. Evelyone was closely monitoring

radartraffic to see ifLibyadetectedand then reacted toour presence.

'Descent and hook-up went flawlessly. I thought about dropping

off the tanker a couple of times and re-engaging to top off the fuel in

the aircraft, but the decision was made that instead of risking not being

able to hook-up aga in , t he eas ie st a ct ion was t o s tay on t he s econd

tanker's boom for about 45 minutes. We saw a lot of airtraffic over the

Mediterranean during this time, but none of it is out of theordinary.

'With our tanks topped off, John and I were ready for the las t leg.

We had been in our pressuresuit s now for more than nine hours , and

I'd later learn that with the normal dehydrating 100 per cent oxygen

breathing environment in thecockpit,coupled with my earlierillness, I'd

lost more than eight pounds in weight, even though I had been eating

tubefood and drinkingwater throughout the mission.

'Climb and acceleration were normal, and we passedback through the

Straits ofGibraltar and starteda turn tothe north, heading home. Prior to

s:::

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35



A surprisinglylarge numberof

colourful artworks and badges

were applied to various SR-71s

over the years. From24 October

to 16 November 1977,64-17976

displayed large 9th SRWbadges

on its fins while detached to

Mildenhall (Lindsay Peacock)

our descent,we learnedrhar ir was raining arMildenhall.The descenr rook

us down i n such a way rhar we enrered rhe UK landmass subsonically.

Driving across rhe countryunder radar approach conn·o!' we ser up for a

precision landing. However,while running rhrough rhe recoverychecklisr

we dew·mined rharrhenosegeardid norwant rocome down.Now in rhe

rain, we would have ro run rhe a1rernare gear-lowering checklisr, which

meant leavingrhelandinggearselecrion handledown, pullingsomecircuir

breakers and rhen releasing a cable in rhe front cockpit". Whilsr going

rhrough rhese anions, we rerminared rheprecisionapproachand swirched

ro a visual approach insread. Afrer wharseemedliked an ererniry, rhegear

dropped inrorhe down and lockedposirion.

'We fooled rhe"birdwarchers" on rhisoccasion, as rherewere very few

around rheairfield ro warch our return roMildenhall i n rhe rain ar rhe

end of our ren-hour mission.Landing, rhankfully, was uneventful,and as

we raxied into our parking posirion ourside rhe hangar ir seemed rhar

all rhe deployment personnel were sranding around cheering our

mission complerion.John and I felrso honoured ro bea par r of rhis grear

ream. Engine shurdown commenced and rhe ganrrysrand was rolled up

besideus. I felr prerry good, bur a l i rde weak. I r ri ed ro racrfully rell rhe

groundcrewnor ro gerroo close, and rhere was a pervading odour.

'Unbeknownsr ro John and I, rhe firsr ranker had relayed our problem

back ro base, andduring rheflighrrhe ream hadorganiseda lirdeceremony.

Arrhe foor of rhe ladderrhe9rh SRW's vice wing commander, Col Dave

Young,mer me ro ger a quickdebrief,bur more imporrandy ro presentme

wirh an SR-71 ri e rack rhar rhey had paimed brown. I rs accompanying

cerrificare arresred rhar on rhi s dare I was rhe f irs r "sure ly nor r rue, bur

funny" supersonicrurd. Whar couldI say! Laughrercame fromevelywhere.

I f el r okay, so rhe PSD guys gave me my cusromary afrer-flighr beer

re-hydrarionwasalsoa criricalparrof rhishigh flight".

'As ir turned our, our missionwould berhe only one flownby rhe SR

71 overrhe Middle Easr during rhis parricularcrisis.All rhedara required

by r he NSC had been collecred, meering Presidenrial needs. On 28

March, John and I launched "Snake" and "Nape" inro rhe air as "Inpur

62", raking "972" home. To rhis day, Rich sri ll kids me abour rricking

him inro having rhe Chiefof Srandardizarion Aircrew for rhe 9rh SRW

acr as a "mere" ferry crew for us. Such is rhe luckoflife.'

37



eN

00

2SR-71C Article Number 2000 (64-17981) of the 9th SRW, Beale AFB,

March 1969 to April 1976

3

SR-71A Article Number 2006 (64-17955), Air Force Logistics Command, Palmdale, August 1965 to January 1985



-l'><=>

5SR-71B Article Number 2007 (64-17956), 9th SRW, BealeAFB, 1965 to 1990

17964· l I < 1 ~ " " " " " ' ~ ·

' .... 1·.1

"'~ ~ . " 3 ~ " - - : : ; ; ' ~ U . S . A I R ' F O R C E _ ~ " , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,-

..... " " " " ~ . ~ " " - : ' ? " ' - o<

6SR-71A Article Number2015 (64-17964) ofthe 9th SRW's Det 4, RAF Mildenhall16 August to 6 November 1981

17959

~ . ! : . . ' ' i 7 - - ~ U.S.AIR FORCE ~ . , . ~ ' . ~ ..

7SR-71A Article Number2010 (64-17959) of Det 51, Palmdale, 20 November 1975 to 24 October 1976



N

9

SR-71A Article Number 2031 (64-17980), NASA, Edwards AFB, September 1992 to October 1999

10SR-71A Article Number 2018 (64-17967) of the 9th SRW's Det 2, Beale AFB, October 1997

Ol

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45

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Majs B C Thomas andJay Reid

became thef i rst crew to landan

SR-71 at a ContinentalEuropean

air base when, on 12 August 1981,

they diverted 64·17964 into Bodo,

Norway (B C Thomas)

SR-71 64-17976 monitoredboth the

autumn troop rotat ionof 1979 and

the spring exercisesin 1980

(Paul F Crickmore)

Maj B C Thomas tookthis self-

port rai t during a Det 4 flight.

He accrued 1217 hoursand 18

minutes in th SR-71 - morethan

any other 'Habu' pilot (B C Thomas)

64-17964, hav ing col le ct ed a n

HRRJELINT take on their

inbound legto Mildenhall. Thiswas

to prove a milestone deployment,

with thea ircraft s taying in the UK

forfour months until itwas replaced

by 64-17972 t he d ay p ri or t o its

retu rn to Bea le on 6 March . The

latterSR-71 stayed for cwo months,

beforeeventually departingfor Beale on 5 May 1981 as 'Yappy 22'.

No t all round-robins went as planned, however. For example, the

mission scheduled for 12 August 1981 was meant to see SR-71 64-17964

take off f rom Beale, o ver fly the Baren ts Sea a nd the n return to it s

California home. Majs BC Thomas

a nd RSO J ay Reid duly took off at

2 200 h rs to fly the ten-and-a-half

hour sortie, with refue ll ings over

Idallo, Goose Bay, cwice over the

North Seaand againover GooseBay,

before returning to Beale. Becween

the cwo North Sea refuellings they

would make a run over the Baren ts

Sea, where their side-looking HRR

would pick-up Sovie t submarine

targetsfor theUS Navy.

The mission went like clockwork

until they were in the ' take' area, at

which point Maj Thomas noticed

that his left engine low'oil-quantity' warning light was flashing on and

off. After completing the important radar run, hecommenced refuelling

from one of the KC-135Qs.Whilst on thetankerThomas noted thatthe

oil warninglightwasnow on continuously.This was a 'mandatory abort'

item on his emergency procedures checklist because prolonged flight

under such degraded conditions could easily result in engine seizure.

There were cwo preferred bases in northwest Europe for diversionary

aborts- Mildenhall, which would take cwo-and-a-halfhours to reach at

subsonic speeds, or B0do, in Norway,whichwasjust 20 minutesaway.

Thomas decided that caution was the better part of valour on this

occas ion and diverted into B0do.

Once there he wasgreeted bythe base

commander, Gen Ohmount of the

Royal NorwegianAir Force(RNAF),

who, as Thomas recalled, was very

polite but very nervous. It later

transpired that Ohmount had been a

young lieutenantat the base in 1960

when Gaty Powers had been shot

down.After it becamewidely known

that the inten tion was for the C IA

p ilot to hav e landed a t B0do, the

Norwegian government disclaimed

TheWarsaw Pact spring troop

rotation of 1979 was monitored

by SR-71 64-17979. Notethe 9th

SRWemblem on the aircraft's tail

(BobArcher)

On 31 March 1979, Det 4 of the9th SRW was established at RAF

Mildenhall. As i tsf i rst uni t badge

clearlyshows, at this stage Det 4

was a jo int SR-71/TR-1 operator

(BobArcher)

DETACHMENT 4ISFORMED

The success of the Yemen mission , and the various exercise

deployments in theyears preceding it, convinced theUSAF that

the 9th SRW should have a more permanent presence at RAP

Mildenhall. Thus, on 31 March 1979, Detachment 4 was created as the

European SR-71 and TR-1 operat ing unit . I ts f irst taskwas to prov ide

surveillance of the Sovie t spring troop ro ta t ion, with missions being

f lown by Majs Bil l G roning er a nd Le e She lton , tog ethe r w ith the ir

respective RSOs, Majs Chuck Sober and Barry MacKean . Aircraft

64-17979 was tasked with performing these sorties , the je ta rriv ing a t

Mildenhall as 'Fern 29 'on 17April anddepartingon 2 May.

In response to theCNO's requests for RadInt of the Barents Sea, the

very first round-robin mission into the region was flown from Beale on

13 Ju ly 1979 in suPPOrt of SAC worldwide nuclear readiness exercise

Global Shield79. The 10 hour 4 minute mission obtainedHRR imagery

of thetargetedarea, and cwo similar missionswere conducted in 1980.

The autumn troop rotation of 1979wascoveredfrom 18 October to

13 November byMajs Rich Youngand RSO Russ Szczepanik and Majs

]oe Kinegoand RSO Bill Keller in 64-17976.The sameaircraft rerurned

for the 1980 springro ta tion on 9 April, and three 'Habu' crews flew it

during the 30-day deployment. 64-17972 arrived as 'Cup 10' a nd

covered the autumn rotation becween 13 September and 2 November,

fourcrews sharingthe mission load. However, due to the resurfacing of

Mildenhall 's runway, the je t was flown in to nearby RAP Lakenheath ,

from where it continued to operateuntil returning to Beale as 'Room 60'.

On 12 December 1980, a th ird SR-71 deployment to Mildenha ll

occurred. This t ime the ]CS had directed that Det 4 should conduct a

series of missions in response to a request from theUS Commander in

ChiefAtlanticCommand (USCinCACOM),who was concerned at the

possible intervention of Sovie t mil i ta ry forces to que ll r is ing dis sent

in Poland . Majs Rich Young and RSO Russ Szczepanik duly arrived in



"::JJ

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47

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64-17964's return to Det 4 in August

1981 hadbeen totally unscheduled,

as t h e j e t had only recently spent

three mont hs at Mildenhall from 12

December 1980 through to 7 March

1981. SAC was ordered b y t h e JCS

to keep t h e j e t w i t h Det 4 (which

h ad n o SR-71 assigned to it a t t h e

t ime) unt i l 6 November 1981 due to

t he growing political crisisin Poland

(Paul F Crickmore)

Majs B C Thomas and Jay Reid taxi

64-17964 to De t4 ' s o p e ra t i n g area

a fte r l a n d in g a t Mi l de n h al l following

t heirf l ight f rom Ba d o o n 16 August

1981. Note "THE BaDON/AN"

Express t it l ing freshlyapplied to

the jet's twin f i n s i n Norway

(Lindsav Peacock)

The political siruation in Poland continued ro deteriorate as the

clamour for reforms and democracy gathered momemum. By early

December things had reached breaking poim, and on the night of the

12th Poland's communist leader, Gen Wojciech Jaruzelski, cut all

communicarion linkswith theWest and deployed rroops and armour ro

set up roadblocks a n ~ I 2 Y suategic installations. He then declared

a s ta te of manial raw and appeared on relevision ro announce the

formation of a MilitaryCouncil of National Salvation. He claimed that

strikes,protest demonsuationsand crime hadbrought rhe counny ' rothe

border ofmenral endurance and rheverge of an abyss'.

Two days larer ir became apparenr rhar ar leasr 14,000 rrade union

acrivisrs had been roundedup and arresred and seven had been shor in rhe

Silesian coal fieldswhile resisringmaniallaw.Would Gen Jaruzelski rum

ro the SovierUnion forhelp in hisstruggle ro rerain controlof Poland,or

would President Leonid Brezhnev commir Sovier rroops ro crush rhe

uprising, as he had done in Czechoslovakiaon 21 Augusr 1968? Clearly,

rhe Reagan Administrarion needed some answers,

and fasr, and as ever rheSR-71 and irs crewswereon

handro providerhem.

Capts Gil Berrelson and RSO FrankStampfwere

on the rosterfor rhis imporranrsortie.The significance

of rheir mission dicrared rhar ir was ro be backed

up by a spare a ircrafL Consequendy, Majs Nevin

Cunningham and RSO Geno Quist (known wirhin

me crew force as 'Neno' and 'Geno') were also

suited-up as 'spares'. As Benelson and Srampfdeparted

Bealeand disappeared wirh rheir SR-71 inro rhecold,

wet, nighr, Cunningham and Quisr waired ar rhe end

of rhe runway in 64-17958 for rhe code words rhar

would eirhersend rhem 'back ro rhe barn' or on rheir

way over much of rhe Norm Aclanric and normern

Europe. Soon afrer, Srampf called back ro Quisr on

their discrere HF radio frequency, sayingsimply'Your

guys have gor i r' , ro which bom spare crewmen

simulraneouslysaid 'O h Shit',and off rheywenL

The wearher in rhe firsr a ir refue ll ing area over

Nevadaand Utahwasso bad rhar ir was all rhe 'Habu'

crew could do ro find me rankerin rhe rhickclouds.

When rheyfinally located ir, and were 'on rhe boom',

ir proved extremely difficulr for Cunningham ro

any knowledge of me plan and fired

Ohmount's boss ar mar rime - an

event marwassrillsrronglyerchedon

his memory!

Having norified rheSAC SRC of

__QIlt£....... hisinrenrions ro diven, Thomas was

anx ious ro p rovide 'home plare'

wirh orher derails. The Norwegian

general d irec red rhe 'Habu' pilor

rowards his underground command

posr- a very impressivefacilirybuilr

in ro rhe s ide of a mounrain - f rom

where Thomas could rell Col DaveYoung (CO of rhe 9rh SRW) of rhe

narure of 64-17964's mechanicalproblem. Youngaskedar wharsragerhe

decision had been made ro abon, rowhich Thomas gave rheroral mission

rime and rhe rhird airrefuelling rime. From rhar answer, ColYoung was

able roascenain rhar rheaircrafr had rhe reconnaissance 'rake'on board,

and rhar cenain specialisrs would needro accompany rherecoverycrew ro

download rhedara.

An RNAF officer was rhen assigned ro each of rhe 'Habu' aircrew

Thomas recalledrhar his 'minder' was F-I04 pilor LrRoar Srrand of rhe

331sr Fighrer Squadron. The Norwegian pilors did norler rheir charges

our of rheir sighr, and even sleprin rhesamerooms. The recovery ream,

headed up b y Lr C ol Randy Henzog, arrived in a KC-135Q on 15

AugusL Gen Ohmounr had reque sred rha r rhe ream wea r mil ir ary

uniforms and norcivilian clorhesro ensurerharall was kepr'aboveboard'.

Unfonunarely, rhis message didn'r reach rhe new arrivals, who were

quicklyusheredback onro rheranker and insuucred ro don rheir farigues.

Wirh a million members of rhe Polish Solidariry movemenr having

goneon srrikeon 7 Augusr, and mounring rension berween communisr

srare officials and rhe resr of rhe Polish popularion, ir was decided rhar

64-17964 should remain in Europe ro moniror any possible Sovier

response. Consequendy, ar 1342 hrs on 16 Augusr, Thomas and Reid

depaned B0do in rhe company of rheir rrusry ranker for a rerurn flighr

ro Mildenhall , which was performed ar subsonic speed . Bearing rhe

inscriprion "THE B0DONIAN"EXPRESS on irs rwin rails, 64-17964

rouched down ar 1452 hrs. The crew was merar rheborrom of rhe gamry

pla rform by rwo orher 'Habu' crew members, Majs Jerry Glasser and

RSO Mac Hornbaker, who would fly rhe nexr 'B0donian Express' sonie

inro rhe Balric and alongrhe coasrof Polandon 22AugusL

A week larer, Thomas and Reid

performed a mirdsonie ro rhesame

area, and mis was followed up by

CaprsRichYoungandEd Bemanon

31 AugusL Finally, on 2 Seprember

Thomasand Reid rerurned ro Beale

by ranker. Their scheduled ren

hou r s on ie had las red 21 days!

64-17964 conrinued rooperarefrom

Mildenhallunril 6 November, when

ir roo rerurned ro Beale.

64-17964 appeared again at

Mildenhallon 16 August 1981,

bu t t hiswas an unscheduled visit

f ol lowing i t s earlier diversion into

Bado with a n e n g i n e o i l warning

a mandat oryabort i t em on the

emergencyprocedures checklist.

As a result t h e j e t had t he words

"THE BODONIAN" Express paintedonto its twin tai l fins (Paul F

Crickmore)

The international airspace over

the Barentsand Baltic Seas were

extremely important intelligence

gathering areas for Det 4 SR-71s.

Here 64-17964 formates on the

r i g ht w i n g o f a KC-135Q in the

'Viking North' air refuell ing track

(probablyone of the USAF's most

northerly air refuell ing areas). Note

condensation trails from two other

'Q birds' in t het rack (Paul F

Crickmore)



om-ll>n:r:s:mZ-l

ono:JJ

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49

Dependentupon weight, ambient

air temperature and pressure,

normal approach speed for an SR-71

when landing at Mildenhallwas 175

knots, with ten degrees of nose-uppitch. Final flare further increased

the angle of t he nose-up pitch, thus

reducingspeed to 155 knots for

touch down (Paul F Crickmorel

Aside f romcrew fatigue, the

ultimate limiting factoron

SR-71 mission endurance was

thejet 's nitrogen capacity.

Gaseous n i trogenwas used to

pressurise boththe TEB and the

fue l tanks as they became depleted,

otherwisethe part-occupied tanks

would havebeen crushed bythe

increasing atmosphericpressure

as the aircraftdescended to cruise

altitudes (Lockheecf)

Back at Beale, the Californian

winter weather was less severe, and

as Maj s B C Thomas and Jay Reid

d ep la ned f rom a 9 th SRW T -3 8

following the completion of a rou

tine trainingflighton 16December,

theywere met by wingdeputy CO ,

Col Randy Hertzog. He instructed

them togo homeand grabwhatever

they needed for an indef ini te

deployment to Mildenha ll . The

KC-135 carrying both them and a

maintenance teamdeparted Beale at

1930 hrs and arrived in England at

0730 hrs the f o l l o W t r r g - ~ l o r n i n g .On 18 December Majs Cunningham and Quist flew 64-17958 on a

second sortieoverthe Baltic,and anothermission that would endatBeale

was plannedfor Thomas and Reid as soon as theywere crew-rested from

theirtransatlanticflight. An analysis ofQuist's ' take'had revealedthat the

SovietUnion was not makingpreparationsto intervene militarily toquell

Poland'spolitical unrest.

Thomas and Reiddeparted Mildenhall in 64-17958 on 21 December

and headed out over theNorth Sea for the first of five aerial refuellings.

They t oo h ad been tas ked w ith monitoring the Soviet/Polish border

s i tuat ion from a stand-off position in international airspace over the

Baltic Sea. Their mission profile also included a lengthyrun around the

coast of Norway a nd up a long the nor th ern c oa st of the USSR. Reid

activated the sensors as they cruised at Mach 3 on their northern loop,

which saw the j et e xi t t he ' ta ke ' a re a n ea r Murmansk on a wes te rly

heading, bound for itsfourth refuelling.Ou t overthe North Atlantic, the

rightgenerator curoff, butThomas managed toget it reset.

Afte r the fif th tank ing near Goose Bay , Labrador, another problem

a ro se tha t wou ld l im it t he ir c ru is e s pe ed inbound to Beale. During

acceleration,Thomas notedthat 64-17958'ssupplyof liquid nitrogen had

been depleted , and that the fuel tanks could not be pressurised to inert

the fuel fumes at high Mach. He limited

thecruiseMachto 2.6 in accordance with

emergency opera ting procedures, and

madehis final descent into Bealeloweron

fuel after a flight of almostten hours.

Th is series of Bal t ic sorties had not

only obtained invaluable intelligence for

the Reagan Administration at a t ime of

high international tension, they had also

vividly demonstrated US resolve ro stay

actively engaged in thesituation by using

its key surveillance assets in the NATO

WarsawPact theatreof operations.

Det 4's capabilitywas doubled during

1 982 w hen two SR-71s were based

'permanently' a t Mildenha ll for the first

On 6 October 1981, Maj Rich

Judson and RSO Lt Col FrankKelly

f lew 64-17964 on a Barents/Baltic

Seas sortie. It is seen here during

the course of the mission in the

'V iking North' airrefuell ing track

(paul F Crickmorel

Maj Nevin Cunningham (left), wh o

was nostranger to Mildenhall,later

becameDet 4 's C O. H e is s e en here

talking to Lt Col Joe Kinego, wh o

was CO of the 1st Strategic

ReconnaissanceSquadron at the

time thisphotograph was taken

(Paul F Crickmorel

mamcam the connection due to heavy turbulence.

The updrafts bounced theKC-135 all over theskyto

thedegree that i ts autopilot was unable to react fas t

enough to the unstable conditions. As a result, this

refue ll ing proved to be one of the most difficult

experienced by both t he t anke r a nd SR-71 c rews

involved. Cunningham asked the KC-135 pilo t to

forget autopilot and ' go manua l' to ach ieve a be tter

'offload platform'.Meanwhile, the transfer operation

was enshrouded in Sa in t Elmo 's Fire, which lit up

both aircraft likeglowingChristmas trees.

After completing the ragged refuelling, Cunning

ham lit both ' burners and pressed on to thesecond

ARCP over Canada. Once again the weather did its

utmost to make the operation as uncomfortable as

possible. After c ross ing the Atlantic, they headed

for their third refuelling track off the west coast of

Norway. Here, theywere sandwiched between layers

of cloud, but theair was smooth in theArctic twilight

and thetop-offwent smoothly.

The 10ngAdanriccrossingrequired asplit off-load

from two tankers , and after taking half of the fuel

from one KC-135, Cunningham l ooked for the

second tanker. As heclosed in on theaircraft, he discovered that hewas

actually joining up with a Soviet Ilyushin I1-20 'Coot' ELINT aircraft!

Cunningham flew 64-17958 up to the 'would-be' tanker, who was no

doubt just as startled by the presence of a 'Habu '. The crew quickly

dropped back tofind thesecondtanker, andaftertakingon morefuel, the

pilotlit the'burnersfor the next high-hot run.

At 72,000 ft, Cunningham and Quist headed into the'take' area,where

it was especially dark at altitude.Indeed, itseemed thatthe only source of

l ight was coming from the SR-71 's a fterburners 100 ft behind them.

Havingcompletedan inner'loop' around the BalticSea, they were on their

waybackdownto thefourth refuellingtrackwhen thesunpoppedbackup

over the horizon.

To further complicate matte rs on this long and difficu lt mission ,

Quist was unable to make rad io contact with the tankers . Fortuna te ly ,

Cunningh am sporredcontrailswell belowand ahead of

them,and simplyfollowedthe aerial 'railroadtracks' for

ajoin up. Whileon theboom, Quist broke furdler bad

news to his pilot about theirAstro-Inertial Navigation

System (ANS), which had failed. Clearly it would not

bepossibleto rerurn to Beale,since 'ANSFailure' was a

mandatory abort item. The crew dlerefore settled into

formation with t he tankers, who led them to

Mildenhall, where snow and ice covered the runway

and taxiways. Finally, after what had turnedour to bea

'velyentertaining' mission,64-17958 slitheredto ahalt

ourside the dedicated SR-71 barn and Cunningham

and Quistclimbed OLlt after theireight-and-a-halfhour

'fun filled' mission- their27th sortie together.



51

inlerspikesand doors made fuel consumptionevenworse, and tilecrewwas

only able to maintain Mach 3 in this configuration. Slowing to subsonic

speedswould furtller exacerbatetheir low fuel predicament, and tlley found

thattheywere beyond tile pointof noreturn togoback to B0do. Therefore,

Cunningham and Quist had no choice but to press on toward their KC

135Qs inme hope that theymightbeable toimprovetheir fuel flow rare or

divert into Iceland. For tile next 45 minutes Cunningham flew at Mach

3.09,beforeslowing to3.05 toallow theEGT todrop back intothe 'green'.As they approached the 'point-of-no-return' off Iceland, Quist

recalculatedthe fuelsituation,which had improvedslightly. Once availed

of this news, Cunningham decided to presson, and hetold hisRSO toget

thetankersto fly toward themso as tospeed up the refuellingrendezvous.

After completing a hook-up in record-breaking time, the fuel streamed

into 64-17972 at more than 6000 Ibs per minute. Once back at Beale

after anorher seven hours of SR-71 excitement, neirher crewmember

would admit tohow much (orhow little) fuel they had remainingbefore

theymade contactwirh theireverlasting friends in the ranker.

64-17955

In May 1983 HQ SAC and AFSC decided to test rhe effectiveness of

Goodyear'sAdvanced SyntheticApertureRadarSystem-1 (ASARS-1) on

an SR-71 prior to upgrading the rest of the 'Habu' fleet with this new

high-definition, ground-mapping equipment. 64-17955 was dul y

equippedwith thesystem,and Majs BC Thomas andRSOJohn Morgan

wereassigned thetaskof conducting

the first operational test flight with

the equipment fitted.

On 1July1983, they carried out

SAC's firstASARS-1 familiarisationf lighr, which lasred jusr over f ive

hours. During rhe mission Morgan

gor to g rip s wirh rhe ASARS-1

' sw ir chol ogy' and rhe sys rem' s

operar ing rechniques. Five days

larer, Majs Maury Rosenberg and

RSO E D McKim also flew

64- 17955 on a f ive-hour sor tie,

a ft er whi ch rhey r ecover ed i nt o

Bealerather rhan Lockheed'sPalm

dale facility, where rhe jet had been

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64-17971 arrived at Mildenhall on 23

December 1982, and with 64-17972

having already f lown in just five

days earlier, it meant t ha t f o r t he

first time in its history Det 4 had

tw o SR-71s underi ts command

(Lindsay Peacock)

Capturedon ' f ina ls ', '64-17962',

f l own by Majs Maury Rosenberg

and RSOE D McKim, prepares to

land at Mildenhall on 9 July 1983,

having completed an operational

sortie intothe Barents/Baltic Seas

collection area. In fact, falseserial

numbers hadbeenapp l ied t o t he

aircraftspecially for its three-week

deployment wi th Det 4 ,as this

airframe was in fact 64-17955

(BobArcher)

Bottom

64-17974 set the record deployment

time to date when it left Det 4 on 13

December 1982 lPaul F Crickmore)

64-17974 arr ived in Eng landon 30

April 1982 for an eight-month stint

with Det 4 (Lindsay Peacock)

Below

64-17980 deployed to Det 4 from 5

January through 27 April 1982,

when it was replaced by 64-17974.

The mid-semi-span position of the

enginesare immediately apparent

f romthis shot, takenby a No 41 SqnJaguar during a sortie from RAF

Coltishall (Crown Copyright)

time. The aircraft, manned by crews

on 30-day deployments, flewa suc

cession of'rourine, bur highly pro

ductive, missions' across the North

Sea and Eastern Europe. 64-17972

was one of thetwo jetsoperated dur

ing this period, and following seven

monthson deployment, itwasready

to be returned to Bealefor periodic

hea vy ma in te na nc e. The latter

included the replacement of fuel

tank sealant that tended to burn away after repeated high-Mach flights.

Majs Cunningham and Quist got the big redeployment sortie, and they

left Mildenhall at 1000 hrs on 5 Jul y 1983 and headed for t he Ba r

ents/BalticSeas,prio r to flying westacross theNorthAtlanticand back to

California.

After completing their first ' take' run on a 'northern loop' over rhe

BarentsSea, thecrewdeceleratedinto the'Viking North' aerial refuelling

track in international airspace west ofB0do. Topped off, they climbed

back to alt itude and entered their second 'collection area' within the

narrow Baltic corridor to complete the reconnaissance portion of rhe

mission. Preparing to head home, they again deceleratedand descended

into the 'Viking North' area over the North Sea. Back at high altitude

after taking on morefuel, Quist calculared that Cunningham would have

to accelerate to maximum Mach to improve rhe aircraft 's range so as to

ensure that they would have enough

fuel to reach the next set of rankers

near Labrador.

During this'highand hot' phase of

the f light, the SR-71's lef t engine' s

EGT in dic ato r sh owed t ha t the

temperature of the exhaust gas exiting

the J58 had become uncontrollable,

and tim 64-17972 shoul d not be

flown faster than Mach 3.05 in order

to p rev en t the p owe rp la nt be ing

damaged. However, by flying at this

less than optimum speed the SR-71

wouldrun out offuelbefore itreached

the KC-135s. Manual control of the



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53

permission from the base comman

d er t o do a farewel l f lyby), f lew a

wide circular pattern at 250 knots

t ow ard s t he Greenham Peace

Camp. As 64-17980 r ea ch ed a

strategic point,Jiggenspushedboth

throttlesto full 'burner, whereupon

the jet thundered over the

encampment a t very low al ti t ude.

Apply ing sharp back-pressure to

rhe control column and loft ing the

'Habu' into a spectacular climb, he

a ll ow ed his a ir cr af t t o trumpet

the 'sound of freedom' as only an

SR-7l could.

The final ASARS-l demonstration fl ight wasconducted on 30 July,

when Thomas and Morgan flew 64-17955 on a 7.3-hour fl ight back to

Beale, via the Baltic/Barents Seas.The system had performed flawlessly

throughout t he d ep loymen t, p rovi ng t ha t ASARS-l r ep re se nt ed a

quantum leap in radar resolutionand capabil i tyfor reconnaissancepur

poses. CaptsGary Luloffand RSO

Bob Coats ferried the aircraft back

to Palmdaleon 2August, wherefur

ther t es ts were conducted, prior to

an ini ti al order being placed wi th

Goodyearfor two production radar

sets forthe operational fleet.

PERMANENTDET

Al though the 1983 deployment to

Mildenhall was still called a

'temporary operation' , two SR-71s

remained on s trength with Det 4

throughout (he year (apar t f rom a

period lastingjust33 daysin early1983, and tllreedaysin theautumn).

As early as 1980, SAC had begun planning changes in the SR-71' s

European operations to cut thecostof deploymentsand to increase the

frequency of surveillance flights. Such changes required actionsof 'air

d iplomacy ' on the par t of HQ 3rd Air Force and USAF and SAC staff

64-17980 joined Det 4 from Beale

on 7 March 1983, and it is seen

here coming over the fence at RAF

Greenham Common on 22 July,

where it participated in that year'sAir Tattoo (Paul F Crickmorel

Maj B C Thomas carries out post

f light checks of 64·17955 (USAF)

Surrounded by daisies, 64-17980

returned to Beale on 6 September

1983 (BobArcher)

DET 4

omE·OFTHE·BLACHBIR

WhenDet 4 lost i ts TR-1s,

the change was reflected in its

redesigned operationslocation

board (Paul FCrickmore)

Palmdale 'test-bird' 64-17955 is

seen here in i tsnormal markings,

resplendent with the lockheed

Skunk - a schemeguaranteed to

haveprovoked unwanted interest in

t he je t had it been so adorned when

it arrived at Mildenhall (Lockheed)

Thisradome, housing the C3 Com

datalink antenna, wasf i t ted to

64-17955 in 1983 along wi t h t he

ASARS-1 equipment (USAF)

based. On 9 July, Rosenberg and McKim completed

a s ev en -h ou r fl ig ht to Mi ld en ha ll , via t he B ar

ents/Baltic Seascollection area,in 64-17955.

Local Brit ish aeroplane spotters peering through

binoculars and telescopes from various off-base

v an ta ge poi nt s e xc it ed ly r ec or ded t he 'Habu's'

arrival. Some noted i ts sl ightly bumpy ASARS-l

nose, as well as an 'al ready fami li ar ' t ai l number,

which many people jot ted down in theirlog books.

On that occasion, however, all of them had logged

a false serial , as a cover number was being used to

conceal the fact that t he t es t jet had been deployed

overseas. As 64-17955 was already known by avia

t ion enthusiasts as 'the Palmdal e t es t s hi p' , i t h ad

been dec ided by the main tenance per sonnel at Beale to temporari ly

re-christen it 64-17962 for thi s deployment . The l at te r j et h ad

previouslyvisited Mildenhallon a number of occasions,and i twouldnot

thereforedraw unwelcomeattention, and speculation, to theunique test

deployment of theASARS-l system.

On 18 July, Thomas and Mor gan t ook t he a ir cr af t o n a 2 .6 -hou r

ASARS-l operational test sort ie to monitor mili tary installations in East

Germany. Three days later, Rosenbergand McKimcompleteda four-hour

mission. On the22nd, Thomas and Morgan flew Det 4's second SR-71,

64-17980,to nearbyGreenhamCommon for the 1983AirTattoo.Among

the tens of thousands of people whocanleto see theaircraftweresomeof

the 'Greenham Women', who had long been demons t ra t ing aga inst

numerous poli tical issues, and whohad been campingoutside thebase to

gainpublic recognition for theircause.The daybeforethe SR-71 was due

to return to Mildenhall,someof thedemonstrators managed todaub white

p ai nt on i t. They were quickly arrested for causing a disturbance, and

for possibl e damage to the a ircraf t' s t i tanium - labora tOlY ana lysi s

subsequently proved that itwas unharmed.

Several days later, Maj Jim Jiggens and RSO Capt Joe McCue per

formed an unforgettabledeparture from thebase. After a morning take

off on 26 J ul y fo r t he short f li gh t back to Mi ldenha l l, J iggens (an

ex-Thunderbirds airshow demonstration pilot , who had obtained prior



specialists. Following orders From the JCS, HQ USAF and HQ SAC,

Col Don Walbrecht of the 3rd Air Force, accompanied by Lt Col John

Fuller and LtCol Dwight Kealoa oFHQ USAF/XOXX (Protectotateof

Plans and Policy), and Lt Col Kenneth Hagemann of HQ SAC/XP

(Deputy ChieF of StaFF Plans), proposed to Assistant Secretary Martin

Scicluna and Gp Capt FrankAppleyard, Deputy Director of Operations

in the RAF's Direc torate of Organisation (DGO/RAF), that SR-71

operations at Mildenhall should be 'bedded down' on a permanent basis.

Scicluna (Head of the MoD's 5-9 (AIR)) led theBritish contingent

who reviewed the proposal.Although he thought that the SR-7I's high

visibilityimage might cause'political difficulties' at someseniorlevels, he

took the issue Forward to SecretaryoFState For Defence,Sir FrancisPym,

who agreed to consider it.After specialisedbriefings toa handFul oFMoD

'insiders', includingcertain intelligence officers who had 'special access'

to US reconnaissance inFormation, their recommendationswere taken to

Pym,who agreed to the initiative. Another meetingheld three dayslater

worked out the politics of the proposal.

The Following week, each member of t he US t eam brieFed hi s

respective CINC or Deputy Chief of Staff in Ramstein, Omaha orWashington, DC that theprogramme was 'on track' inWhitehall. Soon

aFter, PrimeMinister MargaretThatcher'sapproval was noted as asimple

'change of mode of operat ions' from temporary deployments to a

permanent presence at RAFMildenhall. U-2/TR-] operations werealso

to be moved from Mildenha ll to nearby RAF AlconblllY as both bases

were'beefed-up' for theirexpanded intelligence roles.

On 5April]984,Prime MinisterThatcher announced thata permanent

detachmentofSR-71s hadbeenestablishedat theSuffolkbase following the

blanket clearance given by her government to the USAF to operate two

'Habus' From the UK. Nevertheless, certain sorties performed by Det 4

would still requireprior high-level approval from theMoD. Moreover,those

especiallysensiciveoperations would require'clearance'from the PM herself.

Anglo-American cooperation also extended to the performing of the

actual SR-7] missions themselves. For example, 'Habu' sorties venturing

into the Barents/Baltic Seas were occasionally timed to coincide with

missions beingflown in thesame area by the RAF's trio of Nimrod R ]

ELINT aircraft,operated at thattime byNo5 ] Sqnfrom RAF Wyton, in

Hun tingdons hi re . Such coope ra tion also e xtended to the German

Marineflieger, which used Breguet

Arlan tics to carry out a s imilar

ELINT roleto theNimrod R ]s.

During such sorties, the SR-71

acted as the provoca teur, with the

on-station timings of both aircraft

beingcontrolled towithin secondsso

as to ensure r11at the slower ELINT

platform was in the optimum

pos it ion to take full advantage of

signals traffic that was not usually

forthcomingfrom theSovietside.

64·17971 departsMildenhall 's

runway 29 on 2 February 1983

at 230 knots andcl imbs away

at an in i tia lang le of attack of

ten degrees. The gear-l imit

speed on take-off/landing

was 300 knots, whichmeant

thatprompt undercarriage

retraction was necessary if

damage to the doors was to

be avoided. Shock diamonds

i n t he exhaustplume are clearly

visiblein the clear, crisp winter air

(Bob Archer)

)

'HABU' AND THE

OPPOSITION

Immediately afterWorld War 2, itwasclearthat two major geo-politi

cal sys tems would domina te the world . Inheren t in both was their

mutually abiding mistrust of theother, which in turnsowed theseeds

For an armsracethat wouldcontinue until onesystem achieved dominance

over the other. Soviet intelligence concerning the development of USAF

high-speed, high altitude bombers and reconnaissance platForms like the

Convair B-58 Hustler, North American B-70 Valkyrie and Lockheed

SR-71 inevitably provoked a self-perpetuating cause and eFfect response

with theopposingpower bloc.

As early as ]960, the Mikoyan-Gurevich Opyrno-Konstruktorskoye

Byuro (OKB des ign bureau) was tasked with develop ing a mult i-role

supersonic interceptor that was capable of deFea ting these new and

emergingthreats then under development in the US.The end result was

thefirst 'bigMiG' - the outstandingMiG-25 'Foxbat'.

The Soviets also embarked upon the development of the improved

S-200 medium- to h igh-al t itude SAM sys tem. Des ignated the SA-5

'Gammon' by NATO, it represented a considerable advance over the

SA-2'Guideline'. The single-stage missile consisted of four jettisonable,

wraparound solid propellant boosters, givingit a range of up to 300 km,

a maximum altitude of between 20,000 and 40,000 metres, depending

upon thevariant, and a topspeed oF2500 metres persecond. Equipped

witha 2] 5-kghighexplosive warhead, theSA-5 enteredservice in ]967.

Just twoyears later,it was estimated that75 SA-5 battalionshad been

deployed around the nation's military bases, industrial complexes and

population centres. Each missile battalion was equipped with between

two and five trainable, semi-fixedsingle rail launchers and one 320-km

range P-35M 'Barlock-B' E/F-band target search and acquisition radar

thatalso boasted an integral D-band IFF (Identification Friend or Foe)

system. Target trackingand missile guidance were handled by a 5N62

'SquarePair' H-band radar that hada range of270 km. Once launched,

the missiles were command guided until switched to semi-active mode

for terminal homing ro the target.

Five years afterthe SA-5 had enteredservice, the establishment of the

firstMiG-25P lInit wasoFficiallyannounced bythe Sovietair force (VVS)

in a d irec tive da ted ]3 April ]972. Initially, Protective Air DeFence

(PYO)unitswerestationednearMoscow, Kiev, Perm, Baku, Rostovand

in the northern and far eastern regions of the USSR. By the mid-]970s,

600+ MiG-25Ps constituted the backbone of the YVS's interceptor

inventory.Soon afterconvertingto type, PVO unitsstationednear Soviet

borderareas werecarryingout intercepts ofSR-71s involvedin peripheral

reconnaissance missions of the USSR.

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The mighty MiG-25PD/PDS'Foxbat

E' posed a serious threat to Det4 's

operationsover the Barents/Baltic

Seas. SR-71s conducting reconnais

sance missions in this area were

primarily opposed by interceptors

f romthe 787th lAP. The unit was

equipped with the MiG-25PD from

July 1982 through to August 1989

(VVS)

On 6 Sep tember 1976, ' Foxbar ' p il ot Lt Y ic to r Bel enko f rom a

py a unitat Chuguyevka air base, north ofYladivostok, defected to the

West via Japan in 'his' MiG-25P. This totally unexpected turn of events

provided the US intelligence community with a 'windfall' , and the

aircraft was virtually dismantled by USAF intelligenceanalysts.Althoug h

the interceptorwas later returned to its country of origin, it was obvious

to Soviet officialsthat theMiG-25P's capabilities had now beenseverely

compromised. Indeed, unless the design was drastically upgraded, the

type's combatefficiency wouldbe enormouslydegraded.

In a joint effor t that involved the Minis tty of Aircraft Industry and

military experts, the Mikoyan OKB embarked upon a comprehensive

upgrade programme. The jet's earlier monopulse low-pulse repetition

frequency (PRF) 'Smerch-A2' (Izdelye nOM) radar was replaced by the

much-improved 'Sapfeer-25'. This newsystem was larger than its prede

cessor, which in turn meant that a modestfuselage stretch forward of the

cockpitwas required in order to facilitate its accommodation. The radar's

improved capabilities allowed the aircraft to detecr targets with a Radar

CrossSection of16 m2 ata rangeof morethan 100 km (62.5 miles).

An infra-red search and track (IRST) system was also developed

which, when coupled with the radar , made the weapons system less

susceptible to the effects of enemy ECM. It also provided the platform

with the capabil iry to perform 'sneak attacks ' against aer ial targets

without the pilothaving to firstswitch on the radar.

The upgrade also included the installation of the BAN-75 target

indication and guidance system, which acted in conce rt w it h t he

ground-basedLuch-1 ('Ray') guidancesystem toalign theoptical axis of the

aircrafr's radar with the target. This also ensured that the MiG-25's radar

was less sensitiveto jamming.In addition, a newIFF setand ground-based

command system were also provided - the lat ter, which replaced the

Yozdookh-1M, incorporateda jam-proofaircraft receiver.

Four R-60(AA-8 'Aphid') air-to-air missiles(AAMs) couldbe carried,

which due to more effective homing heads had almostdoublethe range

of earlier weapons. R-40TD (AA-7 'Acrid') IR-homing and R-40R

act ive- radar homing AAMs remained in the MiG-25's arsenal too.

Finally, and perhaps not surprisingly, the upgraded platform would

be powered by the improved version of the Tumanskii R-15 engine,

designatedthe R-15BD-300.

Work progressed rapidly on the fighter, which was designated the

MiG-25PD or Izdelye 84D (D standing for Dorabotannyy in Cyrillic,

)whi ch meant mod if ied o r upgraded i n Eng li sh ). The new verSIOn

replaced the MiG-25P on the production line in 1978, and examples

weredelivered to the VVS through to late 1982. Some 370 MiG-25Ps

were also subjected to a mid-life update programme berween 1979 and

1984, leading to them being redesignatedMiG-25PDSs (Perekhvatchik,

DoraLotannyy v Stroyou, or field-modified interceptor).

FRONTLINE FIGHTER OPERATIONS

An insight into MiG-25PD operations as conductedby the 787th lAP

(lstrebiteLniy Aviatsionniy PoLk, or Fighter Aviation Regiment) against

Det 4 SR-71s flying over the Baltic Sea is reproduced here courtesy of

LutzFreund, editorof Sowjetische FLiegerkrafte Deutschland 1945-1994;

'Berween 14July 1982and 10August 1989, the 787th IAP flew the

MiG-25PD. This was moreor less thesameperiod of time that the SR-71

operated out of Mildenhall. With the retirement of theSR-71 from the

UK, t he 787th lAP replaced its MiG-25PDs with MiG-23s and

MiG-29s. The regiment operated its MiGs from Finow-Eberswalde air

base in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). This airfield had

originally been builtfor the Luftwaffe in 1936, and i twasusedby Soviet

forces from 1945. With the introduction of the MiG-25PU two-seat

trainer, Finow-Eberswalde's runway (10128) was enlargedto 2510 m.

'In 1980,Warsaw Pact py a unitsintroduced a newalarmcall-"Jastreb"

(hawk). It meant that an SR-71 was approaching! Later on, it became the

standard alarm signal for all high and very fast flying targets. Under normal

circumstances the alarm call came several minutes beforea SR-71, with its

rypical flight parameters at an altitude of20 to 25 kilometres and flying at

some 800-900 metres asecond, entered therangeof Soviet and GDR radar

airsurveillance and radarguidance troops. In parallel, this alarm prompted

action at Finow-Eberswalde which usually resulted in thein thescrambling

ofMiG-25PDs from the787th lAP.

'The interceptors took off and approached the intruder by f lying a

wide curve on a parallel course, separated by a few kilometres. When

performingthis manoeuvre, theMiG-25 pilots hadto use all the airspace

available to them over either the northern or southern GDR. On all

militalYmaps the MiG-25's flight path was shown as a bigcircle.

'When theweatherwas favourable, SR-71s flew reconnaissancemissions

once or twice a week along the Warsaw Pact border. During mil itary

64-17975 only deployed to Det

4 once, between mid-July and

16 October 1984. Having just

cleared the 'piano keys', the

aircraftis just seconds from

touchdown on Mildenhall 's

runway 11. This aircraft f lew

a number of Barents/Baltic

Seasmissions during its

time in the UK (Paul F Crickmore)

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missilescarried semi-recessed in the fuselageon AKU-410ejecrorracks, or

four R-60M missiles if the target was ro beengaged usingthe IRST. Each

R-33 weighed 10581bs,including its103-lb HE/fragmenrationwarhead,

and hada range of75 miles.

The newZaslon radarroureda detection range of 180 km (111 miles)

and a targettracking range of 120 km (75 miles). The aircraft's avionics

s ui te al so inc lu ded the BAN-75 command l in k, t he SAU-155M

auromatic flight control system, the APD-518 digital secure data link

system (whichenableda flight offourMiG-31s ro swapdatageneratedby

their radars provided that they were within 200 km (124 miles) of one

another), the RK-RLDN secure data link a nd the SPO-15SL Radar

HomingAndWarning System.Finally,the jet'ssuperiornavigation suite

allowed thecrew ro safelypatrol the barrenArctic thearre of operations.

By l at e 1980 the ' Foxhound 's ' f li ght t est p rogramme had been

successfullycompleted, and within twoyears the firstMiG-31 production

aircraft had been delivered ro PYO units. The latter had achieved

initial operating capabiliry by mid-1982. The major units ro be equipped

withthe rype were the 153rdIAP, stationed atMorshansk, the786th IAPat

Pravdinsk, the180thIAPat Gromovo, the174m GvIAPat Monchegorsk,the 72nd IAPat Amdermaand me 518m IAPat Talagi.

Russian writer Yalery Romanenko has undertaken detailed research

for this book, piecing rogether a unique insight inro MiG-31 operations

against Det 4 SR-71s. The fruits of that effon aredetailed below;

'Military 1st ClassPilot Guards Maj Mikhail Myagkiy (ret.),was one

of the PYO pilots who executed inrercepts of t he SR-71 nea r the far

northern borders of the USSR. Between 1984 and 1987, he was a

MiG-31 "Foxhound" commander with the 174th GvIAP (Gvardeiskaya

IstrebiteLniy Aviatsionniy PoLk, or Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment).

During thisperiod Myagkiy conducted 14successful SR-71 intercepts.

'A graduate of theArmavirWAKUL PYO (HigherMilitary Aviation

Red Banner Academy of Pilots of the PYO) i n 1977, Myagk iy

commenced his frondine service fly ing the Sukhoi Su-15 "Flagon".

He then qualified as a 1 st C la ss P ilot o n the MiG-23ML "Flogger-G",

having by then accumulated approximately600 hours of rotal flying time

andbeen promoted ro therank of captain.

'In 1983, only two reg imen rs f lew the MiG-31. The 786th IAP

at Pravdinsk (near Gorkiy) had been the first regiment ro receive the

"Foxhound", fol lowed by the 174th GvIAP at Monchegorsk (near

Murmansk). Prior ro being issued with the MiG-31, the 174th GvIAP

had flown the Yakovlev Yak-28P 'Firebar'. During the rransition ro the

MiG-31, many pilots left the unit - they di d not want r o f ly the new

aircraft. With most of the regiment's remaining rrainees being weapon

systemsoperarors(WSOs), the PYO had ro select pilots from other units

in order ro bringthe 174th GvIAP backup ro srrength onceagain.At that

time only 1stClass pilotswere beingselected ro f ly the MiG-31, so just a

small number of aviarors werequalified ro jointhe regiment.

'The PYO's 14thAirArmy was required ro supply one pilot ro the10th

AirArmy,rowhich the 174thGvIAP wasassigned.This proved ro beCapt

Myagkiy. As an actingflight commander, a transfer ro the 174th GvIAP

meant a reduction in rank for h im s ince the 14th Air Army commander

refused ro release Myagkiy from his permanenr dury p sition. Indeed, he

200

RUSSIAN

\

CCUPIED

LATVIA

.-.- _._-

RUSSIAN

OCCUPIED

LITHUANIA

15000

MILES

50

manoeuvres, flight frequency could

increase to two missions per 24 hours.

For all of t he se SR-71 f li gh ts,

m er e were two s tan da rd roures.

The a ircrafr usually approached

GDR airspace from Denmark. Over

me Wes t German ciry of Kiel, the

flight pam conrinued either ro At/jk-

liirungsstrecke 2 (reconnaissance roure

2),whichwas along the Balticsea coast

ro Len ingrad (now S t Peterbu rg )

a nd back, o r ro Aufkliirungsstrecke 5

(reconnaissance roure), along me

GDR's western border. Suchmissions

usually rook 60 minutes ro complete.

The distance ro me bordervaried due

ro meaircraft's high velociry - it was

unable ro follow me exact borderline.

Sometimes , an SR-71 c losed up ro

wimin a few kilometres of the GDR's

border in me area of Boizenburg, or

just slippedover ir!

'Had t he re e ve r b ee n an o rd er ro shoot down the inr ru de r, t he

MiG-25 crews would have been ready. Fonunarely, suchan order was

never given.After a shon time flying next ro eachother, theMiG-25PDs

headed home ro Finow-Eberswalde via Polish airspace.

'Beside the airbornedefenders, missile defence forceswould have also

been placedin alarm starus. Technically, itwould have been possible ro

successfully desrroy the inrruder, although the SA-5 batterywould have

needed the SR-71 ro f ly laterally ro the missile 's launch ramp for a shon

while so as ro improve the weapon's chances of attaining a successful

lock-on at the exrreme a1tirude at which thejet madeits reconnaissance

runs. The missileair defence force was kept at full alen whilst the SR-71

wasbeing rracked bySoviet radio-listening systems.'

In 1972, the Mikoyan OKB began work ing on a new inrercepror

destined ro r epl ace the MiG-25. Des ig ned a round two power ful

Aviadvigatel D-30F6 afterburning turbofans, me aircraftwould have bom

a lower rop speed and ceiling than theMiG-25PD. However, this fourth

generationfighterwasequipped with a weapons conrrol system based on

the SBI-16 Zaslon ('Flash Dance') phased-array radar, enabling its two

crewmembers ro inrercept targetsin eitherme fronr or rearhemisphere, day

or night,in anyweatherconditions, whilstoperatingin apassiveor an active

jamming environmenrat highsupersonicspeeds. Cleared forconstruction

inlate1979, theMiG-31'sfinalActofAcceptance wassigned in December

1981 and the first examples were delivered ro PYO uni ts in 1982.

Codenamed the 'Foxhound' by NATO, some 500 examples had been

delivered ro theWS bythe timeproduction ended in 1989.

Like the MiG-25PD before i t, the new MiG al so h ad a ful l IRST

capabiliry. Located in a rerractable pod beneath the forward fuselage, the

Type 8TP IRST enabled theaircrafr ro execureattacks without recourse ro

its radar. Typical armamenr consisted of four R-33 long-range air-ro-air

POLANDEASTGERMANY

This map reveals the standard

course fol lowed by SR-71 crews

whenoverf lying the Baltic Sea,

as well as the typical 'engagement'

zonesemployed by VVS MiG-25PDs

and MiG-31s and SwedishAir Force

JA 37 Viggens when tasked with

interceptingthe high-flying 'Habu'

(Osprey)

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Ma ki ng i ts frontline debut w i t h t h e

PVOi n 1982, the MiG-31 'Foxhound'

represented an extremely capable

adversary forthe SR-71 - especially

when equipped with R-33 air-to-air

missiles as seen here under the belly

of 'Blue31' (YefimGordon)

onlyallowedhis pilors ro rransfer ro remporary posirionswirhin orherAir

Armies. Myagkiyjoined rhe174rh GvIAPin Ocrober 1983. The regiment

hadbeenequippedwirh rheMiG-31 for 18 months by rhen, and irs crews

had frequendy flown missionsagainsr rheSR-71.

'Afre r a month ar Monchegorsk, Myagkiy was sen t ro rhe TsBP

lA-PYa (Tsentry Boyevoy Podgotovki - centre forcombar readiness, pya

fighreraviarion) inSavasleykaforMiG-31 rransirion rraining.The WSOs,

rwo of whom Myagkiy would larer fly wirh, also underwent rransirion

rraining ar Savasleyka. Over rhe course of rwo months , rhe p ilors were

raughr ro fly rhe MiG-25PU "Foxbar-C" and MiG-31 (srudents rook a

separare examinarion on each aircrafr). Inirially, rhey complered four

flighrs indual-controlMiG-25PU rwo-searer rrainers, and rheirfifrh, sixrh

and seventh sonies in rhe MiG-31 (wirh an insrrucror). On rhe eighrh

flighr rhe pilors went solo (wirh a WSO in rhe back sear, rarhe r rhan

an insrrucror). Having successfully gone solo on rhe "Foxhound", pilors

complered all rheir remaining rrainingflighrs in rheMiG-31.

'The flighr-rraining programme was very shorr. On 21 May 1984,

Capr Myagkiy received his aurhorisarion for independent flighrs in rhe

MiG-31, and on 21 June hewas deemed ro be com bar ready. Thismeant

rha r he could now perform a combara ir parro l in dayrime and i n b ad

wearher. Byrhe end of ]ulyMyagkiywas carrying our frondine parrols.

'His firsr mission againsr rheSR-71 came on 21 Augusr 1984.According

ro Myagkiy, rhe procedures followed by rhe regiment in an arrempr ro

perform a successful intercept were totally inadequate when it came ro

negatingrhe threat posed bythe SR-71 's spy flighrs. The speedand altirude

of rheUS aircrafr simply hypnotised everyone in theWS . Therefore, each

attempted SR-71 interception was considered a rop priority, not only for

fighteraviation but also for rhePYa's entire 10thAirArmy.

'The ground vectoringstation on the Rybachiy Peninsulaoften made

the firsr "sighring". Intercepting jets rhen rook off from bases in the

norrh rhat were not wearher affected. An error a t any level - bya irc rew,

groundcrew, thosein the command posr or by a ground vecroring starion

controller- broughtwirhit thethreat of a military tribunal (counmartial).

Between 21 August 1984 and 8

January 1987, 174th GvlAP pilot

Ma j Mi kh a i l Myagkiy (right)

conducted 14 practice intercepts

on SR-71s whi lstat the controls

of a MiG-31 'Foxhound'. Most of

these took place over the Barents

Sea, Myagkiy having been

scrambled f romthe 174th

GvlAP's base at Monchegorsk,

near Murmansk (Mikhail Myagkiy)

64-17973 taxiesback to i ts ' b a rn '

at Mildenhall in May 1987, the jet 's

brake ' ch ute d o o rs st i l l in the open

position. The 'chute was usually

ejectedby thepi lot whi lst

decelerating during the roll-out

through 55 knots to ensure that its

heavy at tachment pointwas pulled

clear o f t h e a f t fuselage without

damaging the SR-71

(PaulF Crickmore)

'Eachfighter regimentexecured

intercepts in their own secror. For

the 174 th GvIAP , thi s was the

secror of the Soviet border from

Kharlovka ro Cape Svyaroy Nos.

For the unit' s MiG-31 crews , 16

minures usually elapsed from the

moment thealert was sounded ro

the take-offcommand beinggiven.

Of rhis time,rwo minuteswere

usedby thepilotandWSO todon

the ir VKK-3 (vysotnyy kompen-

siruyushchiy kostyum, or altitude

compensating suit) flightsuits ,

followed by rwo more minutes ro

run 60 m (66 yards) in the VKK

and getstrapped inro rhe jer. The remainder of rhe time was then spent

checkingout theMiG-31 's varioussystems,start ing the enginesand taxiing

ro therunway threshold. After 16 minutes thefighterwould be parkedat

the end of rherunway, with its enginesrunning, fullyprepared for take-off.

'When theSR-71 alerrwasfirsr given, rherechnical personnel would

run ro thejet and remove its R-60shorr-rangemissiles, as these could not

be fired at speeds exceedingMach 1.75 - thestandardMiG-31 ordnance

load consisted offour R-60sand four long-rangeR-33s.

'Prior ro theaircrafttaking off, itsinerrialnavigarionsystem (INS) had

ro be activated in minimum time. As soon as thegreen lightscame on in

the cockpits confirming that the INS was aligned (after approximately

three minutes), rheengines could befired up.

'Sat in their cockpits, the minutes ticking away, the pilotsandWSOs

of rheready flight had ro complete their pre-flight checks in a somewhat

tense environment. The MiG-31s assigned ro the 174th GvIAP were

from the firsr production series, and they were prone ro suffering from

systemsfailure - panicularlyduring the turningoffof ground poweronce

the "Foxhound's" engines had fired up. If the ground power plug was

pulled our roo abrupdy, the INS system malfunctioned. The crew that

managed ro reach full mission readiness first was the one that launched.

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'Having received permission to taxi, the aircraft took up itsposition at

the end of the runway. Here, crewssomerimes had to "cool theirjets"for

several minutes if they had reached the runway ahead of the allocated

departure time. The SR-71 in te rcep t profi le adopted by the PYO had

been computed down to the very last second, which in turn meant that

the MiG-31s had to launch exactly 16 minutes after the initial alert was

sounded.By then the ground vectoringstation had determined precisely

what route (outroute or return route) theSR-71 was following.

'Five minutes after take-off, theMiG-31 was already at an altitude of

16,000 m (52,493 ft) . The afterburners would s ti ll be l it and the crew

experienc ing s ignifican t G-forces. Addit ionally, the MiG-31 had a

disconcerting idiosyncrasy.At highsupersonicspeeds (aboveMach 2.35),

the control column moved all the way forward, pushing up against the

instrument panel.The pilot hadto fully extendhisarm inorderto remain

in control of the jet. Fatigue would soon set in if the pilot was forced to

keep his armoutstretched for morethan a few minutes at a time. Despite

this peculia r prob lem, the MiG-31 was far more benign in its Aight

characteristics at supersonicspeeds than the MiG-25. The great weight of

the MiG-31'sonboard equipmentand systems all hadan adverseeffecton

its topend performance incomparison withthe "Foxbat", but its avionics

were vastlysuperior to those firred in rhe MiG-25.

'During an SR-71 intercepr, many commonly accepred pracriceswere

broken. For example, take-offwasexecuted in a northerlydirecrion, while

normalprocedurecalled fora take-offto thesouth.A numberoflimitations

were alsoremoved, includingthe altitude for transitionto supersonic Aight.

Established as 11,000 m (36 ,089 ft) during a rou tine Aighr, when a

MiG-31 crewwas interceptingan SR-71, Sovietaircraft were permittedto

passthrough thesoundbarrierat just8000 m (26,247ft). Finally, ground

vectoring was usually conducted at an altitude of 16,000 m (52,493 ft),

but when going after an SR-71 , the MiG-31 could reach a lt itudes of

18,500-19,500 m (60,696-63,976 ft). In an attempt to establish the bestmissile launch trajectory, the MiG crews gained as much altitude as they

could- often upto ahe igh tof20,000 m (65,617ft).

'Soviet radio intercept stations usually started receiving information

abour an inbound SR-71 when it was three hours out. As the jet departed

Mildenhall, conversations between its crew and those manningsupporting

KC-135Qswere"captured" duringinAightrefuelling. Highlytrained radio

interceptoperators knew that if the tankersshowed up, the PYO needed to

betoldthatan SR-71 was headingfor theBarents/BalticSeas.

'The s tandard SR-71 route was normally loop shaped. If t he j etappeared from the direction ofNorway, it tracked towardthe White Sea,

headedfurther norrh toward ovaya Zemlyaand then turnedaround on

a reversecourse to thewest over theArctic Ocean. This trackwascalleda

"straightloop". However, ifit initiallyapproached from the direction of

theArctic Ocean toward NovayaZemlya, thenheaded south toward the

White Seaand westalongthecoast of theUSSRtowardNorway, its track

was called the "return loop". The tactics employed by theMiG-31 crew

weregeared toward thetype ofloop thespyplanewas Aying.

'The SR-71 was intercepted usingonly a thermal channel (infra-red,

IR), as the massive IR emissions of its engines meant that the je tcou ld be

detected at a distance of 100-120 km (62-75 miles). The MiG-31's

thermal detection system was called OMB (optical multi-functional

apparatus), and wasmounted in thelower nose of theaircraft.The device

waslowered and turned on bytheWSO, whilsttheMiG's radarremained

inactive throughout the interception.When on a combat alert the radar

wasseton a combat frequency. However, theVYS was keen not to expose

this frequency to a "probable enemy" during a routine SR-71 intercept,

so the rad ar was not turned on - al l SR-71 Aights were supported by

RC-135 ELINT/SIGINT platforms arrempting to collect frequencies

such as this. A passive system such as the OMB firred to theMiG-31 was

morethan adequateto ensurethat theSR-71 was intercepted.

'After capture of the ta rge t by the OMB, a target indicatOrshowing

the range to theSR-71 appeared on theSEI (sistema edinoy indikatsii, or

unified display system) in the pilot's head-up display (HUD). A female

voice (known as "Rita" to the crews) indicatOr announced "Attack!" The

range to rhe targer was calculated by the aircraft's BTsVM (or onboard

digital computer), using a rriangularion method that employed other

on-board sensors. This sysrem was unique to the MiG-31, for the p ilo t

did not receive range-tO-target data in the MiG-25 - he had to rely on

da ta passed from ground vectOring stations instead. Also, the ZDR

(missileengagementenvelope) wasprojected onto the HUD.

' Af te r b eing g iv en the "Ar rack !" s ig na l, t he c rew began missi le

preparation. Targeting instructions were handed off to the GSN (golovka

samonavedeniya, or the target-seeking device of the missile - i.e. its seeker

head). Four green triangles appeared on the image of rhe MiG in the

cockpit displayafterthe missileshad been prepared forlaunch.

'The BRLS (bortovaya radiolokatsionnaya stantsiya, or on-board radar)

was turned on onlyin theevent thatthe vectoringstation issuedan order

to des troy the targe t. In this case, the WSO would activate the radar.

In formation regard ing the targe t would then be ins tantly transferred

from the OMB t o the rad ar . A ft er thi s the p ilot h ad only to pus h the

firing button and the missileswould be launched.

'I f the SR-71 had violated Soviet airspace, a live missile launchwould

have been carried out - there was practically no chance that theaircraft

couldavoid an R-33. But in theearly 1980sthe SR-71 did not violate the

borde r, a lt hough the y s omet imes " ti ck le d" i t ( came r ig ht up to i t) .

Indeed, local counter-intelligence officers dreamt of finding piecesof an

SR-71, i fnot on land then in the territorial waters of theUSSR.'

Of all the in te rcept missions Aown by Mikhail Myagkiy in the

MiG-31, his eighth one stands out the mos t, as he managed to g ain

v isua lcontac t with an SR-71 - and not just in the form of a dot on his

windscreen. As a keepsake, he preserved the printout of the recording

from the'blackbox' through which all the interceptdata was processed.

Here is how Myagkiydescribed the Aight;

' I wen t on comba r a le rt o n 31 J anua ry 1986 as norma l. I d rew my

personal weapon in themorningand rhen headedfor theon-dutycrewhut.

'They alerted us about an inbound SR-71 at 1100 hrs. They sounded

thealarmwirh a shrill bell and thenconfirmed itwith a loudspeaker. To

thisday Ihavebeen averseevento ordinaryschool bells,becausea bell was

thefirst signal for a bursr of adrenaline. The appearance of an SR-71 was

a lwaysa mpanied by nervousness . Everyone began to talk in frenz ied

voices, r surry about and react to thesituationwith excessive emotion.

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Although deployed to Mildenhall

just once,64-17960 served with

Det 4 f o rno less than 15 months,

from 29 October 1985 through to

29 January 1987. It was almost

certainlyintercepted by 174th

GvlAP pilot Maj Mikhail Myagkiy

over the Barents Sea during this

time (Paul F Crickmorel

All buttoned-down and wi t h i t s

systems fully operable, 64-17964

prepares to leave the Det 4 'barn'

on a Barents/BalticSeas sort ie on

17 December 1987 (Paul FCrickmore)

' I r an to p ur o n myVKK and GSh-6 (germoshlem, or flighr helmer),

and overrhara fur-lined flighrjackerwirh IPS (individualnayapodvesnaya

systema, or parachure harness), rhen ran 60 m to rhe a ir craf r. I was nor

fly ingwirh my own WSO, bur wirh AJeksey Parshin, our flighr WSO.

I sal' down in rhe cockpir , and as I was being snapped in - ir was b or h

simple and convenienr to besrrapped in wearing a jacker and IPS, which

iswhyweflew inrhem- rhe readinesslamps for rhe INSwerelir. I pressed

rheengine sran burton, reponed to rhe command posr and immediately

received rhe order to raxi to rhe runway. We sal' on rhe runway for five

minures, myWSO loudly"reading rhe prayer" (pre-rake-offchecklisr).

'Afrer receiving rhe rake-offorder from rhe command pos t, we lit rhe

afrerburners and tookoff. Our rake-offspeedwas approximarely360 kmh

(224 mph ). Remaining in a frerbu rn er s, we wen r for a1r irude w ith a

60-degreerighrbank,followedby a rurn onto acourse of l 00°.We arrained

8000 m (26,247 fr) and reached rhe horizonral area (for accelerarion), ar

which point we pas se d rhrough rhe sound barrier. Vectoring srarion

"Gremikha" had by rhen assumed responsibiliry for guiding us t o rhe

SR-71. Our ind icared speed ar rhis rime was 1190 kmh (739 mph).

Wewenr foralrirudeagain,up to 16,000m (52,493 fr).

'Once ar 16,000 m wewereflying arMach 2 .3 , and I made a le fr rurn

onro a combar course of 360°. The WSO lowered and rurne d on the

OMB, and wirhin five seconds he had caprured the rarger. A feminine

voice in rhe earphones announced, "Arrack!" , and a s ymbo l was

illuminared on rheSEI. The SR-71 was proceedingon rhe"rerurn loop",

from easrto west, sowe began rhe inrerceprimmediarely.

'As usual , we execured an "a iming run" f rom 16,000 m, galI1l11g

altirude to 18,900 m (62,008ft).Afrer closingto within60km (37 miles)

of rhe targer, I sporred the conrrai l of rhe SR-71 on an intersecting

course. I reporred rhe heading to my WSO over rhe SPU (samoletnoye

peregovornoye ustroystvo, or inrercom), rhen told him "I have visual!"

A contra il a r 22,000-23,000 m (69,000-72,000 fr) is very rare, but on

rhis day the wearher was excellenr and the air was transparenr, making

rhe conrrai l c learly v is ib le . I passed under rhe spyplane, which was

3000-4000 m (8843-13,123 fr) above us, and I even managed to make

our irs black silhouerre. The SR-71 was fly ing over rhe ocean ever so

carefully on a track 60 km (37miles) our from, and parallelto, thecoasr.

I reponed "We're breaking off' t o t he command post and came off

afrerburners.We

had been airborneforjusr 15minuresand

40 seconds.'The SR-71 was flying irs normal roure over neurral warers, and ir

made no senseto follow ir. Therefore, the vectoringsration gave us rhe

command t o turn onto a course for our airfield. We dropped down to

15 ,000 m (49,213 fr), rransirioned to horizontal flighr and engaged a

stopwarch. This was the so-ca lled "area for canopy cooling". During

flighrar speeds in excess ofMach2, theskin, including rhecanopy, heared

upto 800°C (1472°F). Therefore, it was necessaryto cool ir. Failure to do

so mighr resulr in c rack ing or carasrrophic failure during subsequent

alrirude reducrion. Ou r speed remained in rheorder ofMach 1.6.

'After 30 seconds we once aga in began to lose a1tirude. We wenr

subsonicar 12,000m (39,370 fr). Droppingdown to 8000 m (26,247fr),

we rracked toward our a irfield. After rhe las t vec tor was issued, the

command centre handed us off to our regimental command post, which

direcred us toa checkpoinraran alrirude of4100 m (13,451 fr).AI' 32 km

(20miles) ourfrom rhe airfield,I lowered rhegear and began to descend.

We conducted a srraight-in landing at a speed of310 kmh (193 mph).

The entire flighr had lasred 50 minures.

'During t he 15 t o 2 0 m in ut es thaI' I was on a combar course, rhe

second alerr crewwassitting on the ground wirh engines running. Larer,

rhey shur down rheir engines, burthe pilorand WSOsarin their aircraft

ara srate of readiness unril wehad landed.

'This was the only occasion in my 14 interceprs that] saw rhe SR-71

with my own eyes. II' was obvious rhar a combination of circumsrances

facilirared rhis evenr- goodweather, whichwas rare in rhe north, clearair

and unusual armosphericcondirions,which meanr thaI' rhe jer's contrail

was clearlyvisible ar an a1rirude of23,000 m (75,459 fr).'

Mikhail Myagkiy rerired from the WS in 1992 wirh rhe rank of

GuardsMajor arthe age of36.

MONITORING INTERCEPTS

Rerired Swedish a ir force fighter contro l le r ] olf J nsson rourinely

monitoredSR-71 interceprs conducred by borh frien lIy ATO aircraft

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and not so friendly Soviet MiG-25s and MiG-31s whilstthe 'Habu' was

operating overthe Baltic Sea;

'We would detect possible SR-71 "Baltic Express" flights about an

hour before the aircraft physicallyentered thearea. The "Habu" always

headedintothe BalticSeaovera reportingpoint named"Codan", located

about 50miles(80 km) south of Copenhagen, andon a headingof about

90°. This usuallytriggereda scramble bya pair ofjA37 Viggens that were

kept on alert a t F lO Angelholm, F17 Ronneby and F13 Norrkoping

sometimes,jets operatingfrom temporarybasessuch as Visbywere also

used. The perfect basefrom which ro launch an SR-71 interception was

F17 Ronneby because it was bes t pos i t ioned for the accelerat ion and

climb phase due roit beingjust 31 miles(50 km) southeast ofGotland.

'The SR-71'sBalticflightpath remained thesame throughout thetime

it operated in Europe, consisting of a single anticlockwise loop that rook

about 30 minutes ro complete. It remained in international airspace,

initially flying along the Polish coastline. As i t approached the Bay of

Gdanska, well ins ide the Kalingrad enc lave , the je t tu rned left onro a

heading of 0 1Y. With the "Habu" now flying at 80,000 ft (24,384 m),

only the Su-15 "Flagons" based at Vainode, in Latvia, had a chance of

making an intercept, and it's doubtful that any of them were actually

successful. Certainly the MiG-21 "Fishbeds" and MiG-23 "Floggers"

based at Pamu, Haapsalu and Tapa, in Esronia, had no chance- their

trails on our radar screens in Sweden wereso harmless it was painful!

'The "Habu" then proceeded ro a point about 37 miles (60km) westof

the Esronian island of Saaremaa, where it began a long, programmed left

turn, takingit onroa southerly heading of about 190°, before rolling out

east of Srockholm. It then passed between the islands of Gotland and

Oland, and this always impressed us because the corridor of international

airspace between the two islands is onlytwo miles wide. The "Habu" only

violated our airspace once (thiswasthe only time thatit becamenecessary

for the Swedish foreign office ro protest about an airspace violation) when

anSR-71 was forced ro interrupt its high speedleftturn, reduce speed and

descendfrom itsoperationalceilingdue ro an in-flight emergency. On that

occasion, theSR-71 was forced r o f ly direcrlyoverGorland, at which point

JA 37 Viggen pilots rook hand-held phoros of the "Habu". From them it

JA 37 pilots managed to fly

hazardous interception profi les

whichbrought them within

range of cruising SR-71s over

the Baltic Sea. Although the

Viggen, if carefullymanaged,

had the abi l ity to get within

striking range of the 'Habu',

the performance of its SkyFlash

missiles in such an engagement

is open to debate. This aircraft,

from F13, is armed with SkyFlash

(inboard) and Sidewinder air-to-air

missiles (Artech/Aerospace)

Having completed their EGTchecks,

and with the wheel chocks sti l l in

place underthe mains, thecrew

of 64·17964 hold on runway 29

in readiness for another pre-dawn

departure (Paul F Crickmorel

wasclear ro see that the aircraft was

flyingon just one engine.

'It was in this area thatour JA 37

pilots carried out the ir p ract ice

intercepts. Once 46 miles (74 km)

southeast of l and, t he "Bal ti c

Express" turned onto a heading of

265° and e xi te d the a re a ove r the

same pointthat ithad entered.

'Almo st evelY t ime the SR-71

was about ro leave the Baltic,a lone

MiG-25PD "Foxbat-E" belonging

ro the VVS's 787th TAP would be

scrambled. The 787thmaintainedthree squadrons(around 40 aircraft) at

Finow-Eberswalde, all ofwhich mayhave flown theMiG-25PD.It seems

likely, however, that two of the units were equipped with MiG-23M

"Flogger-Bs" and one with MiG-25PDs. A detachment of the lat ter

aircraft was also maintained at Wittsrock, and a second flight may have

also been based at another airfield in southern GDR.'When it arrived at its exit point, the "BalticExpress" was flying at

about 72,000 ft (21,946 m). The lone MiG-25PD sent up ro intercept

theSR-71 would reach about63,000 f t (19,202 m) in a left turn, before

rolling out and completing i ts s te rn a tt ac k s ome 1.8 mil es (2.9 km)

behind its target. We were a lways impressed by this precision - the

"Foxbat"was always 63,000 f tand 1 .8 miles behind the SR-7!.

'When the SR-71 detachment at Mildenhall was deactivated, the

787th lAP re-equipped with newMiG-29 "Fulcrum-Cs". Even after the

reconna is sance a ircraft 's withdrawal from the UK, our intelligence

sources indicated that a t least th ree MiG-25PDs remained behind at

Finow-Eberswalde just in case the "BalticExpress" returned!'

It is interesting ro notewhen readingRolfJonsson'saccount involving

a lone MiG-25PD out of Finow-Eberswalde that the simulated attack

always terminated when the intercepror was at 63,000 ft and 1 .8 miles

behind its target. This would suggest that these were the parameters

necessaryfor itsweaponssystemro effect asuccessful intercept if theorder

ro fire was ever given. This will, of course, forever remain supposition.

INTERCEPTION

It was rare for R-71 crews ro spot their pursuers during Barents/Baltic

Seas operations, fora fully functioning'Habu'

would remainout of

reachof any NAT or oviet intercepror. However, a jet with technical issues

(or the onSCl f frcak weather conditions) could bringthe SR-71 back ro

within rca h f hasing fighters. This happened ro Maj s ' Srormy '

Boudr aux and I S Ted Ross, who departedMildenhall in 64-17980 at

1010 hr n. JlInc 1986 on yet another Barents/Baltic Seas sortie.Hea lin OUl a ross the orth Sea toward their first refuelling west

of N rway . lh · rew discovered once they were in the tanker track at

26,000 fllh.lllh .sun was directlyahead of them. To makematters worse,

they wcr' n.1I1k ·d on citherside byclouds.As theyclosed for contactwith

t he K -I . S,. lh · loud both diffused and angled thesunlight, causing

the lall T l( I .f1. l brightlyoff the bottom of the tankers.

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As soon as rhe boomer made conracr, Boudreaux found himselfflying

formarion in a lmosr blinding condirions , wirh rhe SR-71' s cockpir

insrrumenrs obscured in rhe dark shadow of rhe dashboard below rhe

windscreen. He was forced ro arrange his rilrable car-like sun-visor ro

shield againsr rhe high conrrasr condirions. Thar efforr proved of lirde

value , for while in rhe conmcr posirion 'on rhe boom', rhe ranker's

reference poinrs for formarion fly ing were flash ing in such exrreme

conrrasr rhar, according ro Boudreaux,rheyappeared ro be surrounded by

'sea, skyor wharever'. A srrongsensarion of verrigo overrook Boudreaux,

leaving him wirh a false sense of diving and c limbing (and wirh rhe

even more powerful sensarion of flying inverred while refuelling). An

inrerphone call ro h is WSO, Maj Ross, assured Boudreaux rhar he was

nor upside-down. He was rhen able ro conrinue filling 64-17980's ranks

whilefighring hissenseofflying 'srraighrup or srraighr down'.

Mrer clearing rhe ranker, and hissenses, Boudreaux climbed rhrough

60,000 fr, where he nored rhrough hisperiscoperhar 64-17980 was srill

pulling contrails, which should have scoppedaboverhar alrirude.Anorher

check ar 70,000 fr revealed rhar he was 'srill conning', which he hoped

would surelysrop before rhey approached rhe rarger area. Upon enrering

rhe Barenrs Sea zone, rhe aircrafr began a programmed lefr rum ro rhe

norrheasr and rhen reversed in alarge sweeping righr rum ro roll ouron a

wesrerly heading, whichwould rake rheSR-71 on rhe 'collecrion run' and

backacross rheenrry poinr.

When esrablished on rhe wesrerly heading norrh of Archangel, rhe

crew nored rhar rhey were srill 'conning', which was mosr abnormal ar

high alrirudes. To add ro rheir dismay, Boudreaux sporred rhree orher

conrrails ahead of rhem and off ro rhe lefr,burrurning ro convergein whar

mighr be an inrercepr. Anorher sourherly glance revealed more 'cons'

closing from rhelefr, bur ara loweralrirude.These sixSovier fighrers, each

separared by approximarely15 miles, wereexecuringwhar appeared ro be

a well-rehearsed rurning inrercepr manoeuvre ro po p up somewhere

in rhe v ic in iry of rhe fasr-moving 'Habu' and porenrially fire off

sophisricared air-ro-air missiles.The Sovierfighrer pilors had execuredan

in-place rum, which would haveposirionedrhem perfecdyfor a head-on

arrack had 64-17980 's rrack penetrared Sovie r a irspace. As Ross

monirored rhe fighrers' electronic acriviries, Boudreaux increased speed

and alrirude.

Suddenly, a conn'ail shor by jus r b en ea rh rhe nos e of rhe SR-71,

leaving borh crewmembers wairing for a missile or anorher aircrafr ro

appear which mighr have 'spoiled rheirwholeday'. Irwaswirhgrear relief

rhar Boudreaux realised rhar rhey were now paralleling rheir inbound

conrrail- rhey had laid ir while rurning norrheasr prior ro headingwesr!

For a few momenrs rheirhearrsmissedseveralbears as rhey conremplared

rhe rhoughr ofhaving unwanredhigh-Mach company 15 miles aboverhe

cold Arcric seas.

Boudreaux eased offsome power and serded rhe SR-71 back inro a

rourine high-Mach cruise, rhe auropilor complering a long ' lazy rum'

around rhe norrh shore of Norway before rhe pilor srarred his descenr

roward anorher refuelling. To complete rhe mission, rhecrew made an

easyhigh alrirude dash inro rheBalric corridor and down rhrough Wesr

Germany, before heading home ro Mildenhall.

MIDDLE EASTAND SHUTDOWN

By rhe mid-1970s, rhe Middle Easr's complicared poliricsrhar had

bonded Chrisrian and Muslim facrions rogerher in relarivepeace

in Lebanon since rhar counrry had declared irs independence in

November 1943had broken down. Soon afrer, a longand rragic civilwar

erupred which was furrher complicared by rhe wider implicarions of rhe

region's power polirics. In an effolT ro resrore peace, Presidenr Assad of

Syria desparched more rhan 40,000 of his besr rroops ro supporr rhe

Palesrine Liberarion Organisarion (PLO), and various orher Muslim

groups in rhearea, ina series of fruidessbardes againsrChrisrian milirias.

In Augusr 1982, rhegrimcaralogue of human carnage had reached many

rhousands deadon borh sides of rhe rising conflicr.

Some 15 rerrorisr organisarions symparheric ro rhe Palesrinian cause

operared from numerous bases in sourhern Lebanon, and periodically

launched arracks againsr neighbouring Israel. These acrs of rerrorism

became progressivelymore numerous and violenr.Afrer several reraliarory

srrikes, Israel responded on 6 June 1982 wirh a major land, sea and air

invasion aimed ar desrroying rhe PLO leadership, and irs armed forces.

Twenry-mree days larer, Israeli rroops had reached rheourskirrs ofBeirur,

and were in a posirion ro fulfil rheirsraredobjecrive. AJrhough the Israeli

Defence Force (IDF) had gained considerable ground, Prime Minisrer

Menachem Begin was rhen forced ro modifY his fierce demands when

faced wirh rhrears of Sovier inrervenrion ro aid Syria, as well as American

disapproval of rhe invasion.

The IDF's siege of Beirur culminared in some 7000 PLO fighrers

abandoning rhe c iry and fleeing Lebanon inro symparheric Arab

sancruaries in Syria, Jordan,Sudan, Norrh and SourhYemen,Algeria,Iraq

and Tunisia, whererheir leaderYasserArafarserup hisheadquarers.

On 28 Seprember Presidenr Reagan announ e d tha r rhe US Mar in e

Corps was ro resume irs peacekeeping role in Beirur, which had been

inrerrupredby rheIsraeli invasion ofLebanon. The Reagan aclminisrrarion

sraredrhar irwasimporranr rharrhe US mainrain a military presence in rhe

area unril rheLebanesegovernmenrwas in full conrr I. Fran e, IraJyandrhe

Unired Kingdom also desparched conringenrs f rr ps to rhe region in

an arrempr ro add world pressure ro rhepolicingof thearea. However, rhe

deparrure of rhe PLO ulrimarely heralded me b i nni ng of a n ew e ra of

rerrorismin Lebanon.

On 18Apri11983,asuicide bomber from I lami Jil1.ld (apro-Iranian

nerwork of fanarical Shi 'i re s) drove a rruck I ;Idcd with 300 lbs of

explosives up rorhe enrrance of rheUS Embassy in n 'illit and deronared

irs deadlycargo, killing40 people, including i .ht lll'l i "ans. A second

suicide arrack by Hezbollah, again involvin • •1 t i l l k packed wirh

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ZnotbeflownaboveMach3 and70,000 ft. Boudreaux, therefore, held tllejet

at thedegraded limit and pressed on through theStraits of Gibraltar high

overthe Mediterranean.Off thesouthern coastofItaly, thecrewdecelerated

anddescended for asecondrefuelling.

S tandard procedures (once they had re turned to subsonic fligh t)

included resetting all inlet switches back to 'automatic' , and to continue

the next leg of the flight in 'auto', sincesuch inlet 'glitches' often tended

to clear themselves on another acceleration cycle. The crewfollowed this

logical procedure, but 64-17979 repeated the previous disturbances. At

that point, 'according to the book', they should haveaborted the flight.

The mission hadbeen planned around a single high-speed, high-altitude

passover the targetarea. The well-seasoned crew reasoned that they had

alreadycome so far that they could easily make that one pass and collect

the needed reconnaissance data within imposed operating constraints,

especially since they could 'break off over the waters of the eastern

Mediterraneanshould theyhaveany serious difficulties overland.

Consequently, theycompletedthe reconnaissancerun 'manually', but

then found that 64-17979 (operated in the less fuel-efficient 'manual'

inlet configuration) had ended the run in a notably depleted fuel state.

Ross urgentlycontacted thetankers, which were orbitingnear the island

of Crete and asked that they head east to meetthe thirsty 'Habu'. Asthe

As with all operations undertaken

byDe t 4 throughout the 1980s, the

unit re liedheavi ly on tanker support

during Eldorado Canyon (Lockheed)

64-17979 launches from

Mildenhallon yet another

sortie during Eldorado Canyon-

note the tw o C-130s in 'Europe

One' camouflage parked in the

background.

(Paul F Crickmore)

Thenosesection andfuse lage

fore-bodychine provided

housing forthe SR-71's

varied reconnaissance

gathering equipment

(Lockheed)

explosives (thistime some 12,000lbs of TNT), followed on 23 October.

Its target was a four-storey barracksblock where more than 300 Marines

were billeted. The resulting explosion killed 220 of them, as well as

18sailors from theUS Navyand threeUS Army soldiers.A simultaneous

a ttack on French paratroopers left 58 dead. A third raid 12 days later

claimed the lives of39 Israeli troopswithin their guardedcamp.

By early1984 the peacekeepingpositionshad becomeuntenable and

the troops were withdrawn, leaving behind only the Syrians and the

Israelis. By February, Lebanon was once aga in embro iled in an ever

worsening civil war.

The resurgence of Islamic Fundamenta l ism in the reg ion had been

sparked off bythe rise to power of the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran on

1April 1979 , when hedec la red thecountry to bean Islamic Republic.

Khomeini was a zealotwhose unquestioned devotion to Islam was only

equalled by his all-consuming hatred for the West and,in particular,the

United States. Accordingto mostWestern intelligencesources, Islamic

Fundamentalismwas the most destabilising influencein the Middle East

throughout the 1980s.

Once again, the capabilities of theSR-71 wouldbecalled upon in thishot spot to serve the needs of the transatlantic intelligence community,

and of those friendly nations who also shared in the revelations of the

'Habu's' highquality photographic and electronic surveillance. Missions

over Lebanon were flown by Det 4 crews in o rd er to k eep tab s on the

Syrian and Israeli armies, as well as on thesupply of contraband to Islamic

Jihad warriors and othersupporting groups. These flightsalso monitored

the movements of key rerrorist leaders in their small executive aircraft,

which slipped from one tinyairstripto another inthe region.

One such Middle Eastern SR-71 sortie took place o n 2 7 July 1984,

when , a t 0730 hrs, Majs 'Stormy' Boudreaux and Ted Ross departed

Mildenhall in 64-17979 using the call sign 'Boyce 64'. This important

flight (the crew's 30th together) was complicatedby several factors - the

usual refusal of overflight transit across France, which necessitated

en te ring the Mediterranean area via

the Straits of Gibraltar; inlet control

problems during acceleration to high

Mach, which forced Boudreaux to 'go

manua l' on bypass door operations;

and spike control problems at Mach

2.2, which made the aircraft difficult

to fly accurately.

By this time 64-17979 was heading

eastboundand nearing Mach 2.5, and

itsflightpath saw theaircraftcommitted

to e nter in g the Med irer ra ne an on a

preplanned course, or overflying West

Africa or Spain dur ing an abort.

Consequently,Boudreaux elected to 'go

manua l' on both inlet spike and door

ope ra tion s. Eme rg en cy ope ra ting

procedures dictated that an aircraftin a

'double-manual' configuration should



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SR-71 descended, Boudreaux caughtsight of the tankers some 30,000 ft

below him, and executed what he describedloosely as 'an extremely large

variation of a barrel-roll', slidding in behind a KC-135Q ' in no timeflat' .

The boomer plugged in immediately, and 64-17979 began takingon the

much-neededJP-7. Hooking up well east of thenormal ARCP, 'Boyce 64'

had tostaywith thetankersmuch longerthan theusual 12to 15minutes

'on the boom' i n o rd er to drop off at the scheduled end-ARCP, before

proceedingback to England.

With theSR-71's tanksfilled to apressuredisconnect, Boudreaux and

Rossclimbed to high altitude on thefinal leg back through the Straits of

Gibraltarand headed home to Mildenhall, wherethey landedafter nearly

seven hours - four of which had been spent at supersonic speed while

manuallycontrolling both inlet spikes and doors.

The goodnewswasthat theit'take' was of exceptional quality as a result

of a cold front thatcoveredthe eastern Mediterraneanand produced very

clear air for 'razor sharp' photographic imagery. Det 4's commander,

ColJay Murphy, was especially proud of hiscrew's very notable mission

accomplishments. The bad news was that they had flown a 'degraded '

aircraftwithin range of a knownSovietSA- 5 SAMsite.Overweighing that

concern, however, was word from Washington, DC that the ' take' was

'most valuab le ' for the an alys ts b ac k a t the Nat io na l Pho tographic

Interpretation Center (NPIC).

LIBYAOn 1 Sep tember 1969, a g roup of revolutionary army officers seized

power while KingIdris of Libyawason holiday inTurkey. In a revoltled

byasubaltern namedMoamarGhadaffi, the officers proclaimed Libya to

b e a repub li c in the name of 'freedom, socialism and unity'. The US

government recognised the new regime just f ive days later , a llowing

Ghadaffi to consolidate his position of power over the next two-and

a-half years. He nationalised foreign banking and petroleum interests

within Libya, and was called a 'strongman' byWestern news editors.

Ghadaffisoon madehis interpretation of'freedom,socialism and unity'

clear totheworldon II June 1972when heannouncedhe was givingaid to

the Irish Republican Army. That support was also extended to similar

tertoristorganisationswithin Europeand the MiddleEast.

In the summer of 1981, Ghadaffi decided to lay claim to territorial

rights over much of the Gulf of Sidra off Libya's northern coastline.

The United Statesgovernment refusedto recogniseany extension beyond

the traditional three-mile limit, and to back up its ' international waters'

claim to thegulf, theaircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN-68), arrached to

the SixthFleet, began a missilefiringexercisewithin the disputedarea on

18 August. Interference by Libyan Mirage IIIs, Su-22s, MiG-23s and

MiG-25s culmina ted in theshooting down of two Su-22 'Firrer-Js' by

F-14A Tomcats from VF-41 'Black Aces' . Libyan-American relations

plummeted toan a ll t ime low as Ghadaffi's aggression continued.

Over the next few years, neighbouring northern Chad was annexed

by Libyan forces, an English police woman was shot dead bya Libyan

'diplomat' in London, arms were sent to Nicaraguan Sandinistas and

continued support was given to terrorist o rgan isat ions throughout

the world.

MajFrankStampf (right) headed

the SR-71 SRC a tSACHQ inOmaha ,

Nebraska, during Eldorado Canyon.

He is seen here as a captain with his

pilot, CaptGi l Berte lson.As a crew,

theywere involved i n t he important

missions that monitored political

unrest in Poland during the late

winterof 1981 (Frank Stampfl

ByJuly 1985 US patience was running out, and in an address to the

American BarAssociation on the 8th of that month, President Reagan

branded Libya, Iran, North Korea, Cubaand Nicaragua as members of a

'confederation of terrorist states'. Libya's political ruse finally reached its

end after further act ions in the Gulf of Sidra, the hijacking of a TWA

Boeing 727 airliner on a flight from Rome toAthens and the bombing

of the La Belle discotheque in Berlin. The lat ter event on 5 April 1986,

which killedtwo US servicemen and a Turkish civilian, was the catalyst

that finally prompted the Reagan administration into action.

However, Det 4 had been planning for a potential strike on Libyan

targetssince late 1985, as RSO Maj Frank Stampf recalled;

'The week before Chrisrmas,while enjoying the holiday company of a

group of friends, rheir wives and significantothers at an evening cocktail

party, my pager startedto buzz. I hadto fight off theurgeto make believe

I hadn't not ic ed i t. I was f ina lly b eg inning to rel ax a nd get into the

holiday spirit, and nowit appearedI was to bes lapped back in to rea li ty

by a call f rom "Mother SAC". I excused myself and called the SRC

operat ions desk to see wha t was up. I was hoping it was just a routine

notification of a sortie delayed or cancelled for weather somewhere vety,

veryfaraway. No such luck. Iwastoldby theduty officerthat I was needed

at SAC HQ immedia te ly , and tha t I should bypass the SRC a nd go

directlyto thetankershop downstairsin the bowelsof thebuilding. I made

my apologies to the hosts, and vety reluctantly left thewarm glow of the

partyfor the cold, wet,snowy Decemberstreets of Omaha.

'Driving toward the base, I was perplexed as t o the reas on for my

"recall". Not t ha t I hadn't been called in at all odd hours many times

before in thealmost three years I had been chiefof the SR-71 branch a t

SRC. It was just that normally rhe duty officer could giveme a hint as to

rhe reason. For example, just theword "delay" or "cancel" or "wearher"

wou ld b e enough to give me the g en eral ide a of wha t was going on

(without compromising classified information about specific missions,

locations, times, ete.) so thatI could begin to formulate possible options

on myway to the b as e. Not t hi s t ime. And being told to repor t t o the

tankeroperationsshop, rather thanthe SRC,wasanothersurprise.

'O f course, weworked with the

tanker guys all the time - their

support was cri tica l to the success

of t he SR mis sion . In fact , ae ri al

refuelling support for all kinds of

f ighter , bomber, reconna is sance

and mission supporr operations

wor ldwide was coo rd in at ed and

tasked through the tanker shop a t

SRC. They had the "big p ic tu re "

when it came to tanker availability

and capabilities.

'As I walked intothe tankervault

(pretty much all of the operations

areas in t he HQ SAC build ing

were in secure "walk-in vaults",

where classified information could

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be openly displayed and readi ly handled by author i sed per sonnel ) , I

recognised most of the people standing around as tanker guys, some

folks from theairborne command and control division, and a bunch of

intelligence types.Almost all were in civilian clothes, as I was, since they

had also been called in unexpectedly from what they thought would be

a quiet evening with friends or family.

'After a few more minutes, when someonedecided thateveryone who

needed to be there hadarrived, wewere quietened down and thecolonel

who ran the tanker opsdivision stood up. He told us t hat SAC had just

r eceived order s f rom the Pentagon to develop plans for t anker and

reconnaissance support fora bombing raid on Libya. The targets were to

be terrorist training compounds and militalY facil it ies suchas airfields,

air defences, command and control centres, etc. The raid would rake

place before dawn, and be immedia te ly fol lowed (at f ir st l ight ) by an

SR-71 overflightof the targetareasto assessbomb damage,which wouldbe

critical in determining whether follow-on strikes would be necessary.

My first thoughtwasthat thetiming for theSR-71overflightwould purthe

jetoverhead justwhen the Libyans were fullyalerted, and very pissed off.

'Apparently, PresidentReagan had finally decided that he had hadjust

about enough of Moamar Ghadaffi. The US response was to be cal led

OperationEldoradoCanyon. The specificdate for theattackwas not given,

but wewere to begin planningour respective roles immediately, and have

enough information assembled to provide a briefingto theSACDeputy

Commander for Operations and Directorof Intelligence (both two-star

gene ra ls) by 0700 h rs t he nex t d ay - j us t t en hou rs from our initial

notification.It wasgoingto bethe firstofmany long nights.

'We obviouslywouldn't have thewhole operation naileddown in great

detail by then, but wewere to be prepared to presentthe various coursesof

actionand recommendationsto theSAC General Staff.Then the rest ofour

resourceswould be calledin and wewould begin in earnest to put together

themany piecesofwhatwould turnout to bea prettycomplexoperation.

'The actual attacks would be carriedout by US Navy fighter-bombers

opera ting f rom a car ri er in the Medi t er ranean and USAFE F-Il lFs

flying out of RAF Lakenheath. They would besupportedby RAF Upper

Heyford-basedUSAFE EF-Ills (electronicjamm ing aircraft), a numberof

commandand control aircraftand,of course, about a "bazillion" tankers.

An F-111F f romthe 494th

TFS/48thTFW drops parachute

retarded 500-lb bombs over a

range inSpain during a training

mission in the late 1980s (USAf)

The weather conditions faced

byDe t 4 crews were guaranteed

to be varied compared to those

back at Beale. Here,64-17964,

call sign 'Sheik99', launches

from a snow-covered runway

in February 1987

(PaulF Crickmore)

'Obviously, the US Navyand USAFEfighter-bombercommunity did

the planning for theirattack aircraft.The F-III planners passed on their

fuel load and mission timing requirements to SAC, and theSAC tanker

crowd figured out howmanyand what types of tankers would be needed,

where theycould locate thetracks tosafely(both militarilyand politically)

conduct air refuelling operations, where the tankers would operate from

and howand whento getthem wherethey neededto be.

'This was never goi ng t o be an e asy t ask , a lt hough i t s ta rr ed out

significantly less complex than it ended up. The original concept for the

USAFE strike component called for eight primaryF-ll l s actua lly on

target, with another four "ai r spare" a ircraf t l aunching and f ly ing to a

go/no go poin t, where theywould be told whether theywere needed or

not (based upon the status of the primary jets). The "opera tor s" - the

folks who knew theaircraftand mission capabil i t ies first-hand, and who

were best qualified to make the call - seemed pretty satisfied that those

numberswould do the trick.

'However, because thespecificdateforthe attack hadnot yetbeenset

(or at least ithad not yetbeen sharedwith us planning the missions), there

must have been sufficient t imefor more and more general officersto get

involved in the game. The plan went through several ever-increasingly

complex evolutions until the final strike packageofUSAFEF-li is even

tually reached 18 aircraft, with sixairspares.This of courseexponential ly

increased the number of tanker aircraft required to get the "armada" of

aeroplanes from theUK to Libya and hopefully backagain.

'To make matters worse, several weeks into the process the planners

wer e t ol d t ha t t he F re nch wou ld not a llow any US aircraf t, s tr ike or

support, to overfly theirlandmasseitheron theway toor returningfrom

the strike. All of t he aeroplanes would have to fly south, just off the

western coast of France, then turn eastand thread their way through the

Strait of ibral tar to get over the Mediterranean Sea.That translated

i nt o ever al m re hours of flying time for all the aircraft , which in turn

would requireeven more tankers than before.

'Eventual ly, the plan cal led for more than 20 KC-l35 and KC-lO

t anke r a ir ra fl t support the USAF strike force, not t o men ti on t he

SR-71 I rimal"y and air-spare aircraft. This was not g oi ng to be a " low

profile" op r, lion. In fact, one of the most serious concerns was how to

avoid mid-air ollisions between thedozensof aeroplanes thatwould be

traver in Ih· 'xlrcmely narrow gap of the Strai ts of Gibra lt a r in both

di re ct i n w il hi n a short span of t ime, while radio-si lent andwithout

beingl ind " a ir I ram control .

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'Fortunately for us "recce types", that planningproblem was one of

many logistical and operational challenges left ro the tanker troops ro

resolve. Allwe had rodo was put rogethera plan roget an SR-71 overall

the targets on t ime, with cameras and electronic sensors blazing, defeat

whatweexpected would beveryalertand activeLibyan defences and then

getthe jet back roRAP Mildenhall .There, the mission "take" would be

processed and the intelligence immediately disseminatedroall the people

who would be anxious ly awai ting the s tr ike resul ts . Among those

peoplewere numerous militaty and civilian "high rollers", including the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President of the United

States,who wanted ro be petsonallyassured that the job had beendone.

'Normally,"non-routine"SR-71 missionssuch as this one would have

been developed by the planners a t the opera t iona l detachment from

which thesortiewas ro be flown, and theplanwould thenbe passedback

ro our people at the SR-71 branch of the SRC for review and approval.

This made sense , s ince the folks a t the Dets were the ones who had

firsthand knowledge of the operational environment in which t he

mission would be flown. However, in this case, therewerewayroomany

operational, logistical and political variables that were changing o n an

almost daily basis (and roo many senior off icer s continuing ro g et

involved) forthe Det 4 mission planners ro keep abreastof developments

by themselves.

'Fortunately, in addition ro the very capable and experiencedplanners

at the detachments, wehad a coupleof prettysolid folksworking the task

at SRC, including one Maj Chuck Holte. Although Chuck was not a

former SR-71 crewmember, hehad extensive operationalexperienceas an

ElectronicWarfare Officer,havingflownmany real-worldreconnaissance

missions in theRC-135. He was assigned ro the SR-71 branch because

of his in-depth knowledge of the ever-changing electronic threat

environment, and his expert ise was most welcome both in the specific

planningof"Habu" missions and in the overall developmentof strategic

plans forfuture defensivesystemsthat wouldbe neededro allow theSR-71

ro remain operationally viable.

'Chuck's quiet, efficientmanner and subtle sense of humour made

him highly respected and very well l iked and t rust ed by a ll theSR-71

peoplewho knew him, both at headquarters and at the operational sites.

As a r esu lt , t he Det 4 planner s a t RAP Mi ldenha l l, f rom where thi s

mission would be flown, welcomed his input i n the planning process for

thiscomplex,highly visibletasking.

'As theweeksand months went on and the Omaha winter gave wayro

spring, westillhadn't receiveda specificdate forthe attack. Nevertheless,

everygeneral in theHQ buildingwanted daily updateson theplan.The

latter, as initiallyenvisioned, would have beenreadyro gomonths earlier,

but i t seemed as though every general officer ro whom i t was briefed

wanted another change or tweak, so it becamethe proverbial "perpetual

motion machine". Consequently, most of us involved in planning the

mission had worked every day and some nights, without a break, from

the f ir st n ight we were cal ledout pre-Christmas. That pa tt e rn was ro

continue right up ro theday of theattackin April ,and for several weeks

following, due ro the samegeneral officerswanting "after-action" reports

and "lessonslearned" briefings.

'Chuck's patient nature allowed him ro do a remarkable job keeping

up with all t he changes for the R-71 mission plan, and coordinating

them wi th theDet 4 folks as theycameup. Then one day in mid-spring,

almost four months after we'd been given the order rodevelop the plan

for the mission, themorning news headlines rold of a terroristbombing

at the La Belle discotheque in Berlin.A number of peoplehad been killed

and injured, among them American soldiers. Almost immediately, links

were reported between the terrorist bombers and Libya. We had t he

feeling that t hi s incident would be the t rigger for the Presidentro give

the go-ahead forthe strike.We wereright.The date for theattackwas set

for 15 April 1986, and theSR-71 plan was ready.

'At Det 4 - the "pointy end of t he s pe ar " - t he HABU crews and all

their ops support, maintenance, intelligenceand tanker support people

werewell prepared and waitingro go.

' Ab ou t 4 8 h ou rs p ri or ro t he sc he du le d SR -71 l au nc h from

Mildenhall, theCINCSAC's executive officer calleddown ro SRC and

said that thegeneral wanted mybossand me ro come up rohisofficeand

brief him o n t he SR element of the mission. I dutifully folded up the

missioncharts, packed them inroour securebriefcaseand thecoloneland

I weaved our way through the lowervaultsof the headquarters building

wherewewentaboutour classified work everyday (andmany nights).We

eventually camero thestairs that rook us up the several flights ro where

thesunlightand airwereand, not surprisingly, the generals' offices. I'm

not sure how many general officers wereassigned ro SAC headquarters

at thetime, but I think i twould havebeen easier ro count thestars in the

MilkyWay than the collectivestarson theirshoulders.

'We made our way rotheCINCSAC's office and waited outsideunder

thewatchfuleyeof histrustyexecuntil thegeneral was readyro receiveus.

As one of t he SAC opera t ions bri efer s, I had s rood in front of the

CINCSAC quite a few t imes before whi l e present ing the dai ly SAC

operations briefing, with my emphasis being placed on the resultsof all

the worldwide reconnaissance missions that had been flown during the

previous24 hours.

'As a frameof reference forthis briefing, it wasno secret thatSAC did

not l ike having the SR-71 within i ts operating budget. As I was a lso

responsible for art iculat ingand advocating theSR-71 operatingbudget

wi th in SAC, I was constan t ly locked ina s t at eof mortal combat within

the command ro increase, or at t imes just sustain, funding for the flying

hours we neededro meet our growingtasking. The problem was that the

majority of that tasking wascoming from many sources outside SAC, and

evenoutsidethe USAF. For example, the drivingreason weestablished a

permanent SR-71 det in Europe was ro meet theUS Navy'scri tical need

ro moniror t h s ta tu sof the Soviet orthern Fleet, and in particular their

nuclear submarineoperations out ofMurmansk, on the Barents Sea.

'Once pcrmanent SR-71 opera tions were set up and opera t ing in

Europe, thc U Army realisedthat wecould provideexcellentcoverageof

the Eastern Blo countries around the Federal Republic of Germany,

particularly during the darkness and cloud-covered weather of the

European wintcr. The USArmy was also the primary driverof the regular

coverage thal we providedwhich allowed itro monirorthe North Korean

force statu and movement inand around theKoreanPeninsula.

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SAC was not roo h ap py about

having ro pick up the tab as the

benevolent provider of all that great

intelligence ro o ther commands and

services, especially when it felt that it cut

inro fundingfor strategicbombers, inter

continental ballistic missiles and tankers.

So itwas no surprise that the ClNCSAC

was not a huge supponer of the SR-71

programme- other than, of course,when

SACwanted romake asplash at airshows

or otherexhibitions,where theSR-71 was

a lways its s ta r performer and biggest

crowd pleaser.

'The general had us layout thechartwith theSR-71 trackon his desk,

and we were ro briefhim straight from themap. I hadgorren about as far

as "Sir, this is .. ." when he jabbed hi s f ing er a t the two large r ing srepresenring the coverage of the Soviet-made SA-5 SAM sites, both of

which were clearly bisected by theSR-71's planned track. One waslocatedatSin, near the first target area at Benina airfield in eastern Libya, and the

other at Tripoli, ro the west. TheCINC then asked, whilecontinuing ro

stareat theverylarge circles on themap, "Will these SA-5s be taken out

prior ro theSR-71going in?"My response, I thought at thetime, was pretty

obvious, even for a lowly major like me. "Sir, we'll know if the sites were

destroyed when theSR returns and the inrelfolks analysethe take".Wrong

answer. The remainder of the"briefing" went somethinglike this;

'The gen eral - " I don't wanr the aeroplane penetrating those SAMs

unlesswe know they've been neutralised prior ro the pass."

'The lowly major - "Sir, there is nowayfor the SR ro collect all of the

tasked targetswithout going through the SA-5 coverage. The SR will be

at berrerthan Mach 3 and at, or above, 80,000 ft. The best intel wehave

o n t he SA-5 and t he SR' s a bi li ty ro d efea t i t w ith the a erop la ne 's

combination of onboard systems, speed and a lt it ud e put s thi s a t a n

acceptable risk level for the mission."

'The general - "Like I said, major, I don't want the SR ro penetrate

those rings unlesswe know the sites have been taken out."

The lowly major- "Sir, ifwecould just .. . "The general, this time in a clearlyangered rone - "Major, you are not

listening. I 'm not going ro risk one of MYSR-71s for this piddly little

operation!"

'The lowly major, in thought only - "One of 'his'SR-71 s? Piddlylittle

operation?"

'End of discussion, end of briefing. Back ro the drawing board, and

with less than 48 hours ro come up with an alternativeapproach.

'Although theSA-5wasthe mostmodern, and onlyexistingSovietSAM

system with a postulated capabilityagainst theSR-71, nonehad yet been

fired a t the "Habu", and therefore its capability against a high- altitude,

Mach 3+ manoeuvring target was still hypothetical. Additionally, we had

more than reasonable confidence in the SR-71 's onboard electronic

defensivesystems, when coupledwith theaeroplane's speedand a1tirude, ro

handle the threat. On rop of all that, this was thevery type of mission for

During the May 1986 Mildenhall

airfete, 64-17980's performance

was accidentallyenhancedw hen,

during the course of a knife-edge

pass, a build-up of unburned fuel

in the enginessuddenly ignited

with spectacularresults. Also of

note is t he f l ow pattern of t he

wing vortices. The previous month,

this aircraft had played a key role in

obtaining BOA photos of Eldorado

Canyon targets (BobArcher)

A close-up of the noseof 64-17980

following i tsre turn to Beale from

Mi ldenha ll in October 1986

(Lockheed)

Thiswas the map used by Pentagon

officials to brief the media on the

route taken by USAF strike

packages from Lakenheath and

Upper Heyford to Libya during

Eldorado Canyon (000)

I

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which the SR-71 had been des igned, and had proven itselfso well in

successfully accomplishingfor over 20 years up ro thatpoint. In fact, even

whenthe programmewas evenruallyterminatedfour yearslater, theSR-71

boasteda record that no otherUSAF aircraftcould claim.After 26 years of

operational service and hundreds of missions over and around hostile

terrirory, withhundreds ofSA-2SAM firings againstit during theVietnam

War a lone , not a s ingle USAF crewmember had ever been kil led in an

SR-71 due roenemy action.

'Notwithstanding the reality of all that, wewereclearlygoingro have

ro come upwith another approach ifwewere going ro meet the tasking

that had beenleviedon us. In hindsight, ifwehad failed rocome up with

a workable plan, this would have been a perfect wayfor SAC ro say that

theSR-71 was tasked, but couldn't suppon the mission - another arrow

in its quiver ro getrid of the programme.

'Aftera lot of scurrying and many secure phone calls , wewererold by

our people in Washingron, DC that t he re was a slight possibility the

status of theSA-5 sitescould beassessed bya highly classified inrelligence

source in the shon period between the time that the last bomb was

droppedandtheSR-71 cameoverthe target. Sowecameup with

another

plan thatnone of usliked very much.

'The status of theSAM sites, ifknown by then, couldbe transmitted via

satellitecommunicati ons ro the KC-l 0 tankerthatwould bewaitingforthe

SR-71 over the Mediterranean Sea prior ro the larrer accelerating inro the

targetarea. Once theSR-71 was on thetanker'sboom and takingfuel, its

crewwouldsimplypass thewords"OptionAJpha" or"Option Bravo" ro the

R crew via thesecure boom inrerphone.TheSR-71 RSOwould thenselect

one of two Aightpaths pre-programmed inrothe ANS computer. From the

end of the air refuelling track, "OptionA"would direct theaeroplanealong

the origina lly p lanned Aightpa th

d ir ec tly through the SA-5 r ings,

assuming that inrel had confirmed

that thesites hadbeen destroyed.

'I f tile siteswere eitherconfirmed

as s ti ll opera tional , or the

information simply wasn't available,

then the RSO would select "Option

B", which would take the SR on a

peripheral flightpath that skirred the

operational range of the SA-5s. This

Aightpath wouldobviouslyallowthe

SR-71 ro avoid the potenrial SA-5

threa t, bur i t would a lso reduce the

number of targets its sensors could

collect , and there fore degrade the

usefulnessof the inrelligenceit would

bring back.

'We at SRC didn't like this plan

for any number of reasons. First of

all, no SR-71 c rew l ik ed ro mess

around w it h t he ANS o nc e t he

jet was a irborne and operating

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'The SR-71 mission was to provide BDA forall rherargerareas struck

in Libya. US Navy strikeaircraftwere rargering Benghazi, in rhe easrern

parr of Libya, while the USAF was artacking milirary insrallarions in

Tripoli and surrounding areas. An addirional burden was placed on all

AirForcesorties to fly around France, Spain and Porrugal, rhen rhroughrhe Srrairs of Gibralrar, becauserhe French government refused to granr

rheUSAF overfightclearance.

'The sensor chosen by the Pentagon for t he "Habu" mission was a

suireoFhighly sensirive cameras. This choice was based on rhe ability of

inrel personnel to declassifY the photo images for release to rhe world's

press, whereas producrs generared From our HRR sysrem would reveal

their capabilities and, rherefore, could not be declassified. This decision

would prove operarionally restricrive For us, however, as alrhough rhe

radar was day/nighr a ll-wearher capable , rhe wer film cameras were

res rric red ro dayrime missions in

clear weatheronly.

'Our mission planning ream,

led b y Maj B ru ce Bl akely under

rhe supervision of rhe Director of

Ope ra ri on s Lr Co l Bo b Behl er ,

d ev elop ed a ve ry c rea rive fl ighr

profile For the SR-71 rharmaximised

rarget collecrion while minimising

e xp osu re to SAMs and Libyan

fighrers. S ince we had previously

f lown mis sion s into rhe e as te rn

Medirerranean area, rhe same aerial

refuelling rrack was selecred to help

disguise rhis mission. Ir consisted

of a high altitude roure rhar

unexpecredly rurned back to rhe

west, covering rhe rargets in eastern

Libya,beforeproceedingar Mach 3+

to the capiral,Tripoli. The speed ar

which rhese photo passeswere flown

would give rhe Libyan a ir defence

sysremslirtlerime to respond.

..rIR

TARABULUSf AZIZlYAH BKS

, S/OI B I L A L " ~ TRIPOU

Y MILITARYAJRPORT--...!-------B ~ ~ l l I Y A H BKS .... BENINA ~ R B A S E

-'

Pentagonofficialsalso revealedthis

mapto the press when detailing the

targetsattackedduring EIDorado

Canyon (000)

ThreeEF-111 Ravens from the

42nd ElectronicCountermeasures

Squadron accompanied the F-111 Fs

during the Eldorado Canyon strikes,

jamming Libyan radars (USAf)

i

\

DET 4 COMMANDER

smoothly. The system was certainlycapableof doingwhatwas planned in

this case, but it just didn't "ftel"right to the crews. But moreimportantly,

by not allowing the SR-71 to fly rhe mission as originally planned to

acquire all rhe rasked damage assessment of rhe rargets hir by rhe srrike

force, rhere was a grear risk of nor knowing whar was and whar wasn't

desrroyed. This would very likely result in sending more aircrafr in for

a second s rrike. As it was , we los t one F-l l l F c rew in the first attack.

Another strike, especially if launched unnecessarily - only because

the SR-71 wasn't allowed to confirm which targe ts had already been

hit - would just expose more aircrews to the danger of losing their lives

for no reason.

'But, as ordered, we passed the revised "OptionAlB" plan to the Det

planners, and they prepared to execu te i t as the SR-71's launch time

approached. Frustrationlevelswerehigh all around. Thiswas one of those

times when the crews on the line, getting ready to fly the mission , no

doubt wonderedwhat in the world was going on i n the minds of their

formercrewmates at the headquarters whohad raskedthis crazy sortie.

'Ulrimarely, the "Oprion AlB" plan was scrapped for some reason

undisclosed to usprerrymuch arthe lasr hour. The SR-71 crewwoundup

flying rhe mission as originally rasked, and obviouslysurvived rheSA-5

rhrear to comebackwirh rhe"rake". Thiscame as no surprise to thoseof

us who knew and understood rhe "Habu",and its incredible capabilities.

Ir is nor unreasonableto specularerhar rhe"highly classifiedsource" thar

was supposed to provide rhesrarusof rhe SAM sires prior to rheSR going

in wasn'r up to rhe rask, and rheSAC general sraffwas beginning to feel

rhe pressure, borh from rhe Joint Chiefs of Sraff and from the Whire

House, to produce rhe much-needed intelligence.'

LrCol BarryMacKean was rheDer 4 commander during rhis period, and

i rwasupto himand his teamto implement rheplan, as herecalled forrhis

volume;

'Planning for rheraids on Libya in April 1986 began weeks before rhe

acrual flighrs. Maj Frank Stampf from rhe SRC ar HQ SAC in Omaha,

Nebraska, inirially advised me of rhe pending operarion, codenamed

Eldorado Canyon. Ar rhar point everyrhing was handled as Top Secrer

because of rhe implicarionsof overflying foreign rertitory. There wasalso

a grear deal of uncertainry abour whether the missions would ever be

flown due to rhe necessa ry approva ls required from several foreign

counrries- mosr norably rheBrirish government.

'USAF involvement in rhe plan was to be exclusively execured from

England. The F-ll l F srrike would launch from RAF Lakenhearh, the

EF-l l l Raven electronic support a ircraft from RAF Upper Heyford,

KC-135 and KC-IO refuelling supporr from RAF Fairford and RAF

Mildenhall, while SR-71 reconnaissance support would be fielded from

the latter base. Given rhe enormiry of rheplan, world sensirivitiesar rhe

t ime and the lack of Brirish involvement, I had my doubrs rhar Prime

Minister Margaret Thatcher wou ld app rove a ir s tr ik es f lown f rom

England. Fortunately for rhe free wor ld , and in spire of mounting

opposirion from wirhin herown parry, as well as from rheLabour Parry,

she ulrimarely approved the missions.



'When it appeared that Eldorado Canyon "might" be approved, the

build up of tanker aircraft, both KC-IOs and KC-135s, began at RAF

Mildenhall. Part of t he covet s to ry f or t hi s h ighl y v is ib le addition of

tankers parked everywhere on base was that a large European exercise,

normally scheduled for this time of year, was taking place. There were

even photographs and s tor ies in local Br it ish newspapers to that effect,

which helped minimise any potential leaks.

'To add further credence to thisruse, and disguise the real operation,

at 0500 hrs on t he morning of the acrualmission (the strike aircraft and

tankers launched from UK bases ataround 1700 hrs later that sameday)

the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing at RAF Lakenheath initiated a rypical

base "exercise". This included a recall of all mi li tary personnel to thei r

dury stations, generation of ai rcraf t for a ler t, including uploading

conventional weapons, and the instigation of general exercise activities.

Many of the" exercise" participantswere com pletely unaware ofwhatwas

about to happen later that day.

'Launch of the strike force and tankers occurred in the late afternoon

on Monday, 14 April. The day p ri or , I had received a cal l f rom Maj

StampfatSRC directing us to cancel our regularly scheduled sorties and

configure both of our je ts for the pending Libyan mission. One aircraft

was designated as primary, with the other scheduled to followa littleover

an hour later as back-up in c as e t he primary SR-71 had to abort for

me hanical or sensor problems.

'Our maintenance t eam, l ed by Mel Rushi ng , con si st ed of 45

Lockheed personnel, with 15 subcontractots and associates from other

companies that supported systems/sensors o n t he ai rcraf t. I had twO

"blue-suit" (USAF) technical sergeants (Robby Butterfield and Jerry

Gresham) that provided me with qualiry assurance of the contractor

maintenance. The intelligence branch consisted of about 100 military

per sonnel l ed by Maj Rod Mitchell. This team provided the targeting

data for mission planning, processed the film after the mission, analysed

t he image ry f or weapons' effects and managed all the elect rica l and

conditioned air requirements for theAmerican systems operating under

British standards. Bottom line, the entire team wasextremely anxious to

participate in Operation Eldorado Canyon.

'Our scheduled launchtime was 0500 hrs on Tuesday, 15April. Irwas

hoped that by the time the jet reachedLibya therewould be enough light

in the target areas to effectively expose the camera film and reveal the

damage. Withour aircraft and team infull readiness,I departed my office

at around 1700 hrs on 14 April for my on-base quar ters a t RAF Laken

heath. My staffcarwas equippedwith UHF/VHF radios that allowedme

to monitor our operation, aswell as that of the tower at RAF Mildenhall.

The most amazing thing was happeningon the taxiways and runway

tankers were taxiing and taking off without communicating with the

tower or departure control. The entireoperation was performed "comm

out" - all movementand approvalswere done with lights from the tower

based on timing. It was trulyan amazing sight to behold!

'A s I approached my qua rt er s, I w in ie ss ed t he same "comm out"

launch of the F-IIIFs, fully loaded with their conventional stores.

My wife Ter ri , a n Air Force nurse stationed at the hospi ta l at RAF

Lakenheath, had part icipated in the ear ly morning exerciselrecall that

This blurred v iewof a Libyan

airforce 11-76 'Candid' transport

aircraftparked at Tripoli Airport

was taken from footageshot by

a 'Pave Tack'/Iaser-guided bomb

deliverysystem f i t ted to one of

the 48th TFW F-l l lFs. The 11-76

was struckby a bomb just

seconds after this image

was recorded (USAF)

day. When I entered the house shetold me how for the first time ever an

exercise had been terminated early. The cover story was thatthe exercise

had gone so well t hat the wing staff chose to terminate the remaining

events.I gave her a set of binoculars and told her to look a t the next F-l l l

that took off. She too was amazedto see the conventional weapons on the

wings. I then told her abour Eldorado Canyon.

'After a few hours of restless sleep I returned to our uni t t o f ind

everything in perfectshape. We launched the primary aircraft, flown by

LtColJerryGlasser andRSO Maj Ron Tabor, "on thehack, comm out".

After our spareaircraft, flown by MajsBrian Shul andRSO WaltWatson

launched successfully, severalof uswent forbreakfast.As we got out of the

car, theF-Il l swere returningone by one back into RAF Lakenheath, but

this time there were no weapons on t he wings - definitely an eeriesight.

Unfortunately, one F-l l ! had been lost with its crew and another had

beenforced to land in Spain with engine problems.

'Remember the earlier comment about cameras requiring good

weather?Well,we encountered our nemesis- cloud-cover over the target

area. The primary aircraftflew perfectly anddid everything required, but

the target areas remained obscured by clouds. Both aircraft came back"codc onc" , meaning notone maintenance discrepancy. Before we even

reccivcd word from SRC requesting us to perform a re turnmiss ion, I had

thc maintenance teams preparing both aircraftfor possible flights rhe next

day. 'vcryonc wasso mission oriented there was no problem making it

happcn. While weawaited thego-aheadfrom SRC,our intelligence team

wa p uring ovcr the film with the hope ofgettingenough usableimagery

l mplcl' a full BDA report. Unfortunately, when it came to thearea

ar un ITripoli thcre was none tobe had.

'Wilh 51 _approval, we swapped the aircrews and jets and flew the

v'ry ncx t day . u r mis si on p lanner s c leve rl y a lt er ed t he f li gh t p lan t o

pr ' Iud' pI' ·di labiliry and to minimise potential threats. However, on

l h i ~ () ."ion the lead aircraft experienced a malfunction of the Optical

B.II '.1111 ·r.\ () B ). AJthough the other cameras performed flawlessly,

l h · l .\ I ' '1 .\1 '.1\ were obscured by sand storms. Becauseof the high level of

n.lli(lIl,t1II11 '1 ' \ l ,joining our imageryanalyststo review the film was Maj

,' n I 110111.1\ t Inerny, the Third Air Force commander stationed at

Ilid nll.\11. Ilc understood that we had no control over Mother

.\1111 " ,llld \ .1\ very supportive of the efforts of our personnel.However,

senior leadership was adamant that

we provide releasable BDA.

'Without m is si ng a b ea t,our

team prepared both a ir cr af t f or a

third consecutive flight. SRC gave

approval and t he two j et s departed

Mildenhall for the third,and finally

successful, time. Th e primary crew

consisted of Lt Cols Bernie Smith

a nd R SO D en ny Wh ale n, with

the spare crew being Lt Col Jerry

Glasser and Maj Ron Tabor. As fate

would have i t, t he t ar ge t a re a was

clear and we wer e abl e t o p rovi de

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It Col Jerry Glasser andh is RSO

Maj Ron Tabor secured vital EI

Dorado Canyon BOA intell igence in

64-17980. Thesame aircraft is seen

here ten daysafte r t he l i byan strike,

t he je t st i l lbe ingequ ipped with its

'glassnose' - the lat ter housedan

Itek Corporation OBC. Imagery

taken by t hecrewof this 'Habu'

was released to theworld's media

(BobArcher)

EI Dorado Canyon chalked up many

f i rstsfor Oet 4, includingrefuell ing

from a KC -1 0 Extender tanker

in-theatre (Lockheed)

31,000 ft. This was 6000 ft above our usual refuelling block altitude.

Checking the Mach/IAS limits for the KC-I0 confirmed that we'd be

"well behind thesubsonicpower curve while on the boom". From what

I recaJl , even the KC-1O/SR-71 compatibi l ity checks carried out at

Palmdale didn't get up to 31,000 ft. A second, and common, problem as

we later learned at firsthand was the"brutalsun angle", which would be

directly down the boom as we refuelled.

'Mission briefwas a t0300 hI'S. Brian and Walt werealso our mobile

c rew, so after see ing us of f, t hey h ad t o ge t s ui te d u p and launch as

airborneback-up. Ou r route was subsonic to Land's End, where we'd be

topped-offby twO KC-135s. We'd then climb and acceleratesouth along

the Portuguese coast , makea left tu rn through theStrai ts of Gibraltar,

decelerate and refuel inthe western Med. Our second acceleration wason

an e as te rly h ea ding , a nd we' d the n make a r ig ht c limb ing turn to the

south and headdirectlyfor our first target- Benghazi. We'd then perform

a h ar d r igh t t o sl ip by t he SA-5 sit es at Sirte, before setting course

for Tripo li - our second target. The plan then called for a pos t-ta rget

decelerationfor our third, andfinal, aerial refuelling in thewesternMed,

Following Oet 4's unprecedented

operational effort between 15 and

17 April 1986,64-17980 emerged

with mission mark ingsin the form

of three red camelsapplied to theleft nose-gear door

(Paul F Crickmorel

The results of 64-17980's OBCBOA

pass overBen ina a i r fie ld in thewake

of the F-111F strike were released to

theworld's media, althoughtheir

source was neverofficially

acknowledged (USAF)

good BOA as tasked. However, this

was all very frustrating to u s in the

"recce" team because we knew that

we could have provided BOA

imageryafter theveryfirst sortiehad

we b een al low ed t o use our very

sophisticated radarsystem.

'Besides final ly prov iding the

much sought after BOA, our team

established a benchmark for SR-71

sortiesgeneratedand flown thatwas

to remain unparalleled. We flew six

sorties in threedays with only two

aircraft supported bya maintenance

t eam t ha t was st af fed to support

only twO t o three s or ti es a week.

As t he commander of t he uni t, I

was extremely proud of their

accomplishments, and the manner in which everyone pulled together.Definitely in keepingwith the "Habu" tradition!'

MISSION EXECUTION

Lt 01 Jerry lasser, anSR-71 InstructorPilotand Directorof Simulator

rainingwith over 900 hIS of'Habu' flight timealready under his belt,

t gether with h is RSO Maj Ron Tabor, an RSO instructor and the chief

ba k-seat simulatorinstructor,werethe primaryaircraftcrew that would

onduct post-strike BOA surveillanceafter the attack. Majs Brian Shul

and his R 0 Walt Watson were nominated to fly back-up first time

around. A third c rew, Lt Col BernieSmith, the Chief of the Standards

Board, and instructor RSO Lt Col Dennie Whalen were en route v ia a

KC-135Q to join their colleagues. They would fly a later mission over

Libya. Glasser nowprovidesa unique insight into that first sortie;

'Asthe taskingcame downand theF-111s geared-up,we weredirected

to equipthe aircraftwith optical sensors, an OBC inthe noseand TEOCs

(Technical Objective Cameras) in the chine bays. The weather could

alwaysbe a problemwith visualsensors, but they provided thebestimage

quality, and this was very important for theReagan administration back

in Washington, DC.

Th e plan was to launch the twoaircraftwith a time interval between

themwhichwouldensure thatifallwentaccordingtoplan, primarywould

justbecomingoff the target as back-up ("air spare") was just about toturn

onto the Mediterranean refuelling track. If primary had sustainedsome

kind of mechanical or sensor malfunction, back-upwould continue into

theareaand get thetake. If, however, primaryclearedthe targetarea and

reported "Ops Normal", back-upwould turn back for home priorto the

Straits of Gibraltar. Three aerial refuelling trackswere planned to support

the mission- one off Land'sEnd and twoin theMediterranean. This was

due to the French refus ing to gran t us over-flight permission, which we

weren't particularlypleasedabout, but came as nogreatsurprise to us.

'An area of concern for us as crewmembers was the decision that the

secondaerial refuellingin theMed was tobe conducted froma KC-10 at



before our final acceleration saw us exit through the Straits onro a

northerly headingthat would take us back ro the UK.'

The main thrust of thestrikewas ro be conducted by18 F-lll Fs fromRAF Lakenheath, split inro six flights of three aircraft each using call

signs 'Puffy', 'Lujan', 'Remit', 'Elron', 'Karma' and 'Jewel'. More than

20 KC-I0s and KC-135s were used ro provide aerial refuelling supporr

for the srrike force. In addition, rhree EF-l11 Ravens were ro provided

ECM coverage for the srrikers.

Hours before the 'Habu' launched, the first of its supporr tankers got

airborne. Four KC-135s and KC-lOs left the base for their refuelling

orbits, 'Finey 50' (KC-135 59-1520) and 'Finey 51 ' (KC-I0 83-0079)

launching at 0230 hI's and 0240 hI's, respectively. 'Finey 52' (KC-135

58-0125 and 'Finey 53' (KC-I0 83-0082) launched a t 0402 hI's and

0405 hI's, fol lowed by 'Finey 54' (KC-135 60-0342) and 'Finey 55'

(KC-13558-0094) at 0412 hI's and 0415 hI's. Finally, 'Finey 56' (KC-I0

83-0075) left Mildenhallat 0740 hI's.

LtCol JerryGlasserand MajRon Tabor rook-off as scheduled at 0500

hI's in SR-71 64-17980 (call sign 'Tromp 30'). Lt Col Glasser continues;

'For take-offwecarried55,000 lbs offuel,which was 10,000 lbs more

than normal. A night launch down Mildenhall 's 8500-ft runway was

always exciting. From a safety aspect, I a lways had concerns for the

buildings at the end of runway 29, especially when we were heavy.

We rendezvoused as plannedwith"Finey 54" and "Finey55",which had

entered a holding pattern off the southwest coast of England. Our first

aerial refuellingwasfine except for a little turbulence.We thenmade our

first acceleration rowardsthe Med.

'The early morning acceleration with the sunrise and the coast of

Europe ro the left painted a wonderful scene, and the turn through the

Srraits of Gibral tar was quite spectacular - we were prohibited from

taking random phorosof the Srraits, however.

'Forour second aerial refuelling, we planned ro have a KC-135Q act

as lead ro a KC-l 0 in rrail. This wasbecause of the special commlranging

equipment that was unique ro our dedicated tankers. We thought the

addition of an extratanker was overkill, but things worked out just fine.

The KC-135Q flew one mileahead of the KC-I0 and werangedon both.

'The weather was clear but the sun angle was a big problem. As we

hooked-up at31,000 ft, Icouldn't see thetanker'sdirecrorlightsdue ro the

glare. I'd talked ro the KC-I0 boomerprior ro themission,and this proved

ro be an invaluableconversation.As a result of ourchaton theground, he

fully undersroodthe speed/altitudeincompatibilityissue, and that thesun

anglewas likely ro cause a problem. I had two boomdisconnects before I

settled down, and ro further help reduce theglare, Ron got thetanker ro

turn ten degrees r ight and I "hid" under it s number one engine nacelle.

When we reached 53,000 Ibs of JP-7 on-load, I put both throttles into

min-burner ro stay on the boom- normally, we'dengage theleftburner at

about 77,000 lbs (dependanton theoutsideairtemperature) inorder ro get

a fuJi fuel load from a KC-135 at our usual altitude.

'Ron did a masterful job managing the on- load - heknewI wasjus t

hanging on for thelast 27,000 Ibs ro complete a full off-load. Knowing

that thedirecrorlights were of nohelp ro me, theKC-l 0 boomer alsodid

a fine job keeping us plugged in.When we'd finally finished, we began

our second acceleration. I have ro say that I 've completed many aerial

refuellings in the SR-71 in good and bad weather on pitch black nights,

even inan areawe called the"blackhole" over thePacific, off Kadena, at

night,with no moon and in rough weather. However, that secondaerial

refuelling wasmy most challengingever.

'As we began thesecond acceleration, the right afterburner wouldn't

light, but alittlemanualrise inexhausttemperature,togetherwith another

shot ofTEB (TriEthyIBorane- JP-7wasso inertthat ithad tobe kindled

by use of TEB, which ignited spontaneously on contact with oxygen),

and wewere off again. We entered a solid cirrus deck at 41,000 ft, and I

began ro geta littleconcerned when wedidn't break out until we reached

60,000 ft. However, as soon as wewere clear, dead allead of us was the

coast of Africa, and Ron gotset for the Benghazi take. As we levelledoff

at 75,000 ft at our cruising speed of Mach 3 .15, t he j et was running

just beautifully. I knew to leave Ron alone during this phase, as he was

really busy. The DEF warning lights starred ro flash and Ron signalled

that all was a GO. The rake seemed normal as we made our hard right

turn towards Tripoli, andwe were tuned for the SA-5 site at Sirre.Again,

warning lightsflashed, but nothingwasvisible- we truly felt invincibleat

Mach3.15.

'The weather overTripoli wasn'tgood.As wecompleted the run and

turned out of thearea, Ron gavean "OPSNORMAL" call,so Brian and

Walt, who were fast approaching the pre-designated aborr point, made

a r ight t ur n short of Gibraltar and headed back to Mildenhall. As it

subsequently turned out, morning fog cu tou t some of the optical take

around Tripoliand twomore missions wouldbe required tocomplete the

BDA picture - onedue ro weather and the other becauseofOBC failure.

'Our third, and final, refuelling, conducted down at 26,000 ft, was

uneventful. We pressure disconnected off the boom and headed home

once again through the Strai ts . The remainder of the mission was

"normal, normal, normal", as Ron and I made our final descent into the

UK and called"London Mil". I still plainly recall the impeccable English

of theAirTrafficConrrollerthat gave us both a littlelift. "Good morning

gentleman. It 'sbeen a longday for you". I feel some nostalgia,and agreat

sense of pride,when I think back to the professional relationship Det 4

had with British controllers.

'As wewerehanded overto thevarious conrrollingagencies on ourway

back to Mildenhal l, we were eventually vectored to runway II for a

ground-controlled approach. The landing was uneventful, and as we

taxied back to the"barn", there was Brian,Walt, Bernie and Dennie in

the"mobilecar" to greet us. But as was my habit, as I stepped from the

gantry la IdeI', the peopleI first made sure ro shake hands with were the

maintenan echiefswho, through theirprofessionalism, hadenabled Ron

and1t fulf ill our parr of the mission.'

As planned, Maj Brian Shul and Walt Watson had launched at

0615 hI' in air raft 64-17960 (call sign 'Tromp 31') and duplicated the

route fl wn by lasserand Tabor to thefirstARCPwith 'Finey54' and '55'

off I'I1wall. hul spotted the returning F-llls approaching head-on,

everal lh man I feet below. 'Lujac 21's' pilot (me F-l11 flight leader)

duly I k·d hiswings in recognition and Shulreturnedmis time honoured

aviali n salul. wilh asimilarmanoeuvre.

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Capts larry Brown (left) and Keith

Carterenjoy ed the hospitalityof the

Norwegian air force on 20 October

1987 afterthey wereforced to divert

to BlIdo following generator failure

in 64-17980 (USAF)

This photo was a l so ta ken by the

Viggen piloton 29 June 1987. Note

that 64-17964's rudders are clearly

angled t o t h e right, pilot Duane Noll

having to compensate for the effects

ofasymmetric thrust from the

serviceable left engine

(Swedish air force)

DET 4 's NEARLOSS

Some 18 months earlier, on 29 june

1987, Det 4 had almostsuffered an

aerialdisaster of itsown. Majs Duane

Nol l and RSO Tom Veltri, in 64

17964,wereconductinga seemingly

routine Barents/Baltic Seas mission

when there was an explosion in the

aircraft's right engine. Having just

and Whalen as the primary crew in 64-17980, backed-up by Shul and

Watson,again in 64-17960.

To preserve security,call signs were changed, with 'Fatty' and 'Lute'

being allocatedto the tankers and SR-71s, respectively, for the 16April

mission, and 'Minor' and 'Phony' used thenextday.Photos taken in the

vicinity of Benghazi by 'Tromp 30' on 15Aprilwere releasedto thepress,

although the source was never officially admitted and imagequalitywas

purposelydegraded to hide thesystem's truecapabilities.

Bellicose rumblings from Ghadaffi continued a ft er t he r aid , and

14months later,US intelligenceservicesbelieved thatLibyahad received

MiG-29 'Fulcrums ' f rom the USSR. This outs tanding f ighter , with a

ground attackcapability, wouldconsiderablyenhance Libya'sairdefence

network. It was therefore decided that Det 4 should fly another series of

sortiesover the region to tryand confirmtheseintelligencereports.

On 27, 28 and 30 August 1987, both SR-71s were launched from

Mildenhall to photograph all the Libyan bases. Tanker support foreach

operation consisted of three KC-135s and two KC-I0s.The tankersand

the 'Habus' used the call signs 'Mug', 'Sokey' and 'Baffy'. Two other

KC-135s ('Gammit 99' and 'Myer99') flew courier missions toAndrews

AFB on 29 Augus t and 9 Sep tember t o t ransport t he ' take ' t o t he

Pentagon, whereintelligenceanalyst failed to find thesuspectedMiGs .

Thereafter,until 21 December1988, itappeared as though theLibyan

leader and his regime may have learned a lesson about US intolerance

towards internationalterrorism.However, that night, highover thesmall

Scottish town of Lockerbie , Pan American Boeing 747 Flight 103

was blown out of t he skyby a bomb that had been planted in luggage

loaded onto th e aircraft. I n all, 2 59 passeng ers a nd crew a nd a t

least 11 people on theground were

killed, making this Britain's worst

air disasterand terroristatrocity.

64-17980 deployed to Det 4 on four

occasions, and i t i s seen herebeing

made ready to participate in the

static display a t t h e 1987 Mildenhall

air f e te duringi t s final visit t o t h e

UK (Paul F Crickmore)

On 29 June 1987, during th e course

of an opera tionalmissioninto the

Baltic to monitor the Sovie tnuclear

submarine flee t, Majs Duane Noll

andTom Veltri suffered an

explosion in the r ightengine of

64-17964. This photograph was

taken by a Swedish air force JA 37

Viggen pilot- note the position of

the ejector nozzle on th e shutdown

engine (Swedish air force)

The final tanker (K -10 83

0075) assigned co refuel the F-ll 1s

on theirrerurnflightduring Eldorado

Canyon was re-rolled'on thewing' co

help out the rerurning'Habus' once

thestrikershad reached Lakenheath.

At 0910 hr s, s ome four hours

after the SR-71s had launched, a

KC-135Q (call sign ' ja va 9 0' )

l an de d a t M il de nh al l ca rry in g

senior members of the 9 th SRW

s ta ff from Beale to witn es s t he

mission debriefing. Twenty min

utes later , t ankers 'Finey 54' and

'55' touched down,followed at0935 hrsby 'Tromp30',whichhad flown

a mission lasting four-and-a-halfhours. One hour and 13 minutes later

Shul and Watson landed in the back-up 'Habu', 'Tromp 31'. The five

remaining tankers returned over the next four-and-a-half hours, 'Finey

51' having flown a rwelve-and-a-halfhoursortie.When 'Finey 56' landed

at 1526hrs, Eldorado Canyonwas completed,with theexception of search

efforts for Capts Fernando Ribas-Domminici and Paul Lorence, whose

F-ll1F hadbeen lost theprevious night off the coast of Libya.

The mission's 'take' was processed in the MPC and then transported

by a KC-135 (Trout 99') to Andrews AFB, Maryland (only 25 miles

from thePentagon and the White House), where national-level officials

wereeagerlyawaiting post-strikebriefings that showed both thegood and

bad effects of the strike. The world's media had been quick to reportthe

latter aspect of theoperation, BBCjournalist Kate Adie being used as a

propaganda dupe to show not only where one F-lll 's bomb load had

goneastray near the French Embassy, but also where Libyan SAMs had

fallen backon thecity,only to belabelled as moremisdirectedUS bombs.

On a more posit ive note for the USAF, her repor ts proved useful in

providing post-strike reconnaissance footage of an accurately bombed

terroristcamp, referred to by her as an army 'cadet'school.

As mentioned ear lier , the marginal weather around the Libyan

capital forced another 'Habu' sortie co be flown the following day. This

time jeny Glasser and Ron Tabor

wereback-up, again in 64-17980,for

Brian Shul and Walt Watson, who

were the primaty crew in 64-17960.

Bernie Smith and Dennie Whalen

were t he mob ile crew, ch ar ge d

with overseeing both launches and

recover ies back into Mildenhal l.

However , dur ing th is sor ti e t he

primary aircraft suffered a sensor

failure, and for whatever reason the

back-up aircraft,which was in theair

and operational, was not norified.

Thismeant that a third mission had

co be flown on 17 April, withSmith



91

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Lt Cols Ed Yeilding and J T Vida

established a coast-to-coast speed

record in 64-17972 on 6 March 1990

whenthey ferried the aircraft from

Palmdale to the National Air and

Space Museum at Dulles Airport, in

Washington, DC. This aircraft had

completed no fewerthan six stints

at Mildenhall during i tst ime with

the9th SRW (Lockheed)

Stackedand ready fort ransport

back to Beale, tw o SR-71 nose

sections areseen in storage at

Mi ldenhal l in early 1990. The

mission f lexibility offeredby

this fea ture isread i ly apparent

(Paul F Crickmore)

SHUTDOWN

The end of theColdWar broughtwith ila ~ l : l m p -de to 'cash-in the peace

dividend'on theback of promises fora 'n wworll lrder'. Twentyyears on

from such unbridledoptimism,and the realilY app ';lrs S mewhatdifferent.

For the SeniorCrown programme, however, lh "n d r lhe oldWar really

was the end of the line. No opetational R-71 fli ,hl were flown after

20 September 1989, despite a valiant all 'mpl lO resurrect a limited

programmein 1995 - this was suspended n il April 1996. The bottom

line was that theprogramme had , over the y \11', 10\l practically all of its

high-powered supporters in SAC,anda t a l im ' h 'n rundsweretightthe

SR-7l becan le an easy ta rge t- reconna i ,n 'wa\ ,llways a 'Cinderella'

when itcameto SACfunding.

meantno brakesor steeringon landing. The base closed off all surrounding

roads prio r to our arrival inailli ipation of our going off the runway.

Fortunatelyfor everyone, there was JUSt enough residual hydraulic fluid left

in the l ines for one applica ti n or the brakes. The aeroplane stopped just

short of the end of tilerunway, and lhaL's where we leftit for therest of the

day until amaintenance rew rrom M ildenhall arrivedand moved it.'

Fourmonths later, on20 l bel ', a pt sLar ryB rown and RSO Keith

Carter alsoexperiencedan in-fli hlemergencywhilston aBarents/Baltic

Seas mission at night. Flying 64-17980, the c rew had completed their

reconnaissance runs and wer l o ~ i n g n t he t anker for thei r last

aerial refuellingwhen the mas ter warn in l igh tcame on in the cockpit,

telling Brown that the righ t e le lri :II A engine-driven genera tor had

disconnected itselffrom the main A b u ~ . heANS also went down at

thesame time, leaving the RS wilh Ul h i primary navigation system.Although thesecond generator in lh ' a ir rarl onrinued to function, the

crew could not get the r ig ht g en eral r ba k n l in e, so the a ir craf t was

instructed to land at B0do.

Ashortwhile laterthe remaining ervi e,lbl' cneratorfailed, forcingthe

crew to rely on t he emer genc yA g n ' rm r. With diminished cockpit

lighting and faltering systems, Brown r, rmal' I with the KC-135Q and

headed for the NOlwegianbase. Eventually, lh ' ~ l r i ken R-7l managed to

landat B0do, whereit sat for fourdays b in' r', aired, priorto being flown

backto Mildenhall atsubsonicspeed.

completed theiranti-clockwise run off the coasts of Lithuania, Latvia and

Estonia, and with 'denied territory' off t o the ir r ig ht , t he crew had no

alternative but to turn left, decelerateand descend. Norrh ofGotland, and

with the a ircraft descending, Veltr i tu rned on the IFF and declared an

emergencyon Guard frequency, as he recalls;

'That got theSwedishair force'sattention, and a pairofViggenswereon

our wing before we reached 18,000 ft. Given that the Sovie ts were

monitoring our activity, I wasgladto seea friendlyescort.We laterfound our

thatthe Soviets had launched numerous fighters with ordersto force us to

land in Soviet territory or shoot us down. The descent from 80,000 ft to

25,000 ft, whetethe aeroplane began

to stabilise, tookjust a few minutes.

The Viggens continued to escort us

through the Baltic and a long the

Polish and EastGermanbordetsun til

USAFE F-15s from West Germany

intercepted and took over escort

duties, but theworstwasnot yetover.

'Since fuel constra in ts made it

impossible for us t o make i t b ac k to

Mildenhall, we were forced to land

at Nordholz Air Base, in West

Germany. The engine explosion

also c au se d the c omplet e loss of

our auxiliary hydraulic fluids, which

Maj Tom McCleary(right) and

RSO Lt Col Stan Gudmundson bid

farewell to t he t eamof Mildenhall

based ground technicians, and the

assembled media, before ferrying

64-17964 back to Bealeon 18

January 1990 (Paul F Crickmorel

Following cancellation of the Senior

Crown programme, no operational

sorties weref lown af ter 30

September 1989 ( theend of the

USAF'sfiscal year). 64-17967, seen

hereequipped with a panoramic

nosesection, returns to Mildenhall

o n20 November 1989 after

completing a functional check

f light - i tsnext flight was to be the

journey back to Beale (BobArcher)

Following departure of t he f i rs t

SR-71 from Mildenhall on 18

January 1990,a pressconference

was held in t heDet 4 building. Majs

DonWatk ins l Ieft)and his RSO Bob

Fowlkes were on hand to answer

questions, before they in turn ferried

64-17967 back to Beale t henext day.

Ironically, both menhad f l own what

turned out to be the SR-71's final

operationalmission from Det 1 at

Kadena air base, Okinawa, on 19

September 1989 (Paul F Crickmorel



CHRONOLOGY OF SR-71 DEPLOYMENTS TO THE UK

93

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executedby those withinthe Senior Crown

programme thatwishedto divert closeattentionawayfrom the aircraft's actual identity. In actuality,a false serial number hadbeen applied towhat

was in fact SR-71 64-17955- a platformforeverassociated with flight test operationsat Palmdale.Thisaircraftwas participating in a classifiedevaluationof a revolutionary ground mapping radarknown as the Advanced SyntheticAperture RadarSystem. In ordertodivert unwantedattention awayfrom itsduckbill-like nose section that housed the

newantenna, groundcrews had reliedon artistic

l , w l Hill I

t ,flAI

C OUR PLATES

DeploymentDates

9September 1974to 13 September 1974

20 April 1976 to30 April 1976

6September 1976 to18 September 1976

7 January 1977 to17 January 1977

16May 1977to 31 May 1977

24 October 1977 to16 November 1977

24 April 1978 t o12May 1978

16 October 1978 to 2November 1978

12 March 1979 to 28 March 1979

17 April 1979 to 2May 1979

18 October1979 t o13 November 1979

9April 1980 to 9May 1980

13 September 1980to 2Novomb r 1980

12 December1980 to 7March 1981

6March 1981 to 5May 198116 August 1981 to 6Novombor 19811lhvortl d from 80dol

16 December 1981 to 2\ Docornb r 1 81

5 January 1982 to 27 April 1987.

30 April 1982to 13 Docurnb r 1 87

18 Decembor 1902 to 6 July 1 83

23 December 1982 to711 hllllly Inll3

7March 1983 to 6Supt rnh I I 8

9 July 1983 to 30 July 1 83 I I II 7'l2August1983 to 1 July 1 1149 September 1983 to12 JIIIH 1 4

14 June 1984to mid-July 1 9 1 1 ~mid-July 1984 to16 Octoilul 19114

19 October 1984 to mid-Detoh 111

19 July 1985 to 29 October 1906

29 October1985 to29 January 1 7

1November1986 to 22 July 1987(1 II5February 1987to mid-March 1 88

27 July 1987 to 3October 1988 (IrOIH IIA Ihl

13 March 1988 to 28 February 1909

5October 1988 (to RAF Lakenheathl to 10J I 0

2March 1989 to 19 January 1990

APPENDICES

Aircraft

64-17972

64-17972

64-17962

64-17958

64-17958

64-17976

64-17964

64-17964

64-17972

64-17979

64-17976

64-17976

64-17972

64-17964

64-1797264-17964

64-17958

64-17980

64-17974

64-17972

64-17971

64-17980

64-17955

64-17974

64-17958

64-17979

64-17975

64-17962

64-17980

64-17960

64-17973

64-17964

64-17980

64-17971

64-17964

64-17967

64-17964 rotates from RAF

Mildenhall's runway for the

last time on 18 January 1990

(Paul F Crickmorel

64-17962 is seen outsidethe IWM

Duxford super hangar after it was

unveiled to the public on 11 April

2001. Thisaircraftis presently on

displayin the American Air Power

hangar a t the Cambridgeshire

museum (Paul F Crickmorel

The irony was t ha t th e

SR-71 provided a vast amount

of extremely useful intelligence

to many other agencies other

t han j us t i ts par en t ope ra to r

SAC, who h ad to p ick up its

operating costs. The Senior

Crown Programme Element

number a t t he Pen tagon was

PE 11133F. The first digit (I)

denoted the major force

programme as s trategic - the

programme that provides fiscal

authority. Had t ha t numbe r

been a 3, the programme

would have been intelligencefunded, which is where theSR-71's budget

should have come from all along. That of course could have meant a

completely different future for the world's most advanced, jet-powered,

aviation programme.For Det 4, the end cameshorrlyafter midday on Friday, 19 January

1990, when SR-71 64-17967, f lown by Majs Don Watkins and RSO

Bob Fowlkes,departed the runwayat Mildenhall for thelast time as part

ofOperation Busy Relay. This jethad actuallyflown Det 4's last recorded

sortie (a functional check flight) on 20 November 1989, after which the

jets stood idle foralmost two months.

The second SR-71 in residencewith Det 4 at thetimewas64-17964,

and i t departed for Beale as 'Quid 20', with Majs Tom McCleatyand

RSO Stan Gudmondson on board,on 18January 1989. Deactivation of

De t 4 tookapproximatelythreemonths, with support equipment being

shipped back tothe US and reassigned.

The 87 milirary personnel, including

Det 4 's final CO , Lt Col Tom

Henichek, and 76 civilian contractors

also returned to Beale.

Some 11 yearslater, on 4April2001,

an SR-71 r et ur ned to t he UK once

againwhen 64-17962arrivedatTilbuty

docks from Houston, Texas . It had

been in storage at Lockheed Martin's

Palmdale facility since its retirement

by the USAF on 4 February 1990.

Donated to theImperial War Museum

(IWM) for display within its American

Air Power hangar at Duxford airfield,

in Cambridgeshire, the aircraft had

been dismantledby WorldwideAircraft

Recovetyand sent byship to England.

Reassembled once on site, 64-17962

was unveiled to the British public on

11 April. To this day, itremainsthe only

SR-71 on displayoutside the US.



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The material from this volume came from two basic sources- open literature,including books, newspapers,

professionaljournals, variousdeclassified reportsand first-hand accounts from pilots, ReconnaissanceSystemsOfficersand other people associatedwiththe various programmes.Much ofthe information

contained within these pages was pieced togetherduring the courseof numerous interviews(many of which

were taped,others beingconducted over the internet) with those intimately connected with the Senior Crown

programme. Several individualscontributed information with the proviso that theira nonymity be respected.

Firstly lowe an immense debt of gratitudeto Bob Archer,who went through his vast photographic

collection and kindly made available to me somewonderful images that are of significant historicalinterestto the Det4 story.

My grateful t hanksgoes toCol Don Walbrecht, Frank Murray,Tom All ison, BuddyBrown, Rich Graham,Don Emmons, Ed Payne, Tom Pugh, BC Thomas, Jerry Glasser, Frank Stampf, 'Buzz' Carpenter, Barry

MacKean, CurtOsterheld andRod Dyckman, LtColsBlairBozekand Tom Veltri, Denny Lombard,Thomas

Newdick, Dave Adrian, Bob Gilliland, Jim Eastham, Jay Mil ler , Jeff Richelson, Valery Romanenko, James

Gedhardt, I lya Grinberg, MajMikh il My gkiv, LutzFreund, Heinz Berger,RolfJonsson, Per-Olof Eldh,

TO Barnes, Bob Murphy, Paul Eden, Tim Brown, Yefim Gordon and David Allison.

Ialso wish to thank MajGen Pat H 1I0ram, Brig Gens DennisSullivan andBuckAdams, Co Is Tony

Bevacqua, PatBledsoe, Larry Bogges ,G rg Bull , GaryColeman, Ken Coll ins, Dave Dempster, BruceDouglass, Carl and Tom Estes, Joe Ki n 0, JackLay ton, Jay Murphy,Rich Young andJack Maddison,

LtCols Nevin Cunningham, Bill Flanag n, Jim Gr nwood, DanHouse, Tom Henichek, BruceLeibman, Bob

Powell, Maury Rosenberg, Tom T il de n, d Y "ding, Reg Blackwell and 'Stormy' Boudreaux, MajsBrianShul,Doug Soifer and Terry Pappas,and alsoKith B wick, KentBurns, RussDaniell , Kevin Gothard,LindsayPeacock, BettySprigg,Rich Stadler, Ell n B nct II nd Steve Davies.

Finally, love t omy wife Ali, Dad, Neil,Pul l nct Nic for their endless support and encouragement.

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deception to maskits true identity, and it worked

perfect ly- unti l i tsradaremissionsweremonitored

by the SovietUnion. The real 64-17962, of course,

hasresidedat IWM Duxford since April 2001.

2

SR-71CArticle Number 2000 (64-17981) ofthe 9thSRW, Beale AFB, March 1969 to April 1976

Byany measureSR-71C64-17981 was a bastard. Its

flying characteristics didnotmeasure upto those of

the surviving two-seat pilot trainer, 64-17956,and its

parentage was franklyvery questionable. Followingthe lossofSR-71B64-17957on 11 January 1968,it

was deemednecessaryto create a hybridthat could

substitute for the sole surviving SR-71 Bwhilst the

latterwas undergoing deepmaintenance. Therefore,

drastictri-sonicsurgerysaw the forebody of astatic

testspecimen mated tothe rear sect ion of a retired

YF-12A prototype interceptor.Flown forthefirstt ime

on 14 March 1969, it did ajob. Ret iredin April 1976,

the aircraft ispresent lyon displayat Hi ll AFB,Utah.

3

SR-71A Article Number 2006 (64-17955), Air Force

LogisticsCommand, Palmdale, August 1965 toJanuary 1985

SR-71A 64-17955 first flew on 17 August 1965. It

was operated exclusively by Air Force LogisticsCommand from Palmdale, in California, and

was the premier SR-71 test bed. Itsonlyknown

overseas deploymentwas to RAF Mildenhall

from 9 to 30 July 1983when it testedASARS whilstmarked up as 64-17962. This aircraft made itsfinal

flight on24 January 1985and was eventually

placed on display at EdwardsAFB, California.

4

SR-71A Article Number 2027 (64-17976) ofthe 9th

SRW, RAFMildenhall, 24 October to 16 November1977

SR-71A64-17976 flew for thef i rst time in May 1967.

It subsequentlygained fameby becomingthe f irst

'Habu' to complete anoperat ionalmission- an

accomplishment achieved on9 March 1968over

the hostile skies of North Vietnam. The aircraft

deployed to RAF Mildenhall onthree occasions-24October to 16 November 1977, 18 October to 13

November 1979and 9 April to 9 May 1980. Justpr ior

to the cancellation ofthe Senior Crown programme,a pantherwas applied(in chalk) to the jet's

twin vertical stabilisers. Havingaccumulated2985.7 flight hours by the time i twas grounded on

27 March 1990, this aircraftis now on display atthe

USAF Museum at Wright-PattersonAFB, Ohio.

5

SR-71B Article Number 2007 (64-17956), 9th SRW,BealeAFB, 1965to 1990

One of only two B-models built by Lockheed, thisaircraftbecame the sole survivor after 64-17957

waslost in anon-fatal crash following fuel cavitationwhile on approach to BealeAFB on 11 January 1968.Pilotoperational conversion t raining ontothe 'Habu'was completed via simulator flights andsort ies in

the SR-71 B. Bythe time thejet was finally retired bythe 9thSRWand NASA,64-17956 hadaccumulated

no less than 3760 flight hours. I twastransferred to

the Kalamazoo Air Zoo, in Michigan, andplaced ondisplay in December2002.

6

SR-71A Article Number 2015 (64-17964) of the

9th SRW's Oet4,RAFMildenhall16 August to6 November 1981

SR-71A64-17964 first flew on 11 May 1966, andbythe time i twas forced into early retirement in March

1990,the airframe had accumulated 3373.1 flighthours. Thisjet proved to be a true Anglophile,

deployingto RAFMildenhall on no fewerthan sixoccasions - the highest UK deployment rate of any

SR-71. On 12 August 1981, during a scheduledround-robin operational mission from Beale AFB

over t heArcti c to theBarents/Baltic Seas and back,

the aircraf tsuf fered a low oi l qual ity warning in theleftengine, forcing its crewto divert to the Norwe

gianair force base at Bl1ldo. Upon its subsequentpositioning flight into RAF Mildenhall, it was seen

tobe

sportingtail-art

proclaimingtheSR-71

tobe"THE Bf2}DONIAN" EXPRESS. Clearlyenriched by

its unscheduledEuropean tour, the aircraft chalked

up another unscheduled stop on 29 June 1987

when, following an explosion in i ts r ightengine

during the course of an operational sortie from

Mildenhal l into the Barents/Baltic Seas, 64-17964was forced t oshut down its right engine,descend,

violate Swedish airspace and divert intoNordholz

air base,West Germany.

7SR-71A Article Number 2010 (64-17959) of Oet51,

Palmdale,20 November 1975 to 24October 1976If 64-17981 was 'The Bastard',then 64-17959 fitted

with the 'Big Tail' sensor enhancement modification

was just plain ugly. First flown on 18 December

1965,it had t henew tail fitted a decade later. Thelatterwas almost 9 ft (2.74 m) long, and it was

added to increase the SR-71'ssensor capacity/capability. In orderto preventthe appendage

from contacting theground dur ing take-off, or

being snagged by the brake 'chute during roll

out, thetai lwas hydraulically repositioned eight

degrees upor down. The first airbornetestwas

completed on 11 December1975,and the jet per

formed thelast flight with this unique modification

on 24October 1976. By then it had been decidedthat sucha modificationwas unnecessary. 64-17959

was permanentlygrounded f ive days laterand sub

sequentlytrucked to theUSAF Armament Museum

at Eglin AFB, Florida, for permanent display.

8

SR-71A Article Number 2031 (64-17980), 9th SRW,BealeAFB,1990

SR-71A64-17980 gained a reputation for being

one ofthe most reliable airframes in the fleet.First flown on25 September 1967, the aircraft

accumulated 2255.6 flight hours before i tsf inal

sortie withthe USAF on 5February1990.The jet

undertook its first operational tour from Kadena

air base between 12 September 1968 and 19 April

1969. Another FarEast deployment followed

between 19 June 1971 and 15 August 1972. It first

arrived in the UKon 5 January 1982, and returned

to Beale three months later. 64-17980 commenced

a six-month deployment to Det 4 on7 March 1983,and a subsequent 15-monthdetachment began

in July 1985. Itwas duringthe latter deploymentthatthe jetcompleted one of its most significant

operational missions - asorti e to gather BOA

imagery following the raid by USAFE and US Navy

strike aircrafton targets in Libya during the early

hours of 15April 1986.64-17980's fourth, and final,

tour in the UK was completedbetween 27 July 1987

and 3 October 1988.

9

SR-71A Article Number 2031 (64-17980), NASA,

Edwards AFB, September 1992 to October 1999

Following cancellation ofthe Senior Crown

programme, all SR-71 operational flights around

theworld ceased on 30 September 1989. Aircraft

remaining atDetachments 1and 4were eventuallyreturned to Beale, and togetherwith their stablemates, they were retired from service. Some jets

weresent to museums, three were placedin storage

at Palmdale and the remaining SR-71 B pilottrainerand SR-71As64-17971 and 64-17980 were loaned

to NASA andre-numbered831,832 and844,

espectively.On 31 October1997, the first ina series

of experiments began during which 844 flew theLinearAerospike (LASRE).Three further flights

were made before the programme was cancelled in

November 1998 after numerous leaks in the LASREl iquid-hydrogen fuel systemwere detected and it

was deemed too expensive to rectify. Thisaircraft

madethe last flight performedby an SR-71 in

October 1999,after which it was put on display

at NASA's Hugh L Dryden FlightResearch Facility

at EdwardsAFB.

10

SR-71A Article Number 2018 (64-17967) of the9th SRW'sOet2, BealeAFB,October 1997

First flown on 3 August 1966,64-17971 made justone deploymentto RAFMildenhall-from 2 March

1989 to 19 January 1990, when its departure to

Beale signalled the end of Det 4. Like the rest of

the SR-71 fleet, it was retired in 1990. Following

intense lobbying over the short-sightedness

of prematurely cancelling the Senior Crown

programme, a 'three-aeroplane SR-71 aircraft

contingency reconnaissance capability'was

resurrected ata cost of$100 million for Fiscal

Year 1995. NASA 8 31 (SR-71 B 64-17956) and 832(64-17971) were called back to arms, as wasthis

machine, which hadbeen languishing in storage

at Palmdale. This programme was eventuallycancelledon 10October 1997 after being l ine i tem

veto by the then supreme commander of USForces, President BillClinton. Prior t o the latter

development, Detachment2 of t he 9th SRW had

activated at Edwards AFB,and its aircraf tadorned

with the markings seen on this aircraft. The SR-71 's

considerablereconnaissance gathering capabilityhadalsobeen further enhanced through the

installation of a data-link thatal loweddigi t ised

ASARS imagery to be t ransmit tedto a ground

receiving station in nearreal-time. Al l these

improvements were ultimatelyto no avail,

however. 64-17967is presently on display

at the Barksdale air force base Museum

in Louisiana.

»-0

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95



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xINDEXJ

0

zINDEX Jacks, Maj Roger 17 SA-5 'Gammon SAM 21,22, 22, 55, 72.

Page numbers in bold denote illu stra tio ns. Jiggens, M aj J im 52·3 78, 79, 85, 87

Bracketsshow captions to colour plates. Joersz, Maj AI 9, II, 13 Shelton, It Co Jim 8·9, 9, 10

Johnson, Clarence 'Kelly' 22, 35 Shelton, Maj Lee44

Adams, Maj Harold 'Buck 12, 15, 15 Jonsson, Rolf, RSwedish AF 65·7 Shu I Maj Bran 83,84, 85, 87·8, 88-9

Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System Judkins, Maj TY 13 Six DayWar 6·13

51·3,52 Judson, Maj Rch48 Smith, It Co Bernie 83,84, 88·9

Allison, Maj Tom 17, 18, 21, 21·3, 25 Sober, Maj Chuck 17, 44

KC-l0 Extender tankers 75, 84·5, 85. Soviet submarine bases 21·2, 29·30, 45

Baltic missions 29,46, 47·8, 58,66·7 86bis, 898 SR·71A

Barents Sea missions 21-3, 44,44-5, 62 KC-135tankers7,10, 14,15,18,20 nose sections 70, 91

Barents/Baltic missions 49, 50, 52,53,54, 22,28,28. 32, 35, 45, 46, 48,51, USAF9556,8,39(94143,51-2,

68,89-90 67-8,71, 72. 75, 80,82, 85,86, 52bis, 53

Behler, Lt Co Bob 81 88,89 wearing 962 37(93·4) 51, 52·3

Belenko, Lt Victor 56 Keck, Maj Tom 17 USAF 95818,19·21,21,21·3,23·5,

Bertelson,Cap tGi 47, 73 Keler, MajBi l l 17, 28,44 24,25,47-8,49

Bethart, Maj Ed 46 Kely, Lt Co Frank 48 USAF 959 41(94)

Billingsley, Maj John 29 Kinego, It Co Joe 17, 27, 44, 48 USAF 96064, 87-8, 889

Blackwell,Maj Reg 'Ronnie' 12 USAF 96217,17,18,92,92

Blakely, Maj Bruce 81 Lawson, Co Willie 21 USAF 964 8 , 9 , 10, 12bis, 29,29,

Bledsoe, Maj Pat12, 16bis, 17 Lebanon 69-70 31,40(94)43,45-6,46bis,47bis,

Boudreaux, Maj 'Stormy' 67·8, 70-2 L bya 72-3 48,64,67,75,88,89,90,92,92

Brown, CaptLarry89, 91 Lbya mission,planning 74-80, USAF 967 42(95)90bis, 92

Buloch, Capt Don 16bis 79,80-2,81 USAF97113,51,54

Butterfield, Sgt Robby82 execution 83-9, 84 USAF 97214, 15/er, 16,20, 32·6, 50·1Liebman,Maj Bruce 17, 17 bis USAF973 61

Carnochan, Maj John13 Lorence,Capt Pau 88 USAF 974 50bis

Carpenter,Maj 'Buzz 17,19-21,23, Luloff, Capt Gary 53 USAF 97557

23-5,31-6 USAF976 27,28, 28-9, 36,39(94143,45

Carter, CaptKeith 89, 91 McCleary, Maj Tom 90, 92 USAF 979 8 , 9 , II, 12, 13,44,70·2,71

Cirino, Maj AI 17, 17bis McCue, Capt Joe 52-3 USAF 980 41(94-51. 42(95143,50, 53bis,

Coats, Capt Bob 53 Machorek, Maj Bill 12, 15, 15 67-8, 78bis, 84-7, 85bis, 88,88-9,89, 91

Coleman,Maj Gary 8 , 9 , 9-10, 10 Mcinerny, Maj Gen Thomas 83 SR-71B, USAF 956 40(941

Crowder, Maj Bob28, 28·9, 29 MacKean, It Co Barry 44,80-4 SR-71C, USAF98138(941

Cunningham,Maj Nevin47-8, 48, McKim, Maj ED51, 51-2, 52bis Stampf, Maj Frank47, 73, 73-80, 80

49,50-1 Meyer, Gen John 7-8 Storrie, Co John17, 18

Middle Easternmissions 70-2 Strand, Lt Roar, RNorwegian AF 46

Dougherty, Gen Russel 17 MiG-25 'Foxbat 55, 56, 56-8, 67 Sullivan,Maj Jim 12,12,15, 15,17

Douglass, Capt Bruce 12, 13 MiG-31 ' Foxhound 5 8-65, 60, 61 sunsets, double 10

SR-71 interception 61-5, 68 Szczepanik, Maj Russ 44bis

earthcurvature 34 Mitchell, Maj Rod 82Elliott, Maj Larry 12, 27 Morgan, Maj George T 13 Tabor, Maj Ron8 , 83bis, 84-7

Els , Gen Richard 17, 18bis, 19 Morgan, Maj John 28, 28-9, 29,51, Thomas, Maj BC17, 31, 45·6, 45bis, 47,

Emmons, Maj Don17, 17bis, 18,31, 52bis, 53 49,51, 52bis, 53,53

32bis, 33, 36 MPC (Mobile Processing Center) 19,88

Estes, It Co Tom 7,7, 9 Murphy, Co Jay 29, 72 unit badges 43, 44, 52, 84

Murphy, Maj John 17, 20-1,23,23-5,31-6 US Navy, Phantom I I CAP 9,10

Fowlkes, Maj Bob90,92 Myagkiy, Guards Maj Mikhail 59-65, 61 USAFE EF-11'Ravens 74, 80, 81,86

Fuler, MajJohn 9, 11,13, 16bis, 17 USAFE F-ll1 fighter-bombers 74, 74-5,

NATO exercises 16-19 79,80,82-3,83,86,87

German bordermissions 23-5, 28, 31, nitrogen capacity 49, 49

44, 52, 58 Noll, Maj Duane88, 88-91 Veltri, Maj Tom 88, 89-91

Glasser, It Col Jerry 46, 83bis, 84-7, 88 Veth, Maj Jack 28

Graham, Maj Rch 17, 17bs, 18, 31, Dhmount, Gen, RNorwegian AF 45-6 Vick, Lt Col Dewain 7, 7

32bis, 33, 36 Vida,lt Col Joe 17,18,21,21-3,25,91

Gresham,Sgt Jerry 82 Peak, Maj Gen Ear 26

Groninger,MajBi l l 17, 44 Pitts, Lt Gen Bi 18 Walbrecht, Col Don 12bis, 13, 54

Gudmundson,Lt Co Stan 90, 92 Watkins, Maj Don 90,92

Quist, Maj Gena 47-8, 49, 50-1 Watson, Maj Wall 83,84, 85, 87-8, 88-9

Hain, Co Harlan 12bis Whalen, Lt Co Denny 83,84,88-9

Haloran, Col Pat 8 , 8 , 13 RC-135U 'Combat Sent 28-9, 29 Widdifield, MajNoel 12,15,15

Hell, Maj Bob 12 RC-135V 'Rivet Joint 21, 22,23, 26, 26-7 Wilson, MajJim 12, 13

Henichek, It Co Tom 92 Re d, MajJay 17, 31, 45,45-6, 47, 49 Winters, It Co Red 21

Hertzog, It Co Randy 13, 46, 49 Ribas-Domminici,Capt Fernando 88 world speed records14, 15,15,91

Holloway, Adm James L, III 29, 30 Rogers, It Co Jack 17

Holte, Maj Chuck 76-7 Rosenberg, Capt Maury 16bis, 51,51-2, 52bis Yeilding, It Co Ed 91

Hornbaker,Maj Mac 46 Ross, Maj Ted 67-8, 70-2 Yemen mission 31-5

Rushing, Mel 82 Young, Co Dave36, 46

JA-37 Viggens 66,66-7,90 Young, Maj Rch 44bis, 46

96



O I OSPREY COMBAT AIRCRAFT • 8010

LOCI{HEED SR-71 OPERATIONS IN EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

icon of the Cold War, the SR-71 had been in

tline service for almost a decade by the time it

rted flying from RAF Mildenhall, Suffolk, UK, on a

lar basis. The aircraft's mission in-theater was

ple - moni tor Warsaw Pact troop movements

ng the Iron Curtain and photograph the various

ts with access to the Baltic and Barents Seas that

home to the Soviet Union's nuclear submarine

t. During the course of these vital missions, the

iets tried to intercept the SR-71 as it flew at

3 just within international airspace. Despite

COMBAT

SERIES

• Comprehensive histories of fighting

aircraft and their crews, highlighting

their vital role in the development of

warfare in the 20th and 21 st centuries

• A unique source of information,

researched by recognized experts

and brought to life by first-hand

accounts from the combat

veterans themselves

employing the best frontline fighters and surface-to

ai r missiles at their disposal, Soviet forces could

not touch the SR-71 . When tensions between

America and Libya flared in April 1986, the

intelligence-gathering capabilities of the British

based SR-71 s were called upon to provide

post-strike bomb damage assessment, and

three missions were flown by the SR-71 over

Tripoli and Benghazi. The last SR-71 departed

the UK in January 1990, after which the jet

returned to the USA for good.

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44396675 SR 71 Operations From Www Jgokey Com