437The Logic of Non Duality and Absolute Affirma

8/8/2019 437The Logic of Non Duality and Absolute Affirma

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Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 1995 22/1-2

The Logic of Nonduality and Absolute AffirmationDeconstructing Tendai Hongaku Writings

Ruben L. F. HABrro

Tendai hongaku thought has come under scrutiny and severe criticismrecently on two counts, one ontological and the other socio-ethical. Theontologacal critique maintains that hongaku thought espouses substantial-istic notions inconsistent with the teaching of early Buddhism. This articleexamines passages from hongaku writings and offers a reading that takesin to account enlightenment practice i n the Ten dai tradition as the contextwith in which these texts were written a nd used. Not ing the role of "decon-structive disclaimers" imbedded in the text, it suggests a way of readingtha t ca n allow the contents to avoid the pitfall of substantialism.

HONGAKUHISC) *BE.?!?:or the doctrine of originary enlightenment,'is a thought-movement that took shape within Japanese TendaiBuddhism and exerted a profound influence in the wider circle ofJapanese thought, culture, and society. Its essential proposition is thatno distinction exists between the phenomenal and the absolute, thatis, between samsara and nirvana [shoji soku n eha n &?EEP?B%],elusivepassions and enlightenment [bo nno soku bodai E348EPBR], and ordi-nary beings and Buddha [ bon soku sh6 LQP91)H o n g a k u thought has been the subject of a recent controversy,sparked by claims from reputable scholars that it is "not Buddhist"(HAKAMAYA989 and 1991; MATSUMOTO989, 1993; see SWANSON1989b, 1993). These critics assert that hon gak u shiso is a heterodox set

Here I depart from some of my own previous articles (1991a, 1991b, 199 1~)n render-ing hon * n the term hongaku *% with the awkward but less limiting English term "origi-nary." The particular disadvantages of terms such as "innate" or "inherent" or "original"have been noted (see SWANSON987, p. 74), and "origlnary" would seem to encompass themeanings of these terms in a way that need not carry their limited nuances. The term alsoimplies a dimension that cuts across time and space and that embraces the firmation ofthe here-and-now.


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84 Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 22/1-2

of ideas deeply influenced by indigenous Japanese elements-includ-ing a kind of naturalism and pragmatic this-worldliness-that for cen-turies has tainted much of what has passed for "Japanese Buddhism."They maintain that hongaku shis6, with the attitudes and worldviewsrelated to it, must be repudiated if we are to return to the "pure" formof Buddhism taught by ~ i i k ~ a m u n i . ~

The criticism of hongaku shis6 has been multipronged, but for pur-poses of convenience it can be classified into an ontological critiqueand a socio-ethical critique. The ontological critique holds that hon-gaku thought is non-Buddhist because it is based upon a substantialis-tic conception-a Brahmanical philosophical view that s2kyamuni dis-claimed and that the orthodox early Buddhists guarded against. Nordoes this critique confine itself to the Japanese Tendai concept of hon-gaku: its precursors, the Indian Mahayiina notion of tathGgatagarbhaand the Chinese "Buddha nature," plus many related concepts fromthe sutras and commentaries, are similarly "exposed" as substantialistand thus incompatible with the basic Buddhist view of anGtman.'

The socioethkal critique maintains that hongaku thought has led toa pernicious tendency in Japanese Buddhism to engage in what mightbe called aku-by6d6 z9% evil equalization). This is the tendency touse the hongaku doctrine of nondistinction in a way that legitimizeshistorically condi tioned attitudes and structures of discriminationagainst certain sectors of Japanese society (mainly, but not exclusively,descendants of the medieval outcaste group known as the burakumin%%E; AKAMAYA989, pp. 134-58). The socioethical critique alsoattacks the militaristic and nationalistic stance taken by prominentBuddhist leaders and intellectuals during World War 11, attributingthis failure in ethical judgment to the influence of a doctrine thatconflates the absolute with historical reality. The critics see the samenationalistic forces motivating the actions and words of certain con-temporary intellectual and political leaders (HAKAMAYA990, pp.47-92.) Another prong of this critique points to the historical role ofhongaku thought as an ideological buttress for the powerful politico-religious establishment that controlled the life of the masses andmaintained a rigid and oppressive hierarchical structure during themedieval p e r i ~ d . ~

* The three basic elements of this "pure" orm of Buddhism as described by HAKAMAYA( 1 9 8 9 , pp. 9-10) are: the law of causation (pmtzlya-samutpada), he standpoint of anatman,and a view of reality informed by faith (iraddhci) and wisdom ( p a j f i a ) .See SWANSON992,pp. 126-28.

MATSUMOTOoined the term dhdu-v idu to describe this substantialistic viewpoint, see-ing it as a corollary view to the heretical a t m a-vda (1989 ,pp. 1-9).

See KURODA 975 and 1990. On the basis on his study of actual documents of the period,


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HAMTO: The Logic of Nonduality a nd Absolute Affirmation 85

The recent controversy surrounding hongaku thought and its rolein the formation of Japanese religion and culture has made it neces-sary to map out with greater precision the historical parameters of thisthought-movement and the set of ideas it espouses, and to clarify themeaning of the various texts identified with it. This paper is one mod-est contribution in this direction.

Texts belonging to the hongaku tradition abound in statementsthat negate the conventional duality between concepts normally inpolar opposit ion, like the notions of samsiira and ni rv an a. We willexamine certain hongaku texts in an attempt to understand the logicof nonduality and absolute affirmation that they present.'' Then, focus-ing on the ontological critiques of hongaku shiso, we will offer somereflections relating to the social and religious role of hongaku thoughtin Japan.

Birth-death and Nirvana: The Hongaku Logzc of NondualityThe negation of dualities is a recurrent theme not only in Tendai hon-gaku thought but in Mahiyiina Buddhism as a whole. Nagiirjuna'sMiidhyamika treatises built on this theme, and the various philosophi-cal schools and systems that later arose in China, Tibet, Korea, andJapan all developed their own individually nuanced logic of non-d ~ a l i t y . ~ne question that arises then is whether there is a logic ofnonduality in Japanese Tendai hongaku thought that distinguishes itfrom previous traditions in Mahi i~ ana .~Kuroda devised the term kvnmit.tu tniwi B%#tO to denote this rnedieval politico-religiousestablishment that is ideologically supported by the conceptual framework of hongaku shis6.Kuroda's historical critique comes independently of and from a different angle thanHakarnaya's and Matsunloto's critiques. (See also Sueki's article in this issue, pp. 3-16.)

See TA DA t al. 1973, for a handy anthology of important texts in the hongnku cluster.These are but a few of the many texts known to espouse Tendai hongaku ideas.

For a background study on different kinds of ~lo ndualit y,ee Lou 1988.To offer a sweeping sunirnary, the Midhyarriika c on cept io~l f the two truths and the

Yogacara corl cep tio~ l f the three natures can be seen as attempts to provide a log.lcal frame-work for nonduality in the Buddhist tradition (HARRIS991). The doctrin e of tnthdgatn-garbha represents an attempt to use nonduality as a basis for a system of thought (TAKASAKI1966 and 1974; R u ~ c c 969 and 1989).Th e T'ien-t'ai conceptiorl of the threefold truth(SWANSON989a) and the Hua-Yen corlception of the interpenetratiorl of part and whole(COOK 977) are philosophical expositions of nond ual standpoints .

Tarnura Yoshiro presents a neat schema tracing the development of diffe rent logics ofnonduality (.tKwku-ronWU&) from the "fundan~en ta l ogic of nonduality" (kihonteki .tKwkku-ronX*B9HBO%) found in Madhyamika texts to the "i~rmranerrtal" noizaitekim&@J)logic ofnonduality of tathCgntr~gnrbhnhoug ht, the "manifestational" (kvngmkkiW R & ) logic of non-duality in early T'ien-t'ai and Hua-yen thinkers, and finally the "actualized" (kmmitekij lR&&) logic of nondual ity found in hongnku writings. This schema places the last of these as


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Let us examine a passage from the Gozu homon yosun W % i % B 9 RX, atext dated to the late twelfth century (TAMURA973,p. 523).

,411 the awakened oncs are not separate from the realm ofbirth-death, and at the same time are separated from birth-death; they do not cling to nirvwa, and thus attain nirvana.Having abandoned the way and its practice, they are in eternity,bliss, self, purity. The living beings of the three worlds, due totheir views of birth and death, are submerged in the sixrealms; wishing to cut themselves off from birth and death,they do not escape birth and death; wishing to hold on tonirvana, they do not attain nirvana.

The effortless (musa %I+ ) birthdeath is from the outsetbeginningless and endless. In the Perfect Teaching [of ourschool] the phenomenal world and emptiness fall into neitherthe eternalistic nor the nihilistic view. Contemplate this, anddo not fear birth and death. Birthdeath is originary bliss (shcjiwa mot0 raku nari &%/\$%3-')). Human beings are deludedand perceive this as suffering. Remove this erroneous view atonce, and you will arrive at the Buddha-land.

(TADAt al. 1973, p. 38)The central theme of this passage-the negation of the conventionalopposition between birthdeath on the one hand and nirvana on theother--echoes that of othe r M ah ayh a texts. Examples in PrajGi-piiramitii literature can be pointed out , such as the following:

Maitrqra: If, 0 Lord, the Bodhisattva in the interest of othersdoes not renounce samsira, how is it that through his non-renunciation of samsara he has not also renounced niM na? Ifthe Bodhisattva has in his own interest not (completely)renounced nirvsna, how is it that as a result of his non-renunciation of nirvana he has not also renounced saxpsiira?The Lord: Here, Maitreya, the Bodhisattva, the great being whocourses in perfect wisdom, neither discriminates samsara assamsara, nor niMna as nirvana. When he thus does not dis-criminate, they, samsara and nirvina, become exactly thesame. And why? Because, when he does not discriminatesamsara as samska, he does not become alarmed by samsfu-a;and so, when he does not discriminate nirvana as nirviina, hedoes not fall away from nirvana. Thus one should know that

the highest stage of development in Buddhist thought (see TAMURA973, pp. 480-83). Butsince it is precisely Tamura's hyperbolic claims about the place of hrmgnku shi~rin the historyof Buddhist thought that is now being challenged, we will not rely on his schema but willinstead reexamine the textual evidence in light of the recent critiques.


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HAMTO:he Logic of Nonduality and Absolute Affirmation

for one who is established in the indiscriminate realm therecan for this reason be no renunciation of samsara and norenunciation of nirvana.

(CONZE 975, pp. 650-51)T he well-known verses in Nagiirjuna's Mulamadhyamaka-kan'ka on

the nonduality of samsara and nirvana also loom in the background:There is no difference whatsoever between samsara and nirvanaThere is no difference whatsoever between nirvana and samsara.The boundary of samsara is the boundary of nirvanaBetween these two there is not the slightest space-in-between.

(chapter 25, verses 19, 20; see STRENG967, p. 217)Needless to say, these affirmations of nonduality are presented in thecontext of Sunyata. This of course raises the question of what the con-cept of Sunyata signifies in t he Mahiiyana trad ition . He re we ar eindebted to the recent Buddhist scholarship that has demonstratedhow the exposition of Sunyata is meant to lead, not to an intellectualcomprehension of the term as an ontological concept relating to ulti-mate reality, but to an illuminative understanding of it as a soteriologi-cal principle. ' To employ t he classic categories of Jo hn He nr yNEWMAN,he proper understanding of Sunyata does no t merely involvea "notional assent" but a "real assent" that transforms the subject inthe very act of understanding (1947).

Thus the expositions of nonduality in many of the Mahiiyiina textsfrom India, Tibet, an d China are meant to be read in conjunctionwith an attempt to realize Sunyata, that is, with an attempt to attain an

See STRENC967 for a notable study that called attention to the soteriological implica-tions of the episte~nological rocess involved in understanding .iunynli In this paper I amadapting Streng'a use of this term .wlm-iologzcnl,described "in a broad scnse to mean 'ulti-mately transforming'; and it is this trar~sfor~natior~hich is seen in terms of 'purifying,''becoming rea l,' 'being free ,' and 'knowing the tru th' in various traditions all over theworld" (p. 171). See also HUN TING TON1989, p. xii):

The significar~ce f the words and concepts used within the Miidhyanrika systemderives not from their supposed association with any objectively privileged vocab-ulary supporting a particular view of truth or reality, but from their specialefficacy as instru~rler~tshich may be applied in daily life to the sole purpose oferadicating the suffering caused by clinging, antipathy, and the delusion of reifiedthought .. . The critical distinction here is between systematic philosophy, co11-cerrled with the presentation of a particular view or belief (&ti), and edifymgphilosophy, engaged in strictly deconstructive activity (the Madhya~rlika rman-gnvrEkyn). The central concepts of an edifymg philosophy must be ultimately aban-doned when they have served the purpose for which they were designed. Suchconcepts are not used to express a view but lo nrhin~r n u/luc.t: They are a means(upnya).


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88 Japanese Jou rna l of Religious Studies 22/1-2

illuminative understanding that is at the same time transformative of-the o ne who understands. This is the common thread uniting the vari-ous Buddhist texts from ancient times to the present.

If the above standpoint is to be adopted in the reading of certainMahayana texts, it follows that a " p r ~ p e r " ' ~nderstanding of thesetexts requires that one situate one's reading in the context of Bud-dhist enlightenment practice, that is, in the context of a personalquest for enlightenment. This is not, of course, to dismiss other waysof reading as "improper" nor to deny the validity of other approachesfor different purposes, but simply to accept the proposition that thesoteriological dimension can be a decisive factor in the understandingof these works.

The implication for the present study is, needless to say, that hon-gaku texts too can be seen and hopefully better understood within theparticular context of enlightenment practice. This possibility is sup-ported by what we know of the actual situation in which hongaku docu-ments were written and read. The present scholarly consensus is thatthe oral transmissions (kuden fZ ) of the Tendai tantric traditionwere the matrix out of which these writings emerged. The first stage,according to Tamura, was the appearance of short note-like writingson separate pieces of paper ( kirikami-s6j6W WB 7 % ) ; these short docu-ments may have served as prompt-notes in the face-to-face encountersbetween teacher and disciple that were part of enlightenment prac-tice. This stage, in Tamura's op inion, continued until around thetwelfth century. The next stage of documentation (from the lateHeian period until the thirteenth century) involved the collection ofthese pieces of paper, followed by the systematization of their content(mid-thirteenth century onwards). There was then a commentarialstage (fourteenth to fifteenth centuries) in which the content waselaborated upon (TAMURA973,p. 479) .

If, indeed, the hongaku texts emerged from the context of enlight-enment practice and were intended not for the general public noreven for the intellectuals of the time, but for those engaged in medita-tional and devotional practice, it goes without saying that the trueintent of the texts can only be understood if the factor of praxis istaken into account.

In the above-mentioned passage from the Gozu h6mon yosun, theperception of birth-death as suffering and nirvana as bliss is describedas the product of delusion. It is the very yearning for nirvana, mis-takenly thought to transcend the realm of birth-death, that plunges

l o In the sense of the Lat h j ~ r o j n i o , hat is, "referririg to its own particular character. "


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-]TO: The Logic of Nonduality and Absolute Affirmation 89

sentient beings all the more deeply into the world of suffering andprevents them from truly realizing nirvana. The various statements inthe passage work together to help the reader-practitioner recognizeand overcome the er roneous view that samsara and nirvana are sepa-rate , oppositional realities.

O n one level, this standpoint of nonduality appears to be groundedon concepts highly susceptible to the charge of substantialism. Forexample, the terms eternity, bliss, self, and purity (jo-raku-ga-jo %'$)-terms first seen in sutras and commentaries expounding thedoctrine of tathigatagarbha (TAKASAKI 974)-are lined up as attributesof the mode of being of an awakened one. The frequent appearanceof such terms in hongaku texts, and of others like "one mind" (isshin-&), "suchness" (shinny0BBU), and "Dharma-realm" (hokkai &%) ,serves to confirm critics in their opinion that we are dealing with aform of dhatu-vida (MATSUMOTO989). However, if we keep in mindthe idea that the text is to be read in the context of enlightenmentpractice and in such a way as to lead the reader to a transformativeexperience of awakening, then we can see the passage as somethingmore than a conceptual explanation based on substantialist notions.

The statement "birth-death is originary bliss" is one instance ofwhat the critics describe as "an absolute afirmation of phenomenalreality." Similar affirmations are found throughout hongaku writing,and are indeed characteristic of this entire cluster of texts. Our ques-tion is whether there is a way to read these statements that does notfall into self-contradiction or enter the trap of substantialism.A clue can be found in the short disclaimer, "The phenomenal

world and emptiness fall neither into the eternalistic nor the nihilisticview." Immediately after this comes the pivotal statement, "Do not fearbirth-death. Birth-death is origmary bliss." The reader-practitioner isenjoined not to look for a nirvana beyond or separate from this phe-nomenal world of samsara. 'What you are looking for, what you yearnfor as true Bliss, is to be found right from the start in this very worldof birth-death, and nowhere else." Birth-death, in other words, is thevery field wherein the middle path that avoids the two extremes ofsubstantialism and nihilism is attained. Neither the phenomenalworld characterized by samsara nor the world of emptiness identifiedwith nirvana is to be hypostatized as eternal, yet neither are they to bedenied or dismissed as nothingness. Birthdeath , in other words, is notto be denigrated and nirvana is not to be hypostatized, and conversely,birth-death is not to be hypostatized and nirvana is not to be denied(i.e., viewed simply as extinction).

We must stress here that the statement "birth-death is originary


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bliss" comes after the disclaimer, 'T he phenomenal world and empti-ness fall neither into the eternalistic nor the nihilistic view." The readeris being cautioned not to take the statement "birth-death is originarybliss" as simply another affirmation of eternalism, that is, not to fallinto the mistaken view of hypostatizing birth-death. An absoluteaffirmation is made, but in such a way that it cannot be confused withthe extreme view of eternalism already repudiated in the disclaimer.

How, then, are we to understand this absolute affirmation? Takingthe disclaimer in a straightforward way, we can say that the birth-deaththat is absolutely affirmed as originary bliss is no longer the birth-death that is viewed in opposition to nirvana. The latter bir thdeath isthe suffering of everyday experience, a reality that no human (or sen-tient) being can ignore or deny. In this sense, "birth-death is originarybliss" is not an unrealistic viewpoint that ignores the fact of suffering,since the "birth-death7'of this affirmation is not the birth-death of suf-fering bu t the effortless (musa k4$) birth-death that transcends alloppositions. It is a beginningless and endless bir thdeath that is totallyindependent of linear time. Likewise, the "originary bliss" predicatedon this effortless birth-death is not the nirvana opposed to birth-death, but the nirvana that transcends the opposition of birth-deathand nirvana, suffering and bliss.

The substantialistic nuances of such terms as "eternity," "bliss,""self," and "purity" remain, of course, a problem. The same problem isfound in other texts of the tathagatagarbha lineage that employ theseterms when descriing the absolute, most notably the Ratnagotravibhaga(T #I61 1) and the Ta-sheng ch'i-hsin lun kRS4S2 [The awakening offaith] (T #1666, #1667). It is helpful to recall in this regard that thesetreatises were written in part to counter the tendency to interpretSunyata from the standpoint of nihilism. In the Ratnagotravibhaga, forexample, tathagatagarbha, tathagatadhatu, nitya-sukha-atma-Subha-paramit5 (supreme eternity, bliss, self, and purity) and other suchcharacteristics of the dharmakaya in its perfected state (NAKAMURA1962, p. 65: 20-23) are presented as "positive notions" that function asantidotes to the nihilistic view of Sunyata (TAKASAKI966, pp. 54-57).Much the same can be said concerning the concept of one mind, thekey notion that ties the Awakening ofFaith together and another termthat figures prominently in hongaku texts (HIRAKAWA973, pp. 71-80;TAKASAKI 974, pp. 751-71).

Moreover, when Tathagatagarbha treatises use notions with substan-tialistic nuances they accompany them with important disclaimers,indicating that the authors were aware of the problem. These dis-claimers caution the reader not only against the extreme view of


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-1~0: The Logic o f Nonduality an d Absolute Affirmation 91

nihilism when considering SiinyatcZ, but also against the equally falseview of eternalism."

In other words, though a surface reading suggests that the notionof a substantial absolute is implicit in the argumentation of thesetexts, the disclaimers imbedded in the texts themselves can be said todeconstruct the substantialistic notions and bring the reader back tothe matter at hand: the overcoming of the erroneous views that keepsentient beings trapped in the dualistic world, suffering in the realmof birth-death and seeking bliss in nirvana.

This ruling out of both eternalism and nihilism leaves the reader-practitioner with no rational, coherent way of resolving the issue. Inthe above passage from the Gozu hcimon ycisan a "way out" of thisquandary is opened through the deconstructive power of the text'sdisclaimers. Thus the statement 'The phenomenal world and empti-ness fall into neither the eternalistic nor the nihilistic view" decon-structs the substantialist interpretations not only of the terms "eterni-ty," "bliss," "self," and "purity," but also of the statement "birth-death isoriginary bliss" that follows in the next paragraph.

This disclaimer can, however, do more: it can open the practitionerto a new understanding of what the text may be conveying beyond itsactual words. In giving way to the deconstructive power of the disclaimer("neither eternalistic, neither nihilistic"), the key statement ("birth-death is originary bliss") can serve to open a new dimension of under-standing that is none other than the experience of awakening: "Removethis erroneous view, and at once you will realize the Buddha-land."

However, the statement "birth-death is originary bliss" can also beread simply as a proposition m aking a n absolute afJirmation (i.e., as a state-ment affirming the absoluteness of birth-death as originary bliss). Inthis case, the discourse about absolute affirmation itself succumbs to acrucial pitfall, namely, the conceptualization of absolute affirmation.The logical difficulties inherent in such a conceptualization are easyto point out. For one, since the key terms are used in a way thatgoes beyond the boundaries within which they are conventionallyemployed-i.e., birth-death as the realm of suffering and bliss as thel1n the htnagotmv ibhign , for example, the Jewel of the Dharma is described as "nei-

ther non-being nor being, nor both being and non-being together, and neither differentfrom being nor from non-being" (NAKAMURA962, pp. 17-18; TAKASAKI966, p. 163, for atranslation). This classic disclaimer, from the fourfold negatiou expounded in such texts asthe Mndhynmnkn-kiriki (I,7) and Mnhiyinnsutrcilnmkcirn (M,1),expresses a basic Mahiyhaposition. In the Aw abn ing o fFai th there is a noted phrase suggesting that knowledge of theultimate (shinnyo, suchness) is through a process whereby "words are used to eradicatewords" [filZ j B 8 (T #1666, 32.576a ; see HIRAXAWA973, pp. 71-75, for corn~ne~ltary).


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opposite of this suffering-the proposition makes no sense from a lin-guistic-analytic point of view. If the proposition is understood as anattempt to bring the reader beyond the parameters of normal dis-course by transcending the conventional meaning of the termsinvolved, the preceding arguments fail to make the case and simplybeg the question. Again, if one assents to the proposition that birth-death is qualified in an absolute way by the predicative notion of"originary bliss" despite experiential evidence that birth-death doesindeed involve suffering, one cannot explain oneself out of the result-ing conceptual contradictions. A literal acceptance of the propositionleads not to illuminative understanding but to an ontological positionunwarranted by ordinary experience and by the sense of the termsinvolved-a more subtle form of delusion than the dualistic view theproposition was meant to deny.

Our passage from the Gozu hornon y&an thus offers a good exampleof the conclusions that can result from a reading that fails to gobeyond the surface meaning of the words (eternity, bliss, self, purity,etc. ). One can easily end up believing that what is being espoused is asubstantialist absolute affirmation founded on weak premises, withcontradictory. implications and indefensible conclusions. But by con-sidering the specific context in which the text is used (enlightenmentpractice) and examining the deconstructive function of the dis-claimers imbedded in the writing, one can detect the source of thetext's latent liberative power: the "emptying" of concepts that leads toan opening of illuminative understanding.

The "logic of nonduality" in this hongaku passage can be describedas triple-layered. The first layer involves the recognition that sentientbeings are lost in dualistic thinking, despising samsara and aspiringfor nirvana; they are sunk deep in the six realms because of their erro-neous views of birth-death. The second layer involves the affirmationthat samsara and nirvana are not separate. Truly awakened ones(Buddhas) do not seek to separate themselves from samsara "in orderto" attain nirvana, and are thus liberated from all attachments, evento nirvana. For this precise reason they dwell in nirvana. The thirdlayer is the dimension opened by the disclaimer "neither eternalistic,neither nihilistic," which denies not only that nirvana is eternal andsamsara impermanent, but also that nirvana is impermanent andbir th-death eternal. Freed from both er roneous views by this dis-claimer, and left with n o logical alternative, the reader-practitioner isprepared for an absolute-affirmation-leading-to-awakening: "Birth-death is originary bliss."


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HABITO:he Logic of Nonduality and Absolute Affirmation

A s Such-The Logzc of Absolute AfJirm ationLet us now examine two other passages to see if hongaku texts may beread in such a way that the surface meanings can be transcended.The notion of the "three bodies of effortlessness" ( m u sa n o sa n j i nM Z B ) s one that finds frequent mention in hongaku texts. T he follow-ing, from the Sanjii-shi ka no kotogaki 3+Pll@9f,s but one example:

The term "the three bodies of originary effortlessness" (honjgmusa no sanjin) usually signifies that with the first realization ofthe path the three bodies [of the Buddha] become the effortlessthree bodies. Now we say, consider carefully the term "originaryeffortlessness." There is no beginning whatsoever to the threebodies. By "the three bodies of originary effortlessness," we donot mean the three bodies that attain enlightenment upon thefirst realization of the path. Everything (issai shoh6 --!XI%$!?) isthe embodiment of the three bodies, since everything is begin-ningless and originary. The efforts of the Buddha have noth-ing to d o with it, nor do the efforts of asuras and heavenlybeings. Everything is just as it was at the outset, and since thereis nothing that is not an embodiment of the three bodies, eachand every delusive thought of ours is the entirety of the wis-dom of the Glorious Body. All our activity, passivity, sitting, andlying down is the embodiment of the Body of Transformation.All of our sufferings and all of the onerous tasks in this worldof birth-death are the embodiment of the Dhanna-body in thefullness of perfection. It is thus with sentient beings (sh6h6iE%) as well as with the environment (eh6 @%). Cherry treesand plum trees, peaches and apricots and the like, the in-exhaustible myriad of phenomena, are all embodiments of thebody of transformation. Also, flowers and fruits and the in-exhaustible variety of such things, as they grow and matureand come to be from moment to moment, are no other thanthe Glorious Body. Everything twisted and straight, everythingthat comes to be from moment to moment, is just as it is, andembodies the Dharma-body. Sentient beings as well as theenvironment are already the three bodies. Moreover, sentientbeings as sentient beings are the three bodies, the environ-ment as the environment is the three bodies. There is no pointeven in calling them "the three bodies." Sentient beings assuch embody all the qualities of the three bodies. The environ-ment as such embodies the qualities of the three bodies.

(TADAt al. 1973, p. 173)


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First, a note on the background of the key term, the "three bodies."The notion of the threefold body of the Buddha is but one of manyBuddha-body theories that developed over the long history of Maha-yana speculative thought. These theories may be seen as attempts toaddress the relationship between the historical and the transhistorical,the phenom ena l and the absolute, as well as between practice andenlightenment, self-oriented and other-oriented action, and wisdoman d compassion (HABITU978, 1985, l9 9la ).

Japanese Tendai hongaku texts, as I have argued elsewhere, simply"take the pre-packed notion of the three bodies of the Buddha andother related notions, 'cooking' them and dealing them out in linewith a particular menu, that is, the affirmation of all phenomenal real-ity as absolute and abiding" (HABITO 991a, p. 59) . This descriptionremains valid, but a second look at some of the texts that discuss thethree bodies-notably where the term appears in the context of thecompound musa no sanjin-may be of interest, since it reveals some-thing more than a naive, conceptual "affirmation of all phenomenalreality as absolute and abiding."

The passage just quoted is a case in point. O ur clue again is in thedisclaimer, "There is no point even in calling them 'the three bod-ies'." The passage first makes a conceptual identification of cherrytrees, etc., as embodiments of the three Buddha-bodies, then, withthis disclaimer, invites the reader-practitioner to cast aside the veryconcept of the three bodies and simply encounter "cherry trees, plumtrees, peaches and apricots and the like" as such. The text, in otherwords, overturns the initial predication of the subject "cherry trees"by "the three bodies" to present cherry trees as cherry trees, plumtrees as plum trees, etc. It prompts the reader to take this as a cue andexperience the awakening in which every particular event, encounter,and element is, as such, just as it is; it invites us to accept "all our activ-ity, standing up, sitting, or lying down," "all our sufferings and all ofthe onerous tasks in this world of birth-death" as such, and to notpredicate the concept of "the three bodies of the Buddha," or anyother concept for that matter, onto these concrete particularities ofour experience. It is in the very midst of these particular things as suchthat an illuminative understanding, an awakening, can take place.

The first part of the passage sets the stage for this awakening byaffirming that "all our activity," etc., is the embodiment of the Body ofTransformation, that "all our sufferings," etc., are the embodiment ofthe Dharma Body in the fullness of perfection. But stopping herewould leave one with a mere conceptual identification or conflationof these things with the three bodies of the Buddha. To rest content


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with this affirmation would be to stop with a notional assent to an ,apparent assertion of absolute affirmation, and thus succumb to thepitfall of essentialism. But the passage adds the crucial disclaimer andthus overturns this conceptual identification by inviting the practi-tioner to simply take things "as such, just as they are."

The same kind of disclaimer is found in another passage from theSanjii-shi ka no kotogaki that expounds the relationship between therealm of Buddha and the realm of sentient beings.

In the Perfect Teaching [of our school], we do not say thatsentient beings are transformed and attain Buddhahood.Realize that sentient beings as such, and Buddha-realm assuch, are both abiding [as they are].

(TADAt al. 1973,p. 176)The passage earlier builds up a careful argument, backed by traditionalBuddhist concepts, that affirms the nonduality of sentient beings andBuddha and the oneness of the phenomenal and the absolute. Thenthe disclaimer comes, rejecting the conceptual identification of sentientbeings and Buddha. But this rejection, coming right ajim the said iden-tification, cannot be interpreted as a mere return to the other extremeof naively denying the nonduality of sentient beings and Buddha.What this disclaimer does is deconstruct the conceptual absoluteaffirmation, and thus open the reader-practitioner to a transformativeawakening experience wherein erroneous views are eliminated. In thiscase, "as such" functions as a turning word with a deconstructiveeffect.

The above passages from the Sanjii-shi ka no kotogaki expound thenonduality of sentient beings and Buddha in a way that first proposesarguments for the absolute identity of these two polar concepts, thenat a crucial point deconstructs the argument with a disclaimer. Butwhat we have in each case is not a passage that contradicts itself, but acarefully crafted text that, when read in the context of enlightenmentpractice, can serve to open the practitioner to a transformative awak-ening experience.

The logic of absolute affirmation in the above texts likewise exhibitsa threefold layer, which can be summarized in the following manner.The first layer is the level of ordinary delusive thinking, wherein cherrytrees are identified as cherry trees and not as plum trees, humanbeings, or hungry ghosts, much less as bodies of the Buddha. Thesecond layer, one that we could call the level of conceptual absolutiza-tion, is where "cherry trees [and] the inexhaustible myriad of phenom-ena are all the embodiments of the body of transformation." And thethird, crucial layer, is the level that disclaims this conceptual affirma-


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96 Japanese Journ al of ReLigious Studies 22/1-2

tion in o rde r to op en o ne anew to the fact that cherry trees are cherrytrees, but with a difference. This "difference" is the realization in which"cherry trees" are absolutely affirmed as such. This third layer is mademanifest with the "emptying of concepts" effected by the disclaimer.These are only examples of how hongaku texts, though susceptibleon first reading to logical misunderstandings and accusations of sub-stantialism, may acually convey far more than the conceptual co nten tof the te rms would suggest if read within the context of enlighten-ment practice. The final entry in the Sanju-shi ka no kotogaki, whichprefaces a transmission lineage chart situating the supposed author(Kokaku $%) in the Eshin lineage, corroborates this suggestion.

This Teaching of Thirtyfour I tems is the transmission of ourschool, a compendium of contemplative practice ( kan j inBL,).If this teaching is transmitted perfectly and completely, every-one will understand all the doctrines. Herein the main pointsof our school are made clear. It has been passed down to thisstupid one (gushin .%B from teacher to disciple in a six-gen-eration lineage. In order that it might be handed down tolater disciples I manifest it here in writing, not omitting anyprofound teaching. May later generations of disciples findherein a looking-glass mirror. Even at the cost of one's life oneshould not give this [to those unworthy]. Because it concernsthe profound teaching, both teacher and disciple would fallinto hell if this were to happen. But if there is someone whohas the capacity to receive this teaching, and only then, at lastit must be transmitted. Because this is the profound teachingthat has been transmitted in our lineage, one must be very dis-creet, very discreet indeed. If there is no one that can befound who has the capacity to receive this, let it be burieddeep beneath the walls. Those of you who are disciples of thislineage, take this intent to heart. Anyone who violates thisintent is not a disciple, much less a teacher.

(TAUAt al. 1973, pp. 184-85)This en try makes it clear that the document was not m eant for a gen-eral audience. It may have been intended as a "companion text" forthe face-to-face teacher-disciple enco unters that are par t of enlighten-ment practice, to be given only to those "worthy ones" whose state ofpractice showed them capable of reading it "properly."

In these Tendai hongaku documents, therefore , we are dealing withtexts intended for use in the context of religious praxis. The teacher-disciple en co un te rs that occur in this contex t obviously involveexchanges of meaning that cannot be recorded in written form. The


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HABITO:h e Logic of Nonduality an d Absolute Affirmation 97

disciple is repeatedly challenged to demonstrate a grasp of the matterat hand, not only in the form of propositional statements, but alsothrough gestures, noises, or even silence. The very manner in whichthese things are done is itself part and parcel of the way one "pre-sents" one's understanding of the text at hand. The teacher respondswith words or gestures intended to deconstruct those concepts ateither extreme that the disciple may still be clinging to. The teacherthereby creates a conceptual impasse that can open the disciple toawakening. It may even happen that this deconstructive disclaimer(the "turning word," to borrow Ch'an/Zen vocabulary) is uttered inthe course of the face-to-face encounter, so that no trace is left in thewritten text.

An understanding of the way in which these texts were used mayhelp the prospective critic avoid taking the passages "out of context"and attempting definitive pronouncements on their content andintent. This caution about attempting definitive pronouncementsapplies, of course, to the present paper, which is no more than anattempt to suggest a way of reading Tendai hongaku texts that mightnot fall entirely off the mark.

Concluding RefictionsThis paper has explored the possibility of reading hongaku texts in away that takes into consideration the particular context of enlighten-ment practice out of which they may have arisen. By no means do ourquite limited efforts permit conclusions that might apply to all hon-gaku texts; we can only say that further attempts along these lines maylead to a better understanding of some other texts as well.

This position is corroborated by evidence that the earliest textsidentifiable as part of the Tendai hongaku shis6 cluster-the loosesheets of paper known as kin'kami sGj+were written notes intended tosupplement or supplant oral transmission in the Japanese Tendai tra-dition (TAMURA973, p. 479). A fuller understanding of the hongakuwritings thus requires tha t we take into consideration the variousaspects of Tendai enlightenment practice, aspects such as monasticlife, contemplation (kanjin @&), individual study, and tantric ritual.Further studies of the aspect of praxis will inevitably throw new lighton hongaku shis6, situating it in a wider context than studies (includingthis one) that are limited to textual, philological, and philosophicalconsideration^.'^ It is precisely this that will make a difference in the

l 2The studies of Michael Saso on tantric rituals (see, for example, his "Kuden:The Oral


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98 Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 2 2 / 1 4 '

way we read some of those texts. It is indeed ironic that these texts,which emerged from the matrix of Tendai enlightenment practice,later came to be seen as having fostered laxity in practice or even ashaving advocated the abandonment of practice altogether. The cri-tiques of hongaku thou gh t by Dogen (1200-1253) an d Hochib oShoshin Zii&EZiEW (a Tendai monk of the late twelfth and early thir-teenth centuries) indicate that this cluster of texts had already cometo be seen in this way over seven centuries ago (TAMURA984).

This reputation may not have been entirely unwarranted, of course,given the wordirlg of some of the texts: "All he Buddhas.. .abandon-ing the path and its practice altogether, are in eternity, bliss, self, andpurity" (TADA t al. 19'73, p. 38); "Without our subjecting ourselves todifficult practice for innumerable kalpas, without practicing the sixparamitas, if one now, for a moment, bears in mind the thought that'this body of mine is suchness itse lf , one becomes a Buddha and real-izes the way to birth in the land of bliss" (p. 123); "If at this verymoment, without making any effort at all, without casting away ourlives, we simply bear in mind the thought that we are suchness itself,in an instant we become Buddha" (p . 128). This is just a random sam-pling of the types of statements in the Tendai hongaku texts that havealways been difficult to defend from criticism. The very fact that suchcriticism was made by those like Shoshin and Dogen who sought to re-emphasize the importance of praxis suggests that even then thesetexts were being read in ways divorced from their original context ofenlightenment practice.

This paper is an attempt to demonstrate that in at least some textsthe ontological critique-the charge of substantialism-may be avoidedby taking in to account the context of enl igh tenment practice. Myho pe has been to show that the sweeping attacks on hongaku shis6 riskthrowing out the proverbial baby with the bathwater. My intent is not,however, to suggest that thc baby remain unwashcd, much less that wekeep the bathwater. Although beyond the scope of this paper, thesocio-ethical critique against hongaku thought calls for serious consid-eration.

T h e hongaku texts also provided a conceptual framework thatproved eminently useful as an ideological buttress for the religio-political establishment of the time. Tendai hongaku shis6 thus came torepresent the "orthodoxy" that upheld and, conversely, was upheld by

Hermeneutics of Tendai Tantric Buddhisnl" in SWANSON987, pp. 235-46) are noteworthyin this regard, venturing into an important area that merits further exploration. On anotherplane, the stilldeveloping academic field of ritual studies has much to contribute for a morewell-rounded understanding of certain aspects of the hongnku genre.


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HABITO:he Logic of Nonduality and Absolute Affirmation 99

the Buddhist establishment of the time (KURODA975 and 1990) Butthis was an "orthodoxy" divorced from "orthopraxis" (see HABITO1991b).

The ontological critique against hongaku shiso, though daunting,may no t be insurmountable, and certain prominent Buddhist scholarshave already presented thoughtful responses in this regard.'' Th esocio-ethical critique, however, continues not only to question the roleof hongaku shiso in Japanese culture and society, but also to challengethe ent ire Japanese Buddhist establishment both past and present.

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