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Equality and Equal Opportunity for WelfareAuthor(s): Richard J. ArnesonSource: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the AnalyticTradition, Vol. 56, No. 1 (May, 1989), pp. 77-93Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4320032 .

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RICHARD J. ARNESON

EQUALITY AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITYFOR WELFARE

(Received2 January, 988)Insofaras we care for equalityas a distributivedeal,what is it exactlythat we prize?Many personsare troubledby the gapbetween the livingstandardsof richpeople andpoor people in modern societies or by thegap between the averagestandardof living in rich societies and thatprevalentn poor societies.To some extent at anyrateit is the gapitselfthat is troublesome,not just the low absolute level of the standardofliving of the poor. But it is not easy to decide what measure of the"standardof living"it is appropriateto employ to give content tothe ideal of distributiveequality.Recent discussionsby John Rawls1and RonaldDworkin2have debated the meritsof versions of equalityof welfare and equalityof resources taken as interpretationsof theegalitarian deal. In this paper I shall argue that the idea of equalopportunity or welfareis the best interpretationof the ideal of dis-tributive quality.

Consider a distributiveagency that has at its disposal a stock ofgoods thatindividualswantto own and use. We need not assume thateach good is useful for every person, just that each good is useful forsomeone.Each good is homogeneous n qualityand can be divided asfinely as you choose. The problem to be considered is: How to dividethe goods in order to meet an appropriate tandardof equality.Thisdiscussion assumesthat some goods are legitimatelyavailable or dis-tributionin this fashion, hence that the entitlements and deserts ofindividualsdo not predetermine he properownershipof all resources.No argument s providedfor thisassumption, o in thissense my articleisaddressed o egalitarians,ottheiropponents.

I. EQUALITY OF RESOURCESThe norm of equalityof resourcesstipulates hat to achieveequality hePhilosophicalStudies56: 77-93, 1989.C 1989 KluwerAcademicPublishers.Printed n theNetherlands.

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78 RICHARD J. ARNESON

agency ought to give everybody a share of goods that is exactlyidenticalto everyoneelse's and that exhaustsall availableresources tobe distributed.A straightforwardbjection to equalityof resources sounderstoodis that if Smithand Jones have similartastes and abilitiesexcept that Smith has a severe physical handicapremediablewith thehelp of expensive crutches, then if the two are accorded equal re-sources, Smith must spend the bulk of his resources on crutcheswhereas Jones can use his resource share to fulfill his aims to a fargreaterextent.It seems forced to claim that any notion of equality ofcondition that is worthcaringaboutprevailsbetween Smith and Jonesinthis case.

At least two responses to this objection are worth noting. One,pursued by Dworkin,3is that in the example the cut between theindividual and the resources at his disposal was made at the wrongplace. Smith's defective legs and Jones's healthylegs should be con-sideredamongtheirresources,so thatonly if Smith s assigneda gadgetthat rendershis legs fully serviceablein additionto a resourcesharethat is otherwise identical with Jones's can we say that equalityofresources prevails. The example then suggests that an equality ofresourcesethic should countpersonaltalentsamongthe resources o bedistributed.This line of response swiftly encounters difficulties.It isimpossiblefor a distributiveagencyto supplyeducationaland techno-logicalaid thatwilloffsetinborn differencesof talentso that all personsare blessed with the same talents.Nor is it obvious how much com-pensationis owed to those who are disadvantagedby low talent.Theworth to individualsof their talents variesdependingon the nature oftheir life plans.An heroic resolutionof this difficulty s to assigneveryindividualan equal share of ownershipof everybody'stalents in thedistribution f resources.4Under this procedureeach of the N personsin societybeginsadultlife owninga tradeable1/N shareof everybody'stalents.We can regard his share as amounting o ownershipof a blockof time duringwhich the owner can dictate how the partiallyownedperson is to deploy his talent.Dworkinhimself has noticed a flaw inthis proposal,whichhe has aptlynamed "theslaveryof the talented."5The flaw is that under this equal distributionof talent scheme theperson with high talent is put at a disadvantagerelative to her low-talent fellows.If we assume that each person stronglywantslibertyin

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EQUALITY AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR WELFARE 79the sense of ownershipover his own time (that is, ownershipover hisown body for his entire lifetime),the high-talentperson finds that histaste for libertyis very expensive,as his time is sociallyvaluable andverymuchin demand,whereasthe low-talentpersonfinds thathis tastefor liberty is cheap, as his time is less valuable and less in demand.Underthis versionof equalityof resources, f two personsare identicalin all respects exceptthat one is more talentedthan the other,the moretalentedwill find she is far less able to achieve her life plan than herless talented counterpart.Again, once its implicationsare exhibited,equalityof resourcesappearsan unattractiventerpretation f the idealof equality.A second response asserts that given an equal distributionof re-sources, persons should be held responsiblefor formingand perhapsreforming heir own preferences,n the lightof theirresourceshareandtheir personal characteristicsand likely circumstances.6The level ofoverallpreferencesatisfaction hat each personattains s then a matterof individualresponsibility, ot a socialproblem.ThatI havenil singingtalentis a given,but that I have developedan aspiration o become aprofessionalopera singerand have formedmy life around his ambitionis a furtherdevelopment hatwas to some extent withinmy control andfor whichI mustbearresponsibility.The difficultywith this responseis that even if it is acceptedit fallsshort of defending equalityof resources.Surelysocial and biologicalfactors influencepreferenceformation,so if we can properlybe heldresponsibleonly for whatlies withinour control, then we can at mostbe held to be partiallyresponsible or our preferences.For instance, twould be wildly implausible o claim that a person without the use ofhis legs should be held responsible or developinga full set of aims andvalues toward the satisfactionof which leglessness is no hindrance.Acceptanceof the claim that we are sometimes o an extentresponsiblefor our preferences leaves the initial objection against equality ofresources fully intact. For if we are sometimes responsible we aresometimesnotresponsible.The claim that "we are responsiblefor our preferences"s ambi-guous. It could mean that our preferenceshave developed to theirpresentstate due to factorsthat lay entirelywithin our control. Alter-natively, t could mean that our present preferences,even if they have


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arisen throughprocesses largelybeyondour powerto control,are nowwithinour controlin the sense thatwe could now undertakeactions, atgreateror lesser cost, that would changeour preferences n ways thatwe can foresee. If responsibility or preferenceson the first construalheld true, this would indeed defeat the presumption hat our resourceshare should be augmentedbecause it satisfies our preferencesto alesser extent thanthe resourceshares of otherspermitthem to satisfytheirpreferences.However,on the firstconstrual, he claim that we areresponsiblefor our preferencesis certainly always false. But on thesecond, weaker construal,the claim that we are responsiblefor ourpreferences s compatiblewith the claim that an appropriatenorm ofequal distributionshould compensate people for their hard-to-satisfypreferences at least up to the point at which by taking appropriateadaptivemeasuresnow, people could reach the same preferencesatis-faction evelas others.The defense of equality of resources by appeal to the claim thatpersons are responsible for their preferences admits of yet anotherinterpretation.Without claiming that people have caused their pre-ferences to become what they are or that people could cause theirpreferences to change, we might hold that people can take respon-sibility or theirfundamental references n the sense of identifyingwiththem and regardingthese preferences as their own, not as alienintrusions on the self. T. M. Scanlon has suggested the example ofreligious preferencesin this spirit.7That a person was raised in onereligioustraditionrather than another may predictablyaffect his life-time expectationof preferencesatisfaction.Yet we would regard t asabsurd o insistupon compensationn the name of distributive qualityfor havingbeen raised fundamentalist rotestantratherthan atheist orCatholic(a matter that of course does not lie withinthe individual'spower to control). Provided that a fair (equal) distribution of theresources of religious libertyis maintained, he amountof utility thatindividualscan expect from their religious upbringings s "specificallynot anobjectofpublicpolicy."The example of compensation or religious preferences s complex,and I will return to it in sectionII below. Here it sufficesto note thateven if in some cases we do deem it inappropriate o insist on suchcompensationn the nameof equality, t does not follow that equalityofresources s an adequaterenderingof the egalitarian deal. Differences


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among people includingsometimesdifferences n theirupbringingmayrender resourceequalitynugatory.For example,a person raised in aclosed fundamentalistommunity uch as the Amishwho then loses hisfaith and moves to the city may feel at a loss as to how to satisfyordinarysecularpreferences,so that equal treatmentof this rube andcity sophisticatesmay requireextracompensation or the rubebeyondresource equality.Had the person's fundamentalvalues not altered,suchcompensationwould not be in order.I am not proposingcompen-sation as a feasiblegovernmentpolicy,merelypointingout that the factthatpeople mightin some cases regard t as crass to ask for indemni-fication of theirsatisfaction-reducingpbringingdoes not show that inprinciple it makes sense for people to assume responsibility act asthoughtheywereresponsible) or what does not lie withintheir control.Any policy that attempted to amelioratethese discrepancieswouldpredictablynflict wounds on innocent parentsand guardiansar out ofproportion o any gain that could be realizedfor the norm of distribu-tive equality.So even if we all agree that in such cases a policy ofcompensations inappropriate, ll thingsconsidered, t does not followthat so far as distributive quality s concerned (one among the severalvalueswecherish), ompensation houldnotbe forthcoming.Finally, it is far from clear why assumingresponsibility or one'spreferencesand values in the sense of affirming hem and identifyingthem as essential to one's self precludes demandingor acceptingcompensationor these preferences n the name of distributive quality.Suppose the governmenthas accepted an obligation to subsidize themembersof two native tribeswho are badlyoff, low in welfare.The twotribeshappento be identicalexcept that one is stronglycommittedtotraditional eligiousceremonies nvolvinga psychedelicmade from thepeyote cactus while the other tribe is similarlycommittedto its tradi-tional rituals nvolvingan alcoholic drinkmade from a differentcactus.If the marketpriceof the psychedelicshould suddenlyrisedramaticallywhile the price of the cactus drinkstays cheap, membersof the firsttribemightwell claimthatequity requiresan increasein theirsubsidyto compensatefor the greatlyincreasedprice of the wherewithal ortheirceremonies.Advancingsuch a claim,so far as I can see, is fullycompatiblewithcontinuing o affirmandidentifywith one'spreferencesand in thissense to take personalresponsibilityor them.In practise,many laws and other publicpoliciesdifferentiate oughly


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82 RICHARD J. ARNESONbetween preferences that we think are deeply entrenchedin people,alterable f at all only at great personalcost, andvery widespreadn thepopulation,versus preferences that for most of us are alterableatmoderate cost should we choose to try to changethemand thinlyanderratically preadthroughout he population.Laws and publicpoliciescommonlytake account of the former and ignorethe latter.For exam-ple, the law caters to people's deeplyfelt aversionto publicnudity butdoes not cater to people's aversion to the sight of tastelesslydressedstrollers in public spaces. Of course, current American laws andpolicies are not designed to achieve any strongly egalitarian deal,whetherresource-basedor not. But in appealing o commmonsense asembodied in current practises in order to determine what sort ofequalitywe care aboutinsofaras we do careaboutequality,one wouldgo badlyastray n claimingsupport n thesepractises or the contentionthat equalityof resourcescapturesthe ideal of equality.We need tosearch urther.

II. EQUALITY OF WELFAREAccordingto equalityof welfare,goods aredistributed quallyamongagroupof personsto the degreethat the distributionbrings t about thateach person enjoys the same welfare.(The norm thus presupposesthepossibilityof cardinal interpersonalwelfare comparisons.)The con-siderationsmentioned seven paragraphsback already dispose of theidea that the distributiveequality worth caring about is equalityofwelfare. To bring this point home more must be said to clarify what"welfare"means nthiscontext.I take welfareto be preferencesatisfaction.The more an individual'spreferencesare satisfied,as weightedby their importance o that veryindividual,the higherher welfare.The preferences that figure in thecalculationof a person'swelfareare limited to self-interestedprefer-ences - what the individual prefers insofar as she seeks her ownadvantage.One may prefer something or its own sakeor as a means tofurtherends; this discussion is confined to preferences of the formersort.The preferences that most plausibly serve as the measure of theindividual'swelfare are hypotheticalpreferences.Consider this familiar


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EQUALITY AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR WELFARE 83account:The extent to which a person'slife goes well is the degree towhich his ideally considered preferences are satisfied.' My ideallyconsidered preferencesare those I would have if I were to engageinthoroughgoingdeliberationabout my preferenceswith full pertinentinformation, n a calm mood, while thinking clearly and makingnoreasoningerrors.(We can also call these ideallyconsideredpreferences"rational references.")To avoid a difficulty,we should think of the full information hatispertinent to ideally considered preferencesas split into two stagescorrespondingo "first-best" nd "second-best"ationalpreferences.Atthe first stage one is imagined to be consideringfull informationrelevant to choice on the assumption that the results of this idealdeliberationprocesscan costlesslycorrect one's actualpreferences.Atthe second stage one is imaginedto be consideringalso informationregarding a) one's actual resistanceto adviceregardinghe rationalityof one'spreferences, b) the costs of an educationalprogram hat wouldbreak down this resistance,and (c) the likelihood that anything ap-proachingthis educational programwill actuallybe implementedinone's lifetime. What it is reasonableto preferis then refigured n thelightof these costs. For example,suppose thatlow-lifepreferences orcheapthrillshave a large place in myactualconceptionof the good, butno place in my first-bestrationalpreferences.But suppose it is certainthatthese low-lifepreferencesarefirmly ixedin mycharacter.Then mysecond-bestpreferencesare those I would have if I were to deliberatein ideal fashion about my preferencesin the light of full knowledgeaboutmy actualpreferencesand theirresistance o change.If you aregiving me a birthday present, and your sole goal is to advance mywelfareas much as possible, you areprobablyadvisedto give me, say,abottle of jug wine rather han a volume of Shelley'spoetryeven thoughit is the poetry experience that would satisfy my first-bestrationalpreference.10On thisunderstanding f welfare,equalityof welfare s a poor ideal.Individualscan arriveat different welfare levels due to choices theymake for which they alone should be held responsible.A simpleexample would be to imagine two persons of identical tastes andabilities who are assigned equal resources by an agency chargedtomaintaindistributive quality.The two then voluntarily ngagein high-


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stakesgambling,romwhich one emergesrich(withhigh expectationofwelfare)andthe other poor (withlow welfareexpectation).For anotherexample,consider two persons similarlysituated,so they could attainidenticalwelfare evels with the same effort,but one chooses to pursuepersonal welfare zealously while the other pursues an aspirationalpreference(e.g., savingthe whales),and so attains esser fulfillmentofself-interestedpreferences. n a thirdexample,one person may volun-tarilycultivatean expensive preference(not cognitivelysuperiorto thepreference it supplants),while another person does not. In all threeexamplesit would be inappropriate o insist upon equalityof welfarewhen welfare inequalityarises through the voluntary choice of theperson who gets lesser welfare. Notice that in all three examples asdescribed,there need be no groundsfor findingfault with any aims oractions of anyof the individualsmentioned.No imperativeof practicalreason commandsus to devote our lives to themaximalpursuitof (self-interested)preferencesatisfaction.Divergencefromequalityof welfarearising n these waysneed not signal any fault imputable o individualsor to "society"understoodas responsible for maintainingdistributiveequality.

This line of thoughtsuggeststakingequalopportunityor welfaretobe theappropriate ormof distributivequality.In the light of the foregoing discussion, consideragain the example

of compensationfor one's religious upbringingregardedas affectingone'slifetimepreferencesatisfaction xpectation.Thisexample s urgedas a reductio ad absurdumof the norm of equalityof welfare,whichmayseem to yieldthe counterintuitivemplication hat suchdifferencesdo constitute legitimategrounds for redistributingpeople's resourceshares, in the name of distributiveequality. As I mentioned, theexample is tricky;we should not allow it to stampede us towardresource-basedconstruals of distributiveequality.Two comments ontheexample ndicate omethingof its trickiness.First,if a person changesher valuesin the lightof deliberation hatbringher closerto the ideal of deliberative ationality,we shouldcreditthe person'sconviction that satisfying he new values counts for morethansatisfying he old ones, now discarded.The old valuesshould becounted at a discount due to their presumed greater distance fromdeliberativerationality.So if I was a Buddhist,then become a Hindu,


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EQUALITY AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR WELFARE 85

andcorrectlyregard he newreligiouspreferenceas cognitively uperiorto the old, it is not the case that a straightequalityof welfarestandardmust register my welfare as decliningeven if my new religiousvaluesareless easilyachievablehanthe onesthey supplant.Secondly,the example mightmotivateacceptanceof equal oppor-tunityfor welfare over straightequalityof welfare rather hanrejectionof subjectivistconceptionsof equality altogether.If equal opportunityfor welfare obtains between Smith and Jones, and Jones subsequentlyundergoesreligiousconversion hat lowers his welfareprospects, t maybe that we will takeJones'sconversioneither to be a voluntarily hosenact or a prudentiallynegligentact for which he should be held re-sponsible.(Consider the norm: Other things equal, it is bad if somepeopleare worseoff than othersthroughno voluntary hoice or fault oftheirown.)This trainof thoughtalso motivatesan examination f equalopportunityorwelfare.

III. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR WELFAREAn opportunitys a chanceof gettinga good if one seeks it. For equalopportunity or welfare to obtain among a number of persons, eachmust face an arrayof options thatis equivalent o every otherperson'sin terms of the prospects for preference satisfaction it offers. Thepreferences nvolved in this calculationare ideallyconsideredsecond-best preferences(where these differfrom first-bestpreferences).Thinkof two personsenteringtheir majorityand facingvarious life choices,each action one might choose being associated with its possible out-comes. In the simplest case, imaginethat we know the probabilityofeach outcome conditionalon the agent'schoice of an action thatmightlead to it. Given that one or anotherchoice is madeand one or anotheroutcome realized,the agent would then face another arrayof choices,then another,and so on. We construct a decision tree that gives anindividual'spossible complete life-histories.We then add up the pre-ference satisfactionexpectation or each possible life history.In doingthis we take into account the preferences that people have regardingbeing confrontedwith the particularrange of options given at eachdecision point. Equal opportunity or welfare obtains among personswhen all of them face equivalent decision trees - the expected value of


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each person'sbest (= most prudent11) hoice of options, second-best,... nth-best is the same. The opportunities persons encounter arerankedby the prospects or welfare heyafford.The criterion for equal opportunityfor welfare stated above isincomplete.People mightface an equivalentarrayof options, as above,yet differ in their awarenessof these options, their abilityto choosereasonablyamong them, and the strengthof character hat enables aperson to persist in carryingout a chosen option. Furtherconditionsare needed. We can summarize hese conditionsby stipulating hat anumberof persons face effectively quivalentoptionsjustin case one ofthe following s true:(1) the options are equivalentand the persons areon a par in theirabilityto "negotiate"hese options,or (2) the optionsare nonequivalent n such a way as to counterbalanceexactly anyinequalitiesin people's negotiating abilities, or (3) the options areequivalentand any inequalities n people's negotiatingabilities are dueto causes for which it is proper to hold the individuals themselvespersonallyresponsible.Equal opportunity or welfareobtainswhen allpersons aceeffectively quivalentarraysof options.Whetheror not two persons enjoy equal opportunity or welfareata time depends only on whetherthey face effectivelyequivalentarraysof options at that time. Suppose that Smith and Jones share equalopportunity or welfare on Monday,but on Tuesday Smith voluntarilychooses or negligentlybehaves so that from then on Jones has greaterwelfareopportunities.We may say that in an extended sense peopleshare equal opportunity or welfarejust in case there is some time atwhich their opportunitiesare equal and if any inequalitiesin theiropportunitiesat later times are due to theirvoluntarychoice or differ-entiallynegligentbehavior or whichtheyarerightlydeemedpersonallyresponsible.When persons enjoy equal opportunity or welfarein the extendedsense, any actual nequalityof welfare n the positions they reach is dueto factors that lie within each individual'scontrol. Thus, any suchinequalitywill be nonproblematic rom the standpointof distributiveequality.The norm of equal opportunityfor welfare is distinct fromequalityof welfareonly if some version of soft determinism r indeter-minism s correct.If harddeterminisms true,the two interpretations fequality ome to the same.


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In actualpolitical life under modernconditions,distributive gencieswill be staggeringly gnorantof the facts that would have to be knownin order to pinpoint what level of opportunityfor welfare differentpersonshave had. To some extent it is technicallyunfeasibleor evenphysically mpossibleto collect the needed information,and to someextent we do not trust governmentswith the authority o collect theneeded information,due to worries that such authoritywill be subjectto abuse.Nonetheless,I supposethatthe idea is clearin principle,andthat in practise it is often feasible to make reliable rough-and-readyjudgments o the effect that some people face very grimprospectsforwelfarecompared o whatothersenjoy.In comparingthe merits of a Rawlsianconception of distributiveequalityas equalsharesof primarygoods and a Dworkinian onceptionof equalityof resources with the norm of equalityof opportunity orwelfare,we runinto the problemthat in the realworld,withimperfectinformation available to citizens and policymakers,and imperfectwillingnesson the part of citizens and officials to carryout conscien-tiously whatevernorm is chosen, the practicalimplicationsof theseconflictingprinciplesmay be hard to discern, and may not divergemuchin practise.Familiar nformation-gatheringnd information-usingproblemswill make us unwillingto authorizegovernmentagencies todeterminepeople'sdistributive hares on the basis of theirpreferencesatisfactionprospects,which will often be unknowable or all practicalpurposes.We may insistthatgovernmentshave regard o primarygoodshare equalityor resourceequalityas roughproxies for the welfaristequalitythat we are unable to calculate.To test our allegianceto therivaldoctrinesof equalitywe mayneed to consider realor hypotheticalexamplesof situations n which we do havegood information egardingwelfareprospectsand opportunities or welfare,and considerwhetherthis informationaffectsour judgmentsas to whatcounts as egalitarianpolicy.We also need to consider cases in which we gainnew evidencethat a particularresource-basedstandard s a much more inaccurateproxy for welfareequalitythan we mighthave thought,and muchlessaccurate than another standardnow available. Indifferenceto theseconsiderationswould markallegianceto a resourcist nterpretation fdistributiveequalityin principle,not merely as a handy rough-and-readyapproximation.


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88 RICHARD J. ARNESONIV. STRAIGHT EQUALITY VERSUS EQUAL OPPORTUNITY;

WELFARE VERSUS RESOURCESThe discussionto this pointhas exploredtwo independentdistinctions:(1) straight equality versus equal opportunityand (2) welfare versusresources as the appropriatebasis for measuringdistributiveshares.Hence thereare four positionsto consider.On the issue of whetheranegalitarianshould regard welfare or resources as the appropriatestandardof distributiveequality, t is important o comparelike withlike, rather than, for instance, just to compare equal opportunity orresources with straight equality of welfare. (In my opinion RonaldDworkin'sotherwise magisterial reatmentof the issue in his two-partdiscussionof "What s Equality?"s marredby a failureto bringthesefourdistinctpositionsclearly ntofocus.12)The argument or equal opportunityrather than straightequality ssimplythat it is morally fittingto hold individualsresponsiblefor theforeseeableconsequencesof their voluntarychoices,.andin particularfor thatportionof these consequences hat involves their own achieve-ment of welfare or gain or loss of resources.If accepted,this argumentleaves it entirelyopen whetherwe as egalitarians ughtto supportequalopportunityor welfareorequalopportunityor resources.For equal opportunity or resources to obtain among a number ofpersons,the rangeof lotterieswith resourcesas prizesavailable o eachof them mustbe effectively he same.The rangeof lotteriesavailable otwo personsis effectively he same whenever t is the case that,for anylotterythe first can gain access to, there is an identical ottery that thesecondpersoncangainaccess to by comparable ffort.(So if Smithcangainaccess to a lucrativeotteryby walkingacross the street,and Jonescannotgaina similar ottery except by a long hardtrek across a desert,to this extent their opportunities or resources are unequal.)We maysay that equal opportunity or resourcesin an extendedsense obtainsamonga numberof persons just in case there is a time at which theiropportunitiesare equal and any later inequalitiesin the resourceopportunities hey face are due to voluntarychoices or differentiallynegligent behavior on their part for which they are rightly deemedpersonally esponsible.I would not claim that the interpretationof equal opportunity or


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EQUALITY AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR WELFARE 89resourcespresentedhere is the only plausibleconstrualof the concept.However,on any plausibleconstrual, he normof equalopportunityorresources is vulnerableto the "'slavery f the talented"problem thatprovedtroublesome or equalityof resources.Supposingthat personaltalents should be includedamongthe resources to be distributed forreasons given in section I), we find that moving from a regime ofequalityof resources to a regime that enforces equal opportunity orresources does not change the fact that a resource-basedapproachcauses the person of high talent to be predictablyand (it would seem)unfairlyworseoff in welfareprospectsthan her counterpartwith lessertalent.13 f opportunitiesfor resources are equallydistributedamongmore and less talented persons, then each person regardlessof hernative talent endowment will have comparableaccess to identicallotteries for resourcesthat include time slices of the laborpowerof allpersons.Each person'sexpectedownershipof talent,shouldhe seek it,will be the same. Other things equal, if all persons stronglydesirepersonal ibertyor initialownershipof one's own lifetime laborpower,thisgood will turnout to be a luxurycommodity or the talented,and acheapbargainor the untalented.

A possibleobjection to the foregoingreasoning s that it relies on avaguelyspecified idea of how to measureresourceshares that is shownto be dubiousby the very fact that it leads back to the slaveryof thetalented problem. Perhaps by taking personal liberty as a separateresource this result can be avoided. But waiving any other difficultieswith this objection we note that the assumption hat any measure ofresourceequalitymust be unacceptablef applying t leads to unaccept-able results for the distributionof welfare amounts to smuggling n awelfarist standardby the back door.Notice thatthe welfaredistributionmplicationsof equalopportunityfor resourceswillcountas intuitivelyunacceptableonly on the assump-tion that people cannot be deemed to have chosen voluntarilythepreferencesthat are frustratedor satisfiedby the talentpooling that aresourcist nterpretation f equal opportunityenforces. Of course it isstrictlynonvoluntaryhat one is bornwith a particular ody and cannotbe separated rom it, so if others hold ownershiprights n one's laborpower one's individualliberty is thereby curtailed. But in principleone'sself-interestedpreferencescouldbe concernedno more withwhat


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happensto one's own body than with whathappensto the bodies ofothers. To the extent that you have strong self-interestedhankeringsthat your neighborstry their hand at, say, farming,and less intensedesires regarding he occupationsyou yourselfpursue,to that extentthe fact that under talent pooling your own labor power is a luxurycommodity will not adversely affect your welfare. As an empiricalmatter,I submit that it is just false to hold that in modern societywhetherany givenindividualdoes or does not care aboutretainingherown personal iberty s due to thatperson'svoluntarily hoosingone orthe other preference.The expensivepreferenceof the talentedpersonfor personal liberty cannot be assimilatedto the class of expensivepreferences that people might voluntarilycultivate.'4On plausibleempiricalassumptions,equal opportunityfor welfare will often findtastes compensable, ncludingthe talentedperson'staste for the per-sonal libertyto commandher own laborpower.Beingborn with hightalent cannot then be a curse under equal opportunity or welfare(itcannotbe ablessingeither).

V. SEN'S CAPABILITIES APPROACHThe equal opportunityfor welfare construalof equality that I amespousingis similarto a "capabilities"pproachrecentlydefended byAmartyaSen.'5I shallnow brieflysketch and endorse Sen's criticismsof Rawls's primary social goods standard and indicate a residualwelfaristdisagreementwithSen.Rawls's primarysocial goods proposal recommendsthat societyshould be concerned with the distributionof certain basic socialresources,so his positionis a variantof a resource-basedunderstandingof how to measure people's standard of living. Sen holds that thedistributionof resourcesshould be evaluated n terms of its contribu-tion to individualcapabilities o function n variouswaysdeemed to beobjectively mportantor valuable.That is, what counts is not the foodone gets, but the contribution t can make to one's nutritionalneeds,not the educationalexpenditures avished,but the contributiontheymake to one's knowledgeand cognitiveskills. Sen objectsto takingpri-marysocialgoods measurementso be fundamental n the groundthatpersonsvaryenormouslyfrom one anotherin the rates at whichthey


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transformprimary ocialgoods into capabilitieso function n key ways.Surelywe care about resource shares becausewe care whatpeople areenabled to be and do with their resourceshares,and insofaras we careaboutequalityt is the latter hatshouldbe ourconcern.So far, I agree. Moreover,Sen identifiesa person's well-beingwiththe doings and beings or "functionings"hat he achieves,and distin-guishesthese functionings rom the person'scapabilities o functionor"well-being reedom."6 Equalityof capability s then a notion withinthe familyof equalityof opportunityviews,a familythat also includesthe idea of equal opportunity or welfarethatI havebeen attemptingodefend.So Iagreewith Sen to alargeextent.

But given that there are indefinitely many kinds of things thatpersonscando or become,how arewe supposedto sum an individual'svarious capabilityscores into an overall index?If we cannot constructsuch an index, then it would seem that equalityof capabilitycannotqualifyas a candidateconceptionof distributive quality.The indexingproblem that is known to plagueRawls'sprimarygoods proposal alsoafflictsSen'scapabilities pproach.17Sen is aware of the indexing problem and untroubledby it. Thegrandtheme of his lectureson "Well-being,Agency and Freedom" sinformational aluepluralism:We should incorporate n our principlesall moral information that is relevant to the choice of actions andpolicies even if that informationcomplicatesthe articulationof princi-ples and precludesattainmentof a set of principles that completelyrank-orders he availablealternativeactions in any possible set of cir-cumstances."Incompletenesss not an embarrassment,"en declares.18I agree that principlesof decision shouldnot ignore morallypertinentmattersbut I doubt that the full set of my functioning apabilitiesdoesmatter or the assessmentof my position.Whetheror not my capabilitiesinclude the capability o trek to the SouthPole, eat a meal at the mostexpensiverestaurantn Omsk, scratchmy neighbor'sdog at the precisemoment of its daily maximal tch, mattersnot one bit to me, because Ineitherhave nor have the slightestreason to anticipate ever willhaveanydesire to do anyof these andmyriadotherthings.Presumably nlya small subset of my functioningcapabilitiesmatter for moral assess-ment,butwhichones?We may doubt whetherthereare any objectivelydecidablegrounds


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by which the valueof a person's capabilitiescan be judged apartfromthe person's (ideallyconsidered) preferencesregarding hose capabil-ities. On what grounddo we hold that it is valuable or a person to havea capabilitythat she herself values at naught with full deliberativerationality? f a person's having a capability s deemed valuableongrounds ndependentof the person'sown preferences n the matter, heexcess valuationwould seem to presupposethe adequacyof an as yetunspecifiedperfectionistdoctrinethe like of whichhas certainlynot yetbeen defendedand in my opinion is indefensible.19n the absenceofsucha defenseof perfectionism, qual opportunity or welfare ooks tobe an attractiventerpretationf distributivequality.

NOTESJohn Rawls, 'Social Unity and Primary Goods,' in Amartya Sen and BernardWilliams, eds., Utilitarianism nd Beyond (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1982), pp. 159-185.

2 Ronald Dworkin, 'What Is Equality?Part 1: Equalityof Welfare,'PhilosophyandPublic Affairs 10 (1981): 185-246; and 'What Is Equality?Part 2: Equality ofResources,' Philosophyand Public Affairs 10 (1981): 283-345. See also ThomasScanlon, Preference ndUrgency,'Journalof Philosophy72 (1975):655-669.3 Dworkin, Equality f Resources.'4 Hal Varian discusses this mechanismof equal distribution, ollowed by trade toequilibrium,n 'Equity,Envy, and Efficiency,'Journalof Economic Theory9 (1974):63-91. See also John Roemer, 'Equalityof Talent,'Economics and Philosophy 1(1985): 151-186; and 'Equalityof ResourcesImplies Equalityof Welfare,'QuarterlyJoumal ofEconomics101 (1986):751-784.Dworkin, Equality f Resources,'p. 312.It should be noted that the defender of resource-basedconstruals of distributiveequalityhas a replyto the slaveryof the talentedproblemthatI do not consider n thispaper. Accordingto this reply,what the slaveryof the talentedproblemreveals s notthe imperativeof distributing o as to equalize welfare but rather the moralinappro-priatenessof considering all resourcesas fully alienable.It may be that equalityofresources shouldrequirethatpersonsbe compensated or theirbelow-par alents,butsuch compensationshould not take the form of assigningindividuals full privateownershiprights n other people's talents, which should be treatedas at most partiallyalienable.See MargaretJane Radin, 'Market-Inalienability,'arvardLaw Review 100(1987): 1849-1937.6 Rawls, SocialUnityand PrimaryGoods,'pp. 167-170.7 Thomas Scanlon, 'Equalityof Resources and Equalityof Welfare:A Forced Mar-riage?',Ethics 97 (1986): 111-118; see esp. pp. 115-117.8 Scanlon, Equality f ResourcesandEqualityof Welfare,' . 116.

See, e.g., John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress, 1971), pp. 416-424; Richard Brandt, A Theoryof the Good and the Right(Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 110-129; David Gauthier,Morals byAgreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 29-38; and Derek Parfit,ReasonsandPersons Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 1984), pp. 493-499.


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EQUALITY AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR WELFARE 9310 In this paragraph attemptto solve a difficultynoted by James Griffin n 'ModernUtilitarianism,'Revue Internationalede Philosophie 36 (1982): 331-375; esp. pp.334-335. See also AmartyaSen andBernardWilliams, Introduction'o Utilitarianismand Beyond,p. 10.11 Here the most prudent choice cannot be identified with the choice that maximizeslifelong expected preferencesatisfaction,due to complicationsarising rom the pheno-menon of preferencechange.The prudentchoice as I conceiveit is tied to one's actualpreferencesnwaysI will not tryto describehere.12 See the articles cited in note 2. Dworkin'saccount of equality of resources iscomplex,but withoutentering nto its detailI can observe that Dworkin s discussingaversion of what I call "equal opportunity or resources."By itself, the name chosenmattersnot a bit. But confusionenters because Dworkinneglects altogether he rivaldoctrine of equal opportunityfor welfare. For a criticism of Dworkin'sobjectionsagainsta welfaristconceptionof equality hat do not dependon this confusion,see my'Liberalism,DistributiveSubjectivism,nd EqualOpportunity orWelfare.'13 Roemer notes that the person withhigh talent is cursed with an involuntary xpen-sive preference orpersonal iberty.See Roemer, Equality f Talent.'14 As Rawls writes,". . . thosewith less expensivetastes have presumably djusted heirlikes and dislikes over the course of their lives to the income and wealththey couldreasonablyexpect; and it is regardedas unfairthat they now should have less in orderto spareothersfromthe consequencesof their lack of foresightor self-discipline." ee'SocialUnityandPrimaryGoods,' p. 169.1' Amartya Sen, 'Well-being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984,'Journalof Philosophy82 (1985): 169-221; esp. pp. 185-203. See also Sen,'Equalityof What?', n his Choice, Welfare nd Measurement Oxford:Basil Blackwell, 1982),pp. 353-369.16 Sen, 'Well-being,Agencyand Freedom,'p. 201.17 See Allan Gibbard, 'DisparateGoods and Rawls' Difference Principle:A SocialChoice TheoreticTreatment,'Theoryand Decision 11 (1979): 267-288; see esp. pp.268-269.18 Sen, 'Well-being,AgencyandFreedom,'p. 200.'9 However, it should be noted that filling out a preference-satisfaction pproachtodistributive qualitywould seem to requirea normativeaccount of healthy preferenceformationthat is not itself preference-based.A perfectionistcomponent may thus beneeded in a broadly welfaristegalitarianism. or this reason it would be misguided oforeclose too swiftlythe questionof the possible value of a capability hat is valued atnaughtby the person who has it. The developmentand exercise of variouscapacitiesmight be an importantaspect of healthypreferenceformation,and have value in thisway even though this value does not registerat all in the person'spreferencesatisfac-tionprospects.Departmentf Philosophy,University f California, anDiego,LaJolla, CA92093,U.S.A.

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