079 CECILIA B. ESTINOZO v. COURT OF APPEALS, FORMER SIXTEENTH DIVISION, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 150276 February 12, 2008TOPIC: Rule 40-56PONENTE: NACHURA, J.:

AUTHOR:

FACTS:1. Sometime Feb and March 1986 – petitioner, in Sogod, Southern Leyte, represented to

private complainants Gaudencio Ang, Rogelio Ceniza, Nilo Cabardo, Salvacion Nueve, Virgilio Maunes, Apolinaria Olayvar, and Mariza Florendo that she was one of the owners of Golden Overseas Employment and that she was recruiting workers to be sent abroad.

a. She then asked from them payment of placement and processing fees (total: P15,000.00).

b. Viewing this as a golden opportunity for the amelioration of their lives, the private complainants paid the fees, went with petitioner to Manila, relying on her promise that they would be deployed by July 1986.

c. They never left the country on said date.d. Petitioner informed tham that there were no available plane tickets and that they’d

leave by Sept.2. Nov 1986 – still here.

a. prompted private complainants to suspect that something was amiss, and they demanded the return of their money.

b. Petitioner assured them refund of the fees and even executed promissory notes to several of the complainants; but, as before, her assurances were mere pretenses.

3. Early months of 1987 – complainants then initiated formal charges for estafa against petitioner.

a. After preliminary investigation – the Provincial Prosecutor filed with RTC Maasin, Southern Leyte 7 separate infos for Estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315, par. 2(a) RPC.

b. On request of petitioner, the cases were consolidated and jointly heard by the trial court.

4. TRIAL –a. petitioner testified –

i. that she was an employee of the Commission on Audit who worked as a part-time secretary at FCR Recruitment Agency owned by Fe Corazon Ramirez;

ii. that she received the amounts claimed by the complainants and remitted the same to Ramirez;

iii. that complainants actually transacted with Ramirez and not with her; andiv. that she was only forced to execute the promissory notes.

5. Nov 9, 1994 – RTC – found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges of estafa.

6. CA - affirmed the RTC ruling.a. The CA ruled that the complainants positively identified petitioner, their townmate,

as the one who falsely presented herself as possessing a license to recruit persons for overseas employment.

b. The seven (7) complainants relied on that representation when they paid the amount she required as a condition for their being employed abroad.

c. Petitioner even admitted receiving the said fees.d. The prosecution had then satisfactorily proved that she committed the offense of

Estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (a) of the RPC.e. Her defense that she was merely an agent of the real recruiter was deemed as merely

a last-ditch effort to absolve herself of authorship of the crime.f. The CA noted that Ramirez was never mentioned when petitioner conducted her

recruitment activities, and no evidence was further introduced to show that petitioner remitted the said fees to Ramirez.

7. May 30, 2001 – (within the 15-day reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review) petitioner filed with the appellate court a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Motion for Reconsideration.

a. June 28 – the CA, denied the said motion pursuant to Rule 52, Section 1 of the Rules of Court and Rule 9, Section 2 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA).

8. Petitioner then filed an MR of the June 28, 2001 Resolution of the CA.a. CA – denied it on Aug 17, in the other assailed Resolution.

9. Displeased with this series of denials, petitioner instituted the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, arguing, among others, that:

a. (1) her previous counsel, by filing a prohibited pleading, foreclosed her right to file a motion for reconsideration of the CA’s decision, and consequently an appeal therefrom;

b. (2) she should not be bound by the mistake of her previous counsel especially when the latter’s negligence and mistake would prejudice her substantial rights and would affect her life and liberty;

c. (3) the appellate court gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed petitioner’s conviction for the other four (4) criminal cases—Criminal Cases Nos. 1264, 1265, 1267 and 1269—absent any direct testimony from the complainants in those cases;

d. (4) she was deprived of her constitutional right to cross-examine the complainants in the aforementioned 4 cases; and

e. (5) she presented sufficient evidence to cast reasonable doubt as to her guilt in all the seven (7) criminal cases.

ISSUE(S): WON Certiorari under Rule 65 is the correct remedy NO.The Court rules to dismiss the petition.RATIO:1. Immediately apparent is that the petition is the wrong remedy to question the appellate

court’s issuances.

a. Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that a party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the CA may file a verified petition for review on certiorari.

b. Considering that, in this case, appeal by certiorari was available to petitioner, she effectively foreclosed her right to resort to a special civil action for certiorari, a limited form of review and a remedy of last recourse, which lies only where there is no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

2. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive remedies. Certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The nature of the questions of law intended to be raised on appeal is of no consequence. It may well be that those questions of law will treat exclusively of whether or not the judgment or final order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. This is immaterial. The remedy is appeal, not certiorari as a special civil action.

3. Even granting arguendo that the instant certiorari petition is an appropriate remedy, still this Court cannot grant the writ prayed for because we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA in the challenged issuances.

a. The rule, as it stands now without exception, is that the 15-day reglementary period for appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration or new trial cannot be extended, except in cases before this Court, as one of last resort, which may, in its sound discretion grant the extension requested.

b. This rule also applies even if the motion is filed before the expiration of the period sought to be extended.

c. Thus, the appellate court correctly denied petitioner’s Motion for Extension of Time to File a Motion for Reconsideration.

4. It is well to point out that with petitioner’s erroneous filing of a motion for extension of time and with her non-filing of a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review from the CA’s decision, the challenged decision has already attained finality and may no longer be reviewed by this Court.

a. The instant Rule 65 petition cannot even substitute for the lost appeal —certiorari is not a procedural device to deprive the winning party of the fruits of the judgment in his or her favor. When a decision becomes final and executory, the court loses jurisdiction over the case and not even an appellate court will have the power to review the said judgment.

b. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation and this will set to naught the main role of courts of justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.

5. We reiterate what we stated in Amatorio v. People that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or to a mistaken mode of procedure.

6. As a final note, we remind party-litigants and their lawyers to refrain from filing frivolous petitions for certiorari.

a. The 2nd and 3rd paragraphs of Section 8 of Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, now provide that:

i. x x xHowever, the court may dismiss the petition if it finds the same patently without merit or prosecuted manifestly for delay, or if the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration. In such event, the court may award in favor of the respondent treble costs solidarily against the petitioner and counsel, in addition to subjecting counsel to administrative sanctions under Rules 139 and 139-B of the Rules of Court.

b. The Court may impose motu propio, based on res ipsa loquitor, other disciplinary sanctions or measures on erring lawyers for patently dilatory and unmeritorious petitions for certiorari.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.DOCTRINE: A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive remedies. Certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy.

080 HEIRS OF SPS. RETERTA v. SPS. MORESG.R. No. 159941 August 17, 2011TOPIC: Rules 40-56PONENTE: Bersamin, J.

AUTHOR:NOTES: (if applicable)

FACTS:1. Petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and reconveyance in the RTC in Trece Martires City, averring that they were the true and real owners of the parcel of land (the land) situated in Trez Cruzes, Tanza, Cavite, having inherited the land from their father who had died on July 11, 1983; that their late father had been the grantee of the land by virtue of his occupation and cultivation; that their late father and his predecessors in interest had been in open, exclusive, notorious, and continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years; that they had discovered in 1999 an affidavit dated March 1, 1966 that their father had purportedly executed whereby he had waived his rights, interests, and participation in the land; that by virtue of the affidavit, Sales Certificate No. V-769 had been issued in favor of respondent Lorenzo Mores by the then Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-64071 had later issued to the respondents.

2. Respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss, insisting that the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case due to the land being friar land, and that the petitioners had no legal personality to commence.

3. RTC granted the motion to dismiss. Considering further that the land subject of this case is a friar land and not land of the public domain, consequently Act No. 1120 is the law prevailing on the matter which gives to the Director of Lands the exclusive administration and disposition of Friar Lands. More so, the determination whether or not fraud had been committed in the procurement of the sales certificate rests to the exclusive power of the

Director of Lands. Hence this Court is of the opinion that it has no jurisdiction over the nature of this action.

4. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.

5. The petitioners had challenged the dismissal by petition for certiorari, but the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed their petition on the ground that certiorari was not a substitute for an appeal, the proper recourse against the dismissal.ISSUE:Whether or not a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was the proper remedy to assail the trial court’s dismissal of the case

HELD:No. Nonetheless, the CA should have given due course to the petition.RATIO:1. The CA seems to be correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari, considering that the order granting the respondents motion to dismiss was a final, as distinguished from an interlocutory, order against which the proper remedy was an appeal in due course. Certiorari, as an extraordinary remedy, is not substitute for appeal due to its being availed of only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

2. Nonetheless, the petitioners posit that a special civil action for certiorari was their proper remedy to assail the order of dismissal in light of certain rules of procedure, specifically pointing out that the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court (An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy being an appeal from the judgment or final order) prohibited an appeal of a denial of the motion for reconsideration, and that the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court ( No appeal may be taken from: xxx An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration) expressly declared that an order denying amotion for reconsideration was not appealable. They remind that the third paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly provided that in the instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.

The petitioners position has no basis.

3. For one, the order that the petitioners really wanted to obtain relief from was the order granting the respondents motion to dismiss, not the denial of the motion for reconsideration. The fact that the order granting the motion to dismiss was a final order for thereby completely disposing of the case, leaving nothing more for the trial court to do in the action, truly called for an appeal, instead of certiorari, as the correct remedy. (Prelude to #9)

4. The fundamental distinction between a final judgment or order, on one hand, and an interlocutory order, on the other hand, has been outlined in Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, viz:

The concept of final judgment, as distinguished from one which has become final (or executory as of right [final and executory]), is definite and settled. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes final or, to use the established and more distinctive term, final and executory.

xxxConversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and

does not end the Courts task of adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is interlocutory, e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a final judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an interlocutory order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.

5. Moreover, even Section 9 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, cited by the petitioners, indicates that the proper remedy against the denial of the petitioners motion for reconsideration was an appeal from the final order dismissing the action upon the respondents motion to dismiss. The said rule explicitly states thusly:

Section 9. Remedy against order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration. An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy being an appeal from the judgment or final order.

6. The restriction against an appeal of a denial of a motion for reconsideration independently of a judgment or final order is logical and reasonable. A motion for reconsideration is not putting forward a new issue, or presenting new evidence, or changing the theory of the case, but is only seeking a reconsideration of the judgment or final order based on the same issues, contentions, and evidence either because: (a) the damages awarded are excessive; or (b) the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final order; or (c) the decision or final order is contrary to law.[10] By denying a motion for reconsideration, or by granting it only partially, therefore, a trial court finds no reason either to reverse or to modify its judgment or final order, and leaves the judgment or final order to stand. The remedy from the denial is to assail the denial in the course of an appeal of the judgment or final order itself.

7. The enumeration of the orders that were not appealable made in the 1997 version of Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court the version in force at the time when the CA rendered its assailed decision on May 15, 2002 included an order denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit:

Section 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.

No appeal may be taken from:

(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;

(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;

(c) An interlocutory order;

(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;

(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;

(f) An order of execution;

(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and

(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. (n)

8. It is true that Administrative Matter No. 07-7-12-SC, effective December 27, 2007, has since amended Section 1, Rule 41, supra, by deleting an order denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration from the enumeration of non-appealable orders, and that such a revision of a procedural rule may be retroactively applied. However, to reverse the CA on that basis would not be right and proper, simply because the CA correctly applied the rule of procedure in force at the time when it issued its assailed final order.

9. The settled rule precluding certiorari as a remedy against the final order when appeal is available notwithstanding, the Court rules that the CA should have given due course to and granted the petition for certiorari for two exceptional reasons, namely: (a) the broader interest of justice demanded that certiorari be given due course to avoid the undeserved grossly unjust result that would befall the petitioners otherwise; and (b) the order of the RTC granting the motion to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter evidently constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.10. On occasion, the Court has considered certiorari as the proper remedy despite the availability of appeal, or other remedy in the ordinary course of law. In Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court has declared that the requirement that there must be no appeal, or any plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law admits of exceptions, such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where there may be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved; and (g) in case of urgency.

11. Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party from making use of certiorari if appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari. A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency. It is understood, then, that a litigant need not mark time by resorting to the less speedy remedy of appeal in order to have an order annulled and set aside for being patently void for failure of the trial court to comply with the Rules of Court.

12. Nor should the petitioner be denied the recourse despite certiorari not being available as a proper remedy against an assailed order, because it is better on balance to look

beyond procedural requirements and to overcome the ordinary disinclination to exercise supervisory powers in order that a void order of a lower court may be controlled to make it conformable to law and justice. Verily, the instances in which certiorari will issue cannot be defined, because to do so is to destroy the comprehensiveness and usefulness of the extraordinary writ. The wide breadth and range of the discretion of the court are such that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus, and that in the exercise of superintending control over inferior courts, a superior court is to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case as the ends of justice may require. Thus, the writ will be granted whenever necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.

13. The petitioners complaint self-styled as being for the quieting of title and reconveyance, declaration of nullity of affidavit & Sales Certificate, reconveyance and damages would challenge the efficacy of the respondents certificate of title under the theory that there had been no valid transfer or assignment from the petitioners predecessor in interest to the respondents of the rights or interests in the land due to the affidavit assigning such rights and interests being a forgery and procured by fraud.

14. The petitioners cause of action for reconveyance has support in jurisprudence bearing upon the manner by which to establish a right in a piece of friar land. According to Arayata v. Joya, in order that a transfer of the rights of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands may be legally effective, it is necessary that a formal certificate of transfer be drawn up and submitted to the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for his approval and registration. The law authorizes no other way of transferring the rights of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands. In other words, where a person considered as a grantee of a piece of friar land transfers his rights thereon, such transfer must conform to certain requirements of the law. Under Director of Lands v. Rizal, the purchaser in the sale of friar lands under Act No. 1120 is already treated by law as the actual owner of the lot purchased even before the payment of the full payment price and before the execution of the final deed of conveyance, subject to the obligation to pay in full the purchase price, the role or position of the Government becoming that of a mere lien holder or mortgagee.

15. Thus, pursuant to Section 16 of Act No. 1120, had grantee Teofilo Reterta perfected his title, the petitioners as his heirs would have succeeded him and taken title from him upon his death. By law, therefore, should the execution of the deed in favor of the respondents be held invalid, the interests of Teofilo Reterta should descend to the petitioners and the deed should issue in their favor. Adding significance to the petitioners claim was their allegation in the complaint that they were in possession of the land. Moreover, as alleged in the petitioners opposition to the motion to dismiss of the respondents, Teofilo Reterta had partially paid the price of the land.

16. Given the foregoing, the petitioners complaint made out a good case for reconveyance or reversion, and its allegations, if duly established, might well warrant the reconveyance of the land from the respondents to the petitioners.

17. RTC has jurisdiction over the case, not LMB.  The authority of LMB under Act No. 1120, being limited to the administration and disposition of friar lands, did not include the petitioners action for reconveyance. LMB ceases to have jurisdiction once the friar land is disposed of in favor of a private person and title duly issues in the latters name. By ignoring the petitioners showing of its plain error in dismissing Civil Case No. TM-983, and by disregarding the allegations of the complaint, the RTC acted whimsically and capriciously.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

082 Latorre v. LatorreG.R. No. 183926 March 29, 2010TOPIC: Rules 40-56PONENTE: Nachura, J.

AUTHOR: Pat

FACTS:1. PETITIONER Generosa Almeda Latorre (petitioner) filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa a

Complaint for Collection and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale with application for Injunction against her own son, herein respondent Luis Esteban Latorre (respondent), and one Ifzal Ali (Ifzal).

2. Petitioner averred:(a) thatrespondent and Ifzal entered into a Contract of Lease over a 1,244-square meter

real property, at Dasmarias Village, Makati City (subject property). Under the said contract, respondent, as lessor, declared that he was the absolute and registered owner of the subject property. Petitioner alleged that respondent's declaration was erroneous because she and respondent were co-owners in equal shares.

(b) Petitioner narrated that, on March 14, 1989, she and respondent executed their respective Deeds of Donation, in favor of The Porfirio D. Latorre Memorial & Fr. Luis Esteban Latorre Foundation, Inc. (the Foundation). Subsequently, on September 2, 1994, petitioner and respondent executed separate Deeds of Revocation of Donation and Reconveyance of the subject property. However, the Deeds of Revocation were not registered; hence, the subject property remained in the name of the Foundation.

(c) Petitioner insisted, however, that respondent was fully aware that the subject property was owned in common by both of them. To protect her rights as co-owner, petitioner formally demanded from Ifzal the payment of her share of the rentals, which the latter, however, refused to heed.

(d) Petitioner averred that she discovered that respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim on the TCT of the subject property, claiming full ownership over the same by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 21, 2000, allegedly executed by petitioner in favor of respondent.

(e) claimed that the deed was a falsified document; that her signature thereon was forged by respondent; and that she never received P21 Million or any other amount as consideration for her share of the subject property.

3. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the sole ground that the venue of the case was improperly laid. He stressed that while the complaint was denominated as one for Collection and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale with application for

Injunction, in truth the case was a real action affecting title to and interest over the subject property. Respondent insisted that all of petitioner's claims were anchored on her claim of ownership over one-half () portion of the subject property. Since the subject property is located in Makati City, respondent argued that petitioner should have filed the case before the RTC of Makati City and not of Muntinlupa City.

4. Ifzal also filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of want of jurisdiction, asserting that he was immune from suit because he was an officer of the Asian Development Bank, an international organization.

5. RTC issued a TRO, restraining Ifzal from paying his rentals to respondent6. RTC denied respondent's MTD. The RTC ruled that the nature of an action whether real or

personal was determined by the allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to recover upon the claims asserted - a matter resolved only after, and as a result of, a trial. Thus, trial on the merits ensued.

7. RESPONDENT filed an Answer Ad Cautelam:(a) insisting, that the case was a real action and that the venue was improperly laid.(b) that he was a former Opus Dei priest but he left the congregation in 1987 after he was

maltreated.(c) that petitioner lived with him and his family from 1988 to 2000, and that he provided for

petitioner's needs.(d) for almost 20 years, the Opus Dei divested the Latorre family of several real properties.(e) To spare the property from the Opus Dei, both agreed to donate it to the Foundation.(f) In 1994, when respondent got married and sired a son, both petitioner and respondent

decided to revoke the said donation. The Foundation consented to the revocation. However, due to lack of funds, the title was never transferred but remained in the name of the Foundation.

(g) that he and his wife took good care of petitioner; because of this, and the fact that the rentals paid for the use of the subject property went to petitioner, both parties agreed that petitioner would convey her share over the subject property to respondent; and that, petitioner executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondent.

(h) that relationship of the parties, as mother and son, deteriorated. Petitioner left respondent's house because he and his wife allegedly ignored, disrespected, and insulted her. Respondent claimed, however, that petitioner left because she detested his act of firing their driver. It was then that this case was filed against him by petitioner.

8. RTC: dismissed petitioner's claim against Ifzal because the dispute was clearly between petitioner and respondent. RTC ruled in favor of respondent, disposing of the case in this wise: involves recovery of possession of a real property, the same should have been filed and tried in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City who, undoubtedly, has jurisdiction to hear the matter as aforementioned the same being clearly a real action.

9. Aggrieved, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied10.Hence, this Petition, claiming RTC erred treating venue as jurisdiction and treating pet’s

complaint as a real action.11.While the instant case was pending resolution before this Court, petitioner passed away on

November 14, 2009. Thus, petitioner's counsel prayed that, pending the appointment of a representative of petitioner's estate, notices of the proceedings herein be sent to petitioners other son, Father Roberto A. Latorre.

ISSUE(S): WON petitioner’s Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, in relation to Rule 41, of the Rules of Civil Procedure on alleged pure questions of law directly filed to the SC is the proper remedy in the case at bar.HELD: We find no merit in the petition. Neither do we find any reversible error in the trial courts dismissal of the case for want of jurisdiction, although the trial court obviously meant to dismiss on the ground of improper venue.RATIO:First. Petitioner filed her complaint with the RTC of Muntinlupa City instead of the RTC of Makati City. Petitioner's complaint is a real action involving the recovery of the subject property on the basis of her co-ownership thereof.

Second. RTC also committed a procedural blunder when it denied respondent's motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue.

Third. Respondent also did not do very well, procedurally. When the RTC denied his Motion to Dismiss, respondent could have filed a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition inasmuch as the denial of the motion was done without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. However, despite this lapse, it is clear that respondent did not waive his objections to the fact of improper venue, contrary to petitioner's assertion. Notably, after his motion to dismiss was denied, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration to contest such denial. Even in his Answer Ad Cautelam, respondent stood his ground that the case ought to be dismissed on the basis of improper venue.

Finally, petitioner came directly to this Court on a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, in relation to Rule 41, of the Rules of Civil Procedure on alleged pure questions of law. In Murillo v. Consul, we laid down a doctrine that was later adopted by the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In that case, this Court had the occasion to clarify the three (3) modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, namely: (1) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) petition for review, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) petition for review to the Supreme Court.

The first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41, is brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal, covered by Rule 42, is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal, provided in Rule 45, is filed with the Supreme Court only on questions of law.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of

facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.

In her Reply to respondents Comment, petitioner prayed that this Court decide the case on the merits. To do so, however, would require the examination by this Court of the probative value of the evidence presented, taking into account the fact that the RTC failed to adjudicate this controversy on the merits. This, unfortunately, we cannot do. It thus becomes exceedingly clear that the filing of the case directly with this Court ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy sought cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and by immemorial tradition.

081 Manaloto v. Veloso IIIGR No. 171365, Oct. 6, 2010Topic: Fresh Period Rule

AUTHOR:

FACTS: (chronological order)1. The petitioners filed a case for unlawful detainer against the respondent.2. MTC: decided in favor of the petitioners. MTC ordered the respondents to vacate

and to pay rentals.3. The respondents appealed to the RTC.

While the case is pending in appeal….4. Separately, the respondents filed a case for breach of contract.

4.1 1st cause of action: damages. Because they allegedly suffered embarrassment.

4.2 2nd cause of action: breach. The respondents alleged that the petitioners as lessors failed to make continuing repairs on the property.

5. Petitioners countered by filing MTD alleging no cause of action.6. RTC: dismissed the case for splitting of cause of action, lack of jurisdiction, and

failure to disclose the pendency of the related case.Order of Dismissal received on Sept. 26, 2003

7. Petitioners filed an MR on Oct 10, 2003 (14 days after receipt of dismissal)8. MR of petitioner denied.

Order of denial of MR received on Feb. 20, 2004.

9. The respondents fled notice of appeal to CA on March 1, 2004 (9 days after receipt of denial of MR)

10. CA: affirmed RTC’s dismissal on the 2nd cause of action, but held that the RTC should have conducted trial on the first cause of action.10.1 CA adjudged the petitioners liable for damages.

11. Hence this petition.11.1 Petitioners assert that respondent’s appeal was filed out of time.

Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on September 26, 2003, and he only had 15 days from such date to file his appeal, or until October 11, 2003.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the appeal was filed out of time?HELD: No. It was filed on time.RATIO:Jurisprudence has settled the “fresh period rule,” according to which, an ordinary appeal from the RTC to the Court of Appeals, under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, shall be taken within fifteen (15) days either from receipt of the original judgment of the trial court or from receipt of the final order of the trial court dismissing or denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In Sumiran v. Damaso, 596 SCRA 450 (2009), we presented a survey of the cases applying the fresh period rule: As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, 469 SCRA 633 (2005), that by virtue of the power of the Supreme Court to amend, repeal and create new procedural rules in all courts, the Court is allowing a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. This would standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted.

Also in Sumiran, we recognized the retroactive application of the fresh period rule to cases pending and undetermined upon its effectivity: The retroactivity of the Neypes rule in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to the date of promulgation of Neypes on September 14, 2005, was clearly explained by the Court in Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Homena-Valencia, stating thus: The determinative issue is whether the “fresh period” rule announced in Neypes could retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was promulgated. That question may be answered with the guidance of the general rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure. Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do not create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing.

To recapitulate, a party-litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from

receipt of the Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the “final order”) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.

In the case before us, respondent received a copy of the Resolution dated September 2, 2003 of the RTC dismissing his complaint on September 26, 2003.Fourteen days thereafter, on October 10, 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said resolution. The RTC denied respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated December 30, 2003, which the respondent received on February 20, 2004. On March 1, 2004, just after nine days from receipt of the order denying his Motion for Reconsideration, respondent already filed his Notice of Appeal. Clearly, under the fresh period rule.

082 Latorre v. LatorreG.R. No. 183926 March 29, 2010TOPIC: Rules 40-56PONENTE: Nachura, J.

AUTHOR: Pat

FACTS:1. PETITIONER Generosa Almeda Latorre (petitioner) filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa a

Complaint for Collection and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale with application for Injunction against her own son, herein respondent Luis Esteban Latorre (respondent), and one Ifzal Ali (Ifzal).

2. Petitioner averred:(a) thatrespondent and Ifzal entered into a Contract of Lease over a 1,244-square meter real

property, at Dasmarias Village, Makati City (subject property). Under the said contract, respondent, as lessor, declared that he was the absolute and registered owner of the subject property. Petitioner alleged that respondent's declaration was erroneous because she and respondent were co-owners in equal shares.

(b)Petitioner narrated that, on March 14, 1989, she and respondent executed their respective Deeds of Donation, in favor of The Porfirio D. Latorre Memorial & Fr. Luis Esteban Latorre Foundation, Inc. (the Foundation). Subsequently, on September 2, 1994, petitioner and respondent executed separate Deeds of Revocation of Donation and Reconveyance of the subject property. However, the Deeds of Revocation were not registered; hence, the subject property remained in the name of the Foundation.

(c) Petitioner insisted, however, that respondent was fully aware that the subject property was owned in common by both of them. To protect her rights as co-owner, petitioner formally demanded from Ifzal the payment of her share of the rentals, which the latter, however, refused to heed.

(d)Petitioner averred that she discovered that respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim on the TCT of the subject property, claiming full ownership over the same by virtue

of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 21, 2000, allegedly executed by petitioner in favor of respondent.

(e) claimed that the deed was a falsified document; that her signature thereon was forged by respondent; and that she never received P21 Million or any other amount as consideration for her share of the subject property.

3. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the sole ground that the venue of the case was improperly laid. He stressed that while the complaint was denominated as one for Collection and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale with application for Injunction, in truth the case was a real action affecting title to and interest over the subject property. Respondent insisted that all of petitioner's claims were anchored on her claim of ownership over one-half () portion of the subject property. Since the subject property is located in Makati City, respondent argued that petitioner should have filed the case before the RTC of Makati City and not of Muntinlupa City.

4. Ifzal also filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of want of jurisdiction, asserting that he was immune from suit because he was an officer of the Asian Development Bank, an international organization.

5. RTC issued a TRO, restraining Ifzal from paying his rentals to respondent6. RTC denied respondent's MTD. The RTC ruled that the nature of an action whether real or

personal was determined by the allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to recover upon the claims asserted - a matter resolved only after, and as a result of, a trial. Thus, trial on the merits ensued.

7. RESPONDENT filed an Answer Ad Cautelam:(a) insisting, that the case was a real action and that the venue was improperly laid.(b) that he was a former Opus Dei priest but he left the congregation in 1987 after he was

maltreated.(c) that petitioner lived with him and his family from 1988 to 2000, and that he provided for

petitioner's needs.(d) for almost 20 years, the Opus Dei divested the Latorre family of several real properties.(e) To spare the property from the Opus Dei, both agreed to donate it to the Foundation.(f) In 1994, when respondent got married and sired a son, both petitioner and respondent

decided to revoke the said donation. The Foundation consented to the revocation. However, due to lack of funds, the title was never transferred but remained in the name of the Foundation.

(g) that he and his wife took good care of petitioner; because of this, and the fact that the rentals paid for the use of the subject property went to petitioner, both parties agreed that petitioner would convey her share over the subject property to respondent; and that, petitioner executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondent.

(h) that relationship of the parties, as mother and son, deteriorated. Petitioner left respondent's house because he and his wife allegedly ignored, disrespected, and insulted her. Respondent claimed, however, that petitioner left because she detested his act of firing their driver. It was then that this case was filed against him by petitioner.

8. RTC: dismissed petitioner's claim against Ifzal because the dispute was clearly between petitioner and respondent. RTC ruled in favor of respondent, disposing of the case in this wise: involves recovery of possession of a real property, the same should have been filed and

tried in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City who, undoubtedly, has jurisdiction to hear the matter as aforementioned the same being clearly a real action.

9. Aggrieved, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied10.Hence, this Petition, claiming RTC erred treating venue as jurisdiction and treating pet’s

complaint as a real action.11.While the instant case was pending resolution before this Court, petitioner passed away on

November 14, 2009. Thus, petitioner's counsel prayed that, pending the appointment of a representative of petitioner's estate, notices of the proceedings herein be sent to petitioners other son, Father Roberto A. Latorre.

ISSUE(S): WON petitioner’s Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, in relation to Rule 41, of the Rules of Civil Procedure on alleged pure questions of law directly filed to the SC is the proper remedy in the case at bar.HELD: We find no merit in the petition. Neither do we find any reversible error in the trial courts dismissal of the case for want of jurisdiction, although the trial court obviously meant to dismiss on the ground of improper venue.RATIO:First. Petitioner filed her complaint with the RTC of Muntinlupa City instead of the RTC of Makati City. Petitioner's complaint is a real action involving the recovery of the subject property on the basis of her co-ownership thereof.

Second. RTC also committed a procedural blunder when it denied respondent's motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue.

Third. Respondent also did not do very well, procedurally. When the RTC denied his Motion to Dismiss, respondent could have filed a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition inasmuch as the denial of the motion was done without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. However, despite this lapse, it is clear that respondent did not waive his objections to the fact of improper venue, contrary to petitioner's assertion. Notably, after his motion to dismiss was denied, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration to contest such denial. Even in his Answer Ad Cautelam, respondent stood his ground that the case ought to be dismissed on the basis of improper venue.

Finally, petitioner came directly to this Court on a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, in relation to Rule 41, of the Rules of Civil Procedure on alleged pure questions of law. In Murillo v. Consul, we laid down a doctrine that was later adopted by the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In that case, this Court had the occasion to clarify the three (3) modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, namely: (1) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) petition for review, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) petition for review to the Supreme Court.

The first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41, is brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal, covered by Rule 42, is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal, provided in Rule 45, is filed with the Supreme Court only on

questions of law.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.

In her Reply to respondents Comment, petitioner prayed that this Court decide the case on the merits. To do so, however, would require the examination by this Court of the probative value of the evidence presented, taking into account the fact that the RTC failed to adjudicate this controversy on the merits. This, unfortunately, we cannot do. It thus becomes exceedingly clear that the filing of the case directly with this Court ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy sought cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and by immemorial tradition.

083 ARIEL A. TRES REYES, vs. MAXIMS TEA HOUSE and JOCELYN POONG.R. No. 140853. February 27, 2003Topic: Rule 40-56 (rule 43)Ponente: QUISUMBING, J.

AUTHOR:NOTES:

FACTS:

1. Respondent Maxims Tea House (Maxims) had employed petitioner Ariel Tres Reyes as a driver since October 1995. He was assigned to its M.H. del Pilar Street, Ermita, Manila branch. His working hours were from 5:00 P.M. to 3:00 A.M., and among his duties was to fetch and bring to their respective homes the employees of Maxims after the restaurant closed for the day.

2. In the wee hours of the morning of September 27, 1997, petitioner was driving a Mitsubishi L300 van and was sent to fetch some employees of Savannah Moon, a ballroom dancing establishment in Libis, Quezon City. Petitioner complied and took his usual route along Julia Vargas Street in Pasig City. He was headed towards Meralco Avenue at a cruising speed of 50 to 60 kilometers per hour, when he noticed a ten-wheeler truck coming his way at full speed despite the fact that the latters lane had a red signal light on. Petitioner maneuvered to avoid a collision, but nonetheless the van he was driving struck the truck. As a result, petitioner and seven of his passengers sustained physical injuries and both vehicles were damaged.

3. October 15, 1997: the management of Maxims required petitioner to submit, within 48

hours, a written explanation as to what happened that early morning of September 27, 1997. He complied but his employer found his explanation unsatisfactory and as a result he was preventively suspended for 30 days, effective October 20, 1997.

4. November 19, 1997: Maxims terminated petitioner for cause.5. Feeling that the vehicular accident was neither a just nor a valid cause for the severance

of his employment, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.6. Labor Arbiter: found that petitioner was grossly negligent in failing to avoid the collision.7. October 8, 1998: instead of filing the requisite pleading for appeal, petitioner filed a

Motion for Partial Reconsideration with the NLRC. The NLRC opted to treat petitioner’s motion as an appeal.

8. NLRC: reversed LA’s decision – petitioner was not negligent -> respondent filed a MR-> denied

9. Respondents then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to want or excess of jurisdiction in: (a) giving due course to petitioners Motion for Partial Reconsideration notwithstanding that it was a prohibited pleading under Sec. 17 (now Sec. 19), Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure and despite want of showing that it was seasonably filed; and (b) for substituting its own findings to the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter.

10. CA: in favor of respondentsISSUE(S): Whether Petitioner’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration can be considered as an appeal to the NLRCHELD: Yes. A motion for reconsideration of a decision, order, or award of a Labor Arbiter is prohibited by Section 19, Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure. But said rule likewise allows that a motion for reconsideration shall be treated as an appeal provided it meets all the requisites of an appeal (nakacomply si Petitioner)RATIO:

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner- argues that the Court of Appeals grievously erred in holding that the NLRC has gravely

abused its discretion in treating his Motion for Partial Reconsideration as an appeal. Petitioner asserts that when a motion for reconsideration of a decision of a Labor Arbiter is filed, the Commission will properly treat it as an appeal.

- under labor law, rules of procedure should be liberally construed to assist the parties in obtaining a just, expeditious, and inexpensive settlement of disputes. Hence, technicalities should not prevail over substantial merits of the labor case.

Respondent- granting without admitting, that the NLRC did indeed correctly treat petitioners Motion

for Partial Reconsideration as an appeal, nonetheless, it still behooves petitioner to comply with the other requisites for perfection of an appeal.

- said motion contained no statement when petitioner received a copy of the Labor Arbiters decision to determine the timeliness of the motion cum appeal, as required by Section 3, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure.

- Petitioner’s failure to pay the necessary filing fees- appellate court committed no reversible error when it ruled that petitioners Motion for

Partial Reconsideration failed to comply with the requisites of a valid appeal, hence fatally defective, e.g. for want of verification and absence of proof that it was filed within the reglementary period.

1. Strictly speaking, a motion for reconsideration of a decision, order, or award of a Labor Arbiter is prohibited by Section 19, Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure. But said rule likewise allows that a motion for reconsideration shall be treated as an appeal provided it meets all the requisites of an appeal.

2. We have minutely scrutinized the records of this case, particularly the questioned Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but we find no basis for the appellate courts finding that said pleading did not contain a statement as to when petitioner received a copy of the decision in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-12-08773-97

3. All that Section 3, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure requires with respect to material dates is a statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision. We rule that petitioner’s declaration in his motion that he received a copy of the Labor Arbiters decision on September 28, 1998 is more than sufficient compliance with said requirement imposed by Section 3, Rule VI. We likewise find that the motion in question was filed with the NLRC on October 8, 1998 or on the tenth (10th) day from the date of receipt by petitioner of his copy of the Labor Arbiters decision. Otherwise put, said pleading was filed within the reglementary ten-day period, as provided for in Section 1, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure. The law on the timeliness of an appeal from the decision, award, or order of the Labor Arbiters, states clearly that the aggrieved party has ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof to appeal to the Commission. Needless to say, an appeal filed at the last minute of the last day of said period is, for all intents and purposes, still seasonably filed.

4. We find that petitioner verified his motion to reconsider the Labor Arbiters decision on October 8, 1998, or on the same day that it was filed. We must, perforce, rule that petitioner has substantially complied with the verification requirement as provided for in Section 3, Rule VI of the Commissions Rules of Procedure.

5. The records clearly show the basis for the finding of the Commission that the appeal fees were paid (P110.00)

6. In labor cases, rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense.1[18] They are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and where their strict application would result in the frustration rather than promotion of

1

substantial justice, technicalities must be avoided. Technicalities should not be permitted to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties. Where the ends of substantial justice shall be better served, the application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed.

*** There being no clear showing that petitioner was culpable for gross negligence, petitioners dismissal is illegal.CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

084 Land Bank of the Phils. Vs De Leon[G.R. No. 143275. September 10, 2002]TOPIC: Rule 40-56PONENTE: Corona, J.:

AUTHOR:NOTES: (if applicable)

FACTS: (chronological order)1. The petitioners-appellees Arlene de Leon and Bernardo de Leon are the registered owners

of a parcel of land situated at San Agustin, Concepcion, Tarlac covered by TCT No. 163051 with a total area of 50.1171 hectares. The subject property was voluntarily offered for sale to the government pursuant to RA 6657 at P50,000.00 per hectare.

2. The DAR made a counter offer of P17,656.20 per hectare, or a total amount of P884,877.54, but the same was rejected. Another offer was made by DAR increasing the amount to P1,565,369.35. In view of the petitioners-appellees failure to respond to the new offer made by DAR, the DARAB took cognizance of the case pursuant to Sec. 16 (d) of RA 6657.

3. Subsequently, the DARAB issued an Order directing respondent-appellant LBP to recompute the value of the subject property in accordance with DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992.

4. In a Petition dated October 27, 1994, filed with the RTC, which is the designated Special

Agrarian Court in the area, petitioners-appellees asked the court, among others, to fix the just compensation of the subject property.

5. On March 17, 1998, the DAR filed in the CA a petition for review of the decision of the Special Agrarian Court. The said petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 47005, was assigned to the Special Third (3rd) Division of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner LBP also initiated in the CA an appeal of the same decision of the Special Agrarian Court by filing a notice of appeal. Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 60365, the said ordinary appeal was assigned to the Fourth (4th) Division of the Court of Appeals.

6. On November 6, 1998, the Special Third Division of the appellate court, rendered in CA-G.R. SP No. 47005 a decision:he decision dated February 9, 1998 is partially reconsidered. The trial court is ordered to recompute the compensation based on the selling price of palay at 213.00 per cavan. Petitioner is ordered to pay legal interest at 6% of the compensation so fixed from 1990 until full payment is made by the government

7. Thereafter, on February 15, 2000, the Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner LBPs ordinary appeal (CA-G.R. CV No. 60365), in a resolution dated February 15, 2000: In dismissing the ordinary appeal (CA-G.R. CV No. 60365) instituted by petitioner LBP, the appellate court reasoned that the mode of appeal followed by the petitioner was erroneous considering that Section 60 of RA 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, mandates that appeals from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts should be by petition for review. Therefore, the notice of appeal filed by LBP was ineffectual and did not stop the running of the period of appeal

8. Petitioner LBP filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in a resolution dated May 22, 2000.

9. Hence, this petition questioning the resolutions of the Fourth (4th) Division of the CA.

Petitioner LBP, in its bid to maintain the legitimacy of its appeal, contends that the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the Special Agrarian Court is by way of a notice of appeal due to the reference by Section 61 of RA 6657 to the Rules of Court as the governing procedure for appeals to the Court of Appeals. According to the petitioner, Section 61 of RA 6657 should be followed, not Section 60. The reference by Section 61 to the Rules of Court implies that an ordinary appeal requiring a notice of appeal is the proper manner of appealing decisions of Special Agrarian Courts on just compensation because Section 2(a) of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that decisions of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction follow the procedure governing ordinary appeals.

ISSUE(S):  whether ordinary appeal is the proper procedure in effecting an appeal from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts acting as Special Agrarian CourtsHELD: NO. A petition for review, not an ordinary appeal, is the proper procedure in effecting an appeal from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts acting as Special Agrarian Courts in cases involving the determination of just compensation to the landowners concerned. Section 60 of RA 6657 clearly and categorically states that the said mode of appeal should be adopted. There is no room for a contrary interpretation. Where the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for construction, but only applicationRATIO:

First, there is no conflict between Section 60 and 61 of RA 6657 inasmuch as the Rules of Court do not at all prescribe the procedure for ordinary appeals as the proper mode of appeal for decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Section 61 in fact makes no more than a general reference to the Rules of Court and does not even mention the procedure for ordinary appeals in Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure as the appropriate method of elevating to the Court of Appeals decisions of Special Agrarian Courts in eminent domain cases.

Second, the failure to mention Special Agrarian Courts in Section 1 of Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be construed to mean that a petition for review is not permissible for decisions of the said special courts. In fact, the said Rule is not relevant to determine whether a petition for review is the proper mode of appeal from decisions of Regional Trial Courts in agrarian cases, that is, when they act as Special Agrarian Courts. Section 1 of Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure merely mentions the Court of Tax Appeals and the other different quasi-judicial agencies without exclusivity in its phraseology. Such omission cannot be construed to justify the contention that a petition for review is prohibited for decisions on special agrarian cases inasmuch as the category is for quasi-judicial agencies and tax courts to which the Regional Trial Courts do not properly belong. Although Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91 (precursor to Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure) included the decisions of Special Agrarian Courts in the enumeration requiring petition for review, its non-inclusion later on in Rule 43 merely signifies that it was inappropriately classified as a quasi-judicial agency.

What is indisputable is that Section 60 expressly regards a petition for review as the proper way of appealing decisions of agrarian courts. So far, there is no rule prescribed by this Court expressly disallowing the said procedure.

Third, far from being in conflict, Section 61 of RA 6657 can easily be harmonized with Section 60. The reference to the Rules of Court means that the specific rules for petitions for review in the Rules of Court and other relevant procedures in appeals filed before the Court of Appeals shall be followed in appealed decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Considering that RA 6657 cannot and does not provide the details on how the petition for review shall be conducted, a suppletory application of the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court is necessary. In fact, Section 61 uses the word review to designate the mode by which the appeal is to be effected. The reference therefore by Section 61 to the Rules of Court only means that the procedure under Rule 42 for petitions for review is to be followed for appeals in agrarian cases.

According to the petitioner, an ordinary appeal prescribed under the Rules of Court should prevail over a petition for review provided under Section 60 of RA 6657 inasmuch as a contrary interpretation would violate the constitutional provision granting to the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleadings, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and Legal Assistance to the underprivileged.

As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the Rules of Court that categorically prohibits the adoption of the procedure for petitions for review of decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Section 60 of RA 6657 and the provisions of the Rules of Court can be harmonized and can co-

exist.

The reason why it is permissible to adopt a petition for review when appealing cases decided by the Special Agrarian Courts in eminent domain cases is the need for absolute dispatch in the determination of just compensation. Just compensation means not only paying the correct amount but also paying for the land within a reasonable time from its acquisition. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just for the property owner is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Such objective is more in keeping with the nature of a petition for review.

Unlike an ordinary appeal, a petition for review dispenses with the filing of a notice of appeal or completion of records as requisites before any pleading is submitted. A petition for review hastens the award of fair recompense to deprived landowners for the government-acquired property, an end not foreseeable in an ordinary appeal. This is exemplified by the case at bar in which the petition for review before the Special Third (3rd) Division (CA-G.R. SP No. 47005) was disposed of way ahead of the ordinary appeal filed before the Fourth (4th) Division (CA-G.R. CV No. 60365) in the Court of Appeals.

Inasmuch as the notice of appeal filed by petitioner LBP did not stop the running of the reglementary period to file a petition for review, the time to appeal the decision of the Special Agrarian Court has lapsed, rendering the said decision final and executory.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

85!!!!!!!!!!!!

086 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELIZABETH BETH CORPUZG.R. No. 148198 October 1, 2003TOPIC: RULE 40-56PONENTE: Ynares-Santiago, J.

AUTHOR:NOTES: (if applicable)

FACTS:In June 1998, private complainants Belinda Cabantog, Concepcion San Diego, Erlinda Pascual and Restian Surio went to Alga-Moher International Placement Services Corporation at 1651 San Marcelino Street, Malate, Manila to apply for employment as factory workers in Taiwan. They were accompanied by a certain Aling Josie who introduced them to the agencys President and General Manager Mrs. Evelyn Gloria H. Reyes. Mrs. Reyes asked them to accomplish the application forms. Thereafter, they were told to return to the office with P10,000.00 each as processing fee.

On July 30, 1998, private complainants returned to the agency to pay the processing fees. Mrs. Reyes was not at the agency that time, but she called appellant on the telephone to ask her to receive the processing fees. Thereafter, appellant advised them to wait for the contracts to arrive from the Taiwan employers.

Two months later, nothing happened to their applications. Thus, private complainants decided to ask for the refund of their money from appellantwho told them that the processing fees they had paid were already remitted to Mrs. Reyes. When they talked to Mrs. Reyes, she told them that the money she received from appellant was in payment of the latters debt. Thus, on January 13, 1999, private complainants filed their complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation which led to the arrest and detention of appellant.

On March 23, 2000, while the case was before the trial court, private complainants received the refund of their processing fees from appellants sister-in-law. Consequently, they executed affidavits of desistance from participation in the case against appellant.

For her part, appellant resolutely denied having a hand in the illegal recruitment and claimed that she merely received the money on behalf of Mrs. Reyes, the President/General Manager of Alga-Moher International Placement Services Corporation, where she had been working as secretary for three months prior to July 30, 1998. On that day, Mrs. Reyes called her on the telephone and told her to receive private complainants processing fees. In compliance with the order of her employer and since the cashier was absent, she received the processing fees of private complainants, which she thereafter remitted to Mrs. Reyes. She had no knowledge that the agency’s license was suspended by the POEA on July 29, 1998.RTC: accused Elizabeth Beth Corpuz is hereby found guilty of the offense charged in the Information for violation of Sec. 6 (l), (m) in relation to Sec. 7 (b) of R.A. 8042 without any mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attendant to its commission, without applying the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Elizabeth Beth Corpuz is hereby sentenced to suffer a life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.

ISSUE: Whether or not the findings of facts of the trial court in this case should be adopted by this CourtHELD: NO.

RATIO:It is axiomatic that findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the collective testimonies of witnesses and probative weight thereof and its conclusions culled from said findings are accorded by this Court great respect, if not conclusive effect, because of the unique advantage of the trial court in observing and monitoring at close range, the conduct, deportment and demeanor of the witnesses as they testify before the trial court. However, this principle does not apply if the trial court ignored, misunderstood or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case. The exception obtains in this case.

In the case at bar, we have carefully reviewed the records of the case and found that the prosecution failed to establish that appellant, as secretary, had control, management or direction of the recruitment agency. Appellant started her employment with the agency on May 1, 1998 and she was tasked to hold and document employment contracts from the foreign employers. She did not entertain applicants and she had no discretion over how the business was managed. The trial courts finding that appellant, being the secretary of the agency, had control over its business, is not only non sequitur but has no evidentiary basis.

In the appreciation of evidence in criminal cases, it is a basic tenet that the prosecution has the burden of proof in establishing the guilt of the accused for the offense with which he is charged. Ei incumbit probation qui dicit non qui negat, i.e., he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove. The conviction of appellant must rest not on the weakness of his defense, but on the strength of the prosecutions evidence.

In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove appellants active participation in the illegal recruitment activities of the agency. As already established, appellant received the processing fees of the private complainants for and in behalf of Mrs. Reyes who ordered her to receive the same. She neither gave an impression that she had the ability to deploy them abroad nor convinced them to part with their money. More importantly, she had no knowledge that the license was suspended the day before she received the money. Their failure to depart for Taiwan was due to the suspension of the license, an event which appellant did not have control of. Her failure to refund their money immediately upon their demand was because the money had been remitted to Mrs. Reyes on the same day she received it from them.

While we strongly condemn the pervasive proliferation of illegal job recruiters and syndicates preying on innocent people anxious to obtain employment abroad, nevertheless, we find the pieces of evidence insufficient to prove the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. They do not pass the requisite moral certainty, as they admit of the alternative inference that other persons, not necessarily the appellant, may have perpetrated the crime. Where the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which is consistent with guilt, and the other with innocence, the accused must be acquitted. Indeed, it would be better to set free ten men who might be probably guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

PAL vs CARule 45Facts:

Private respondents Judy Amor, Jane Gamil, minor Gian Carlo Amor, represented by his father, Atty. Owen Amor, and, minor Carlo Benitez, represented by his mother, Josephine Benitez, filed with the Regional Trial Court (Branch 53), Sorsogon, Sorsogon, a complaint[3] for damages against petitioner due to the latters failure to honor their confirmed tickets.

On May 8, 1988, Judy with Gian, Jane and minor Carlo Benitez, nephew of Judy and Jane, arrived at the Legaspi Airport at 6:20 a.m. for PR 178. Carlo Benitez was supposed to use the confirmed ticket of a certain Dra. Emily Chua.[5] They were accompanied by Atty. Owen Amor and the latters cousin, Salvador Gonzales who fell in line at the check-in counter with four persons ahead of him and three persons behind him[6] while plaintiff Judy went to the office of the station manager to request that minor plaintiff Carlo Benitez be allowed to use the ticket ofDra. Chua.[7] While

waiting for his turn, Gonzales was asked by Lloyd Fojas, the check-in clerk on duty, to approach the counter. Fojas wrote something on the tickets which Gonzales later read as late check-in 7:05

Even though they clearly arrived on time, they were not allowed to board the plane. Later on it was found out that there was over booking and that non-revenue passengers were allowed to board the plane.

They tried to ride the bus but the bus had already left for manila. They decided to return to the airport for an afternoon flight, the flight was

subsequently cancelled due to aircraft malfunction.

RTC: RTC rendered judgment upholding the evidence presented by private respondents. Note: that the RTC believed the testimony of the complainants that they indeed

arrived on time, and that the reason as to why they were not allowed to board the plane was that other non-revenue passengers took their place. (non-revenue passenger was not defined in the case)

CA: Affirmed the RTC ruling

SC: WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals Ang gusto kasi mangyari ng PAL dito is that there be another determination as

to the aspect of determining facts of the case. PAL insists that the reason why the complainants were not allowed to board

the plane was that these passengers checked in late. According to PAL the findings of the RTC is grounded entirely on speculations,

surmises or conjectures. Hence, exception daw ito sa general rule that findings of facts of the appellate court is binding upon the sc.

Sc ruled that the exception is not applicable in this case and that the complainants have sufficiently proven that they arrived on time to check in for their flight.

What is the doctrine of this case? It pertains to rule 45!!!!!!Doctrine:

In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the general rule is that only questions of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court.[18]Factual findings of the appellate court are generally binding on us especially when in complete accord with the findings of the trial court.[19] This is because it is not our function to analyze or weigh the evidence all over again.[20] However, this general rule admits of exceptions, to wit:

(a) where there is grave abuse of discretion;

(b) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (c) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (d) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals was based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the factual findings are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and, (h) where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, or are mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on recordAGUSTO V RIOS

089 Escueta v. LimTOPIC: Section 3 of Rule 38; Rule 40-56PONENTE: Azcuna, J.

AUTHOR:NOTES:The doctrine of estoppel … is not only that which prohibits a party from assuming inconsistent positions, based on the principle of election, but that which precludes him from repudiating an obligation voluntarily assumed after having accepted benefits therefrom. To countenance such repudiation would be contrary to equity, and would put a premium on fraud or misrepresentation.

The real character of the contract is not the title given, but the intention of the parties.

Nature: This is an appeal by certiorari (Rule 45) to annul and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA)

FACTS:1. Respondent Rufina Lim filed an action to remove cloud on, or quiet title to, real property,

with preliminary injunction and issuance of a hold-departure order from the Philippines against Ignacio E. Rubio. Respondent amended her complaint to include specific performance and damages.

2. In her amended complaint, respondent averred inter alia that she bought the hereditary shares (consisting of 10 lots) of Ignacio Rubio and the heirs of Luz Baloloy, namely: Alejandrino, Bayani, and other co-heirs; that said vendors executed a contract of sale

dated April 10, 1990 in her favor; that Ignacio Rubio and the heirs of Luz Baloloy received [a down payment] or earnest money in the amount of P102,169.86 and P450,000, respectively; that it was agreed in the contract of sale that the vendors would secure certificates of title covering their respective hereditary shares; that the balance of the purchase price would be paid to each heir upon presentation of their individual certificates of title; that Ignacio Rubio refused to receive the other half of the down payment which is P[100,000]; that Ignacio Rubio refused and still refuses to deliver to [respondent] the certificates of title covering his share on the two lots; that with respect to the heirs of Luz Baloloy, they also refused and still refuse to perform the delivery of the two certificates of title covering their share in the disputed lots; that respondent was and is ready and willing to pay Ignacio Rubio and the heirs of Luz Baloloy upon presentation of their individual certificates of title, free from whatever lien and encumbrance;

3. As to petitioner Corazon Escueta, in spite of her knowledge that the disputed lots have already been sold by Ignacio Rubio to respondent, it is alleged that a simulated deed of sale involving said lots was effected by Ignacio Rubio in her favor; and that the simulated deed of sale by Rubio to Escueta has raised doubts and clouds over respondent’s title.

4. Respondent has no cause of action, because the subject contract of sale has no more force and effect as far as the Baloloys are concerned, since they have withdrawn their offer to sell for the reason that respondent failed to pay the balance of the purchase price as orally promised on or before May 1, 1990.

5. Respondent has no cause of action, because Rubio has not entered into a contract of sale with her; that he has appointed his daughter Patricia Llamas to be his attorney-in-fact and not in favor of Virginia Rubio Laygo Lim (Lim for brevity) who was the one who represented him in the sale of the disputed lots in favor of respondent; that the P100,000 respondent claimed he received as down payment for the lots is a simple transaction by way of a loan with Lim.

ISSUE(S): Whether the contract of sale between petitioners and respondent is valid.HELD: The petition lacks merit. The contract of sale between petitioners and respondent is valid. Bayani Baloloy was represented by his attorney-in-fact, Alejandrino Baloloy.- In the Baloloys’ answer to the original complaint and amended complaint, the allegations

relating to the personal circumstances of the Baloloys are clearly admitted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48282, dated October 26, 1998 and January 11, 1999, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.RATIO:

Consequently, Ignacio Rubio could no longer sell the subject properties to Corazon Escueta, after having sold them to respondent. "[I]n a contract of sale, the vendor loses ownership over the property and cannot recover it until and unless the contract is resolved or rescinded x x x." The records do not show that Ignacio Rubio asked for a rescission of the contract. What he adduced was a belated revocation of the special

power of attorney he executed in favor of Patricia Llamas. "In the sale of immovable property, even though it may have been stipulated that upon failure to pay the price at the time agreed upon the rescission of the contract shall of right take place, the vendee may pay, even after the expiration of the period, as long as no demand for rescission of the contract has been made upon him either judicially or by a notarial act.

Section 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court Furthermore, no fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence exists in order that

the petition for relief may be granted (Rule 38 Sec1). There is no proof of extrinsic fraud that "prevents a party from having a trial x x x or from presenting all of his case to the court"

There is no reason for the Baloloys to ignore the effects of the above-cited rule. "The 60-day period is reckoned from the time the party acquired knowledge of the order, judgment or proceedings and not from the date he actually read the same."

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: PRE-TRIAL is mandatory. The notices of pre-trial had been sent to both the Baloloys and their former counsel of

record. Being served with notice, he is charges with the duty of notifying the party represented by him. He must see to it that his client receives such notice and attends the pre-trial.

What the Baloloys and their former counsel have alleged instead in their motion is the belated receipt of the special power of attorney, not that they have not received the notice or been informed of the scheduled pre-trial. Not having raised the ground of lack of a special power of attorney in their motion, they are not deemed to have waived it. Certainly, they cannot raise it at this late stage of the proceedings. For lack of representation, Baloloy was properly declared in default.

SEC 3. TIME FOR FILING PETITION; CONTENTS AND VERIFICATION - a petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more that 6 months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense as the case may be.

There is no reason for the Baloloys to ignore the effects of the above rule. the 60-day period is reckoned from the time the party acquired knowledge of the order, judgment, or proceedings and not from the date he actually read the same. Further, no fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence exists in order that the PETITION FOR RELIEF may be granted.

SPRINGFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC. vs.HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL,G.R. NO. 142628 February 6, 2007

TOPIC:PONENTE: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

AUTHOR:

The rule is that where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain administrative bodies to the CA, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the RTC, in terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter.

Given that DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA, the inevitable conclusion is that the DARAB is a co-equal body with the RTC and its decisions are beyond the RTC's control. The CA was therefore correct in sustaining the RTC's dismissal of the petition for annulment of the DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995, as the RTC does not have any jurisdiction to entertain the same.

FACTS:

Petra Capistrano Piit previously owned Lot No. 2291 located in Cagayan de Oro City which measured 123,408 square meters under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-62623. Springfield Development Corporation, Inc. (Springfield) bought Lot No. 2291-C with an area of 68,732 square meters, and Lot No. 2291-D with an area of 49,778 square meters. Springfield developed these properties into a subdivision project called Mega Heights Subdivision.

On May 4, 1990, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through its Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, issued a Notice of Coverage, placing the property under the coverage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

There being an opposition from the heirs of Petra Piit, the case was docketed as DARAB. On August 27, 1991, DARAB Provincial Adjudicator Abeto A. Salcedo, Jr. rendered a decision declaring the nature of the property as residential and not suitable for agriculture.

The Regional Director filed a notice of appeal, which the Provincial Adjudicator disallowed for being pro forma and frivolous. The decision became final and executory and Springfield proceeded to develop the property.

The DAR Regional Director then filed a petition for relief from judgment of the DARAB Decision, docketed as DARAB Case No. 0555. In its Decision dated October 5, 1995, the DARAB granted the petition and gave due course to the Notice of Coverage. It also directed the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office to proceed with the documentation, acquisition, and distribution of the

property to the true and lawful beneficiaries.

The DARAB also issued an Order dated May 22, 1997, ordering the heirs of Piit and Springfield to pay the farmer-beneficiaries the amount of Twelve Million, Three Hundred Forty Thousand, Eight Hundred Pesos (P12,340,800.00), corresponding to the value of the property since the property has already been developed into a subdivision.

On June 13, 1997, Springfield and the heirs of Piit (petitioners) filed with the RTC, a petition for annulment of the DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995 and all its subsequent proceedings. Petitioners contend that the DARAB decision was rendered without affording petitioners any notice and hearing.

On motion filed by the farmer-beneficiaries, the RTC issued an Order dated June 25, 1997, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.

On July 2, 1997, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 44563. Petitioners alleged that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that the annulment of judgment filed before it is actually an action for certiorari in a different color.

In the assailed Decision dated July 16, 1998, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit, ruling that the RTC does not have jurisdiction to annul the DARAB Decision because it is a co-equal body.

CA simply denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration per Resolution dated February 23, 2000 without specifically resolving the issues raised concerning the prayer for a writ of prohibition.ISSUE(S): whether the RTC has jurisdiction to annul a final judgment of the DARAB.

HELD: NO, Given that DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA, the inevitable conclusion is that the DARAB is a co-equal body with the RTC and its decisions are beyond the RTC's control. The CA was therefore correct in sustaining the RTC's dismissal of the petition for annulment of the DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995, as the RTC does not have any jurisdiction to entertain the same.RATIO:

Petitioners argue that under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, there is no provision that vests with the CA jurisdiction over actions for annulment of DARAB judgments. Petitioners, however, contend that the RTC may take cognizance of the annulment case since Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129 vests the RTC with general jurisdiction and an action for annulment is covered under such general jurisdiction.

Note must be made that the petition for annulment of the DARAB decision was filed with the RTC on June 13, 1997, before the advent of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on July 1, 1997. Thus, the applicable law is B.P. Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, enacted on August 10, 1981.

It is also worthy of note that before the effectivity of B.P. Blg. 129, a court of first instance has the authority to annul a final and executory judgment rendered by another court of first instance or by another branch of the same court. This was the Court's ruling in Dulap v. Court of Appeals. Yet, in subsequent cases, the Court held that the better policy, as a matter of comity or courteous interaction between courts of first instance and the branches thereof, is for the annulment cases to be tried by the same court or branch which heard the main action.

The foregoing doctrines were modified in Ngo Bun Tiong v. Sayo, where the Court expressed that pursuant to the policy of judicial stability, the doctrine of non-interference between concurrent and coordinate courts should be regarded as highly important in the administration of justice whereby the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction.

With the introduction of B.P. Blg. 129, the rule on annulment of judgments was specifically provided in Section 9(2), which vested in the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now the CA) the exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of RTCs. Sec. 9(3) of B.P. Blg. 129 also vested the CA with "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948." As provided in paragraph 16 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines implementing B.P. Blg. 129, the quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions are exclusively appealable to the CA are those, which under the law, R.A. No. 5434, or its enabling acts, are specifically appealable to the CA.

Significantly, B.P. Blg. 129 does not specifically provide for any power of the RTC to annul judgments of quasi-judicial bodies. However, in BF Northwest Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court ruled that the RTCs have jurisdiction over actions for annulment of the decisions of the National Water Resources Council, which is a quasi-judicial body ranked with inferior courts, pursuant to its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, under Sec. 21(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, in relation to acts or omissions of an inferior court. This led to the conclusion that despite the absence of any provision in B.P. Blg. 129, the RTC had the power to entertain petitions for annulment of judgments of inferior courts and administrative or quasi-judicial bodies of equal ranking. This is also in harmony with the "pre-B.P. Blg. 129" rulings of the Court recognizing the power of a trial court (court of first instance) to annul final judgments. Hence, while it is true, as petitioners contend, that the

RTC had the authority to annul final judgments, such authority pertained only to final judgments rendered by inferior courts and quasi-judicial bodies of equal ranking with such inferior courts.

The foregoing statements beg the next question, i.e., whether the DARAB is a quasi-judicial body with the rank of an inferior court such that the RTC may take cognizance of an action for the annulments of its judgments. The answer is no.

The DARAB is a quasi-judicial body created by Executive Order Nos. 229 and 129-A. R.A. No. 6657 delineated its adjudicatory powers and functions. The DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure adopted on December 26, 1988 specifically provides for the manner of judicial review of its decisions, orders, rulings, or awards. Rule XIV, Section 1 states:

SECTION 1. Certiorari to the Court of Appeals. Any decision, order, award or ruling by the Board or its Adjudicators on any agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement or interpretation of agrarian reform laws or rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, may be brought within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof, to the Court of Appeals by certiorari, except as provided in the next succeeding section. Notwithstanding an appeal to the Court of Appeals the decision of the Board or Adjudicator appealed from, shall be immediately executory.

Further, the prevailing 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, expressly provides for an appeal from the DARAB decisions to the CA.

The rule is that where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain administrative bodies to the CA, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the RTC, in terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter.

Given that DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA, the inevitable conclusion is that the DARAB is a co-equal body with the RTC and its decisions are beyond the RTC's control. The CA was therefore correct in sustaining the RTC's dismissal of the petition for annulment of the DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995, as the RTC does not have any jurisdiction to entertain the same.

This brings to fore the issue of whether the petition for annulment of the DARAB judgment could be brought to the CA. As previously noted, Section 9(2) of B.P. Blg. 129 vested in the CA the exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments, but only those rendered by the RTCs. It does not expressly give the CA the power to annul judgments of quasi-judicial bodies. Thus, in Elcee Farms, Inc. v. Semillano, the Court affirmed the ruling of the CA that it has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for annulment of a final and executory judgment of the NLRC, citing Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which only vests in the CA "exclusive jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts." This

was reiterated in Galang v. Court of Appeals, where the Court ruled that that the CA is without jurisdiction to entertain a petition for annulment of judgment of a final decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

In Macalalag v. Ombudsman, the Court ruled that Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions covers "annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies could no longer be availed of through no fault of the petitioner." Thus, the Court concluded that judgments or final orders and resolutions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases cannot be annulled by the CA, more so, since The Ombudsman Act specifically deals with the remedy of an aggrieved party from orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only, and the right to appeal is not to be considered granted to parties aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative cases.

While these cases involve annulments of judgments under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, still, they still find application in the present case, as the provisions of B.P. Blg. 129 and the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, on annulment of judgments are identical.

Consequently, the silence of B.P. Blg. 129 on the jurisdiction of the CA to annul judgments or final orders and resolutions of quasi-judicial bodies like the DARAB indicates its lack of such authority.CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

92 DIONA v. BALANGUEG.R. No. 173559 January 7, 2013TOPIC: Rule 47: Annulment of Judgment; exception to final judgment rule; lack of due process as additional groundDEL CASTILLO, J.

R failed to pay P for loan so P filed case. RTC rendered decision imposing 5% monthly interest but the complaint only prayed for 12% per annum interest. Former counsel for R was negligent, bobo. R filed w/ CA petition for annulment of judgment, thru new counsel, saying that the RTC decision deprived them of property w/o due process as the 5% monthly was in excess of the relief sought in the complaint which is 12% per annum (violation of sec3(d) rule9). SC: Annulment of judgment was proper. While extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction are the only grounds, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process

as additional ground to annul a judgment.FACTS:

1. Respondents obtained a loan of P45K from petitioner payable in 6 months and secured by a REM. Respondents failed to pay despite demand. Thus, petitioner filed a complaint with the RTC praying that respondents be ordered to pay petitioner the principal obligation and 12% interest, actual damages, atty’s fees, and to issue a decree of foreclosure upon failure to fully pay, and costs.

2. Respondents were served summons thru respondent Sonny Balangue.3. Oct 17, 2000- RTC declared respondents in default and allowed petitioner to present her

evidence ex parte. The RTC ordered respondents to pay petitioner P45K plus 5% interest per month, P20K atty’s fees, and in the event of failure to pay, an order of foreclosure will be issued.

4. Petitioner filed a Motion for Execution.5. Respondents filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment claiming not all of them were duly

served with summons. Sonny did not inform them of the summons. Thus, respondents prayed that the RTC decision be set aside and a new trial be conducted.

6. RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution, however, it was cannot be satisfied. Thus, petitioner moved for the public auction of the mortgaged property. A certificate of Sale was issued in her favor.

7. Respondents filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution Sale claiming that the parties did not agree in writing of any rate of interest and that petitioner merely sought for 12% interest per annum but the RTC awarded 5% month interest until full payment.

8. May 7, 2002- RTC granted respondents’ motion and modified the interest to 12% per annum.

9. Petitioner filed for Certiorari with CA.10.CA for petitioner: the TC exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding 5% monthly instead of 12%

per annum. However, the proper remedy was not to amend the judgment but to declare that portion as a nullity. Void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. No legal rights can emanate from a resolution that is null and void. The RTC order of May 7, 2002 is annulled and set aside.

11.Thus, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment and Execution Sale with Damages.

12.CA granted the Petition for Annulment of Judgment : the monthly interest of 5% was not agreed upon by the parties as the complaint of petitioner clearly sought 12% per annum. Following the mandate of sec. 3 (d) of Rule 9 of the ROC, the CA concluded that the awarded rate of interest is void for being in excess of the relief sought in the complaint.

13.CA annulled the judgment allowing 5% monthly interest and the sale at public auction. It also ordered that the judgment debt be recomputed at the rate of 12% per annum.

ISSUE: WON the RTC order awarding 5% monthly interest may be set aside in a Petition for Annulment of Judgment.(WON the CA erred in granting the respondent’s petition for annulment of judgment as a

substitute or alternative remedy for lost appeal. NO.)(WON the CA erred in granting the respondent’s petition for annulment of judgment despite the fact that the RTC decision has become final and executor contrary to the doctrine of immutability of judgment. NO.)

HELD: YES. The award of 5% monthly interest violated their right to due process and, hence, the same may be set aside in a Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.RATIO:Annulment of judgment under Rule 47; an exception to the final judgment rule; grounds therefor.

A petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies. Said rule explicitly provides that it is not available as a substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the party’s own neglect in promptly availing of the same. “The underlying reason is traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment, litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an affective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to rest.”

While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, this Court declared that a final and executory judgment may still be set aside if, upon mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law.

Grant of 5% monthly interest is way beyond the 12% per annum interest sought in the Complaint and smacks of violation of due process.

It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the party. In the case at bench, the award of 5% monthly interest rate is not supported both by the allegations in the pleadings and the evidence on record. The REM executed by the parties does not include any provision on interest and the complaint merely prayed for a 12% interest per annum. They were deprived of reasonable opportunity to refute and present controverting evidence as they were made to believe that the complainant petitioner was seeking for what she merely stated in her Complaint.

Respondents’ former counsel was grossly negligent in handling the case of his clients; respondents did not lose ordinary remedies of new trial, petition for relief, etc. through their

own fault.

Ordinarily, the mistake, negligence or lack of competence of counsel binds the client.1âwpA recognized exception to the rule is when the lawyers were grossly negligent in their duty to maintain their client’s cause and such amounted to a deprivation of their client’s property without due process of law.

Manifest indifference of respondents’ former counsel:(1) Filed motion to extend period to answer but former counsel let the extension pass

without filing answer thus respondents were declared in defaults(2) He did not question the 5% monthly award despite receipt of RTC decision. A simple

reading shows that it was exhorbitant but he did not do anything.(3) He instead filed a motion to set aside judgment OTG of lack of jurisdiction, oblivious to

the fact of the erroneous 5% would deprive respondents of property without due process.

(4) He allowed the RTC decision to become final by not perfecting an appeal neither did he filed a petition for relief therefrom.

It was only a year later, thru their new counsel, that respondents filed a motion to correct/amend judgment and to set aside execution sale.

Judging from how respondents’ former counsel handled the cause of his clients, there is no doubt that he was grossly negligent in protecting their rights, to the extent that they were deprived of their property without due process of law.

In fine, respondents did not lose the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other remedies through their own fault. It can only be attributed to the gross negligence of their erstwhile counsel which prevented them from pursuing such remedies. We cannot also blame respondents for relying too much on their former counsel. Clients have reasonable expectations that their lawyer would amply protect their interest during the trial of the case

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed November 24, 2005 and June 26, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85541 are AFFIRMED.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment.DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

092 NHA vs EVANGELISTA

G.R. No. 140945             May 16, 2005

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs.JOSE EVANGELISTA, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

A person who was not impleaded in the complaint cannot be bound by the decision rendered therein, for no man shall be affected by a proceeding in which he is a stranger.1

This refers to the petition for review on certiorari filed by the National Housing Authority assailing the decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 51646, granting respondent’s petition for annulment of judgment. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The assailed part of paragraph No. 3 of the dispositive portion of the decision dated November 29, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Br. CIII, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-91-10071 is hereby declared void, non-binding and inapplicable in so far as petitioner’s TCT No. 122944 is concerned.

Let a copy hereof be furnished the Register of Deeds of Quezon City for the proper annotation. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.3

FACTS:

NHA filed a case for recovery of property docketed as Civil Case No. Q-91-10071.5 Said case involves a real property measuring 915.50 square meters and located in V. Luna Road, Quezon City, originally awarded in 1968 by the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (petitioner’s predecessor) to a certain Adela Salindon.

After the death of Salindon, her heirs executed an extra-judicial settlement where the property was transferred to Arsenio Florendo, Jr., Milagros Florendo, Beatriz Florendo and Eloisa Florendo-Kulphongpatana. However, in a decision in G.R. No. L-60544, entitled "Arsenio Florendo, Jr., et al. vs. Hon. Perpetuo D. Coloma, Presiding Judge of Branch VII, City Court of Quezon City, et al.," rendered by the Court on May 19, 1984, the award in favor of Salindon was nullified and set aside for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion, and petitioner was declared the owner of the property.

Despite said decision, the property was auctioned off by the Quezon City Treasurer’s Office on April 23, 1986, for unpaid real property taxes by the Florendos. The highest bidder was Luisito Sarte. Because the Register of Deeds refused to register the final deed of sale issued by the City Treasurer, Sarte filed a petition for issuance of title and confirmation of sale, which was granted by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 84). Consequently, the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 28182 in the name of Sarte, who divided the property into Lot 1-A, measuring 570.50 square meters and covered by TCT No. 108070, and Lot 1-B, measuring 345 square meters and covered by TCT No. 108071.6

It was in 1991 that petitioner filed Civil Case No. Q-91-10071 with Sarte, the City Treasurer of Quezon City and the Quezon City Register of Deeds, as defendants. While the case was pending, Sarte executed in favor of respondent Jose Evangelista, a Deed of Assignment dated December 2, 1994, covering Lot 1-A.7 TCT No. 108070 was cancelled and TCT No. 122944 was issued in the name of respondent on December 21, 1994. Subsequently, the Register of Deeds annotated on TCT No. 122944 an Affidavit of Adverse Claim of petitioner.

On May 1, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for leave to file supplemental complaint in Civil Case No. Q-91-10071, seeking to include respondent Evangelista, Northern Star Agri-Business Corporation and BPI Agricultural Development Bank as defendants. The proposed additional defendants were the subsequent purchasers of Lots 1-A and 1-B.10 The trial court, however, denied the motion in its Order dated May 17, 1995.11

Thus, petitioner, on May 31, 1995, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 82) a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Assignment, Deed of Absolute Sale, Real Estate Mortgage, Cancellation of TCT Nos. 122944 and 126639, and Damages, against Sarte, respondent Evangelista, Northern Star Agri-Business Corporation, BPI Agricultural Development Bank and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23940.12 

RTC dismissed this second case on the ground of litis pendencia.

In a decision dated November 29, 1995, the trial court, in Civil Case No. Q-91-10071, rendered its decision in favor of petitioner, with the following dispositive portion:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff National Housing Authority as follows:

1. The auction sale is null and void

2. TCT No. 28182 subsequently issued in the name of defendant Luisito Sarte is hereby null and void.

3. Any transfers, assignment, sale or mortgage of whatever nature of the parcel of land subject of this case made by defendant Luisito Sarte or

his/her agents or assigns before or during the pendency of the instant case are hereby declared null and void, together with any transfer certificates of title issued in connection with the aforesaid transactions by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City who is likewise ordered to cancel or cause the cancellation of such TCTs;

Respondent then filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the trial court’s judgment, particularly paragraph 3 of the dispositive portion, referring to the nullity of any transfer, assignment, sale or mortgage made by Sarte. In his petition, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as ground. According to respondent, since he was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071, he was prevented from ventilating his cause, right or interest over the property, and the judgment was not binding on him, as the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person.15

The CA granted the petition and declared null and void paragraph 3 of the dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision insofar as petitioner’s title to the property is concerned.16 The CA found that respondent was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071 and the trial court did not acquire any jurisdiction over his person. The CA also ruled that the judgment violated respondent’s right against deprivation of the property without due process of law.17

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner took the present recourse.

Petitioner insists that it should not be faulted for the trial court’s denial of its motion to include respondent as defendant in Civil Case No. Q-91-10071. Petitioner also claims that the auction sale of the property by the City Treasurer of Quezon City is void ab initio because it was never supposed to be included in the auction sale as petitioner, which has been declared by the Court in G.R. No. L-60544 as the owner of the property, is exempt from payment of taxes. Hence, Sarte cannot claim any right over the same and respondent, having bought it from Sarte, does not acquire any better right thereto. Petitioner also alleges that respondent is not a buyer in good faith because the latter was aware of the pending litigation involving the property.18

ISSUE: whether or not the CA erred in annulling paragraph 3 of the trial court’s decision on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of due process of law.

Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy.19 Jurisprudence and Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court lay down the grounds upon which an action for annulment of judgment may be brought, i.e., (1) extrinsic fraud, and (2) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process.20

Lack of jurisdiction refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim, and in either case, the judgment or final

order and resolution are void.21 A trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons.22

In this case, it is undisputed that respondent was never made a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071. It is basic that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court.23 Yet, the assailed paragraph 3 of the trial court’s decision decreed that "(A)ny transfers, assignment, sale or mortgage of whatever nature of the parcel of land subject of this case made by defendant Luisito Sarte or his/her agents or assigns before or during the pendency of the instant case are hereby declared null and void, together with any transfer certificates of title issued in connection with the aforesaid transactions by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City who is likewise ordered to cancel or cause the cancellation of such TCTs." Respondent is adversely affected by such judgment, as he was the subsequent purchaser of the subject property from Sarte, and title was already transferred to him. It will be the height of inequity to allow respondent’s title to be nullified without being given the opportunity to present any evidence in support of his ostensible ownership of the property. Much more, it is tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.24 Clearly, the trial court’s judgment is void insofar as paragraph 3 of its dispositive portion is concerned.

Petitioner argues that it should not bear the consequence of the trial court’s denial of its motion to include respondent as defendant in Civil Case No. Q-91-10071. True, it was not petitioner’s fault that respondent was not made a party to the case. But likewise, it was not respondent’s fault that he was not given the opportunity to present his side of the story. Whatever prompted the trial court to deny petitioner’s motion to include respondent as defendant is not for the Court to reason why. Petitioner could have brought the trial court’s denial to the CA oncertiorari but it did not. Instead, it filed Civil Case No. Q-95-23940 for Annulment of Deed of Assignment, Deed of Absolute Sale, Real Estate Mortgage, Cancellation of TCT Nos. 122944 and 126639, and Damages, against herein respondent Sarte and others. Unfortunately for petitioner, this was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 82) on the ground of litis pendentia. Be that as it may, the undeniable fact remains -- respondent is not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071, and paragraph 3, or any portion of the trial court’s judgment for that matter, cannot be binding on him.

.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51646 are hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.