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4th International Critical Management Studies Conference (Technology and Power Stream)

Judge Institute of Management

University of Cambridge 4th-6th July 2005

Pi-Shen Seet PhD Candidate

Judge Institute of Management University of Cambridge

Cambridge CB2 1 AG United Kingdom

Tel: (01223) 335942 Fax: (01223) 339701

E-mail: pss31@cam.ac.uk

Charles Hampden-Turner Senior Research Associate

Judge Institute of Management University of Cambridge

E-Mail: cmh26@cam.ac.uk

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Technocrats and Technopreneurs – Power Paradoxes in Singapore’s National Innovation System

Abstract

This paper explores the complex power relationship in Singapore’s National Innovation System (NIS), specifically between two major groups of players, namely, the technology entrepreneurs or ‘technopreneurs’ and NIS bureaucrats and policy makers or ‘technocrats’ in the context of a NIS that is itself struggling to reconcile the contradictions between ‘planning’ against ‘entrepreneurship’ as it seeks to transform itself to support a more entrepreneurial and knowledge-based economy for the twenty-first century.

The research follows Alvesson & Willmott’s (1992) critical theory agenda in that there is value in studying tensions between key groups in the inter-organisational space and in particular critiquing the exercise of power in the context of a NIS. The study in particular takes up Hamilton-Hart’s (2000) call for more research to be done on the quality of ties between state and non-state actors in Singapore. In addition, to examine issues beyond the superficial exercise of power, the study uses Lukes’ (1974) three-dimensional classification of power as a framework to study both observable and unobservable exercises of power between the technocrats and technopreneurs.

The paper argues that unlike the consensual power relationship that is assumed, the power relationship is largely tilted towards the technocrats and away from the technopreneurs. Using Hampden-Turner’s (1990; 2000) dilemma methodology as an interpretive lens in which to analyse the relationships between the technocrats and technopreneurs, the research found three major patterns of power paradoxes in which the power relationship is skewed towards the technocrats as shown below:

Power Paradoxes Technocrats’ perspective Technopreneurs’ perspective

Meritocratic effect A system based on academic ‘merit’ that focuses on answers

versus A system based on diversity and play that focuses on ‘questions’

Multinational Corporation – Government-Linked Corporation (MNC-GLC) effect

Wooing MNCs and sponsoring GLCs

versus Empowering Technopreneurs

Process-engineering effect

Process Engineering skills within highly structured environments

versus Soft skills within complex, dynamic environments

The paper concludes with a few observations that the NIS may be undergoing a shift in the power-relationship to correct some of these imbalances but cautions that these changes could take time and may be met with resistance.

Key Words: Innovation systems; Singapore; bureaucracy; technology; entrepreneurship; power relations.

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Introduction

Singapore is, in many ways, one of the most peculiar, yet one of the most impressively successful economies of the world. Despite its size and lack of natural resources, within 30 years of independence in 1965, it has seen its GDP per capita grow from US$600 to pass US$24,000 by 2002, placing it among the top twenty wealthiest nations in the world (Peebles & Wilson, 2002; United Nations Development Programme, 2003).

As a result, Singapore’s economy has undergone dramatic changes in the last 20 years as part of its move to transform the economy into a knowledge-based economy. This has seen a dramatic shift in the economy from one based on labour-intensive manufacturing to one based on capital-intensive and service-oriented industries. Part of the success of this dramatic change has been attributed to an early adoption of a coordinated National Innovation System (NIS) even before the concept of NIS were firmly established (Doh, 1996; Toh, 2000; Wong, 2002).

More recently, with competition from its neighbours, especially from China and India, intensifying, knowledge has become the main differentiator in maintaining Singapore’s economic edge. However, it is not just any knowledge, but unique, innovative ideas that can be scaled rapidly and commercialised that is important (Lim, 2001). This has again re-focussed efforts on transforming the Singapore NIS so that entrepreneurship can be used as a driver to make structural reforms so as to stay ahead of the economic race. A key component of that move is the focus on entrepreneurship as a key change agent in economic re-structuring, with the belief in the Schumpeterian claim that entrepreneurs can “create value by carrying out new combinations causing discontinuity” (Schumpeter, 1942). So, as part of a comprehensive review of the Singapore economy, Technopreneurship 21 (T21) was launched to cultivate entrepreneurship in four key areas of Education, Facilities, Regulations, and Financing. A major component of this is a US$1 billion Technopreneurship Investment Fund (TIF) was launched to attract smart venture capital activities to Singapore and to support efforts to develop knowledge-based start-ups. (The term ‘technopreneurship’ comes from the combining of ‘technology’ with ‘entrepreneurship’. Teo (2002) gives an account of how this term was crafted by the Singapore Economic Development Board (EDB) and how the term has entered mainstream use in Singapore).

When the economy was less volatile and growing strongly, it became popular to promote Singapore’s success of consensual relationships or ‘tripartism’ between employers, workers and the government as a ‘Third Way’ or ‘Asian Model’ of development (Cotton, 2000; Lim & Chew, 1998). This was in contrast to the highly antagonistic relationship between the trade unions and the employers and government in certain developed countries, most notably the United Kingdom in the early Thatcher years. This was also different to cosy cronyism that characterised capitalism in neighbouring South-East Asian countries (Searle, 1999). Translated to the NIS, ‘tripartism’ sees highly consensual relationships between the major players of the technology entrepreneurs or ‘technopreneurs’, the Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and Government-Linked Corporations (GLCs), and the government technology policy bureaucrats or ‘technocrats’. These technocrats include those bureaucrats or civil servants who develop and execute science, technology and research policy as well as those who purchase goods and services in science and technology. The study also follows Hamilton-Hart (2000) by including former members of the bureaucracy who are now prominent members in the political and private sector in Singapore as part of this technocratic elite. The 2 triangles in Exhibit 1 are illustrative:

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This study contributes to research in the following three areas. Firstly, most of the studies of power-relationships in the Singapore economy stay at the very macroeconomic level, examining the tensions in the tripartite economic model (Deyo, 1981; Heyser, 1983) or when they do move down to a more micro-level, they examine mainly the relationships between workers and employers (Deyo, 1989; Tan, 1993). There has been little work done on the relationships between entrepreneurs and government bureaucrats. This leads on to the second area namely that in the NIS literature, much of the research has been in the area of mapping out science and technology linkages and processes and not on the actual power-relationships within the main actors themselves (Andersen, Lundvall, & Sorrn-Friese, 2002; Dosi, 1988). And thirdly, the study aims to apply a paradoxical perspective to interpret phenomenon in the NIS, a method that has been used effectively in other fields of management studies e.g. in culture (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998), strategy (Hampden-Turner, 1990), marketing (Trompenaars & Woolliams, 2004b) and human resource development (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 2004a).

The study hence uses the dilemma methodology as an interpretive lens in a new area of the NIS to better understand the power relationships between technocrats and technopreneurs. It finds that unlike the consensual power relationship that is assumed, the power relationship is largely tilted towards the technocrats and away from the technopreneurs. In particular, there was evidence of three major patterns of power paradoxes in which the power relationship is skewed towards the technocrats namely, the meritocratic effect, the MNC-GLC effect, and the process-engineering effect.

Literature on Power Relations in National Innovation Systems

The modern concept of an innovation system was first put forward by Lundvall (1985) and this examined the interaction between users and producers with respect to product innovation. The approach was further developed by Freeman (1987) and by contributors in Dosi (1988), for example, Lundvall (1988) and Nelson (1988), all of whom developed models that were supported by empirical findings in the 1970s and 1980s that indicated a process whereby market and knowledge inputs from users on the demand side would feedback into and interact with entrepreneurial activities and knowledge creation on the supply side (Andersen et al., 2002). While Lundvall (1985) noted that these relationships had components of non-market relationships with differing levels of power, trust and loyalty, much of the subsequent work has presented NISs as highly organised markets.

These early approaches investigate innovation systems as economic-political and spatial systems with much of the analysis carried out at nation state level. Some have argued that with growing inter-connectedness of the economy especially in terms of technology, research should focus on regional systems (Cooke, 1998), sectoral systems (Breschi & Malerba, 1997) or broad technological systems (Carlsson & Jacobsson, 1997). However, while it is accepted that the

Government

Trade Unions Employers

Technocrats

Technopreneurs

Markets (Financial, Goods & Services

Exhibit 1 – Tripartism in the Singapore Economy (Left) and in the National Innovation System (Right)

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Singapore economy is a very open one, this research is carried out at the national level as Research and Development (R&D) activities and the role played by universities, research institutes, government agencies, and government policies are viewed as components of a single national system. This research therefore follows the Aalborg concept of national innovation systems which recognises that the bulk of linkages between players still tend to be organised along national lines due to limitations of distance and language in the co-ordination of decisions and interactive learning that is necessary for the innovation process (Lundvall, Johnson, Andersen, & Dalum, 2002).

Evans et al. (2003) find that much of the research on Singapore’s NIS tends to focus on pieces of the NIS in isolation. However there have been a few studies that attempt to look at the players at a systemic level. For example, Wong (2001) argues that the Singapore NIS is unique due to its high level of government coordination in his study which tracks in detail, the changes in Singapore’s NIS from the 1970s to 2000. However, Wong (2001) is constrained by the problem of aggregation (Carlsson, Jacobsson, Holmen, & Rickne, 2002). Because of the complexity and size of the system (and therefore, the high number of linkages among players at lower levels of aggregation), the empirical research focuses mainly on statics or comparative statics. Wong’s analysis only broadly identifies three groups of NIS actors namely, the enterprise, public R&D and manpower development. In addition, by keeping these groupings broad and large and just mapping out the linkages and flows between the key drivers, Wong (2001) does not analyse the quality of linkages and the non-market relationships and assumes the actual power distribution in the NIS to be quite well shared among the groups and that they work well together and are quite constant despite the ongoing changes to the NIS. This is in line with pluralistic notions of power whereby power is dispersed in a network and is visible in instances of concrete decision-making and formal actions (Presthus, 1964). As Hamilton-Hart (2000) comments on existing research done on Singapore’s political economy:

“It is necessary to say something about the quality of the ties that connect state and societal actors, not just whether ties exist. This while studies focus on the macro-political foundations of effective government, the micro-institutional factors that structure the interaction of different actors in a political system also deserve attention.” (p. 211)

Lee & Wong (2004) attempt to address the shortcoming by examining cognitive divergence among actors in the Singapore entrepreneurial ecosystem. In a quantitative approach using data from the Singapore survey of the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) 2002-2003 studies, they found partial support for their hypothesis that there is a systematic difference in perception of entrepreneurship framework conditions among the four main groups of entrepreneurial actors i.e. the entrepreneurs, the investors, the venture support professionals and the policy makers. They also find partial support for their hypothesis that policy makers have systematically higher perception of tangible, policy-based entrepreneurship framework conditions as compared to other entrepreneurial actors. More significantly, Lee & Wong (2004) find that there is a clear polarisation between “policy makers and venture support professionals” on the one side and “entrepreneurs and investors” on the other side especially on “dimensions that policy makers have the highest self-interest in” (p. 12). However, their analysis stops at measuring the cognitive diversity and perception gap and does not go the extra step to analyse that is actually influencing or directing the activities or agenda in the NIS.

It may be that the reason for not going the additional step is that the analysis of power relationships in the NIS would be difficult given the complex inter-relationships between the different parties. It may also be that the survey instrument used elicited overt and describable responses while the bulk of the exercise of power may be more hidden and covert. In addition, it could be that the research uses a ‘researcher’s model’ as opposed to an ‘informant’s model’ which is possibly better at identifying and analys ing issues behind power relationships. As Prus (1996) notes, if we are to fully explain what the actors mean and why do they do what they do, we must enter into and share their experiences. According to Lukes’ (1974), the concept of

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power is "ineradicably evaluative" and “essentially contested” (p. 9). In terms of Lukes’ (1974) three-dimensional concept of power, Lee & Wong’s (2004) study remains predominantly in the first dimension which involves direct, observable exercises of power (e.g. policy makers controlling issues like financial support and government incentives). Based on the second dimension, one could only interpret from the survey responses that there is a perception that there is some imbalance in the more indirect exercises of power (e.g. policy makers controlling of the innovation agenda). However, there is no evidence of skewed power relationships that may be unobservable and unconscious, as proposed in Lukes’ (1974) third dimension: "Men's wants may themselves be a product of a system which works against their interests, and, in such cases, [the radical view] relates the latter to what they would want and prefer, were they able to make a choice" (p. 34).

Foucault (1979) follows Lukes in that for him, social control involves the investment of power within and upon ourselves. As such, the basic building-blocks of power are knowledge and discipline. These endow the body with power and reciprocally, power invests the body with its socially productive capacities. Coherent order is achieved by mechanisms that are “diffuse, rarely formulated in continuous, systematic discourse”. These mechanisms “cannot be localised in a particular type of institution or state apparatus”. Instead, power is seen as occupying key positions in constantly active, even conflicting, network of relations:

“In short … power … is not the ‘privilege’ of the dominant class, but the overall effect of its strategic positions – an effect that is manifested and sometimes extended by the position of those who are dominated.” (Foucault, 1979) (p. 26-27)

Purushotam (1992) has found that Foucault’s idea that those who are controlled are themselves instruments of those exercising power over them is appropriate to describe the culture of “male dominance” in Singapore context and this study finds that her approach is equally applicable in the context of the NIS with its “technocrat dominance”.

This study therefore takes up Alvesson & Willmott’s (1992)’s call to study deeper and more pervasive aspects of the exercise of power by also building on work conducted in the sphere of political science that has largely focussed on power relations among governmental and political agents (Burawoy, 1979). The main issue in the debate has been whether the growth in the bureaucracy’s power as compared to other groups in society is legitimate and beneficial for society. On one side of the debate are those that see this phenomenon positively and support their arguments with the favourable economic and social effects that efficient and technically bureaucrats have had on the Singapore economy (Chen, 1978). On the other side of the debate, there are those who argue that there are large negative effects, many of them not observable, with the net result of building an environment that is “socially-controlled”. This position follows Clegg’s (1977) view that: “The order of a particular interest theorizes the possibility of whatever issues arise for power to be exercised over in such a way that the security of the ruling convention and interest is rarely disturbed.” (p. 21). Within “Singapore Inc.”, an extensive study of the major governing and political groups in Singapore finds evidence that the overall Singapore governing elite or “core executive” is exercising a quasi-Gramscian form of hegemonic power with a sophisticated programme that is largely hidden and perpetuates itself through the consent mechanism of civil society via a variety of controls (Worthington, 2003). This is supported by Deyo (1981) who describes Singapore as a case of “authoritarian corporatism” and Vennevald in his study of the role of technocrats in the Singapore economy in which he concludes that

“highly motivated, economically trained professionals and not rent-seeking groups or an indigenous bourgeoisie conquered the heights of political power. Through their access to and command of political resources they changed the socio-economic structure of the country.” (Vennevald, 1994) (p. 16).

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Reasons for this Study

It would have been easy to just take one side in the discussion but central to this debate is the question of how Singapore’s NIS can be such an outstanding success in terms of growing the science and technology base of the country, yet remaining relatively lacking in terms of success in developing its own indigenous technopreneurs. This paradox is at the heart of the tensions and struggles in Singapore’s NIS especially between technocrats and technopreneurs since the first major recession to hit post-independence Singapore in 1986.

The research objectives of this study follows Alvesson & Willmott’s (1992) critical theory agenda in that there is value in studying tensions between key groups in the inter-organisational space. The inability to reconcile the different aspects of the paradox in the NIS is manifested in some quite skewed exercises of power. For Lukes (1974), the central interest of studying power relations is "an interest in the (attempted or successful) securing of people's compliance by overcoming or averting their opposition" (p. 31). This is the basis of this study i.e. that there is not only a perception or cognition gap but actually an imbalance in the exercise of power in the Singapore NIS between the technocrats and the technopreneurs.

In studying the process of change within technology venture creation, it is evident that vertical forms of integration based on command and control are being replaced by horizontal forms based on collaboration and cooperation (Jaffee, 2001), and existing circuits of power form a powerful barrier to change (Clegg, 1989). Specifically, the research examines the power-relationships of technopreneurs and technocrats in the context of actual experiences of technopreneurs who were attempting to start and grow their ventures as part of the Singapore NIS.

Methodology

This research method selected was inductive, exploratory and qualitative. The research forms part of a larger study into how technopreneurs deal with problems they face as they try to start and grow their ventures. From the data and observations of that study, there appeared a pattern in which they seemed to be struggling with government agencies and bureaucrats. As these seemed to be quite different from what the official publications and news media were stating, it was then decided to follow up by examining whether there could be an underlying reason behind these struggles.

It has been found that an inductive approach based on a logic of paradoxical thinking or ‘dilemma methodology’ has been effective in eliciting both observable and unobservable interactions between different players with differing cultures and interests (Hampden-Turner, 1990; Hampden-Turner et al., 2000; Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 1997; Quinn & Cameron, 1988; Stone, 1997).

In organisations and in the lives of individuals, each day brings up various problematic situations and choice combinations. Currently, the dilemmas that people face are becoming much more complex and difficult to manage. The Internet, for example, has assisted in the creation of virtual organisations, which lack both physical location and tangible presence. Organisations have become much less mechanical; cause-and-effect linkages harder to foresee; intangible elements in business seem to be even more important than tangibles. In short, everything around us has become much more equivocal, or ambiguous. Given that power-relationships follow the path of both tangible and intangible linkages, this makes the empirical study of power relationships difficult. As noted by Kearins (1996):

“Research on power in organisations has generally been based on simplistic notions of power which appear to render it amenable to empirical investigation, for the most part of a quantitative nature despite the impracticabilities of quantitative solutions to the problem. The

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tendency has been to examine the intentional and overt behaviour of individuals and groups and the effects of power.”

Quantitative empirical research focuses on relationships that are based on equilibrium, linearity, stability, order as opposed to relationships based on disequilibr ium, non-linearity, instability, and disorder. However, one needs to remember that there is no order without disorder, no stability without instability, no change without continuity, no rules without exceptions, no risking without securing the proceeds of those risks, no individuality or personal gain without satisfying a community (Kangaslahti, 2002). Many phenomena come to us in “pairs” of opposing values, or dilemmas, from the Greek meaning “two-propositions” which appear to be seemingly in conflict. The dilemma methodology sees both “propositions” as equally important and positive and is therefore appropriate to examine both observable and hidden exercises of power.

Given that Lukes’ (1974) view focuses on latent conflict - inaction rather than observable action and both conscious and unconscious exercises of power, the dilemma methodology is particularly effective. This is because the dilemma methodology is able to interpret metaphors, symbols, slogans, visions, figures of speech, as well as problems and difficulties faced by the informants and as such highlighting issues which involve ambiguities, tensions and conflicting views (Hampden-Turner, 1990; Hampden-Turner et al., 2000). These are often more indicative of the real values and experiences that the actors face as opposed to what can be expressed in questionnaires. For example, in examining entrepreneurship as a social phenomenon rather than as a purely economic one, the dilemma methodology has been effectively applied to map out six high-level policy dilemmas that Singapore had to overcome in order to make the transition to an innovation-based, entrepreneurial society (Hampden-Turner & Tan, 2002).

We also used the process of theoretical sampling as proposed by Glaser & Strauss (1967) to gather the data involved in this study. According to this process, the researcher may jointly collect, code and analyse data while at the same time deciding where to find the data and which data to collect next. As the research objective was exploratory in nature and aimed to examine the underlying power relationships among technopreneurs and technocrats, the field work consisted of in-depth interviews of technopreneurs, technocrats and other members in the NIS (e.g. venture capitalists and entrepreneurship educators). In total, 41 technopreneurs, 8 technocrats and 9 other members of the NIS were interviewed from late 2002 to early 2005. Getting honest feedback was a challenge but when given the option not to record the interviews with a guarantee of anonymity, the ‘culture of fear’ was quickly overcome and many technopreneurs gave insightful and interesting responses. However, this approach was less accepted among the technocrats who were sceptical and therefore remained more reserved and gave quite standard responses to questions.

In addition, desk research was conducted consisting of documentary analysis of corporate materials, including annual reports, prospectus for listing, newspaper articles from Singapore newspapers and other business publications, as secondary instruments.

Research Findings

As predicted by Lee & Wong (2004), the perceptions among the two main groups of actors were very different. Although the discourse in the media and among politicians was highly positive in terms of supporting technopreneurs and new ventures in the knowledge-based sector, many of the experiences that the technopreneurs underwent exhibited continuing controls on innovation and creativity that the existing establishment wanted to retain despite the calls for changes and transformation. The resulting tensions between the technocrats and the technopreneurs can be traced to three paradoxical effects: the Meritocratic effect, the MNC-GLC effect, and the Process Engineering effect.

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1. The Meritocratic Effect.

The prevailing view is that meritocracy was a crucial component in the building of modern Singapore (Lee, 2000). Its pervasiveness has even become enshrined in the Singapore Public Service’s governance fundamentals (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1998) and academic merit has been seen as the principal performance-based measure in the public service (Hamilton-Hart, 2000). Many of the technocrats are scholars that are the products of an inherited British Civil Service system that offers employment to selected, intelligent young people, whose educational performance is used to anticipate and substantially assure how high they will rise. In 1979, the then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew stated that it was desirable that at least a third of the country’s “best brains” be retained in the public sector (Seah, 1987).

A meritocracy requires an unambiguous definition of merit. The goal posts should not be moved in the course of the game, nor should the rules be changed. In a genuine meritocracy, and Singapore may be the world’s foremost exponent, people compete on “a level playing field” to reach the premier leagues. Instead of favouring one race or one gender, merit cuts through all prejudice and partiality.

However, a system built primarily on academic merit has negative effects on entrepreneurship. Belbin’s research on high-performing and creative teams has found that teams which do not have a diversity of members who can play different roles will not perform (Belbin, 1996). The team should have various roles ranging from a Plant who comes out with new ideas, a Shaper who makes the ideas happen, to a Monitor/Evaluator to kill off ruinously expensive ideas. Teams formed around academic merit consist mainly of Super-intelligent Monitor/Evaluators who cut each other down with intellectual scalpels and stomp on new ideas.

Therefore on the one hand, the success of the Singapore economy has largely been attributed to a highly impartial and structured system of merit based on educational assessment that focuses on conformity, control and ‘answers’, while on the other hand, there is a need for more diversity, more play and a focus on ‘questions’ in a more entrepreneurial economy (Hampden-Turner et al., 2002). The dilemma can therefore be depicted as such:

A system based on academic ‘merit’ that focuses on answers

A system based on diversity and play that focuses on ‘questions’

The use of the ‘rope’ follows Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner (2001) and has been used to represent the opposite poles of a dilemma with each end depicting contrasting characteristics that are in constant tension. The ‘rope is frequently stretched between rival factions, in this case, between technocrats and technopreneurs, as in a tug-of-war, each believing that to do better, it needs to pull harder towards its own end. If the interests are well-balanced or reconciled, the net result is a form of creative tension. However, if the ‘rope’ snaps, then the system will descend into a vicious spiral.

Despite the increased recognition of those who did not make academically or were not interested in their studies but who have “made it” as entrepreneurs, there is still a bias towards the technocrats and those technopreneurs who have made it through the government scholarship system. The net effect has been to create a “government-industrial bureaucratic network” with power positions given to a “new bureaucratic elite” (Chen, 1978) or technocratic elite that have been selected because they have been seen to have a sufficient national, transnational and scientific knowledge useful for Singapore’s development model that is driven by MNCs (Heyser, 1983). The focus on meritocracy has paradoxically created negative bureaucratic power-relationship features in the NIS (Adler, 1999) and has also crowded out the space for technopreneurs. For example, when the former Prime Minister and then Senior Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, recognised this negative effect of meritocracy in a speech made to a

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forum of humanities scholars in Beijing in April 2004, the news media in Singapore could not quite agree with him. The following was the editorial comment in the Business Times, Singapore’s main financial and business newspaper, in response to his remarks:

“Particularly in the Singapore context, it is far from evident that the people who clinch government scholarships - those who ace exams, garner a string of S-Paper distinctions, and basically succeed top of the crop in a highly structured, strait-laced academic system - typically become 'inventors, innovators, venture capitalists' and, perhaps least of all, entrepreneurs. They have mostly proven to be competent policy makers, bureaucrats and administrators - and Singapore has been the better for it.” (Editor of Business Times, 18 June 2004)

Perhaps this view reflected the reality that many of the top positions in the Singapore media organisations are occupied by former government scholars (Worthington, 2003). Therefore they could have feared if they admitted that the Senior Minister was right, this would have eroded their status or prestige and may have even resulted in reprimand from their peers or even worse, threaten their raison d’être for holding those senior positions. But these views were also supported in our interviews with technopreneurs. A typical response is seen below:

“All our people are involved in the rush for scholarships, for a stable job in the bank, the GLCs. When you have somebody our age coming back and earning S$400,000 a year, he sets a very good example for the rest to follow. Even the Senior Minister has said that the system has drawn out all the talent from the private sector and that there is not much else to work with. If your best brains are focussed on getting that government job, he is not going to get down and say let’s start a business.”

However, this feedback only reflects on the first and second dimensional exercise of power. In a few of the interviews, we had hints of more unobservable forms of the exercise of power whereby power is transformed through a set of tacit ‘social rules’ which are acknowledged, acted on and reproduced by groups and individuals. As Cotton (1996) observes, an independent entrepreneurial class is absent in Singapore from which demands might arise which would undermine the government and that it is arguable that this absence, like the policy of meritocracy is designed. A unique insight is provided by an informant who failed to obtain a government scholarship and therefore became an entrepreneur:

“Q: How is the fact that you were not awarded a scholarship affect your decisions later on in life? Do you have any opinions on the system?

A: … We were supposed to be trained to go to overseas universities. Very early on in the scheme, I was told that I had only a slim chance of going overseas because I could not make it as an officer during my National Service days because I was overweight ... This shaped a lot of what I was further to do. I was with the best of the cohort. My academic results were good then. These people came back to good positions in the civil service. I had to work out my own path. I was naturally inclined to selling at that time and I thought it was a good way to make money. But there were very limited choices. I was not prepared to apply for a job and start at a very low rank in some organisation and see my classmates come back with high ranks in the army at ten times the salary I was getting.

Q: So you feared your classmates?

A: (Laughter) I think it is natural. They are your equals. You sit in class with them. You either are going to be a scholar or bust. You are guaranteed to be beneath them if you take a humble job as a sales clerk whereas as an entrepreneur, you still have chance of making money.”

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In this case, the technopreneur’s fear reflected a unobservable exercise of power that did not stem from institutional coercion but a more subtle social forces whereby in order to ‘save face’, people who failed to meet the cut would start their own ventures to prove their own merit again.

The bias towards the technocrats is exacerbated by former scholars who retire or leave the government. Some of these set up their own ventures that often end up selling goods and services back to the government:

“I was from the system so I know that the top people have many headaches. Not many people know exactly what the nature of the headaches are as some of this are very subtle. As such, they don’t know what medicine to prescribe. I know and I just approach them to say, ‘Don’t worry. I have the appropriate Panadol or painkiller for your headaches.”

With Singapore’s chosen economic role in the past thirty years to refine and implement foreign-developed high technology, the need for intelligence and to be a paragon of civil society, meritocracy has therefore played an important role. Besides inheriting the British Civil Service system, the meritocratic effect is reinforced by the high-standing of ‘Imperial Scholars’ in a Confucian society and is exacerbated by an attitude of optimisation of talent in a resource poor environment. This creates a perception that it is in the interests of society that those blessed with ability should use it for the benefit of all. Unfortunately, the high attrition rate of educationally weaker students has resulted in a relatively low educational attainment for the population and has created a structural weakness that impedes the transition to a "knowledge-based economy". For example, in 2001, the average years of schooling was only 8.7, albeit a substantial gain over the average of 5.7 years in 1985 (Evans et al., 2003).

More seriously, this progressive vision has crowded-out entrepreneurship and intellectual capital epitomised as innovativeness and creativity, not merely a well-trained, educated and productive workforce. One characteristic of entrepreneurs is that they redefine what merit or excellence means and pose new questions to their environments. As noted by Hampden-Turner & Tan (2002):

“If Singapore wishes to take its place in the forefront of enterprise innovation then it must create new contexts and define its own novel directions. The case for equality lies not in the claim that people are equal at test-taking. They are not. It lies in having the widest discussion among people of diverse abilities as to what constitutes merit in continuously changing circumstances.” (p. 87) (emphasis in original)

Gardner (1983) has located eight varieties of intelligence, yet in the Singapore system, typically only one is measured. If the technocrats are really serious about learning and technopreneurship, they will need to challenge their measures and even discard some of them, especially when they underestimate the full extent of human endowments and mark down the creativity of learners.

2. The MNC-GLC Effect.

Studies have shown that MNCs and large nationally-oriented companies have a significant impact on NISs (Archibugi, Howells, & Michie, 1999; Lundvall, 1992; Sigurdson, 1990). Singapore’s NIS has until recently focussed on developing technologies that support MNCs that base their manufacturing in Singapore or GLCs that provide the bulk of services to the local economy and are supposed to spearhead the regionalisation and globalisation drive (Mirza, 1986). As Lim (2002a) notes, local enterprise development was

“regarded as ‘less interesting’ in EDB compared with the more glamorous job of wooing foreign MNCs” (p. 222) and “the foreign investments brought in by EDB were the single most important factor in stimulating the growth of our supporting industries and local enterprise.” (p. 224)

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Again, while supporting the MNCs has been successful in allowing Singapore to catch-up quickly in terms of economics, scientific knowledge and technology (Goh, 1972), this has paradoxically resulted in Singapore being unable to develop core competencies in growing its own inventions and discoveries.

This view is supported by technopreneurs. As one of them commented:

“We were blessed because the government was very rational. They had the common sense to harness all the networks and to harness all the profits that were being made to build an equitable system, something open and they took advantage of the revenues that these MNCs were bringing in. That was another strategy for bringing MNCs into Singapore. They had the revenue and a lot of common sense to use it properly to build the infrastructure for the business to thrive. But it has come to the stage today that the other economies, e.g. Malaysia, are learning the same things and are doing it at lower cost. Our costs have run ahead of us so we are losing out.”

Therefore on the one hand, the success of the Singapore economy in the past has largely benefited from MNCs being wooed into Singapore by the EDB and by the government encouraging the development of GLCs. While on the other hand, there is a keen admission that if Singapore is to take the next step in economic development, the nations core competencies must grow out of its own inventions and discoveries. As noted by the current chairman of the EDB and co-chairman of the Agency for Science, Technology and Research (A*STAR),

“With knowledge creation exploding and its exploitation accelerating around the world, we cannot rely only on borrowing technology and ideas and translating then into products or services, even if we were to do so with great efficiency. No longer can we be just a production site for multinational corporations. We need to have the conditions for all locally based companies to keep pace with accelerating development of disruptive technologies or breakthroughs that can make their products or services obsolete. To continue to be relevant to the world, we will have to be able to generate new knowledge and innovation of our own and commercialise them effectively. Only then will investors and entrepreneurs find value in locating here, to exploit the new-found knowledge and innovation to enhance their competitive edge.” (Teo, 2002)(p. 305-306)

The dilemma can therefore be depicted as such:

Wooing MNCs and sponsoring GLCs

Empowering Technopreneurs

However, despite the recent large investments given to promote indigenous technology enterprise, some of the technopreneurs relate experiences in which they have been discriminated against in favour of a MNC. A typical experience is:

“With the Singapore government, there is no such thing as a free lunch. But very often, they do not know what is on the menu and when they see the menu, they don’t understand it. We could explain it to them and convince them to buy our products but they saw us as a start-up and would not listen to us. However, they would listen to the big players. If you were an established multinational technology player, you could get the government’s ears. In fact, they already had the government’s ears when they were attracted to invest in Singapore.”

The irony is that, unlike the government agencies, many of the MNCs were willing to work with or invest in the start-ups as they could recognise the potential. As such, some of the more ambitious ones actively court MNCs and by teaming up with MNCs that were comfortable with working with small innovative start-ups, they were able to secure government contracts. The net synthesis was that as a result of the innovative technology developed and the

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recommendation and selling of the technology by the large multinational to the Singapore Government, some of the technopreneurs were able to re-kindle interest of sceptical bureaucrats in their offerings:

“We had wanted to use the MNC link to smell for government projects … If we could get them to recognise us and perhaps recommend us, then maybe the government agencies would see us differently … In this case, it worked.”

The technopreneurs’ experiences indicate that the technocrats were using MNCs as filters or evaluators of technology. This was in line with the Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SME) Master Plan (Economic Development Board, 1989) developed after the mid-1980s recession to attract MNCs back to Singapore through local industry upgrading so as to be able to meet the growing outsourcing needs of MNCs (Chew & Goh, 1996). As a former technocrat commented:

“We viewed local companies as primarily key suppliers and supporting companies to the MNCs. We introduced a Local Industry Upgrading Programme (LIUP) to link the SMEs to the MNCs and to capitalise on the trends towards outsourcing, downsizing and decentralisation…This was an excellent instance of how a strategic fit was achieved by aligning the aspirations of Singapore and the companies.” (Tan, 2002) (p. 194)

The skewing of the power balance away from technopreneurs was further compounded by the perceived and actual barriers set up by the government especially in the form of GLCs. Following the recession of the mid-1980s, many state enterprises were set up in various industries. These commercial enterprises owned and managed by the Government via statutory boards came about as a result of an unwillingness on the part of the Government to be over-reliant on MNCs in an economy characterised by a relatively less developed private domestic sector (Singapore Government, 1985). According to Rodan (1989; Rodan, 1993) this policy of entrenching the dominance of the MNCs in partnership with the GLCs allowed an “ethnic bypass” of Chinese capital and business that had supported the communist and anti-PAP movements in the 1950s and 1960s. Hence, the government assumed an entrepreneurial role in the restructuring and diversification of the economy. As the then Minister for Trade and Industry stated:

“In my view, such intervention was necessary in order to build up our economic base. If the Government had not taken up the initiative in areas where the private sector was hesitant, especially in the earlier years when the political climate was unsettled, our economic framework today would be a far cry from the strong and resilient structure which has enabled us to weather many economic storms.” (Singapore Government, 1985)

However, the effect of the GLCs has been to reduce the room for technopreneurs to commercialise their ideas even further. According to the Department of Statistics, GLCs contributed 12.8% of Singapore’s GDP in 1998 (Low, 2001). However, this data only includes companies which have more than 20% government ownership. Data from the US Embassy in Singapore puts that figure much higher i.e. by 1997, GLCs and their subsidiaries “account for 60 percent of GDP” (US Embassy Economic and Political Section Singapore, 2000). In particular, this has given rise to the Temasek-Linked Companies (TLC) phenomenon with “hundreds” of companies with direct and indirect ties with Temasek Holdings, the Singapore government’s investment holding company, “having ventured into almost every sector of the economy” so much so that “its critics complain that it has probably crowded out many worthwhile private sector initiatives.” (Sue Leng, 2003) (p.13) As one technopreneur mentioned, the resources and strategies adopted by the GLCs make it extremely hard to conduct business in Singapore:

“GLCs are one problem that we face constantly. We are small businessmen with limited resources but we are up against these companies. Take GLC-X for example, they have almost unlimited access to funds. If they want to take you over, they will take you over. It is

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very difficult to compete against these mammoth giants in a small market where they set the rules … For example, GLC-X, in the past year or so, they have entered the school bus market. In the past, private bus drivers picked up students from place to place. It was a lucrative industry and people had been making money. When GLC-X came in, they went to all these schools and factories and said that they will give them 20% less. 20% less means they are charging cost i.e. they are not making money. They just want to take that contract for that year. So when everyone else goes out of business, GLC-X comes around and says, “Let’s buy your buses. We will buy your buses to do this business that you were originally doing. If you want to drive for us, we will pay you $800.” It’s ridiculous but that is what they do.”

It appears therefore that, unlike the conventional picture that GLCs were “blazing the high-technology and globalisation trails” (Low, 2001) (p. 420), the GLCs may be engaging in low-level low technology interventions. School buses are hardly knowledge-intensive and GLCs should be really sticking to higher-level, higher-technology interventions. Cynically, one could argue that by taking over the commoditised markets, the GLCs could drive more Singaporeans to start up ventures in the more knowledge-intensive sectors.

Like their experience of leveraging on MNCs, technopreneurs often had little choice but to collaborate with the GLCs to gain market access and visibility given the close relationship that the GLCs have with the bureaucracy (Worthington, 2003). This relationship has been tightened with other means. For example, some of the GLCs have venture funds which invest in local technology start-ups. This is on top of other equity investments from various government-controlled or government-linked venture capital funds. This became extremely important following the bursting of the technology bubble in 2000 when many of the technology start-ups could only survive by selling to the government. One technopreneur recounts:

“We had this innovative technology and a government-linked venture capital fund invested in us. They had also invested in another company in the same technology area. So when the bubble burst and the potential market evaporated, we were told by the investors to merge … we had secured a big government contract while the other company had not but in order to avoid closing any company down, the merger was the way forward. It did not matter that the synergy was not there or that it did not make economic sense. The merger saved some jobs initially but in the long run, it started a chain of events that saw me and my group of founders leaving the company.”

While a non-government venture capitalist might have done likewise, the negative reactions to more firm closures and job losses could have brought out more technocratic type of decision-making as opposed to merely portfolio management and optimisation as practised by traditional venture capitalists.

While having MNC operations in Singapore has been extremely beneficial in the past, especially in terms of complementing and balancing other players, informing the Singapore culture while being informed by it (Hampden-Turner et al., 1997), the main players that have profited in the long run have been the GLCs. The MNCs do not feel threatened and are in fact happy to have GLCs as “reliable and consistent corporate partners” (Low, 2001) (p. 419). As Chan (1975) notes, the "Government of Singapore (has become) the most important entrepreneur in the Singapore economy." (p. 61) but without the characteristics of the entrepreneur. The balance of power from the MNCs and GLCs need to be tilted back to the entrepreneurs if entrepreneurship is to take off in Singapore.

3. The Process Engineering Effect.

Many high-technology MNCs are located in Singapore and the government has a well defined policy of producing well-trained workers and managers for these MNCs. Most Singaporean managers are process engineers instead of research engineers and the top ones

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are recruited into the government to manage technology policy. Hampden-Turner & Tan (2002) find evidence that Singaporeans have a strong preference for the hard sciences with highly structured content as opposed to soft skills with preferences for dynamic restructuring. While this has meant that they have been quick to adapt and borrow on the best ideas from the West and execute the technology policy with great efficiency, this has also meant that they have been infused with a culture characterised by high power-distance and high uncertainty avoidance (Hampden-Turner, 2003; Hofstede, 1980). High power-distance is indicative of a high level of inequality of power and wealth within the society. This condition is not necessarily forced upon the population, but rather accepted by the society as part of its cultural heritage or social development. High uncertainty avoidance indicates society’s low level of tolerance for uncertainty. Together, these produce effects that may not be favourable to entrepreneurship. The dilemma can therefore be depicted as such:

Process Engineering skills within highly structured environments

Soft skills within complex, dynamic environments

In some ways, this is reflective of the “asymmetric motivation” within members of large established firms identified by Christensen (1997) and Christensen & Raynor (2003) whereby there is a strong preference for sustaining innovation with its established processes, customers and competitors as opposed to disruptive innovation that have new “trajectories”, customers and competitors. The creates a “problem-driven approach to policy” (Hamilton-Hart, 2000) (p. 205) executed by mainly engineers or those trained in the hard-sciences with a focus on “strategic pragmatism” (Schein, 1996) and with little or no motivation to explore, support or defend the new markets that technopreneurs find attractive, especially if they are also so-called ‘low-end’ markets.

Combined with a preference for abstract thoughts as opposed to ‘getting their hands dirty’ with concrete operations, this sees technocrats who are unable to understand the science and technology especially in between traditional disciplines and are unwilling to step outside their silo-based processes to sponsor projects that are potentially detrimental to their careers, thereby effectively marginalising technopreneurs. The net result is that technopreneurs are often supported or taken notice of based on the ‘fashionable’ technology of the moment. As one technopreneur notes:

“the government certainly have fads and fashions that come and go. At times, IT is the fashion, or communications and cell phones are the fashion, and biotech is the fashion. And certainly even in the heyday, even in the dot-com era, while there was intent to help, it does not come through for two reasons. Firstly, the staff officers who are invested with the authority to go out and do this are too careful because their jobs are on the line or they perceive that their jobs are on the line. So they are not prepared to take the risk. They are not entrepreneurial at all. The second is that to operate at the real high-tech level, there isn’t that corresponding understanding so the government will support fashionable things.”

When they do offer to help, the technocrats’ process engineering culture brings on a ’minimise waste’ and ‘maximise efficiency’ culture. For example, in August 2000, a Pro-Enterprise Panel, or PEP, was established and headed by the civil service head to act on feedback by the public and businesses on how to make government regulations more pro-enterprise. Subsequently, another two committees, the Rules Review Process and the Rules “Action Crucible” of the Action Community for Entrepreneurship (ACE) were established to review internal Civil Service rules and general business regulations to make them more business-friendly.

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The focus on rules fits right into a process engineering culture. In line with Belbin’s team roles, this behaviour relates to technocrats as a class of Monitor/Evaluators of imported innovations with the Plants and Shapers being inventors located elsewhere like in the Silicon Valley. Tremewan (1994) has argued that rules and regulations are an important way in which bureaucrats impose “social control” over “an unsuspecting population” (p. 228). It is therefore ironic that in the Business Times on 20 September 2003, its cover page had its main article covering the pro-business efforts (Wong, 2003), while its main opinion article, also on the cover page, was entitled: “To fix Singapore economy, government must step aside” (Bhaskaran, 2003). In line with Adler (1997), it appears that technocrats are trying to “create the underlying rules of the game, to define what constitutes acceptable play, and to get other players to commit themselves to those rules, because these rules are now part of the self-understanding of the players.” (p. 261). In particular, Tan (2003) finds evidence that technocrats have developed rules and policies that focuses mainly on growing firms that have potential. The net result is that technopreneurs “are under the impression that the government is only picking winners.” (p. 14).

This practice of “picking winners” has also seeped into the general society. Since 2000, the fastest growth area in terms of management education has been in the entrepreneurship, new venture creation and small business management courses (Lee, 2003a). Even in general management programmes, there is avid interest in how to become an entrepreneur. As one management educator commented:

“It is amazing. Our students keep asking us, ‘How do we become entrepreneurs?’ We get asked this question all the time even when we don’t teach entrepreneurship. They seem to be looking for some structured, textbook answer.”

Creativity and innovation, which are important factors in technology entrepreneurship, in contrast, require some disorder, some slack, some ferment and some casting around before the best solution is discovered (Florida, 2002). Unfortunately the world’s turbulent markets with windows of opportunity opening up very briefly are not orderly at all and call for swift, unplannable responses by innovative persons. They also require the lightning fast restructuring of resources and the soft skills necessary to persuading customers, colleagues, providers of capital and key resource persons to commit themselves with a high-risk strategy and share their destinies. Toffler (1990) has argued that most innovative breakthroughs occur between disciplines rather than at the cutting edge of established disciplines . This combination supports technology development in highly structured environments and frustrates entrepreneurs developing new products and new combinations of ideas especially at the overlap of disciplines which is potentially the richest area for commercially viable technology breakthroughs.

The Way Forward?

The study has presented findings in which the power relationships in the Singapore NIS have been tilted towards the technocrats. Should we just stop at that? Following Huff & Huff’s (2001) recommendation, management scholars should go beyond Mode 2 knowledge production and incorporate “appreciation” and “critique” in what they term as Mode 3 knowledge production. Until now, the paper has “critiqued” the uneven power relationship in Singapore’s NIS. As such, it is also necessary to conduct an “appreciation” to see if there are any ongoing developments to correct the power imbalance.

There is a temptation to look at the power paradoxes as zero-sum games or finite games. This linear or adversarial logic will see one group’s losses cancelling out the other group’s gains. However, as opposed to this ‘either-or’ logic, there is a ‘through-through’ logic that can be applied to paradoxes (Trompenaars & Woolliams, 2003). So while an ‘either-or’ view of paradoxes sees losers being eliminated at each round of a game in a zero-sum fashion, in a ‘through-through’ practice, one continuously improves the game by, for example, drawing intelligent conclusions from the winners and losers of successive rounds. The losers are invited

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back to be taught better moves and lessons from winner-takes-all episodes is widely recognised and disseminated. The longer term includes many short term games whose outcomes inform all the players. In other words, there can be an infinite game which consists of many finite games connected to each other (Hampden-Turner et al., 1997). The logic of infinite games can be applied to appreciate power relationships that may not be zero-sum. As Bertrand Russell (1975) noted:

“Power, like energy, must be regarded as continually passing from any one of its forms into any other, and it should be the business of social science to seek the laws of such transformations. The attempt to isolate any one form of power, more especially, in our day, the economic form, has been, and still is, a source of errors of great practical importance.”

The dilemma methodology is also able to act as a lens to “appreciate” these changes in complex environments. The dilemma methodology does not argue that individuals and organisations face standard dilemmas; nor does it offer standard solutions. In contrast the dilemma methodology views the world through underlying polarities, or opposing values: competition versus co-operation, differentiating versus integrating, order versus chaos, and dependence versus independence, to name a few. But beyond that, the dilemma methodology includes in itself a logic of dilemma resolution in which both one value and its opposite are integrated, or reconciled, to create synergy. With the above in mind, balancing and reconciling opposing values and/or propositions becomes crucial. In that light, there are four observations that show that there may be moves towards some form of reconciliation in terms of power paradoxes in the Singapore NIS.

Firstly, that the meritocratic effect exists does not mean that it will continue to dominate. To their credit, some of the technocratic group members have recognised the need to integrate the values of having more divers ity, play and questions. While the media were not too positive about the Senior Minister’s suggestion that public sector should release up to half its scholars to the private sector after six or seven years - for them to become entrepreneurs, a few of the technopreneurs that were interviewed admitted that some of the government agencies had become more flexible and that they had their government bonds “suspended” so that they could pursue their entrepreneurial interests.

Secondly, there have been calls for and hints that the government is looking into implementing a system similar to the US’ Small Business Innovation Research Programme (SBIR) (Hancock & Fitzsimons, 2005; Tan, 2003). Under the SBIR, all major Federal Government agencies are required to put aside a percentage of their extramural R&D budgets to fund R&D contracts undertaken in small US businesses. Initially set at 1.25%, the percentage has since been increased to 2.5% and it is estimated that US funding for small businesses through this route is around US$1.8 billion a year (Branscomb & Auerswald, 2002). While 2.5% of R&D contracts may be small, a similar scheme would tilt the power slightly back towards the technopreneurs. This will reinforce initiatives to increase the distance between GLCs and government leadership which is being driven by the need for greater market transparency (Loo, 2002).

Thirdly, the technocrats’ fixation on rules may be changing. For example, in 2002, the first Singapore-based biotech company, Rockeby Biomed, had its application for listing on the secondary Stock Exchange of Singapore Dealing and Automated Quotation or SESDAQ market rejected because it “did not meet the requirement to be commercially viable within a reasonable timeframe” (Lee, 2003b). This was likely due to technocrats within the Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX) responding to criticism from retail stock market investors who had been badly hit by the bursting of the technology bubble. However, after Rockeby managed to secure listing on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) in December 2003, the Singapore media was highly critical of the interpretation of the rules which ironically had been further tightened:

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“SGX’s rejection of Rockeby’s application raised questions about whether it was being too cautious, especially when it comes to biotechnology start-ups, which usually take years to turn profitable. The high thresholds set by the regulators could even hamper Singapore’s efforts to develop as a hub for the life sciences. There is a bit of disconnect here.” (Lim, 2003)

In response to the critics, while not admitting it was wrong, the SGX was forced to concede that it may make revisions to the listing manual to better accommodate biotechnology start-ups:

“The biotech industry is a relatively nascent one and the challenges of achieving commercialisation are greater. Given the increasing interest and the positive developments in the sector, SGX is now considering how it can better serve the fund raising requirements of the biotech sector and the needs of the investing community.” (Source: SGX statement dated 23 Dec 2004 and quoted in (Lim, 2003))

As the then head of the Entrepreneurship and Internationalisation sub-committee (EISC) of the Economic Review Committee who was also the Minister of State, Foreign Affairs and Trade & Industry admitted:

“If everything must have its place and nothing left to chance, then there is going to be very little out of the box thinking that is needed in an innovation-driven economy. If we wipe off every speck of dust in the economy, we may well be getting rid of stardust as well … (we) recommended a paradigm shift in the way the Government regulates business to that of a negative list approach. In effect, it is ‘Yes’ unless the Government says ‘No’ rather than ‘No’ unless the Governments says, ‘Yes’. If we want Singaporeans to reach for new frontiers, to establish leadership in unknown, future markets, then regulating them by what is know is not the way to go.” (Lim, 2002b) (p. 3)

This ‘paradigm shift’ in the regulatory approach points towards a fourth observation, which is a more general one, but perhaps the most significant one, in that at least some senior technocrats have become aware of the negative effects that the power imbalance is having on entrepreneurship. They have also recognised the traditionally paternalistic relationship means that the change initiatives have to start from them first. Hence, as Minister of State Raymond Lim notes, there are moves to

“roll back the involvement of the Government in the everyday lives of Singaporeans so that they have more space to make their own decisions (with the net effect that) state-citizen relationships will evolve and the Government will adjust, people will adjust.” (Quoted in Kan (2003) p. 1)

Trompenaars et al. (2004a) note that reconciling differences between two groups is best undertaken when the synthesis is initiated by both parties. Hence while there have been positive observations for the technocrats, this has been relatively lacking on the part of the technopreneurs. For instance, technopreneurs have started initiatives like SME First Stop and the Entrepreneurship OAR Programme but the evidence that these originated from the technopreneurs themselves is unclear as most of these initiatives are funded or sponsored by government agencies (Singapore Government Press Release, 2003). It appears that the technocrats are still setting the agenda and pace as they have done so in the past (Low, 2001). Also, as the technopreneur community is small with little critical mass, these initiatives have been diluted by widening their appeal to the larger entrepreneurial community, which has also seen its power weakened significantly in the last 30 years (Rodan, 1989). In following Foucault (1979), in so far as the technopreneurs accept the meanings of such terms as “an administrative state”, “building a broad elite” and “meritocratic leadership”, the power-balance will remain on the side of the technocrats. Only when these meanings, whether specific or notional, are questioned and challenged, can the power relationship be re-balanced

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significantly. In order for the new synthesis in the power relationship to result in a win-win situation, the technopreneurs need to take heed of Lim’s (1984) warning,

“If an enterprising people whose entrepreneurial activities have been restricted by Government intervention, the removal of Government intervention logically would stimulate the growth or revitalisation of enterprise … However, if the people concerned have no enterprise or have lost their enterprise, the removal of Government restrictions per se can do very little or stimulate the enterprising spirit, particularly in the short run.” (p. 74)

Conclusion

This paper has studied the power relationship between the technopreneurs and the technocrats within the Singapore NIS. Using Lukes’ (1974) three-dimensional concept of power, it has attempted to argue that there is not only a perception gap between the technopreneurs and technocrats but that there is an underlying imbalance between the two groups of actors with the power relationship largely tilted towards the technocrats and away from the technopreneurs. Using the dilemma methodology as an interpretive lens in which to analyse the relationships between the technocrats and technopreneurs, the study found evidence of three major patterns of power paradoxes namely, the meritocratic effect, the MNC-GLC effect, and the process-engineering effect. All of these power-relationships tended to tilt the balance of power towards the technocrats and unless ‘rebalanced’, technopreneurs will continue to find the odds against them.

However, this paper concludes with observations that certain moves within the NIS are currently taking place to address this, resulting in a more balanced or synthesised power-relationship that will offer some pathways out of this potentially destructive situation and that this should reduce tensions and encourage the development of indigenous entrepreneurship in Singapore. Looking back at Exhibit 1, the ‘tripartism’ that has formed the ‘Third Way’ for Singapore shows a balanced relationship between the three major groups. The aim for the NIS should also be to have as balanced a relationship as possible. The ‘Third Way’ in the NIS may be that the technocrats do not take on the roles that the markets play but adopt roles that are appropriate for cultures of high power-distance. For example, just like they do for the MNCs, technocrats can offer technology support and infrastructure renewal to the technopreneurs and then let the technopreneurs get on and innovate independently. A clue that this shift may be happening is given in the advice from Mentor Minister Lee Kuan Yew to entrepreneurs where there is no mention of technocrats:

“Suppose you make a new product, spring rolls or murtabak. You try and franchise something, then somebody will tell PepsiCo, it will come and offer you $100 million or $200 million. You sell out, start another one. From prata you go on to something else, then sell it for $500 million. You can buy a house in New Zealand, California, Shanghai, wherever you like, and your base is in Singapore.” (Quoted in Koh (2005))

A final word of caution is that these initiatives will change and may not be easily implemented. As mentioned earlier, if the ‘rope’ in the dilemma snaps, the situation will rapidly descend into a highly vicious circle with negative effects. For example, if the moves towards more flexible SGX listing rules fail, it could again lead to more risk aversion and less access to local financial markets for technology start-ups. As history suggests, when the process of change accelerates, this will see shifts in power that may cause the existing holders of power to try their best to hold onto their power base.

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