350 BC POLITICS by Aristotle Translated by Benjamin Jowett BOOK

8/14/2019 350 BC POLITICS by Aristotle Translated by Benjamin Jowett BOOK

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350 BC POLITICSby Aristotle Translated by Benjamin JowettBOOK ONE I EVERY STATE is a community of somekind, and every community isestablished with a view to some good; for mankindalways act inorder to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communitiesaim at some good, the state or political community, which is thehighest of all,and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in agreater degree than any other,and at the highest good. Some people think that the qualifications of a

statesman, king,householder, and master are the same, and that they differ, not inkind, but only in the number of their subjects. For example, the rulerover a fewis called a master; over more, the manager of ahousehold; over a still largernumber, a statesman or king, as ifthere were no difference between a greathousehold and a smallstate. The distinction which is made between the king and thestatesman is as follows: When the government is personal, the ruler isa king;when, according to the rules of the political science, thecitizens rule and areruled in turn, then he is called a statesman. But all this is a mistake; forgovernments differ in kind, as willbe evident to any one who considers the matteraccording to the methodwhich has hitherto guided us. As in other departments ofscience, soin politics, the compound should always be resolved into the simpleelements or least parts of the whole. We must therefore look at theelements ofwhich the state is composed, in order that we may see inwhat the different kinds

of rule differ from one another, andwhether any scientific result can be attainedabout each one of them. II He who thusconsiders things in their first growth and origin,whether a state or anythingelse, will obtain the clearest view ofthem. In the first place there must be aunion of those who cannotexist without each other; namely, of male and female,that the racemay continue (and this is a union which is formed, not of deliberatepurpose, but because, in common with other animals and with plants,mankind have anatural desire to leave behind them an image ofthemselves), and of natural rulerand subject, that both may bepreserved. For that which can foresee by the exerciseof mind is bynature intended to be lord and master, and that which can with itsbody give effect to such foresight is a subject, and by nature aslave; hencemaster and slave have the same interest. Now nature hasdistinguished between thefemale and the slave. For she is notniggardly, like the smith who fashions the

Delphian knife for manyuses; she makes each thing for a single use, and everyinstrument isbest made when intended for one and not for many uses. But amongbarbarians no distinction is made between women and slaves, becausethere is nonatural ruler among them: they are a community ofslaves, male and female.Wherefore the poets say, It is meet that Hellenes should rule over barbarians;as if they thought that the barbarian and the slave were by natureone. Out ofthese two relationships between man and woman, master andslave, the first thing toarise is the family, and Hesiod is rightwhen he says, First house and wife andan ox for the plough,for the ox is the poor man's slave. The family is theassociationestablished by nature for the supply of men's everyday wants, andthemembers of it are called by Charondas 'companions of thecupboard,' and byEpimenides the Cretan, 'companions of the manger.'But when several families areunited, and the association aims atsomething more than the supply of daily needs,

the first society to beformed is the village. And the most natural form of thevillageappears to be that of a colony from the family, composed of thechildren andgrandchildren, who are said to be suckled 'with thesame milk.' And this is thereason why Hellenic states were originallygoverned by kings; because the Helleneswere under royal rule beforethey came together, as the barbarians still are. Everyfamily is ruledby the eldest, and therefore in the colonies of the family thekingly form of government prevailed because they were of the sameblood. As Homersays: Each one gives law to his children and to his wives.For they liveddispersedly, as was the manner in ancient times.Wherefore men say that the Godshave a king, because they themselveseither are or were in ancient times under therule of a king. For theyimagine, not only the forms of the Gods, but their ways of


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life tobe like their own. When several villages are united in a single completecommunity,large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comesintoexistence, originating in the bare needs of life, andcontinuing in existence forthe sake of a good life. And therefore, ifthe earlier forms of society arenatural, so is the state, for it isthe end of them, and the nature of a thing isits end. For what eachthing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whetherwe arespeaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final causeand end ofa thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the endand the best. Hence it is

evident that the state is a creation of nature, and thatman is by nature apolitical animal. And he who by nature and not bymere accident is without a state,is either a bad man or abovehumanity; he is like the Tribeless, lawless,hearthless one,whom Homer denounces- the natural outcast is forthwith a lover ofwar;he may be compared to an isolated piece at draughts. Now, that man is more ofa political animal than bees or any othergregarious animals is evident. Nature, aswe often say, makesnothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom she hasendowedwith the gift of speech. And whereas mere voice is but an indicationofpleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals (fortheir nature attainsto the perception of pleasure and pain and theintimation of them to one another,and no further), the power ofspeech is intended to set forth the expedient andinexpedient, andtherefore likewise the just and the unjust. And it is acharacteristicof man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and

unjust, and the like, and the association of living beings who havethis sensemakes a family and a state. Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to thefamily and tothe individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part;forexample, if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot orhand, exceptin an equivocal sense, as we might speak of a stone hand;for when destroyed thehand will be no better than that. But thingsare defined by their working andpower; and we ought not to say thatthey are the same when they no longer havetheir proper quality, butonly that they have the same name. The proof that thestate is acreation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual,when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like apart in relationto the whole. But he who is unable to live insociety, or who has no need becausehe is sufficient for himself, mustbe either a beast or a god: he is no part of astate. A socialinstinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first

founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, whenperfected, is thebest of animals, but, when separated from law andjustice, he is the worst of all;since armed injustice is the moredangerous, and he is equipped at birth with arms,meant to be usedby intelligence and virtue, which he may use for the worst ends.Wherefore, if he have not virtue, he is the most unholy and the mostsavage ofanimals, and the most full of lust and gluttony. But justiceis the bond of men instates, for the administration of justice, whichis the determination of what isjust, is the principle of order inpolitical society.III Seeing then that the state is made up of households, before speakingof thestate we must speak of the management of the household. Theparts of householdmanagement correspond to the persons who composethe household, and a completehousehold consists of slaves andfreemen. Now we should begin by examiningeverything in its fewestpossible elements; and the first and fewest possible parts

of a familyare master and slave, husband and wife, father and children. We havetherefore to consider what each of these three relations is andought to be: I meanthe relation of master and servant, the marriagerelation (the conjunction of manand wife has no name of its own), andthirdly, the procreative relation (this alsohas no proper name).And there is another element of a household, the so-called artofgetting wealth, which, according to some, is identical withhousehold management,according to others, a principal part of it; thenature of this art will also haveto be considered by us. Let us first speak of master and slave, looking to theneeds ofpractical life and also seeking to attain some better theory oftheirrelation than exists at present. For some are of opinion thatthe rule of a masteris a science, and that the management of ahousehold, and the mastership of slaves,


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and the political and royalrule, as I was saying at the outset, are all the same.Others affirmthat the rule of a master over slaves is contrary to nature, andthatthe distinction between slave and freeman exists by law only, andnot by nature;and being an interference with nature is thereforeunjust.IV Property is a part of the household, and the art of acquiringproperty is apart of theart of managing the household; for no mancan live well, or indeed live at all,unless he be provided withnecessaries. And as in the arts which have a definite

sphere theworkers must have their own proper instruments for theaccomplishment oftheir work, so it is in the management of ahousehold. Now instruments are ofvarious sorts; some are living,others lifeless; in the rudder, the pilot of a shiphas a lifeless, inthe look-out man, a living instrument; for in the arts theservantis a kind of instrument. Thus, too, a possession is an instrumentformaintaining life. And so, in the arrangement of the family, aslave is a livingpossession, and property a number of suchinstruments; and the servant is himselfan instrument which takesprecedence of all other instruments. For if everyinstrument couldaccomplish its own work, obeying or anticipating the will ofothers,like the statues of Daedalus, or the tripods of Hephaestus, which,says thepoet, of their own accord entered the assembly of the Gods;if, in like manner,the shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch thelyre without a hand to guidethem, chief workmen would not wantservants, nor masters slaves. Here, however,

another distinctionmust be drawn; the instruments commonly so called areinstruments ofproduction, whilst a possession is an instrument of action. Theshuttle, for example, is not only of use; but something else is madeby it, whereasof a garment or of a bed there is only the use.Further, as production and actionare different in kind, and bothrequire instruments, the instruments which theyemploy must likewisediffer in kind. But life is action and not production, andthereforethe slave is the minister of action. Again, a possession is spokenof as apart is spoken of; for the part is not only a part ofsomething else, but whollybelongs to it; and this is also true of apossession. The master is only the masterof the slave; he does notbelong to him, whereas the slave is not only the slave ofhismaster, but wholly belongs to him. Hence we see what is the nature andoffice ofa slave; he who is by nature not his own but another'sman, is by nature a slave;and he may be said to be another's man who,being a human being, is also a

possession. And a possession may bedefined as an instrument of action, separablefrom the possessor. V But is there any onethus intended by nature to be a slave, andfor whom such a condition is expedientand right, or rather is not allslavery a violation of nature? There is nodifficulty in answering this question, on grounds bothof reason and of fact. Forthat some should rule and others be ruledis a thing not only necessary, butexpedient; from the hour of theirbirth, some are marked out for subjection, othersfor rule. And there are many kinds both of rulers and subjects (and thatrule isthe better which is exercised over better subjects- forexample, to rule over menis better than to rule over wild beasts; forthe work is better which is executedby better workmen, and whereone man rules and another is ruled, they may be saidto have awork); for in all things which form a composite whole and which aremadeup of parts, whether continuous or discrete, a distinctionbetween the ruling and

the subject element comes to fight. Such aduality exists in living creatures, butnot in them only; itoriginates in the constitution of the universe; even in thingswhichhave no life there is a ruling principle, as in a musical mode. But wearewandering from the subject. We will therefore restrict ourselvesto the livingcreature, which, in the first place, consists of souland body: and of these two,the one is by nature the ruler, and theother the subject. But then we must lookfor the intentions ofnature in things which retain their nature, and not in thingswhichare corrupted. And therefore we must study the man who is in themost perfectstate both of body and soul, for in him we shall seethe true relation of the two;although in bad or corrupted natures thebody will often appear to rule over thesoul, because they are in anevil and unnatural condition. At all events we may


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firstly observein living creatures both a despotical and a constitutional rule;forthe soul rules the body with a despotical rule, whereas theintellect rules theappetites with a constitutional and royal rule.And it is clear that the rule ofthe soul over the body, and of themind and the rational element over thepassionate, is natural andexpedient; whereas the equality of the two or the ruleof the inferioris always hurtful. The same holds good of animals in relation tomen; for tame animals have a better nature than wild, and all tameanimals arebetter off when they are ruled by man; for then they arepreserved. Again, the male

is by nature superior, and the femaleinferior; and the one rules, and the other isruled; this principle,of necessity, extends to all mankind. Where then there issuch a difference as that between soul and body,or between men and animals (as inthe case of those whose businessis to use their body, and who can do nothingbetter), the lower sortare by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for allinferiorsthat they should be under the rule of a master. For he who can be, andtherefore is, another's and he who participates in rationalprinciple enough toapprehend, but not to have, such a principle, is aslave by nature. Whereas thelower animals cannot even apprehend aprinciple; they obey their instincts. Andindeed the use made ofslaves and of tame animals is not very different; for bothwiththeir bodies minister to the needs of life. Nature would like todistinguishbetween the bodies of freemen and slaves, making the onestrong for servile labor,the other upright, and although uselessfor such services, useful for political

life in the arts both of warand peace. But the opposite often happens- that somehave the soulsand others have the bodies of freemen. And doubtless if men differedfrom one another in the mere forms of their bodies as much as thestatues of theGods do from men, all would acknowledge that theinferior class should be slaves ofthe superior. And if this is trueof the body, how much more just that a similardistinction shouldexist in the soul? but the beauty of the body is seen, whereasthebeauty of the soul is not seen. It is clear, then, that some men areby naturefree, and others slaves, and that for these latter slaveryis both expedient andright. VI But that those who take the oppositeview have in a certain wayright on their side, may be easily seen. For the wordsslavery andslave are used in two senses. There is a slave or slavery by law aswellas by nature. The law of which I speak is a sort of convention-the law by whichwhatever is taken in war is supposed to belong to thevictors. But this right many

jurists impeach, as they would anorator who brought forward an unconstitutionalmeasure: they detestthe notion that, because one man has the power of doingviolence andis superior in brute strength, another shall be his slave and subject.Even among philosophers there is a difference of opinion. The originof thedispute, and what makes the views invade each other'sterritory, is as follows: insome sense virtue, when furnished withmeans, has actually the greatest power ofexercising force; and assuperior power is only found where there is superiorexcellence ofsome kind, power seems to imply virtue, and the dispute to be simplyone about justice (for it is due to one party identifying justice withgoodwillwhile the other identifies it with the mere rule of thestronger). If these viewsare thus set out separately, the other viewshave no force or plausibility againstthe view that the superior invirtue ought to rule, or be master. Others, clinging,as they think,simply to a principle of justice (for law and custom are a sort of

justice), assume that slavery in accordance with the custom of waris justified bylaw, but at the same moment they deny this. For whatif the cause of the war beunjust? And again, no one would ever say heis a slave who is unworthy to be aslave. Were this the case, men ofthe highest rank would be slaves and the childrenof slaves if they ortheir parents chance to have been taken captive and sold.WhereforeHellenes do not like to call Hellenes slaves, but confine the termtobarbarians. Yet, in using this language, they really mean thenatural slave of whomwe spoke at first; for it must be admittedthat some are slaves everywhere, othersnowhere. The same principleapplies to nobility. Hellenes regard themselves asnoble everywhere,and not only in their own country, but they deem the barbariansnoble only when at home, thereby implying that there are two sortsof nobility and


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freedom, the one absolute, the other relative. TheHelen of Theodectes says:Who would presume to call me servant who am on both sidessprung from the stem ofthe Gods?What does this mean but that they distinguish freedom and slavery,nobleand humble birth, by the two principles of good and evil? Theythink that as menand animals beget men and animals, so from goodmen a good man springs. But this iswhat nature, though she may intendit, cannot always accomplish. We see then thatthere is some foundation for this difference ofopinion, and that all are noteither slaves by nature or freemen bynature, and also that there is in some cases

a marked distinctionbetween the two classes, rendering it expedient and right fortheone to be slaves and the others to be masters: the one practicingobedience, theothers exercising the authority and lordship whichnature intended them to have.The abuse of this authority is injurioustoboth; for the interests of part and whole, of body and soul, arethe same, and theslave is a part of the master, a living butseparated part of his bodily frame.Hence, where the relation ofmaster and slave between them is natural they arefriends and have acommon interest, but where it rests merely on law and force thereverse is true. VII The previous remarks arequite enough to show that the rule of amaster is not a constitutional rule, andthat all the differentkinds of rule are not, as some affirm, the same with eachother. Forthere is one rule exercised over subjects who are by nature free,anotherover subjects who are by nature slaves. The rule of ahousehold is a monarchy, for

every house is under one head: whereasconstitutional rule is a government offreemen and equals. Themaster is not called a master because he has science, butbecause heis of a certain character, and the same remark applies to the slaveandthe freeman. Still there may be a science for the master andscience for the slave.The science of the slave would be such as theman of Syracuse taught, who mademoney by instructing slaves intheir ordinary duties. And such a knowledge may becarried further, soas to include cookery and similar menial arts. For some dutiesareof the more necessary, others of the more honorable sort; as theproverb says,'slave before slave, master before master.' But all suchbranches of knowledge areservile. There is likewise a science ofthe master, which teaches the use ofslaves; for the master as such isconcerned, not with the acquisition, but with theuse of them. Yetthis so-called science is not anything great or wonderful; for themaster need only know how to order that which the slave must knowhow to execute.

Hence those who are in a position which places themabove toil have stewards whoattend to their households while theyoccupy themselves with philosophy or withpolitics. But the art ofacquiring slaves, I mean of justly acquiring them, differsboth fromthe art of the master and the art of the slave, being a species ofhuntingor war. Enough of the distinction between master and slave.VIII Let us now inquire into property generally, and into the art ofgettingwealth, in accordance with our usual method, for a slave hasbeen shown to be apart of property. The first question is whether theart of getting wealth is thesame with the art of managing a householdor a part of it, or instrumental to it;and if the last, whether inthe way that the art of making shuttles is instrumentalto the artof weaving, or in the way that the casting of bronze is instrumentaltothe art of the statuary, for they are not instrumental in thesame way, but the oneprovides tools and the other material; and bymaterial I mean the substratum out of

which any work is made; thuswool is the material of the weaver, bronze of thestatuary. Now itis easy to see that the art of household management is notidenticalwith the art of getting wealth, for the one uses the material whichtheother provides. For the art which uses household stores can beno other than theart of household management. There is, however, adoubt whether the art of gettingwealth is a part of householdmanagement or a distinct art. If the getter of wealthhas toconsider whence wealth and property can be procured, but there aremany sortsof property and riches, then are husbandry, and the careand provision of food ingeneral, parts of the wealth-getting art ordistinct arts? Again, there are manysorts of food, and thereforethere are many kinds of lives both of animals and men;they must allhave food, and the differences in their food have made differencesin


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their ways of life. For of beasts, some are gregarious, othersare solitary; theylive in the way which is best adapted to sustainthem, accordingly as they arecarnivorous or herbivorous oromnivorous: and their habits are determined for themby nature in sucha manner that they may obtain with greater facility the food oftheir choice. But, as different species have different tastes, thesame things arenot naturally pleasant to all of them; and thereforethe lives of carnivorous orherbivorous animals further differ amongthemselves. In the lives of men too thereis a great difference. Thelaziest are shepherds, who lead an idle life, and get

theirsubsistence without trouble from tame animals; their flocks havingto wanderfrom place to place in search of pasture, they are compelledto follow them,cultivating a sort of living farm. Others supportthemselves by hunting, which isof different kinds. Some, for example,are brigands, others, who dwell near lakesor marshes or rivers or asea in which there are fish, are fishermen, and otherslive by thepursuit of birds or wild beasts. The greater number obtain a livingfromthe cultivated fruits of the soil. Such are the modes ofsubsistence which prevailamong those whose industry springs up ofitself, and whose food is not acquired byexchange and retail trade-there is the shepherd, the husbandman, the brigand, thefisherman, thehunter. Some gain a comfortable maintenance out of two employments,eking out the deficiencies of one of them by another: thus the life ofa shepherdmay be combined with that of a brigand, the life of afarmer with that of a hunter.Other modes of life are similarlycombined in any way which the needs of men may

require. Property, inthe sense of a bare livelihood, seems to be given by natureherself toall, both when they are first born, and when they are grown up. Forsomeanimals bring forth, together with their offspring, so muchfood as will last untilthey are able to supply themselves; of thisthe vermiparous or oviparous animalsare an instance; and theviviparous animals have up to a certain time a supply offood fortheir young in themselves, which is called milk. In like manner we mayinfer that, after the birth of animals, plants exist for their sake,and that theother animals exist for the sake of man, the tame for useand food, the wild, ifnot all at least the greater part of them,for food, and for the provision ofclothing and various instruments.Now if nature makes nothing incomplete, andnothing in vain, theinference must be that she has made all animals for the sakeof man.And so, in one point of view, the art of war is a natural art ofacquisition, for the art of acquisition includes hunting, an art whichwe ought to

practice against wild beasts, and against men who,though intended by nature to begoverned, will not submit; for warof such a kind is naturally just. Of the art ofacquisition then there is one kind which by natureis a part of the management of ahousehold, in so far as the art ofhousehold management must either find ready tohand, or itselfprovide, such things necessary to life, and useful for thecommunityof the family or state, as can be stored. They are the elements oftrueriches; for the amount of property which is needed for a goodlife is notunlimited, although Solon in one of his poems says that No bound to riches hasbeen fixed for man.But there is a boundary fixed, just as there is in the otherarts; forthe instruments of any art are never unlimited, either in number orsize,and riches may be defined as a number of instruments to beused in a household orin a state. And so we see that there is anatural art of acquisition which ispracticed by managers ofhouseholds and by statesmen, and what is the reason of

this. IX There is another variety of the artof acquisition which is commonlyand rightly called an art of wealth-getting, andhas in fact suggestedthe notion that riches and property have no limit. Beingnearlyconnected with the preceding, it is often identified with it. Butthough theyare not very different, neither are they the same. Thekind already described isgiven by nature, the other is gained byexperience and art. Let us begin ourdiscussion of the question with the followingconsiderations: Of everything whichwe possess there are two uses: both belong tothe thing as such, but not in thesame manner, for one is theproper, and the other the improper or secondary use ofit. Forexample, a shoe is used for wear, and is used for exchange; both areuses ofthe shoe. He who gives a shoe in exchange for money or food tohim who wants one,


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does indeed use the shoe as a shoe, but this is notits proper or primary purpose,for a shoe is not made to be anobject of barter. The same may be said of allpossessions, for the artof exchange extends to all of them, and it arises at firstfrom whatis natural, from the circumstance that some have too little, otherstoomuch. Hence we may infer that retail trade is not a natural partof the art ofgetting wealth; had it been so, men would have ceased toexchange when they hadenough. In the first community, indeed, whichis the family, this art is obviouslyof no use, but it begins to beuseful when the society increases. For the members

of the familyoriginally had all things in common; later, when the family dividedinto parts, the parts shared in many things, and different parts indifferentthings, which they had to give in exchange for what theywanted, a kind of barterwhich is still practiced among barbarousnations who exchange with one another thenecessaries of life andnothing more; giving and receiving wine, for example, inexchangefor coin, and the like. This sort of barter is not part of thewealth-getting art and is not contrary to nature, but is needed forthe satisfaction ofmen's natural wants. The other or more complexform of exchange grew, as might havebeen inferred, out of thesimpler. When the inhabitants of one country became moredependenton those of another, and they imported what they needed, andexportedwhat they had too much of, money necessarily came into use.For the variousnecessaries of life are not easily carried about,and hence men agreed to employ intheir dealings with each othersomething which was intrinsically useful and easily

applicable tothe purposes of life, for example, iron, silver, and the like. Ofthisthe value was at first measured simply by size and weight, but inprocess oftime they put a stamp upon it, to save the trouble ofweighing and to mark thevalue. When the use of coin had once been discovered, out of the barterofnecessary articles arose the other art of wealth getting, namely,retail trade;which was at first probably a simple matter, butbecame more complicated as soon asmen learned by experience whenceand by what exchanges the greatest profit might bemade. Originatingin the use of coin, the art of getting wealth is generallythoughtto be chiefly concerned with it, and to be the art which producesriches andwealth; having to consider how they may be accumulated.Indeed, riches is assumedby many to be only a quantity of coin,because the arts of getting wealth andretail trade are concerned withcoin. Others maintain that coined money is a meresham, a thing notnatural, but conventional only, because, if the users substitute

another commodity for it, it is worthless, and because it is notuseful as a meansto any of the necessities of life, and, indeed, hewho is rich in coin may often bein want of necessary food. But howcan that be wealth of which a man may have agreat abundance and yetperish with hunger, like Midas in the fable, whoseinsatiable prayerturned everything that was set before him into gold? Hence menseek after a better notion of riches and of the art ofgetting wealth than the mereacquisition of coin, and they areright. For natural riches and the natural art ofwealth-getting area different thing; in their true form they are part of themanagement of a household; whereas retail trade is the art ofproducing wealth, notin every way, but by exchange. And it is thoughtto be concerned with coin; forcoin is the unit of exchange and themeasure or limit of it. And there is no boundto the riches whichspring from this art of wealth getting. As in the art ofmedicinethere is no limit to the pursuit of health, and as in the other artsthere

is no limit to the pursuit of their several ends, for they aimat accomplishingtheir ends to the uttermost (but of the means thereis a limit, for the end isalways the limit), so, too, in this artof wealth-getting there is no limit of theend, which is riches of thespurious kind, and the acquisition of wealth. But theart ofwealth-getting which consists in household management, on the otherhand, hasa limit; the unlimited acquisition of wealth is not itsbusiness. And, therefore,in one point of view, all riches must have alimit; nevertheless, as a matter offact, we find the opposite to bethe case; for all getters of wealth increase theirhoard of coinwithout limit. The source of the confusion is the near connectionbetween the two kinds of wealth-getting; in either, the instrumentis the same,although the use is different, and so they pass intoone another; for each is a use


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of the same property, but with adifference: accumulation is the end in the onecase, but there is afurther end in the other. Hence some persons are led tobelieve thatgetting wealth is the object of household management, and the wholeidea of their lives is that they ought either to increase theirmoney withoutlimit, or at any rate not to lose it. The origin of thisdisposition in men is thatthey are intent upon living only, and notupon living well; and, as their desiresare unlimited they also desirethat the means of gratifying them should be withoutlimit. Those whodo aim at a good life seek the means of obtaining bodily

pleasures;and, since the enjoyment of these appears to depend on property,they areabsorbed in getting wealth: and so there arises the secondspecies of wealth-getting. For, as their enjoyment is in excess,they seek an art which produces theexcess of enjoyment; and, ifthey are not able to supply their pleasures by the artof gettingwealth, they try other arts, using in turn every faculty in a mannercontrary to nature. The quality of courage, for example, is notintended to makewealth, but to inspire confidence; neither is thisthe aim of the general's or ofthe physician's art; but the one aimsat victory and the other at health.Nevertheless, some men turnevery quality or art into a means of getting wealth;this theyconceive to be the end, and to the promotion of the end they think allthings must contribute. Thus, then, we have considered the art of wealth-gettingwhich isunnecessary, and why men want it; and also the necessary art ofwealth-getting, which we have seen to be different from the other, andto be a natural

part of the art of managing a household, concernedwith the provision of food, not,however, like the former kind,unlimited, but having a limit.X And we have found the answer to our original question, Whether theart ofgetting wealth is the business of the manager of a householdand of the statesmanor not their business? viz., that wealth ispresupposed by them. For as politicalscience does not make men, buttakes them from nature and uses them, so too natureprovides them withearth or sea or the like as a source of food. At this stagebegins theduty of the manager of a household, who has to order the thingswhichnature supplies; he may be compared to the weaver who has not tomake but to usewool, and to know, too, what sort of wool is goodand serviceable or bad andunserviceable. Were this otherwise, itwould be difficult to see why the art ofgetting wealth is a part ofthe management of a household and the art of medicinenot; forsurely the members of a household must have health just as they musthave

life or any other necessary. The answer is that as from one pointof view themaster of the house and the ruler of the state have toconsider about health, fromanother point of view not they but thephysician; so in one way the art ofhousehold management, in anotherway the subordinate art, has to consider aboutwealth. But, strictlyspeaking, as I have already said, the means of life must beprovidedbeforehand by nature; for the business of nature is to furnish food tothatwhich is born, and the food of the offspring is always whatremains over of thatfrom which it is produced. Wherefore the art ofgetting wealth out of fruits andanimals is always natural. There are two sorts of wealth-getting, as I have said;one is a partof household management, the other is retail trade: the formernecessary and honorable, while that which consists in exchange isjustly censured;for it is unnatural, and a mode by which men gainfrom one another. The most hatedsort, and with the greatest reason,is usury, which makes a gain out of money

itself, and not from thenatural object of it. For money was intended to be used inexchange,but not to increase at interest. And this term interest, which meansthebirth of money from money, is applied to the breeding of moneybecause theoffspring resembles the parent. Wherefore of an modes ofgetting wealth this is themost unnatural. XI Enough has been said aboutthe theory of wealth-getting; we will nowproceed to the practical part. Thediscussion of such matters is notunworthy of philosophy, but to be engaged in thempractically isilliberal and irksome. The useful parts of wealth-getting are,first,the knowledge of livestock- which are most profitable, andwhere, and how- as, forexample, what sort of horses or sheep oroxen or any other animals are most likelyto give a return. A manought to know which of these pay better than others, and


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which paybest in particular places, for some do better in one place and some inanother. Secondly, husbandry, which may be either tillage or planting,and thekeeping of bees and of fish, or fowl, or of any animalswhich may be useful to man.These are the divisions of the true orproper art of wealth-getting and come first.Of the other, whichconsists in exchange, the first and most important division iscommerce (of which there are three kinds- the provision of a ship, theconveyanceof goods, exposure for sale- these again differing asthey are safer or moreprofitable), the second is usury, the third,service for hire- of this, one kind is

employed in the mechanicalarts, the other in unskilled and bodily labor. There isstill athird sort of wealth getting intermediate between this and the firstornatural mode which is partly natural, but is also concerned withexchange, viz.,the industries that make their profit from theearth, and from things growing fromthe earth which, although theybear no fruit, are nevertheless profitable; forexample, the cuttingof timber and all mining. The art of mining, by which mineralsareobtained, itself has many branches, for there are various kinds ofthings dugout of the earth. Of the several divisions ofwealth-getting I now speak generally;a minute consideration of themmight be useful in practice, but it would betiresome to dwell uponthem at greater length now. Those occupations are mosttruly arts in which there is the leastelement of chance; they are the meanest inwhich the body is mostdeteriorated, the most servile in which there is thegreatest use ofthe body, and the most illiberal in which there is the least need

ofexcellence. Works have been written upon these subjects by various persons;forexample, by Chares the Parian, and Apollodorus the Lemnian,whohave treated of Tillage and Planting, while others have treated ofotherbranches; any one who cares for such matters may refer totheir writings. It wouldbe well also to collect the scattered storiesof the ways in which individuals havesucceeded in amassing a fortune;for all this is useful to persons who value theart of getting wealth.There is the anecdote of Thales the Milesian and hisfinancial device,which involves a principle of universal application, but isattributedto him on account of his reputation for wisdom. He was reproachedfor hispoverty, which was supposed to show that philosophy was ofno use. According to thestory, he knew by his skill in the starswhile it was yet winter that there wouldbe a great harvest ofolives in the coming year; so, having a little money, he gavedepositsfor the use of all the olive-presses in Chios and Miletus, which hehired

at a low price because no one bid against him. When theharvest-time came, and manywere wanted all at once and of a sudden,he let them out at any rate which hepleased, and made a quantity ofmoney. Thus he showed the world that philosopherscan easily be richif they like, but that their ambition is of another sort. He issupposed to have given a striking proof of his wisdom, but, as I wassaying, hisdevice for getting wealth is of universal application, andis nothing but thecreation of a monopoly. It is an art oftenpracticed by cities when they are wantof money; they make amonopoly of provisions. There was a man of Sicily, who,having money deposited with him,bought up an the iron from the iron mines;afterwards, when themerchants from their various markets came to buy, he was theonlyseller, and without much increasing the price he gained 200 percent. Whichwhen Dionysius heard, he told him that he might takeaway his money, but that hemust not remain at Syracuse, for hethought that the man had discovered a way of

making money which wasinjurious to his own interests. He made the same discoveryasThales; they both contrived to create a monopoly for themselves. Andstatesmen aswell ought to know these things; for a state is oftenas much in want of money andof such devices for obtaining it as ahousehold, or even more so; hence some publicmen devote themselvesentirely to finance. XIIOf household management we have seen that there are three parts- oneis the rule ofa master over slaves, which has been discussed already,another of a father, andthe third of a husband. A husband and father,we saw, rules over wife and children,both free, but the rule differs,the rule over his children being a royal, over hiswife aconstitutional rule. For although there may be exceptions to the orderofnature, the male is by nature fitter for command than the female,just as the elder


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and full-grown is superior to the younger and moreimmature. But in mostconstitutional states the citizens rule andare ruled by turns, for the idea of aconstitutional state impliesthat the natures of the citizens are equal, and do notdiffer atall. Nevertheless, when one rules and the other is ruled we endeavortocreate a difference of outward forms and names and titles ofrespect, which may beillustrated by the saying of Amasis about hisfoot-pan. The relation of the male tothe female is of this kind,but there the inequality is permanent. The rule of afather over hischildren is royal, for he rules by virtue both of love and of the

respect due to age, exercising a kind of royal power. And thereforeHomer hasappropriately called Zeus 'father of Gods and men,'because he is the king of themall. For a king is the natural superiorof his subjects, but he should be of thesame kin or kind with them,and such is the relation of elder and younger, offather and son. XIII Thus it is clear thathousehold management attends more to menthan to the acquisition of inanimatethings, and to human excellencemore than to the excellence of property which wecall wealth, and tothe virtue of freemen more than to the virtue of slaves. Aquestionmay indeed be raised, whether there is any excellence at all in aslavebeyond and higher than merely instrumental and ministerialqualities- whether hecan have the virtues of temperance, courage,justice, and the like; or whetherslaves possess only bodily andministerial qualities. And, whichever way we answerthe question, adifficulty arises; for, if they have virtue, in what will they

differ from freemen? On the other hand, since they are men and sharein rationalprinciple, it seems absurd to say that they have novirtue. A similar question maybe raised about women and children,whether they too have virtues: ought a woman tobe temperate and braveand just, and is a child to be called temperate, andintemperate, ornote So in general we may ask about the natural ruler, and thenaturalsubject, whether they have the same or different virtues. For if anoblenature is equally required in both, why should one of themalways rule, and theother always be ruled? Nor can we say that thisis a question of degree, for thedifference between ruler andsubject is a difference of kind, which the differenceof more and lessnever is. Yet how strange is the supposition that the one ought,andthat the other ought not, to have virtue! For if the ruler isintemperate andunjust, how can he rule well? If the subject, howcan he obey well? If he belicentious and cowardly, he willcertainly not do his duty. It is evident,

therefore, that both of themmust have a share of virtue, but varying as naturalsubjects also varyamong themselves. Here the very constitution of the soul hasshownus the way; in it one part naturally rules, and the other issubject, and thevirtue of the ruler we in maintain to be differentfrom that of the subject; theone being the virtue of the rational,and the other of the irrational part. Now, itis obvious that the sameprinciple applies generally, and therefore almost allthings ruleand are ruled according to nature. But the kind of rule differs; thefreeman rules over the slave after another manner from that in whichthe male rulesover the female, or the man over the child; althoughthe parts of the soul arepresent in an of them, they are present indifferent degrees. For the slave has nodeliberative faculty at all;the woman has, but it is without authority, and thechild has, butit is immature. So it must necessarily be supposed to be with themoral virtues also; all should partake of them, but only in suchmanner and degree

as is required by each for the fulfillment of hisduty. Hence the ruler ought tohave moral virtue in perfection, forhis function, taken absolutely, demands amaster artificer, andrational principle is such an artificer; the subjects, oilthe otherhand, require only that measure of virtue which is proper to each ofthem.Clearly, then, moral virtue belongs to all of them; but thetemperance of a man andof a woman, or the courage and justice of aman and of a woman, are not, asSocrates maintained, the same; thecourage of a man is shown in commanding, of awoman in obeying. Andthis holds of all other virtues, as will be more clearly seenif welook at them in detail, for those who say generally that virtueconsists in agood disposition of the soul, or in doing rightly, orthe like, only deceivethemselves. Far better than such definitions istheir mode of speaking, who, like


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Gorgias, enumerate the virtues.All classes must be deemed to have their specialattributes; as thepoet says of women, Silence is a woman's glory,but this isnot equally the glory of man. The child is imperfect,and therefore obviously hisvirtue is not relative to himself alone,but to the perfect man and to his teacher,and in like manner thevirtue of the slave is relative to a master. Now wedetermined thata slave is useful for the wants of life, and therefore he willobviously require only so much virtue as will prevent him from failingin his dutythrough cowardice or lack of self-control. Some one willask whether, if what we

are saying is true, virtue will not berequired also in the artisans, for theyoften fail in their workthrough the lack of self control? But is there not a greatdifference in the two cases? For the slave shares in his master'slife; the artisanis less closely connected with him, and only attainsexcellence in proportion as hebecomes a slave. The meaner sort ofmechanic has a special and separate slavery;and whereas the slaveexists by nature, not so the shoemaker or other artisan. Itismanifest, then, that the master ought to be the source of suchexcellence in theslave, and not a mere possessor of the art ofmastership which trains the slave inhis duties. Wherefore they aremistaken who forbid us to converse with slaves andsay that weshould employ command only, for slaves stand even more in need ofadmonition than children. So much for this subject; the relations of husband andwife,parent and child, their several virtues, what in their intercoursewith oneanother is good, and what is evil, and how we may pursuethe good and good and

escape the evil, will have to be discussedwhen we speak of the different forms ofgovernment. For, inasmuch asevery family is a part of a state, and theserelationships are theparts of a family, and the virtue of the part must haveregard tothe virtue of the whole, women and children must be trained byeducationwith an eye to the constitution, if the virtues of either ofthem are supposed tomake any difference in the virtues of thestate. And they must make a difference:for the children grow up to becitizens, and half the free persons in a state arewomen. Of these matters, enough has been said; of what remains,let usspeak at another time. Regarding, then, our present inquiry ascomplete, wewill make a new beginning. And, first, let us examine thevarious theories of aperfect state. BOOK TWOI OUR PURPOSE is to consider what form of political community isbest of all forthose who are most able to realize their ideal oflife. We must therefore examine

not only this but other constitutions,both such as actually exist in well-governedstates, and anytheoretical forms which are held in esteem; that what is good anduseful may be brought to light. And let no one suppose that in seekingforsomething beyond them we are anxious to make a sophistical displayat any cost; weonly undertake this inquiry because all theconstitutions with which we areacquainted are faulty. We will begin with the natural beginning of the subject.Threealternatives are conceivable: The members of a state must eitherhave (1) allthings or (2) nothing in common, or (3) some things incommon and some not. Thatthey should have nothing in common isclearly impossible, for the constitution is acommunity, and must atany rate have a common place- one city will be in one place,and thecitizens are those who share in that one city. But should a wellorderedstate have all things, as far as may be, in common, or someonly and not others?For the citizens might conceivably have wives andchildren and property in common,

as Socrates proposes in theRepublic of Plato. Which is better, our presentcondition, or theproposed new order of society.II There are many difficulties in the community of women. And theprinciple onwhich Socrates rests the necessity of such an institutionevidently is notestablished by his arguments. Further, as a meansto the end which he ascribes tothe state, the scheme, taken literallyis impracticable, and how we are tointerpret it is nowhereprecisely stated. I am speaking of the premise from whichthe argumentof Socrates proceeds, 'that the greater the unity of the state thebetter.' Is it not obvious that a state may at length attain such adegree of unityas to be no longer a state? since the nature of astate is to be a plurality, andin tending to greater unity, frombeing a state, it becomes a family, and from


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being a family, anindividual; for the family may be said to be more than thestate,and the individual than the family. So that we ought not to attainthisgreatest unity even if we could, for it would be thedestruction of the state.Again, a state is not made up only of somany men, but of different kinds of men;for similars do notconstitute a state. It is not like a military alliance Theusefulness of the latter depends upon its quantity even where there isnodifference in quality (for mutual protection is the end aimedat), just as agreater weight of anything is more useful than a less(in like manner, a state

differs from a nation, when the nation hasnot its population organized invillages, but lives an Arcadian sortof life); but the elements out of which aunity is to be formed differin kind. Wherefore the principle of compensation, as Ihave alreadyremarked in the Ethics, is the salvation of states. Even among freemenand equals this is a principle which must be maintained, for theycannot an ruletogether, but must change at the end of a year orsome other period of time or insome order of succession. The resultis that upon this plan they all govern; justas if shoemakers andcarpenters were to exchange their occupations, and the samepersonsdid not always continue shoemakers and carpenters. And since it isbetterthat this should be so in politics as well, it is clear thatwhile there should becontinuance of the same persons in power wherethis is possible, yet where this isnot possible by reason of thenatural equality of the citizens, and at the sametime it is just thatan should share in the government (whether to govern be a good

thingor a bad), an approximation to this is that equals should in turnretire fromoffice and should, apart from official position, betreated alike. Thus the oneparty rule and the others are ruled inturn, as if they were no longer the samepersons. In like mannerwhen they hold office there is a variety in the officesheld. Hence itis evident that a city is not by nature one in that sense which somepersons affirm; and that what is said to be the greatest good ofcities is inreality their destruction; but surely the good ofthings must be that whichpreserves them. Again, in another point ofview, this extreme unification of thestate is clearly not good; for afamily is more self-sufficing than an individual,and a city than afamily, and a city only comes into being when the community islargeenough to be self-sufficing. If then self-sufficiency is to bedesired, thelesser degree of unity is more desirable than thegreater.III But, even supposing that it were best for the community to havethe greatest

degree of unity, this unity is by no means proved tofollow from the fact 'of allmen saying "mine" and "not mine" at thesame instant of time,' which, according toSocrates, is the sign ofperfect unity in a state. For the word 'all' is ambiguous.If themeaning be that every individual says 'mine' and 'not mine' at thesame time,then perhaps the result at which Socrates aims may be insome degree accomplished;each man will call the same person his ownson and the same person his wife, and soof his property and of allthat falls to his lot. This, however, is not the way inwhich peoplewould speak who had their had their wives and children in common; theywould say 'all' but not 'each.' In like manner their property would bedescribed asbelonging to them, not severally but collectively.There is an obvious fallacy inthe term 'all': like some otherwords, 'both,' 'odd,' 'even,' it is ambiguous, andeven in abstractargument becomes a source of logical puzzles. That all personscallthe same thing mine in the sense in which each does so may be a finething, but

it is impracticable; or if the words are taken in the othersense, such a unity inno way conduces to harmony. And there isanother objection to the proposal. Forthat which is common to thegreatest number has the least care bestowed upon it.Every onethinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest; andonlywhen he is himself concerned as an individual. For besidesother considerations,everybody is more inclined to neglect the dutywhich he expects another to fulfill;as in families many attendantsare often less useful than a few. Each citizen willhave a thousandsons who will not be his sons individually but anybody will beequallythe son of anybody, and will therefore be neglected by all alike.Further,upon this principle, every one will use the word 'mine' ofone who is prospering orthe reverse, however small a fraction hemay himself be of the whole number; the


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same boy will be 'so andso's son,' the son of each of the thousand, or whatever bethenumber of the citizens; and even about this he will not be positive;for it isimpossible to know who chanced to have a child, orwhether, if one came intoexistence, it has survived. But which isbetter- for each to say 'mine' in thisway, making a man the samerelation to two thousand or ten thousand citizens, or touse theword 'mine' in the ordinary and more restricted sense? For usually thesameperson is called by one man his own son whom another calls hisown brother orcousin or kinsman- blood relation or connection bymarriage either of himself or of

some relation of his, and yet anotherhis clansman or tribesman; and how muchbetter is it to be the realcousin of somebody than to be a son after Plato'sfashion! Nor isthere any way of preventing brothers and children and fathers andmothers from sometimes recognizing one another; for children areborn like theirparents, and they will necessarily be findingindications of their relationship toone another. Geographersdeclare such to be the fact; they say that in part ofUpper Libya,where the women are common, nevertheless the children who are born areassigned to their respective fathers on the ground of theirlikeness. And somewomen, like the females of other animals- forexample, mares and cows- have astrong tendency to produce offspringresembling their parents, as was the case withthe Pharsalian marecalled Honest. IV Otherevils, against which it is not easy for the authors of sucha community to guard,will be assaults and homicides, voluntary aswell as involuntary, quarrels and

slanders, all which are mostunholy acts when committed against fathers and mothersand nearrelations, but not equally unholy when there is no relationship.Moreover,they are much more likely to occur if the relationship isunknown, and, when theyhave occurred, the customary expiations ofthem cannot be made. Again, how strangeit is that Socrates, afterhaving made the children common, should hinder loversfrom carnalintercourse only, but should permit love and familiarities betweenfather and son or between brother and brother, than which nothingcan be moreunseemly, since even without them love of this sort isimproper. How strange, too,to forbid intercourse for no otherreason than the violence of the pleasure, asthough the relationshipof father and son or of brothers with one another made nodifference. This community of wives and children seems better suited to thehusbandmen than to the guardians, for if they have wives andchildren in common,they will be bound to one another by weakerties, as a subject class should be, and

they will remain obedientand notrebel. In a word, the result of such a law would be just theopposite of whichgood laws ought to have, and the intention ofSocrates in making these regulationsabout women and children woulddefeat itself. For friendship we believe to be thegreatest good ofstates and the preservative of them against revolutions; neitheristhere anything which Socrates so greatly lauds as the unity of thestate which heand all the world declare to be created byfriendship. But the unity which hecommends would be like that ofthe lovers in the Symposium, who, as Aristophanessays, desire to growtogether in the excess of their affection, and from being twotobecome one, in which case one or both would certainly perish.Whereas in a statehaving women and children common, love will bewatery; and the father willcertainly not say 'my son,' or the son 'myfather.' As a little sweet wine mingledwith a great deal of wateris imperceptible in the mixture, so, in this sort of

community, theidea of relationship which is based upon these names will be lost;there is no reason why the so-called father should care about the son,or the sonabout the father, or brothers about one another. Of the twoqualities which chieflyinspire regard and affection- that a thingis your own and that it is your onlyone-neither can exist in such astate as this. Again, the transfer of children assoon as they are born from therank of husbandmen or of artisans to that ofguardians, and from therank of guardians into a lower rank, will be very difficulttoarrange; the givers or transferrers cannot but know whom they aregiving andtransferring, and to whom. And the previously mentionedevils, such as assaults,unlawful loves, homicides, will happen moreoften amongst those who are transferredto the lower classes, or whohave a place assigned to them among the guardians; for


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they will nolonger call the members of the class they have left brothers, andchildren, and fathers, and mothers, and will not, therefore, be afraidofcommitting any crimes by reason of consanguinity. Touching thecommunity of wivesand children, let this be our conclusion. VNext let us consider what should be our arrangements about property:should thecitizens of the perfect state have their possessions incommon or not? Thisquestion may be discussed separately from theenactments about women and children.Even supposing that the women andchildren belong to individuals, according to the

custom which is atpresent universal, may there not be an advantage in having andusingpossessions in common? Three cases are possible: (1) the soil may beappropriated, but the produce may be thrown for consumption into thecommon stock;and this is the practice of some nations. Or (2), thesoil may be common, and maybe cultivated in common, but the producedivided among individuals for theirprivate use; this is a form ofcommon property which is said to exist among certainbarbarians. Or(3), the soil and the produce may be alike common. When thehusbandmen are not the owners, the case will be differentand easier to deal with;but when they till the ground forthemselves the question of ownership will give aworld of trouble.If they do not share equally enjoyments and toils, those wholabormuch and get little will necessarily complain of those who laborlittle andreceive or consume much. But indeed there is always adifficulty in men livingtogether and having all human relations incommon, but especially in their having

common property. Thepartnerships of fellow-travelers are an example to the point;for theygenerally fall out over everyday matters and quarrel about anytrifle whichturns up. So with servants: we are most able to takeoffense at those with whom wemost we most frequently come intocontact in daily life. These are only some ofthe disadvantages which attend thecommunity of property; the present arrangement,if improved as itmight be by good customs and laws, would be far better, and wouldhavethe advantages of both systems. Property should be in a certainsense common,but, as a general rule, private; for, when everyonehas a distinct interest, menwill not complain of one another, andthey will make more progress, because everyone will be attending tohis own business. And yet by reason of goodness, and inrespect ofuse, 'Friends,' as the proverb says, 'will have all things common.'Evennow there are traces of such a principle, showing that it isnot impracticable,but, in well-ordered states, exists already to acertain extent and may be carried

further. For, although every man hashis own property, some things he will place atthe disposal of hisfriends, while of others he shares the use with them. TheLacedaemonians, for example, use one another's slaves, and horses, anddogs, as ifthey were their own; and when they lack provisions on ajourney, they appropriatewhat they find in the fields throughoutthe country. It is clearly better thatproperty should be private, butthe use of it common; and the special business ofthe legislator is tocreate in men this benevolent disposition. Again, howimmeasurablygreater is the pleasure, when a man feels a thing to be his own; forsurely the love of self is a feeling implanted by nature and not givenin vain,although selfishness is rightly censured; this, however, isnot the mere love ofself, but the love of self in excess, like themiser's love of money; for all, oralmost all, men love money andother such objects in a measure. And further, thereis the greatestpleasure in doing a kindness or service to friends or guests or

companions, which can only be rendered when a man has privateproperty. Theseadvantages are lost by excessive unification of thestate. The exhibition of twovirtues, besides, is visiblyannihilated in such a state: first, temperance towardswomen (for itis an honorable action to abstain from another's wife fortemperance'sake); secondly, liberality in the matter of property.No one, when men have allthings in common, will any longer set anexample of liberality or do any liberalaction; for liberalityconsists in the use which is made of property. Suchlegislation may have a specious appearance of benevolence;men readily listen toit, and are easily induced to believe that insome wonderful manner everybody willbecome everybody's friend,especially when some one is heard denouncing the evilsnow existing instates, suits about contracts, convictions for perjury, flatteries


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of rich men and the like, which are said to arise out of thepossession of privateproperty. These evils, however, are due to avery different cause- the wickednessof human nature. Indeed, we seethat there is much more quarrelling among those whohave all things incommon, though there are not many of them when compared with thevast numbers who have private property. Again, we ought to reckon, not only theevils from which thecitizens will be saved, but also the advantages which theywilllose. The life which they are to lead appears to be quiteimpracticable. Theerror of Socrates must be attributed to the falsenotion of unity from which he

starts. Unity there should be, both ofthe family and of the state, but in somerespects only. For there is apoint at which a state may attain such a degree ofunity as to be nolonger a state, or at which, without actually ceasing to exist,itwill become an inferior state, like harmony passing into unison, orrhythm whichhas been reduced to a single foot. The state, as I wassaying, is a plurality whichshould be united and made into acommunity by education; and it is strange that theauthor of asystem of education which he thinks will make the state virtuous,shouldexpect to improve his citizens by regulations of this sort, andnot by philosophyor by customs and laws, like those which prevailat Sparta and Crete respectingcommon meals, whereby the legislatorhas made property common. Let us remember thatwe should not disregardthe experience of ages; in the multitude of years thesethings, ifthey were good, would certainly not have been unknown; for almosteverything has been found out, although sometimes they are not puttogether; in

other cases men do not use the knowledge which they have.Great light would bethrown on this subject if we could see such aform of government in the actualprocess of construction; for thelegislator could not form a state at all withoutdistributing anddividing its constituents into associations for common meals, andintophratries and tribes. But all this legislation ends only in forbiddingagriculture to the guardians, a prohibition which the Lacedaemonianstry to enforcealready. But, indeed, Socrates has not said, nor is it easy to decide, whatinsuch a community will be the general form of the state. Thecitizens who are notguardians are the majority, and about themnothing has been determined: are thehusbandmen, too, to have theirproperty in common? Or is each individual to havehis own? And are thewives and children to be individual or common. If, like theguardians,they are to have all things in common, what do they differ fromthem, orwhat will they gain by submitting to their government? Or,upon what principle

would they submit, unless indeed the governingclass adopt the ingenious policy ofthe Cretans, who give their slavesthe same institutions as their own, but forbidthem gymnasticexercises and the possession of arms. If, on the other hand, theinferior classes are to be like other cities in respect of marriageand property,what will be the form of the community? Must it notcontain two states in one, eachhostile to the other He makes theguardians into a mere occupying garrison, whilethe husbandmen andartisans and the rest are the realcitizens. But if so the suits andquarrels, and all the evils which Socratesaffirms to exist in otherstates, will exist equally among them. He says indeedthat, havingso good an education, the citizens will not need many laws, forexamplelaws about the city or about the markets; but then he confineshis education to theguardians. Again, he makes the husbandmenowners of the property upon condition oftheir paying a tribute. Butin that case they are likely to be much more

unmanageable andconceited than the Helots, or Penestae, or slaves in general. Andwhether community of wives and property be necessary for the lowerequally with thehigher class or not, and the questions akin tothis, what will be the education,form of government, laws of thelower class, Socrates has nowhere determined:neither is it easy todiscover this, nor is their character of small importance ifthecommon life of the guardians is to be maintained. Again, if Socrates makes thewomen common, and retains privateproperty, the men will see to the fields, but whowill see to thehouse? And who will do so if the agricultural class have both theirproperty and their wives in common? Once more: it is absurd toargue, from theanalogy of the animals, that men and women shouldfollow the same pursuits, foranimals have not to manage ahousehold. The government, too, as constituted by


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Socrates, containselements of danger; for he makes the same persons always rule.Andif this is often a cause of disturbance among the meaner sort, howmuch moreamong high-spirited warriors? But that the persons whom hemakes rulers must be thesame is evident; for the gold which the Godmingles in the souls of men is not atone time given to one, atanother time to another, but always to the same: as hesays, 'Godmingles gold in some, and silver in others, from their very birth; butbrass and iron in those who are meant to be artisans andhusbandmen.' Again, hedeprives the guardians even of happiness, andsays that the legislator ought to

make the whole state happy. Butthe whole cannot be happy unless most, or all, orsome of its partsenjoy happiness. In this respect happiness is not like the evenprinciple in numbers, which may exist only in the whole, but inneither of theparts; not so happiness. And if the guardians are nothappy, who are? Surely notthe artisans, or the common people. TheRepublic of which Socrates discourses hasall these difficulties,and others quite as great.VI The same, or nearly the same, objections apply to Plato's laterwork, the Laws,and therefore we had better examine briefly theconstitution which is thereindescribed. In the Republic, Socrates hasdefinitely settled in all a few questionsonly; such as thecommunity of women and children, the community of property, andtheconstitution of the state. The population is divided into two classes-one ofhusbandmen, and the other of warriors; from this latter istaken a third class ofcounselors and rulers of the state. ButSocrates has not determined whether the

husbandmen and artisans are tohave a share in the government, and whether they,too, are to carryarms and share in military service, or not. He certainly thinksthatthe women ought to share in the education of the guardians, and tofight bytheir side. The remainder of the work is filled up withdigressions foreign to themain subject, and with discussions aboutthe education of the guardians. In theLaws there is hardly anythingbut laws; not much is said about the constitution.This, which hehad intended to make more of the ordinary type, he gradually bringsround to the other or ideal form. For with the exception of thecommunity of womenand property, he supposes everything to be the samein both states; there is to bethe same education; the citizens ofboth are to live free from servile occupations,and there are to becommon meals in both. The only difference is that in the Laws,thecommon meals are extended to women, and the warriors number 5000,but in theRepublic only 1000. The discourses of Socrates are never commonplace; they always

exhibit grace and originality and thought; but perfection ineverything can hardlybe expected. We must not overlook the factthat the number of 5000 citizens, justnow mentioned, will require aterritory as large as Babylon, or some other hugesite, if so manypersons are to be supported in idleness, together with their womenandattendants, who will be a multitude many times as great. In framing anideal wemay assume what we wish, but should avoid impossibilities. It is said that thelegislator ought to have his eye directed to twopoints- the people and thecountry. But neighboring countries alsomust not be forgotten by him, firstlybecause the state for which helegislates is to have a political and not anisolated life. For astate must have such a military force as will be serviceableagainsther neighbors, and not merely useful at home. Even if the life ofaction isnot admitted to be the best, either for individuals orstates, still a city shouldbe formidable to enemies, whether invadingor retreating. There is another point:

Should not the amount of property be definedin some way which differs from this bybeing clearer? For Socratessays that a man should have so much property as willenable him tolive temperately, which is only a way of saying 'to live well'; thisis too general a conception. Further, a man may live temperately andyet miserably.A better definition would be that a man must have somuch property as will enablehim to live not only temperately butliberally; if the two are parted, liberallywill combine withluxury; temperance will be associated with toil. For liberalityandtemperance are the only eligible qualities which have to do with theuse ofproperty. A man cannot use property with mildness or courage,but temperately andliberally he may; and therefore the practice ofthese virtues is inseparable fromproperty. There is an inconsistency,too, in too, in equalizing the property and


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not regulating thenumber of the citizens; the population is to remain unlimited,andhe thinks that it will be sufficiently equalized by a certain numberofmarriages being unfruitful, however many are born to others,because he finds thisto be the case in existing states. But greatercare will be required than now; foramong ourselves, whatever may bethe number of citizens, the property is alwaysdistributed among them,and therefore no one is in want; but, if the property wereincapableof division as in the Laws, the supernumeraries, whether few ormany,would get nothing. One would have thought that it was evenmore necessary to limit

population than property; and that the limitshould be fixed by calculating thechances of mortality in thechildren, and of sterility in married persons. Theneglect of thissubject, which in existing states is so common, is a never-failingcause of poverty among the citizens; and poverty is the parent ofrevolution andcrime. Pheidon the Corinthian, who was one of themost ardent legislators, thoughtthat the families and the number ofcitizens ought to remain the same, althoughoriginally all the lotsmay have been of different sizes: but in the Laws theoppositeprinciple is maintained. What in our opinion is the rightarrangement willhave to be explained hereafter. There is another omission in the Laws: Socratesdoes not tell us howthe rulers differ from their subjects; he only says that theyshouldbe related as the warp and the woof, which are made out of differentwools.He allows that a man's whole property may be increasedfivefold, but why should nothis land also increase to a certainextent? Again, will the good management of a

household be promotedby his arrangement of homesteads? For he assigns to eachindividualtwo homesteads in separate places, and it is difficult to live intwohouses. The whole system of government tends to be neither democracy noroligarchy, but something in a mean between them, which is usuallycalled a polity,and is composed of the heavy-armed soldiers. Now,if he intended to frame aconstitution which would suit the greatestnumber of states, he was very likelyright, but not if he meant to saythat this constitutional form came nearest to hisfirst or idealstate; for many would prefer the Lacedaemonian, or, possibly, someother more aristocratic government. Some, indeed, say that the bestconstitution isa combination of all existing forms, and they praisethe Lacedaemonian because itis made up of oligarchy, monarchy, anddemocracy, the king forming the monarchy,and the council of eldersthe oligarchy while the democratic element is representedby theEphors; for the Ephors are selected from the people. Others,however, declare

the Ephoralty to be a tyranny, and find the elementof democracy in the commonmeals and in the habits of daily life. Inthe Laws it is maintained that the bestconstitution is made up ofdemocracy and tyranny, which are either notconstitutions at all, orare the worst of all. But they are nearer the truth whocombine manyforms; for the constitution is better which is made up of morenumerouselements. The constitution proposed in the Laws has noelement of monarchy at all;it is nothing but oligarchy and democracy,leaning rather to oligarchy. This isseen in the mode of appointingmagistrates; for although the appointment of them bylot from amongthose who have been already selected combines both elements, the wayin which the rich are compelled by law to attend the assembly and voteformagistrates or discharge other political duties, while the restmay do as theylike, and the endeavor to have the greater number ofthe magistrates appointed outof the richer classes and the highestofficers

selected from those who have the greatest incomes, both theseare oligarchicalfeatures. The oligarchical principle prevails also inthe choice of the council,for all are compelled to choose, but thecompulsion extends only to the choice outof the first class, and ofan equal number out of the second class and out of thethird class,but not in this latter case to all the voters but to those of thefirstthree classes; and the selection of candidates out of the fourthclass is onlycompulsory on the first and second. Then, from thepersons so chosen, he says thatthere ought to be an equal number ofeach class selected. Thus a preponderance willbe given to thebetter sort of people, who have the larger incomes, because many ofthe lower classes, not being compelled will not vote. Theseconsiderations, andothers which will be adduced when the time comesfor examining similar polities,


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tend to show that states likePlato's should not be composed of democracy andmonarchy. There isalso a danger in electing the magistrates out of a body who arethemselves elected; for, if but a small number choose to combine,the electionswill always go as they desire. Such is theconstitution which is described in theLaws. VII Other constitutions have beenproposed; some by private persons,others by philosophers and statesmen, which allcome nearer toestablished or existing ones than either of Plato's. No one else hasintroduced such novelties as the community of women and children, orpublic tables

for women: other legislators begin with what isnecessary. In the opinion of some,the regulation of property is thechief point of all, that being the question uponwhich all revolutionsturn. This danger was recognized by Phaleas of Chalcedon, whowasthe first to affirm that the citizens of a state ought to have equalpossessions. He thought that in a new colony the equalization might beaccomplishedwithout difficulty, not so easily when a state wasalready established; and thatthen the shortest way of compassingthe desired end would be for the rich to giveand not to receivemarriage portions, and for the poor not to give but to receivethem. Plato in the Laws was of opinion that, to a certain extent,accumulationshould be allowed, forbidding, as I have alreadyobserved, any citizen to possessmore than five times the minimumqualification But those who make such laws shouldremember what theyare apt to forget- that the legislator who fixes the amount ofproperty should also fix the number of children; for, if thechildren are too many

for the property, the law must be broken. And,besides the violation of the law, itis a bad thing that many frombeing rich should become poor; for men of ruinedfortunes are sureto stir up revolutions. That the equalization of propertyexercises aninfluence on political society was clearly understood even by someofthe old legislators. Laws were made by Solon and others prohibitingan individualfrom possessing as much land as he pleased; and thereare other laws in stateswhich forbid the sale of property: amongthe Locrians, for example, there is a lawthat a man is not to sellhis property unless he can prove unmistakably that somemisfortune hasbefallen him. Again, there have been laws which enjoin thepreservation of the original lots. Such a law existed in the island ofLeucas, andthe abrogation of it made the constitution too democratic,for the rulers no longerhad the prescribed qualification. Again,where there is equality of property, theamount may be either toolarge or too small, and the possessor may be living either

in luxuryor penury. Clearly, then, the legislator ought not only to aim attheequalization of properties, but at moderation in their amount.Further, if heprescribe this moderate amount equally to all, hewill be no nearer the mark; forit is not the possessions but thedesires of mankind which require to be equalized,and this isimpossible, unless a sufficient education is provided by the laws. ButPhaleas will probably reply that this is precisely what he means;and that, in hisopinion, there ought to be in states, not onlyequal property, but equal education.Still he should tell preciselywhat he means; and that, in his opinion, there oughtto be in be inhaving one and the same for all, if it is of a sort that predisposesmen to avarice, or ambition, or both. Moreover, civil troublesarise, not only outof the inequality of property, but out of theinequality of honor, though inopposite ways. For the common peoplequarrel about the inequality of property, thehigher class about theequality of honor; as the poet says, The bad and good

alike in honor share. There are crimes of which the motive is want; and for thesePhaleas expects to find a cure in the equalization of property,which will takeaway from a man the temptation to be a highwayman,because he is hungry or cold.But want is not the sole incentive tocrime; men also wish to enjoy themselves andnot to be in a state ofdesire- they wish to cure some desire, going beyond thenecessities oflife, which preys upon them; nay, this is not the only reason- theymay desire superfluities in order to enjoy pleasures unaccompaniedwith pain, andtherefore they commit crimes. Now what is the cure of these three disorders? Ofthe first,moderate possessions and occupation; of the second, habits oftemperance;as to the third, if any desire pleasures which depend onthemselves, they will findthe satisfaction of their desires nowherebut in philosophy; for all other


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pleasures we are dependent on others.The fact is that the greatest crimes arecaused by excess and not bynecessity. Men do not become tyrants in order that theymay not suffercold; and hence great is the honor bestowed, not on him who kills athief, but on him who kills a tyrant. Thus we see that theinstitutions of Phaleasavail only against petty crimes. There is another objection to them. They arechiefly designed topromote the internal welfare of the state. But the legislatorshouldconsider also its relation to neighboring nations, and to all whoare outsideof it. The government must be organized with a view tomilitary strength; and of

this he has said not a word. And so withrespect to property: there should not onlybe enough to supply theinternal wants of the state, but also to meet dangerscoming fromwithout. The property of the state should not be so large that morepowerful neighbors may be tempted by it, while the owners are unableto repel theinvaders; nor yet so small that the state is unable tomaintain a war even againststates of equal power, and of the samecharacter. Phaleas has not laid down anyrule; but we should bear inmind that abundance of wealth is an advantage. The bestlimit willprobably be, that a more powerful neighbor must have no inducementto goto war with you by reason of the excess of your wealth, but onlysuch as he wouldhave had if you had possessed less. There is astory that Eubulus, whenAutophradates was going to besiegeAtarneus, told him to consider how long theoperation would take,and then reckon up the cost which would be incurred in thetime.'For,' said he, 'I am willing for a smaller sum than that to leaveAtarneus at

once.' These words of Eubulus made an impression onAutophradates, and he desistedfrom the siege. The equalization of property is one of the things that tend toprevent the citizens from quarrelling. Not that the gain in thisdirection is verygreat. For the nobles will be dissatisfied becausethey think themselves worthy ofmore than an equal share of honors;and this is often found to be a cause ofsedition and revolution.And the avarice of mankind is insatiable; at one time twoobols waspay enough; but now, when this sum has become customary, men alwayswantmore and more without end; for it is of the nature of desirenot to be satisfied,and most men live only for the gratification ofit. The beginning of reform is notso much to equalize property asto train the nobler sort of natures not to desiremore, and to preventthe lower from getting more; that is to say, they must be keptdown,but not ill-treated. Besides, the equalization proposed by Phaleasisimperfect; for he only equalizes land, whereas a man may be richalso in slaves,

and cattle, and money, and in the abundance of whatare called his movables. Noweither all these things must beequalized, or some limit must be imposed on them,or they must an belet alone. It would appear that Phaleas is legislating for asmallcity only, if, as he supposes, all the artisans are to be publicslaves andnot to form a supplementary part of the body of citizens.But if there is a lawthat artisans are to be public slaves, it shouldonly apply to those engaged onpublic works, as at Epidamnus, or atAthens on the plan which Diophantus onceintroduced. From these observations any one may judge how far Phaleas waswrong orright in his ideas. VIII Hippodamus, the son ofEuryphon, a native of Miletus, the same whoinvented the art of planning cities,and who also laid out thePiraeus- a strange man, whose fondness for distinctionled him intoa general eccentricity of life, which made some think him affected(forhe would wear flowing hair and expensive ornaments; but thesewere worn on a cheap

but warm garment both in winter and summer);he, besides aspiring to be an adept inthe knowledge of nature, wasthe first person not a statesman who made inquiriesabout the bestform of government. The city of Hippodamus was composed of 10,000citizens dividedinto three parts- one of artisans, one of husbandmen, and a thirdofarmed defenders of the state. He also divided the land into threeparts, onesacred, one public,the third private: the first was setapart to maintain the customary worship ofthe Gods, the second was tosupport the warriors, the third was the property of thehusbandmen. Healso divided laws into three classes, and no more, for he maintainedthat there are three subjects of lawsuits- insult, injury, andhomicide. Helikewise instituted a single final court of appeal, towhich all causes seeming to


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have been improperly decided might bereferred; this court he formed of elderschosen for the purpose. Hewas further of opinion that the decisions of the courtsought not tobe given by the use of a voting pebble, but that every one should havea tablet on which he might not only write a simple condemnation, orleave thetablet blank for a simple acquittal; but, if he partlyacquitted and partlycondemned, he was to distinguish accordingly.To the existing law he objected thatit obliged the judges to beguilty of perjury, whichever way they voted. He alsoenacted thatthose who discovered anything for the good of the state should be

honored; and he provided that the children of citizens who died inbattle should bemaintained at the public expense, as if such anenactment had never been heard ofbefore, yet it actually exists atAthens and in other places. As to themagistrates, he would havethem all elected by the people, that is, by the threeclassesalready mentioned, and those who were elected were to watch over theinterests of the public, of strangers, and of orphans. These are themost strikingpoints in the constitution of Hippodamus. There is notmuch else. The

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350 BC POLITICS by Aristotle Translated by Benjamin Jowett BOOK