315. Cadalin v. POEAG.R. No. 104776December 5, 1994Sec. 13 – right to speedy trial

Facts: Cadalin etc. are overseas contract workers recruited by respondent-appellant AIBC for its accredited foreign principal, Brown & Root, on various dates from 1975 to 1983. As such, they were all deployed at various projects in several countries in the Middle East as well as in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and Malaysia. The case arose when their overseas employment contracts were terminated even before their expiration. Under Bahrain law, where some of the complainants were deployed, the prescriptive period for claims arising out of a contract of employment is one year.

Issue: whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that shall be the governing law

Held:

The Supreme Court held that as a general rule a foreign procedural law will not be applied in our country as we must adopt our own procedural laws.

EXCEPTION: Philippines may adopt foreign procedural law under the Borrowing Statute such as Sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Rule stating “if by the laws of the State or country where the cause of action arose the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippines.” Thus, Bahrain law must be applied. However, the court contends that Bahrain’s law on prescription cannot be applied because the court will not enforce any foreign claim that is obnoxious to the forum’s public policy and the 1 yr. rule on prescription is against public policy on labor as enshrined in the Philippine Constitution.

The court ruled that the prescription period applicable to the case should be Art 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines with a 3 years prescription period since the claim arose from labor employment.  

It is true that the constitutional right to “a speedy disposition of cases” is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasijudicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice. However, as held in Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., 153 SCRA 153 (1987), “speedy disposition of cases” is a relative term. Just like the constitutional guarantee of “speedy trial” accorded to the accused in all criminal proceedings, “speedy disposition of cases” is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances of each case. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.