31267771 Inside Our Outdoor Policy Cato Policy Analysis

7/29/2019 31267771 Inside Our Outdoor Policy Cato Policy Analysis

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CatoInstitutePolicyAnalysisNo.113:InsideOurOutdoorPolicySeptember29,1988TerryL.Anderson,DonaldR.LealTheauthorsareassociatesofthePoliticalEconomyResearchCenterinBozeman.Montana.

ExecutiveSummarySinceWorldWarII,thedemandforoutdoorrecreationhasincreasedtremendously.Whilethepopulationhasincreasedby65percentandrealpercapitaincomehasapproximatelydoubled,[l]overallparticipationinoutdoorrecreationhasnearlyquadrupledinthepast40years.[2]Anincreaseindemandforoutdoorrecreationmeansthatitsvaluehasrisen;thatis,peoplearewillingtopaymoreforrecreation.Comparing1985to1960,averageexpendituresperindividualincreased,inrealterms,200percentforfishingand400percentforhunting.[3]TotalvisitstoYellowstoneNationalParkincreased8percentfrom1986to1987,eventhoughentrancefeesrosefrom$2to$5pervehicle.[4]Therewere60privateshootingpreservesinSouthDakotain1987,whereonly3or4operatedin1982.Otherstates,includingWashington,Wyoming,andColorado,alsoreportanincreaseintheseoperations.[5]Privatespendingfortheprotectionofwildlifehabitatandenvironmentallyfragileareasisalsodramaticallyup.ThistrendisshowninTable1bythetremendousincreasesinannualmembershipandfundingexhibitedbytheNatureConservancyandDucksUnlimited,twoconservationorganizationsthatspendmostoftheirfundingonacquiringcriticalhabitat.[6]Giventheburgeoningdemandforoutdoorrecreation,wewouldexpecttheprivatesectortorespond,sinceincreaseddemandmeansincreasedprofitopportunities.Totalspendingonoutdoorrecreationreached$100billionin1984.[7]Ahostofrecreationalproductinnovationshaveappearedinrecentyearsineverythin

gfromelectronicfishfinderstoweather-resistant,featherweightclothing.Indeed,mostprivatespendingonrecreationhasbeenforequipmentandtravel.Untilveryrecently,arelativelysmallamountofprivatesectorspendinghadbeenforinputssuchasland,water,andothernaturalresourcesnecessaryforrecreation.ExceptionstothistrendincludeKampgroundsofAmerica,whichwasfoundedin1962asaresponsetoagrowingdemandforcampingfacilitiesalongmajorhighways;huntingandfishingclubsintheEast,whichhaveleasedlandsformanyyears;hikingclubs,whichhavebuilttrailsandhutsthroughprivateinitiatives;youthcamps,whichhaveprovidedfacilitiesforavarietyofoutdooractivities;andskislopesandlifts,whichhavebeenbuiltonbothprivateandpubliclandswithprivatefunds.Table1IncreasesinMembershipandFundingTheNatureConservancyDucksUnlimitedYearMembershipFundingMembershipFunding


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19601986

6,000309,643

$1,000,000$73,400,000

25,000580,000

$719,098$54,000,000

Themajorreasontherehasnotbeenmoreofaprivatesupplyresponseintheprovisionofnaturalresourceshasbeencompetitionfromthepublicsector.Withover30percentofthelandownedbythefederalgovernmentandthevastmajorityofthisprovidingrecreationalopportunities,theprivatesectorhasfounditdifficulttocompete.MuchoftheprivateresponsehasoccurredintheEast,wherefederallandislesspervasive,orintheprovisionoffacilities,suchasskirunsandcampgrounds,whereadditionalcapitalinvestmentisnecessary.Recently,theprivatesectorhasrespondedintheWestasovercrowdingoffreepublicresourceshascreatedmoreopportunitiesforentrepreneurs.Unfortunately,thelargeextentofpubliclandownership,combinedwithalonghistoryoffederalprovisionofrecreationalopportunities,createsaninertiathatisdifficulttoovercome.TherecentPresident'sCommissiononAmericansOutdoorsreportprovidesanexampleofthispublicsectorinertia.Chargedwithreviewing"outdoorrecreationpolicies,programsandopportunities"forboththepublicandprivatesector

s,thePCAOfocusedmostlyonasinglecomponentofrecreation:thefederal"outdoorestate.HThedramaticproposalsinthereportcouldwellsetthestageforavastexpansionofpubliclandownershipandfederalcontrolsonlanduseinthenexttwodecades.Theyincludea$15billiontrustfund,whichwouldgenerate"anabsoluteminimum"of$1billiontoacquire,develop,andprotectopenspace;anationwidenetworkofpublicgreenwaysconnectingexistingandnewparks,forests,andotheropenspaces;andfinally,ascenicbywaysprojectthatwouldrequireanexpenditureof$200millionperyeartoprotectscenicviewshedsalongroadwaysthroughrestrictivezoning.InthewordsofConservationFoundationpresidentWilliamK.Reilly,thecommissionhas"affirmedacrucialfederalroleinfunding,leadership,andresourcehusbandry."[8]Therecommendationthatgovernmenttakeanevenlargerroleinsupplyingrecreationsuggeststhattheprivatesectorisunabletoprovidetheoptimallevelofrecreationalservicesandresou

rcehusbandryformeetingthegrowingdemandforoutdoorrecreation.PCAOrecommendationsimplythatgovernmentisthebest-qualifiedproducer.AdismayedJacquelineSchafer,amemberofthePresident'sCouncilonEnvironmentalQuality,pointsoutthatthecommissiondoesnotemphasizepeopleandthewaystheycreateopportunities.Shesaysthecommissionbelievesthat"youcan'thave[recreational]opportunityunlessyouhavelandguaranteedbythegovernment."[9]Siximportantquestionsareraisedregardingtheprovisionofrecreationalopportunities:(1)Whatistheeconomicsofoutdoorrecreation?(2)Istheremarketfailure?(3)Whyistheremomentumforgovernmentalprovision?(4)Cantheprivatesectorrespond?(5)Whataretheimpedimentstoaprivatesectorresponse?(6)Wheredowegofromhere?Answeringthesequestionsiscriticaltorealizingthefullpotentialofouroutdoorresources.Privatelandsprovideanimportantindicationofthispotential.Theselands,afterall,"constitute60percentofthe1.35bil

lionacresofAmerica'sforestsandrangelands."[l0]Privatelandscontributetoourfood,building,andenergysuppliesandprovideacriticalhabitatforfishandwildlifeaswellasaestheticandotherenvironmentalamenities.Anotherreasonforacriticaleconomicanalysisofrecreationpolicyisthatgovernmentoftenhasprovednegligentincaringforthelandandwaterresourcesitcontrols.Agrowinglistoftravestiesonpublicrangelands,forestlands,andwaterwaysraisesquestionsaboutwhethergovernmentisthecorrectchoiceforresourcestewardship.[ll]Equallyimpor-tant,amountingfederaldebtisforcingustoseekwaystoreducethesizeofgovernmentandthuslessentheburdenonthetaxpayer.Iftheprivatesectorcanassumemoreoftheresponsibilityforprovidingoutd


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oorrecreation,thisburdencanbereduced.WhatIstheEconomicsofOutdoorRecreation?Economicthinkingprovidesausefulanalyticalframeworkforstudyingtheproductionandconsumptionofoutdooractivitiesandenvironmentalamenities.Thiswayofthinkingfocusesourattentionontheincentivesandinformationfacedbyproducersandconsumersintheenvironmentalarena.Theindividualistheunitofinterest,andhisorherdecisiontoproduceorconsumedependsonthepersonalbenefitsandcostsassociatedwiththeactiontaken.Therefore,wemustcontinuallyask:Areallthecostsandbenefitstakenintoaccountinthechoicesmadebyproducersandconsumers?


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Thefirstlawofeconomicsisthatindividualsrespondtoprices;thatis,demandcurvesslopedownwardandsupplycurvesslopeupward.Thislawisbasedontheeconomicpropositionthattherearesubstituteseverywhere.Ontheconsumptionside,consumersmoveawayfromconsumingrelativelyhigh-pricedgoodsbyfindingalternativesthatarethebestconsumptionsubstitutes.Ifrecreationalopportunitiesaremadeavailableatloworzeroprices,consumerscanbeexpectedtotakeadvantageofthoseopportunitiesandusethemtothepointwheretheadditionalvalueinconsumptionisequaltotheadditionalcost.Ontheproductionside,ifhigherpricesareofferedforrecreationalopportunities,producerswillshiftresourcesawayfromalternativeproductiveusesandintorecreation.Forexample,somelandusedsolelyforagriculturewillbeshiftedtowildlifehabitatifthepriceofferedforhuntingleasesishighenough.Unfortunately,theideaofsubstitutionisoftenignoredintheformulationofnaturalresourcepolicyingeneralandrecreationpolicyinparticular,becausepricesfacedbydecisionmakersareoftenzero.Withgovernmentalprovisionofrecreationalopportunities,oftentheonlycosttoconsumersisthatoftravelingtothelocation.Fromcityparkstonationalparks,entryfeesarezeroinmanycasesandminimalinothers.Forexample,theentryfeeforonestandardautomobileforsevendaysinYellowstoneandGrandTetonnationalparksis$5,regardlessofthenumberofpassengers.Inthewinter,thisfeeisseldomchargedforthoseenteringYellowstoneNationalParkforcross-countryskiing.Attheselowprices,thereisnosignaltoeitherconsumersorproducersthattheresourceisscarceandlittleincentiveforthemtoconsidersubstitutes.Ifprivateprovidersofrecreationalopportunitiesdonotreceivepositivenetreturns,thereislittlereasonforthemtogi

veuptraditionalcommodityproductionevenifthechangecouldbemadeatalowcost.Forexample,therancherwhoownslandalongatroutstreamcouldsignificantlyimprovefishingbykeepingcattleawayfromthestream,thusreducingbankerosionandincreasingbankvegetation.Thecapitalcostoffencingoutthecattlemaybequitelow,butiffreepublicaccessisensuredbylegislation(asitrecentlywasinMontana),theincentivetodosoisremoved.Indeed,improvingfishingopportunitieswouldonlyencouragefishermentoenterranchproperty,reducingtherancher'sprivacyandexposinghimorhertoliability.Unfortunately,muchoftheenvironmentalrhetoricarguesthatthereisno(oratleastverylittle)substitutionbetweentraditionalcommoditiesproducedfromlandandwaterandotheramenities.Asanillustration,considertherecentpositiontakenbyenvironmentalistsinthedebateoverwhethertoallowoilexplorationintheAlaskaNationalWildlifeRefuge's1.5-million-acrecoastalplain.Thisarearepre

sentsabout8percentofthenation'slargestrefuge.In1986,theDepartmentoftheInteriorrecommendedthatthecoastalplainbeopenedtoexplorationanddevelopment.Inresponsetothisrecommendation,however,environmentalistshavefoughttokeepthecoastalplainclosed,fortheyseelittleroomforcompromiseontheissue.InthewordsofaspokespersonfortheWildernessSociety,Where'sthecompromise?It'sthetypeofanissuewhereyoudon'tthinkcompromise.Youdriveastakeinthesandandsay,"Youdon'tcrosstheCanningRiver[markingthewesternedgeoftherefuge'scoastalplain]."[12]Inmostcases,thedecisionisnotrecreationwithnocommodityproductionorviceversa.Undermanycircumstances,recreationalopportunitiesandtraditionaloutputscanbejointlyproducedfromthesameinputs,andinsomecases,arise(fall)inthesupplyoftraditionalcommoditieswillresultinacorrespondingrise(fall)inthesupplyofamenities.Agricultureandopenspaceareexamplesofjointlyproducedoutputs.

About1.5billionacresareincrop,forest,andpasture/rangeproductionbutalsoprovidemuchofthetotalopenspaceinthiscountry.[13]Agriculturealsocomplementstheproductionofwildlifehabitat.Onestudyfoundthatagriculturallandsupportsover3,000speciesofbirds,mammals,fishes,reptiles,andamphibians.[14]Manywildlifeconservationistsfeel,however,thatwildlifehaslostgroundinthelasttwodecades.Priorto1960,forexample,Midwestfarmsprovidedthenecessarycropsandnaturalhabitatdiversitytosupportenormouspopulationsofuplandbirds.Similarly,California'sSacramentoandSanJoaquinvalleyswinteredtensofmillionsofducksandgeese.Unfortunately,thelasttwodecadeshaveseenwildlifehabitatandagricultureconflictwithoneanotherbecauseo


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famuchmoreintensiveapproachtofarming.Theresultshavebeendevastatingforwildlife,withmillionsofacresoflostwetlandsandnestingcover.Suchasituationcanbeturnedaroundiftheincentivesthatfosterintensiveagriculture--


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manyofwhicharerelatedtofederalfarmpolicy--arechanged.Recreationandtimbercanalsobejointlysupported.Forestshelpprovidenaturalwaterstorageforstreamsandriversandensurestableflowsthroughoutthewarmermonths.Thisinturnsupportstheburgeoningdemandforwater-relatedactivities,suchasfishingandwhite-waterrafting,aswellaspleasingsettingsforcampingandhiking.Inaddition,theseareasprovideavaluablehabitatforbig-gamespecies,suchaselk,deer,andbighornsheep,andanimportanthabitatforendangeredandthreatenedspecies,includingthegrizzlybearandtheperegrinefalcon.Timberremoval,ontheotherhand,canimposecostsonrecreationifitisnotmanagedinawaythatminimizestheimpactonwatersheds,riparianzones,andtheavailablecoverforwildlife.Thisoftenhasbeenthecasewithpublicmanagementofforestlands,whererecreationalvaluesarenotaccountedforinForestServicebudgets,andwithprivatemanagement,whererecreationisnotseenasaviableeconomicoutput.Considerthefactorsthataffectaprivatelandowner'sdecisiontoproducearecreationalorenvironmentalamenitysuchaswildlifehabitat.Acattleranchermayhaveatroutstreamonhisorherproperty,butifitscostexceedsitsbenefits,thestreamwillnotbepreserved.Thecostsincludegatesleftopenandgarbagestrewnaboutaswellasalossofprivacy.Undertheseconditions,thetroutstreamposesanuisance.Facingonlydisincentives,therancherislikelytoturnthestreamintonothingmorethanawateringtroughforcattle,thusdestroyingitsrecreationalPotential.Liabilityisanotherpotentialcostofprovidingrecreation.[l5]Liabilityprotectionisconsideredanormalcostofmanyactivities.Businesseselecttobuyliabilityinsurancebecausetheexpectedcostsofalawsuitexceedtheinsurancecosts.Theseinsurancepremiumsbeco

meacostofdoingbusinessandarereflectedinprices.Ifconsumersarenotwillingtopaytheprice,includinginsurancecosts,theproductwillnotbesupplied.Sincetheprivateprovisionofrecreationoftencommandsaloworzeroprice,thelandownerisnotadequatelycompensatedfortheincreasedliabilityandthereforesupplieslessrecreation.Anotherdeterrentoccursiflandownersarepenalizedbythegovernmentforimprovinghabitat.DaytonHydeexperiencedsuchaproblemafterputting25percentofhisranchintomarshesforwildlife,initiatingresearchonthesandhillcrane,andbuildingalakewiththreeandahalfmilesofshorelineforwildlife.Mylandshavebeenzoned.Iambeingregulatedforwetlandsthatweren'ttherebeforeIcreatedthem.LikemostofmyneighborsIcansavemyselffromfinancialdisasteronlybysomecreativelandmanagement,butthestatelegislaturehascutoutmostofmyoptions.[16]Hydeisveryseriousaboutwildlifeconservation.HisbookSandywasreadintotheCongressionalR

ecordandisconsideredbysometobeoneofthemostimportantaidsintheendangeredspeciesrecoveryprogram.[17]Inaddition,hehasturnedhisideasonprivateconservationintoanationaleffortbystartinganonprofitfoundation,OperationStronghold,dedicatedtothecreationofwildlifehabitatonprivatelands.Todate,OperationStrongholdhascreatedoverfourmillionacresofwildlifehabitatonprivatelands.Suchaneffort,however,restsonthecooperationofthousandsofprivatelandownersandcouldgoalotfurtherifgovernmentwouldrefrainfromimposingcostlyzoningrestrictions.AsHydehasfound,someranchersarereluctanttojoin.Asonelandownerputit,Look,youdon'tunderstand.Wewouldliketodoourshareforwildlifebutweareafraidifwecreatesomethingworthwhilethepublicwillwantwhatwehave.It'sjustplaineasierandalotsafertosterilizetheland.[18]Sincethewillingnessoftheprivatesectortoimprovehabitatorcreaterecreationalopportunitiesdependsontheincentives

landownersface,wecannotexpectapositiveresponsefromtheprivatesectoriflandownersarepenalizedforimprovinghabitat.IsThereMarketFailure?Doesthefactthatprivateproducersofoutdoorrecreationoftenfacecoststhatexceedbenefitsdemonstratethatthemarketsystemhasfailed?Theprivatecalculusforprovidingrecreationisexpressedbyafamiliarsayingamongfarmersandranchers:"Ifitpays,itstays."Inshort,privateproducersmustfacetherealitycheckofprofitsandlosses.Thus,theimportantpublicpolicyquestionbecomes:Domarketsforprivatelyprovidedrecreationalcervicesand


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environmentalamenitiesaccuratelyreflectthevaluestoconsumersandthecoststoproducers?Theanswertothisquestionwilldependonthenatureofpropertyrightstoinputsandoutputs.Ifrecreationissimplyaby-productofotherproductionandthereisnomarketfortheby-product,therewillbelittleincentivetofocusonproductionofrecreationalopportunities.Amarketforanygood,includingrecreation,requirestwoelements:(1)ademandforthegood,meaningthatconsumersarewillingtopay;and(2)awayforproducerstocapturethebenefitsfromproducingthegood.Cattleranchingprovidesanexample.Meatconsumersarewillingtopaythepricethatmakesitprofitabletodevoteresourcestoranching.Withwell-definedandenforcedrightstotheattendantresources,producerscanruntheirenterpriseswithsomedegreeofcertaintythattheyhavealegitimateclaimtotherewards.Fencingdefinestheownershipoflandandwaterresources,andabrandidentifiestheownershipofthecattle.Theforceofthelawalsoprotectsanddefendstheproducer'sclaimtotheseresources.Amarketforrecreationsuchaselkhuntingisnodifferent.Forhuntingtobeaprofitableventure,enoughhuntersmustbewillingtopayforit.Therefore,propertyrightstoresourcesmustbeclearlyspecified.Understandably,ifthereisuncertaintyincontrollingtheresourcesandclaimingthereturns,veryfewproducerswilltaketheactionsandincurthecoststoproducethegood.Afrequentargumentagainstprivatesectorprovisionofwildlife-relatedrecreationorotherenvironmentalamenitiesfocusesontheexploitationtheme.Itisargued,forexample,thatwithoutgovernmentownership,"commercialism"ofthebuffaloalmostledtoitsextinction.UnderGarrettHardin's"tragedyofthecommons"characterization,however,theproblemismoreaccuratelydepictedasoneinwhichthereweren

oprivatepropertyrightstothebuffaloherd.[l9]Iftheherdwasleftupforgrabs,everyindividualcouldkillbuffalowithoutfacingthefullcostsofherddepletion.Historically,wildlifeexploitationcanbelinkedtoaninabilitytoes-tablishprivatepropertyrightsratherthantoallegedmarketfailure.[20]Thiscrucialpointhasnotbeenaddressedintraditionalargumentsforgovernmentalprovisionofoutdoorrecreation.Insomecases,theremaybetechnologicalbarrierstoestablishingpropertyrights.IntheearlysettlementoftheUnitedStates,forexample,prairiegrasswaswidelyavailableasanopen-accessresource.Thelowvalueofgrazingland(duetoitsinitialabundance)didnotoffsetthehighcostsofrestrictingentry.Eventually,however,asgrazingvaluesrose,cattlemenformedassociationstorestrictentryintothecommonsanddevelopedhumanfencesknownaslinecamps,whichweremannedbycowboys.Eventhenthehumanlaborcostsofenforcementwerestillquitehigh,thusprovidingtheincentiv

efortheinventionofbarbedwire.Thistechnology,whichwenowtakeforgranted,substantiallyloweredthecostofenforcementandfurtherreducedthetransitiontimefromthecommonstoprivatepropertyrightsinland.Inadditiontotechnologicalbarriers,institutionalbarrierscanmakethecostofestablishingprivatepropertyrightstowildlifeandenvironmentalamenitiesveryhigh.Forexample,intheUnitedStates,thepublictrustphilosophygovernstheownershipofwildlife.Thecourtshaveruledthatwildlifebelongstothepeopleandthatthestateisempoweredtoactasguardianortrusteeofthepeople'swildlife.Inotherwords,therighttoregulatethehuntingofmanyformsofwildlifeiscontrolledbythestate.Withrisingwildlifevalues,however,landownershavetriedtocapturesomereturnsbysellingaccessortrespassrightstoindividualswhowishtohuntorfishontheirland,whilethestatehasregulatedthetakingofwildlife.Suchabifurcationofcontrolmayinterferewithefficientwildlife

management.Forexample,supposeanextendedhuntingseasononarancher'spropertywouldbepossibleiftheranchermadehabitatimprovements.Theextradaysofhuntingwouldallowtheranchertocollectadditionalrevenueandcapitalizeonimprovements.Thecurrentregulatoryrigidity,however,preventssuchcompensationbecausestatesareunwillingtoallowlandownerstocontrolhuntingseasons.Anotherexampleofinstitutional(legal)rigiditiesconstitutingabarriertoprivateownershipiswaterleftinriversandstreams.Likewildlife,ownershipofinstreamflowsisconsideredthedomainofthestatesand,occasionally,thefederalgovernment.Ifanorganizationrepresentingenvironmentalistsorfishermenwantstoimprovefishhabitat,ithasoneandonlyoneoption:topushforgr


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eatergovernmentalcontrol.Unfortunately,wherewaterisscarce,suchanoptioninevitablyleadstoconflictwithprivateuserswhodivertwaterforagricultureandothercommercialpurposes.Theyareunderstandablyresistanttomoregovernmentalcontrol,becausetheyfeartheywilllosetheirwaterrights.[21]Whenlandownersarecompensatedforthewildlifeontheirproperty,viewsofwildlifecanchangedramatically.


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MontanarancherFranklinGrosfieldwastiredofbeingawakenedinthemiddleofthenightbyhunterswantingpermissiontohuntonhislandandalsooflosinghaytowildlife.Buthisattituderegardingthesecostschangedwhenhedecidedtoleasehislandtoahuntingclub.TheclubmanagesthehuntersandprovidesGrosfieldwithaddedrevenuetosupplementhiscattleoperation.SaysGrosfield,"I'vetakenoneofourworstliabilities[wildlife]andturneditintoanasset.n[22]Ifrancherscannotcapturebenefitsfromproducingenvironmentalamenities,suchamenitiesmaybecomeliabilities.Theproductionofelkandelkhabitatprovidesanillustration.If"welfare"elkdonotpaytheirway,resourceallocationwillnotreflecttheirvalue.RancherMichaelCurran'ssituationpointstosomeofthefactorsthatinfluencedecisionstoproducewildlifeandhabitat.Wefeed250elkforsixmonths,and500deerandabout300antelopeforanentireyear....We'vefiguredthatiftheMontanaFishandGameDepartmentpaidusfortheforageconsumed,they'doweus$6,500everyyear.[23]Intheabsenceofcompensation,thepresenceofelkonprivatelandisoftenviewedasaliabilityratherthananasset.Somewesternlandownersstillconsiderdeer,antelope,andelkacostlynuisancebecausetheyconsumeforage,destroyfences,andattracttrespassers.OnerancherinWyomingwentasfarastoconstructa"six-foot-high,27-mile,antelopeprooffence"toprotecthisrangeforlivestock.[24]Thefencinghadtragicconsequencesforantelopeduringthe1984winter:Manyantelope,stymiedbythetightlywovenwire,bunchedupagainstthefence,becomingvulnerabletoslowdeathbystarvationandfreezing.AfewoftheweakonesmadeitintothetownofRawlins,onlytobechasedandkilledbydogs.[25]Eveninthepublicsector,thelackofapositivereturncandiscourageprovisionofwildlife

habitat.Ofcourse,inthiscase,therevenue-generatingmechanismisnotmarketdemandbutcongressionalappropriation.Forexample,elkinnationalforestsaretreatedasaliabilitybecausetheForestServicereceivesmostofitsfundingfromtimberproductionandtheaccompanyingroadconstruction.InFY1985,theForestServicespent$800milliononitstimberandtimbersupportprogramsandanadditional$418milliononroadconstruction,orapproximately75percentofthetotalappropriatedfunds.Incontrast,approximately$37million,or2.3percentofthetotalappropriatedfunds,wasspentonwildlifeandfishmanagement.[26]Thislargedisparityexistsbecausethebudgetingsystemrewardstimber,notwildlife,production.[27]Notsurprisingly,thisbudgetingprocessaffectsresourcemanagement.DamagetohabitatfromexcessiveloggingandroadconstructioniswidespreadinthesevennationalforestssurroundingYellowstoneNationalPark.Theseforestsprovidesomeofthebestopportunitiesforelkhuntingonpubl

iclandinthecontiguousUnitedStates.Theyalsobringmillionsofdollarsintostateeconomies.InMontana,theoutfittingbusinessforbig-gamehunting,whichgenerated$37.4millionforthestate'seconomyin1986,extensivelyusesmanyoftheremote,unlogged,unroadedareasinGallatinNationalForest,locatedjustnorthofYellowstoneNationalPark.[28]BecauseelkvaluesarenotreflectedintheForestService'sbudget,however,theForestServicecontinuestochooseloggingandroad-buildingactivitiesoverpreservingelkhabitatintheforest.Accordingtostatewildlifebiologists,thehugeswathsofdeforestedlandcreatedbyclear-cuttingandbyconstructingroadsinroadlessareashavereducedsecurityandincreasedaccess.Theresultisthatmature(six-point)bullelkharvestedintheseareasareonthedecline."Today,theelkharvestisapproximately65percentspikes[yearlings];tenyearsago,10percentoftheharvestwerespikes;inthemid-50sonly35percentoftheharvestwerespikes."[29]Ironical

ly,alltheforestssurroundingYellowstoneNationalParkaremarginaltimberproducers,meaningthatthecostsofadministration,reforestation,androadconstructionexceedtherevenuesfromtimbersales.TheWildernessSociety,forexample,conductedaneconomicstudyoftimbersalesandfoundthatalltheseforestslostmoneyontheirtimberprograms.Six-yearaveragelossesrangedfrom$241,000peryearforCaribouNationalForestto$2.2millionperyearforBeaverheadNationalForest.[30]Unfortunately,suchproblemsarewidespreadthroughoutthe190-million-acrenationalforestsystem.Seventy-fournationalforestscoveringallregionsofthecountryexceptthePacificNorthwest"consistentlyexperiencebelow-costtimbersales."[31]


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Ifthedemandforrecreationalamenitiesishigh,thereareuncapturedreturnsthatshouldprovidetheincentiveforprivateresourceownerstoattempttodefineandenforcepropertyrights.ThispointwasmadebyeconomistHaroldDemsetz,whoarguedthatpropertyrightsdeveloptointernalizeexternalitieswhenthegainsfrominternalizationbecomelargerthanthecostsofexternalization.[32]DemsetzwentontodescribetheestablishmentofbeavertrappingterritoriesbytheMontagnaisIndians(wholivedontheLabradorpeninsula)whenFrenchfurtraderouteswereestablishedintheearly1600s.Priortothearrivalofthefurtraders,theMontagnaishuntedbeavercommunally.Theaddeddemandfromnewmarketsincreasedthevalueofthebeaver,however,andhencepressureontheresource.Toavoidcompletedepletion,theMontagnaisestablishedprivatehuntinggroundsandsuccessfullymanagedthebeaveronasustained-yieldbasis.Thecostsofdefiningandenforcingprivatepropertyrightswerethetimeandresourcesusedforidentifyingterritoriesforindividualhuntersandexcludingothersfromahunter'sterritory.However,theincreasedvalueofthebeaverjustifiedincurringthesecosts.Ingeneral,privatepropertyrightswillbeestablishedwhentheanticipatedbenefitsoutweighthecostsofestablishment.Onthecostside,technologyisoneofthemaindeterminantsofwhenorifpropertyrightswillbeestablished.Barbedwireprovidesanexample.SettlersontheGreatPlainsfoundfewmaterialsusefulforbuildingfencestokeeptheircattleinandtheirneighbors'cattleout,sotheywereforcedtograzecattleincommonareas,withrulesestablishedbycattlemen'sassociations.Inthe1870s,theintroductionofcheapandeasilyerectedbarbedwiredramaticallyusheredinexclusiveprivateownershipintheregion.[33]Therearemanywaysthattechnologycaninfluencethecost

ofestablishingpropertyrightsinwildlifeandenvironmentalamenities,too.Obviously,fencescanbeusedtokeepanimalsinandpeopleout.Recently,forexample,onewildlifeorganizationtriedtousefencestostopbisonfrommigratingfromYellowstoneNationalParktoplaceswheretheycouldbehunted.Radiotransmittersalsoprovideawayofmonitoringwildlifemovement.WhentheU.S.FishandWildlifeServicereintroducedtheredwolfintheSoutheast,theanimalswereequippedwithradiotransmittersandelectronicallycontrolledinjectiondevicesthatcouldimmobilizethem.Themovementofwolvescannowbemonitoredandcontrolled,andsimilarproposalshavebeenconsideredforwhales.Insuburbanneighborhoods,boundariescanbedefinedwithaburiedcablethatemitsasignaltotriggershockcollarsondogs,replacingfencesasamechanismfordefiningandenforcingpropertyrights.Thoughithasnotbeentried,thistechnologycouldhavepotentialforcontrollingwildlife.Satellitesareamoderntechnologyuse

dtocountwildlifeandtrackpollutantssothatliabilitycanbeestablished.Eachoftheseapproachesoffersawaytoreducethecostsofestablishingandenforcingpropertyrights.Onthebenefitsideofthepropertyrightscalculusisthevalueoftheresourcesinquestion.Inthecaseofrecreationalandenvironmentalamenities,competitionfromthepublicsector(whichprovidesthesegoodsatazeroortokenprice)tendstoreducethevalueofprivatealternatives.Forexample,intheWest,wherethereareextensivefederallandholdings,thepricesofhunting,fishing,backpacking,andcampingarequitelow.However,thecostsoftheseactivitiesaresubsidizedbythefederaltreasuryratherthanbeingpaidforinfullbyrecreationaluserfees.TimbercompanieswithlargelandholdingsintheWestcouldprovidesignificantrecreationalopportunities,buttheycannotcompetewiththeunrealisticallyloworzerogovernmentprices.Asaresult,timbercompaniesspendlittleornothingtoenforcetheirpropertyrightsin

amenitiesandtendtoignorethesevaluesinmanagementdecisions.ThestoryismuchdifferentintheEastandtheSouth,wheremostofthelandisprivatelyowned.Intheseregions,timbercompaniescarryoutmanyprogramstoimprovewildlifepopulationsandhabitatandenhancerecreationalopportunities.Intheabsenceofsubsidizedpublicrecreation,thesecompaniescanchargeuserfeesthatmakeitworthdefiningandenforcingpropertyrights.Inotherwords,theyareabletointernalizethebenefitsoftheirwildlifeprogramsandrecreationalprojects.Letusrecaptheargument.Decisionstoprovideandenhancerecreationalopportunitiesdependonbenefitsandcosts.Ifconsumersofrecreationalandenvironmentalgoodscanenjoythebenefitswithoutpaying,thereislittleincentive


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toincurcoststoprovidethem.Eveninthepublicsector,ifreturnsfromrecreationalamenitiesareovershadowedbyreturnsfromtheproductionoftraditionalcommodities,amenitieswillsuffer.Furthermore,ifpublicalternativesareavailableatzeroorlowprices,itisdifficultforprivateproducerstocompete.Whatmustbeemphasizedisthatneithertheexistenceofsubsidizedpublicalternativesnortheinabilitytoestablish


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privatepropertyrightsconstitutesamarketfailure.Theformerissimplyakindofcompetitionthatdrivesoutprivateproduction,andthelatterisacostofdoingbusinessthatmaybetoohightoallowprofitableproduction.Establishingpropertyrightstorecreationalopportunitiesandamenitiesisnotcostless,butthingshaveawayofchanging.Ifthedemandforafacetofrecreationrisesandthenetreturnsbecomepositive,entrepreneurshaveanincentivetointernalizethebenefitsofamenityprovision.WhyIsThereMomentunforGovernmentalProvision?Onthe18th-centuryAmericanfrontier,institutionswereevolvingtocopewiththenewresourceendowments.Sincesupplyinitiallyexceededdemand,therewaslittleneedtoformalizeclaimstoresources.Earlysettlerssimplytookwhattheywanted.Butasthis"GardenofEden"supplydeclinedrelativetodemand,newinstitutions,suchasthepriorappropriationwaterandlandclaimsclubs,evolvedtorestrictentryintothecommons.Insomecases,federallaws,suchasthehomesteadacts,establishedprivatelandclaims.Infact,duringthefirsthalfofthe19thcentury,themajoremphasisofthefederalgovernmentwasprivatization.Neartheturnofthecentury,therewereallegationsthatprivateownershipwasleadingtorecklessexploitationoflandresources.GiffordPinchotandotherpublicforestadvocatesarguedthatanimpendingtimberfaminewasnotbeingtakenintoaccountbytheprivatesector.Theseconcernspersistedeventhoughtheallegationsdonotstandthetestofcarefuleconomicscrutiny.Lumberandstumpagepricesatthetimesignifythatthetimbermarketadjustedsmoothlytochangingresourcevaluesandinventoriesandthatnomajorpriceshocksexistedtoindicateasuddenrealizationthatwewererunningoutoftimber.[34]Inadditiontotheallegedproblemoftimberfamine,certainspeciesofwildlifew

erethreatenedwithextinctionbecauseofhunting.Asaresourceheldincommon,theruleofcaptureprovedtobeadestructiveforceagainstspeciessuchasthebison,passengerpigeon,andtrumpeterswan.Wildlifeconservationistswereurgingthatgamelawsbeestablishedtostopunregulatedhuntingandthatspecialareasbesetuptoprotectthewildlifehabitat.[35]Theseconcernsledtoawholesalechangeinnationalpolicy;thefederalestatewasformedthroughthemassivereservationofpubliclands.Insteadoflanddisposition,whichhadbeenthepolicyfornearlyacentury,thefederalgovernmentswitchedtolandreservationandevenacquisition.ThisswitchincludedthedesignationofYellowstoneNationalParkin1872,thefirstinthenationalparksystem;theForestActin1891,aforerunnerofthenationalforestsystem;andthedesignationofthefirstfederalwildliferefuge,onPelicanIsland,Florida,byTheodoreRooseveltin1903.Inaddition,federalregulationofwildlifebeganwiththeLaceyActin1900,

whichprohibitedthetransferacrossstatelinesofgametakenillegally.[36]Intheearlystages,nationalforests,parks,andwildliferefugesformedthebulkofthefederalestate.Later,federalgrazingdistrictsunderthedirectionoftheBureauofLandManagementwereadded.Ultimately,thesepoliciesresultedinthefederallandsystem,whichnowcomprisesover700millionacres,orone-thirdofallthelandintheUnitedStates.TheideathatthegovernmentshouldprovideoutdoorrecreationalopportunitieswasfirstvoicedduringtheHooveradministration,butitwasnotuntilafterWorldWarIIthatthisrolewassignificantlyimplemented.Fueledbytheenvironmentalmovementintheearly1960s,theconcernthattheexistingsupplyofoutdoorresourceswouldbeoutstrippedbytherisingdemandforoutdoorrecreationwasformallyexpressedinthe1962findingsandrecommendationsofthefirstoutdoorcommission,theOutdoorRecreationResourcesReviewCommission.TheprincipalrecommendationsofORRRCemphasizedad

ominantroleforthefederalgovernmentandledtothecreationoffederalprogramsincludingtheWildernessPreservationSystem,withsome89millionacresofwildernesslands;theWildandScenicRiversSystem,whichhasdesignated72riverstotaling7,365miles;andtheNationalTrailsSystem,whichhasproducedsome23,500milesofscenicandhistorictrails.[37]Moreover,ORRRCrecommendationsledtotheestablishmentoftheLandandWaterConservationFund,whichwasusedtopurchasesome2.8millionacresforfederalagenciesbetween1965and1982.[38]Asecondpresidentialcommission,thePresident'sCommissiononAmericansOutdoors,recentlyreemphasizedthefederalroleinoutdoorpolicy,includingtheimportanceofpubliclandownership.Oneofthemoredramaticandcontroversia


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lPCAOproposalsistheestablishmentofa$1billiontrusttoreplacetheLandandWaterConservation


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Fund,whichnowfinanceslandacquisitionandisscheduledtoexpirein1989.Thetrustwouldhavethesamepurpose,acquiringpubliclands,butitwouldbevirtuallyguaranteed,sinceitwouldnotbesubjecttoannualcongressionalapprovaloroversight.[39]Anothercontroversialproposalincludesthecreationofanetworkofgreenwaysthatwouldconnectexistingandnewparks,preserves,forests,andotherpublicandprivateopenspaces.ThissystemwouldrequireamassiveexpansionoftheexistingWildandScenicRivers,NationalTrails,andScenicHighwayssystemsthroughtheacquisitionofeasementsonprivateproperty.Atleast2,000newriversegmentswouldbeaddedtotheWildandScenicRiversSystem.[40]TheScenicBywaysProgramwouldrequireanannualexpenditureof$200millionfromtheHighwayTrustFundinFY1988and1989alone.Throughthisprogram,ahalf-milescenicviewshedineitherdirectionwouldbeestablishedalongdesignatedroadways.Withinthiscorridor,therecouldbeno"visualblight"suchasnonapprovedbillboardsandjunkyards.Thecommission(awarethatfederallandacquisitionissometimesunpopular)statedthattheprogramwill"emphasizenon-acquisitiontechniques"suchaszoning.[41]ThepremisebehindU.S.recreationpolicyisthatgovernmentalinvolvementisnecessarytoprotectland,water,andwildlifeadequatelybecausethemarketoverlooksthevaluesofenvironmentalandrecreationalamenities.AsRoderickNash,awildernesshistorian,asserts,"Withoutformal[government]preservationtheremainingAmericanwildernesswouldvanish."[42]Theculpritisperceivedtobethefreeenterprisesystem,andonlythepubliclandsystemcancompensateforitsshortcomings."OntheevidenceofseveralgenerationsofexploitativefreedomnoonecouldguaranteethefutureitsshareofAmericanearthexcepttheAmericangovernment,"wroteWallaceStegnerin

BeyondtheHundredthMeridian.[43]Theseinterpretations,however,failtorecognizethatgrowingscarcitychangestheincentives.Asrecreationalandenvironmentalgoodsbecomeincreasinglyscarceandvaluesincrease,individualshaveanincentivetotrytocapturethesevaluesbyestablishingprivatepropertyrights.Indeed,thedrivingforceofthemarketsystemistheeffortsofentrepreneurstocapturepotentialprofits.Ifrecreationalvaluesremainupforgrabs,thatis,subjecttotheruleofcapturelikecommonlyownedbison,theywillnotbe"conserved"bymarkets.Butthesevaluesalsorepresentopportunitiesforentrepreneurswhocanestablishownershipclaimstothem.Theabilityoftheentrepreneurtocapturereturnsfromvariousattributesoflandresourceswillbeafunctionofresourcevaluesandthecostsofdefiningandenforcingpropertyrights.[44]Justascattlemenrespondedtorisingvaluesofthewesternrangebyformingassociationsandfencingintherange,entrepreneurscanandwillrespondtorisi

ngamenityvalues.Anearly19th-centuryexampleofaprivateresponseisRavennaParkinSeattle,Washington.In1887,Mr.andMrs.W.W.BeckcreatedRavennaParkbybuyingseveralparcelsoflandwithgiantDouglasfirsontheoutskirtsofSeattle.TheBecksmadeahostofimprovements,includingbuildingapavilionforconcertsandnaturelecturesandaddingpaths,benches,andtotempolesdepictingIndianculture.Theparksoonbecameimmenselypopular.Visitorspaid25centsadayor$5ayeartoenter,whichcorrespondtoapproximately$3and$60in1987dollars.Evenwiththesefees,8,000to10,000peoplevisitedtheparkonabusyday.[45]Astheareagrewanddeveloped,however,manySeattleresidentsbegantolobbyformorepublicparklands,andin1911thecityboughtRavennafromtheBecksfor$135,663followingcondemnationproceedings.Underpublicstewardship,theparkfellvictimtoanenvironmentaltravesty.Accordingtonewspaperaccounts,thegiantfirtreesbegantodisappearsoonafterthecity'spurch

ase.TheSeattleFederationofWomen'sClubsconfrontedParkSuperintendentJ.W.Thompsonwithreportsoftreecutting.Heacknowledgedthat,yes,thelarge"RooseveltTree"hadbeencutdown,becauseithadposeda"threattopublicsafety.nYes,ithadbeencutintocordwood,SuperintendentThompsonconceded--soitcouldbemoreeasilyremoved.True,thewoodhadbeensold--butonlytodefraythecostsofremoval.Thefederationaskedthatalocalforestryprofessorinvestigate.Theprofessorfoundthatanumberoftreeshadbeencut.WhenthewomenbroughtthistotheattentionoftheParkBoard,theboardexpressedregretandpromisedthatthecuttingwouldstop.Butby1925allthegiantfirtreesinRavennahaddisappeared.[46]


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Somepeoplestillblamethetrees'destructionona1925windstormandothersblameautomobileandchimneysmoke,buttheseexplanationsdonotholdupunderscrutiny.Mostlikely,parksystememployeestookadvantageoftheiraccesstotheparkandcutdowntreestosellforfirewood.SuperintendentThompsoncouldhavebeenoneoftheculprits.ParkDepartmentrecordschargehimwiththeabuseofpublicfunds,equipment,andpersonnelplustheunauthorizedsaleofparkproperty.Evenifheandhissubordinateswerenotthedirectculprits,theycertainlyallowedthecuttingtogoon.WhatlessonscanbelearnedfromRavenna?First,thepossibilityofprivateprovisionofenvironmentalamenitiesmustnotbedismissedquickly.Asearlyasthelatel9thcentury,privateentrepreneursweremotivatedtotrytocapturethebenefitsfromrisingenvironmentalvalues.Indeed,muchofthepressuretoestablishnationalparkssuchasYellowstonecamefromprivateenterprises,suchasrailroads,thatwantedtocapitalizeontheamenityvalues.TotheBecks,Ravennarepresentedasourceofincome.TheyprotectedRavennabecausetheywerefinanciallyaccountable.Iftheyhaddestroyedthebigtrees,theywouldnothavereceivedtheannualincome,andtheywouldnothavereceivedthe$135,663thecitypaidforthepark.Second,publicownershipdoesnotalwayspreserveenvironmentalvalues.IncontrasttotheincentivesoftheBecks,cityemployees,whodidnotownRavennaPark,didnotbenefitdirectlyfrompreservation.Theymayhavehadaformalobligationaspublicemployeestoprotectparkresources,buttheyhadnopersonalstake;theirwealthwasnotdiminishedwhentreesweredestroyed.Infact,theymadeshort-termgainsbycuttingandsellingthetrees.EvenanoutcryfromcivicwatchdogswasunabletopreventtheRavennatravesty.Today,similarresultsareobservedinYellowstoneNational

Park,whereelkareovergrazingtherangeandgrizzlybearsareendangered,andinnationalforests,whereclearcuttingpersistsbecauseofsubsidizedtimbersales.IndescribingtheincentivesthatForestServiceplannersface,foresteconomistRandalO'Toolewrites,UnderpricingofresourceshasinsulatedtheForestServicefromthetruedemandforvariousforestresources.Pricesandcostsshouldactassignals,tellingmanagerswhentheyareproducingtoomuchortoolittleofaresource.ButCongressionalappropriationsallowForestServicemanagerstoignorecosts,whileunderpricingallowsthemtobelievethatdemandiseverincreasing.[47]CanthePrivateSectorRespond?Despitehighdefinitionandenforcementcosts,modernexamplesalsosuggestthatincreasingrecreationalandenvironmentalvaluesareattractingentrepreneurialattention.Ranchers,corporateexecutives,andenvironmentalleadersarefindinginnovativewaystoencouragenaturalresourceownerstoconsideralternativeoutputs.Bygettingthosewhobe

nefitfromrecreationandthenaturalenvironmenttopay,entre-preneursareeliminatingwhathasbeenperceivedasamarketfailure.Theresultsarepartofanevolvingprocessthroughwhichrecreationalandenvironmentalamenitiesarebeingmarketed.ThisprocessisparticularlyevidentintheSouth,wherepubliclandsarelessprevalentandwherethetimberindustryisdominatedbyprivateholdings.Underthesecircumstances,companieshavebeguntomanageforlandvaluesotherthantimber.Theseforestswerepreviouslyviewedaspulpproducers,withlittleattentionpaidtowildlifehabitat.Itsimplywasnotworththecostsofmanagingforthelatter.Aswildlifevalueshaverisen,however,companieshavebeguntochange.TheInternationalPaperCompany'swildlifeprogramisaprimeexampleofestablishingnewpropertyrightsandhencenewincentives.IPemployswildlifespecialiststooverseewildlifeandrecreationonitslands,includingthe16,000acreSouthlandsExperimentForestlocatednearBainbridge,Georgia,w

hereresearchiscarriedouttodevelopforestmanagementpracticesthatenhancewildlifepopulationsaswellasprofits.[48]White-taileddeer,turkeys,rabbits,bobwhitequail,mourningdoves,andotherspeciesarebeginningtoreapthebenefitsofnewmanagementtechniques,asareIPandhunters.Habitatisimprovedbycontrolledburning,bufferzonesalongstreams,andtree-cuttingpracticesthatleavewildlifecoverandplentyofforage.[49]Accordingtocompanyofficials,investinginwildliferesearchandhabitatproductionmakessoundbusinesssense.Onits1.65millionacresintheSoutheast,IPcharges83centsperacreforhuntingclubsand62centsperacreforindividualhunters.Companyofficialsseeagoodpossibilitythatthereturncouldgoashighas$10peracreasmore


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huntersseekthebetterhuntingconditionsavailableonIPlands.IP's3,500-acreCherokeeGameManagementAreaineastTexasalreadyearns$6peracreannually.Forthenation'slargestprivatelandowner,$10peracreisaconsiderableincentive.[50]Intermsofrespondingtorecreationaldemands,NorthMaineWoods,Inc.,offersanotherinterestingcontrasttopubliclandmanagement.Anonprofitassociationformedby20landowners,NorthMaineWoodsmanagesrecreationon2.8millionacres(abouttwicethesizeofDelaware)ofmostlyprivatecommercialforests.Sincetheorganizationwasformedin1974inresponsetothegrowingdemandforoutdoorrecreation,visitordayshavegrownfrom121,000in1974to189,000in1984.[51]Thegrowingattractiontotheareaisbasedontherecreationalandenvironmentalvalues.TheareaincludestwoofthemostwildriversinNewEngland,theUpperSt.JohnandtheAllagash,bothofwhichhavenumerouswhite-waterstretchesforraftingenthusiasts.Theareaalsohasabundantwildlife,includinghuntablepopulationsofmoose,whitetaileddeer,blackbear,andpartridge.With252lakesandpondsandmilesofbrooksandstreams,theareaisparticularlynotedforitsexcellentfishingforbrooktrout,laketrout,landlockedsalmon,andwhitefish.Ingeneral,theareaisnotawildernessinthestrictlegalsense,becauseitismanagedfortimberproductionandisinterlacedwithloggingroads.Nevertheless,thelandprovidestherecreationistwithahighqualityoutdoorexperience.[52]NorthMaineWoods,Inc.,wasinitiatedbythelandownerswhentheybegantoexperienceproblemsresultingfromrecreationaluseofthearea.Theseproblemsincludedsoilerosionandsafetyhazardsonprivateroads,overcrowdingandoveruseofcampingareas,littering,andtheever-presentproblemofforestfires.Theassociation'sprimarytaskwastodevelopaprogramtom

anagepublicuseandtofindwaystofundit.[53]NorthMaineWoodscontrolsaccesstotheareathrough17checkpointsandaccessroads,wherevisitorsarerequiredtoregister,payfeesfordifferenttypesofuses,andobtainpermitsforcampsites.Thefeesrangefrom$2perdayto$17foranall-seasonpermitandareusedbytheassociationtoconstructandimprovecampsites,runatrashcollectionsystem,andrunpubliceducationprogramsonuseofthewoods.Thoughtheinitialeffortswereresistedbythosewhowereaccustomedtofree,unrestrictedaccess,theless-crowded,clean,well-organizedsystemofrecreationmanagementispromotingcooperationbetweenlandownersandrecreationists.[54]Evensmallerindividuallandownersareseekingwaystocapturereturnsfromnontraditionallandattributes.Inthepast,recreationalamenitiesoftenhavebeenviewedasliabilitiesornuisancesbecauseofgatesleftopen,roadstornup,andlitter.Thefeehuntingalternative,however,opensupnewopportunities.Inthesedaysof

postedfarmland,shrinkingpublicaccess,andgrowinghordesofhunters,ahuntingpreservemembershipisanabsoluteguaranteethatyouwillhaveaplacetohuntandaplacetotakejunior,andyouwon'thavetospendhalfofthedaylookingforalandownerwhosepermissiontohuntmaynotcomereadily....Thebottomlineisbetterhunting,moreshooting,andahappierendtoeachexcursion.Whatmorecanthesportsmanaskfor?r551ThisalternativeisveryevidentinTexas,whereover85percentofthelandisprivatelyowned.Deerhunterspurchaseleasesrangingfrom$100to$2,000perindividual,dependingonthequalityandquantityofthegameandthefacilitiesandservicesofferedbythelandowner.Leasesvary;71percentaredeerseasonleases,19percentareyear-roundleases,5percentaredayleases,and5percentareshort-termleases.Thenetreturns"fromdeerleasesequalorexceedtheannualnetreturnsfromlivestockoperationsinmanyareasofthestate."[56]Thus,thereturnsareapowerfulincentive

forlandownerstoprovidethepublicwithgoodhuntingopportunities.PrivateRanchesofMontana,Inc.,alsoprovidessportsmenwithanattractivealternativetopublichuntingandfishing.Bysecuringhuntingandfishingaccesstoseverallargeranchesthatareadjacenttooneanother,PRMIoffersover60,000contiguousacresofwildlifehabitat.Thisamountoflandgreatlyminimizesthird-partyeffectscreatedbywildlifemigratingacrossgeographicboundaries.Huntingisexcellentfordeer,antelope,blackbear,andpartridge.Deerhuntingsuccess,forexample,hasaveraged90to95percentoverthelastseveralyears.[57]Inaddition,numerouspondsandseveralstreamsofferexcellenttroutfishing."Eventhoughpublicareasarefree,Igottiredofthecrowdsandlousyhunting,"expla


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insaveteranPRMImember.PRMIisveryinnovativeinofferingsportsmenawide


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varietyofoptions.Forexample,thereisareducedfeeforbowhunters,anda25,000-acreprimitiveareaisavailableonlytothosewhohuntbyfoot.SuchqualityandserviceprobablyexplainwhyPRMIisattractingmoreandmoresportsmendespitetheabundanceofnationalforestlandnearby.PRMIworkshardtomakethearrangementattractiveforthelandownerinanumberofways.Recreationalmembersmustfollowstrictrulesofconduct,suchasclosingallgatesandobservingclosedareas.Landownersarecompensatedoutofrevenuesfrommembershipfeesrangingfrom$150to$500.ImpressedwithPRMI'sreputationforattractingwell-behavedsportsmenandwiththepotentialforadditionalrevenues,otherranchoperatorsintheregionarejoiningPRMI.OperationStrongholdisanexampleofa"simple,workableprogramledbytheprivatesector--ranchers,farmers,timberproducers--tocreatevitalreservoirsofwildlifeorplantsontheirownlands."[58]Theprogramwassetupasavoluntarycoalitionofrurallandownerswhowantedtoconserveresourcesforwildlife.Itisprivatelyfinancedbymembershipduesandgrantsanddirectedbythelandownersthemselves.Initially,theideawastocreateandimprovehabitatandprotectwildlifeinreturnforapackageofservices,includingprovidingliabilityinsurancetomembersandprovidingtechnicalassistanceandideastolandownerstoshowthatareasofwildlifehabitatcanexistwithoutadverselyaffectingagriculturalproduction.StrongholdfounderDaytonHyde,arancher,conservationist,andauthorofwildlifebooks,hasprovedtheeffectivenessofvarioustechniquesforjointlyproducingcommoditiesandwildlifeonhisownranchinOregon.Hehascreatedhabitatforover5,000waterfowl,apairofbaldeagles,ospreys,twopairsofsandhillcranes,afamilyoftrumpeterswans,andmanyotherspecies.Hydehasalsodevisedawaytomitigate

thepublic'snegativereactiontotrespassrestriction;heerectedcorrugatedStyrofoamsignsthatread,"Member,PrivateLand,WILDLIFESTRONGHOLD,aNationwideProject.Thislandownercares:HehascommittedhispropertytoasignificantconservationandwildlifeprogrambenefittingYOU.Wildlifeneedsprivacy.Pleasecooperate.Itisunlawfultoenterthesepremiseswithoutwritten,datedpermissionofthelandowner.n[59]Thepublicseemstorespectthepropertyrightsestablishedbythesigns,andtheresultislessvandalismandtrespassing.OperationStrongholdiscatchingonbyprovidingavaluedservicetolandownerswhowishtoconservewildliferesources.Thereareasmanyas"400aroundthecountrywhohavepledgedsomethreemillionacrestotheprogram.MembersarelocatedinallstatesandhaveevenjoinedfromEnglandandSouthAfrica.[60]Consumersarealsotryingtodeveloprecreationalandenvironmentalamenitiesandtodiscoverinnovativewaystomarketthem.Anumberofemergingsportsmen'sorganizati

onsbringhuntersandprivatelandownerstogetherbyofferingbenefitstoboth.TheNationalOutdoorsAssociation,forexample,registersprivatelandinNebraska,Iowa,SouthDakota,Washington,Ohio,Florida,andNewYorkthatisavailableforusebyNOAmembers.Foranannualfeeof$20,eachmemberreceivesalistofcooperatinglandownersanda$500,000excessliabilityinsurancepolicy.Theorganizationalsomonitorsitsmembersandbackstheirconduct.[61]SandhillsOutfitters,Inc.,gotstartedbyofferinganewlineofbusinesstoranchersintheSandhillscountryofNebraskawhowereindangeroflosingtheirranches.SandhillsOutfittersofferedtoleasehuntingrights,andranchersreelingfromplummetingcattlepricesweremorethanwillingtolisten.[62]Thenewbusinessisaprofitmaker,andtheorganizationcurrentlyleasesmorethan100,000acresofprimewaterfowl,pheasant,sharp-tailedgrouse,andprairiechickenhabitatandoffersguidedhuntsonprivateland,completewithroomandboard.Intheintere

stofhelpingasmanyarearanchersaspossible,SandhillsOutfittersalsolistsindividualrancherswhowanttoaccommodatehuntersandopentheirownlandtoguests.[63]Landconservationeffortsprovideyetanotherexampleofestablishingprivaterightstotheenvironment.Usingprimarilyvolunteerinitiativeandprivatefunds,landconservationorganizationshavegrownrapidlyduringthepastthreedecades.In1950only36conservationorganizationsexistedintheUnitedStates,butby1975therewere173,andby1982therewere404groupsrepresentingover250,000members.Localconservationorganizationsin1982controlledover675,000acresofvaluableresourcelands,ofwhichmorethan60percentwasintheNewEnglandandMiddleAtlanticstates(whereprivatelandownershipdomina


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tes).Landconservationtrustsaregenerallyestablishedwithtax-exemptstatustopreservelandforitsamenityvaluesandtokeeplandforagriculturaluse.Fundsareraisedbysolicitingmembers,whopayasmallfeeperyear,andbysolicitinggrantssometimesamountingtothousandsofdollarsfromfoundationsandcorporations.Withthesefunds,landtrustscanpurchaselandinfeesimpletitleorpurchaseconservationeasements.


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Sincelandtrustscannottappublicfunds,theyarecontinuallylookingforinnovativewaystofinancetheirefforts.SpeakingfortheTrusteesofReservationsinMassachusetts,GordonAbbott,Jr.,stated,We'realsofortunatethatuserdemandenablesustoraise35percentofouroperatingincomefromadmissionfeesandthatthesecanbeadjustedwithinreasontocatchupwithinflation.We'regreatbelieversinthefairnessofuserspayingtheirway.[64]Astheamenityvaluesrise,organizationsarefindingitworthwhiletotrynewwaysofraisingrevenue.Organizationshaveanincentivetochargefees,becausetherevenuecanbeusedtofurthertheirconservationefforts.ThispracticeisinsharpcontrasttothepoliciesoftheNationalParkService,whichhaskeptfeesinrealtermsbelowpre-1920levels.Atthenationallevel,theNatureConservancyleadsthewayinprivatelandpreservation."TodatetheConservancyanditsmembershavebeenresponsiblefortheprotectionof2,916,819acresin50states,inCanada,LatinAmerica,andtheCaribbean."[65]TheNatureConservancyisalsoapacesetterininnovatingwaystoraisemoneytocovertheoperatingexpensesofeachpreserveitruns.Onthe13,000-acrePineButtePreserveinnorthwesternMontana,forexample,ConservancycomanagersDaveandCindiMcCallisteroffernaturetoursthroughthelastlowlandgrizzlybearstrongholdinthelower48states.Inaddition,DaveMcCallisteroverseescattlegrazinginselectareasofthepreserve.Thegrazingfeesalonenetted$10,000in1986.Besidesthesemethods,aguestranchbusinessoffersguidednaturetoursandaccesstohiking,fishing,andhorsebackriding.TheMcCallistersplantousetherevenuefromtheranchtopurchaseeasementsonsomeofthesurroundingranches.[66]WhatAretheImpedimentstoaPrivateSectorResponse?Itisnotalackofentrepreneurshipthatispreventin

gtheprivatesectorfromprovidingmoreoutdoorrecreationandprotectionofenvironmentalamenities.Theexamplesaboveprovideevidencethatasthevalues;ofthesegoodsrise,entrepreneurswillmakeefforts;tocapitalizeonprofitopportunitiesbyestablishingpropertyrights.Whenattemptstoestablishprivatepropertyrightsarenotmade,however,weneedtoaskwhy.Incertaincases,thereasonwillbethatalackofknowledgeortechnologymakesthecostsofestablishingprivateownershipprohibitive.Unfortunately,governmentalhurdlescanpreventtheprivatesectorfromproducingrecreationandprotectingenvironmentalamenities.Theseobstaclestaketwomainforms.Thefirstissubsidizeddistortionofvalues,andthesecondisinstitutionsmakingitprohibitivelycostlytoestablishprivatepropertyrightstoresources.Sincemostservicesprovidedbythegovernmentarenotfullypaidforbytheuser,governmental(political)pricesgenerallyarelowerthanprivatesectorpricesforthesamegoodorservice.Wi

threspecttorecreation,themostobviouscasesincludetokenfeesforadmissiontonationalparksandpubliccampgroundsandfreehikingandhuntinginpublicareas.TheentrancefeeforYellowstoneNationalPark'sapproximately2.5millionvisitorsannually,forexample,wasraisedfrom$2(theratesincetheNationalParkServiceassumedmanagementresponsibilityin1912)to$5pervehicle.Adjustingthe1912priceforinflationresultsina1987priceofnearly$90!Notonlyisthe$5entrancefeefarbelowtherealpricein1912,itisalsofarbelowthecostofalternativerecreationnotasuniqueasavisittothecrownjewelofthenationalparksystem.Comparethe$5pervehicleentrancefeewithanindividualdailyskiliftticketat$25oradayataprivatewaterparkat$10.Furthermore,the$5entrancefeecomesnowherenearpayingthecostsofoperatingthepark.[67]Similarly,thefeeforcampingatapubliccampgroundismuchlowerthanthefeechargedataprivatecampground.InYellowstoneNationalPark,f

orexample,anovernightstaycosts$6pervehicle,versus$15to$21,dependingonthesizeoftheparty,atnearbyprivatecampgrounds.[68]Ofcourse,theprivateoperationsdonothavetheluxuryofhavingtaxpayerspickupthetabforsuchitemsasland,roads,toilets,wateroutlets,labor,trashremoval,andmaintenance.Tocounterthepricedisparity,however,privatecampgroundsoftenprovideadditionalfacilities,includingshowerunitsandelectricalandwaterhookupsforrecreationalvehicles.Freepublichuntingprovidesanotherexampleinwhichgovernmentalprovisionatlowpricesinterfereswithproductionbytheprivatesector.Acomparisonoftworegionsofthecountryillustratesthisprinciple.InTexasandtheSouth-east,mostofthewildlifehabitatisprivatelyowned,


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solandownersdonothavetocompetewithzero-priced


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huntingfromthepublicsector.Asaresult,feehuntinghasbeenwellestablishedsincetheearly1970s.Ontheotherhand,privatefeehuntingoperationsintheRockyMountainstatesofMontana,Idaho,andWyominghavetocompetewiththelargeamountoffederalforestlandandrangelandwherethehuntingisfreetotheuser.NotonlyhasthezeropriceforhuntingonpubliclandsdelayedtheevolutionoffeehuntingintheWest,ithasalsocontributedtoadeteriorationofqualityduetocrowding.Whyisthereareluctancetoraisefeestorealisticlevels?ThemainproblemisthatanincreaseinentrancefeesdoesnotbenefiteithervisitorsorNationalParkServicebureaucrats.Visitorsmightbewillingtopayahigherpriceifitmeantbetterfacilities,butthereisnoguaranteethatfeeswillgotowardproducingabetterproduct.Forthesamereason,NationalParkServicemanagerscannotkeepincreasedrevenuesintheirbudgets;revenuesgotothegeneraltreasury,reducingoreliminatingtheincentivetoincreasefees.Indeed,sinceNationalParkServicebudgetsdependinpartonthenumberofvisitors,keepingthepricelowshouldincreasethosebudgets.(ThefactthattheNationalParkServiceincludestrafficcountsfromtheRockCreekParkwayinWashington,D.C.,anareaunderitsmanagement,initsvisitorcounttonationalparksunderscorestheimportanceofvisitornumbers.)Giventheseincentives,itisnotsurprisingthatsomefeeshavenotgoneupsince1912.[69]Inothercases,subsidiesfortheproductionofnonrecreationaloutputsdecreasetheproductionofrecreationalamenities.Asdiscussedpreviously,theForestService'stimbersaleprogramisatragicexampleofsubsidizeddestructionofwildlifehabitat.Thelossofwetlandhabitatisanequallydepressingexample.Lessthan46percentoftheoriginal215millionacresofwetlandsinthelower48statesremai

ns,anddespitelegislationdesignedtoprotectwetlands,annualwetlandlosscontinuesatanaverageof300,000acresayear.Ironically,thedevelopmentpressurescreatedbythefederalgovernmentareprimarilyresponsible.Forexample,thebottom-hardwoodwetlandsoftheLowerMississippiAlluvialPlain,amajorconcentrationareaforwinteringducksinthecentralflyway,havebeenreducedby80percent.[70]ArecentEnvironmentalDefenseFundstudyfoundthat"atleast25percentoftotalforestedwetlanddepletionintheLowerMississippiAlluvialPlainwasduetotheconstructionandoperationoffederalflood-controlanddrainageprojects"andthat"theroleplayedbythesefederalprojectsinwetlandconversionwasmoreimportantthantheroleplayedbyanyothersinglefactor.[71]IntheWest,irrigationwaterdeliveredbytheBureauofReclamationprovidesyetanotherexample.Throughinterestfreerepaymentsandextendedschedules,irrigatorshavereceivedsubsidiesforwaterashighas90percentoftheactualc

ostsofstorageanddelivery.[72]Ifirrigatorspayonlyasmallfractionofthecosts,itshouldnotbesurprisingthatmorewaterwillbedemanded.Unfortunately,thispatternhasspelledenvironmentaldisasteratNevada'sPyramidLakeandStillwaterNationalWildlifeRefuge.Becauseofsubsidizedirrigation,thewaterlevelatPyramidLake,homeoftheendangeredcui-uifishandthethreatenedLahontancutthroattrout,hasdroppedby60feet.StillwaterNationalWildlifeRefuge,whichingoodyearsharbored200,000ducks,6,000geese,and8,000tundraswans,haslostalmost68percentofitsproductivemarshhabitat.[73]Institutionalrestrictionsonprivatepropertyrightsareanothersignificantimpedimenttoprivateprovisionofrecreationandenvironmentalamenities.Thecostsofdefiningandenforcingpropertyrightscanthwartprivateeffortstoproducerecreation.Thesecostsmaybeassociatedwithtechnology,ortheymayresultfromthelegalstructure.Considertheprovisionofstreamhabitatforfishing.Ifari

parianlandownertriedtofenceoffalargesectionofanavigableriver,thetechnologicalcostsofenforcingrightslikelywouldbequitehigh.Ontheotherhand,itisfeasibletofenceoff,andchargeatrespassfeeon,smallstreamssuchasspringcreeks,asdescribedabove.Theinstitutionalcosts,however,willbeprohibitiveineithercaseifthelawallowsfreeandopentrespassforrecreationalpurposes.Suchaninstitutionalcostisfoundinthepublictrustdoctrine.HavingevolvedfromEnglishcommonlaw,whichpreventedthecrownfromexcludingcitizensfromtheuseofnavigablewaterways,tidalareas,andbeaches,thedoctrinewasexpandedrecentlytoextendpublicaccesstoallstreamsinMontana.Thepublictrustdoctrinecontendsthatrightstowaterandriparianlandare


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heldsubjecttothestate'strustresponsibilitytoprotecttheresources.Priorto1984,thedoctrineappliedmainlytolarger,navigablerivers,butthatyeartheMontanaSupremeCourtextendedthedoctrinetoallstreams;in1985,thestatelegislaturecodifiedfreeaccessbetweenthe"highwatermarks."[74]Sincetheycannolongercontrolaccess,landownershaveverylittleincentivetocareforthestreamsthatrunthroughtheirproperty.Theyknowthatwithouttherighttocontrolaccess,theycannevercapturebenefitsfromimprovingstreamsandadjacenthabitatforfishingandhunting.Furthermore,anyimprovementswouldonlyattractmorevisitors,thus


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reducingprivacyandinvitingliability.Thislegalimpedimenttoprivatecontrolofaccessthwartsincentiveforprivatestewardshipofstreamresources.Asimilarbarrierresultsfromthelegalandmoraloppositiontofeehuntingandfishing.Wildlifeisthepropertyofthestateandthereforecannotbesoldorregulatedforhuntingbyanyoneotherthanthestate.Thislegalformalityiscircumventedbychargingtrespassoraccessfees(wherefreeaccessisnotguaranteedbythepublictrustdoctrine),butsomefeelthataccess-toapubliclyownedresourcesuchaswildlifeshouldbefree."Special-interestcommercialgroupsaretryingtocapitalizeonMontana'sabundantbig-gamepopulations,nsaysonespokespersonfortheGallatinWildlifeAssociationinMontana.[75]ThepressureismountingtoextendtheconceptoffreeaccessascodifiedinMontana'sstreamaccesslegislation.Sportsmen'sorganizationsarelobbyinginMontanaandWyomingtoopenaccessacrossprivatelandtoreachpubliclands,andsomefeelthatpublicaccessshouldbeextendedtothewildlifeitself,whetheronpublicorprivateland.Thisactionwouldraisethecostofenforcingpropertyrightstowildlifehabitat,thusremovingincentivesforlandownerstoimprovethehabitat.Incontrast,Colorado,California,andUtahhavedeveloped"ranchingforwildlife"programsthatencouragelandownerstoinvestinimprovingwildlifehabitatontheirpropertyinreturnforcertainbenefits.Basically,landowners(inconjunctionwithstatefishandwildlifeagencies)workoutwildlifeimprovementprojects.Forexample,aranchermightimprovebrushcoverforuplandgamebirdsorplantwillowstoprovidehabitatforwhite-taileddeer.Inreturn,thestateallowsmodificationofhuntingregulationsontheranchessothatthelandownerscanraiseadditionalrevenuesfromwildlifeproduction.Suchmodificationstypicallyconsi

stofextendingthehuntingseason,raisingthelimitongametaken,orsellingpermitsdirectlytohunterswithoutgoingthroughthestatelotterysystem.[76]Anotherlegalbarrierpreventsprivateproductionofinstreamandriparianamenities:Asawayofvalidatingwaterrights,statesapplytheconceptofbeneficialuse,whichrequiresthatwatermustbewithdrawnfromthestreamforusessuchasirrigationortheprivatewaterrightsarelost.Unfortunately,inallstatesbeneficialprivateuseonlyincludesdivertingwaterforagricultural,mining,industrial,anddomesticuses.Excludinginstreamflowsfrompotentialprivateuseshasproducedperverseresults.AnexampleoftheseperverseresultswasfoundonMontana'sRubyRiverinMay1987.Minimalsnowpack,littlespringrain,andaheavydemandforirrigationhadreducedtheflowina1.5-milesectionoftheRubytoatrickle.Hundredsoftrouthadbecomestrandedinoverheatedpoolsandeventuallydied.[77]Sadly,theadditionalwaterneededtokeeptheriverflo

wingwasoflowvalueinotheruses.Indeed,asfishweredyingintheRuby,thereweresixinchesofwaterinnearbyfields.Itwasobviousthattheproblemcouldhavebeenavoidedeasilyifonlysmallamountsofwaterhadbeentrans-ferredfromirrigationtoinstreamflows.Montana'sDepartmentofNaturalResourcesandConservationeventuallypersuadedlocalirrigatorstoleaveapproximately100cubicfeetpersecondflowinginthestream.Unfortunately,theeffortprovedtobetoolittle,toolateforthedeadtrout.Theagencyhadtodependonthegoodgracesoftheirrigators.Therewaslittleelsethatcouldbedone,andanylegalactionbytheagencywouldhaveundoubtedlyresultedinlitigation.Withthelowsnowpack,itwaseasytoanticipatethedewateringproblem,soaprivateconservationgroupsuchasTroutUnlimitedcouldhavereadilyleasedwaterfromtheirrigators.Thisarrangementwouldhavebeenpossibleonlyiftherewerenorestrictionsonprivateinstreamflowrights.Giventhatthevalueofthewater

standinginfieldsisquitelow,theamountofwaternecessarytohavepreventedthekillcouldhavebeenrentedforlessthan$4,000.With50,000membersandanannualbudgetofseveralmilliondollars,TroutUnlimitedhadaccesstothenecessaryresourcesifitcouldhavepurchasedthewater.WhereDoWeGofromHere?Sincethefirstpresidentialcommissiononoutdoorrecreationmadeitsrecommendationsin1962,theapproachhasbeentoturnprovisionofoutdoorrecreationovertothepublicsector.Asadirectresult,thousandsofacreswereaddedtothepublicdomain,andcountlessregulationshavebeenimposedonprivatelandowners.Thesecondpresidentialcommission,whichmadeitsreportin1987,carriedonwiththisapproach,callingformoreacquisitionsforthefederalestate"an


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dmorerestrictionsonprivatelandowners.Buttheprivatesectorcanmakeimportantstridesincreatingnewopportunitiesinoutdoorrecreation.Ifproponentsof


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currentpolicyrealizedthis,theywouldnotpersistinmakingnaiveandshortsightedrecommendationsthatclearlyhamperresponsesfromtheprivatesector.Sixpolicyinitiativeswouldencourageevengreaterparticipationbytheprivatesectoraswellasgreaterfiscalresponsibilityonthepartofthegovernment.Thesemaybethoughtofasthe"pathofleastresistance"totheprovisionofoutdoorrecreation.Forreasonsofpoliticalfeasibility,theydonotincludeotherbeneficialinitiatives,suchassellingofforleasingpubliclandstotheprivatesector.opinionsaboutsuchamovemaywellchangeinthefutureifthefollowingproposalsareimplementedbeforehand:1.Fortheproductionofamenities,stateagenciesandcourtsshouldremovelegalrestrictionsontheprivateProvisionofinstreamflows.Thiswouldincludetheremovaloflegalitiesthatrestrictprivate-waterusetowaterdiversionsfor"beneficial"purposes,requireuserstodivertallthewaterallocatedtothem,andpreventthemfromfreelysellingorleasingaportionoftheirallocationtointerestedparties.Suchamovewouldenableprivatepartiestoprotectstreamhabitatandwouldencouragegreatercooperationwithotherwaterusers.2.Thecourtsshouldstopexpandingthepublictrustdoctrineinwaysthaterodeprivateownershipanddiscourageprivateprotectionofamenityvalues.Theuseofthisdoctrinetopreventlandownersfromrestrictingpublicaccesstotheirpropertyprovidesafreelunchtospecialinterests,butitsendsaclearmessagetolandownersthatfishandwildlifearealiabilityinsteadofanasset.Intheend,landownerswillacttoreducetheproductionoffishandwildlifeontheirpropertytodiscouragethepublic'sinterestintheirland.3.Inthesamevein,stateandlocalgovernmentsshouldceaseapplyingso-calledenvironmentalzoninglawsandotherland-userestrictionstopr

ivateownerswhooftheirownvolitionimprovefishandwildlifehabitat.TheexperienceofrancherandconservationistDaytonHydeisalessoninhowintrusivezoninglawscansquashprivateinitiative.Asnotedabove,theNatureConservancy'suseofthemarketplaceprovidesanexcellentexampleofhowitispossibletoachieveenvironmentalprotectionandworkwithlandowners.4.Stateandfederalwildlifeofficialsshouldinstituteflexiblefishandgamelaws.Typically,gamelawsaresetbystateandfederalagenciesonastatewideorregionalbasis.Byworkingwithlandownersinsettingseasonsandbaglimitsonanindividualbasis,theagenciescouldcreateeconomicincentivesthatwouldachievegreaterproductivityinfishandwildlifehabitat.Landownerswhosellrecreationalaccesstothepublicandproducegainsinfishandgameproductionthroughhabitatimprovementsshouldberewardedwithextendedseasonsandgreaterbaglimits.Suchamovewouldencourageimprovementsthatwouldbenefitwildlifepopulationson

thepartoftheprivatesectorandgreaterrecreationalaccesstoPrivatelands.5.Federallandagenciesshouldimplementarealisticuserfeeprograminnationalforests,BureauofLandManagementrangelands,wildliferefuges,andnationalparks.Currently,zeroortokenfeesarechargedforrecreationonpubliclands.Thispracticehasresultedincrowdinginmanyareas,abusesofresources,andreducedincentivesfortheprivatesectortoprovidesimilaractivities.PrivateforestryeconomistandecologistRandalO'Toolehasproposedarecreationaluserfeeprogramforthenationalforests,alongwithotherrecommendationstocreategreatersensitivityonthepartofforest-managementofficialstothevalueofrecreationalamenities.Hesuggestsa$3dailypermitfordispersedrecreationinallnationalforestsaswellashigherfeesforhigh-demandactivitiesuniquetoindividualforests.Healsoproposesdecentralizingthenationalforestsystem,anapproachthatincludeshavingeachnationalforestretainrecreational

userfeesandincomefromproductionofcommodities,suchastimberandminerals,andendingappropriationsfromCongress.Underthisarrangement,eachunitwouldhavetoemphasizeproductionofgoodsthatproduceapositivenetreturn.AccordingtoO'Toole'sstudyofnationalforestbudgets,thispolicywouldresultinanoverallshiftinemphasisfromtimberproductiontorecreationproduction.Thisapproachisappropriateforapplicationintheotherrecreationalfederal-landsystemsaswell.Finally,themovetohigherrecreationaluserfeeswouldhavetheimportantfeatureofgivingtheprivatesectorachancetocompeteonanequalfootingwhenitattemptstoprovidesimilarformsofrecreation.6.Congressshouldcancelgovernmentprogramsthatsubsidizethedestructionofrecreati


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onalandenvironmentalamenities.Asfaraspublicawarenessandpoliticalcloutareconcerned,thisareahasshownmarkedimprovementinrecentyears.Environmentalistsandfiscalconservativeshavemuchtogainbyworkingtogetherinputtinganendto,


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forexample,timbersalesinournationalforestsandfederalwaterprojectsthatnetlargenegativereturnsoninvestmentandwreakhavocontheenvironment.Encouraginggreaterparticipationbytheprivatesectorwillhavedesirableresults.Suchparticipationcanreducepressureonpublicresourcesandcreategreaterdiversity.Theimportanceofsubstitutesshouldnotbeunderestimated.Manyconsumersofoutdoorrecreationwhoaretiredofthegrowingcrowdsonpubliclandsarelookingforoptionsthattheprivatesectorcanprovide.ThereisevidenceofthisintheWest,wherefeehuntingisgrowinginpopularitydespitetheavailabilityofmassiveamountsofpublicland.TherecentlycompletedreportofthePresident'sCommissiononAmericansOutdoorswassupposedtohelpbringaboutahappy,healthy,andprosperousrecreationalfuture.Byclingingtoanoutdatedagendathatpromotesbiggergovernment,however,itfailedtodoso.Thealternativeparadigmisfreemarketenvironmentalism,whichsuggeststhatthereisuntappedpotentialintheprivatesector.Risingvaluesofrecreationandenvironmentalamenitieswillprovidetheincentiveforentrepreneurstodevelopnewtechnologiesandinstitutionsforproducingandmarketingthem.Wemustensurethatthelegalenvironmentisnotinimicaltoprivateownershipandprovisionofthesegoods.FOOTNOTESTheauthorsthanktheEarhartFoundationforitssupportofthisresearch.[1]Realpercapitaincomeincreaseisbasedonthefollowing:for1946-70,TheStatisticalHistoryoftheUnitedStates:FromColonialTimestothePresent,withanintroductionbyBenJ.Wattenberg(NewYork:BasicBooks,1976),p.225;for1970-85,BureauoftheCensus,StatisticalAbstractoftheUnitedStates,1987(Washington:GovernmentPrintingOffice,1986),pp.219,425.[2]Theincreaseinoutdoorrecreationisbasedonanestimatedannualgrowthrate

of10percentfromtheendofWorldWarIIintothe1970sand3to4percentthereafter.SeePresident'sCommissiononAmericansOutdoors,AmericansOutdoors:TheLegacy.theChallenae,withaforewordbyWilliamK.Reilly(Washington:IslandPress,1987),p.38.[3]Figuresfor1960arefromTable380inStatisticalAbstractoftheUnitedStates,1987,p.219.Figuresfor1985arefromDucksUnlimited,July/August1987,p.17.IncreasesareadjustedforCPIincreasefrom1960through1985.[4]ThisincreaseisbasedonpreliminaryfiguresreportedbyMikePflaum,NationalParkServicerangerinchargeofvisitationinformationatYellowstoneNationalPark.[5]JimRobbins,"RanchersFindingProfitintheWildlife,"NewYorkTimes,December13,1987.[6]ThesourcesfortheNatureConservancydataareGeorgeB.Fell,"TheNaturalAreaMovementintheUnitedStates,ItsPastandItsFuture,"NaturalAreasJournal3,no.4(October1983):47-55;andTheNatureConservancy:AnnualReport.1986.ThesourcefortheDucksUnlimit

eddataisaninterviewwithitsheadquartersinLongGrove,Illinois.[7]AmericansOutdoors,p.24.[8]Ibid.,p.xi.[9]TerryL.Anderson,"CampedOutinAnotherEra,"WallStreetJournal,January14,1987.[10]TaskForceonRecreationonPrivateLands,RecreationonPrivateLands:IssuesandOpportunitiesproceedingsfromaworkshopheldinWashington,March10,1986,p.1.[11]Descriptionsofsuchproblemsarepresentedinthefollowing:DeanneKloepferandH.MichaelAnderson,ForestsoftheFuture?AReportbytheWildernessSocietyonNationalForestPlanning(Washington:WildernessSociety,1987);andMarcReisner,CadillacDesert:TheAmericanWestandItsDisappearingWater(NewYork:VikingPenguin,1986).


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[12]DonaldWoutat,"StakesAreHighintheBattleoverOilExplorationinAlaskaNationalWildlifeRefuge,"BozemanDailyChronicle,November5,1987.[13]VictorH.Ashe,"NeedsandOpportunitiesforOutdoorRecreation,"inTransactionsoftheFifty-firstNorthAmericanWildlifeandNaturalResourcesConference,ed.RichardE.McCabe(Washington:WildlifeManagementInstitute,1986),p.14.[14]JamesSpitz,"USDA:CommitmenttoConservation,ninTransactionsoftheFifty-firstNorthAmericanWildlifeandNaturalResourcesConference,p.8.[15]AmericansOutdoors,p.209.[16]Ibid.,p.25.[17]DaytonHyde,Sandy:TheTrueStoryofaSandhillCrane(NewYork:DialPress,1968).[18]Ibid.,p.26.[19]GarrettHardin,"TheTragedyoftheCommons,"Science162(1968):1243-48.[20]Inthenaturalresourcearena,thetraditionalobjectionstomarketprovisionofnaturalresourceamenitieshavefocusedonpublicgoodsandcommonpropertyarguments.Publicgoodsarecasesinwhichexistingpropertyrightsdonotallowexclusiontocapturetherealdemandforthegood.Commonpropertyisacaseinwhichpropertyrightssimplydonotexist.Thecommonpropertyargumentsfailtoaskwhatobstaclesstandinthewayofestablishingprivatepropertyrights.[21]TerryL.AndersonandRonaldN.Johnson,"TheProblemofInstreamFlows,"EconomicInquiry24(October1986);JamesHuffman,"InstreamUses:PublicandPrivateAlternatives,"inWaterRights:ScarceResourceAllocation.Bureaucracy,andtheEnvironment,ed.TerryL.Anderson(SanFrancisco:PacificInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch,1983),pp.249-82;TerryL.AndersonandAllenFreemyer,"ThePublicTrustDoctrine:Recreationalists'FreeLunch,"InstitutePerspectives(InstituteofPoliticalEconomy,UtahStateUniversity)4(Spring1987).[22]"AstheCattleBusinessWeakens,RanchersTurnTheirLandOvertoRecreationalUse,"Wal

lStreetJournal,August27,1985.[23]TomBloodandJohnBaden,"WildlifeHabitatandEconomicInstitutions:FeastorFamineforHuntersandGame,"WesternWildlands10,no.1(Spring1984):13.[24]NationalWildlifeFederation:AnnualReport.1984(Washington:NationalWildlifeFederation,1984),pp.8-9.[25]Ibid.,p.8.[26]KatherineBartonandWhitFosburgh,"TheU.S.ForestService,"inAudubonWildlifeReport.1986(NewYork:NationalAudubonSociety,1986),p.34.[27]SeeRandalO'Toole,ReformingtheForestService(Washington:IslandPress,1988).[28]MarkHenkel,"ImpactofOutfittersIsSetat$86Million,"BillinqsGazette,January18,1987.[29]MarkHenkel,TheHunter'sGuidetoMontana(Helena,Mont.:FalconPublishing,1985),p.17.[30]ManagementDirectionsfortheNationalForestsoftheGreaterYellowstoneEcosystem(Washington:WildernessSociety,1987),p.22.[31]KloepferandAnderson,pp.viii-xiv.


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[32]HaroldDemsetz,"TowardaTheoryofPropertyRights,"AmericanEconomicReview57(May1967):348.[33]TerryL.AndersonandP.J.Hill,"FromFreeGrasstoFences:TransformingtheCommonsoftheAmericanWest,ninManagingtheCommons,ed.GarrettHardinandJohnBaden(SanFrancisco:W.H.Freeman,1977),pp.200-216.[34]RonaldN.JohnsonandGaryD.Libecap,"EfficientMarketsandGreatLakesTimber,"ExplorationsinEconomicHistory17(October1980):372-84.[35]StephenFox,JohnMuirandHisLeaacy:TheAmericanConservationMovement(Boston:Little,Brown,1980).[36]AudubonWildlifeReport.1985(NewYork:NationalAudubonSociety,1985).p.7.[37]NationalParksforaGeneration:Visions.Realities,Prospects(Washington:ConservationFoundation,1983),pp.65-66;andAmericansOutdoors,p.153.[38]NationalParksforaGeneration,p.283.[39]AmericansOutdoors,p.260.[40]Ibid.,pp.142-49.[41]Ibid.,pp.163-67;andPresident'sCommissiononAmericansOutdoors,"DraftRecommendationonScenicByways,"October14,1986.[42]TheAmericanEnvironment,ed.RoderickNash(MenloPark,Calif.:Addison-Wesley,1976),pp.26,126-27.[43]WallaceStegner,BeyondtheHundredthMeridian:JohnWesleyPowellandtheSecondOpeningoftheWest(Lincoln:UniversityofNebraskaPress,1982).[44]TerryL.AndersonandPeterJ.Hill,"TheEvolutionofPropertyRights:AStudyoftheAmericanWest,"JournalofLawandEconomics18(April1975):165.[45]TerryL.AndersonandJaneShaw,"GrassIsn'tAlwaysGreenerinaPublicPark,nWallStreetJournal,May28,1985.[46]Ibid.[47]RandalO'Toole,"ReformingtheForestService,nForestWatch,October1987,p.17.[48]DeanLueck,"ThePrivateProtectionofNaturalEnvironments"(Master'sthesis,UniversityofMontana,Missoula,1983),p.12.[49]President'sCouncilonEnvironmentalQuality,EnvironmentalQuality.1984:

15thAnnualReport(Washington:GovernmentPrintingOffice,1984),p.426.[50]BloodandBaden,p.11.[51]EnvironmentalOuality.1984,p.384.[52]Ibid.,p.381.[53]Ibid.,p.383.[54]Ibid.,p.384.


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[55]"PrivateClubsProvideChoiceShooting,"FishingandHuntingNews.[56]RobertC.Taylor,BruceBeattie,andKerryR.Livengood,"Publicvs.PrivateSystemsforBigGameHunting,"paperpresentedattheconference"PropertyRightsandNaturalResources:ANewParadigmfortheEnvironmentalMovement,"CenterforPoliticalEconomyandNaturalResources,Bozeman,Montana,December1980.[57]Basedondeertakenonranchesduringthe1984and1985deerseasons.[58]EnvironmentalOuality.1984,p.420.[59]Ibid.[60]Ibid.,p.422.[61]KitHarrison,"GroupSolicitsLandownerHelp,"SportsAfield,March1985,p.29.[62]JeromeB.Robinson,"SandhillDucks,"SportsAfield,September1987,p.144.[63]Ibid.[64]GordonAbbott,Jr.,"Long-termManagement:ProblemsandOpportunities,"inPrivateOptions:ToolsandConceptsforLandConservation,ed.BarbaraRusmore,AlexandraSwaney,andAllanD.Spader(Covello,Calif.:IslandPress,1982),p.207.[65]NatureConservancyMagazine,November/December1987,P.2.[66]BasedonconversationwithDaveMcCallisterduringsitevisitinJuly1987.[67]JaneShaw,"MakeVisitorsPayatSitesandParks,nUSAToday,February23,1987.[68]BasedonasurveyconductedatfiveprivatecampgroundsinvariouslocationssurroundingYellowstoneNationalPark.[69]"ParkFeePlanWorriesW.YellowstoneResidents"(AP),BozemanDailyChronicle,July1986.[70]AudubonWildlifeReport.1986,p.374.[71]Ibid.[72]RichardW.Wahl,"CleaningUpKesterson,"Resources(ResourcesfortheFuture)83(Spring1986):12[73]KathleenRude,"HeavenlyWater,EarthlyWaste,"DucksUnlimited,May/June1986,pp.41-45.[74]AndersonandFreemyer,p.2.[75]JoKwong,"PrivateHuntingProvidesPublicBenefits,"WallStreetJournal,June19,198>7.[76]Ibid.[77]EricWiltse,"IrrigationSpellsDeathforHundredsofRubyRiverTrout,"BozemanDailyChronicle,May12,

1987.


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31267771 Inside Our Outdoor Policy Cato Policy Analysis