3032231 Israel Self- Perception

Civil Religion in IsraelAuthor(s): Myron J. AronoffSource: RAIN, No. 44 (Jun., 1981), pp. 2-6Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and IrelandStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3032231 .

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CIVI RELIGIONI Myron J. Aronoff has doctorates in social anthropology (from Manchester) and political science (from UCLA) and is cur- rently Chairman of the Department of Political Science at Livingston College, Rutgers University. He is the author of Power and Ritual in the Israel Labour Party (van Gorcum, 1977). This article was presented at a symposium on Plurality in Religion organised by M. Schoffeleers for the IUAES Intercongress in Amsterdam last April.

In order to explain the complex range of religious views in Israel and relate them to the even more complex variety of ideological perspectives, I find it useful to adapt the notion of civil religion. I treat civil religion as a special type of dominant ideological superstructure which is rooted in religion and which incorporates signifi- cant elements of religious symbol, myth, and ritual that are used selectively and transformed through their incorporation into the civil religion. Although most political systems tend to have dominant ideologies, they do not all necessarily have civil religions in the sense that I am employing the term.

If we were to think in terms of ideal types along an analytic continuum, a society with a dominant civil religion would fall somewhere between one in which the traditional religion was the dominant ideological superstructure, in which religious myth and ritual were virtually synonymous with those of the polity, and in which there is the presump- tion of the immutability of the symbolic universe; and a society in which there is an absolute differentiation between tradi-

tional religion(s) and the rationalized dominant ideology that is expressed characteristically through secularized cultural symbols, epics, and ceremonies (cf. Gluckman, 1963:135).

Civil religions in different societies, the civil religion of one society in different periods of time, and the same civil religion at the same point in time for different members of the society will be character- ized by the range of attributes between these two analytic ideal poles. For example, because civil teligion is more conspicuously a humanly constructed cultural form it will generally tend to lack the force of immutability of traditional religion. On the other hand it will tend to be more taken for granted than will more rationalized ideological expressions that are not clothed in symbolic expressions which invoke a transcendent reality and maybe even a supernatural power. 'By placing the collectivity at the center of its meaning system, civil religion can order the environment and shape the experi- ences only of those whose personal identity is merged to their communal identity. Civil religion's success is measured by its ability to accomplish this fusion but it is clear that it is only likely to succeed under a limited set of circumstances; generally its success will only be partial' (Liebman and Don-Yehiya:6). Therefore, the success of a civil religion in integrating and mobil- izing sectors of the population and giving legitimacy to the polity is partial and variable with regard to different individuals, sectors of the population, and periods of time, and for the same individuals and groups in different contexts.

COM1MENT TWITCHINGS OF THE THIRD REICH One of the first important decisions of the new Association Frantaise des Anthropologues has been to appoint a committee to report on whether or not Dr Ilse Schwidetzky's opinions on race published mainly before the end of World War 2 were sufficiently culpable for her to be considered unworthy of a French scientific honour today. We have summarized the arguments against Dr Schwidet- zky and her defence in RAIN 40 and 41 (under 'Other News') and will report in due course on the AFA's findings.

It is emnphasized that the AFA's aim is not to hound an elderly scientist but to examine a chapter in the history of anthropology which demands analysis. In an article we published last year by Ulrich Braukamper, 'Ethnology in West Germany Today' (RAIN 33, August 1979) it was hinted - though not stated - that the development of German ethnology has still not recovered from the setback of Nazisma. In some other countries today, the distortion of both physical and social anthropology for political purposes remains an urgent issue.

Even the anti-seiilitic fantasies of Nazi pseudo-science are still alive in extreme right-wing circles. For instance, Hans

Gunther's The Racial Elements of European History is being serialized in English translation; no need to give details, because it appears that such 'journals' are helped to survive financially by those who collect them as curiosities. The AFA's decision to investigate L Affaire Schwidetzky must be viewed in the context of the anti-semitic outrages committed in France last year.

Having read various extracts from Dr Schwidetzky's writings we have not yet seen anything that disproves her explanation of her position as summarized in the December issue of RAIN. A full analysis would have to determine whether a word such as Umsiedlung (re- settlement) must have had the same connotations of deadly euphemism for her in 1943 as for historians in 1981. The studied flatness of tone with which, in 1940, she reviews a book of so-called research on the Jewish question is in its own way peculiarly disturbing, as an abuse of academic objectivity. Whether or not she should have been given the Broca Medal is one thing; but it is too easy to assume that in Dr Schwidetzky's shoes one would have shown less frailty than she admits. J.B.

As can be seen in Figure 1, the civil religion of Israel fails to integrate even the entire Jewish population of the state, much less the Muslim and Christian minority who are almost all Arab. None- theless, it does incorporate the majority of the Jews and perhaps a proportion of the Druze population of Israel. It does so on a highly variable basis with great varia- tion in adherence to different principles, response to different symbols, myths, epics, and participation in different civil rituals. Yet the symbolic framework of the Israeli civil religion in its various forms and incarnations provides a common frame of reference and unity for Israelis with various and varying religious and ideological persuasions. It does so in the absence of a general consensus of religious and/or ideological values.

Based on the previous Ottoman millet system Israeli citizens are divided on a basis of religious communities (Jewish, Muslim, Christian, and Druze), each having its own system of religious courts whose officials are paid by the state and which have jurisdiction in matters of personal status. Each of these main religious divisions contain further subdivisions, some of which are formally recognized, e.g., Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox and Protestant divisions within Christian- ity, and Ashkenazi (European) and Sephardi (Oriental) Chief Rabbis (which have no precedent in traditional Judaism). Other divisions which are recognized in Jewish communities outside of Israel, such as Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform, are not officially recognized in Israel because of the Orthodox political monopoly of the religious establishment. Individuals included within each of these religious categories range from those who strictly believe in the dogmas of the religion to those who totally reject them.

According to various estimates, between one-fourth and one-third of the Jewish population of Israel identify themselves as Orthodox or religiously observant. The large majority either keep certain aspects of tradition and/or are not religiously observant at all. Yet most do relate their Israeli identities to Jewish history, tradition, culture, ethics, and/or religious symbols. Liebman and Don- Yehiya argue that 'if any one factor accounts for the development of Israeli civil religion and its particular character, it is the continued Jewish identity of the vast majority of the population, the desire of the majority of Israelis to express that identity symbolically and transmit it to their children, and their inability to filnd in the system of traditional Judaism an adequate expression and vehicle for their Jewish identity' (Ibid, 17).

Since the Israeli civil religion is strongly identifiled with Jewish history, tradition, and culture it is not surprising that the overwhelming majority of the Arab population of Israel does not identify with it. With the exception of a segment of the D)ruze minority within the Arab minority, the Arabs of Israel, be they Muslim or Christian, religious or nonreligious, tend to range from non-Zionist to anti-Zionist in their orientation. The more integrated and acculturated in Israeli society and

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CIVIL RELIGION

Nonpartisan Zionist a

RELIGION Nonpartisan Partisan Religious Zionist IDEOLOGY Zionist

Partisan Religious Zionist

Nonpartisan\ Religious Non-Zionist Partisan

Non-Zionist Prtisan }

\ \ R~~~eligious // \ \ ~~~Anti/non- //

\ \~~~Zionist // \ \ / ~~~~~Partisan /

\ \ / ~~~~Anti-Zionit

Figure 1. Relationships between Religion, Civil Religion, and Ideology. Note: This diagram shows purely structural relationships, and no reference to the size or importance of any individual groupings should be read into it.

culture the Israeli Arabs become, the more likely they are to take a more militant stand against the dominant civil religion. This is true for a segment of the Druze community as well as the Christian and Muslim Arabs.

The dominant civil religion is rejected by a minority of the Jews as well. Ex- treme religious militants like Neturei Karta (Guardians of the City) refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the State of Israel, and refuse to carry Israeli identity cards, vote in elections or serve in the army. They consider Zionism blasphemous on the grounds that only with the coming of the Messiah will Jewish redemption be achieved. There are other Orthodox Jewish communities living in Israel, such as the Eda Haredit (The Pious Com- munity) located mainly in segregated sections of Jerusalem such as Meah Sharim and also in Bnei Brak whose adherents are close in their view to Neturei Karta, but whose less militant followers more closely approximate the non-Zionist views of Agudat Yisrael. Agudat Yisrael prior to the independence of Israel was more hostile to Zionism, but accommodated itself to the Jewish state and works within its institutions main- taining as much autonomy as it can, e.g., its private, but State subsidized school system. Liebman and Don-Yehiya (27) point out that the followers of Agudat Yisrael tend to 'minimize the importance of Israel as a component in their collective identity'. The followers of the National Religious Party (Mafdal) adhere to a version of Zionist ideology which inter-

prets traditional religious symbols within a nationalist framework, and identifies national goals within a religious frame of reference. The more extreme nationalist elements within the National Religious Party (e.g., the Young Guard) and the militant Gush Emunim (Block of the Faithful), whose membership overlaps with the young militants of the NRP but is not identical with it, are attempting to significantly reinterpret and revitalize aspects of the civil religion.

There are militantly anti-Zionist organizations like the P.L.O. which is illegal in Israel, but has supporters among Israel's Arab population. Some openly acknowledge such support, such as more radical members of the Association of Arab University Students. Another militantly anti-Zionist Arab nationalist group, the Sons of the Village, rejects any form of Arab Jewish cooperation such as that represented in Rakah. Rakah, which has both Arab and Jewish leadership but is supported primarily by Arabs, is a Com- munist Party which accepts Israel, but rejects its Jewish character. Over the years there have been a number of predominantly Jewish non-Zionist political movements and parties, the Canaanites, Maki (the defunct predominantly Jewish Com- munist Party from which Rakah split off in 1965), Moked (which was formed by the merger of the remnants of Maki and various new left groups), and Uri Avneri's Ha Olam HaZeh-Coach Chadash. In 1977 some of the leaders and followers of these defunct groups merged with left-wing Zionist doves to form Shelli, a political

party which presently has two members in the Knesset.

All of the other Zionist parties, movements, and lists (of which there are over twenty) ranging from the socialist Labor Alignment to the capitalist Likud list and including the National Religious Party share an adherence to and support of the basic elements of the dominant civil religion. To be sure, each party interprets the symbols according to their own ideological goals and group interests. They are differentially affected by different symbols and myths. Each group has its own unique shrines and heroes. Yet they all share common symbols, rites, legends and myths. Although it means very different things to the different groups and different individuals within the groups, Zionist civil religion constitutes a corpus of collective cultural meanings which unites most of a nation that is otherwise deeply divided.

The dominant Israeli civil religion is not clearly articulated in a coherent state- ment of dogma and related symbol, myth, and ritual. It has not only changed over time, but even at any given point in time, different constituencies (individuals and groups) selectively interpret various aspects of the civil religion attributing different and at times even conflicting meanings to them. I shall attempt to sketch the broad outlines of the civil religion by discussing some of the more important symbols, myths, legends, and rites which are summarized in Figure 2. The central myth of Exile and Redemp- tion derives from Jewish religious tradition. Zionist civil religion interprets the messianic vision of Zion in terms of contemporary nationalism. As it became elaborated it provided the motivation and the legitimization for the return of the Jews to their historic homeland and the creation of the modern state of Israel.

There are two key symbols in Israeli civil religion, the Western Wall in Jerusalem and the Holocaust with its major shrine, Yad Vashem. The Western Wall is a major condensation symbol which symbolically encapsulates 'everything that is Jewish- Israeli . . . historical, national and religious - both the grandeur and the degradation, the suffering, the yearning and the achievement' (Liebman, 1978:9). On the first day after the cease-fire in June 1967 the general public was allowed to view the Wall. Thousands of Israelis walked with uncharacteristic patience and solemnity in a line which wound from the newer Jewish sections of the city through the winding narrow streets of the ancient walled section occupied by Jordan since 1948. Walking carefully on a path which had been cleared of land mines by sappers. Israelis representing every ethnic group, socio-economic class, and ideology (religious and nonreligious) waited their turn to enter the narrow passage immediately facing the Wall where they prayed, kissed the stones, placed notes in the cracks between the stones, or simply observed in awe the scene before theml. It is impossible to convey in words the mood and the power of the shared experience at that time which for many was mystical or transcendent. Since then thle Government bulldozed several hlouses to

3



Figure 2. Selected Attributes of Israeli Civil Religion

Myth/Legend Symbol/Shrine Rite/Ritual

Exile and Redemption Israel Aliyah (Immigration) Jewish History (Condensed) Western Wall (Jerusalem) Pilgrimage, Prayer and Tourism Holocaust Legends Yad Vashem (and secondary shrines) Martyrs and Heroes Remembrance Day Masada Legends Masada Army ceremonies and Tourism Zahal Legends Zahal/military cemeteries Yad Lebanim Memorial Day and other memorial rites

memorials Biblical Legends and Myths Mount Zion and Tomb of the Patriarchs Pilgrimages and Tourism Biblical and Archaeological Museum of the Book (Dead Sea Scrolls) Educational and Tourism Diaspora History and Legends Diaspora Museum Educational and Tourism Religious Myth and Legend Various (specific to each holiday) Religious Holiday Rituals National Legends Flag, State Seal, Leaders, Offices, Army National Holiday Ceremony

make a plaza immediately in front of the Wall, and officials of the Ministry of Religious Affairs have made segregated areas for men and women to pray. Relig- ious pilgrims and tourists are drawn to the Wall from around the world. Many people who viewed the Wall before the alterations were undertaken feel it was more impressive then than presently. It has for each person a different meaning and even different meanings in different contexts. Personally I shall never forget the sense of collective experience and identity which pervaded the cross section of the nation which viewed it with me on that first day.

The Holocaust is another powerful symbol of Jewish history, suffering, and survival which is intimately linked to the creation and raison d 'etre of the State of Israel. 'The major Holocaust shrine is Yad Vashem, second only to the Western Wall as the most sacred place in Israeli civil religion' (Ibid.). It combines a document- ation and research centre for Holocaust studies, a museum with exhibits portray- ing various aspects of the Holocaust, and a memorial chamber with a burning torch illuminating the names of each death camp. It is practically impossible to view this place and not be profoundly moved. Every visiting dignitary is brought to this shrine as one of the first items on his or her itinerary (much as in other countries they are taken to lay a wreath on the tomb of the unknown soldier). There are two days of events each year which com- memorate the Holocaust as Martyrs and Heroes Remembrance Day. The beginning of this memorial rite is signalled by a two minute wail of sirens during which all activity stops throughout Israel and every- one stands at attention. The observance of such a rite closely approximates the aura and solemnity of religious ritual. There are other museums and memorials to the victims of the Holocaust (for example, at Kibbutz Yad Mordecai).

There is also a special memorial day for soldiers who fell in, Israel's wars and battles against terrorism - held the day before Independence Day. The main national memorial ceremony, with full military rites attended by State, military, and religious officials, is broadcast on tele- vision. In addition there are ceremonies at every military cemetery in the country. There are special memorial rites held for various partisan movements such as the Irgun; and there are memorial shrines throughout the country for various military units representing those who fell in Israel's wars, e.g. the burned-out and rust-

ing remnants of the convoys along the highway to Jerusalem. Virtually every Jewish community in Israel has a memorial monument for their fallen sons and daughters. Frequently they are in buildings which double as youth and community centers called Yad le Banim. In certain respects, Zahal, Israel's Defense Forces, is projected and perceived as a symbol of the rebirth of the Jewish people in its national homeland deter- mined to defend itself and to guarantee the survival of the Jewish people.

Israel's modern defenders are frequently symbolically associated with legendary heroes of the past. For example, certain units of Zahal are sworn into the army in special torchlit rites atop Masada, the fortress in the Judean desert where Jewish zealots resisted the might of the Roman legions in a revolt which cul- minated in their mass suicide. Symbolizing armed resistance, courage, and dedication to independence, the archaeological excavation of Masada became an event of great national interest and importance. Archaeology is a widespread hobby bordering on a national obsession in Israel which serves to constantly generate aware- ness of, and interest in, the link of the Jewish people with the land of Israel. Different historical periods have gener- ated their own legendary heroes who symbolize courage and valour. For example, Trumpeldor's heroic defense at Tel-Hai in the pre-state period, and the heroic feats of the young commander of the rescue of the hostages at Entebbe (who died in the raid), became legends in their own time. Each serves to symbolize the spirit of courage and self-sacrifice for their generation.

There is a wide variety of symbolically important sites related to Israeli civil religion. A few examples are Mount Zion in Jerusalem, the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron, the Museum of the Book which contains the Dead Sea Scrolls, and the new Diaspora Museum in Tel Aviv (cf. Lewis for an analysis of the symbolic signifilcance of the latter). Each one evokes different associations between Israel's historic and spiritual past links to the Land of Israel, the sojourn of the Jewish people during their 'exile' in the 'diaspora', and the modern state. Practic- ally every traditional Jewish holiday has been nationalized and given additional and/or new interpretations and meanings. Many of the interpretations stress the struggle of the Jewish people for freedom and independence. Sometimes the nationalist theme is exaggerated to the point of

diminishing the religious theme. For example, a colleague of mine told of his small child returning from nursery school and saying, 'Daddy, I know that the Egyp- tians were our enemies on Passover; the Greeks were our enemies on Chanukah; and Haman the wicked Persian was our enemy on Purim. But, Daddy, who was our enemy on arbor day?' On the other hand, even the most solemn day of the religious calendar, Yom Kippur, has ac- quired an additional national significance since the 'War of Atonement' in 1973. Some purely national celebrations, like Independence Day, have been deliberately tied symbolically to religious tradition, for example by the holding of an international Bible contest in conjunction with it.

From the beginning of the modern Zionist movement, national and religious symbols have been intertwined. The revival of the Hebrew language, which had been only a language of prayer and religious rites for centuries, and the adop- tion of Hebrew names by new immigrants upon settling in Israel, symbolized a tie to the past. The use of the terms aliyah ascent (having spiritual implications) for immigration to Israel and yorida (descent or a spiritual falling from grace tanta- mount to desertion) for emigration from Israel are other examples of symbolic expressions of the civil religion. Most state symbols are related to historic and religious tradition. For example, the state seal is the menorah, an eight branched candelabra which the Romans stole from the second Temple before they destroyed it, a replica or facsimile of which is used in the celebration of the Jewish Festival of Lights, Chanukah. The flag features the Star of David which has both ancient historical and more contemporary significance against blue and white stripes. These colours have associations with traditional religious observance and artifacts, e.g. prayer shawls (tallit) are frequently blue and white. The Hebrew word for syna- gogue is beit knesset. Israel's Parliament is called the Knesset. Such examples are merely illustrative and are by no means an exhaustive or comprehensive list.

The main conclusion of a recent research project by Liebman and Don- Yehiya on civil religion in Israel suggests that there has been a steady increase in the penetration of traditional Judaism into Israeli civil religion in recent years. They argue that religious symbols have become an increasingly important element in Israeli culture providing meaning and identification to many ostensibly non-

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religious Israelis. 3In otler words, the civil religion provides meaning and expression to one's Jewish identity, just as one's Jewish identity provides meaning and expression to one's Israeli identity.' (Liebman and Don-Yehiya, 1979:17). It is the intertwining and at least partial fusion of the two which constitutes the unique character of the dominant Israeli civil religion.

For some Israelis the ingathering of the Jewish people from the diaspora, the creation of the modern state of Israel, its survival against enormous odds in several wars, etc. are divinely inspired. For others the presence of the Jewish people in its historic homeland may not be attributed to divine intervention, but has a mystical or transcendent quality which is kindled and reinforced by the constant associations evoked in the symbolism of Israel's civil religion. There is a fundamental underlying belief on which Israel's civil religion is based, i.e. the historic, religious, and/or moral right of the Jewish people to a national identity and independent state in its ancient homeland. The assumption of that right is taken for granted among those who share the belief. To be sure this right is challenged by others who reject it; and various ideological versions of the civil religion are given to assert and legitimate this right in the face of such challenges. However, the nature of the underlying structure of belief and meanings which are taken for granted within the civil religion differ from the rationalized ideological elaboration of it. If the civil religion itself becomes highly rationalized and the religious content is diluted, as was the case when Ben Gurion attempted to formulate his version of mamlachtiut (Statism), then it becomes more of a dominant ideology. If Liebman and Don-Yehiya have accur- ately identified a trend of increasing penetration of traditional Judaism, the civil religious character of Israel's dominant ideology has been strengthened in recent years.

Writing about civil religion in America, David Little (1974:185) said, 'The found- ing fathers held a view of tthe role of religion and morality in politics that, with all its power, served to obscure certain perplexities and difficulties, and to dis- courage developing the ability to confront and cope with them.' He focuses particu- larly upon the disparity and tensions between religious beliefs, civic respons- ibility, and moral beliefs. Simflarly, the Israeli civil religion contains important inherent tensions, if not contradictions within it, which have profound implications. There is an inherent contradiction between some of the particularistic religious values of Orthodox Judaeism and the universalistic humanism of liberal deniocracy which although ostensibly .synthesized within Zionism, periodically become manifest in many different policy areas. In fact, the wide range of issues related to the relationship between the Jewish religion and the State of Israel are as capable of polarizing the Jewish population in some contexts as the invocation of civil religious imagery is capable of providing a unitary symbolic reference point in other contexts. It obviously provides an unambiguous source of

tension between the Jewish and non- Jewish segments of the population and challenges the liberal image of Israel. Fundamental civil religious concepts such as the 'fusion of the exiles' have profound implications for ethnic and ultimately class relations in Israel today which have serious political consequences. For example, Lewis traces the emergence of the ethnic category 'Oriental' Jews to the aforementioned concept. He argues that, 'the ethnic category Oriental Jew is a phantom, a figment of collective imagina- tion, a symbolic vehicle by which cultural differences capable of masking socio- economic inequality are cognized' (Lewis: 28).

The tensions and contradictions within the civil religion are capable of being interpreted in significantly different ways by groups whose interests and orienta- tions are at odds. One of the challenges to anthropology is to observe and analyse the extent to which different individuals and groups in different contexts are motivated and constrained by their understandings and interpretations of shared cultural meanings in the society. To what extent and in which contexts are the same symbols, myths, and rituals shared? To what extent are the basic cultural beliefs perceived to be immutable or taken for granted; or to what extent are they evaluated and rationalized? How does the relative sacredness or secularity of the symbolic framework relate to cultural change? For example, does the degree to which a symbolic framework is

taken for granted influence the manner in which it can be manipulated for political purposes? Logically it would appear that the more taken for granted aspects of a culture are, the less amenable they would be to manipulation. On the other hand, the more explicit and rationalized they become, the greater is the opportunity for manipulation. I advance this as a working hypothesis.

Civil religion is a concept which fits within an intermediary position bridging immutable transcendent religion on the one hand, and rationalized secular ideology on the other. As such it is less amenable to manipulation and restructuring than is secular ideology, but is more so than is traditional religion. This is so because even though it evokes transcendent images, its humanly constructed nature is more transparent than is that of religion. It attempts to synthesize elements of both religion and ideology, to play upon man's nonrational as well as his rational nature, and in so doing almost inevitably contains fundamental strains and even contradictions. I hope to have shown that the concept of civil religion is useful and worthy of developing and refining. It has helped me to clarify and understand certain aspects of Israeli society and politics. Whereas I seriously doubt that every society has a civil religion, I do not doubt that many of the societies studied by anthropologists miglht either already have, or might be developing a type of religiously based or oriented cultural framework which is, or is becoming, ideo-

WHY TIKOPIA HAS FOUR CLANS

by Antony Hooper and Sir Raymond Firth, F.B.A.

Occasional Paper no. 38 of the Royal Anthropological Institute

ISSN 0080-4150, 76 pp., paperback, price ?4 from the Institute or academic book- sellers. Distributed in North America by Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 07716. Fellows of the R.A.I. may order copies at a 25% discount wherever they reside (?3, cash with order, from the Publications Department).

Antony Hooper advances an ingenious structuralist analysis of the Tikopia data, taking up an idea put forward earlier by Edmund Leach. Rejecting any interpretation of Tikopia tradition as quasi-history, he argues that the myths and rituals are a symbolic expression of cardinal kin relations in Tikopia social structure. Raymond Firth replies with an appreciative if critical commentary on the plausibility of Hooper's inferences, concluding with a challenging Appendix which applies some structuralist assumptions to the English historical succession of kings and queens. Because of its novel theoretical treatment of well-known empirical data, this publication will be of special use in teach- ing anthropology. It is not only a further contribution to Tikopia ethnography, but it is also a noteworthy example of structuralist analysis, and throws into sharp relief a most important modern problem - the interpretation of ethnographic data.

'Tikopia package'

The Institute has also published the following Occasional Papers on Tikopia: no. 19 R. Firth & J. Spillius. A study of ritual modification: the work of the (1963) gods in Tikopia in 1929 and 1952 (?1) no. 29 R. Firth & H. Maude: Tikopia string figures (?3.50). (1970)

These titles may be ordered individually from the Institute, but a 'package' of nos. 19, 29 and the new no. 38 will be mailed for a special price of ?6 (cash with order to the Institute). This offer is not available to North American residents other than Fellows, who may take advantage of the 25% discount and order for ?4.50 post paid.

Royal Anthropological Institute, 56 Queen Anne Street, London WlM 9LA (tel. 01-486 6832)

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logically prominent or dominant. Con- temporary Iran is just one conspicuous example. A more conceptually refilned version of the notion of civil religion which I have proposed might prove a useful analytic tool in understanding such phenomena. Myron J. Aronoff

Gluckman, Max. 1963. Order and Rebellion in 7hibalAfrica. London: Cohen & West.

Lewis, Arnold. 'Phantom Ethnicity: "Oriental Jews" in Israeli Society', unpublished manuscript. Tel Aviv University.

Liebman, Charles. 1978. 'The Myths That Unite'. Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Post International Edition: May 9, 1978:8-9.

- and Don-Yehiya, Eliezer. 1979. Traditional

Religion and Civil Religion, Chapter One of a draft manuscript tentatively titled Civil Religion and Traditional Judaism in Israel. Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University.

Little, David. 1974. The Origins of Perplexity: Civil Religion and Moral Belief in the Thought of Thomas Jefferson. In Russell E. Richey and Donald G. Jones (eds.), American Civil Religion. New York: Harper and Row.

REHABILITATION OF A DENOTIFIED COMMUNITY rTHE EX-CRIMINAL LODHAS OF WEST BENGAL

The author, P.K. Bhowmick, is Professor of Anthropology at Calcutta University and has published many books including Loclhas of West Bengal (Punthi Pustak, Calcutta, 1963) and Some Aspects of Indian Anthropology (Subamarekha, Calcutta, 1980). This paper was delivered at the Edinburgh meeting of the Society for Applied Anthropology last April.

It was 26 September 1979. The people of the whole of Bengal and its border regions were celebrating the Great Puja Festivals. In parties they were visiting the temples and Puja pandals and enjoying the festivi- ties.

Suddenly there came a crowd number- ing several thousands, lethally armed and beating drums. They brought with them a few cartfuls of country liquor. They were a mixed group of tribals. They came to wreak vengeance on a group of 'criminals' who were hiding in a vast stretch of sugar- cane plantation along the basin of the river Subarnarekha. The beating of drums echoed in the jungle on the river banks. The noise and uproar almost rent the sky when the mob found and held forty-five men they were in pursuit of. They tied them with twisted straw ropes like animals and beheaded thirty-nine of them one after another. The bodies were thrown into the river and carried off to the Bay by its strong current. The rest were taken into custody. The angry mob was retaliat- ing against another tribal group for their having committed dacoity and rape in their villages. Then they went back shout- ing all the way like a victorious army.

These victims were the Lodhas who live in the rugged terrain of the Bengal- Bihar-Orissa border where there is an abundance of forests. Their total population is about 20,000 in West Bengal. This group is stigmatized with criminal pro- pensities and this stigma has made them despised, hated and ridiculed. In the few nonths before this incident, they had committed a series of dacoities and rob- beries and in a few cases had molested womiien belonging to the Santal and other tribal groups. The law and order situation greatly deteriorated at this place. The police failed to suppress or apprehend theem, and ultimately the people took the law into their own hands. The tribals declared gira, a traditional form of Santal war against others, by making a knot from the bark of a Sal tree, and by beating kara, their traditional war drums.

In another incident in 1968, eighteen Lodha villages were set on fire by the Santals and four or five people were killed

in broad daylight. Earlier, in 1961, there was a clash between the Lodhas on the one hand and the Mahatos and Santals on the other.

II Anthropologists studied this tribe in 1951-56. They are a people with a pre- agricultural economy mainly dependent on forest products, either consuming these for their sustenance or exchanging or selling them in the market to procure other essential commodities for daily use. Gradually control of the entire forest, the homeland of the Lodhas, got into the hands of the Kings and Zaminders who secured it on a fixed revenue from the British Administration. The agricultural, or rather land-grabbing, communities thus penetrated into these forest lands by clearing the forests and converting them into agricultural fields. The forest thus became gradually reduced, and the lords of these forests became encroachers in the eyes of the law and were strictly re- strained by the Forest Guards and others from using or destroying the forests. Thus they were clamped into a narrow environment and as they had no other means of livelihood, had only one alternative - the path of extra-legal activity - to adopt for their bare existence. This forced criminality and stigmatization for a prolonged period have cut a deep gorge in their minds and the people are now rolling into it helplessly.

Their successive anti-social activities created a serious law and order problem and ultimately in 1871 the then British Administration declared them to be a Criminal Tribe. Since then they were under serious police surveillance. Their movements were restricted and any sort of crime in this locality, whether committed by the Lodhas or others, was always attributed to them. They were sent to jails where in the course of time they picked up acquaintance with other confirmed and skilled dacoits. These gradually penetrated throughout Lodha society. Thus most of them became criminal-minded, 'anti- social' and danger- ous elements. After independence, all the Criminal Tribes of India were considered to be ex-criminal, and in 1953 the Crimi- nal Tribes Acts were repealed so that all such groups are now designated as 'denotified communities'.

It becomes clear on investigation that territorial and economic displacements have disorganised this society and upset its equilibrium. Time and again the Lodhas bore the brunt of outside invasions, and hostile historical forces have not permited them to live as settled agriculturists.

III Lodhas at present do not live exclusively in the jungle areas, but have spread out into other deforested regions also and work there as farm, labourers. But their main economy is still based on: collection of minor forest products, such as leaves for preparing leaf-plates for dining, leaves for preparing country-cigars or bidi, and faggots for sale; collection of edible roots and fruits for household consumption and selling the surplus; collection (by a few of them) of tussore cocoons and selling these for cash; catching snakes, lizards and selling their hides, the flesh of these animals being consumed; catching fish and tor- toises both for domestic consumption and for sale; and finally, daily labour either in agricultural fields or at any other place in the neighbourhood.

But it is said by other people that they are very lazy. Though they live below sub- sistence level, they have a very low aspira- tion to improve their condition of living. Besides, they are vilified with the com- mitment of robbery, dacoity, theft and burglary in the neighbourhood, and the police records are full of their extra-legal activities. Attempts to bring them back to agricultural activities during recent years have in many places not been successful.

IV The Lodhas are a problem-ridden people, but their problems have not been closely studied by the Administration which now wants to tackle these and uplift the Lodhas. Recent study has revealed that their problems are generally of the following nature:-

i) Economic and territorial displacements i.e. loss of livelihood which has caused them to lose self-confidence.

ii) Being not specialized in any pro- fession whatsoever, they could not fit themselves into the existing greater economic structure.

iii) The stigma of 'criminality' has lowered their social status and prestige in the society, and this is acting as a bar to their earning a livelihood.

iv) Frequent police oppression, punishment and torture have loosened their group cohesion and made them migratory. Arrests and confinement in jail have shattered their family bondage, generating an atomized or individualistic mentality.

v) Overall poverty has exposed them to rank exploitation by neighbouring groups and made them surrender to many undesirable situations for the sake of survival.

vi) Being compelled to sell stolen pro-

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