3 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan · 246 Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance Chapter 2 DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2014 Part III Initiatives of Defense of Japan on a special measure

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Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. AllianceChapter 2

Defense of Japan

Section 3 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan

Stationing of the U.S. Forces in JapanSection

3Measures such as force posture realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan are extremely important in mitigating the impact on local communities, such as those in Okinawa, while maintaining the deterrence capabilities of the U.S. Forces. The Ministry of Defense will steadily advance the

U.S. Forces realignment set forth in the Roadmap while making continuous initiatives to gain the understanding and cooperation of local communities accommodating USFJ fa-cilities and areas.

1 Measures to Ensure the Smooth Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan

The stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan forms the core of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements and also demonstrates the deep commitment of the United States to Japan and the Asia-Paci� c region. Thus, the Government of Japan has been actively taking various measures to enhance the credibility of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements in order to ensure the smooth stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan.

1 Measures in accordance with the Status of Forces Agreement

The Status of Forces Agreement1 (SOFA) stipulates matters pertaining to USFJ facilities and areas and the status of the U.S. Forces in Japan, including provisions of facilities and areas for the use by the U.S. Forces (USFJ facilities and areas), and satisfying the labor requirements of the U.S. Forces in Japan.

(1) Provision of USFJ Facilities and AreasJapan provides USFJ facilities and areas for the U.S. Forces under the provisions of SOFA, in accordance with agreements reached through the Joint Committee between the governments of Japan and the United States.

The Government of Japan has entered into agreements and concluded lease contracts with owners of private and public land on which these facilities and areas exist in order to ensure the stable use of USFJ facilities and areas. However, should the Government be unable to obtain the approval of landowners, it will acquire title under the Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release2, while compensating the landowners for any loss they may have suffered in the process3.

(2) Satisfying Labor Requirements of the USFJThe USFJ require manpower (labor) to maintain its forces, and SOFA stipulates that the requirements of the USFJ shall be sat-is� ed with the assistance of the Government of Japan.

As of the end of FY2013, approximately 25,000 USFJ local employees (hereinafter referred to as the “employees”) work at USFJ facilities and areas throughout Japan, working as of� ce workers at headquarters, engineers at maintenance/supply facilities, members of security guards and � re depart-ments on base, and sales staff at welfare/recreational facilities. They perform functions essential for the smooth operations of the USFJ, and support its activities.

The Government of Japan hires these employees in accor-dance with the provisions of SOFA. The MOD supports the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan by performing admin-istrative work for personnel management, payment of wages, health care, and welfare, etc.

2 Host Nation Support (HNS)

HNS plays an important role to ensure the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements. Due to soaring prices and wages in Japan since the mid-1970s, and changes in the international economy, the Government of Japan began to bear labor costs such as welfare costs in FY1978. Then in FY1979, Japan began to bear the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP) respectively.

Furthermore, as the labor costs soared due to chang-es in economic conditions that affected both countries, the employment stability of the employees was adversely in-fluenced, and there was even concern that it would affect the activities of the U.S. Forces in Japan. Therefore in 1987 the Governments of Japan and the United States agreed

1 The offi cial title is the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan.

2 The offi cial title is the Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release, Incidental to the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan.

3 The term “title” means a legal cause that justifi es a certain act.

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Part III Initiatives of Defense of Japan

on a special measure in Article 24 of SOFA (the Special Measures Agreement)4 as a provisional measure for an ex-ception to the cost principle in SOFA.

Based on this agreement, the Government of Japan start-ed to bear labor costs of eight categories such as the adjust-ment allowance (currently replaced by the regional allowance). As the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) was revised later on, the costs borne by the Government of Japan expanded to cover labor costs for base pay, etc., and utilities costs from FY1991. The � nancial responsibility of the Japanese Government was further expanded to cover training relocation costs from FY1996.

Japan has been reviewing HNS with careful consideration to its own dif� cult � nancial situation. The amount of Japan’s HNS budget peaked in FY1999 (annual expenditure base), and has since been declining.

According to the comprehensive review conducted in 2010, the Japanese and U.S. Governments agreed that the over-all expense borne by Japan to support the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan during the period in which the SMA is in effect (for � ve years from FY2011 to FY2015), was determined to be maintained at the same level of FY 2010 (approximately 188.1 billion yen).

3 Special Measures Agreement (SMA)

The key points of the SMA that took effect in April 2011 are as follows:(1) Effective period: Five years(2) Cost sharing: Japan shall bear labor costs, utilities costs,

and all or part of the costs incurred in training relocation. With regard to training relocation costs, on top of the addi-

tional costs incurred on domestic training relocations, costs incurred in training relocation to areas under the control of the U.S. Government, such as Guam, have also been added.

⋅ Operational Guidelines (Exchange of Notes)Labor costs: The upper limit of the number of workers to be funded by Japan will be reduced from 23,055 to 22,6255. The adjustment will be phased in over the new SMA period.

Utilities costs: The upper limit for utilities costs is set at 24.9 billion yen for each � scal year. At the same time, the share of costs to be borne by Japan is reduced from the current 76% (approximate) to 72% (approximate). The adjustment will be phased in over the new SMA period.(3) Cost-saving initiatives: It is clearly stipulated that the

United States shall make further efforts to reduce these ex-penditures6.

See Reference 36 (Outline of Cost Sharing of the Stationing of the USFJ)

4 Costs Associated with the U.S. Forces Stationed in Japan

In addition to costs of stationing the U.S. Forces in Japan, the various costs associated with the U.S. Forces in Japan include costs for implementing the stipulations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report for alleviating the impact on the people of Okinawa, as well as costs for imple-menting measures that will contribute to mitigating the impact on local communities associated with the initiatives for the re-alignment of the U.S. Armed Forces.

See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 3-3-1 (Initiatives for Realignment,

Consolidation, and Reduction of USFJ Facilities and Areas)See Fig. III-2-3-1 (U.S. Forces Japan-related Costs (Budget for FY 2014)

2 Background to the Realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan

Progress of the force posture realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, set forth in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation of May 2006, is shown in Fig. III-2-3-2.

See Fig. III-2-3-2 (Progress of the Realignment of Force Structure of USFJ

and the SDF Described in “Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment

Implementation”)

1 Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting (April 27, 2012)

As to the USFJ realignment, Japan continued to hold discus-sions with the U.S. at various levels. Following these discus-sions, the Governments of Japan and the U.S. decided to con-duct full-scale bilateral discussions concerning the plan for USFJ realignment, in view of factors including the following:

1) The necessity of implementing measures to promptly and steadily enable visible mitigation of impact on Okinawa;

2) The necessity of coordinating the realignment package

4 The offi cial title is the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning Special Measures relating to Article XXIV of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan.

5 The Security Consultative Committee Document issued on June 21, 2011: “The Ministers shared the view to continue to exert maximum effort to maintain stable employment of the employees of the U.S. Armed Forces in Japan while reducing labor costs.”

6 Any amount of reduction in the labor costs and the utilities costs resulting from the measures described above will be added to the current level of FIP funding.

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Defense of Japan


and strategic rebalance to the Asia-Paci� c region, which was set out in the U.S. Defense Strategic Guidance released in January 2012; and

3) The fact that a reduction in the cost associated with the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps to Guam has been de-manded by the U.S. Congress. The discussions led to the release of the “2+2” Joint State-

ment on April 27, 2012.As described above, this “2+2” Joint Statement on April

27, 2012, stated that, in light of important progress made in regard to the plan for USFJ realignment since the “2+2” Joint Statement in June 2011, it had been decided to adjust the plans outlined in the 2006 Roadmap.

Originally, the 2006 Roadmap stated that, among the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) stationed in Okinawa, the main focus of the relocation to Guam would be the com-mand elements, but the U.S. decided to alter the composition of the units in line with the basic approach detailed above. As a result, the U.S. Government decided to continue to retain the U.S. Forces in Okinawa, and deploy Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF)—consisting of command, ground, aviation and logistic support elements—in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii, as well as in Australia as a rotational unit, in order to continue to ensure the presence of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa. This re-

� ects the U.S. review of the composition of the units of the U.S. Marine Corps following the evolving security environment in the Asia-Paci� c region in recent years. As a result, the Governments of Japan and the United States decided to delink both the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena Air Base from the progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF).

An outline of the “2+2” Joint Statement of April 2012 is given below:

(1) Preamble1) The Ministers decided to adjust the plan set forth in the

May 2006 Roadmap for Realignment. 2) The Ministers decided to delink the progress in regard to the

Futenma Replacement Facility from both the relocation of Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam, and the return of land south of Kadena that would arise as a result.

3) The Ministers con� rmed that the overall deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance would be reinforced by strengthen-ing Japan's defense posture and promoting dynamic de-fense cooperation between Japan and the U.S., as well as through the new posture of the U.S. Marine Corps.

Fig. III-2-3-1 U.S. Forces Japan-related Costs (Budget for FY 2014)

Costs for Stationing of USFJ (MOD-Related Budget: ¥365.7 billion (1)+(2))

Cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ (¥184.8 billion (1))

Burden from the Special Measures Agreement (¥143.4 billion)

Realignment-relatedcosts (¥89.0 billion)

SACO-related costs(¥12 billion)

• Projects for land returns ¥2.4 billion• Projects for training improvement ¥0.2 billion• Projects for noise reduction ¥6.0 billion• Projects for facilitating SACO Project ¥2.3 billion

Total: ¥10.9 billion

• Costs for Facility Improvement Program ¥21.3 billion• Labor costs (welfare costs, etc.) ¥26.2 billion


• Costs for taking measures to improve the living environment in areas surrounding the USFJ facilities ¥58.4 billion• Rent for facilities ¥97.0 billion• Relocation, etc ¥1.1 billion• Other costs (compensation for fishery, etc.) ¥24.4 billion

• Relocation of the U.S. Marines in Okinawa to Guam ¥1.4 billion• Projects for realignment in Okinawa ¥5.7 billion• Projects related to the reform of U.S. Army Headquarters ¥7.5 billion• Projects for the relocation of Carrier Air Wing ¥58.9 billion• Projects for training relocation (local coordination cost) ¥30 million• Projects for facilitating realignment initiatives ¥10.5 billion


• Training relocation costs ¥4.9 billion

• Aviation training relocation as part of realignment initiatives

• Training relocation costs: ¥1.2 billion (one of the projects aimed at enhancing training)

• Artillery live-fire training over Highway 104• Parachute training

• Labor costs (basic salary, etc.) ¥111.9 billion Utilities costs ¥24.9 billion• Training relocation costs (NLP) ¥0.5 billion


• Non MOD-related budget• Expenditures borne by other ministries (base subsidy, etc.)• Estimated costs of government owned land provided for use as USFJ facilities3

Total: ¥180.8 billion (2)

Notes: 1. Training relocation costs under the Special Measures Agreement extend either into the cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ or the SACO-related costs and the realignment-related costs. 2. The SACO-related costs refer to the cost for implementing the contents of the SACO Final Report to reduce the impact on people in Okinawa, while the realignment-related costs refers

to the cost relating to a step to contribute to reducing the impact on local communities as part of the realignment initiatives. Since the cost-sharing for the stationing of USFJ is Japan’s voluntary effort to bear some costs in light of the importance of ensuring the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements, its nature is different from the SACO-related costs and the realignment-related costs, and is categorized separately.

3. The costs related to the stationing of USFJ include the MOD-related budget, other ministry-related budgets (base subsidy, etc.: ¥38.4 billion, FY2013 Budget) and the estimated costs of government-owned land provided for use as USFJ facilities (¥166.0 billion, FY2013 Estimated Costs).

4. Numbers may not add up due to rounding.

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Fig. III-2-3-2 Progress of the Realignment of Force Structure of USFJ and the SDF Described in “Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation”

1. Realignment in the Kanto Area

2. Realignment in Okinawa

[Yokota related]Establishment of the bilateral joint operations coordination center (BJOCC) at Yokota Air BasePartial return of airspace, (returned in September 25, 2008) and placing the JASDF air traffic controllers besides the Yokota RAPCON facility (started on May 18, 2007), etc.

Deliberation on civilian-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base (specific conditions and modalities are considered between Japan and the U.S.)

JASDF uses Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. Forces, while taking into account the noise impact on local communities

Release of a portion of land in front of JR Sagamihara Station (about 15 ha) (*JC agreement on partial return (about 17 ha) dated June 6, 2008)Joint/shared use of a specific area (about 35 ha) of open space in the western side of SGD) (*JC agreement dated June 29, 2012)

Release of portions (1.1 ha) of housing area and Others (*JC agreement on partial return (about 5.4 ha) of housing area dated October 31, 2011)

[Sagami General Depot (SGD)]Establishment of facilities along with the transformation of the U.S. Army Japan headquarters (a mission command training center and other support facilities)(Operation of the training center started in August 2011. The development of the training support center has been completed.)

[Relocation of the JASDF Air Defense Command]Relocation of the Air Defense Command and relevant units (Completed on March 26, 2012)

[Camp Zama]Reorganization of the headquarters, U.S. Army, Japan (Reorganized at the end of September 2008)Relocation of the headquarters of the JGSDF Central Readiness Force (Completed on March 26, 2013) Joint/shared use of heliport (*JC agreement dated March 25, 2013)

Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) (full return, about 271 ha)*Return of north access road (about 1ha) on August 31, 2013

Naha Port (full return, about 56 ha)

A replacement facility will be constructed in the Urasoe-Pier district under the Naha Port and Harbor Plan

MCAS Futenma (full return, about 481 ha)

[Relocation within the prefecture]Transport function by helicopter → construct the replacement facility in the area of Oura Bay and the south coast of Camp Schwab

[Relocation of U.S. Marine Corps]III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF),about 8,000 personnel and about 9,000 of their dependents will relocate to Guam* “2+2” Joint Statement of April 27, 2012 states that about 9,000 personnel and their families would be relocated outside of Japan and the authorized strength of U.S. Marine Corps in Guam will be about 5,000.

(Areas indicated are based on the consolidation plan. See Fig.III-2-3-6 for the current status on the returning of land south of Kadena Air Base)

Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)(partial return (153 ha+α) of about 596 ha)

Camp Kuwae (Lester)(full return, about 68 ha)

Naha

Kadena Air Base

Camp Courtney

Replacement Facility

Replacement Facility

SDF bases in mainland, etc.

To Guam, etc.

Camp Hansen

Camp Schwab

Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1 (full return, about 16 ha)

Legend:

Tokyo

Kanagawa

Zama

*JC: Joint Committee: Japan-U.S. Joint Committee

FuchuYokota

Sagamihara

[Land Returns]Formulated a detailed plan (consolidation plan) for returning of significant land area south of Kadena Air Base by consolidating the remaining facilities and areas in Okinawa

*Announced an consolidation plan on April 5, 2013

Implemented Continuing

Implemented Continuing

Legend:

[Joint/Shared Use]Camp Hansen is used for JGSDF training

* Implemented on March 17, 2008

Six candidate facilities for land return located south of Kadena Air Base

[Relocation outside the prefecture]Operational function of air refueling aircraft → relocate to Iwakuni (to be deployed on a rotational basis to Kanoya Base and Guam)Base function for contingency use → Tsuiki and Nyutabaru Air Bases and others

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Defense of Japan


3. Relocation of Aircraft, etc.

Chitose

Shariki

Komatsu Hyakuri

Iwakuni

Kanoya

Futenma

Kyogamisaki

Guam

Kadena

Atsugi

Tsuiki

Nyutabaru

Saipan

MarianaIslands

Relocation of the KC-130 squadron to Iwakuni

Relocation of the functions of aircraft forcontingency use to Tsuiki and Nyutabaru

The KC-130 squadron will deploy on a rotational basis to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam

Portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni (The airport was opened on December 13, 2012)

The relocation of flight training activities from Kadena, Misawa and Iwakuni to ASDF bases, Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki and Nyuutabaru, as well as to Guam. *The relocation to Guam, etc. was agreed upon at the Japan–U.S. Joint Committee in January 2011.

Relocation of MSDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons, etc. from Iwakuni to Atsugi (Affirmed at the “2+2” Joint Statement on October 3, 2013 that they would continue to have a presence at MCAS Iwakuni)

Deploying TPY-2 Radar*Confirmed at the “2+2” Joint Statement on October 3, 2013

Relocation of the CH-53D squadron to Guam (Already relocated to continental U.S.)

Relocation of carrier-based aircraft squadrons to Iwakuni

TPY-2 Rader: deployment of so-called “X-band Radar System”)

Legend:

Implemented

Continuing

Misawa

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(2) Unit Composition in Guam and Okinawa (The personnel numbers shown are authorized strength)

1) As well as stationing MAGTF in Okinawa, Guam and Ha-waii, a rotational presence will be established in Australia

2) Approximately 9,000 U.S. Marines, along with their as-sociated dependents, are to be relocated from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan

3) The � nal Marine Corps presence in Okinawa will be consistent with the levels envisioned in the Realignment Roadmap

4) The number of Marine Corps personnel in Guam will be approximately 5,000

5) The preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Govern-ment for the relocation of the Marine Corps to Guam is $8.6 billion (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2012 dollars). Japan’s � nancial commitment will consist of direct cash contri-bution up to the amount of $2.8 billion (in U.S. FY2008 dollars), as stipulated in Article 1 of the 2009 Guam Inter-national Agreement. Other forms of � nancial support such as loans or equity investment will not be utilized. Even if Japan makes a contribution through cooperation with Item (3) 2) below, it shall be included in this commitment

(3) New Initiatives Aimed at Promoting Regional Peace, Stability and Prosperity

1) The Ministers con� rmed the importance of promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Paci� c region. The Japanese Government will take various measures, including the strategic use of ODA (e.g. provision of patrol boats to coastal states)

2) The Governments of Japan and the U.S. will consider co-operation aimed at developing training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands for shared use by Japanese and the U.S. Forces, and will iden-tify � elds for cooperation by the end of 2012

(4) Land Returns in Okinawa1) 1. Areas eligible for immediate return upon comple-

tion of procedures: Part of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) (West Futenma Housing area and part of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound), part of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) (the north access road, area near Gate 5)

2. Areas eligible for return after relocation within the prefecture: Part of the Makiminato Service Area (the majority of the storage area), part of Camp Zukeran (the Industrial Corridor, etc.), Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester), Naha Port, Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1

3. Areas eligible for return after relocation of the Marine Corps overseas: Additional elements of Camp Zukeran, the remainder of Makiminato Service Area

2) A consolidation plan for facilities and areas remaining in Okinawa will be jointly developed by Japan and the U.S. by the end of 2012

(5) Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma

1) The Ministers reaf� rmed that the existing relocation pro-posal is the only viable solution

2) Japan and the U.S. will both contribute to any refurbish-ment projects required at MCAS Futenma in order to pro-tect the environment and ensure that the air station can be run safely until the FRF is fully operational

See Reference 34 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Commit-

tee (April 27, 2012))

2 Achievements of the “2+2” Meeting (October 3, 2013)

The Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013 cit-ed the achievements in bilateral consultations on the realign-ment of the U.S. Forces in Japan since the release of the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in April 2012. Japan and the United States renewed their strong determination to complete the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Camp Schwab, and agreed to continue to consult on other possible measures while im-plementing the previous agreements as early as possible and steadily from the perspective of mitigating the impact on Okinawa. The following is a description of the realignment of the U.S. Forces in the Joint Statement;� Realignment on Okinawa

⋅ Returns of land: The Ministers welcomed the progress on land returns based on the Consolidation Plan of April 2013

⋅ Relocation of MCAS Futenma: the Ministers con� rmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area and adjacent wa-ters is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma. They reaf� rmed the strong commitment of both Governments to the plan

⋅ Hotel-Hotel training area: The Ministers directed the Joint Committee to reach an arrangement in principle for the par-tial lifting of restrictions for a portion of the Hotel-Hotel training area by the end of November 2013. The two sides committed to continue to consult on other possible measures

⋅ Environment: The Ministers decided to reach a substan-tial understanding by the end of November 2013 on a framework for access to U.S. facilities and areas slated for return, for the purpose of facilitating local authorities’ planning of land use prior to its return

� Iwakuni ⋅ The Ministers con� rmed that the bilateral consultations on

the relocation of a KC-130 squadron from MCAS Futen-ma to MCAS Iwakuni would be accelerated

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Defense of Japan


⋅ The Ministers af� rmed that the MSDF would continue to have a presence at MCAS Iwakuni

⋅ The Ministers acknowledged that the relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni should be completed by around 2017

� Guam ⋅ The Ministers con� rmed the importance of the relocation

of U.S. Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan (as it mitigates the impact on Okinawa, contributes to sustaining the forward presence of the U.S. Forces and facilitates the development of Guam as a stra-tegic hub)

⋅ The Ministers announced the signing of a Protocol to amend the 2009 Guam International Agreement

⋅ The Ministers noted the signi� cance of Japanese cash con-tributions to the development of training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, which bene� t the Alliance by supporting the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps units to Guam and by enabling the shared

use of these training areas by the U.S. Forces and the SDF ⋅ The Ministers completed work re� ecting the breakdown of

costs associated with developing facilities, including training areas, and infrastructure

⋅ The Ministers announced U.S. Marine Corps units are to begin to relocate from Okinawa to Guam in the � rst half of the 2020s

� Advanced Capabilities ⋅ The Ministers con� rmed that deployment of more ad-

vanced capabilities in Japan has strategic signi� cance: 1) MV-22; 2) P-8 maritime patrol aircraft (beginning in December 2013); 3) Global Hawk unmanned aircraft (be-ginning in spring 2014); and 4) F-35B aircraft (in 2017)

See Reference 35 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Commit-

tee (October 3, 2013))

CommentaryCoCoCommentarymmentary

ColumnColumnColumnColumnColumnColumnColumnColumnColumnColumnColumnColumnColumnColumnColumnColumnColumnColumnColumnColumnColumn

The United States has been promoting efforts that place a focus on the Asia-Pacifi c Region (rebalance to the Asia-Pacifi c Region), and as announced in the Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) on October 3, 2013, Japan and the United States confi rmed that deployment of equipment with more advanced capabilities to Japan has a strategic importance and will contribute to the security of Japan and the region. Among other measures, the United States intends to deploy its equipment including MV-22 Osprey, P-8 patrol aircraft, Global Hawk, and F-35B to Japan in order to modernize its capabilities. In December 2013, six P-8 patrol aircraft were deployed by the U.S. Navy to Kadena Air Base, as part of the phased replacement of P-3 aircraft, for the fi rst time outside of the United States. Replacing with P-8 patrol aircraft, which has more advanced capabilities, will improve patrol capabilities of the United States Forces Japan. As for Global Hawk, the temporary deployment to Misawa Air Base started in May 2014. Once the stable operation of Global Hawk has been established, the intelligence capability of the U.S. Forces will be further improved. The deployment will improve de-terrence capabilities of the U.S. Forces in Japan, which consequently will contribute to the defense of Japan and maintaining the peace and stability of the region surrounding Japan.

Deployment of the U.S. Forces Equipment with Advanced Capabilities (Such as P-8 Patrol Aircraft and Global Hawk) to Japan

P-8 patrol aircraft deployed to Kadena Air Base Global Hawk of the U.S. Air Force arriving at Misawa Air Base[Website of U.S. Misawa Air Base]

252




7 The return of Naha Port, the return of Yomitan Auxiliary Airfi eld, and the relocation of artillery live fi re training over Highway 104.

3 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa

As of January 2014, approximately 74% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) are concentrated in Okinawa Prefecture, occupying approximately 10% of the land area of the prefecture and 18% of the main island of Okinawa. The Government of Japan recognizes that the current situation in which USFJ facilities and areas are concentrated in Okinawa imposes a major impact on the local people. The Government of Japan has been making the maximum initiatives to imple-ment a range of measures in light of the security perspective in order to mitigate the impact as much as possible.

1 Initiatives for Realignment, Consolidation, and Reduction of USFJ Facilities and Areas

When Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972, the Government of Japan provided 83 facilities and areas covering approxi-mately 278 km2 for exclusive use by the U.S. Forces under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. However, their concentration in Okinawa has led to strong calls for their realignment, consoli-dation and reduction on the grounds that they seriously affect the lives of people in Okinawa Prefecture.

Both countries have continued their initiatives to realign, consolidate, and reduce USFJ facilities and areas, and, in relation to the so-called 23 issues, it was agreed in 1990 that both sides would proceed with the necessary adjustments and procedures for the return of land. Moreover, regarding the so-called Three Okinawa Issues such as the return of Naha Port7, it was agreed in 1995 that initiatives would be made to resolve these issues.

See Reference37 (Outline of 23 Issues)

Subsequently, in response to an unfortunate incident that occurred in 1995, as well as the refusal of the then Governor of Okinawa to sign land lease renewal documents under the Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release, the Government of Japan decided to devote even greater initiatives towards realignment, consolidation, and reduction, believing that the impact should be shared by the whole nation. In order to hold consultations on issues related to USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, the Government of Japan established the Okinawa Action Council between the central government and Okinawa Prefecture, and the Special Action Committee on Oki-nawa (SACO) between Japan and the United States, and the so-called SACO Final Report was compiled in 1996.

2 SACO Final Report and Progress

The SACO Final Report stipulates the return of land, the adjust-ment of training and operational procedures, the implementation of noise abatement initiatives, and the improvement of opera-tional procedures regarding the Status of Forces Agreement, and also refers to the related facilities and areas covered. The land to be returned based on the SACO Final Report represents ap-proximately 21% (about 50 km2) of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa at that time, exceeding the amount of land returned during the period between the reversion of Okinawa and the im-plementation of the SACO Final Report, which is roughly 43 km2.

See Fig. III-2-3-3 (Facilities and Areas Related to the SACO Final Report);

Fig. III-2-3-4 (Changes in Number and Area of the USFJ Facilities and

Areas (Exclusive Use) in Okinawa)See Reference 38 (The SACO Final Report); Reference 39 (State of Prog-

ress of the SACO Final Report) Fig. III-2-3-3 Facilities and Areas Related to the SACO Final Report

Camp Hansen

Offshore Camp Schwab

Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield

Kin Blue Beach Training Area

Senaha CommunicationStation

Gimbaru Training Area

Kadena Air Base

MCAS Futenma

Naha Port Facility

Camp KuwaeCamp Zukeran

Yomitan AuxiliaryAirfield

MakiminatoService Area

Torii CommunicationStation

Sobe CommunicationSite

Aha Training Area

Northern Training Area

: Facilities and areas involved in land return

: Facilities and areas involved in land return (Cancellation of joint use)

: Potential facility relocation sites

Fig. III-2-3-4 Changes in Number and Area of the USFJ Facilities and Areas (Exclusive Use) in Okinawa

Area (km2)

Cases

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

As of January 2014

End of FY90s

End of FY80s

May 1972 (On return)

Right before the returning of Okinawa

43

242249

46

278

83

353

144

228

32

253


Defense of Japan


3 History and Progress of the U.S. Forces Realignment in Okinawa

As well as initiatives relating to realignment of the U.S. Forces based on the Roadmap, measures have been taken to mitigate the impact on the local communities in Okinawa Prefecture.

(1) MCAS Futenma Replacement Facility, etc.MCAS Futenma ful� lls the following functions relating to the avi-ation capabilities of the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa:

� Transport of Marine ground forces by helicopter, etc.� Operations of air refueling aircraft� A base for accepting aircraft in contingency

However, since MCAS Futenma is located in an urban area, its prompt return has been strongly desired by the local residents due to problems such as the safety of the community, noise, and traf� c. Therefore, coordination has been made to-ward the goal of returning the air station by implementing the following steps:a. Transport of Marine Ground Forces by Helicopter, etc.(a) The Necessity of Locating the Futenma Replacement Facility

(FRF) within Okinawa PrefectureThe U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa consists of air, ground, logistics, and command elements. The interaction of those el-ements in operations of the U.S. Marine Corps is necessary, so it has been determined that the FRF needs to be located with-in Okinawa Prefecture so that rotary-wing aircraft stationed at MCAS Futenma will be located near the elements with which they train or operate on a regular basis.(b) Background Concerning the Futenma Replacement FacilityConsidering the occurrence of the U.S. Forces helicopter crash in Ginowan City in August 2004, bilateral discussions on re-alignment have been made toward realizing the relocation and return of MCAS Futenma at the earliest possible date in order to resolve the unease of the residents living in the vicinity.

In the SCC document compiled in October 2005, the initia-tive to “locate the FRF in an ‘L’-shaped con� guration that com-bines the shoreline areas of Camp Schwab and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay” was approved. Then, based on negotiation and agreement with the local municipalities including Nago City, it was decided to stipulate in the Roadmap that the FRF be located in a con� guration that “combines Henokosaki and ad-jacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays.” In regard to con-struction of this replacement facility, “a Memorandum of Basic Understanding” was exchanged between the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture and then Minister of State for Defense in May 2006.

After the change of government in September 2009, the Exploratory Committee for Okinawa Base Issues was es-tablished. After reviews conducted by the Committee, both Governments, at the “2+2” Meeting held in May 2010, con-� rmed the intention to locate the FRF in the Camp Schwab Henokosaki area and the adjacent waters, and also agreed to

take concrete measures to mitigate the impact on Okinawa.Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in June 2011, it

was decided that the runway would take a “V” shape, and the Ministers con� rmed their commitment to complete the reloca-tion project at the earliest possible date after 2014 in order to avoid the inde� nite use of MCAS Futenma and to remove the risks as early as possible.

During the deliberation process which led to these con-clusions, � rst of all, it was determined that, from a security perspective, the deterrence of the U.S. Forces including that of the U.S. Marine Corps cannot be lessened while there remains instability and uncertainty in the East Asian security environ-ment. Furthermore, there was concern that the functions of the U.S. Marine Corps would be weakened if the helicopter units stationed at MCAS Futenma were to be detached from the other Marine units stationed in Okinawa and moved abroad or out of the prefecture. Therefore, it was concluded that the FRF had to be within Okinawa Prefecture.

At the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013, that followed the “2+2” Meeting of April 2012, the Governments of Japan and the United States also con� rmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma.

See Fig. III-2-3-5 (Background for the Futenma Replacement Facility)See Reference 34 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Commit-

tee); Reference 35 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Com-

mittee); Reference 40 (Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities

and Areas South of Kadena)

(c) Environmental Impact AssessmentProcedures for the environmental impact assessment were pro-ceeded with in accordance with applicable laws and regulations, since the scoping document was submitted to the Governor of Okinawa and other related local governments in August 2007. In response to the opinions expressed by the Governor of Okinawa on the environmental impact statement in February and March 2012, the MOD organized an expert working group and amended the statement based on the scienti� c and specialist advice provided by the external experts. Later, in December 18, the MOD sent the amended statement to the Governor of Okinawa and other related local governments and completed the procedure of environmental impact assessment by making the statement open for public inspection for the period from December 27, 2012, to January 29, 2013.(d) Futenma Replacement Facility Construction Project, etc.On March 22, 2013, an application was submitted to the Governor of Okinawa for approval of the reclamation of the public water body related to the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project. With the Governor of Okinawa approving the application on December 27, 2013, the construction project is being pushed forward steadily toward the relocation and re-turn of MCAS Futenma.

254




Fig. III-2-3-5 Background for the Futenma Replacement Facility

Month & Year Background

April 1996Then Prime Minister Hashimoto and then U.S. Ambassador Mondale held a meeting, and the full return of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma) was announced. SACO Interim Report.→ The airfi eld will be returned within fi ve to seven years, following the completion of an adequate replacement facility.

December 1996SACO Final Report → A maritime facility will be constructed off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa (one that can be dismantled).

November 1999Then Governor of Okinawa Inamine stated that he had chosen the Henoko coast region of Nago City as a candidate for the facility relocation on condition that it would be for joint military-civilian use

December 1999Then Mayor of Nago City Kishimoto expressed that the city would accept the FRF “Government Policy on Relocation of MCAS Futenma“ (Cabinet decision)→ Construction in the Nago City Henoko coastal region in the water area of Camp Schwab

July 2002“Basic Agreement Regarding the Use of Replacement Facilities” concluded between the Director General of Defense Agency and the Governor of Okinawa.“Basic Plan for Replacement Facilities for MCAS Futenma” was prepared. → Scale, construction methods, and specifi c construction site decided.

November 2003 Then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld visited Okinawa.April 2004 The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure started (abolished in 2007).

August 2004 A U.S. Force helicopter crashed into a university campus in Ginowan City, Okinawa.

October 2005“2+2” Joint Statement→ Agreement on a new plan (an L shape plan connecting the coastal area of Camp Schwab with the adjacent water area of Oura bay)

April 2006“Basic Agreement Regarding the Construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility” concluded between the Director General of the Defense Agency, the Mayor of Nago, and the village mayor of Ginoza. → Agreement was reached by creating fl ight paths avoiding overfl ight of the surrounding region (the V shape plan).

May 2006

“2+2” Joint Statement→ Final adjustments made for the “U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,” V shape plan approved“Basic Confi rmation Regarding the Realignment of U.S. Military Forces in Okinawa” concluded between the Director General of the Defense Agency and the Governor of Okinawa.“GOJ Efforts for USFJ Force Structure Realignment and Others” (Cabinet decision)→ The cabinet decision of December 1999 was abolished.

August 2006 Establishment of “the Council on Measures for Relocation of MCAS Futenma”June 2007 Environmental survey started.

August 2007 The EIA scoping document was sent to the governor, municipal mayors etc. of Okinawa.March 2008 Survey based on the EIA scoping document was started.

April 2009 Draft Environment Impact Statement was sent to the governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa.May 2009 “The Guam International Agreement” was approved by the Diet.

September 2009Conclusion of a three-party coalition government agreement between the Democratic Party of Japan, the Social Democratic Party, and the People’s New Party.Agreement on reviewing the status of the U.S. Forces realignment and U.S. Forces bases in Japan.

November 2009Establishment of the Ministerial-Level Working Group on the Replacement Facility for Futenma Air Station. Japan–U.S. summit meetingAgreement on resolving the relocation of Futenma Air Station expeditiously through the working group.

December 2009 Ministerial Committee on Basic Policies convened, Exploratory Committee for the Okinawa Bases Issue was established.

January 2010“2+2” Joint Statement→ Confi rmation of efforts to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing the impact on local communities, including Okinawa.

May 2010“2+2” Joint StatementIntention to locate the Futenma replacement facility at the Camp Schwab Henoko area and adjacent waters was confi rmed“Government Efforts Related to Items Authorized by the United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee on May 28, 2010” (Cabinet decision).

August 2010 Futenma Replacement Facility Bilateral Experts Study Group Report

June 2011“2+2” Joint StatementConfi rming the commitment that a replacement plan should be completed as early as possible after 2014, while deciding that the shape of the runway in the replaced facility should be V-shaped.

December 2011–January 2012

The Environmental Impact Statement report was sent to the governor of Okinawa.

February 2012The Japan-U.S. Joint Statement was announced on the realignment of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan.Offi cial discussion was initiated to delink two issues—the movement of Marines to Guam and resulting land returns South of Kadena—from progress on the FRF.

April 2012“2+2” Joint StatementThe current plan to relocate the air base from Futenma to Henoko was reconfi rmed to be the only viable solution.

December 2012 Revised Environment Impact Statement was sent to the governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa.March 2013 Application for approval of public water body reclamation was submitted to the governor of Okinawa.

October 2013“2+2” Joint Statement→ Recognition was reaffi rmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma

December 2013 Mayor of Okinawa approved reclamation of the public water body related to the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project

255


Defense of Japan


As MCAS Futenma is located at the center of Ginowan City, Okinawa, surrounded by residents’ houses and schools, it is imperative to avoid a permanent � xation of the air station in this location. Taking special notice of the approval of the application for the reclamation of the public water body by the Governor of Okinawa, the government will promptly embark on the construction project and continue to make all-out initiatives to achieve the return of MCAS Futenma at the earli-est possible time.b. Operations of Air Refueling AircraftAir refueling aircraft KC-130 are to be relocated from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni (in Yamaguchi Prefecture) between early July and late August 2014.

KC-130 will regularly deploy on a rotational basis to MSDF Kanoya Base (in Kagoshima Prefecture) and Guam for training and operations. Consultations are being held between Japan and the United States pertaining to training and opera-tions at Kanoya Base.c. Accepting U.S. Aircraft in a ContingencyStrengthened contingency use of the JASDF based at Nyutabaru (in Miyazaki Prefecture) and Tsuiki (in Fukuoka Prefecture) will be provided for the U.S. Forces. Facility improvements for this purpose will be made, as necessary, after conducting site surveys and before MCAS Futenma is returned. The im-proved facilities, when completed, are also expected to be used for the expanded Japan-U.S. bilateral training activities which are described in the examination on the Roles, Missions and Capabilities. Furthermore, improved contingency use of civilian facilities by the U.S. Forces will be examined in the Japan-U.S. bilateral contingency planning, and appropriate arrangements will be made in order to realize the return of MCAS Futenma.

(2) Force Reductions and Relocation to GuamIn conjunction with the realignment of the U.S. Marine Corps in the Asia-Paci� c region, the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011 and other agreements prescribe that approximately 8,000 personnel of the III MEF and approximately 9,000 dependents, will be relocated from Okinawa to Guam at the earliest possible date after 2014.

Regarding the costs of the relocation, the two sides reached an agreement that, of the estimated $10.27 billion (in U.S. � scal year 2008 dollars) cost of the facilities and infrastructure de-velopment costs, Japan would provide $6.09 billion, including $2.8 billion in direct cash contribution, while the U.S. would fund the remaining $4.18 billion. Of the costs to be borne by Japan, with regard to projects for which Japan takes measures in the form of direct cash contributions (so called Mamizu projects)8 in order to legally guarantee that actions taken by

Japan and the United States such as funding over multiple years by Japan are on a more solid footing, the Japanese Government and the U.S. Government signed “the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the III MEF personnel and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam” (the Guam International Agreement) in February 2009. As part of the measures based on this Agreement, the trans-fer of funds to the U.S. Government in relation to the Mamizu projects has been taking place since FY20099.

Subsequently, in the “2+2” Joint Statement of April 2012, the unit composition and the number of personnel to be relocat-ed to Guam were revised. More speci� cally, in the Joint State-ment, it was stated that it is planned that Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) will be positioned and deployed in Guam. While approximately 9,000 U.S. Marine Corps person-nel along with their associated dependents will be relocated from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan and the autho-rized strength of the U.S. Marine Corps forces in Guam is to be around 5,000 personnel, the end-state for the presence of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa will be consistent with the levels envisioned in the Roadmap.

In this Joint Statement, the preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government for the relocation is $8.6 billion (in 2012 U.S. � scal year dollars). With regard to Japan's � nancial com-mitment, it was reaf� rmed that it was to be the direct cash con-tribution up to the amount of $2.8 billion (in U.S. � scal year 2008 dollars) as stipulated in Article 1 of the Guam Interna-tional Agreement. It was also con� rmed that Japan’s equity in-vestment and loans for family housing projects and infrastruc-ture projects would not be utilized. Moreover, it was stipulated that any funds that had already been transferred to the U.S. Government under the Guam International Agreement would be counted as part of the Japanese contribution. Furthermore, as a new initiative, a portion of the direct cash contribution of $ 2.8 billion mentioned above would be used to develop training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mari-ana Islands as shared use facilities for Japan and the U.S. In ad-dition, it was agreed that the remaining costs and any additional costs would be borne by the U.S., and that the two governments were to complete a bilateral cost breakdown.

At the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013, the Ministers con� rmed that the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa contributes to sustaining the forward presence of the U.S. Forces and promoting the development of Guam as the strategic strongpoint, while also mitigating the impact on Okinawa. On that occasion, a Protocol amending the Guam International Agreement, which forms the basis for the bilat-

8 With regard to Japanese Mamizu projects, for expenses relating to construction projects and design projects, approximately 34.6 billion yen, 46.8 billion yen and 14.9 billion yen in FY2009, FY2010, and FY2011 respectively, were budgeted. For design projects expenses, approximately 700 million yen and 200 million yen in FY2012 and FY2013 respectively, were budgeted.

9 Funds of approximately 34.6 billion yen in FY2009, approximately 46.8 billion yen in FY2010, and approximately 9.3 billion yen in FY2011 were provided to the United States.

256




eral cooperation necessary to achieve these goals of the relo-cation, was signed. The amendment, which is in line with the “2+2” Joint Statement of 2012, con� rmed the delinking of the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps units from Okinawa to Guam from progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility, and add-ed provisions concerning the development of training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands and the shared use of these training areas by the U.S. Forces and the SDF. The limit on Japanese cash contributions remains unchanged at $2.8 billion (in U.S. � scal year 2008 dollars).

Under the relocation plan described in the 2012 “2+2” Joint Statement, U.S. Marine Corps units are to begin to re-locate from Okinawa to Guam in the � rst half of the 2020s. The plan is considered to promote the implementation of the consolidation plan on returning the land areas south of Kadena Air Base published in April 2013.

See Reference 41 (Agreement between the Government of Japan and

the Government of the United States of America Concerning the

Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force

Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam); Reference

42 (Protocol amending the Agreement between the Government of

Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concern-

ing the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary

Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam)

(3) Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air BaseAt the SCC Joint Statement in April 2012, it was decided to delink the progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility from both the relocation of the III MEF personnel from Okinawa to Guam, and resulting land returns south of Kadena. In addition, with regard to the land to be returned, it was agreed to conduct consultations focusing on three stages, namely 1) land eligible for immediate return; 2) land eligible for return once the relo-cation of functions is completed; and 3) land eligible for return after the relocation abroad.

Since the change of administration at the end of 2012, Japan and the United States have continued consultation under the basic policy of the Abe administration to dedicate all its strength to mitigate the impact of the U.S. Forces on Okinawa communities. Japan strongly requested an early return of lands south of Kadena, including Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser), and as a result of coordination with the U.S. side, both countries announced the consolidation plan in April 2013, which stipulated the return schedule, including the speci� c years of return.

In the consolidation plan, both sides con� rmed that they will implement the plan as early as possible. The Government of Japan needs to continue to work with all its strength so that lands south of Kadena would be returned at the earliest possible

date. Furthermore, following the announcement of the consoli-dation plan, the consultations have been held since April 2013, involving Ginowan City, Ginowan City Military Land Owners Association, Okinawa Prefecture, Okinawa Defense Bureau, and Okinawa General Bureau10, in order to promote effective and adequate use of West Futenma Housing Area within Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster). The Ministry of Defense has also been providing necessary cooperation.

As a result of initiatives put in following the announcement of the consolidation plan in April 2013 toward the early return of mainly “areas eligible for immediate return upon completion of necessary procedures” (areas boxed in red in Fig. III-2-3-6), the road has been paved toward the return of land of all the four loca-tions involved, including the land return of the north access road of Makiminato Service Area completed in August 2013. As con-� rmed in the “2+2” Joint Statement in October 2013, these re-turns are ahead of schedule. On April 14, 2014, Kin Town agreed to accept the relocation of facilities from the Shirahi River Area of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) to Camp Hansen in the town.

The Government of Japan will take every opportunity to hold consultations with the United States for the prompt devel-opment by the United States of a master plan for the return of land in the remaining areas, and support its development. So far, the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee has agreed on a master plan for the Torii Communication Station that is to accept the relocation of U.S. Army warehouses located in Makiminato Service Area and other places. All-out initiatives are being continuously made to steadily implement the consolidation plan and mitigate the impact on Okinawa as early as possible, and also to realize the respective returns of land in the shortest possible time for more visible mitigation of the impact on Okinawa.

See Fig. III-2-3-6 (Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base)See Reference 40 (Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and

Areas South of Kadena)

4 MV-22 Osprey Deployment in Okinawa

(1) MV-22 Osprey Deployment in OkinawaThe MV-22 is an aircraft that combines vertical takeoff/land-ing and hovering functions of rotary-wing aircraft on one hand and the speed and range of � xed-wing aircraft on the other. As the main force of air components of the U.S. Marine Corps, MV-22 aircraft play an important role in engaging in a broad range of activities, including transportation of personnel and goods.

The U.S. Marine Corps is in the process of replacing rota-ry-wing airplanes (CH-46) with MV-22s, which have superior basic performance. In June 2011, the Department of Defense announced the replacement of CH-46s deployed at MCAS Futenma with MV-22s. On June 29, 2012, the U.S. Govern-

10 In addition to the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Okinawa Office) and the Cabinet Office also participate in the consultations as observers.

257


Defense of Japan


ment made a Host Nation Noti� cation that 12 CH-46s of one squadron in Futenma would be replaced by 12 MV-22s and that CH- 46s of the second squadron would be replaced by MV-22s in the summer of 2013. Following the U.S. announcement and no-ti� cation, the MOD of� cials explained measures to ensure safety to Okinawa Prefecture and Iwakuni City. The movement of the � rst and the second squadron to MCAS Futenma was completed in October 2012 and in September 2013, respectively.

The MV-22 is a highly capable aircraft; compared with the CH-46, it can � y twice as fast, can carry three times the payload, and has four times the range. Its deployment to Okinawa will strengthen the deterrence of the U.S. Forces in Japan as a whole and greatly contribute to the peace and stability of the region.

(2) Safety of the MV-22 OspreyAfter the crash of an MV-22 in Morocco in April 2012 and the crash of a CV-2211 in Florida in June 2012, concerns about its safety have grown among Japanese people. In response, the

Government of Japan and the Government of the United States agreed to refrain from any � ight operation in Japan until the results of the accident investigation are provided and the safe-ty of � ight operation is recon� rmed. Additionally, in order to con� rm its safety, a Japanese analysis and assessment team was set up to validate the contents of the accident investiga-tions of the U.S. government, based on Japan’s own viewpoints and knowledge. The team examined the investigation results and con� rmed that the accident in which the MV-22 crashed in Morocco and the CV-22 crashed in Florida were caused largely by human factors and that there were no safety problems with the aircraft itself.

Furthermore, to maximize the safety of MV-22 � ight operations, the two governments discussed matters concern-ing operations and measures to prevent accident recurrence at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee and other occasions. At the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee, both sides con� rmed that measures have been taken to address these human factors in

11 The MV-22 is designed for the U.S. Marine Corps for assault landing transportation missions, while the CV-22 is designed for the U.S. Air Force aimed at special operations, etc.

Fig. III-2-3-6 Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base

68 ha

23 ha

5 ha

Camp Zukeran(additional areas)

α ha3

Camp Zukeran (WestFutenma Housing area)

52 ha481 ha

Makiminato Service Area(Area to include majority of storage areas)

129 ha

56 ha

Legend

16 ha

Camp Zukeran (industrialcorridor, etc.)

62 ha

Makiminato Service Area (north access road)

2 ha

10 ha

: Returned or Prompt return (65 ha): Return after the relocation of functions within the prefecture (841 ha): Return after the relocation of the Marine Corps outside Japan (142 ha +more) Total: 1,048 ha + more

FY2022 or later

FY2022 or later

FY2025 or later

FY2024 or later

FY2024 or later

FY2014 or later* JC reached Agreement of Return on June 13, 2013

FY2019 or later* JC reached Agreement of Return on September 19, 2013

FY2024 or later

142 haFY2024 or later

FY2014 or later* JC reached Agreement of Return on July 11, 2013

FY2025 or later

1 haReturned on August 31, 2013

FY2028or later

Makiminato Service Area(areas near Gate 5)

Makiminato Service Area(the remainder)

Naha Port facilities

Camp Zukeran(Lower Plaza Housing area)

Camp Zukeran (a part of Kishaba Housing area)

Futenma Air Base

Camp KuwaeThe 1st Kuwae Tank Farm of the Army Oil Storage Facility

Camp Zukeran (a portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound)

Notes: 1. The times and years are based on the best case scenario concerning the return of specifi c facilities/areas after the completion of necessary measures and procedures to be taken by the Governments of Japan and the United States. The periods may become delayed due to such factors as the progress of the preparation for relocation in Okinawa by the Government of Japan and the U.S. Government’s efforts for relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps to outside Japan. Furthermore, the times and fi scal years in parentheses do not include the time necessary for relocation of the Marine Corps from Japan because, though the conditions for returning the areas include its relocation to outside of Japan, the plan for the relocation is yet to be decided. Consequently, the times of return of these areas may be changed depending on the progress of the relocation of the Marine Corps from Japan.

2. The area of each area is an approximate fi gure and may be slightly modifi ed based on the results of future surveys, etc. 3. Studies will be made in the process of developing a master plan to determine the feasibility of additional land returns. *JC: Japan-U.S. Joint Committee

258




light of the lessons learned from the accidents and agreed to implement speci� c measures to ensure the safety of MV-22 operations in Japan.

Based on the above, considering that the safety of MV-22 operations in Japan is fully con� rmed, the Government of Japan released “On MV-22 Osprey Deployment to Okinawa” on September 19, 2012, and then � ight operation of the MV-22 Osprey was started in Japan. Since then, the Government of Japan recognizes that the U.S. has been in full compliance with the Joint Committee agreement concerning the MV-22 and is operating the MV-22 with maximum consideration for safety. Furthermore, in order to ensure that full consideration is given to local residents and the Joint Committee agreement is proper-ly implemented, the Government of Japan has been continuous-ly engaging with the U.S. side through various opportunities, including the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meetings.

See Fig. III-2-3-7 (Chronology of MV-22 Osprey Deployment to Okinawa)

(3) Usability of MV-22 Osprey in Case of DisasterIn the aftermath of the devastating typhoon that hit the cen-tral Philippines in November 2013, 14 MV-22 Osprey aircraft, deployed in Okinawa, were dispatched for humanitarian as-sistance and disaster relief activities to support “Operation Damayan”. The MV-22 combines the vertical takeoff/landing and hovering functions of rotary-wing aircraft on the one hand, and the speed and range of � xed-wing aircraft on the other. Pro-vided its unique capabilities, MV-22s were deployed promptly to affected areas that are dif� cult to access, and it can trans-port several hundred isolated victims and about six tons of support goods in a day. In April 2014, the MV-22, deployed in Okinawa, was dispatched for rescue activities in the wake of an accidental sinking of a passenger ship off the coast of Jindo, Republic of Korea. As such, going forward, it is expected that the superior capabilities of the MV-22 can be showcased in a variety of operations.

5 Measures for Mitigating the Impact on Okinawa

Today, a number of USFJ facilities and areas still remain in Okinawa because of the U.S. occupation of Okinawa and the slower progress of USFJ facilities and areas returned compared to other areas of Japan even after the occupation ended. In order to mitigate the concentrated impact on Okinawa, the Government of Japan is making initiatives toward the realization of the SACO Final Report and the Roadmap. The MOD is committed to fur-ther mitigating the impact on Okinawa through the Okinawa Policy Council, its subcommittee and other means12, while lis-tening to the opinions of the local residents.

At the Okinawa Policy Council Meeting on December 17, 2013, the Governor of Okinawa presented a number of requests, including cessation of the operation of MCAS Futenma within � ve years and its early return, the re-deployment of about 12 MV-22 Osprey aircraft to bases outside of Okinawa, and the total return of Makiminato Service Area within seven years.

While fully understanding that these requests re� ect the sentiments of all Okinawan people, the Government as a whole is addressing the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, including the establishment of the Council for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of MCAS Futenma on Okinawa, consist-ing of the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Minister of State for Okinawa, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense, the Governor of Okinawa and the Mayor of Ginowan.

A meeting of the Committee for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of Bases on Okinawa [Cabinet Public Relations Offi ce]

On January 22, 2014, the MOD established the Committee for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of Bases on Okinawa, headed by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense, and is addressing the issue with the strong resolve to do every-thing it can in order to mitigate the impact on Okinawa.

At the Team for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of Futenma Air Station on Okinawa training exercises involving the use of Osprey such as Japan-U.S. Bilateral Training Exer-cises held at Aibano training area located in Shiga Prefecture in October 2013 will continue to be deliberated so that about half of Osprey training exercises can be held outside Okina-wa Prefecture. The Team is also considering the development of “training infrastructure and bases,” including hangars and refueling facilities, while securing a budget item for research expenses, along with the consideration of the introduction of tilt-rotor aircraft for the SDF in the FY2014 budget, for the promotion of training at multiple training areas and air� elds located on the mainland.

12 On March 19, 2013 a subcommittee was established under the Okinawa Policy Council in order to address issues concerning mitigation of the impact relating to U.S. bases and Okinawa devel-opment measures

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Defense of Japan


Fig. III-2-3-7 Chronology of MV-22 Osprey Deployment to Okinawa

June 6, 2011Provided information to relevant local governments and other organizations on the announcement made by the U.S. Department of Defense to replace the CH-46 deployed at MCAS Futenma with the MV-22 in the latter half of 2012.

June 13–26 Provided safety/noise information that GOJ had obtained so far to relevant local governments and other organizations.

June 24 Received a letter with 29 questions from the Okinawa Governor and others.

September 1 The fi rst written response was handed to the Okinawa Governor and others by Administrative Vice-Minister.

September 2–13 Provided an explanation on the fi rst written response to relevant local governments and other organizations.

December 20 The second written response was handed to the Okinawa Governor by chief of the Okinawa Defense Bureau.

December 20–January 17, 2012 Provided an explanation on the second written response above to relevant local governments and other organizations.

April 12 A prompt report on the accident involving an MV-22 in Morocco was provided to relevant local governments and other organizations.

June 13–Provided an explanation on the results of the Environment Review, MV-22 pamphlet, and the content of the third response to the questions to Okinawa Prefecture, relevant local governments and other organizations.

June 14 A prompt report on the accident involving a CV-22 in Florida was provided to relevant local governments and other organizations.

June 26–Provided an explanation on the information provided from the U.S. side regarding the accidents in Morocco and Florida to relevant local governments and other organizations.

June 29–Provided an explanation on the content of the Host Nation Notifi cation and the press release to relevant local governments and other organizations.

July 20Provided information from the U.S. side stating that the MV-22 would be offl oaded on MCAS Iwakuni on July 23 to relevant local governments and other organizations.

August 1–September 18 Received four questionnaires regarding the Environment Review etc., from the Okinawa Governor and others.

August 28–Provided an explanation on the “Analysis and Evaluation Report on the MV-22 Accident in Morocco” to relevant local governments and other organizations.

August 28–Provided an explanation on the “Analysis and Evaluation Report on the CV-22 Accident in Florida” to relevant local governments and other organizations.

August 28– Q&A session on Osprey deployment with members of the Iwakuni City Council full member committee.

September 19– Provided an explanation on the report “MV-22 Osprey deployment in Okinawa” to relevant local governments and other organizations.

September 21 Provided Yamaguchi Prefecture and Iwakuni City with the information that function check fl ights, etc. were commenced at MCAS Iwakuni.

September 27-28Provided information on the contents of the responses to the questionnaires from Okinawa Prefecture and others received from August 1 to September 18 to Okinawa Prefecture, other relevant local governments and other organizations.

November 2In the nationwide prefectural governors meeting hosted by the Government, Defense Minister explained the initial training plan with the MV-22 Osprey, and Prime Minister and Defense Minister asked for the governors’ cooperation in relocating the training to outside Okinawa.

December 10The MOD received another letter of questions from the Governor of Okinawa in response to the answers to his initial questions which the MOD submitted to him in September.

December 12–14The MOD provided explanations to Okinawa Prefecture and relevant local governments in Okinawa regarding the content of the second set of answers the MOD prepared, since some of these answers did not satisfactorily address the letter of questions from the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture on environmental review.

December 25 The MOD received a request from the Governor of Okinawa to investigate the details of the fl ight operations of MV-22.

January 28, 2013 The Committee for the Okinawa Prefectural Citizens’ Rally and the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly submitted a petition to the Prime Minister.

April 30The MOD provided explanation to the relevant local governments and other organizations regarding U.S. explanation on the deployment of the squadron (unloaded at MCAS Iwakuni in summer 2013).

July 1 It was announced that the squadron plans to be unloaded at the fi nal week of July to MCAS Iwakuni

September 25 Relocation to MCAS Futenma was completed.

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In addition, the Team for Promoting the Return of Makiminato Service Area, created under the Committee for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of Bases on Okinawa, is considering the facilitation of the development of a master plan by the U.S. Forces related to the return of Makiminato Service Area, and as one of the facilitation measures, is set to provide support for the development of the master plan.

See Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 2 (Initiatives to Mitigate the Local Impact of

the Stationing of USFJ)

4 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Regions Other than Okinawa

In regions other than Okinawa, the MOD is implementing mea-sures to secure the stable presence of the U.S. Forces by main-taining its deterrence abilities and trying to mitigate the impact on local communities. This section will explain the current sit-uation regarding measures of this kind, such as the realignment of the U.S. Forces, including the question of how they are being executed in each of the regions other than Okinawa.

1 Realignment of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture

The ideal state of USFJ facilities and areas in Kanagawa Prefec-ture has been discussed between Japan and the United States due to the strong desire from local public bodies and other organiza-tions for their return. As a result, the basic concept pertaining to the return of six facilities and areas (including Kami Seya Com-munication Station in Yokohama City), as well as the construc-tion of approximately 700 housing units for the U.S. Forces fam-ilies in the Yokohama area of the “Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex” were agreed in October 2004, by the Joint Committee.

Subsequently, the Joint Committee in September 2010 agreed that the number of housing units to be constructed for the U.S. Forces families would be around 400, as an interim measure to facilitate the relocation of the Negishi Housing Area, instead of approximately 700 housing units as agreed in October 2004, and that part of land in the Zushi area of the “Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex” would be jointly used once the requirements are ful� lled, as a stopgap measure until the land is returned.

Up to now, two facilities and areas (Koshiba POL Depot and Tomioka Storage Area) were returned. After a round of bilateral consultations on the realization of the early return of the remain-ing facilities and areas, the Joint Committee in April 2014 agreed on the speci� c timing of the return of the Fukaya Communica-tion Site and the Kami Seya Communication Station. In addi-tion, the Joint Committee also agreed to change the number of housing units to be constructed from approximately 400 to 171.

See Fig. III-2-3-8 (Facilities and Areas Related to the Reorganization of the

USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture)

Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister Ryota Takeda (center) inspecting the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Training and Exercises “Forest Light” at Aibano training area

Fig. III-2-3-8 Facilities and Areas Related to the Reorganization of the USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture

As of May 31, 2014

Seya-ku

Minami-ku

Isogo-ku

Naka-ku

Totsuka-ku

Kanazawa-ku

Asahi-ku

Izumi-ku

Yokohama City,KanagawaPrefecture

Kamiseya Communication StationLocation: Seya-ku and Asahi-ku, Yokohama CityArea: About 242 ha National land: About 110 ha Private/public land: About 133 haTo be returned aiming at the end of June, 2015

Fukaya Communication SiteLocation: Izumi-ku, Yokohama CityArea: About 77 ha (national land)To be returned aiming at the end of June, 2014

Location: Naka-ku, Minami-ku and Isogo ku,Yokohama City Area: About 43 ha National land: About 27 ha Private/public land: About 16 ha

Tomioka Storage AreaLocation: Kanazawa-ku, Yokohama CityArea: About 3 ha (national land) Returned in May 2009

Koshiba POL DepotLocation: Kanazawa-ku, Yokohama CityArea: About 53 haNational land: About 51 ha Private/public land: About 1 ha Returned in December 2005

Ikego Housing Area and NavyAnnex (Yokohama City portion)Location: Kanazawa-ku, Yokohama CityArea: About 37 ha

National land: About 36 ha Private/public land: About 0.3 ha

Detached part of the “Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex”Location: Kanazawa-ku, Yokohama CityArea: About 1 ha National land: About 1 ha Private land: About 0.1 ha

Construction of 171 housing units, etc.

In April 2014, an agreement on the timing of the return of both the Fukaya Communication Site and Kami Seya Communication Station was reached.

The areas in total to be returned will be about 320 ha, which is equivalent to about 70% of the total land area of the USFJ facilities and areas in Yokohama City (about 470 ha). (As of April 2014)

Negishi Dependent Housing Area

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2 Current Situation Regarding the Realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan as Stipulated in the Roadmap

(1) Improvement of U.S. Army Japan Command and Control Capability

To have enhanced mobility and readiness as well as to enable joint missions, the headquarters of U.S. Army Japan (USARJ) at Camp Zama (in Kanagawa Prefecture) was reorganized into the headquarters of the USARJI Corps (Forward) in Decem-ber 2007 and the reorganization took place at the end of Sep-tember 2008.

With the aim of strengthening coordination with the reor-ganized USARJ headquarters so as to enable rapid responses to various contingencies, the JGSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters, which unilaterally controls mobile operation units and specialized units, was relocated from JGSDF Camp Asaka (in Saitama Prefecture) to Camp Zama, where the head-quarters of U.S. Army Japan (USARJ) are located, at the end of FY2012. In accordance with the transformation of USARJ headquarters, a mission command training center and oth-er support facilities were constructed within the U.S. Forces Sagami General Depot (SGD, in Kanagawa Prefecture) using U.S. funding. In addition, measures will be implemented for more effective and ef� cient use of Camp Zama and the SGD, including partial release of facilities and areas. The partial re-lease of land (approx. 17 ha) at SGD was approved by the Joint Committee in June 2008, while the partial release of land (ap-prox. 5.4 ha) at Camp Zama, and the joint/shared use of a por-tion of land at SGD (approx. 35 ha) were approved in October 2011 and June 2012, respectively, by the Joint Committee.

(2) Yokota Air Base and Airspacea. Establishment of the Bilateral Joint Operations

Coordination Center (BJOCC)Enhancement of coordination between headquarters, com-bined with the transition to joint operational posture, is quite important from the perspective of ensuring � exible and rapid responses of the SDF and the U.S. Forces. The headquarters of the U.S. Forces in Japan located at Yokota Air Base (in Tokyo) plays an important role in the various mechanisms under the Guidelines. Therefore, along with the relocation of ASDF Air Defense Command HQ as mentioned below, the BJOCC13 was established and commenced operations at the end of FY2011.

See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-2 (Recent Major Achievements in

Defense Cooperation and Exchange)

b. Relocation of ASDF Air Defense Command HQThe ASDF Air Defense Command HQ not only defends air-space, but also functions as a headquarters for BMD operations.

In the case of air defense and BMD, the response time is very short. Therefore, it is important for the SDF and the U.S. Forces to immediately share the necessary information. Thus, at the end of FY2011, approximately 800 personnel from the ASDF Air Defense Command HQ, which was formerly located in Fuchu (Tokyo), and its relevant units were relocated to Yokota Air Base where the U.S. 5th Air Force, Headquarters is located. This arrangement and the establishment of the above-mentioned BJOCC have made it possible to enhance coordination between the headquarters of the SDF and the U.S. Forces, including the sharing of information concerning air defense and BMD.c. Yokota AirspaceAt Yokota Air Base, the U.S. Forces conduct radar approach control for the Yokota airspace spreading from the western part of the Tokyo Metropolitan area to Niigata Prefecture. Measures have been taken to facilitate the operation of civilian airplanes that enter the airspace.

Since September 2006, the temporary transfer of respon-sibility for air traf� c control of portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese authorities, when not required for military purposes, has been started. Moreover, the collocation of the U.S. Forces and ASDF air traf� c controllers at the Yokota Radar Approach Control (Yokota RAPCON) facility started in May 2007. The area adjacent to the west side of Haneda Airport was cut by about 40% in September 2008 and the air traf� c control op-eration was returned to Japan. In addition, the review of the conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace was completed in May 2010.d. Civilian-Military Dual Use of Yokota Air BaseAt the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in May 2003, it was agreed that the joint civilian-military use of Yokota Air Base would be studied, and a Liaison Conference was then estab-lished as a working panel attended by relevant government ministries and agencies and the Tokyo Metropolitan Govern-ment, with discussions ongoing since then.

The Governments of Japan and the United States have con-ducted a study, starting in October 2006, on the speci� c condi-tions and modalities, with the understanding that joint use will not compromise the military operations and safety of Yokota Air Base. Based on further coordination and the outcome of the study, both governments will consult and then make appropri-ate decisions.

(3) Measures relating to U.S. Fleet Activities Yokosuka, Atsugi Air Facility and MCAS Iwakuni

a. Deployment of U.S. Aircraft CarrierThe nuclear aircraft carrier14 USS George Washington is cur-rently forward deployed to Yokosuka (Kanagawa Prefecture).

13 The BJOCC functions to contribute to providing a joint response for Japan’s defense. To that end, it works to enhance information sharing between the Japanese and U.S. headquarters, close coordination, and interoperability.

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The presence of the U.S. Paci� c Fleet plays an important role in ensuring maritime security in the Asia-Paci� c region as well as regional peace and stability. The U.S. aircraft carrier provides the core capability of the Fleet.

In January 2014, the U.S. Navy announced that the aircraft carrier USS George Washington will proceed to the United States in preparation for fuel exchange, and in its place, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan will be forward deployed.

The U.S. Navy vows that it will continue to ensure that all of its nuclear-powered vessels (including the nuclear carrier USS George Washington) adhere to the relevant safety policies. For example, the nuclear reactor will normally be shut down while the aircraft carrier is anchored, and repair work and fuel changes will not be carried out in Japan. The Government of Japan intends to continue taking all possible measures to ensure safety.b. Relocation of Carrier-Based AircraftAtsugi Air Facility (in Kanagawa Prefecture) is currently used as a base for carrier-based aircraft. Since Atsugi Air Facility is located at the center of an urban district, the noise of carrier jets taking off and landing in particular has been a problem for a long time. It is necessary to resolve such problems as soon as possible in order to stably maintain the operations of aircraft carriers.

On the other hand, after the completion of the runway relo-cation project15 at MCAS Iwakuni (the relocation of the runway approximately 1,000 meters offshore), safe aircraft operations would become possible with less impact on the living environ-ment of the surrounding communities.

Taking these factors into consideration, CVW-5 squad-rons are to be relocated from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni. In order to mitigate impacts of the increased opera-tions at MCAS Iwakuni due to the projected relocation, relat-ed measures will be taken, including: (1) conducting the re-location after the runway is moved offshore, (2) relocation of MSDF EP-3, etc. from MCAS Iwakuni to Atsugi Air Facility, and (3) deployment of KC- 130 (to be relocated from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni) on a regular rotational basis to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam, and (4) relocation of U.S. Ma-rine Corps CH-53D helicopters from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam.

As a result of these measures, it is expected that the noise around MCAS Iwakuni will be alleviated. For instance, the area requiring residential noise-abatement work (so-called � rst category area) will decrease from approximately 1,600 ha to 500 ha.

Subsequently, at the “2+2” held in October 2013, it was

acknowledged that the relocation of CVW-5 from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni should be completed by around 2017. In addition, with regard to the relocation of MSDF EP-3, etc. to Atsugi Air Facility as stated in (2) above, upon the re-quest of local public entities in the vicinity of MCAS Iwakuni, it was af� rmed that, as a result of Japan-U.S. deliberation in-cluding defense posture review, MSDF EP-3, etc. would remain at MCAS Iwakuni.

Concerning the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam as stated in (4) above, Japan and the United States con� rmed that based on the Roadmap, etc. the unit, which has been dispatched to the Middle East from MCAS Iwakuni, will be relocated to Guam without returning to MCAS Iwakuni.

With regard to the site (Atagoyama) for constructing fam-ily housing required for the relocation of carrier-based aircraft to MCAS Iwakuni, the sales contract of the site was concluded in March 2012, and site preparation work for family housing and sports facilities, etc. is being undertaken now.c. Field-Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP)The 2006 Roadmap prescribes that a bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent FCLP facility is to be estab-lished with the goal of selecting a permanent site at the earliest possible date. At the “2+2” Meeting of June 2011, it was stated that the Government of Japan will explain to local authorities that Mageshima is considered to be the candidate for the new SDF facility. This SDF facility would be used to support op-erations in response to a variety of situations including large-scale disasters as well as regular exercises and other activities, including use by the U.S. Forces as a permanent site for FCLP. In addition, the 2005 SCC document con� rmed that the U.S. Forces will continue to conduct FCLP at Iwo-To in accordance with existing temporary arrangements until a permanent FCLP training facility is identi� ed.d. Resumption of Civil Aviation Operations at MCAS IwakuniConsidering that the local public entities, etc., including Yamaguchi Prefecture and Iwakuni City, had been working to-gether to request the resumption of civil aviation operations, in October 2005, it was agreed that civil aviation operations of four round trips per day would be allowed as long as such operations do not compromise U.S. military operational requirements.

It was then agreed in the Roadmap that “portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni.” Based on this agreement, Iwakuni Kintaikyo Airport was opened on December 13, 2012, resuming regular � ights of civil aviation aircraft after 48 years.

14 Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers are driven by energy generated in a nuclear reactor, so there is no need to replenish their fuel and they are able to maintain the high speeds necessary for the operation of aircraft, giving them excellent combat and operational capabilities.

15 A project to relocate the runway of MCAS Iwakuni by approximately 1,000 meters to the east (offshore), in response to the requests from Iwakuni City, etc. The new runway commenced its operations in May 2010. The project was completed at the end of FY2010

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Defense of Japan


(4) Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)Japan and the United States are set to continue close co-

ordination on BMD as the two countries improve their respec-tive BMD capabilities. More speci� cally, an AN/TPY-2 radar (so-called “X-Band Radar”) system was deployed to the U.S. Shariki Communication Site16. Also in October 2006, U.S. Army Patriot PAC-3 units (Patriot Advanced Capability) were deployed to Kadena Air Base and Kadena Ammunition Storage Area.

At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in February 2013, both sides agreed on the necessity of the additional deployment of TPY-2 radar in Japan, to further enhance BMD capabilities.

At the “2+2” Meeting held in October 2013, the Ministers con� rmed their intention to designate the ASDF Kyogamisaki sub-base as the deployment site for a second AN/TPY-2 radar (X-band radar) system, and Japan provided the facilities and area necessary for the deployment to the United States in De-cember 2013.

See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1-3 (Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks)

(5) Training RelocationU.S. aircraft from three U.S. facilities – Kadena, Misawa (in Aomori Prefecture) and MCAS Iwakuni (in Yamaguchi Pre-fecture) – participate for the time bing in bilateral training with ASDF at the following ASDF facilities for training relo-cation17 : Chitose (in Hokkaido), Misawa, Hyakuri (in Ibara-ki Prefecture), Komatsu (in Ishikawa Prefecture), Tsuiki (in Fukuoka Prefecture), and Nyutabaru (in Miyazaki Prefecture). The training relocation has been conducted since March 2007. The MOD conducted site survey at the ASDF bases to improve their infrastructure, when required, so that they can better host training relocation.

When ASDF hosts relocation training, a local MOD bureau works with them to support the U.S. Forces during a spec� c training event. The bureau also sets up an of� ce on site to serve as a liaison between government agencies and locals so that local people can feel safe and secure by being kept informed of

what is happening during a training event. These efforts con-tribute to a successful relocation training event.

In January 2011, at the Joint Committee, based on the “2+2” Joint Statement in May 2010, both governments agreed to include Guam as a training relocation site and to expand the scale of training. Moreover, at the JC in October 2011, they agreed on details for training. Since then, relocation training has been conducted on Guam.

In addition to conventional air combat maneuvering train-ing, both governments agreed to add air-to-ground training us-ing the Misawa Air-to-Ground Range as part of training relo-cation to be conducted at ASDF Misawa or Chitose Air Base. The addition of air-to-ground training contributes to enhancing interoperability between ASDF and the U.S. Forces, and also to relocating some of air-to-ground training having been con-ducted so far at Tori Shima Range, etc. with U.S. Forces aircraft � ying to Kadena Air Base. Thus, this training relocation will help reduce noise impact around Kadena Air Base, thereby con-tributing to the mitigation of the impact of U.S. Forces training actitivies on Okinawa.

16 The radar was deployed to ASDF Shariki Sub Base (in Aomori Prefecture) in June 2006, but was thereafter transferred to the neighboring U.S. Shariki Communication Site.17 USFJ aircraft conduct bilateral exercises at JASDF facilities in order to improve interoperability and reduce the impact of training activities on the areas surrounding USFJ air bases.

U.S. Air Force crew participate in bilateral aviation training hosted by ASDF at Nyutabaru Air Base.

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5 Initiatives for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan

In order to smoothly implement the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan based on the Roadmap, the “Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan (USFJ Realignment Special Measures Act)” was enacted in August 2007. Realignment grants, Special Subsidy Rates for Public Projects, etc. and other systems were established based on the law.

During a period of time before and after the implemen-tation of realignment (10 years in principle), realignment grants18 will be awarded to help cover the expenses of projects19 which contribute to increasing the convenience of the lives of residents of local municipalities affected by the realignment20,

and to stimulate local industries. To this end, they will be awarded in accordance with progress made in the steps of U.S. Forces realignment, after the Defense Minister designates the speci� ed defense facilities and neighboring municipalities affected by realignment. As of April 2014, 16 defense facilities in 41 municipalities are eligible to receive the grant.

In addition, under U.S. Forces realignment, some USFJ fa-cilities and areas will be returned, and the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa will be relocated to Guam. Since this may affect the employment of USFJ local employees, the Government of Japan will take measures to maintain their employment, including education and skills training.

18 Approximately 10 billion yen in the FY2014 budget19 Under the Realignment Special Measures Act, changes in the composition of units of those naval vessels that conduct operations integrally with US air wings subject to realignment (replacement

of the aircraft carrier at Yokosuka Naval Base with a nuclear aircraft carrier) will be treated in the same way as the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan.20 The scope of specifi c projects includes 14 projects identifi ed by Article 2 of the enforcement ordinance of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United

States Forces in Japan, including education, sports, and cultural projects.

Documents

3 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan · 246 Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance Chapter 2 DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2014 Part III Initiatives of Defense of Japan on a special measure