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HITLER’S WARPart three: The invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa)

YouTube - 01-BBC War of The Century : High Hopes Part 01

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Germany: war and defeat, c. 1939-1945Origins: Hitler’s aims and objectives in foreign policy

The Nazi foreign position in 1939Key issues: The impact of Blitzkrieg and Total War

German successes in Western Europe and the collapse of FranceThe invasion of the Soviet UnionThe impact of German occupation on the people, regions and countries of EuropeThe defeat of Germany and liberation of EuropeThe post-war settlement

Significance/consequences

The significance and consequences of the main developments in the war years to 1945

KEY ISSUE THREE: The invasion of the Soviet Union

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Operation BarbarossaOn 18 December 1940 Hitler issued Directive No. 21 for ‘Operation Barbarossa’, stating that ‘The German armed forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign even before the end of the war against England’.

This decision can only be explained by Hitler’s belief that Blitzkrieg tactics could also succeed in bringing a swift victory against the USSR, as they had against Poland, France and the Low Countries.

Hitler believed that the destruction of the Soviets could be carried out in five months.

July 1941. A confident looking Hitler with Luftwaffe Chief Hermann Göring (right) and a decorated fighter pilot. Behind Hitler is his chief military aide Wilhelm Keitel, now a Field Marshal. Below: General Heinz Guderian in Russia, full of confidence as well.

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Why did Hitler order the invasion of the USSR in 1941? Obsessed with the need to acquire Lebensraum, or living space Fanatical that Communism was a political creed/system that was a Jewish inspired set of doctrines that had to be destroyed Defeating the USSR would bring about the end of the conflict with Britain Required the grain and oil reserves of the Ukraine and Caucasus Eradicate Stalin who could never be trusted as a long-term ally Racial factors – elimination of Slavs and Jews Strategic – access to Middle East and Asia

Operation Barbarossa Video on History

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Vernichtung (annihilation) The word “annihilation” was rarely from Hitler’s lips. For instance, his final political testament on 29 April, 1945, focussed on the destruction of the Jews.

In early 1941 the High Command were told that the war in the east was to be entirely different to the preceding battles in the west: it was to be an all-out “war of annihilation”

“… the campaign against Russia would be won in a fortnight.” Source: General Halder 3 July 1941

Historical viewpoint:“ Practically all Hitler’s military experts assured him that Russia could be overthrown in a few weeks, and this was also the view of the American and British general staff”.Source: Klaus Hildebrand ‘ The Third Reich’ p.56 1984

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Europe before Operation Barbarossa, 1941

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Operation Barbarossa’: the first phase, 22 June – August 1941

153 divisions, total of 3,050,00 men and 3,350 tanks

Air force could only deploy 68% of strength – 2,510 aircraft. Fewer than Western campaign of 1940.

Facing them were 2.8 million Russians in the western districts alone – 150 divisions with 1800 tanks and 1540 aircraft.

German forces divided into three Army Groups:-

1. Army Group North under Field Marshall von Leeb comprising two armies and one panzer group. Von Leeb was to advance from east Prussia through the Baltic States towards Leningrad.

2. Most powerful thrust came from Army Group Centre under Filed Marshall von Bock, which contained two armies and two panzer groups (Hoth and Guderian). Von Bock was to march due east towards the city of Smolensk.

3. Army Group South under Field Marshall von Runstedt contained three armies and one panzer group with additional Romanian forces. Rundsedt was ordered to advance in two separate wings, one from Poland and one from Romania.

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Largest invasion force assembled in history Commander-in-Chief Brauschitsch assembled three massive army groups supported with Luftwaffe air fleet Soviets could not come bear, at this stage, in matching this Crucial elements – surprise and speed Within 7 days over 4000 Soviet aircraft destroyed Soviet armies pushed back towards Dneiper and Don with thousand encircled Army Group Centre under Bock took Smolensk on 16 July and captured over 600,000. The road to Moscow lay open Army Group North smashed through the Baltic states and headed towards LeningradArmy Group South, somewhat slower pace entered Ukraine and moved on Kiev 30th July – army supreme command put a break on further advances

“ The world will hold its breath” - Hitler

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In- depth map: Opening phase of Operation Barbarossa.

The History Department of the United States Military Academy

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SVo-2jfeoMM

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EARLY SIGNS OF STRATEGIC DISAGREEMENTS

Of the three Army Groups, Field Marshall Bock, Army Group Centre, had the key role, for which he had been given two of the four available Panzer armies.

But, these were not to be deployed in an independent thrust, as in France in 1940, and as General Guderian would have favoured.

Hitler insisted that the prime target was not the acquisition of territory or cities, but the destruction of the Red Army, which was to be achieved by double pincer operations of infantry and armour moving around on the left and right flanks of Russian units.

The entire campaign was designed to fast and brief, and Hitler reckoned to be occupying Moscow before the beginning of the Russian winter.

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Operation Barbarossa: Nazi Invasion of the USSR

June 22 - September 1, 1941

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Initially German armies made rapid progress. Stalin had ignored warnings of the attack from the Allies and his own advisors, because he could not believe that Hitler would dare initiate a war on two front and assumed the Allies were trying to provoke him into the war. He assumed the German preparations were bluff designed to force him to be more conciliatory. In fact in the months preceding the attack he had fell for the German ploy making a number of concessions. Consequently the Germans were able to take full advantage of the element of surprise and in the first two days the Soviet air force was wiped out on the ground. Within the first three weeks the German forces had advanced 500 kilometres on the northern front, up to 600 on the central front, and 350 on the southern front.

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Stubborn Russian resistance prevented the fully effective use of panzer and infantry units essential for Blitzkrieg warfare.

Infantry lagged behind panzer units allowing thousands of Russian troops to escape encirclement.

By the end of July, the German forces had suffered 213,301 casualties, including nearly 50,000 dead and 12,000 missing in action. Infantry divisions had lost 80% of their combat strength.

German reserves had to be drawn upon sooner and to a greater extent than had been planned.

Map of the Eastern Front (WWII), 1941-06-21 to 1941-09-09

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Both Hitler and his commanders had completely underestimated the strength of the Red Army, arguing partly from the purge of officers in 1937 and also the poor performance in the Russo-Finnish war of 1939-40. They reckoned that the Russians would be defeated in less than two months, and this opinion was shared by many military experts in the Allied countries. This helps to explain what in hindsight appears to be the incredible folly of the German attack.

During August they began to become aware of the size of the task they had taken on. Halder admitted in his diary entry of 11 August: “ ...we have underestimated the Russian colossus...the time factor favours them, as they are near their own resources, whereas we are moving farther and farther away from ours. And so our troops, sprawled over an immense front line, without any depth, are subjected to our enemey’s incessant attacks.” Franz Halder - Chief of the

Army General StaffSeptember 1938 - September 1942

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Disagreements between Hitler and OKH

Right from the start of the planning for Barbarossa, there had been an ongoing tension between Hitler and OKH (High Command of the Army) over which of the three fronts should be the main priority.

Halder argued that the main thrust should come from Army Group Centre towards Moscow on the grounds that the Russians would commit the bulk of their forces for the defence of the capital. The Germans would thus have the opportunity of destroying those forces and so create a large gap in the Red Army front, and also capturing the seat of government and a key communications hub, as well as the valuable surrounding industrial belts.

Halder briefing Hitler about the Russian campaign, July 1941

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Hitler’s Strategy and mistakes• Hitler was more concerned with political and economic aspects. His priorities were first, to establish secure communications with Sweden and Finland, ensuring secure supplies of iron ore and nickel. This would require the capture of Leningrad, removing the threat from the Russian fleet in the Baltic.

• Secondly, he was anxious to capture the rich agricultural Ukraine and the industrialised Donetz basin in the south, and to secure the oilfields in the Caucasus. He also believed that this would put pressure on Turkey to enter the war on his side.

• He regarded the attack on Moscow (Operation Typhoon) of lesser priority than objectives in north and south. The offensive on Moscow was dependent on progress made on the flanks. Von Bock was furious with Hitler arguing decsiion was ill-timed and misconceived.

• This controversy came to a head on 15 August when Hitler ordered forces from Army Group Centre to assist Army Group North which was facing a dangerous Soviet counter-attack on its southern flank. He dismissed Halder’s plan to continue the advance on Moscow until the armies in the south and north had achieved their missions.• A key reasons for Hitler’s rejection of Halder’s plan was his mounting awareness that Russia could not be defeated before the onset of winter. He was not prepared to give up his major priorities of Leningrad and the Ukraine for the sake of a bib to capture Moscow.

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Hitler told Halder:“ I don’t want to capture Moscow! I want to destroy the enemy and the mass of this army is standing in front of me! The turn away towards the south is merely a sideshow, however large it may be, through which a question mark is placed over the execution of the main operation, namely the destruction of the Russian armed forces before the winter. It does not help at all!”Halder sympathised, but failed to get the Fuehrer to change his mind.

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File:Eastern Front 1941-06 to 1941-12.png

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OPERATION TYPHOON

Post 1945 many German generals blamed Hitler for the enforced change of strategy which, they so argued, threw the entire invasion plan into disarray. Rather than keeping the focus on the accepted Prussian military doctrine of focussing on the enemy’s centre of gravity, the Fuehrer had taken his eye of the ball, and in all probability, cost Germany a decisive victory in the east. At the time even Von Bock hailed the operation as “a brilliant success”. Guderain’s panzers had swung into supporting Army Group Souths’ offensive towards the Caucasus and Donetz Basin.

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Hitler’s decision to switch the emphasis away from the centre to the south brought short-term gains with the destruction of the entire Soviet South West Army Group in September 1941. However, German casualty figures were massive – 534,000. When the advance of Army Group Centre resumed on October 2, many of the units were at less than 50 per-cent strength. Although the offensive started well by the second week of October the autumn rains slowed down the advance, since only tracked vehicles could move effectively through the mud. And then the Russian winter set in early and with full force. The warnings of the Army High Command about timing and technical issues now proved correct. German soldiers had no winter clothing, nor was military equipment designed for the extreme conditions of the Russian winter. With supply lines over-extended and transport system failing the potential for disaster was clear. Finally, the Russians continued to fight on courageously and tenaciously. Hitler’s mood now changed for the worse.

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Hitler in a meeting with Keitel, Brauchitsch, and Paulus in Russia, early Oct 1941

• By the end of November 1941, with German units in the suburbs of Moscow, the advance ground to a halt.• On December 5, the Russians launched a massive counter-offensive with fresh forces largely drawn from Siberia and well equipped for winter fighting.• During the next days panic spread among the German forces and the Army Commanders advised a withdrawal. Hitler, however, was aware that no defences had yet been prepared in the rear and was afraid that a retreat might become a rout. He ordered all the German armies to stand firm and fight to the death.

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Generals who withdrew were dismissed, including the panzer hero, Guderian. By the spring of 1942, 35 generals had been replaced and Hitler accepted the resignation of his Commander in Chief of the Army, Field Marshall von Brauchitsch, and took over himself. From now on Hitler’s interference at all levels of Army operations increased still further. On 15 January the order for a phased withdrawal was issued. In reality, the Soviet offensive continued and the front could not be stabilised until March/April 1942 when it ran some 150-300 kilometres further back from the line reached by the German armies at the end of November 1941. The cost in casualties was high. The reverse in front of Moscow had been a disastrous setback for Germany; it confirmed the bankruptcy of the Blitzkrieg strategy. They were now faced with a long war on two fronts, the very predicament which Hitler had planned to avoid.

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The Turning-Point 1942-1943

Hitler continued to regard victory as the key to the defeat of Britain. He had learnt his lesson from the over-ambitious attempt to attack on three separate fronts simultaneously and, in any case, the Wehrmacht now lacked the manpower to do so. The capture of the industrial Donetz and primarily the oilfields of the Caucasus became his sole and obsessive objective. Concurrently, Hitler hoped that one final surge would overwhelm Leningrad, which had been under siege throughout the winter of 1941-2 and bring him control of the Baltic. OKW Directive 41 issued on 5 April 1942 ordered a major offensive on the southern front ‘ to destroy the remaining military forces of the Soviets once and for’ and ‘ as far as possible to remove from them the most important economic resources for the war effort’. A series of costly Soviet attacks in May 1942 delayed the German offensive. Consequently, although the Germans advanced they failed to secure the first two phases of their campaign: the destruction of the bulk of the Russian forces in front of the River Don.

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Eastern Front 1942-05 to 1942

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OPERATION ‘BLUE’ – Hitler’s ambitious plan to seize the Caucasus

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Hitler’s fatal blunder

Ignoring the failure to secure the Don and destroy Soviet forces in the east, Hitler gave the order for his armies to invade the Caucasus and seize the city of Stalingrad simultaneously. The Fuhrer made a disastrous error in believing that Soviet forces around Stalingrad were in disarray. Hitler foolishly split his forces, sending the 4th Panzer Army further south to attack Rostov, while the 6th Army was left to advance on Stalingrad alone minus much of its fuel and armour in what the Fuhrer thought was merely a mopping-up operation. Within a week the 4th Panzer Army was forced to return from Rostov to support the Stalingrad assault and weakening the Caucasus thrust.

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Operations Uranus, Saturn and Mars: Soviet advances on the Eastern Front, 18 November 1942 to March 1943:   to 12 December 1942  to 18 February 1943  to March 1943 (Soviet gains only)

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Disaster at Stalingrad The battle for Stalingrad began on 19 August. By the middle of October, the 6th Army had lost 40,000 men. Once again Soviet military capabilities were underestimated and appeals by General Paulus, Commander of the 6th Army, for reinforcements were ignored. It was also clear that Army Group A was unable to capture the main oilfields of the Caucasus. At this point, Hitler’s commanders advised him to withdraw both armies. Hitler ignored this advice, especially withdrawal from Stalingrad. On 19 November, the Russians launched a massive counter-attack and within three days had trapped some 240,000 troops of the German 6th Army Hitler ordered the army to hold. When the siege finally ended on 2 February 1943, the Axis forces had endured massive casualties and nearly 91,000 prisoners taken by the Russians including twenty-four generals.

Von Paulus shortly after surrendering to Red Army forces under the command of Georgi Zhukov. This is the first time the Soviets had taken a Filed Marshall captive.

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Operation UranusGerman 6th Army Trapped in StalingradNovember 19, 1942 - February 6, 1943

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STALINGRAD

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RETREAT AND DEFEAT By the end of January 1943 German forces in the south of Russia had pulled back 450 kilometres in three weeks. In the Ukraine too the German armies were in headlong retreat and, during February, the Red Army liberated the cities of Kursk, Kharkov, and Belgograd. Meanwhile the Russians had managed to break the siege of Leningrad. A successful German counter-attack in the South was brought to a halt by the Russians and heavy rain. In their winter offensive the Russians had failed to destroy Army Groups A and South, and the Germans had finally stabilised their front and regained the initiative. However, the Germans had lost virtually all the territory gained in the summer offensive of 1942 as well as heavy losses of men and equipment. It was a crushing setback for Hitler.

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Operation ‘Citadel’ and the Russian offensives of 1943-45

Germany’s strategic situation in the spring of 1943 in the aftermath of Stalingrad and the loss of North Africa was perilous. Manpower in particular, was gravel stretched. Despite attempts to hold the Eastern Front the quality of troops deteriorated as Germany was forced to mobilize here reserves. Faced with this dire predicament the Wermacht High Command (OKW) resolved to adapt a defensive strategy by turning occupied Europe into a fortress. The aim was to create powerful defensive frontiers that would bleed to death attacking Allied forces. This strategy would buy Germany time to re-gather its momentum and bring about the breakup of the Grand Alliance as a result of their political and ideological differences. This approach required Germany to commit vast amounts of forces to fighting Russia so weakening other parts of the ‘fortress’. There was a real risk that the Germans would bleed to death. Also, it was deceitful in that it attempted to give the impression that victory in the east could still be achieved. The Nazis feared that the truth would devastate morale and hence the war effort.

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Operation ‘Citadel’ ‘Citadel’ was OKH’s plan to launch a decisive strike to destroy the offensive capacity of the Red Army. Its aim was to take-out a large Russian forward bulge between the Orel and Kharkov.

On 15 April 1943, Hitler approved the plan.

http://www.thehistorychannel.co.uk/videos.html?bctid=73433672001&The-Battle-of-Kursk

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Battle of KurskPart of the Eastern Front

of World War II

Soldiers with a Tiger I of the SS-Panzergrenadier

-Division Das Reich advance through the

southern Voronezh Front

The Kursk Offensive Video on History

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KURSK

• The Battle of Kursk began on the 4 July and culminated in the biggest tank battle of the Second World War on July 12. Each side fielded over 900 tanks together with air support. Both sides suffered heavy losses and the fighting continued for a further ten days.

• The essential point was that the German assault had been contained and, with their elite armoured divisions severely mauled, the entire offensive had lost its momentum. Guderian called Kursk ‘a decisive defeat’.

• The Russians exploited their success at Kursk by launching further offensives in August. By September the Russians had crossed the Dneiper River and recaptured Kiev on 6 November.

• A German counter-offensive in mid-November was checked after achieving only limited success.

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Eastern Front: Soviet GainsJune 1944 - January 1945

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Soviet Advance into East Prussia & Seige of KönigsbergJanuary 13 - May 9, 1945

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CONCLUSION By the middle of May 1944 the Soviets had liberated the Crimea and destroyed five German armies during the winter offensives. Other Panzer armies had been badly mauled. Only Army Group Centre remained intact.

The Germans had almost been driven out of the Ukraine, with its valuable economic resources, and of the Crimea, and Russian forces had entered parts of Romania jeopardising the oilfields crucial to the German war effort.

The 1943-44 winter campaign had cost the lives of nearly one million German troops.

Only on the Central front did the Germans still hold a substantial chunk of Russian territory in Byelorussia – apart from the Baltic States.

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With the defeat of Kursk and the subsequent Russian offensives, Germany had lost the strategic initiative. Instead of dictating events to his enemies, Hitler was forced to react to moves made by others.

By the end of 1943 the outcome of the war on the Eastern front had already been decided.

Germany had deployed throughout 1943-44 over 60% of her total strength (4,906,000 men) and over 50% of her tanks (5,400).

Hitler was now bound to lose the war; the only question was how long it would take and what the post-war map of Europe would look like.

When the Russians launched a major offensive on the 12 January 1945 from the Carpathians to East Prussia, the Germans had no more reserves to pitch against them.