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Shiro Matsushima, Doctor of Design, prepared this case under the supervision of Professor Spiro Pollalis as the basis forclass discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation.

Copyright 2003 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies, visit http://www.cdi.gsd.harvard.edu,call (617) 384-6667 or write to the Center for Design Informatics, Harvard Design School, Cambridge, MA 02138. No part ofthis publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by anymeans electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the permission of Harvard Design School.

HARVARD DESIGN SCHOOL CDI-

Center for Design Informatics

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THE GRAND LOUVRE

PARIS, FRANCE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this case study is to examine 1) the advantages and thedisadvantages of the direct operation model that has no executivearchitect, 2) how the architect redefined the contractual model so that he

could take back some of the responsibilities of earlier architects, and 3)what different roles an architect who was an original member of theLouvre project plays as an executive architect for another signaturemuseum project at the Museum of Modern Art in New York (MoMA).

Project definition

owner: Muse du Louvre (national project)building use: museumbuilding type: new construction and renovationsite area: 9 hectaresfloor area: 61,990 square meters (phase I),

55,000 square-meter demolition and50,000 square-meter new construction (phase II)

gallery space: 60,000 square meters (645,000 square feet)project cost: FF6,900,000,000 (approximately US$1 billion)architect: I. M. Pei and Partners, Paris

(now Pei Cobb Freed & Partners)associate architect: Michel Macary, Georges Duvalproject delivery method: design-bid-build (multiple packages)design period: 1983 1988 (phase I), 1988 1993 (phase II)construction period: 1984 1989 (phase I), 1989 1993 (phase II)

The Grand Louvre project represents over fifteen years of work from 1981 to 1998. Its ambition isat once museological, architectural, and urban, since it involves enlarging and modernizing theLouvre, setting off the palace to its advantage, and opening up the whole complex to the city. Apublic authority, Etablissement Public du Grand Louvre (hereafter EPGL), was created in 1983 to

be in charge of the project as a whole. EPGL oversaw all the work right up to its completion in1998.

The architect had to face some key issues: handling a public project,

Figure 1:Cour Napolon with

the pyramidSource: Museum web site

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The Grand Louvre, Paris, France CDI-#

Center for Design Informatics, Harvard Design School page 2 of 23

working in a different cultural environment, managing the different interests of the owner/user groups and the bureaucracy, coping with a high degree of uncertainty and complexity, coordinating the overlapping tenders and works.

In September 1981, the President of the Republic of France, Franois Mitterrand, made a decisionto devote all of the Louvre Palace to housing the museum. Despite its reputation, the Louvre wassuffering from disorganized galleries and lack of space at that time, and there was a strong needsto open the museum more to the public. EPGL was in charge of gathering information for theprogramming and the architect selection, which was originally designated to proceed as aninternational competition.

Although I.M. Pei, one of the potential candidates, refused to participate in the competition, theimpact of his achievements in museum design let the President go outside of the competitionprocess to select him. Pei decided to establish his office in Paris to directly operate the project inassociation with a local designer, instead of working from his home office in New York and havinga local executive architectural firm, and the owner reformed the conventional contractual model sothat Pei could get involved in the construction documents and supervision processes.

This case study will examine the advantages of the direct operation model by comparing it with the

conventional design architect-executive architect model. In the current design context, architecturalprojects have been fragmented and more parties have become involved than before. Even thedesign work is divided into two phases: design development and production of constructiondocuments, which is more apparent in this multinational project. Peis achievement, though it wasmore than a decade ago, teaches us how the architect challenged convention and the bureaucracyto take back the responsibility that had previously belonged to the architect. In addition, the ownersinitiative in setting up a public authority, such as EPGL, providing a means whereby the overalltasks could be well defined, is highlighted as a facilitator of the project. Finally, the creation processof the notable pyramid is used to explicate the collaboration between the architect and thecontractor, with an episode of a strategic move by the architect.

This case study suggests that, if the situation permits, it may be desirable for an architect to directlyoperate a project in proximity to the venue and to the owner so that he/she can control the

documents and hence control the process without leaving them to a middle person, a localrepresentative, or a contractor. It is sometimes necessary to alter the conventional workingframework. The owners streamlined accountability here represented by EPGL, facilitates projectdelivery. Especially when working in an unfamiliar context, having a direct relationship with keyparticipants (EPGL and the curators in this case) is the key to a successful project. The architect isexpected to have certain design attitudes, such as obstinacy, determination, rigor, andattentiveness, along with design skills, to control the complex situation.

PROJECT OUTLINE

Stephen Rustow 70 has recently moved back to New York City from Paris, where he hadspent some 10 years overseeing I. M. Pei's design team for the Louvre Pyramid. Rustowwas a sculptor at Rochester who went on to earn a degree in architecture from M.I.T

1

In its official web site, the University of Rochester celebrated the return of its alumnus from Paris in1996 after his prominent achievement for one of the worlds premier museums. Stephen Rustow,

AIA, was one of five original members of Peis team for the Grand Louvre project. He is currentlychallenging another enterprise for the Museum of Modern Art in New York as a project manager ofhis design team at Kohn Pedersen Fox Associates, PC (KPF).

1 http://www.rochester.edu/

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The Grand Louvre is a part of the Grands Travaux or Grand Projects defined by PresidentFranois Mitterrand, which also included the new Bibliothque Nationale de France, the Opra desBastille, and the Grande Arche de la Dfense. The Grand Louvre constituted the realization of anearlier project which involved devoting the entire palace of the Louvre to the museum function,while modernizing and improving the presentation of the collection in response to both external andinternal needs. Covering an area of some 40 hectares (approx. 99 acres) right in the heart of Paris,on the right bank of the Seine, the Louvre offers almost 60,000 square meters of exhibition space.

Owner entity

The Grand Louvre project was a national project, and thus the ultimate owner was the Frenchgovernment. The EPGL was created in 1983 to be in charge of the project as a whole. It wasrequired to oversee all the work right up to its completion in 1998, when the renovation work on thehistorical areas of the museum was concluded. EPGL, with outside consultants from a number oftechnical design offices such as SODETEG which was in charge of programming, constituted theclient body. The Louvre museum curators and the heads of the Direction des muses de Franceand the Runion des muses nationaux (National Museum Services) were directly involved inlaying down the fundamental guidelines for the programming, and ensuring that the projectcomplied with the programs thus defined.

The projects budget of FF6.9 billion was financed by the government with some donated moneyfor specific exhibitions. The project enabled the exhibition areas of the museum to be doubled insize while increasing the public and the staff work areas. The Grand Louvre projects consisted of aseries of parts: Cour Napolon with the pyramid in the middle, Cour Carre, Richelieu Wing, anunderground parking area for 80 buses and 600 cars, a shopping area (the Carrousel) withinverted pyramid, and the subsequent renovation work on the historical gallery spaces.

Design entity

Architectural and design work for the new parts of the project was carried out by teams ofarchitects and technical design offices. In the case of restoration work to the palace fabric, theHead Palace Architect carried out the work in compliance with the statutory regulations governingwork in historic buildings. New design work was largely the responsibility of I. M. Pei and his team,in collaboration with Michel Macary, associate architect for this project, and Georges Duval, HeadPalace Architect, and with the assistance of SOGELERG and SERETE technical design offices,which were selcted by competition.

Figure 2: The Louvre aerial view

Source: Museum web site

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I. M. Pei was in charge of conceptual design as a whole, surface and underground work on theCour Napolon, and the underground of the Cour Carre in collaboration with Michel Macary andGeorges Duval. He was also in charge of the Richelieu Wing in collaboration with Michel Macaryand Jean-Michel Wilmotte.

The PolemicPyramid

I. M. Pei, commissioned directly by the President of the Republic, tookover the first major parts of the modernization concept for the museum.His project, which included the construction of the pyramid in the center ofthe Cour Napolon, was first exhibited at the Palais de lElyse to thehistorical committee, Suprieure des Monuments Historiques, in January1984, where it caused considerable controversy right from the outset.

According to a request of the then Mayor of Paris, Jacques Chirac, a life-sized simulation was planned and executed in May 1985, when theproject was given final approval after 60,000 Parisians review.

Peis pyramid was inaugurated in 1989, the bicentennial of the FrenchRevolution. Surrounded by fountains, it marked the entrance to the newmuseum, thus constituting only a very small part of the renovation work

and enlargement of unprecedented scale. This work includedthe restoration of the buildings and transformation intoexhibition areas of the former Ministry of Finance quarters inthe Richelieu Wing, along with the creation of an undergroundparking area and a shopping area.

The Richelieu Wing

The Richelieu Wing transformation was another major part of

the project. President Mitterrand took the decision to transferthe offices of 5,000 civil servants of the Ministry of Financefrom the north wing of the Louvre Palace to Bercy. Thisliberated 22,000 square meters of exhibition area, andinitiated the second stage of the project. It also improved thecirculation of the museum, which was dysfunctional becauseof its too linear configuration, enabling the passage from northto south via Cour Napolon. The Richelieu Wing wasinaugurated by President Mitterrand on 18 November 1993,the date of the Louvre museum bicentenary.

Figure 3: Ground floor planSource: Museum web site

Richelieu Wing

Cour Napolon

Inverted

Pyramid

Denon WingFlore Wing

Rohan and Marsan Wing

Cour

Carre

Figure 5: Museum reconfiguration

concept diagram

Source: Bezombes (1994)

Figure 4:The controversy begins.

front page ofFrance-Soir,

24 January 1984

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PROJECT INITIATION

The Louvre was not a competition project, unlike the common practice insuch a situation. It was direct command. However, originally it supposedto have been a competition. Unlike the United States, France does notleave its cultural monuments in the hands of private philanthropists; thestate is by far the major patron. Pei was considered in the first place

because Mitterrand was impressed by Peis design for the east buildingof the National Gallery in Washington. When Pei first met the Presidenton December 11, 1981 in Palais de lElyse, he was asked if he would

join the competitions for some of the grand projects for Paris without theLouvre being mentioned. Pei replied as gracefully as he could that hehad no time to enter competitions.

Not long afterward, Mitterrand began assembling a team to oversee thearchitectural projects he was contemplating. For the Louvre, thePresident assigned a leathery civil servant named Emile Biasini. Biasini had been a cabinetmember under Andr Malraux, De Gaulles Minister of Culture, and a director of French nationaltelevision. In the fall of 1983, he was given the title of president of the Etablissement Public duGrand Louvre (EPGL) and his first task was to look into the selection of an architect.

Some months after the first meeting with the President, Pei was asked by Biasini about his interestin making recommendations for the Louvre. Will you join the competition, if we are sure that youwin? He replied, If you are sure that I am going to win, why dont you select me to execute theproject? In fact, this happened. It was Mitterrands decision to go outside of the competitiveprocess.

The reason that Pei refused the competition was not because he wasaware he was not going to win but because he was convinced that acompetition does not create good architectural solutions. One can disputethat, but the French had previously started on a series of grand projects:the Ministry of Finance that had been awarded, and Opra des Bastille,which was the famous case that had gone badly. Moreover, there were

many competitions afterward as well. In addition, there were manycompetitions for other parts of work at the Louvre.

When Peis office was designated in November 1982, Peis response wasto ask for a period of four or five months in which he could make severaltrips to Paris unaccompanied to essentially study the problem himself andto see if he felt there was a solution. After three such trips (there wereoriginally supposed to be four), he was deeply convinced that there weresolutions. It was formally agreed to continue with the project in June 1983.

Strategic move?

Peis action of refusing to get involved in the competition looks like astrategic move because he finally got a project. However, in fact it is hard

to define. As a younger architect, he had participated in competitions helost and had done very badly. Moreover, he felt that it was a waste ofefforts and resources. Back in 1983, the American perception was that thecompetitions were often arranged or fixed, with the likely winner knownbeforehand. Moreover, above all, he generally felt, and still feels, thatcompetitions do not deliver the best design, because, in order for them tobe organized fairly, everyone must be presented with the sameinformation. In order for that information to be objective, there should bevery little direct contact between the architect and the owner entities,

Figure 8:Pei meeting with

Mitterrand in June1983

Source: Wiseman (1990)

Figure 7:office for the Ministry of

Finance at Bercy byAndre Putman

Source: Tasma-Anargyros

Figure 6:The east building of the

National Gallery,Washington, 1968-1978

Source: Biazini (1989)

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which means that the whole process of development is usually excluded.2 In addition, it is not clearthat the institution is able to rethink its position once it sees the competition result. Therefore, thecompetition is very binding.

In the case of MoMA, for example, if the search committee had lookedinto a different architect selection process, they might have ended up witha more thoroughly understood program. Stephen Rustow suggested, Ifthey had identified six architects and then spent some time to get allthose architects and then ask three to develop ideas quietly, and thenwithout great fanfare had selected one architect, they might have beenable to have a process of development of the program. One of theobvious examples is that there are two pavilions facing the garden, whichis a very strong idea. It is an idea that gives primacy to the garden andhence conditions the entire project. It was there from the very beginning.However, the program impact of that idea was not very well understood,circulation aspects and how the other building was going to be

developed. The consequence was that the education building with nine stories is facing the gallerybuilding with five floors and the two are trying to look identical. Rustow commented, Once thecompetition was there, it was almost impossible to change the project. That is the reason why I. M.does not like competitions.

PROJECT TEAM STRUCTURING

Pei started the project with five of his architects in the New York office, and the design team wascomplemented by the project executive, Emile Biasini, who was assigned by the Frenchgovernment. Michel Macary was brought in by Biasini as an associate architect. They had workedtogether before. For the involvement of Macarys office, SCAU, there were two reasons. First, asPeis office started to gather project background information, SCAU provided Paris-basedassistance and Michel Macary served as Peis key Paris contact. SCAU played a go-between rolewith the Louvre and EPGL because they had a working relationship with Biasini and other peopleat EPGL. Second, as Peis people began to go back and forth between New York and Paris, MichelMacarys office became the central contact point and the place they would actually work. Originally,the thought was that Peis office would be entirely responsible for the design and would develop the

design through the French equivalent of design development, and then Michel Macarys officewould be responsible for construction documents with close supervision on the part of Peis office.

In the first nine or ten months, as they worked on preliminary design, it became absolutely clearthat the French way of working or producing documents and then building was completely differentfrom the American way, that French architects no longer had a tradition of producing workingdrawings. Rustow commented, In some ways it was similar to what I understand of Japanesepractice. In Japan, those who actually produce the working drawings are more firms such asKajima and Takenaka3 that become associated with the project, and from the moment when thedesign is fully developed, they take over the actual production of construction documents and thedetail things, with close supervision of the design architects.The actual working drawing through tothe detail is not done by the design architects.4 On the other hand, Taniguchi is well known for

2 It is possible to say that to some extent Taniguchi was lucky because the competition organized for MoMA asked for acertain number of ideas without suggesting that those ideas would necessarily be going to be the final building. However, infact Taniguchis competition proposal was very close to his building.3

Two of Japans five major contractors. All of them do design-build and just construction.4 This is not always true, but it is likely to happen because design alters or develops even in the construction period andbecause in some cases design firms are not capable of producing feasible documents, so contractors support theconstruction documents to ensure constructablity. Thus, it seems to happen not for contractual reasons but conventionalones. In addition, the contractors play design roles in some situations such as large complex projects that requiredownstream information up front by teaming up with design firms and implementing new construction methods that aredeveloped by the general contractor. Since Japanese contractors heavily invest in building technology, design firmsinevitably need to adapt that technology to their design in some cases, and thus collaborative work with the contractors isneeded.

Figure 9:MoMA from 54th street:

two pavilions facingthe garden

Source: The Museum ofModern Art, New York

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keeping enormous control over the process (though not in the case of MoMA), all the way toconstruction even on the site to the very end. In many projects in Japan, he closely works with theconstruction people and stores the knowledge at the same time, which is a heuristic process.

In France, the situation was a little bit different in that the architect was not involved in theconstruction documentation and in the building process; instead the engineers took over thesetasks. The architects involvement was not prohibited by law, but the structure of the contracts, inparticular the structure of the fees, was designed in such a way that it was almost inevitable.Proportionally the architect was remunerated very much more at the beginning of the process;therefore, by the end of the process there was very little left in terms of fee in order to support theproduction process, which amounted to 15 to 20% for the entire construction documentation cost.So architects were constrained to do a great deal of work early on in the hope that that work wouldbe sufficiently well developed that they could control the process without actually being directlyinvolved in it. The difficulty was that inevitably there were cost overruns or there were budget cuts,and at that moment the architect had essentially no means with which to study alternatives.

Architects had to anticipate all of them before actually having budget implementation. In the event,it was the client with the help of engineering firms who was contractually responsible for creatingthe final project. The French had even developed the term for this contrat dingnierie orengineering contract, which was architectural contract.

Obviously, Peis office understood very little of this before they started the project. As they worked,two things happened. First, they began to understand much more of this convention that wasspecific to the French building industry. Rustow had been in Peis office for three years before theproject started. I was a part of the original team with Didi Pei, Yann Weymouth, and there weretwo [other] people as well, and each of us had a specialty in addition to working on the generaldesign. In the first year, when we were going back and forth, it became clear to us that there wasno way to develop the documents in a way we would control unless the documents were done inFrance by Peis office. And so we decided at the end of 1984 [sic] that we would essentially movethe office, core of the office, over to Paris, recalled Rustow.

For the time being, they thought that they would work with Michel Macarys office and then MichelMacarys office would essentially hire the group. Therefore, Macarys team would be with four orfive of Peis people. They did that for about six months. However, when they completed the

equivalent of the design development, they made a critical decision to keep an office that wasessentially I. M. Peis office in Paris. Although working very closely with Michel Macary, Peis officewould hold the final contractual obligation or responsibility. It was at that point that four of theoriginal five moved to Paris in September 1983; Stephen Rustow was among them. At the outset,the office hired Leonard Jacobson, a former staff member of Peis and a veteran of the EastBuilding, to be project manager and handle the coordination of planning and construction forseveral years. He got going back and forth, but he was actually in Paris more than he was in NewYork. In addition, they started to hire staff in Paris. The Paris office was composed of the officedirector, several construction supervisors, and administrators. And apart from the core staff of fiveand two or three others who were American, everyone else in the office was either French ortreated as French, and the office grew to be as large as 28 people. The office continued to existuntil the end of the second phase in 1995, so it was not just for the pyramid which opened in 1989.There were three parts of the second phase: surface works, extension of the inverted pyramid in

the commercial shopping space, and the renovation of the Ministry of Finance quarters in theRichelieu Wing. They did all of the documents in Paris and did them their own way. In other words,they created a model for following the construction documentation process all the way through tothe end. Therefore, they retained control over how the documents would be produced.

REFORMATION OF CONTRACTUAL MODEL

The French government was itself extremely interested in looking at this other model ofresponsibility, which was actually another contractual model, and of creating a basis that wouldallow architects to take back some of the responsibility that they had given up in preceding

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decades. There were complicated historical reasons why architects had given up thatresponsibility. It had much to do with the reorganization of the French architecture schools after1969. After that, architects essentially became very design oriented, and they were no longerexpected to have actual control over the construction process. What Peis office was proposing, notin order to remake the system of French architecture but only to get this project started, in essencewas to change the model by which construction took place. Not simply because of their efforts, butcertainly with their efforts, the Mitterrand government with the Ministry of Culture adapted thatmodel of working for all of the subsequent great projects that went to foreign architects. Obviouslyseveral of the projects would have French architects, but there were some additional foreignersbrought in, and they were all given the means one way or another to essentially create offices thatwould allow overseeing the construction work.

Control of the documents

Rustow mentions his later experience at MoMA in this context: The key issues that I talked aboutwith Terry Riley

5at quite some length when the MoMA project was just starting out, and I talked

with Brian Aamoth6 and suggested that Taniguchi should think very seriously about thisthe keyissues were the control of the documents, the possibility to revise the project as a function of eithertechnical, budget, or programmatic changes all the way through the process and constructionsupervision.

The other thing this allowed Peis office to do, which would not have been the case otherwise, wasto develop a direct relationship not just with the EPGL but also with the curators of the Louvre,because the Louvre was a strange client in that there were several client entities. EPGL was adelegated construction manager as well as project manager, but the actual client was the Frenchgovernment, while the client institution was the Louvre. The curators were not expected to knowanything about construction, but they would be the users. And so if Peis office had had only theclassic arrangement, with the architect essentially no longer directly involved after designdevelopment, they would have had very little contact with the people who actually would use thegalleries. Such contact proved even more critical for the second phase, when they were makingexhibition spaces. All of the decisions about details, lighting, showcases, exhibition walls, size ofthe rooms, and natural light would have been inconceivable if they had been limited to designdevelopment. They did all that work as a French office. The office existed in France, it isentitled inFrance, it salaried its employees in French francs, and they signed their documents. Therefore,they had the ultimate control and responsibility for all of the pieces.

Liability

Peis office just accepted the entire liability. Michel Macarys office was extremely important to themand was very helpful because Macary could give them a great deal of advice. It was difficult to startsuch a prestigious project in a situation in which architects had never practiced before. However,the liability issues and the responsibility issues were clear for this project.

Associate architect

Michel Macary was an associate architect on the project, but was a design architect on parts of theproject such as the department of sculpture, sculpture courts, and some parts of the secondarywork at the Louvre, for which his office was responsible. For example, he did an expansion of thecommercial gallery in which there is an inverted pyramid. He did the parking garage. So the ideawas not that Peis office had taken over some of Macarys responsibilities, but under their newmodel they took all the different parts of the project and gave some of the commissions to Macary,who he worked very closely under their guidance. That was different from the originally arrangedmodel and not a design architect-executive architect model.

5Terence Riley, Chief Curator, Department of Architecture and Design, MoMA.

6 He graduated from Harvard Design School in 1986 with an MArch degree and is a long-time member of Taniguchis staff.He has been going back and forth between New York and Tokyo as an office advocate. He left Taniguchis office in January2003.

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People and tasks

The Louvre is a public institution. All of the money for the project came from the government, withthe exception of some very special contributions that came from Japan.7

What was important was that EPGL filled an exceptional role. It was a public group, designatedproject management staff, which existed only to build the building. Because it had no independent

life, once the building was finished, it disappeared. In addition, it worked not for a profit motive asan independent contractor, but in the public sector in order to enable the project to come about.Therefore, although it was very conservative in controlling management issues such asexpenditures to keep the budget in balance, it had no profit incentive to make anything lessexpensive or more expensive. If the architect demonstrated that a particular way of doingsomething could be covered somewhere in the budget, the architect did not have to fight with theconstruction manager about an alternative that the construction manager thought would be morelucrative for construction management, or simply easier to produce. In a sense it was, at least intheory, a very transparent process that would have to be completely documented. The reality wasa little bit different. These were public funds so architects had to give an accounting for everythingthat they did.

This model provided for completely different kinds of relationships, with the EPGL, the Louvre, and

the architects very much as colleagues. On a day-to-day basis, the three (EPGL, the Louvre, andI.M. Pei) composed a triangle of communication that went in all directions (see Exhibit A for theproject delivery system) all the time. It was an extremely good collaboration. When the curatorssaid, There is a problem in the program, EPGL said to the architect, You need to talk to themuseum to find out if you need to change it. Then the architect told the museum, You can changeit. We can design it differently. When the museum said, We have a problem. We need morefacilities of this kind, they would ask EPGL to authorize the architect to study it. Then the architectsaid, This doesnt work. You need to get together, do feasibility studies, and come back. Together,well go to the Louvre and work it out. Stephen Rustow, one of the original members of Peis officeand now working on MoMA as project manager at KPF, said, So this was an excellent model. Butyou can see that if we had not been there, if we had been in New York and somebody else hadinterpreted it already, it would have become more difficult.

PARIS AND NEW YORK

8

As for MoMA, Taniguchi as a design architect has carried out the project in a very different way.KPF plays an executive architect role and Stephen Rustow himself is responsible for the projectmanager role to his design team. He remarked, His buildings in Japan are astonishingachievements, and I think all of us who were able to go and see them were very impressed,particularly with the Gallery of Horyuji Treasurers and with the Toyota Museum. It was clear that

7There was a very limited but precise effort to try to get international partners to create a fund that would help with very

particular kinds of gallery construction or the programs. There was a great deal of activity with Japan. Shiseido, Japansmajor cosmetic company, supports the virtual tour of the museum on the web that uses VRML.8 For detailed description, see the case study ofthe Museum of Modern Art.

Figure 10: Toyota Museum, Aichi, Japan, 1996 (left),Gallery of Horyuji Treasures, Tokyo, Japan, 1999

Source: The Gallery of Horyuji Treasures

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the reason that MoMA wanted Taniguchi, apart from his competition design, was because theywere sensitive to qualities of these works. Taniguchi is well known for keeping enormous controlover the process, all the way through construction even on the site to the very end. By his ownadmission, he has somebody who always intervenes on the site and tries to change parts of thedesign after design development was supposed to be completed. In addition, for better or for worsehe has always worked with clients, often including the government,9 who would allow this tohappen.

However, it is a constant struggle to the architect to stay on top of the construction manager to seeto it that the construction manager does not make those decisions in the first place. So, for KPF,where do the problems come from? Obviously, first, Taniguchis office was not going to be in NewYork after schematic design. Because they were in New York until schematic design, Brian Aamothwas here and they had one or two staff. However, after schematic design essentially the officereturned to Tokyo and Aamoth became the person who went back and forth; they could not bethere with a full office for the elaboration of the program. Moreover, they could not be there for thedevelopment of the documents. Therefore, it meant obviously that the first thing KPF had to do wasto provide a great deal of information, because when the design went on from schematic design todesign development, even if KPF had all of Taniguchis documents in hand, there would bethousands of questions they needed to know and to understand. When Rustow started on theproject with Thomas Holzmann in July 1999, they spent a great deal of time putting together a

consulting team, a great deal of time providing information, and a great deal of time continuinginteraction with the Museum because it was very hard to do from Tokyo. Obviously key people fromTokyo would come to New York; KPF staff also travel to Tokyo, ten trips in fourteen months. Theyhad staff who stayed in Tokyo too; KPF insisted that somebody from the office be in Tokyo for theentire schematic design phase, which was Brian Girard10 who was there for sixteen months.

Control of the documents

The curtain wall was a very specific issue for the MoMA project. KPFcreated a team that was in Tokyo for about five or six months, which cameto be seven people plus Brian Girard. The reason for this was very simple:neither Kajima nor Takenaka was on this job and hence KPF had to providetechnical assistance in creating a set of documents that they would be ableto use for design development in the United States. Because the curtainwall was obviously going to be one of the most difficult and prestigiousparts of the project, and the most complicated to coordinate, they set outtheir approach for Taniguchi and the Museum. This was before AMEC, thegeneral contractor, was involved. The approach was that KPF would workdirectly with Taniguchi from schematic design. The idea was to documentall of the necessary information at the outset so that the set of details theycontrolled could realistically be taken over by a curtain wall manufacturer,and develop them in such a way that the designers knew the details wouldwork. Because if the architect simply submitted drawings that hadnt beenworked through, the manufacturer might say, Well, this is fine, but we have

to do that our way. The architect would lose control of the process. Therefore, for the curtain wall,it was absolutely clear that the only way to have Taniguchis office seriously participate in theprocess that would control the construction was for KPF, with their knowledge of curtain walls, to

put a team in his office in Japan. So, in his office on the eighth floor that was leased exclusively forthe project, seven people from KPF were sitting to make the curtain wall drawings to KPFstandards with Taniguchis constant input. In addition, they did a great deal of three-dimensionalcomputer modeling for Taniguchis review, which allowed him to look at things in a very differentway. That was a wonderful collaboration.

9 The owners of the Toyota Museum and the Gallery of Horyuji Treasurers are Toyota city and the Japanese governmentrespectively.10 MArch 94, Harvard Design School. He joined KPF after a three-year stint in Peis office.

Figure 11:MoMAs gallery wingcurtain wall viewed

from the gardenSource: Taniguchi and

Associates

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Brian Girard was very critical in making the relay between Taniguchis ideas about developing thedesign and American construction practice. There was a constant dialogue that did not intend tochange Taniguchis architecture but rather to find an interpretation that could be made withprecision in the United States. Therefore, in those early months in Japan, KPF served as aresource and as a sort of advance control or editor to say, Careful. If you develop it like this, itwould be extremely difficult to get a satisfactory result. But if we do the same thing like this, thenthere is a better chance. However, the real difficulty came in construction documents andconstruction administration, because for reasons that do not really need to concern the designarchitect (political, financial, having to do with the history of the relationship), the Museum madethe decision that Taniguchi would not be directly involved in construction supervision. That put avery difficult responsibility on KPF. Because KPF is a design firm, this is the first time it has servedas an executive architect. Even though they were closer to the owner geographically, they werebasically entrusted with no decision-making rights.

Facilitator

Despite some difficulties and frustrations due to this unfamiliar role, KPF had decided to take asecondary role. They, as a design firm, had made a decision that this project was so exceptionaland so interesting, and also represented a field of work, museum institutional work, in which theydid not traditionally have strength, that it would be very interesting for the firm to take the secondary

role as a way to develop that experience. On top of that, all of the members are aware that thisproject is more significant than any other project in New York right now and is the opportunity to dosomething about architecture in New York. There is, for the first time in a very long time, thepossibility of making very simple and very elegant architecture to a standard that has not beenseen in New York. KPF, as a local, even more than Taniguchi, is very interested in everyone whoparticipates in the local architects community, such as Terence Riley and so on. All of them arehighly motivated to try to see that this should become the public building that is clearly of a higherstandard in New York. This interest is the primary facilitator for the project.

DIRECT OPERATION IN PARISTHE PYRAMID

In that respect, the situation was similar to the Louvre. Because the whole idea of the grandprojects and of the Louvre in particular was to show Parisians that something could be created inParis, by people working in France, that met a higher standard than what preceded it. Rustow

proudly noted, I think it was successful. You dont have to like the project, but the quality ofconstruction, the quality of the way we put it together, was clearly on a higher level than the Frenchhad seen achieved in several generations.

Due to the strict time limits, the decision was made to parcel out work in separate tenders, and thusthere was a high degree of integration between the numerous pieces of work and civil engineeringcontractors. The coordination between the various tenders and major work on the fabric wascritical. Thanks to their intimate acquaintance with the project as a whole, the technical designteams were entrusted with this delicate task under the overall responsibility of the architect.General contractors also worked effectively to filter out cumbersome tasks so that design teamswere not bothered by subcontractors.

The Pyramidintegration of design and engineering

On October 14, 1988, Mitterrand cut a tricolor ribbon leading to the Cour Napolon, officiallyopening the courtyard to the public, and thousands of Parisians streamed in for their first look sincethe cable mock-up review in 1985. The following March 30, at 4:30, the President cut yet anotherribbon, which was to mark the opening of the room of importance beneath the pyramid.

11What

11The French are very good at announcing an opening, having an enormous party, and then closing the building to finish it.

The Louvre opened several times. Mitterrand said it would open in March of 1989, he cut the ribbon, he came inside, and soon, and then they closed it. The public was not able to come for a whole year. Opra des Bastille was publicly opened onJuly 14, 1989, with a concert conducted by Leonard Bernstein, and then it was closed until the end of the same year.

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the first unofficial visitors to penetrate the interior saw was a spectacle of engineering as well asdesign.

The pyramid was the most outstanding feature of the whole scheme, the one that had given rise tothe most controversy and had been subject to the greatest outside pressure. It was an icon thatshould represent the architects genius. Pei wanted the load-bearing structure to be gossamer-lightto give an unobstructed view of the palace.

Although Mitterrand shared the architects vision, the pyramid animated the controversial disputefrom the outset. It was likened to the dark hulk of the Montparnasse office tower of which it wassaid that a single high-rise could damage the Paris skyline. In addition, a journal such as Le Figarowas harsh enough to say that only ten percent of its readers supported the pyramid.

The attacks were slowed down after Biasini organized a meeting of seven departmental curators atArcachon, a small coastal resort west of Bordeaux, where Pei and his team put on a full-dresspresentation, to which the curators gave their unanimous support, and their public statements werepublished.

Although it by no means halted the attacks, with support from Parisian advocates such as Pierre

Boulez and Madame Pompidou and discreet meetings with Pei, Jacques Chirac, then the mayor ofParis and the president of one of the two leading opposition political parties, requested the buildingof a full-scale mock-up, which was to provide a more accurate idea of the impact the pyramid wouldhave on its surroundings. He looked at it and said, Well, its not too bad. 12 During the four-dayinstallation, 60,000 Parisians trooped by for a look and were surprised to see that it was not aslarge as they feared. Almost overnight, the tide of public opinion began to turn. Now Pei did nothave one client; he had fifty-five million clients, the entire population of France.

From a technical point of view, the result is theoutcome of a dialectical process that involved thearchitect, the engineer, and the contractor. As thearchitect wanted the most transparent and lightstructure that could possibly be built, the contractor

marshaled all its talent to meet such a challengingrequirement; meanwhile, they had to ensure thestability of a structure incorporating supportingcomponents that were reliable under a foreseeableamount of distortion, and in which variations indimension would occur as a result of thermalexpansion and changing climatic conditions (layers ofsnow and ice, gusts of wind). The structure

12 Cannell (1995), p. 25.

Figure 12: Computers were used to generate drawings the helped the architect assess

the impact of the pyramid on the semi-sacred monument, the palace

Source: left, Wiseman (1990), right, Biasini (1989)

Figure 13: The pyramid was finally approved

by physical mock-up review in May 1985

Source: Biasini (1989)

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corresponded to the geometrical form defined by the architect, and met the constraints of flatnessthat he stipulated. Protracted calculations and adjustments were necessary to achieve a result thatmet with the unanimous approval of everyone concerned; designers, inspectors, and the ownerentity. The pyramid combined two distinctive features: the faade, which was glass, and thesupporting metal structure.

The glassAcquiring the right glass was a saga in itself and well represented Peis strategy of implementinghis design. He had insisted from the outset that the glass would be absolutely clear in order tomake the pyramid as nearly transparent as possible. Virtually all the glass available on the market,however, was made with small amounts of iron oxide, which gave it a slightly greenish tint. In thehope of finding something most suitable, the Pei team approached the century-old French firm ofSaint-Gobain, the countrys biggest glass manufacturer. Peis people were told that Saint-Gobain,too, had abandoned the technology for making totally clear glass years ago. What they wanted wassimply impossible. That answer was not good enough for Michael Flynn, who had been in chargeof the design of the skylight at the East Building. He tracked down a German firm that, while it hadnot done such a thing in recent memory, said it was willing to resuscitate the craft for such a

prestigious use. Flynn took back the Germans information to the people atSaint-Gobain, who quickly appreciated the threat to French manufacturing

pride. After extensive consultation, for which they were even prepared toirreparably damage one of their normal kilns in pursuit of this objective, thefirm concluded that it could produce the material Pei wanted by using purewhite sand from a quarry in Fontainebleau. As described in Flynns note,They came around when they realized how deadly in earnest we were.

As it turned out, the German product would cost less, but buying Frenchprevailed. Although this was a more reliable solution, it excluded the use ofmodern float system techniques to produce the glass panes. It wasnecessary to resort to an older technique, in which the glass was drawnvertically; this, however, proved an awkward solution, because the paneswere no longer flat enough to prevent the visual distortion that the architecthad rejected.

13Accordingly, the panes were then sent to the United

Kingdom, along with Japan the only place in the world with facilities wherethe glass could be polished perfectly plane.

The structure

The 675 diamond-shaped and 118 triangular panes that were eventually installed were heldtogether by a structural system that involved some major innovations on the designers part. Againto minimize any obstructions to the view through the pyramid, Pei called for a solution that madethe spaceframes in the Kennedy Library in Boston and the Javits Center in New York seem almostclumsy. Jacobson was responsible for making the whole thing work. The result was a steelspiderweb made up of 128 crisscrossing girders secured by sixteen thin cables. Unable to find anyEuropean source for nodes and struts of sufficient strength and lightness for this bowstringtension system, Pei turned to Navtec, a maker of rigging for Americas Cup yachts, in Littleton, MA.

Assembling the structure

Since the political uncertainties14 made it necessary to get the pyramid itself up faster than theywould have liked, the members of the construction team were also faced with the problem of howto support the metal frame while the work that normally would have preceded it continued belowgrade. The problem was solved by erecting concrete columns from the foundations up to groundlevel at an early stage of excavation. They were later connected by 150-ton box girders that were

13Even now, this kind of glass is rarely manufactured because the process emits toxic gas, which requires an exclusive kiln

for its production. The current mass float glass production system does not allow changing the manufacturing line frequentlyfor this special glass.14 Mitterrands first presidency was coming to an end in early 1988.

Figure 14:Pei demonstrated

the clarity of the glassto Mitterrand


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bowed upward in anticipation of their ultimate load by cables attached to the ends. The cableswere gradually loosened as work on the pyramid progressed, until, when the superstructure wasfinished, the girders were allowed to return to being horizontally flat. So accurate were the advancecalculations for the process that not a single pane of glass in the pyramid broke when the last cablewas released.

One of the few low-tech solutions for the problems posed by the pyramid was the one used forcleaning the glass. A team of trained mountaineers was hired.

EPILOGUE

By the time the hall beneath the pyramid opened to the public in 1989, the agonies of the earlydays had been all forgotten. Congratulations poured in from around the world. Le Figaro, one ofPeis harshest early critics, hastily reserved the pyramid to celebrate the tenth anniversary of itsmagazine supplement.15 Rustow returned to the United States in 1996 with this gloriousachievement;16 as Terence Riley praised, It was the highlight of his life.

CONCLUSION

While Wiseman (1990) described Peis challenge as the battle of thepyramid, the real difficulty that lay underneath was the different culture andthe hierarchical system; as Pei himself joked, The Chinese inventedbureaucracy, but the French developed it.

Because of both its nature (as a national project) and its size, many peoplewere involved in the project with very different interests (Exhibit E), whichcaused controversial situations as seen above. The direct relationship withthe president, the highest power, was beneficial for the architect. It is a

great help, Pei said, to deal with one man only. Also he added, It is agreat pleasure to work with someone who knows what he wants and will acton it. Of course, it was a great advantage for the architect to have suchpatronage. However, it seemed a liaison dangerous from a historical point of

15It has to be noted that although the public furor that greeted his plan for the Louvre focused almost entirely on the design

of the pyramid, Pei approached the project from the outset as a planning problem. The most invaluable achievement wasthat he and his people reanimated what had become a backwater in central Paris.16 French heads of state have dedicated themselves to great building programs for their personal gloire, such asPompidous Beaubourg. Now the architect and his supporters are laureates of it.

Figure 16: How is it to be washed?

With soap and water.

Source: Biasini (1989)

figure 15: Bowstring tension system


architect

owner

Figure 17:

Direct command,

dangerous liaison

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Jean-Pierre Aury, the precise composition of the concrete and the finishing treatment wereelaborated. In addition, the formwork, including the choice of wood and its treatment and theshapes, were carefully examined. The concrete that resulted was barely distinguishable from thestonework that featured in the wall facing and flooring.

Project management/construction management

EPGL displayed preeminent skills to manage the project. They noted that the most obviousdifficulty arose from the strict time limits within which the project team had to operate; from the veryoutset, tasks necessary overlapped and the operation had to be planned well in advance. All theseoperations were inevitably interlinked; as a result, administrative shortcuts had to be adoptedthrough the entire design process and building workdespite the constraints thus imposed on allconcerned.

Due to the high degree of quality and complexity involved, such major projects are supremelyprestigious operations. Given the extremely short execution deadlines, the sheer number ofparticipants involved in the work, and the scale of financial provision, they exceeded normalbudgetary allocations; all parties concernedand in particular, the owner entitywere saddledwith a daunting task from start to finish.

The setting up of a public authority such as EPGL provided a means by which the overall taskcould be more accurately defined, thanks to the action of a tightly knit, highly motivated team.However, in cases like this some time might elapse before operations get into their stride, owing tofactors such as the relative inexperience of the newly created team, the diversity of its members,and the need to resort to outside assistance.

In light of such reflections, it is to be hoped that a specific policy would be adopted for the runningof future operations of this nature, and that experienced interdisciplinary teams could be set up toallow a more efficient solution to the problems an owner would encounter in the execution of them,notably with a view to providing improved cost management. EPGL indicated, for future projects,that because cost can vary considerably in the course of such operations, the introduction of asystem of a posteriori cost controlmore attuned to actual conditions, where real-time decisions

have to be takenwould be preferable to the present a priori control arrangements that appearedill-suited to deal with such situations.

Architects posture

Granting that the nature of the projectits prestige and its ample fundingwas a major factor in itssuccess, much of the credit may be attributed to the posture of the architect. Aside from excellencein design and strategic skills, his attitude toward the architecture, which could be represented bysuch terms as obstinacy, determination, rigor, and attentiveness, was the real driving force for theproject.

Figure 19: Materials of ceiling and wall were

barely distinguishable

Source: Bezombes (1994)

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EXHIBIT APROJECT DELIVERY SYSTEM

President of the RepublicFranois Mitterrand

associate architect

Ministry of Cultural Affairs

engineersconsultants

PM/CMdepartments

general contractors

subcontractors

architectI. M. Pei and Partners

head palace architect

engineersconsultants manufacturers

Ministry ofFinance

Etablissement Public duGrand Louvre

Director

museum user group

Muse du Louvre

Runion des musesnationaux

funding

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EXHIBIT BPEOPLE AND TASKS


President of the RepublicFranois Mitterrand

SCAUMichel Macary

Ministry of Cultural AffairsJack Lang

PM/CMdepartments of

Design, Contracts, New Works,

Restoration Works, Financial

general contractors

subcontractors

architectI. M. Pei and Partners

Stephen Rustow

head palace architectGeorges Duval


manufacturer

Ministry of FinancePierre Brgovoy

Edouard Balladur

Etablissement Public duGrand Louvre

Emile Biasini, President

DirectorMichael Laclotte

museum user group

Muse du Louvre

Runion des musesnationaux

programming: Sodetegdesign works: setecbuilding works:

Veritas and Socotec

engineering: Sogelerg and Sereteconcrete: Jean-Pierre AuryCour Care gallery: Italo Rota

exhibit: Jean-Michel Wilmotte

concrete: Dumez Corporationpyramid: Harmon CFEM

glass: SaintGobain

direct

communication

collaboration

triangle

formal (contractual) relation

informal relation

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EXHIBIT CDESIGN DELIVERY TEAM

Director of

the Louvre

Michael Laclotte

owner entity

design entity

direct commission

programming

Sodeteg

Jrme Dourdin

Saint-Gobain

Navtec

architect

I. M. Pei and

Partners, Paris

I. M. PeiLeonard Jacobson

Yann Weymouth

Didi Pei

Stephen Rustowstaff

French community/bureaucracy

- Jacques Chirac (later positive)

- Edouard Balladur, Finance Minister

- Journalism

Tradition of Louvre

- Franois Mansart failure

- Giovanni Lorenzo Bernini failure

Curators (later strongly supported)

Precedence

- Le Ntre

- Georges Pompidou

- Valry Giscard dEstaing

Advocates

- Pierre Boulez

- Claude Pompidou

forces

support

President of

the RepublicFranois

Mitterrand

head palace

architect

Georges Duval

Minister of Culture

Jack Lang

Minister of Finance

Pierre Brgovoy andEdouard Balladur

Etablissement

Public du

Grand Louvre

PM/CM

Emile Biasini

pyramid

concrete

contractor

Dumez

Contrat dingnierie

contract

based on the Ministry of

Finance at Bercy model

associate

architect

SCAU

Michel Macary

consultant

Jean-Pierre

Aury

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EXHIBIT DVALUE-ENHANCED PROCESS

MacaryMacaryMacary

President of theEtablissement du

Grand Louvre

taskprogramming

architect selectionsd/dd

cd

evaluation

surfacing valuesevaluatingprocess structure

evaluatingdesign proposals

decision

makingrecommendation

giving approval

process ownerstructure

professionals

artifactdesign/production

need for alteration

- survey- cost monitoring

pre-structuring

- approval

Project Team: PM/CM

primary contractors

cd

President of the RepublicThe Etablissement du Grand Louvre

cost/schedule

- review

- approval

- design review

architect

selection

episode 1: project team structuring

episode 2: pyramid glass and structure

concept/image

frame

form

design

time

- costadjustment

grand projectspersonal glory

- concept designreview

strategic

moves/

proposal

I. M. Pei

construction

I. M. Pei I. M. Pei

ca

episode 1

involvement ofthe public

I. M. Pei

The Louvre

consultants consultants consultants consultant

subcontractors

episode 23

inquiry

about

interest

President of theRepublic

commission

President of theEtablissement du

Grand Louvre

President of theRepublic

spirit of the Louvre

I. M. PeiYann WeymouthDidi PeiStephen RustowLeonard Jacobson

strategic

moves

Macary

assign

technical

support

The LouvreThe Louvre

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EXHIBIT EDIFFERNET INTERESTS

activity

materials and

components

manufacture

detailed design

and production

design and

consulting

building use

who derivation

of profit

preferences sensitivity

user

owner

construction GCs

better space and

function

time, service

not construction $

tax

patron

personal glory

better facility, increase

of utility, reputation

slowdown,

bad experience, $

fee income or profit

from efficient

management of

process

display of craftsmanship

increase fee income

change coordination

management + time

not to change order if

paid

reputation

- design

quality of execution

liability, slowdown

bad experience, $

consultant reputation - performance

enhanced value-added

owner, architect

subcontractors profit from process finish contracted work

increase productivity

but in many cases

no motivation of time and $

time, $

GC

no customer services

manufacturer development and sales

of products primarily to

meet end-user

requirements

prestigious use

make as specified

open new market

increase market share

delivery, quality, $,

GC

remuneration

needs definition

andprogramming

EPGL

consultants

better space and function

innovationexperiment

represents Louvre

President

time, $

Ministry of Finance

project

management/

construction

management

EPGL represents Louvre

protects Louvre

increment in asset value

getting value according to

investment

President

management + time

quality, liability

$

Ministry of Finance

architect

support architect

protect owner

EPGL

architect

associate

architect

French public nation French culture

good design

alien substance

financing Ministry of

Finance

tax

patron

political influence moving to Bercy

slowdown, $

political

opponent

mayor tax

patron

French culture

not to be hostile

alien substance, $

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EXHIBIT FFACILITATORS AND INHIBITORS

facilitators inhibitors

common

- will-power for out-of-the-ordinary project- entire team meeting with designer

owner

- direct commission

- innovation of contract

- flexibility:

gave the designer partial responsibility

- single-point accountability

- budget (6.9 billion FF) and its flexibility

- cost control system: financial ceiling: 92%,

95%, 100%

- comprehensive site work insurance

users

- concern to alter the institution to an open

museum

architect

- direct commission from the owner

- decision-making structure

- direct operation

- showing different level of quality standard

- design technology: computer graphics for

visualization

GC

- screen between the designer and

subcontractors

common

- distance caused extra expenses- cultural differences

- managing the unpredictable

owner

- construction experience

architect

- different contract contents

- not all-inclusive documents

- bureaucracy of government

- uncertainty

due to three-phased bid

general

- distaste for alien substance

- site conditions

- historical context

- Ministry of Finance at Richelieu

Wing

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C t f D i I f ti H d D i S h l 23 f 23

REFERENCES

Interviews

Riley, Terence: Chief Curator, Department of Architecture and Design, MoMAMarch 29, 2002, at MoMA, New YorkFebruary 15, 2003, via email

Rustow, Stephen L.: Project Manager, KPFJune 3, 2002, at KPF, New YorkFebruary 10 and 12, 2003, and March 24, 2003, via email

Literature

Bezombes, Dominique, Director. The Grand Louvre: History of a Project. Paris, France: Moniteur,1994.

Biasini, Emile, Jean Lebrat, Dominique Bezombes, and Jean-Michel Vincent. The Grand Louvre: AMuseum Transfigured 1981-1993. Paris, France: Electa Moniteur, 1989.

Boehm, Gero von. Conversation with I. M. Pei: Light Is the Key. Munich, Germany: Prestel, 2000.

Cannell, Michael. I. M. Pei: Mandarin of Modernism. New York: Carol Southern Books, 1995.

Taniguchi, Yoshio. The Architecture of The Gallery of Horyuji Treasures. Tokyo, Japan: TokyoNational Museum, 2001.

Tasma-Anargyros, Sophie.Andre Putman. New York: The Overlook Press, Woodstock, 1997.

Wiseman, Carter. I.M. Pei: A Profile in American Architecture. New York: Harry Abrams, Inc., 1990.

Web sites

Muse du Louvre http://www.louvre.fr/louvrea.htmPei Cobb Freed & Partners http://www.pcfandp.com/Pei Partnership Architects http://www.ppa-ny.com/

Documents

3 5 Louvre