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1. G.R. No. 79538 October 18, 1990

FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner,vs.THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURALRESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWINPEAKS DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY CORPORATION, respondents.

Taada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner.

Antonio E. Escober and Jurado Law Office for respondent Twin Peaks Development Corporation.

COURTS, J.:

Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a letter dated March 17, 1986to the Office of the President, and another letter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of theMinistry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its timber license agreementwhich was cancelled in August 1983 during the Marcos administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No.356 which was issued to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation without public bidding and

in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing petitionerto take possession of all logs found in the concession area [Annexes "6" and "7" of the Petition; Rollo,pp. 54-63].

Petitioner made the following allegations:

(a) That on October 12, 1965, it entered into a timber license agreement designated as TLA No. 87with the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, represented by then Secretary JoseFeliciano, wherein it was issued an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber exceptprohibited species within a specified portion of public forest land with an area of 54,920 hectareslocated in the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya * from October 12, 1965 until June

30, 1990;

(b) That on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development [hereinafter referred toas "Bureau"], Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operationsin Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and nineother forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a memorandum order of theMinister of Natural Resources Teodoro Pena [Annex "5" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 49];

(c) that on August 25, 1983, petitioner received a telegram from the Bureau, the contents of whichwere as follows:

PURSUANT TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT YOU ARE REQUESTEDTO STOP ALL LOGGING OPERATIONS TO CONSERVE REMAINING FORESTSPLEASE CONDUCT THE ORDERLY PULL-OUT OF LOGGING MACHINERIES ANDEQUIPMENT AND COORDINATE WITH THE RESPECTIVE DISTRICT FORESTERSFOR THE INVENTORY OF LOGS CUT PRIOR TO THIS ORDER THE SUBMISSIONOF A COMPLIANCE REPORT WITHIN THIRTY DAYS SHALL BE APPRECIATED [Annex "4" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 48];

(d) That after the cancellation of its timber license agreement, it immediately sent a letter addressed tothen President Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing insupport thereof its contributions to alleging that it was not given the forest conservation and

opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging 531, but no operations (Annex "6" of thePetition; Rollo, pp. 50 favorable action was taken on this letter;

(e) That barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half or 26,000 hectares of the area formerlycovered by TLA No. 87 was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and Reality Corporation underTLA No. 356 which was set to expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half was allowed to be loggedby Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or license; and,

(f) That the latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed PresidentFerdinand Marcos. Acting on petitioner's letter, the MNR through then Minister Ernesto Maceda issuedan order dated July 22, 1986 denying petitioner's request. The Ministry ruled that a timber license was


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not a contract within the due process clause of the Constitution, but only a privilege which could bewithdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so demands, and that petitioner was not discriminatedagainst in view of the fact that it was among ten concessionaires whose licenses were revoked in1983. Moreover, emphasis was made of the total ban of logging operations in the provinces of NuevaEcija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao imposed on April 2, 1986, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

It should be recalled that [petitioner's] earlier request for reinstatement has been deniedin view of the total ban of all logging operations in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, NuevaVizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao which was imposed for reasons of conservation and nationalsecurity.

The Ministry imposed the ban because it realizes the great responsibility it bear [sic] inrespect to forest t considers itself the trustee thereof. This being the case, it has toensure the availability of forest resources not only for the present, but also for the futuregenerations of Filipinos.

On the other hand, the activities of the insurgents in these parts of the country are well

documented. Their financial demands on logging concessionaires are well known. Thegovernment, therefore, is well within its right to deprive its enemy of sources of funds inorder to preserve itself, its established institutions and the liberty and democratic way oflife of its people.

xxx xxx xxx

[Annex "9" of the Petition, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 65-67.]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforestated order reiterating, among others. its request thatTLA No. 356 issued to private respondent be declared null and void. The MNR however denied this

motion in an order dated September 15, 1986. stating in part:

xxx xxx xxx

Regarding [petitioner's] request that the award of a 26,000 hectare portion of TLA No. 87to Twin Peaks Realty Development Corporation under TLA No. 356 be declared null andvoid, suffice it to say that the Ministry is now in the process of reviewing all contracts,permits or other form of privileges for the exploration, development, exploitation, orutilization of natural resources entered into, granted, issued or acquired before theissuance of Proclamation No. 3, otherwise known as the Freedom Constitution for thepurpose of amending, modifying or revoking them when the national interest so requires.

xxx xxx xxx

The Ministry, through the Bureau of Forest Development, has jurisdiction and authority

over all forest lands. On the basis of this authority, the Ministry issued the order banningall logging operations/activities in Quirino province, among others, where movant'sformer concession area is located. Therefore, the issuance of an order disallowing anyperson or entity from removing cut or uncut logs from the portion of TLA No. 87, nowunder TLA No. 356, would constitute an unnecessary or superfluous act on the part ofthe Ministry.

xxx xxx xxx

[Annex "11" of the Petition, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 77-78.]

On November 26, 1986, petitioner's supplemental motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.Meanwhile, per MNR Administrative Order No. 54, series of 1986, issued on November 26, 1986, thelogging ban in the province of Quirino was lifted.

Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of the MNR to the Office of the President. In aresolution dated July 6, 1987, the Office of the President, acting through then Deputy ExecutiveSecretary Catalino Macaraig, denied petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. The Office of the President


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ruled that the appeal of petitioner was prematurely filed, the matter not having been terminated in theMNR. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on August 14, 1987.

Hence, petitioner filed directly with this Court a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a

restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, on August 27, 1987. On October 13, 1987, it filed a

supplement to its petition for certiorari. Thereafter, public and private respondents submitted theirrespective comments, and petitioner filed its consolidated reply thereto. In a resolution dated May 22,

1989, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition.

After a careful study of the circumstances in the case at bar, the Court finds several factors which

militate against the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner.

1. Firstly, the refusal of public respondents herein to reverse final and executory administrative orders

does not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencieshave upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of thedoctrine ofres judicata. These decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the affectedparties as though the same had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. The rule of res

judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority acting withintheir exclusive jurisdiction [See Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497 (1956); Ipekdjian Merchandising Co.,Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72; San Luis v. Court of

Appeals, G.R. No. 80160, June 26, 1989].

In the case at bar, petitioner's letters to the Office of the President and the MNR [now the Departmentof Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) dated March 17, 1986 and April 2, 1986, respectively,sought the reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the Bureau of Forest Developmentwhich cancelled its timber license agreement in 1983, as well as the revocation of TLA No. 356subsequently issued by the Bureau to private respondents in 1984.

But as gleaned from the record, petitioner did not avail of its remedies under the law, i.e. Section 8 of

Pres. Dec. No. 705 as amended, for attacking the validity of these administrative actions until after

1986. By the time petitioner sent its letter dated April 2, 1986 to the newly appointed Minister of the

MNR requesting reconsideration of the above Bureau actions, these were already settled matters as

far as petitioner was concerned [See Rueda v. Court of Agrarian Relations, 106 Phil. 300 (1959);

Danan v. Aspillera G.R. No. L-17305, November 28, 1962, 6 SCRA 609; Ocampo v. Arboleda G.R.No. L-48190, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 374].

No particular significance can be attached to petitioner's letter dated September 19, 1983 whichpetitioner claimed to have sent to then President Marcos [Annex "6" of Petition, Rollo, pp. 50-53],seeking the reconsideration of the 1983 order issued by Director Cortes of the Bureau. It must be

pointed out that the averments in this letter are entirely different from the charges of fraud againstofficials under the previous regime made by petitioner in its letters to public respondents herein. In theletter to then President Marcos, petitioner simply contested its inclusion in the list of concessionaires,whose licenses were cancelled, by defending its record of selective logging and reforestation practicesin the subject concession area. Yet, no other administrative steps appear to have been taken bypetitioner until 1986, despite the fact that the alleged fraudulent scheme became apparent in 1984 asevidenced by the awarding of the subject timber concession area to other entities in that year.

2. The principal issue ostensibly presented for resolution in the instant petition is whether or

not public respondents herein acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack orexcess of jurisdiction in refusing to overturn administrative orders issued by their

predecessors in the past regime. Yet, what the petition ultimately seeks is the nullification of theBureau orders cancelling TLA No. 87 and granting TLA No. 356 to private respondent, which wereissued way back in 1983 and 1984, respectively.

Once again, the fact that petitioner failed to seasonably take judicial recourse to have the earlier

administrative actions reviewed by the courts through a petition for certiorari is prejudicial to its cause.

For although no specific time frame is fixed for the institution of a special civil action for certiorari under

Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the same must nevertheless be done within a "reasonabletime". The yardstick to measure the timeliness of a petition for certiorari is the "reasonableness of the

length of time that had expired from the commission of the acts complained of up to the institution of

the proceeding to annul the same" [Toledo v. Pardo, G.R. No. 56761, November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA


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566, 571]. And failure to file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable period of time renders the

petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal consequences of laches [Municipality of Carcar v. Court of

First Instance of Cebu, G.R. No. L-31628, December 27, 1982, 119 SCRA 392).

Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do

that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right

within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either

abandoned it or declined to assert it [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23

SCRA 29; Seno v. Mangubat, G.R. No. L-44339, December 2, 1987, 156 SCRA 113]. The rule is thatunreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce an alleged right may, dependingupon the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself. Verily, the laws aid those who are vigilant,not those who sleep upon their rights (Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt) [SeeBuenaventura v. David, 37 Phil. 435 (1918)].

In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally filed a petition for certiorari

with the Court attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984. Considering that

petitioner, throughout the period of its inaction, was not deprived of the opportunity to seek relief fromthe courts which were normally operating at the time, its delay constitutes unreasonable andinexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari requiring the reversal of

these orders will not lie.

3. Finally, there is a more significant factor which bars the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor ofpetitioner and against public respondents herein. It is precisely this for which prevents the Court fromdeparting from the general application of the rules enunciated above.

A cursory reading of the assailed orders issued by public respondent Minister Maceda of the MNRwhich were ed by the Office of the President, will disclose public policy consideration which effectivelyforestall judicial interference in the case at bar,

Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing the policy to develop

and conserve the country's natural resources, have indicated an ongoing department evaluation of alltimber license agreements entered into, and permits or licenses issued, under the previousdispensation. In fact, both the executive and legislative departments of the incumbent administrationare presently taking stock of its environmental policies with regard to the utilization of timber lands anddeveloping an agenda for future programs for their conservation and rehabilitation.

The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the renewed and growingglobal concern over the despoliation of forest lands and the utter disregard of their crucial role insustaining a balanced ecological system. The legitimacy of such concern can hardly be disputed, mostespecially in this country. The Court takes judicial notice of the profligate waste of the country's forestresources which has not only resulted in the irreversible loss of flora and fauna peculiar to the region,

but has produced even more disastrous and lasting economic and social effects. The delicate balanceof nature having been upset, a vicious cycle of floods and droughts has been triggered and the supplyof food and energy resources required by the people seriously depleted.

While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profit and to meet the country'simmediate financial requirements, the more essential need to ensure future generations of Filipinos oftheir survival in a viable environment demands effective and circumspect action from the governmentto check further denudation of whatever remains of the forest lands. Nothing less is expected of thegovernment, in view of the clear constitutional command to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology.Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:

SEC. 16. The State shall protect and promote the right of the people to a balanced andhealthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused byunbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establishthe basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretionof government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technicalknowledge and training of such agencies [See Espinosa v. Makalintal, 79 Phil. 134 (1947); Coloso v.Board of Accountancy, 92 Phil. 938 (1953); Pajo v. Ago, 108 Phil. 905 (1960); Suarez v. Reyes, G.R.No. L-19828, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 461; Ganitano v. Secretary of Agriculture and NaturalResources, G. R. No. L-21167, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 543; Villegas v. Auditor General, G.R. No.


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L-21352, November 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 877; Manuel v. Villena, G.R. No. L-28218, February 27, 1971,37 SCRA 745; Lacuesta v. Herrera, G.R. No. L-33646, January 28, 1975, 62 SCRA 115; Lianga BayLogging Co., Inc. v. Enage, G.R. No. L-30637, July 16, 1987, 152 SCRA 80]. More so where, as in thepresent case, the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public at largeon the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. For this Court recognizes the wide latitude of

discretion possessed by the government in determining the appropriate actions to be taken to

preserve and manage natural resources, and the proper parties who should enjoy the privilege of

utilizing these resources [Director of Forestry v. Munoz, G.R. No. L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA

1183; Lim, Sr. v. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, G.R. No. L-26990, August 31,1970, 34 SCRA 751]. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instrumentsby which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that publicwelfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by theState to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particularconcession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or

rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed

contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3 (ee) and 20 of Pres.

Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983,125 SCRA 302].

In fine, the legal precepts highlighted in the foregoing discussion more than suffice to justify theCourt's refusal to interfere in the DENR evaluation of timber licenses and permits issued under theprevious regime, or to pre-empt the adoption of appropriate corrective measures by the department.

Nevertheless, the Court cannot help but express its concern regarding alleged irregularities in theissuance of timber license agreements to a number of logging concessionaires.

The grant of licenses or permits to exploit the country's timber resources, if done in contravention ofthe procedure outlined in the law, or as a result of fraud and undue influence exerted on departmentofficials, is indicative of an arbitrary and whimsical exercise of the State's power to regulate the useand exploitation of forest resources. The alleged practice of bestowing "special favors" to preferred

individuals, regardless of merit, would be an abuse of this power. And this Court will not be a party to a

flagrant mockery of the avowed public policy of conservation enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.

Therefore, should the appropriate case be brought showing a clear grave abuse of discretion on the

part of officials in the DENR and related bureaus with respect to the implementation of this public

policy, the Court win not hesitate to step in and wield its authority, when invoked, in the exercise of

judicial powers under the Constitution [Section 1, Article VIII].

However, petitioner having failed to make out a case showing grave abuse of discretion on the part of

public respondents herein, the Court finds no basis to issue a writ of certiorari and to grant any of the

affirmative reliefs sought.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

2. G.R. No. 85502 February 24, 1992

SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner,vs.HON. ALFONSO G. ABAD, as Judge RTC, Br. 22 of Pagadian City, COURT OF APPEALS,ISIDRO GILBOLINGO AND ROBUSTIANO BUGTAI, respondents.

Manuel V. Trinida for petitioner.

Adolf Leo P. Boncavil for private respondents.


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CRUZ, J .:

THIS IS A CASE WHICH PERTAINS TO NON-EXHAUSTION OF

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY WHEN THERE IS A NEED FOR URGENT

JUDICIAL INTERVENTION.

Sunville Timber products: TLA cancelled.

Respondent: Gilbolingo and Bugtai

Problem: the respondents did not exhaust the remedies. This indispensable

Ruling:

The Court will focus its attention only on one of the issues raised in this petition the correct

application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA), authorizing it to cut, remove and utilizetimber within the concession area covering 29,500 hectares of forest land in Zamboanga del Sur, for aperiod of ten years expiring on September 31, 1992.

On July 31, 1987, the herein private respondents filed a petition with the Department of Environment

and Natural Resources for the cancellation of the TLA on the ground of serious violations of its

conditions and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations.

The same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein private respondents, in a complaint

for injunction with damages against the petitioner, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 2732 in theRegional Trial Court of Pagadian City.

The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1) the court had no jurisdiction over

the complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted administrative remedies; and 3) the injunction

sought was expressly prohibited by section 1 of PD 605.

Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss on December 11, 1987, 1 and the motion forreconsideration on February 15, 1988. 2 The petitioner then elevated the matter to the respondentCourt of Appeals, which sustained the trial court in a decision dated July 4, 1988,

3and in its resolution

of September 27, 1988, denying the motion for reconsideration.4

The Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without

exception and pointed to the several instances approved by this Court where it could be dispensed

with. The respondent court found that in the case before it, the applicable exception was the urgent

need for judicial intervention, which it explained thus:

The lower court found out that sometime on July 1981, the City Council of Pagadian in its

Resolution No. 111 requested the Bureau of Forest Development to reserve 1,000

hectares in Lison Valley. This request remained unacted upon. Instead in 1982, a TLA

covering 29,500 hectares, including the area requested, was given to petitioner.

Then the fear expressed by the City Council of Pagadian in its resolution became reality.

"As averred in the complaint, the erosion caused by the logging operationsof the defendant has caused heavy siltation not only in the Labangan River(as predicted by the City Council of Pagadian City in 1981) but also in theTukuran River, Salug River, Sindangan River, and Sibuguey River. In otherwords, the adverse effects of the logging operations of the defendant havealready covered a wider area than that feared to be adversely affected bythe City Council of Pagadian City.


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Floods are unknown phenomena in heavily forested areas years back,particularly in the Island of Mindanao. When the grant of loggingconcessions started, so was the denudation of forests. . . . It is commonknowledge that heavy floods have occurred in areas/places adjoininglogging concessions. (Resolution dated December 11, 1987, p. 5).

Thus, it is urgent that indiscriminate logging be stopped. Irreparable damage wouldensue unless the court intervenes. Reliance on the DENR may not be enough, judging

from its inaction on the council's request seven years back.

The respondent court cited in support of this conclusion the case ofDe Lara v. Cloribel,5

where"irreparable damage and injury" was allowed as an exceptional ground, andArrow TransportationCorporation v. Board of Transportation, 6where the doctrine was waived because of "the strong publicinterest in having the matter settled" as soon as possible.

The decision also declared invalid Section 1 of PD 605, which provides:

Sec. 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order,

preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case involving or

growing out of the issuance, approval or disapproval, revocation or suspension of, or any

action whatsoever by the proper administrative official or body on concessions, licenses,

permits, patents, or public grants of any kind in connection with the disposition,

exploitation, utilization, exploration and/or development of the natural resources of the

Philippines.

This was held to be an encroachment on the judicial power vested in the Supreme Court and the lowercourts by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution. The respondent court cited Export ProcessingZone Authority v. Dulay, 7where several presidential decrees were declared unconstitutional fordivesting the courts of the judicial power to determine just compensation in expropriation cases.

The petitioner is now before the Court, contending that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies was not correctly applied and that the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Section 1 of

PD 605 was improper.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies CALLS FOR RESORT FIRST TOTHE APPROPRIATE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES IN THE RESOLUTION OF ACONTROVERSY FALLING UNDER THEIR JURISDICTION BEFORE THE SAMEMAY BE ELEVATED TO THE COURTS OF JUSTICE FOR REVIEW.Non-observance ofthe doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, 8 which is one of the grounds allowed in the Rules ofCourt for the dismissal of the complaint. The deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke itoperates as a waiver of the objection as a ground for a motion to dismiss and the court may then

proceed with the case as if the doctrine had been observed.

One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon theJudiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively)within the competence of the other departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are ina better position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and that errors committedby subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so. A noless important consideration is that administrative decisions are usually questioned in the special civilactions ofcertiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which are allowed only when there is no other plain,speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner. It may be added that strict enforcement of therule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases which otherwise would

burden their heavily loaded dockets. 9

As correctly suggested by he respondent court, however, there are a number of instances when thedoctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action validly resorted to immediately. Among these

exceptional cases are: 1) WHEN THE QUESTION RAISED IS PURELY LEGAL; 10 2)

WHEN THE ADMINISTRATIVE BODY IS IN ESTOPPEL; 11 3) WHEN THE ACT

COMPLAINED OF IS PATENTLY ILLEGAL; 12 4) WHEN THERE IS URGENT NEED

FOR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION; 13 5) WHEN THE CLAIM INVOLVED IS

SMALL; 14 6) WHEN IRREPARABLE DAMAGE WILL BE SUFFERED; 15 7) WHEN


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THERE IS NO OTHER PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY; 16 8) WHEN

STRONG PUBLIC INTEREST IS INVOLVED; 17 9) WHEN THE SUBJECT OF THE

CONTROVERSY IS PRIVATE LAND; 18 AND 10) IN QUO

WARRANTOPROCEEDINGS. 19

The private respondents now submit that their complaint comes under the exceptions because forestry

laws do not require observance of the doctrine as a condition precedent to judicial action; the question

they are raising is purely legal; application of the doctrine will cause great and irreparable damage;

and public interest is involved.

We rule for the petitioner.

Even if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly require prior resort to administrativeremedies, the reasons for the doctrine above given, if nothing else, would suffice to still require itsobservance. Even if such reasons were disregarded, there would still be the explicit language ofpertinent laws vesting in the DENR the power and function "to regulate the development, disposition,extraction, exploration and use of the country's forests" and "to exercise exclusive jurisdiction" in the"management and disposition of all lands of the public domain,"

20and in the Forest Management

Bureau (formerly the Bureau of Forest Development) the responsibility for the enforcement of theforestry laws aid regulations 21 here claimed to have been violated. This comprehensive confermentclearly implies at the very least that the DENR should be allowed to rule in the first instance on anycontroversy coming under its express powers before the courts of justice may intervene.

The argument that the questions raised in the petition are purely legal is also not acceptable. The

private respondents have charged, both in the administrative case before the DENR and in the civil

case before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, that the petitioner has violated the terms and

conditions of the TLA and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations. The charge involves factual

issues calling for the presentation of supporting evidence. Such evidence is best evaluated first by the

administrative authorities, employing their specialized knowledge of the agreement and the rules

allegedly violated, before the courts may step in to exercise their powers of review.

As for the alleged urgent necessity for judicial action and the claimed adverse impact of the case onthe national interest, the record does not show that the petitioners have satisfactorily established theseextraordinary circumstances to justify deviation from the doctrine by exhaustion of administrativeremedies and immediate resort to the courts of justice. In fact, this particular submission must fall flatagainst the petitioner's uncontested contention that it has since 1988 stopped its operations under theTLA in compliance with the order of the DENR.

In the Petition for prohibition filed with the respondent court, the petitioner alleged that its loggingoperations had been suspended pursuant to a telegram 22 received on February 23, 1988, by theDistrict Forester from the Regional Executive Director of the DENR, Zamboanga City; reading as

follows:

DISTRICT FORESTERPAGADIAN CITY

QUOTED HEREUNDER IS RADIO MESSAGE DATED FEBRUARY 22, 1988 FROMSECRETARY FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR. QUOTE EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELYCMA SUSPEND ALL LOGGING OPERATIONS OF SUNVILLE IN VIEW OF SERIOUSVIOLATIONS OF FOREST PROTECTION AND REFORESTATION UNQUOTE SUBMITREPORT ASAP.

RED BATCAGAN

The petition now before us contains the allegations that the "petition for cancellation of petitioner's TLAis still pending up to this date and that petitioner's logging operations (were) ordered suspended by theSecretary of the DENR pending further investigation." 23

In the memorandum filed by the petitioner with this Court, it is informed that "the Secretary of theDENR suspended petitioner's logging operations until further investigation. The suspension is still inforce up to this date after the lapse of almost 3 years."

24


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These statements have not been disputed by the private respondents in their pleadings before therespondent court and this Court and are therefore deemed admitted.

There in no question that Civil Case No. 2732 comes within the jurisdiction of the respondent court.Nevertheless, as the wrong alleged in the complaint was supposedly committed as a result of theunlawful logging activities of the petitioner, it will be necessary first to determine whether or not theTLA and the forestry laws and regulations had indeed been violated. To repeat for emphasis,determination of this question is the primary responsibility of the Forest Management Bureau of the

DENR. The application of the expertise of the administrative agency in the resolution of the issueraised is a condition precedent for the eventual examination, if still necessary, of the same question bya court of justice.

In view of the above observations, we find that there was no need for the respondent court to declare

the unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605. The rule is that a question of constitutionality must be

avoided where the case can be decided on some other available ground, 25 as we have done in thecase before us. The resolution of this same question must await another case, where all theindispensable requisites of a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question are satisfactorily established.In such an event, it will be time for the Court "to make the hammer fall, and heavily," in the words ofJustice Laurel, if such action is warranted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated July 4,1988, and its resolution dated September 27, 1988, as well as the resolutions of the trial court

dated December 11, 1987 and February 15, 1988, are all REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil CaseNo. 2732 in the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

3. Eduardo Brillantes vs. Leonardo Castro Gr. No. L-9223 June 30, 1956

Facts: On December 1, 1953, Brillantes filed a complaint against Castro before the WageAdministration Service (WAS) for the recovery of the alleged unpaid salary and overtime pay. OnFebruary 15, 1954 Brillantes and Castro entered into an Arbitration Agreement whereby they agreed1. That they submit their case to the WAS for investigation; and 2. That they bind themselves to abideby whatever decision WAS may render over the case; and that they recognize said decision to be finaland conclusive.

WAS ruling: the claim for overtime and underpayment is hereby dismissed but the respondent is

adjudged to pay the claimant P50.88 corresponding to his salary for services rendered in the month ofNovember.

No appeal was taken from this decision and on November 10, 1954, Brillantes filed a complaintagainst Castro with this Court over the same subject matter and cause of action litigated betweenthem before and decided by the WAS. The counsel of Brillantes agreed that the decision rendered bythe hearing officer of the WAS is an order issued pursuant to section 7 of Minimum Wage Law inrelation section 12 which authorizes delegation by the Secretary of Labor of his powers in theadministration or enforcement of the MWL to the Chief of the WAS, however he contends that the rightto go to the Supreme Court for review of said order granted by section 7 of MWL is not exclusivebecause under said section the review by this Tribunal is limited to question of law and that the

findings of fact contained in the appealed decision must be accepted.

Trial Court ruling: dismissed the complaint on the ground that it is barred by prior judgment. Hence,this appeal.

Issue: whether or not, the second complaint is barred by prior judgment.

Held: affirmative; the SC fully agree with the decision of the trial court that the complaint is barred byprior judgment. There is no question that the complaint filed by Brillantes with the WAS may beregarded as a suit by one party as against another to enforce a right; that the WAS in entertaining saidsuit, hearing the parties and deciding the case acted as quasi-judicial body and the proceedings


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before it were quasi-judicial proceedings, and conducted in accordance with law, and so was thedecision rendered. The failure of Brillantes to appeal from said decision to the SC as provided by theMinimum wage law rendered it final and conclusive and served as a bar to another action between thesame parties involving the same subject matter and cause of action and the same issues. Besides, theparties signed an agreement whereby they submitted their case to the WAS, binding themselves toabide by whatever decision it would validly render.

Note: the principle of res judicata is applicable to decisions of a quasi-judicial body like the WAS. In

this connection, it has been declared that whatever a final adjudication of persons invested with powerto decide on the property and rights of the citizen is examinable by the SC, upon a writ of error or acertiorari; such final adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata.

3. [G.R. No. L-9223. June 30, 1956.]

EDUARDO BRILLANTES, Plainti f f-Appel lant, vs. LEONARDO CASTRO, doing business underthe name and style of ALMACAS POLICE PROTECTIVE BUREAU,Defendant-Appel lee.

D E C I S I O N

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila presided by Judge E. Sorianodated February 12, 1955, granting the motion to dismiss filed by the DefendantLeonardo Castro anddismissing the complaint of the PlaintiffEduardo Brillantes. For a statement of the facts of the case weadopt that made by the trial court which we reproduce below:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It appears that on December 1, 1953, the Plaintifffiled a complaint against the Defendantbefore theWage Administration Service for the recovery of alleged unpaid salary and overtime pay, the said casebearing No. C-1046; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat on February 15, 1954; chanroblesvirtualawlibrarythe Plaintiffand the Defendantentered into an ARBITRATION AGREEMENTwhereby they agreed 1. That they submit their case to the Wage Administration Service forinvestigation;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand 2. That they bind themselves to abide by whatever

decision this Office may render on the case and that they recognize said decision to be final andconclusive; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat in accordance with the said agreement, the parties,assisted by their respective counsel, adduced evidence before the Wage Administrative Service; chanroblesvirtualawlibrarythat on May 31, 1954, the latter rendered a decision containing its findings andthe following dispositive parts WHEREFORE, considering the evidence presented, the claim forovertime and underpayment is hereby dismissed but theRespondentis adjudged to pay to theclaimant the amount of fifty pesos and eighty-eight centavos (P50.88) corresponding to his salary forservices rendered in the month of November, 1953 and to deposit the same within five (5) days fromreceipt thereof; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat no appeal was taken from the said decision, and thaton November 10, 1954, the Plaintifffiled a complaint against the Defendantwith this Court over thesame subject- matter and cause of action litigated between them before, and decided by, the Wage

Administration Service. (pp. 22-23, Record on Appeal.)

In support of its order of dismissal, the trial court made the following observations and conclusionswhich we quote with favor:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It is evident that the aforesaid decision rendered by the Hearing Officer of the Wage AdministrationService was pursuant to the authority granted to the Secretary of Labor to delegate any or all of hispowers in the administration or enforcement of the Minimum Wage Law to the Chief of the WAS, whomay act personally or through duly authorized representative Republic Act No. 602, The MinimumWage Law, section 12(e). Section 7 of the same Act also pertinently provides that Any personaggrieved by an order of the Secretary of Labor issued under this Act may obtain a review of suchorder in the Supreme Court by filing in such court within fifteen (15) days after the entry and

publication of such order a written petition praying that the order of the Secretary of Labor be modifiedor set aside in whole or in part cralaw The Jurisdiction of the Wage Administration Service to renderthe aforesaid decision, as well as the remedy of the aggrieved party against such a decision, isimpliedly recognized by the Supreme Court in Gonzales vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor, et als., G.R. No.L- 6409, wherein it was said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The point raised by the Solicitor General onbehalf of theRespondent. Secretary of Labor that Petitioners remedy is to appeal to the President ofthe Philippines is not well taken. Section 7 of the law creating the WAS (Rep. Act No. 602) expresslyauthorized any person aggrieved by an order of the Secretary of Labor to obtain a review of suchorder in the Supreme Court. In view of the failure of the herein Plaintiffto avail himself of the remedymarked out by said Section 7 of Republic Act No. 602 within the time therein specified, the aforesaiddecision of the Wage Administration Service became final and conclusive, not only by clear implication


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but also by express agreement of the parties That they bind themselves to abide by whateverdecision this Office (WAS) may render on the case, and that they recognize said decision to be finaland conclusive. To permit the hereinPlaintiffto institute the present case before this Court, after thesame had been finally and conclusively decided by the Wage Administration Service, is therefore toallow him to go back on his own solemn agreement, to set at naught the provisions of Republic ActNo. 602; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand to encourage duplication of work, if not conflicting judgments,by authorizing a party first to file his case with the Wage Administration Service and thereafter, in caseof an adverse decision, to refile the same case with the Court of First Instance. This could not have

been the legislators intention in the enactment of Republic Act No. 602. (pp. 23 -24, Record onAppeal.)

Attorney Manuel Y. Macias counsel forAppellantin his brief concedes that the decision rendered bythe hearing officer of the WAS is an order issued pursuant to Section 7, above quoted, of theMinimum Wage Law in relation to Section 12 (a) which authorizes delegation by the Secretary ofLabor of his powers in the administration or enforcement of the Minimum Wage Law to the Chief of theWage Administrative Service. He, however, contends that the right to go to the Supreme Court forreview of said order granted by Section 7 of the Minimum Wage Law is not exclusive, becauseaccording to him, under said Section 7 the review by this Tribunal is limited to questions of law andthat the findings of fact contained in the appealed decision must be accepted. This is not entirelycorrect. The findings of fact made by the Secretary of Labor or his delegate are accepted and are

conclusive only if supported by substantial evidence. So that Plaintiffcould well have appealed fromthe decision of the WAS to this Tribunal, even on question of fact, if he was prepared and in a positionto show that the findings of fact of the WAS were not supported by substantial evidence. Then counselforAppellant, referring to the hearing officer of the WAS and his decision, says thefollowing:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Appellantcannot accept the findings of fact in the decision of the Hearing Officer of the WageAdministration Service because they are not merely contrary to the facts but a scandalous distortion ofthem with no other end in view but to favorAppellee, theRespondentemployer. The Hearing Officer,to promote this end, callously ignoredAppellants evidence. His so-called decision is a mockery of

justice, and absolute nullity for which no fair minded citizen can have any respect. (p. 5,AppellantsBrief.)

And of Judge Soriano who dismissed Plaintiffs complaint, the same counsel commentsthus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The court a quo refused to perform the functions of a trial court and rendered the foregoing rulingwithout any evidence having been first presented pro or con. It decided an Issue in favor of one partyand against the other upon the mere representations of the favored party and refused absolutely tohear the other. The court a quos act in so doing is a plain violation of the right to due process p.8,Appellants Brief.)

The above is couched in strong and disrespectful language unbecoming a lawyer who is an officer ofthe court, and highly improper in referring to an administrative official authorized to render decisions

and especially to a Judge of the Court of First Instance. IfPlaintiff-Appellantand his counsel weredissatisfied with the findings of the hearing officer of the WAS; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryif theybelieved that the findings were a distortion of the facts as contained in the evidence, they should haveappealed from said decision to this Tribunal. And if they were really convinced that said hearing officerof the WAS deliberately distorted the facts to favor the employer, they should have prepared chargesof partiality and malfeasance and lodged the same with the proper authorities for investigation. Now isneither the time nor the occasion to air said grievance, assuming for the moment that it is real and wellfounded. And as to the reference to the trial court, said court merely acted upon the motion to dismiss.It considered the complaint and the motion to dismiss. That was enough. There was no need for thepresentation of any evidence. So, the action of the trial court was proper and warranted; chanroblesvirtualawlibrarywhich cannot be said of the comment and observations of counsel above

reproduced. Said counsel is hereby admonished to use more temperate and respectful language andobserve more proper conduct in the future.

We fully agree with the trial court in its order dismissing the complaint on the ground that the action isbarred by prior judgment. There is no question that the complaint filed by Plaintiff-Appellantwith theWAS may be regarded as a suit by one party against another to enforce a right; chanroblesvirtualawlibrarythat the WAS in entertaining said suit, hearing the parties and deciding the caseacted as a quasi-judicial body and the proceedings before it were quasi-judicial proceedings, andconducted in accordance with law, and so was the decision rendered. Not only this, but the partiesbefore the commencement of the proceedings signed an agreement whereby they submitted theircase to the WAS, binding themselves by whatever decision the WAS may render on the same, and


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that they recognized the decision to be final and conclusive. After signing that agreement orpledge, Plaintiff-Appellantmay not now be heard to say that the decision rendered by the WAS hasno legal effect on him. Besides, even assuming that despite the agreement the decision did notautomatically become final, still Plaintiffs failure to appeal therefrom to the Supreme Court as providedby the Minimum Wage Law (Rep. Act 602) rendered it final and conclusive and served as a bar toanother action between the same parties involving the same subject matter and cause of action andthe same issues.

In the case of Pealosa vs. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303, 314, we held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

cralaw a judgment rendered cralaw by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits, is a bar toany future suit between the same parties or their privies upon the same cause of action so long as itremains unreserved; or in the language of Mr. Justice Field in the opinion justcited:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity withthem, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim ordemand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.

And in the case of Tejedor vs. Palet, 61 Phil. 494, 502-503, we equallyheld:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The rule is often stated in general terms that a judgment is conclusive not only upon the questionsactually contested and determined, but upon all matters which might have been litigated and decidedin that suit; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand this is undoubtedly true of all matters properly belonging tothe subject of the controversy and within the scope of the issues cralaw . (citing 34C.J., pp. 909-911.)

The authorities above cited on res adjudicata refer to decisions rendered by the courts. Are theyapplicable to decisions of a quasi-judicial body like the Wage Administration Service (WAS)? Theanswer is in the affirmative, as may be seen from the following authorities:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authorityapplies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive, or administrative officers andboards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers. This

rule has been recognized as applying to the decisions of road or highway commissioners,commissioners of motor transportation, boards of audit, county boards, tax commissioners, boards, orofficers, the federal trade commission, school commissioners, police commissioners, sewerscommissioners, land commissioners or officers, collector of customs, referees in bankruptcy courtcommissioners, boards or other tribunals administering workmens compensation acts, and other likeofficers and boards. However, a particular decision or determination may not be conclusive, as whereit was not a judicial, as distinguished from a legislative, executive, or ministerial, determination, or thematter was not within the jurisdiction of the officer or board cralaw . (50C.J. S., Judgments, Sec. 690,pp. 148-149).

cralaw There are, however, cases in which the doctrine of res judicata has been held applicable tojudicial acts of public, executive, or administrative officers and boards. In this connection, it has been

declared that whenever a final adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on the propertyand rights of the citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari, suchfinal adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata. (30 Am. Jur., Judgments, Sec. 164, p. 910). (ItalicsSupplied).

In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., andEndencia, JJ., concur.


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4. G.R. No. L-56948 September 30, 1987

Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines (D of Forest Devt)

Respondent: Cerantes in behalf of Piraso

Story: a parcel of land has supposed to be registered, however, the Dir of Forest

Development opposed.Reason: Central Cordillera Forest Reserve

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of Forest Development and theDirector of Lands, petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and MARTINA CARANTES for and in behalf of theHeirs of SALMING PIRASO, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J .:

This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming intoto the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, Branch III, at La Trinidad inLRC Case No. N-287, Record No. 37205, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

It having been proven convincingly that this land was owned and possessed by the late SalmingPiraso and later by his successors-in-interest, who are his children for a period of more than thirtyyears up to this date, they have shown to have a registerable title on the property which this Courttherefore confirms and affirms in accordance with the law. Let the land so described in the technical

description of the survey made of the same and in accordance with the corresponding plan be soregistered. (p. 50, Rollo)

On May 9, 1968, respondent Martina S. Carantes for and in behalf of the Heirs of Saying Piraso filedwith the Court of Firing Instance of Baguio and Benguet, Land Registration No. N-287, covering thefollowing describe property:

A parcel of land (as shown on plan PSU-43639) situated in the Barrio of AnsaganMunicipality of Tuba, Mountain Province. Bounded in the, NE., along line 1-2 by propertyof Sioco Carino (PSU-43643, Lot 1); on the SE., and SW., along lines 2-3-4-5 by publicland, on the We, along lines 5-6-1 by property of Tunccalo. Containing an area of TWO

MILLION ONE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED ANDSEVENTY NINE (2,197,879) SQUARE METERS. ... (p. 13, Rollo)

On January 13, 1970, the Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, filed an opposition to theapplication for registration stating, among others:

That neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to saidparcel of land the same not having been acquired by them either by composition titlefrom the Spanish Government or by possessory information title under the Royal Decreeof February 13, 1894;

That neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have been in open,continuous, exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for atleast thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the present application;

That the aforementioned parcel of land is a portion of the public domain belonging to theRepublic of the Philippines. (pp. 13-14, Rollo)

On April 7, 1970, the Director of Forestry also filed an opposition to the application for registration onthe following grounds:


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That the whole area applied for registration is within the CENTRALCORDILLERA FOREST RESERVE established under Proclamation No.217 dated February 16, 1929;

That the area sought to be registered IS NEITHER RELEASE FORDISPOSITION NOR ALIENATION; AND THAT THE HEREIN APPLICANTHAS NO REGISTERABLE TITLE OVER THE WHOLE PARCEL OF LAND

EITHER IN FACT OR IN LAW. (p. 14, Rollo)

After trial, a decision was rendered by the land registration court, as earlier stated, adjudicating theparcel of land to the applicants. The motion for reconsideration filed by Government oppositor's havingbeen denied, an appeal was made to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of theland registration court.

In this petition, the petitioner assigns the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:

A. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION IS NOTCAPABLE OF REGISTRATION BEING PART OF THE PUBLIC FORESTS WITHIN THE CENTRAL

CORDILLERA FOREST RESERVE:

B. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED POSSESSION OF THELAND BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND THEIR PREDECESSORSINTEREST WAS NOT INCONCEPT OF OWNER UNDER SECTION 48 of the PUBLIC LAND LAW, THE LAND BEINGINALIENABLE;

C. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LAND IS AGRICULTURAL BECAUSETHE GOVERNMENT FAILED TO SUBMIT PROOF THAT THE LAND IS MORE VALUABLE FORFOREST PURPOSES;

D. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROPERTY BECAME SEGREGATEDFROM THE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND ASSUMED THE CHARACTER OF PRIVATEOWNERSHIP UPON APPROVAL OF ITS SURVEY PLAN BY THE DIRECTOR OF LAND IN 1925;

E. ASSUMING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAD POSSESSED AND CULTIVATED 10 TO 15HECTARES OF THE LAND APPLIED FOR, RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN RULING THATTHEY HAD ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP THRU CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OVER THE REST OFTHE (219.7879) HECTARES APPLIED FOR. (p. 18, Rollo)

The issues raised are:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE LAND IN QUESTION IS PART OFTHE PUBLIC FOREST WITHIN THE CENTRAL CORDILLERAFOREST RESERVE; AND

2. WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVEESTABLISHED REGISTERABLE TITLE OVER THE LAND INQUESTION.

It is the stand of the petitioner that the land in question covered by the Plan-Psu-43639 is part of the

public forests within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve established under Proclamation No. 217 ofGovernor General Henry Stimson dated February 16, 1929. On February 27, 1980, an ocularinspection of said property was made by Land Inspector Crisogono Bartolo, Jr., of the Bureau ofLands together with representatives of the Bureau of Forestry, the Land Registration Court, and theapplicants for registration. During the ocular inspection, the land was found to be rolling and stony innature. Bartolo, Jr., submitted a report on April 17, 1970 stating among others, that the land is coveredwith trees, bushes and grasses and being also stony is not suitable for agricultural purposes.

The representative of the Bureau of Forestry, Forester Ricardo D. Zapatero, submitted to theProvincial Fiscal a separate report dated April 6, 1970 to the effect that the whole area falls within the


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Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and that the same has not been released for agricultural purposesby the Director of Forestry who had administrative jurisdiction over the same.

The petitioner states that since the land in question is indubitably part of the public forest and has notbeen reclassified or released from the forest zone, the same can not be the subject of registrationeither under Act 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, or under Section 48(b) of

Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. THE PETITIONER POINTSOUT THAT LANDS WITHIN THE FOREST ZONE OR WITHIN A DULY ESTABLISHED

RESERVATION DO NOT FORM PART OF THE DISPOSABLE PORTION OF THE PUBLICDOMAIN NOR CAN THE SAME BE ALIENATED AS SAID LANDS ARE NOT CAPABLE OFPRIVATE APPROPRIATION OR OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION THEREOF, HOWEVER LONG,CANNOT CONVERT THAT SAME INTO PRIVATE PROPERTY.

It is further argued by the petitioner that the private respondents or their predecessors-in-interest,Salming Piraso, had not acquired ownership over the land prior to its classification as part of theCordillera Forest Reserve use there is no evidence on record that Salming Piraso had possessed theproperty for any appreciable period prior to 1929 when the land became part of the Cordillera ForestReserve.

On the other hand, the private respondents assert that the findings of fact of the Court of Appealsshow that the land subject of application is not within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and thesame land applied for registration is disposable and alienable. The private respondents, as applicants,claim to have sufficiently shown by preponderance of evidence that the land being applied for

registration had been possessed by Salming Piraso as far back as 1915when he and his workersplanted the arable portion of about 15 hectares to rice and other products and raised cows on theother portion suited for pasture. The late Salming Piraso had the land surveyed by private surveyorJose Castro on April 3-9, 1924 as Plan Psu-43639 which was approved by the then Director of Lands,Jorge B. Vargas on March 6, 1925, while Proclamation No. 217 was promulgated only on February 16,1929. They state that the approval of the said survey by the government thru the Director of LandsJorge B. Vargas can only mean that said land was no longer included in the overall survey of the

government as it was no longer part of the public land. As applicants, they contend that they havepossessed the land applied for in concept of owner, openly and publicly, adverse against the wholeworld and continuously for more than thirty (30) years before they filed the application over the landwhich is agricultural and separate from the public domain.

We find the petition to be meritorious. It is already a settled rule that forest lands or forest reserves arenot capable of private appropriation and possession thereof, however long, of convert them intoprivate property (Vano vs. Government of Philippine Islands, 41 Phil. 161; Adorable v. Director ofForestry, 107 Phil. 401; Director of Forestry vs. Muoz, 23 SCRA 1183; Republic vs. De la Cruz 67SCRA 221; Director of Lands vs. Reyes & Azurin vs. Director of Lands, 68 SCRA 177; Republic vs.Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; and Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701) unless

such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable by the Director of Forestry, buteven then, possession of the land by the applicants priorto the reclassification of the land asdisposable and alienable cannot be credited as part of the thirty-year requirement under Section 48 (b)

of the Public Land Act (Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, supra). IN THIS CASE, THERE ISNO SHOWING OF RECLASSIFICATION BY THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY THATTHE LAND IN QUESTION IS DISPOSABLE OR ALIENABLE. THIS IS A MATTERWHICH CANNOT BE ASSUMED. It calls for proof.

There is an erroneous assumption implicit in the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals which thegovernment oppositors also appear to have overlooked. This is the reliance on Proclamation No. 217

of Governor General Henry L. Stimson as the operative act which converted the lands covered by theCentral Cordillera Forest Reserve into forest lands. This is wrong. The land was not non-forest oragricultural land prior to the 1929 proclamation. It did not ease a classification from non-forest intoforest land because of the proclamation. The proclamation merely declared a special forest reserveout of already existing forest lands. The land was already forest or timber land even before theproclamation. The alleged entry in 1915 of Salming Piraso and the cultivation of 15 hectares out of a(219.7879) hectares claimed area has no legal significance. A person cannot enter into forest land andby the simple act of cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits towards an eventual confirmation ofimperfect title. The Government must first declare the forest land to be alienable and disposableagricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation, and exclusive and adverse possession can becounted for purposes of an imperfect title.


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The records positively establish that the land in question is part of the public forest which theExecutive formally proclaimed as the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve to further preserve its integrityand to give it a status which is more special for certain purposes than that of ordinary forest lands.

One reason for the respondent court's decision finding a registerable title for the private respondents isits observation that the Government failed to show that the disputed land is more valuable for forestpurposes. The court noted a failure to prove that trees are thriving in the land.

The Court of Appeals finding is based on a wrong concept of what is forest land. There is a bigdifference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a classification oflands of the public domain in the Constitution. (Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, Section10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, as amended; and Section 1, Article XIII of the 1935Constitution).

One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status a classification for legalpurposes.

The "forest land" started out as a "forest" or vast tracts of wooded land with dense growths of treesand underbush. However, the cutting down of trees and the disappearance of virgin forest and not

automatically convert the lands of the public domain from forest or timber land to alienable agriculturalland.

As stated by this Court in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry(126 SCRA 69, 75);

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose suchclassification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted tocrops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be onmountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipapalms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classffied as forest

land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to bedescriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as"forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of thedisposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfecttitle do not apply.

This Court ruled in the leading case ofDirector of Forestry v. Muoz(23 SCRA 1184)that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership.

And in Republic v. Animas,(56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the ground thatthe area covered by the patent and title was not disposable public land, it being a part ofthe forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void at initio. It bears emphasizing

that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is classified asforest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or otherpurposes. (at p. 75)

On February 27, 1970, an ocular inspection of the questioned property was conducted by LandInspector Crisogono Bartolo, Jr., of the Bureau of Lands, together with Forester Ricardo D. Zapateroof the Bureau of Forestry, Deputy Clerk of Court Roberto Gogoling as representative of the landregistration court, Fiscal Navarro and Andres Carantes as representative of the applicant.

Land Inspector Crisogono Bartolo, Jr., submitted his report dated April 17, 1970, which states, amongothers, that the land is covered with trees, bushes and grasses and being stony is not suitable for

agricultural purposes. This negates the claim of the private respondents that the land has beencultivated since 1915.

More important, however, than the appearance of the land is its status, as stated in the separatereport dated April 6, 1970 submitted to the Provincial Fiscal of Benguet Province by Forester RicardoD. Zapatero which declares that the whole area applied for by the applicant fails within the CentralCordillera Forest Reserve and that the same has not been released for agricultural purposes by theDirector of Forestry who has administrative jurisdiction over the same. This has not been successfullyrefuted. It has not been proved erroneous.

Testifying in connection with the matters stated in his report, Forester Ricardo D. Zapatero stated that:


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Q Do you know the land in question here in this case?

A I know, sir.

Q In connection with your duty to inspect the lands that are subject mattersof land registration cases, have you inspected this land in question also?.

A Yes, I inspected it, sir.

Q What is the purpose of your inspection?

A The purpose of my inspection is to determine the status of the area ifitfalls within the reservation or within the alienable or disposable area.

Q What is your finding, if any ?

A My finding was that the area falls within the Central Cordillera ForestReserve.

Q Was that finding reduced into writing?

A Yes, sir.

Q I am showing to you a report found on Pages Sixty-Eight (68) of therecords which for purposes of Identification, we pray that the same bemarked as Exhibit "A" for the government oppositors, your Honor.

COURT:

As what?

FISCAL BRAWNER:

Rather as Exhibit "1"

COURT:

Have it marked.

Q What is the relation of this report with that report that you made?

A This is the original copy of the Report which I submitted to the ProvincialFiscal.

Q There appears a signature above the typewritten name "Ricardo D.Zapatero", whose signature is that?

A That is mine, sir.

Q You stated that in paragraph 3 of your report, Exhibit 1 that the land fallswithin the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, how did you arrive at thatconclusion?

A Because of what I have even of the improvements of the applicantand because of the Bureau of Forestry map.

Q Did you actually go to the land in question or the land applied for?

A Yes, air.

Q So, you actually saw this land applied for?

A Yes, sir.


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Q What is the nature of this land applied for?

A It is generally stony and the topography is level to rolling and there arecertain enemies of plants inside the land, in some area.

COURT:

Q What are the species of plants?

A There are species of Binayuyu.

Q That is for lumber?

A No, that is not.

FISCAL BRAWNER:

Q You stated in paragraph 2 of your report that the topography of the landapplied for is generally stony, and because of the Binayuyu species, the

condition of the land is not suited for agricultural purposes?

A Yes, sir.

Q What is the basis of that statement?

A Because of the topography which is of solid inclination, we believe that isnot good for agricultural purposes. The land applied for is more suited forpasture purposes. (pp. 203-206, tsn., September 6,1971; Emphasissupplied)

The reports and testimonies of Land Inspector Bartolo and Forester Zapatero support the contentionof the petitioner that the area applied for by the applicant is forest land within the Central CordilleraForest Reserve. In the case ofRamos v. Director of Lands (39 Phil. 175) we have ousted:

Great consideration, it may be stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, Paid by thecourts to the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with authority on Forestrymatters.

There is no factual basis for the conclusion of the appellate court that the property in question was nolonger part of the public land when the Government through the Director of Lands approved on March6, 1925, the survey plan (Plan Psu-43639) for Salming Piraso. The existence of a sketch plan of real

property even if approved by the Bureau of Lands is no proof in itself of ownership of the land coveredby the plan. (Gimeno v. Court of Appeals, 80 SCRA 623). The fact that a claimant or a possessor hasa sketch plan or a survey map prepared for a parcel of land which forms part of the country's forestreserves does not convert such land into alienable land, much less private property. Assuming that apublic officer erroneously approves the sketch plan, such approval is nun and void. There must first bea formal Government declaration that the forest land has been re-classified into alienable anddisposable agricultural land which may then be acquired by private persons in accordance with thevarious modes of acquiring public agricultural lands.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming thedecision of the land registration court which granted the private respondents' application for

registration of the land in question is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for landregistration is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

6.


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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Petitioner,

- versus -

CELESTINA NAGUIAT,Respondent.

G.R. No. 134209

Present:

PUNO, J., Chairperson,SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,CORONA,

AZCUNA, and

GARCIA, JJ.

Promulgated:

January 24, 2006

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

Petitioner: Republic of the PhilippinesRespondent: Naguiat

D E C I S I O N

GARCIA, J.:

Before the Court is this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the

reversal of the Decision[1]dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.

37001 which affirmed an earlier decision

[2]

of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69inLand Registration Case No. N-25-1.

The decision under review recites the factual backdrop, as follows:

This is an application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of land located inPanan, Botolan, Zambales, more particularly described in the amended application filedby Celestina Naguiat on 29 December 1989 with the Regional Trial Court of Zambales,Branch 69. Applicant [herein respondent] alleges, inter alia, that she is the owner of thesaid parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from the LID Corporation which

likewise acquired the same from Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monjeand their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more thanthirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage orencumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal orequitable, or in possession thereof.

On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the Philippines [herein petitioner]. . . filed anopposition to the application on the ground that neither the applicant nor herpredecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notoriouspossession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto;that the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do

not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-fide acquisition of the landsapplied for or of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession andoccupation thereof in the concept of (an) owner; that the applicants claim of ownershipin fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of . . .; andthat the parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain belonging to theRepublic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.

On 15 October 1990, the lower court issued an order of general default as againstthe whole world, with the exception of the Office of the Solicitor General, and proceededwith the hearing of this registration case.
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After she had presented and formally offered her evidence . . . applicant restedher case. The Solicitor General, thru the Provincial Prosecutor, interposed no objectionto the admission of the exhibits. Later . . . the Provincial Prosecutor manifest (sic) thatthe Government had no evidence to adduce. [3]

In a decision

[4]

dated September 30, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment for hereinrespondent Celestina Naguiat, adjudicating unto her the parcels of land in question and decreeing the

registration thereof in her name, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby adjudicates the parcels ofland situated in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, appearing on Plan AP-03-003447 containingan area of 3,131 square meters, appearing on Plan AP-03-003446 containing an area of15,322 containing an area of 15,387 square meters to herein applicant Celestina T.Naguiat, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Rommel Naguiat and a resident of

Angeles City, Pampanga together with all the improvements existing thereon and ordersand decrees registration in her name in accordance with Act No. 496, Commonwealth

Act No. 14, [should be 141] as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1529. Thisadjudication, however, is subject to the various easements/reservations provided forunder pertinent laws, presidential decrees and/or presidential letters of instructions whichshould be annotated/ projected on the title to be issued. And once this decision becomesfinal, let the corresponding decree of registration be immediately issued. (Words inbracket added)

With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court, petitioner Republic

went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001.

As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed decision of May 29, 1998, affirmed

that of the trial court, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is herebyAFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the Republics present recourse on its basic submission that the CAs decision is not inaccordance with law, jurisprudence and the evidence, since respondent has not established with the

required evidence her title in fee simple or imperfect title inrespect of the subject lots which would

warrant their registration under (P.D. 1529 or Public Land Act (C.A.) 141 . In

particular, petitioner Republic faults the appellate court on its finding respecting the length of

respondents occupation of the property subject of her application for registration and for not

considering the fact that she has not established that the lands in question have been declassified

from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable property.

Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and released by positive act of the

Government so that they may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, are

not capable of private appropriation.[5]

As to these assets, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title

do not apply.[6]

Given this postulate, the principal issue to be addressed turns on the question of

whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of forest or other inalienable

lands of the public domain.
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Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act[7]

and the Constitution[8]

classifying lands

of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks,do not

necessarily refer to a large tract of wooded land or an expanse covered by dense growth of trees and

underbrush. As we stated in Heirs of Amunategui[9]-

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose suchclassification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover.

Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted tocrops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be onmountains or in out of the way places. xxx. The classification is merely descriptive of itslegal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually lookslike. xxx

Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,[10]

which embodies the Regalian doctrine, all lands

of the public domain belong to the State the source of any asserted right to ownership of land.[11]All

lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumptively belong to the

State.

[12]

Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienableagricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public

domain.[13] Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands

of the public domain, i.e., from forest or mineral to agricultural and vice versa, belongs to the Executive

Branch of the government and not the court.[14]Needless to stress, the onus to overturn, by

incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is

alienable or disposable rests with the applicant.[15]

In the present case, the CA assumed that the lands in question are already alienable and

disposable. Wrote the appellate court:

The theory of [petitioner] that the properties in question are lands of the publicdomain cannot be sustained as it is directly against the above doctrine. Said doctrine is areaffirmation of the principle established in the earlier cases . . . that open, exclusive andundisputed possession of alienable public land for period prescribed by law creates thelegal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure andwithout the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomesprivate property . (Word in bracket and underscoring added.)

The principal reason for the appellate courts disposition, finding a registerable title for

respondent, is her and her predecessor-in-interests open, continuous and exclusive occupation of the

subject property for more than 30 years. Prescinding from its above assumption and finding, the

appellate court went on to conclude, citing Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

(IAC)[16]and Herico vs. DAR,[17]

among other cases, that, upon the completion of the requisite period

of possession, the lands in question cease to be public land and become private property.

Director of Lands, Herico and the other cases cited by the CA are not, however, winning cards for

the respondent, for the simple reason that, in said cases, the disposable and alienable nature of theland sought to be registered was established, or, at least, not put in issue. And there lies the

difference.

Here, respondent never presented the required certification from the proper government agency

or official proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable. Matters of land

classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls for proof.[18] Aside from tax receipts,

respondent submitted in evidence the survey map and technical descriptions of the lands, which,
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needless to state, provided no information respecting the classification of the property. As the Court

has held, however, these documents are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land

sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.[19]

It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation of public lands h

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