2AC Reps – Policymaking T

8/8/2019 2AC Reps Policymaking T

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2AC Reps Policymaking T/ (1/2)

An emphasis on representations hinders policymaking and denigrates agency

Tuathail1996 [Gearoid, Department of Geography at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Political Geography,

science direct]

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourseand concerns of foreign-policy decision- makers are quite different, so different that theyconstitute a distinctive problem- solving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is adanger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in thepractice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not,however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structureamong many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I donot disagree with Dalbysfourth point about politics and discourse except to note that hisstatement-Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisionscould be taken, troops and material moved and war fought-evades the importantquestion of agencythat I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it isrepresentations that make action possible is inadequateby itself. Political, military andeconomic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial inexplaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices.Both here and earlier, Dalbys reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response toDalbys fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is aboutthe CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root thegeographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoningon national security. Dalbys book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of theReagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that thedistinction between critical theorists and post- structuralists is a little too rigidly and

heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalbys interpretation of thereconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peaceresearchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural andideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachevs reforms and his newsecurity discourse were also strongly self- interested, an ultimately futile attempt to save theCommunist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raisedby Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice ofcritical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremelyimportant ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing thisconcern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, thematerialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which

particular discursive strategies become significant. Critical geopolitics, in other words, shouldnot be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompaniespoststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; itneeds to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.


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2AC Reps Policymaking T/ (2/2)

Elevating representations above reality replaces political engagement with abstractmusing

Taft-Kaufman 1995 [Jill, Professor at the Department of Speech Communication AndDramatic Arts at Central Michigan University, Southern Communication Journal, Spring]

In its elevation of language to the primary analysis of social life and its relegation of the de-centered subject to a set of language positions, postmodernism ignores the way real peoplemake their way in the world. While the notion of decentering does much to remedy the ideaof an essential, unchanging self, it also presents problems. According to Clarke (1991):Having established the material quality of ideology, everything else we had hitherto thoughtof as material has disappeared. There is nothing outside of ideology (or discourse). Where Althusser was concerned with ideology as the imaginary relations of subjects to the realrelations of their existence, the connective quality of this view of ideology has been dissolved because it lays claim to an outside, a real, an extra-discursive for

which there exists no epistemological warrant without lapsing back into the bad old ways of empiricism or metaphysics. (pp. 25-26) Clarke explains how the same disconnection between

the discursive and the extra-discursive has been performed in semiological analysis: Where it used to contain a relation between the signifier (the representation) and the signified (thereferent), antiempiricism has taken the formal arbitrariness of the connection between the signifier and signified and replaced it with the abolition of the signified (there can be no realobjects out there, because there is no out there for real objects to be). (p. 26) To the postmodernist, then, real objects have vanished. So, too, have real people. Smith (1988) suggests that

postmodernism has canonized doubt about the availability of the referent to the point that"the real often disappears from consideration" (p. 159). Real individuals becomeabstractions. Subject positions rather than subjects are the focus. The emphasis on subjectpositions or construction of the discursive self engenders an accompanying critical sense ofirony which recognizes that "all conceptualizations are limited" (Fischer, 1986, p. 224). Thispostmodern position evokes what Connor (1989) calls "an absolute weightlessness in whichanything is imaginatively possible because nothing really matters" (p. 227). Clarke (1991)dubs it a "playfulness that produces emotional and/orpolitical disinvestment: a refusal tobe engaged" (p. 103). The luxury of being able to muse about what constitutes the self is aposture in keeping with a critical venue that divorces language from material objects andbodily subjects.


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2AC Reps Impedes Activism

Alt fails representation-only focus impedes macropolitical activism and collapsesinto self-fulfilling negativism

Collins 1997 (Patricia, Professor of Sociology at the University of Cincinnati, Fighting Words,p. 135-136]

In this sense, postmodern views of power that overemphasize hegemony and local politicsprovide a seductive mix of appearing to challenge oppression while secretly believing thatsuch efforts are doomed. Hegemonic power appears as ever expanding and invading. Itmay even attempt to annex the counterdiscourses that have developed, oppositionaldiscourses such as Afrocentrism, postmodernism, feminism, and Black feminist thought.This is a very important insight. However, there is a difference between being aware of thepower of ones enemy and arguing that such power is so pervasive that resistance will, atbest, provide a brief respite and, at worst, prove ultimately futile. This emphasis on power as

being hegemonic and seemingly absolute, coupled with a belief in local resistance as the bestthat people can do, flies in the face of actual, historical successes. African-Americans,women, poor people, and others have achieved results through social movements, revolts,revolutions, and other collective social action against government, corporate, and academicstructures. As James Scott queries, What remains to be explainedis why theories ofhegemonyhaveretained an enourmous intellectual appeal to social scientists andhistorians (1990, 86). Perhaps for colonizers who refuse, individualized, local resistance isthe best that they can envision. Overemphasizing hegemony and stressing nihilism not onlydoes not resist injustice but participates in its manufacture. Views of power groundedexclusively in notions of hegemony and nihilism are not only pessimistic, they can bedangerous for members of historically marginalized groups. Moreover, the emphasis onlocal versus structural institutions makes it difficult to examine major structures such asracism, sexism, and other structural forms of oppression. Social theories that reduceheirarchical power relations to the level of representation, performance, or constructedphenomena not only emphasize the likelihood that resistance will fail in the face of apervasive hegemonic presence, they also reinforce perceptions that local, individualizedmicropolitics constitutes the most effective terrain of struggle. This emphasis on the localdovetails nicely with increasing emphasis on the personal as a source of power and withparallel attention to subjectivity. If politics becomes reduced to the personal, decenteringrelations of ruling in academia and other bureaucratic structures seems increasinglyunlikely. As Rey Chow opines, What these intellectuals are doing is robbing the terms ofoppression of their criticaland oppositional import, and thus depriving the oppressed ofeven the vocabulary of protest and rightful

demand (1993, 13).


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1AR AT: Discourse First

Discourse doesnt shape reality empirical reality must come first

Rodwell 2005 [Jonathan, PhD student at Manchester Met. researching U.S. Foreign Policy,

Trendy but empty: A Response to Richard Jackson]

However, having said that, the problem is Jacksons own theoretical underpinning, his ownjustification for the importance of language. If he was merely proposing that theunderstanding of language as one of many causal factors is important that would be fine. Buthe is not. The epistemological and theoretical framework of his argument means the ONLYthing we should look at is language and this is the problem.[ii] Rather than being a fairlysimple, but nonetheless valid, argument, because of the theoretical justification it actuallybecomes an almost nonsensical. My response is roughly laid out in four parts. Firstly I willargue that such methodology, in isolation, is fundamentally reductionist with a theoreticalunderpinning that does not conceal this simplicity. Secondly, that a strict use of post-

structural discourse analysis results in an epistemological cul-de-sac in which the writercannot actually say anything. Moreover the reader has no reason to accept anything that hasbeen written. The result is at best an explanation that remains as equally valid as any otherpossible interpretation and at worse a work that retains no critical force whatsoever. Thirdly,possible arguments in response to this charge; that such approaches provide a moreacceptable explanation than others are, in effect, both a tacit acceptance of the poverty offorce within the approach and of the complete lack of understanding of the identifiableeffects of the real worldaround us; thus highlighting the contradictions within post-structural claims to be moving beyond traditional causality, re-affirming that rather thanpursuing a post-structural approach we should continue to employ the traditionalmethodologies within History, Politics and International Relations. Finally as a consequenceof these limitations I will argue that the post-structural call for intertextuals must bepracticed rather than merely preached and that an understanding and utilisation of allpossible theoretical approaches must be maintained if academic writing is to remain usefulrather than self-contained and narrative. Ultimately I conclude that whilst undeniably ofsome value post-structural approaches are at best a footnote in our understanding.The first major problem thenisthat historiographically discourse analysis is so capacious as to be largely of little use. The process of inscription identity, of discourse development is not given any political or historical context, it is argued that it just works, is simply a universal phenomenon. It is history thatexplains everything and therefore actually explains nothing. To be specific if the U.S. and every other nation is co ntinually reproducing identities through othering it is a constant and universal phenomenon that fails to help us understand at all why one result of the otheringturned out one way and differently at another time. For example, how could one explain how the process resulted in the 2003 invasion of Iraq but didnt produce a similar invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 when that country (and by the logic of the Regan administrationsdiscourse) the West was threatened by the Evil Empire. By the logical of discourse analysis in b oth cases these policies were the result of politicians b eing able to discipline and control the political agenda to produce the outcomes. So why were the outcomes not the same? Toreiterate the point how do we explain that the language of the War on Terror actually managed to result in the eventual Afghan invasion in 2002? Surely it is impossible to explain how George W. Bush was able to convince his p eople (and incidentally the U.N and Nato) tosupport a war in Afghanistan without referring to a simple fact outside of the discourse; the fact that a known terrorist in Afghanistan actually admitted to the murder of thousands of people on the 11h of Sepetember 200 1. The point is that if the discursive othering of an alienpeople or group is what really gave the U.S. the opportunity to persue the war in Afghanistan one must surly wonder why Afghanistan. Why not No rth Korea? Or Scotland? If the discourse is so po werfully useful in its own right why could it not have happened anywhere at anytime and more often? Why could the British government not have been able to justify an armed invasion and regime change in No rthern Ireland throughout the terrorist violence of the 1980s? Surely they could have just employed the same discursive trickery as George W.Bush? Jackson is absolutely right when he points out that the actuall threat posed by A fghanistan or Iraq today may have been thoroughly misguided and conflated and that there must be mo re to explain why those wars were enacted at that time. Unfortunately that explanationcannot simply come from the result of inscripting id entity and discourse. On top of this there is the clear problem that the consequences of the discursive othering are not necessarily what Jackson would seem to identify. This is a pr oblem consistent through David Campbellsoriginal work on which Jacksons approach is based[iii]. David Campbell argued for a linguistic process that always results in an other being marginalized or has the potential for demonisation[iv]. At the same time Jackson, building upon this, maintains without qualification thatthe systematic and institutionalised abuse of Iraqi prisoners first exposed in April 2004 is a direct consequence of the language used by senior administration officials: conceiving of terrorist suspects as evil, inhuman and faceless enemies of freedom creates an atmosphere

where abuses become normalised and tolerated[v]. The only problem is that the process of differentiation does not actually necessarily produce dislike or antagonism. In the 1940s and 50s even subjected to the language of the Red Scare its obvio us not all Americans came tosee the Soviets as an other of their nightmares. And in Iraq the abuses of Iraqi prisoners are isolated cases, it is not the case that the U.S. militarily summarily abuses prisoners as a result of language. Surely the massive protest against the war, even in the U.S. itself, is also a sel fevident example that the language of evil and inhumanity does not necessarily produce an outcome that marginalises or demonises an other. Indeed one of the points of discourse is that we are continually differentiating ourselves from all others around us without thisnecessarily leading us to hate fear or abuse anyone.[vi] Consequently, the clear fear of the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War, and the abuses at Abu Ghirab are unusual cases. To understand what is going on we must ask how far can the pro cess of inscripting identityreally go towards explaining them? As a result at best all discourse analysis pr ovides us with is a set of universals a nd a heuristic model Next, discourse analysis as practiced exists within an enormous logical cul-de-sac. Born of the original premise that each discourse andexplanation has its own realities, what results is a theoretical approach in which a critique is actually impossible because by post-structural logic a critique can only operate within its own discursive structure and on its own terms. If things only exist within specific languages anddiscourse you must share the basic premises of that discourse to be able to say anything about it. But what useful criticisms can you make if you share fundamental assumptions? Moreover remembering the much argued for normative purposes of Jacksons case he talks abo ut theeffects of naturalizing language and without blushing criticises the dangerous anti-terror rhetoric o f George W. Bush. The only prob lem is Jackson has attempted to illustrate that what is moral or immoral depends on the va lues and structures of each discourse. Therefore whyshould a reader believe Richard Jacksons idea of right and wrong any more than George W. Bushs? Fundamentally if he wishes to maintain that each discourse is specific to each intellectual framework Jackson cannot criticise at all. By his own epistemological rules if he is insidethose discourses he shares their assumptions, outside they make no sense What actually occurs then is an aporia - a logical contraction where a works own stated epistemological premises rob it of the ability to contain any critical force. Such arguments are caught between the

desire to maintain that all discursive practices construct their own truths, in which case critiques are not possible as they ar e merely one of countless possible d iscursive truths with no actually reason to take then seriously, or an appeal to material reality, but again the entirepremises of post structural linguistics rejects the idea of a material reality.[vii] In starting from a premise that it is not po ssible to neutrally describe the real world, the result is that without that real world, discourse analysis actually has nothing to say. The issue of the material real

world, or evidence is actually the issue at the heart of the weakness of post-structural discourse analysis, though it does hold the potential to at least rescue some of its usefulness. The problem is simple, in that the only way Jackson or any post-structuralist can operationalisetheir argument is with an appeal to material evidence. But by the logic of discourse analysis there is no such thing as neutral evidence. To square this circle many post-struturalist writers do seem to hint at complexity and what post-structural culturalists might call intertextuality,arguing for favouring a complexity of interactions rather than linear causality[viii]. The implication is that language is just one of an endless web o f factors and surely this prompts o ne to pursue an understanding of these links. However, to do so would dangerously underminethe entire post-structural project as again, if there are discoverable links between factors, then there are material facts that are identifiable regardless of language. Consequently, rather than seeking to understand the links between factors what seems to happen is hands are thrownup in despair as the search for complexity is dropped as quickly as it is picked up. The result is one-dimensional arguments that again can say little. This is evident in Jacksons appro ach as he details how words have histor ies and moreover are part of a dialectic process in whichthey not only shape social structures but are also shaped by them.[ix] However we do not then see any discussion of whether, therefore, it is not discourse that is the powerful tool but the effect of the history and the social structure itself. Throughout Jacksons argument it is atop down process in which discourse d isciplines society to follow the desire of the dominant, but here is an instance of a dia lectic process where society may actually be the originating force, allowing the discourse in turn to actually to be mo re powerful. However we simply seeno exploration of this potential d ialectic process, merely the suggestion it exists. Consequently because there is no interaction between the language the culture and the material then there is not much that can actually be do ne. All that is done is to repeatedly detail the instances

where the same tropes occur time and time again and suggest they have an impact.[x] What cannot be explained however is why those tropes exist or how they have an in fluence. So, for example, Jackson is unable to explain how the idea that the members of the emergencyservices attending the scene at the World Trade Centre on 9/11 were heroes is a useful trope d isciplining the populace via the tool of Ho llywood blockbusters and popular entertainments heroes. All he is able to claim is that lots o f films have heroes, lots o f stories have heroesand people like heroes. All might be true but what exactly is the po int? And how do we actually know the language has the prescribed effect? Indeed how do we know people dont support the villain in films instead of heroes? The reason it there is no attempt to explore thecomplexity of causation is that this would clearly automatically undermine the concentration on discourse. Moreover it would require the admittance of identifiable evidence about the real world to be able to say a nything about it! For if something historical changed the meaningof a word, o r if something about society gave the word a different meaning and impact, then it would be a n identifiable something. Moreover if the word is tied to a nd altered by an historical event or so cial impact, would it not be a case o f assessing the effect of original event

itself as well as the la nguage?The larger problem is that without clear causal links between materially identifiableevents and factors any assessment within the argument actually becomes nonsensical.Mirroring the early inability to criticise, if we have no traditional causational discussion how


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can we know what is happening? For example, Jackson details how the rhetoric of anti-terrorism and fear is obfuscating the real problems. It is proposed that the real world killersare not terrorism, but disease or illegal drugs or environmental issues. The problem is howdo we know this? It seems we know this because there is evidence that illustrates as much Jackson himself quoting to Dr David King who argued global warming is a greater that than

terrorism. The only problem of course is that discourse analysis has established (as argued byJackson) that Kings argument would just be self-contained discourse designed to naturaliseanother arguments for his own reasons. Ultimately it would be no more valid than theargument that excessive consumption of Sugar Puffs is the real global threat. It is worthrepeating that I dont personally believe global terrorism is the worlds primary threat, nor doI believe that Sugar Puffs are a global killer. But without the ability to identify real factsabout the world we can simply say anything, or we can say nothing. This is clearlyridiculous and many post-structuralists can see this. Their argument is that there areempirically more persuasive explanations.[xi] The phrase empirically persuasive is howeverthe final undermining of post-structural discourse analysis. It is a seemingly fairly obviousreintroduction of traditional methodology and causal links. It implies things that can be seento be right regardless of perspective or discourse. It again goes without saying that logically

in this case if such an assessment is possible then undeniable material factors about the wordare real and are knowable outside of any cultural definition. Languageor culture then doesnot wholyconstitute reality. How do we know in the end that the world not threatened bythe onslaught of an oppressive and dangerous breakfast cereal? Because empiricallypersuasive evidence tells us this is the case. The question must then be asked, is ourunderstanding of the world born of evidential assessment, or born of discourse analysis? Orperhaps its actually born of utilisation of many different possible explanations.


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1AR AT: Discourse First Doesnt Shape Reality

Representations dont shape reality

Kocher 2K[Robert L, Author and Philosopher, Reality Sanity]

While it is not possible to establish many proofs in the verbal world, and it is simultaneouslypossible to make many uninhibited assertions or word equations in the verbal world, itshould be considered that reality is more rigid and does not abide by the artificial flexibilityand latitude of the verbal world. The world of words and the world ofhuman experienceare very imperfectly correlated. That is, saying something doesn't make it true. A verbalstatement in the world of words doesn't mean it will occur as such in the world ofconsistent human experience I call reality. In the event verbal statements or assertionsdisagree with consistent human experience, what proof is there that the concoctions createdin the world of words should take precedence or be assumed a greater truth than the worldof human physical experience that I define as reality? In the event following a verbal

assertion in the verbal world produces pain or catastrophe in the world of human physicalreality or experience, which of the two can and should be changed? Is it wiser to live withthe pain and catastrophe, or to change the arbitrary collection of words whose directionproduced that pain and catastrophe? Which do you want to live with? What proven reason isthere to assume that when doubtfulness that can be constructed in verbal equations conflictswith human physical experience, human physical experience should be considered doubtful?It becomes a matter of choice and pride in intellectual argument. My personal advice is thatwhen verbal contortions lead to chronic confusion and difficulty, better you should stop the verbal contortions rather than continuing to expect the difficulty to change. Again, it's amatter of choice. Does the outcome of the philosophical question of whether reality orproof exists decide whether we should plant crops or wear clothes in cold weather to protectus from freezing? Har! Are you crazy? How many committed deconstructionist philosophers walk about naked in subzero temperatures or don't eat? Try creating and living in analternative subjective reality where food is not needed and where you can sit naked onicebergs, and find out what happens. I emphatically encourage people to try it with thestipulation that they don't do it around me, that they don't force me to do it with them, orthat they don't come to me complaining about the consequences and demanding toconscript me into paying for the cost of treating frostbite or other consequences. (soundslike there is a parallel to irresponsibility and socialism somewhere in here, doesn't it?). Iencourage people to live subjective reality. I also ask them to go off far away from me to tryit, where I won't be bothered by them or the consequences. For those who haven't guessed,this encouragement is a clever attempt to bait them into going off to some distant placewhere they will kill themselves off through the process of social Darwinism because, let'sface it, a society ofdeconstructionists and counterculturalists filled with people debatingwhat, ifany, reality exists would have the productive functionality of a field ofdiseasedrutabagas and would never survive the first frost. The attempt to convince people tocreate and move to such a society never works, however, because they are not as committedor sincere as they claim to be. Consequently, they stay here to work for left wing causes andpromote left wing political candidates where there are people who live productive realitywho can be fed upon while they continue their arguments. They ain't going to practice what


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they profess, and they are smart enough not to leave the availability of people to victimizeand steal from while they profess what they pretend to believe in.


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1AR AT: Discourse First AT: No Reality

If discourse defines reality then its impossible to differentiate between competingtruth claims

Patomaki2K[Heikki, Research Director, Network Institute for Global Democratization, andColin Wright, Lecturer in International Politics, University of Wales, International StudiesQuarterly, June, Vol. 44, Issue 2, p. 213]

On the boundary of negativity, in terms of epistemology, the denial of objects existingindependently of the discourses that construct them as objects seems unable todifferentiate between competing truth claims (Norris, 1996). If discourses construct theobjects to which the discourses refer, then the discourseitself can never be wrong about theexistence of its objects, in any meaningful or methodologically interesting way. Nor can analternative discourse possiblycritique another discourse, since the objects of a givendiscourse exist if thediscourse says they exist. External criticismof the existential claims

ofdiscoursesseems impossible.Ontologically, if discourses do construct their own objects,then what constructed the discourses themselves? There is, of course, a long and venerablephilosophical tradition of overt idealism that attempts to answer just this question. Forexample, for Berkeley it was God, for Hegel, Geist. We are unconvinced by these arguments,but if IR scholars want to adopt idealist positions then let us at least have the arguments inthe open where they might be in the manner of research practices beyond the boundary ofnegativity. Arguments are still advanced and assessed, evidence offered, and independentlyexisting objects, whether created in the discourse or not, are still referred to.


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1AR AT: Methodology First

Policy effects must be evaluated overemphasis on method kills education

Wendt, 2002 [Alexander, Asst. Prof at Univ of Chicago, Handbook ofIR, p. 68]

It should be stressed that in advocating a pragmatic view we are not endorsing method-drivensocial science. Too much research in international relations chooses problems or things to be explainedwith a view to whether the analysis will provide support for one or another methodological ism. But the

point of IR scholarship should be to answer questions about international politics that are of great

normative concern, not to validate methods. Methods are means, not ends in themselves. As a matter

ofpersonal scholarly choice it may be reasonable to stick with one method and see how far it takes us.But since we do not know how far that is,if the goal of the discipline is insight into world politicsthen it makes little sense to rule out one or the other approach on a priori grounds. In that case amethod indeed becomes a tacit ontology, which may lead to neglect of whatever problems it is poorly

suited to address. Being conscious about these choices is why it is important to distinguishbetween the ontological, empirical and pragmatic levels of the rationalist-constructivist

debate. We favor the pragmatic approach on heuristic grounds, but we certainly believe aconversation should continue on all three levels.


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2AC Discourse Contradictions Perm Opens UpSpace

Contradictions open space for discursive rethinking and dissension

Phillips 2002 [Kendall, Spaces of Inventionissension, Freedom, and Thought in Foucault,Philosophy, and Rhetoric]

Discourse formations, however, are not understood as wholly coherent entities; rather, theyare riddled with incoherence and contingency. While any statement is, theoretically,contestable, discourse formations work to create an illusion of authority and absoluteness or,in other words, discourse formations work to hide the existence of incoherence andcontingency. Foucault (1972) calls these points of incoherence contradictions and observes:Such a contradiction, far from being an appearance or accident of discourse, far from beingthat from which it must be freed if its truth is to be revealed, constitutes the very law of itsexistence: it is on the basis of such a contradiction that discourse emerges,and it is in order

both to translate it and to overcome it that discourse begins to speak . . . and, because it cannever . . . entirely escape it, that discourse changes, undergoes transformation, and escapes ofitself from its own continuity. (151) Contradictions, thus, prevent discourse from becomingentirely self-contained. The emergence of incompatible historical conditions or theencounter of an "other"incoherentdiscourse produces contradictions that, in turn,require discourse to "speak," to give accounting of these new incompatible conditions, inorder to cover over the emergence of contingency and maintain the illusion of unity.Importantly, the conditions for the emergence of such contradictions, as the points from which new discourses emanate, are inherent within existing discourses by virtue of theirmultiplicity, overlap, and incompatibility. Foucault describes emergent contradictions as"spaces of dissension" (1972, 152) and the phrase suggests their broader importance.

Contradictions are important not only as points of productivity, in terms of the creation ofnew statements and different discourses, but also as points of possibility. Instability withindiscourse formations prevents discourse from becoming wholly coherent and, thus, it isoppressive, introducing contingency and uncertainty. While discourse is, inevitably, deployedtoward the suppression of such contradictions, their emergence creates the condition forchange and transformation. These are spaces of dissension because they are places where theincoherence and contingency of the discourse is experienced directly and, therefore, theproduction ofdissenting discourse becomes possible for those who have momentarilyrecognized the instability.


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2AC Discourse Masking T/

Turn focus on discourse masks the problem and ignores social constructions

Meisner 1995 [Mark, Professor of environmental studies at York University, Resourcist

Language: The Symbolic Enslavement of Nature]

Changing the language we use to talk about nonhuman nature is not a solution. As Isuggested, language is not the problem. Rather, it seems more like a contagious symptom ofa deeper and multi-faceted problem that has yet to be fully defined. Resourcist language isboth an indicator and a carrier of the pathology of rampant ecological degradation. Further-more,language change alone can end up simply being a band-aid solution that gives theappearance of change and makes the problem all the less visible. In a recent article onfeminist language reform, Susan Ehrlich and Ruth King (1994) argue that because meaningsare socially constructed, attempts at introducing nonsexist language are being undermined bya culture that is still largely sexist. The words may have shifted, but the meanings and

ideologies have not. The real world cure for the sick patient matters more than the treatmentof a single symptom. Consequently, language change and cultural change must go together with social-moral change. It is naive to believe either that language is trivial, or that it isdeterministic.


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2AC Changing Common Words Masks Impacts

Turn masking changing the words we use makes their discursive impacts worse

Meisner 1995 [Mark, Professor of environmental studies at York University, Resourcist

Language: The Symbolic Enslavement of Nature]

Changing the language we use to talk about nonhuman nature is not a solution. As Isuggested, language is not the problem. Rather, it seems more like a contagious symptom ofa deeper and multi-faceted problem that has yet to be fully defined. Resourcist language isboth an indicator and a carrier of the pathology of rampant ecological degradation. Further-more,language change alone can end up simply being a band-aid solution that gives theappearance of change and makes the problem all the less visible. In a recent article onfeminist language reform, Susan Ehrlich and Ruth King (1994) argue that because meaningsare socially constructed, attempts at introducing nonsexist language are being undermined bya culture that is still largely sexist. The words may have shifted, but the meanings and

ideologies have not. The real world cure for the sick patient matters more than the treatmentof a single symptom. Consequently, language change and cultural change must go together with social-moral change. It is naive to believe either that language is trivial, or that it isdeterministic.


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2AC AT Terror Talk K

Changing the way we talk about threats wont deal with their material realityitcauses useless semanticizing that makes the impact inevitableThayer 3/26/09 [J. G. Homeland Linguistics, http://www.commentarymagazine.com/blogs/index.php/thayer/60052]

The Obama administrationhas made great changes in the way we handle national security. And judging by itsactions so far, it seems that the most important failing of the previous administration has been insemantics.The changes started with Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano deciding that the word terrorismwas too harsh. She has made a point of not using it, opting instead for man-caused disasters.That was merely phase one.The next logical step was to find a new term for the War On Terror.Theprofferedsubstitute? Overseas Contingency Operation.I was never in love with the term War On Terror.Terrorism isnt the enemy, its a tactic of an enemy. Referring to the War onTerroris like referring to World War II as the War on Blitzkrieg or War on Kamikazes. War Against Islamist Extremists seemed a bi t more accurate if a bit on the nose.But Overseas Contingency Operation? Lets break it down.

Overseas. Thats intended to make us feel safe its happening Over There, across the oceans, and isntreally a problem for us here.

Contingency. According to one dictionary, it has the following meanings:1.dependence on chance or on the fulfillment of a condition; uncertainty; fortuitousness: Nothing was left to contingency.2. a contingent event; a chance, accident, or possibility conditional on something uncertain: He was prepared for every contingency.

3.something incidental to a thing.In other words: a state wherein something might or might not happen. This is an utterly emptyword in this context.Operation. A singular thing, something considerably smaller than a war or even a campaign.

Lets nor forget that Napolitanos man-caused disasters has its own implications. Man-causeddisasters makes one think of things like the Exxon Valdez oil spill, or global warmingglobalcooling climate change, or mine collapses, or dam fai lures,or Chernobyl not things like the 9/11 attacks.In both cases, the effect is to diminish the magnitude of the problem and remove the key elementthat differentiates terrorist attacks from the above-mentioned examples: intent .

The major difference between Chernobyl and 9/11 was intent. At Chernobyl, it was gross negligence at every stage of the process that led to the biggest nuclear accident in history. The

9/11 attacks, on the other hand, were carried out in with malice and a desire to maximize damage.

Its almost laughable. TheObama administration thinks the best way to fight terrorists is to change theway we talk about them and for most Islamic terrorists, English i snt their native language.It would be truly laughable but the focus on language will most likely come at theexpense of action .

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2AC Reps – Policymaking T