2.99 - Scheuermann, W. E. - The Politics of Socialism Reconsidered (en)

7/30/2019 2.99 - Scheuermann, W. E. - The Politics of Socialism Reconsidered (en)

1/6

The following ad supports maintaining our C.E.E.O.L. service

The Politics of Socialism Reconsidered

The Politics of Socialism Reconsidered

by W.E. Scheuermann

Source:

PRAXIS International (PRAXIS International), issue: 2 / 1988, pages: 250-254, on www.ceeol.com.
http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.dibido.eu/bookdetails.aspx?bookID=c51d4ec3-66bd-4122-9449-de6dade71cc3http://www.ceeol.com/


2/6

REVIEW ESSAY

w. E. ScheuermanLiberal theorists have long questioned the compatibility of socialism, individualfreedom, and democratic government. For as astute a thinker as Max Weber, theorganization of production along socialist lines threatened to widen the sphere ofbureaucratic domination inmodem society. Socialismwould squeeze western society

of one of the few remaining spheres in which individual freedom might flourish,effectively tightening the bolts on the "iron cage" of modernity.Unfortunately, the history of 20th century socialism has too often realized theworst fears of its liberal critics. Socialism has never taken a democratic form.Certainly, left social analysists have justifiably pointed to the specific historicalsources of political authoritarianism in state socialist societies, yet this should leaveus unsatisfied. We need to free ourselves of ossified intellectual blinders and confrontthe problem at hand head on: in short, are socialism, individual liberty, anddemocratic rule truly compatible, and if so, how can we work to guarantee thatsocialism will embody the best of the liberal democratic political tradition?Paul Q. Hirst's Law, Socialism andDemocracy is an important attempt to grapplewith this question. As Hirst rightfully emphasizes, if socialism is once again tobecome a viable political force in the advanced capitalist west, "we need to convincenot only our own supporters but most of all our opponents that socialism doesnot mean in Max Weber's words an 'icy night' of bureaucratic darkness." 1 Moreimmediately, socialism, albeit in a distorted and repressive form, is already a realityfor millions in state socialist regimes. Hirst's work clearly makes a valuable contribution for those who find themselves engaged in concrete political and intellectualstruggles for radical democratization and liberalization in ' 'real-existing' ,socialism." Indeed, it's a tragedy that so few there will be able to read it.Hirst convincingly argues that Marxists have too long ignored the question ofhow socialist political institutions might best be organized so as to guarantee selfrule and individual liberties. "Real-existing socialism" well demonstrates that wecannot naively a priori assume that the socialization of production somehownecessarily engenders popular rule. Yet unfortunately, much of traditional Marxistpolitical theorizing has been tinged by this simplistic view, a vision, in turn, derivedfrom orthodox Marxism's oftentimes reductivist conception of the state. In orderto combat the failings of orthodox left political thought, Hirst ultimately appropriatesa variety of liberal democratic insights about political rule: he thinks that anindependent judiciary, for example, is as essential for the preservation of individualfreedom in democratic socialism as in liberal capitalism. Although Hirst is hardlyuncritical of liberal democratic political ideals - indeed, he is highly suspiciousof traditional notions of sovereignty and representation, his analysis nonetheless* Review of Paul Q. Hirst's Law, Socialism and Democracy (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986).Praxis International 8:2 July 1988 02060-8448 $2.00


3/6

Praxis International 251suggests that the construction of an emancipatory socialist political order posesmany of the same problems liberal polities have been forced to confront, and notsurprisingly, socialism will sometimes have to make use of similar institutions.Appropriately, Hirst directs much of his ire against traditional Marxist politicaltheory. He argues that the dangerous spectre of "the people" as "one agencyof decision, " a "unity with a single interest, " haunts the thinking ofmany membersof this tradition.2 In the orthodox model of "popular democracy," theorists likeLenin and Mao presuppose the existence of a unified working class capable ofexercising direct political power. In this conception, the unitary working class ("thepeople") acts through a variety of directly democratic bodies (soviets, communes,etc.), and "the people's collective interests are allegedly represented at the higheststages of the socialist political apparatus. Perhaps most significantly, this modelassumes that because "the masses" constitute a single, unified body with "a singleinterest, " its power can ultimately be represented by a single, centralized decisionmaking body. In state socialism, the "central plan, " which purports to representthe interests of society at large, often plays this role. Because' 'the people" area single, unified "agency of decision," its collective will can be represented bya single "agency" of decisionmaking, namely "the plan. "3Yet as Hirst argues, this vision tends to obfuscate the fact that even in socialism,there will always be a "plurality of differentiated agencies of decision. "4 Evenin hypercentralized Soviet state socialism, for example, a plurality of importantpolitical and economic decisionmaking bodies function. 5 Hirst seems to think thatthis is simply endemic to modem society; its complexity necessitates the existenceof a diversity of decisionmaking units. This clearly has significant implications.In Hirst' swords, "the people as such cannot rule." 6 Even if we accept thetroublesome assumption that "the people" constitute a unitary body, the fact remainsthat' 'the people" will still be incapable of exercising power by means of a single,centralized "agency of decision." The vision of "popular democracy" therebybecomes misleading because it allows us to ignore the truly important problemsat hand: how should we structure the plurality of decisionmaking bodies necessaryto socialism in the most emancipatory fashion possible? In other words, how canwe make sure that socialist institutions will guarantee democratic rule and preserveindividual freedoms?Yet Hirst is also critical of those who contentedly gaze upon the advantagesof existing parliamentary political forms. Socialism cannot leave existing parliamentary democracy unchanged. Contrary to a view widespread among mainstreamsocial democrats, contemporary parliamentary democracy is hardly sufficientlydemocratic. In Thatcher's Britain, for example, "a Party receives 43% of thevotes cast and yet it is awarded a number of seats sufficient to ensure that itswill is imposed in the assembly despite the fact that its policies are bitterlyunpopular . . . " .7 In this context, Hirst might also have mentioned the 1984 V.S.presidential election, when a quarter of eligible voters made the so-called Reagan"landslide" possible. As Hirst well documents, parliamentary rule in the capitalistwest too often becomes what he fittingly calls "elective despotism."Perhaps not surprisingly, Hirst ultimately envisions a democratic socialism whichcombines directly democratic and representative democratic institutions, and muchof Law, Socialism and Democracy is devoted to an analysis of how we might get


4/6

252 Praxis Internationalthere. In his view, given the complexity ofmodern society, socialism will clearlyhave to rely upon representative institutions. Still, a wide array of directly democraticbodies should complement them. "Units such as village communes, small factories,schools, housing estates and so on can be run in this way. It is necessary to designthe scale and scope of tasks of such bodies to permit direct democracy; it is bothan economical form of control and provides masses of ordinary people with aneducation in basic organizational skills." 8 Only an appropriate mix of direct andrepresentative democratic bodies can make socialism truly emancipatory.Along these lines, Hirst outlines the demandsfor radical economic and politicaldemocratization which he would like to see on the Left's political agenda. Hisdiscussion here of possible political strategies is often quite insightful, yet he toooften fails to examine the tremendous complexities and problems his demands fordemocratization clearly entail. How, for example, do we use piecemeal' 'workplaceparticipation" and "industrial democracy" proposals to move towards a substantially more radical democratization of economic life? How might "efficiency"and' 'industrial democracy" be made compatible, and who would decide whichtrade-offs might need to be made? Hirst is clearly cognizant of issues of this sort,yet the reader unfortunately will have to look elsewhere to get a richer analysisof them. 9Hirst's analysis of the significance of law and legal theory for democratic socialistpolitical institutions is far more engaging. Once again, the brunt of his criticismis directed against orthodox Marxist theory. He attacks the legal theorist Pashukanisfor allegedly seeing law, at the most fundamental level, as a product of bourgeoissociety. For Pashukanis, "the form of law is defined by the categories of 'subject'and 'right': law consists in the recognition of the rights of subjects concerningpossession." 10 Pashukanis thereby ties the existence of legal relations to thefunctioning of capitalist commodity production; law is conceptualized as that bodyof rules which merely functions to regulate the relations between possessive subjectswho have rights over commodities which they exchange. Given law's roots incommodity production, the abolition of commodity production makes law obsolete.Without possessive subjects who own commodities to be exchanged, there is noneed for law. For Pashukanis, socialism ultimately entails the supersession ofcommodity production, and with the end of commodity production, the' 'witheringaway" of law becomes possible.Hirst attacks this rather naive view on a number of fronts. The centerpiece ofhis critique revolves around the claim that, as mentioned, socialism will necessarilyconsist of a plurality of "differentiated agencies of decision" - distinct institutions with decisionmaking powers. In every society, the relationships between theseinstitutions, and between institutions, individuals, and social groups, will haveto be defined and regulated. In Hirst's eyes, this is the role of law. "Law is aninstance of regulation: an institutionally specific complex of organizations andagents, discourses and practices, which operates to define (whether in codifiedrules or not) the form and limits of other organizations, agents, and practices. " 11Because the "form" and "limit" of socialist "organizations, agents and practices"will have to be defined, socialists cannot dispense with law or questions of legaltheory. Contrary to Pashukanis' dreams, law will not "wither away."What role might law then play in a genuinely emancipatory socialist society?


5/6

Praxis International 253Hirst's examination of this question is a complex and fascinating one, and I canonly sketch out its broadest features here. As he notes, the mere legal positingof individual liberties and restraints on state power often means very little. In statesocialist political constitutions, there is clearly a great deal of talk about the legal"rights" citizens purportedly possess. Yet unfortunately, as soon as citizens puttheir legal "rights" to use, the state clamps down and makes a mockery of itsown constitution. As Hirst correctly argues, the solution to this problem lies inorganizing social institutions so that they function to uphold individual libertiesand perpetuate democratic government. "The problem is the absence of institutionsto defend certain agents' capacities for action and to limit those of others. ' , 12 The"political autonomy" of judicial and (democratically chosen) legislative bodiesbecomes essential here. In his eyes, only when legislative and judicial bodies areautonomous in the realm of decisionmaking and independent from administrativeinstitutions (the police, state ministries, etc.) do they function to prevent attackson individual freedoms and democratic rule. One of the sources ofpolitical authoritarianism in the DDR, for example, is the fact that "the courts are part of anadministrative hierarchy and are directly subject in their adjudicative decisionsto orders from, interventions by and more subtle pressures emanating from theMinistry of Justice. " 13 Specifically, democratic socialism hence needs independent "courts, specialist review bodies, supervision by legislature, and administrativepolice" in order to tame the potential excesses of political power. Perhaps mostsignificantly, institutions which "check" the abuses of political power only functioneffectively if there is "an ideological commitment of political leaders and the massof citizens to such forms of regulation." 14 Social groups must respect (and,indeed, buttress) these institutions which work to prevent political tyranny if they areto survive and remain viable. "Checks" on political power must have a social base.

For this reason, social pluralism becomes essential to the well-being ofdemocraticsocialist political institutions. Allying himself with liberal-left pluralists like RobertDahl, Hirst insists that the existence of a plurality of autonomous political andsocial units alone serves to challenge potential abuses of state power and to hinderits centralization into the hands of a small clique. 15 Furthermore, this suggests thespecific form a socialist economy will have to take: only if both market and planningmechanisms are put to use and a wide variety of forms of economic organization(including cooperatives and privately-owned small businesses) are permitted canpluralism, democracy, and individual freedom conceivably flourish.

l.lw, Socialism and Democracy is an important contribution to ongoing debatesin left theory. Hirst is correct in arguing that socialist theorists have too longsuccumbed to naive and even crudely utopian illusions about the political formsappropriate to democratic socialism. Indeed, if the socialist project is to remainof any relevance as we approach the 21st century, we'll have to do better.Yet Hirst 's work has its limitations. Law, Socialism and Democracy is a verythin volume, yet it tackles a tremendous array of issues, some of which - therole of rights in socialism and the nature of legal punishment to name two - Ihave necessarily ignored here. Given the breadth of issues Hirst confronts, hisdiscussion of many of them is often necessarily abridged. As I mentioned above,this is perhaps most blatantly clear in his discussion of political and economic


6/6

254 Praxis Internationaldemocratization proposals and strategies, where Hirst unavoidably ignores manyof the most demanding problems and questions.Perhaps more significantly, there is a sense in which the implications ofHirst'sbook are somewhat more far-reaching than he may intend. As Law, Socialism andDemocracy so well documents, much of traditional socialist political theory is badlyflawed, and it is no accident that left political movements today find themselvesin a state of disarray. Hirst is justified in focussing on the importance of socialists"theorizing about political institutions" in a fresh and unorthodox manner. 16 Still,one is left with the distinct impression that Hirst 's project remains somehowinadequate. The problem with socialist theory and practice today is not simplythat our conception of socialist political strategies and political institutions is flawed.The crisis of socialism is far more profound. Advanced capitalismand state socialismhave taken forms for which traditional left theory has ill-prepared us, and it hasbecome increasingly clear that socialist theory and practice is once again in needof a radical overhaul and reconstruction. We do not simply need a refurbishedsocialist political theory; we need to undertake a somewhat more complexendeavour, namely the reconstruction of a broader social theory of contemporarycapitalism of which explicitly political theorizing constitutes only one part. Wecannot simply set out to supplement the basic tenets of traditional socialist theorywith a refined analysis of politics without first critically scrutinizing those basictenets: otherwise, we risk reconstructing socialist political theory on a dune madeof quicksand.

NOTES1. Paul Q. Hirst, !..Iw, Socialism and Democracy (Boston, 1986), 14.2. Hirst, Law, Socialism and Democracy, 29.3. Hirst, Law, Socialism and Democracy, 29.4. Hirst, Law, Socialism and Democracy, 34.5. Hirst, Law, Socialism and Democracy, 27, 33-38.6. Hirst, Law, Socialism and Democracy, 41.7. Hirst, Law, Socialism and Democracy, 115.8. Hirst, Law, Socialism and Democracy, 42, 102.9. See Workers' Control, ed. G. Hunnius, G. Garson, J. Case (New York, 1973); Robert Dabl,A Preface to Economic Democracy (Berkeley, 1985); M. Carnoy and D. Shearer, EconomicDemocracy (White Plains, 1980); C. Gunn, Workers' Self-Management in the United States (Ithaca,1984).10. Hirst, Law, Socialism and Democracy, 16.11. Hirst, Law, Socialism and Democracy, 19.12. Hirst, Law, Socialism and Democracy, 37.13. Hirst, Law, Socialism and Democracy, 36.14. Hirst, Law, Socialism and Delnocracy, 37.15. Hirst, Law, Socialism and Democracy, 86, 103-5; Dahl, A Preface to Economic Democracy(Berkeley, 1985).16. Hirst, Law, Socialism and Democracy, 14.

Documents

2.99 - Scheuermann, W. E. - The Politics of Socialism Reconsidered (en)