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Chinas Foreign Strategy

MITSURU KITANO

This article introduces four trends of Chinas foreign strategy. Analysis of

Chinas diplomacy since the 1980s based on these concepts demonstrates

Chinas intent to become a great power and its aspirations for a China-

centric order.

Introduction

Where is China headed?

This question has been asked with increasing frequency since around 2009. In

December 2009, China took a stubborn stance at the 15th Conference of the

Parties of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP15), which was

held in Copenhagen, while September 2010 saw the collision incident between

Japans coast guard patrol vessels and a Chinese fishing trawler off the SenkakuIslands. Moreover, we have witnessed tension and disputes between China and

various ASEAN nations over the South China Sea.1

In the wake of the Tiananmen Square incident and the collapse of the socialist

regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Deng Xiao-ping directed that

China should pursue a foreign policy course of hiding its talents and biding its

time, and seeking concrete achievements. In the context of Deng Xiao-

pings foreign policy directives, this has been interpreted as a call for a low-

profile foreign policy, with the emphasis on the first of these two phrases,

hiding ones talents and biding ones time. However, as China has come toaspire to a great-power foreign policy, this appears to have morphed into stead-

fastly continue to hide ones talents and bide ones time, and actively seek con-

crete achievementswith the emphasis on the latter phrase.2 In line with this

process, conflicts between Chinas own values and those of the international com-

munity seem to be becoming more frequent.

Although the Chinese leadership re-emphasizes, both at home and abroad,

that Chinese foreign policy is peaceful in nature and is trying to curb this kind

of friction, it appears to be putting expansion ahead of resolving the issues.

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This is linked to the fact that China is increasingly augmenting its national

strength. However, this is not the whole storyit is also related to the expanding

scope of values which China is seeking to achieve through its foreign policy, the

greater diversity of the players involved in foreign policy, and the increasing dif-

ficulty involved in coordinating foreign policy in such an environment.3

In this context, it seems increasingly necessary to view Chinas foreign strat-

egy from multiple angles, and to regard it as the product of reconciliation, compe-

tition, and conflict between multiple policy trends, instead of simply trying to

explain it in terms of a single unifying principle. Although attempts to understand

China have hitherto encompassed a widespread view of the nation as a monolithic

existence founded on a unified purposewhose every sectors actions are coordi-

nated with a view to the achievement of this purposein reality China is appear-

ing to become multipolar and pluralistic to a significant degree. (Naturally, it must

be recalled that, regarding important matters, discussions held and decisions takenat the leadership level will be acted on accordingly.)

Under this understanding, this article will look at the changes in Chinas

foreign strategy in the period since the era of open and reform, and will attempt

to examine prospects for the future. In this context, the expression foreign strat-

egy has the same meaning it has in Tatsumi Okabes Chinas Foreign Strat-

egythat is, it denotes an external policy with a long-term perspective4 and

which forms the basis for the conduct of day-to-day foreign policy and foreign

relations.

This article is structured as follows: The first section explains the four trendsin foreign strategy that form the theoretical framework for this article, while the

next three sections analyze the changes in Chinas foreign strategy in the period

from the 1980s to the 2000s. The next two sections consist of analysis of the

players involved in foreign relations, and that conducted in accordance with the-

ories of international relations, while the final section presents conclusions based

on the discussion in the earlier sections.

Two axesfour trends

When attempting to look at Chinas foreign strategy as the product of reconcilia-

tion, competition, and conflict between multiple policy trends, the first issue pre-

sented is the question of the best type of coordinate axes against which the strategy

should be viewed.

One point of reference in this regard is the four trends in US foreign policy

identified by Walter Russell Mead in his book, Special Providence.5 As is well-

known, in this book Walter Russell Mead identifies four trends in US foreign

policy: the Wilsonian, the Hamiltonian, the Jeffersonian, and the Jacksonian. In

schematic terms, these are as follows:6

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. Wilsonian: pursuing to spread American democratic and social values through-

out the world. Hamiltonian: aiming to become a maritime nation, with active foreign engage-

ment.

Jeffersonian: aiming to become a continental nation, with selective foreignengagement

. Jacksonian: emphasizing the physical security and the economic well-being of

the American people

A number of axes of conflict are evident among Meads four trends, such as

outward-looking (Hamiltonian) versus inward-looking (Jeffersonian), and realis-

tic (Hamiltonian and Jacksonian) versus idealistic (Wilsonian and Jeffersonian).

With this as a point of reference, Chinas foreign strategy might well be viewed

against an X-axis of Emphasis on domestic revitalization Emphasis onincreased foreign influence, and a Y-axis of InternationalismNationalism.

If these are correlated with the directives of Deng Xiao-ping mentioned at the

start of this article, a course emphasizing hiding ones talents and biding ones

time would equate to emphasis on domestic revitalization on the X-axis,

while a course emphasizing seeking concrete achievements would equate to

emphasis on increased foreign influence. Meanwhile, a tendency to respect the

values of the international community would equate to internationalism on the

Y-axis, while a tendency for China to accentuate its own values would equate to

nationalism. The conventional wisdom tends to regard that those emphasizingseeking concrete achievements are hard-liners, and those emphasizing hiding

ones talents and biding ones time favor international harmony. However, as

Shin Kawashima has pointed out, the faction that emphasizes hiding ones

talents and biding ones time set great store by the fact that China is a developing

country and is inclined to take a cautious attitude to shouldering the weight of an

international role, such as through participation in frameworks for resolving inter-

national issues.7 In this sense, it is necessary to distinguish between the two axes.

If the two axes cross, four quadrants are produced (see Figure 1). These four

quadrants thus represent the four trends in Chinas foreign strategy, which may bedescribed in more detail as follows:

. One-nation course (nationalism in the context of emphasizing domestic revita-

lization). Opening course (internationalism in the context of emphasizing domestic revitalization)

. Responsible-great-power course (internationalism in the context of emphasis

on increased foreign influence). China-centric order course (nationalism in the context of emphasis on

increased foreign influence)



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Among these four trends, it is tempting to conflate the responsible-great-power

course and the China-centric order course under the name great-power course.

However, although they both have a tendency to emphasize expansion of Chinas

foreign influence, the responsible-great-power course (which entails respect for inter-

national values) is designed to maintain the status quo, while the China-centric order

course (which entails respect for Chinas own values) has a revisionist slant.

These four trends can be used as tools for understanding inclinations in

specific periods, for perceiving changes in chronological fashion, for understand-

ing tendencies in specific fields and specific cases, and for understanding the pro-

clivities of the various players involved in foreign policy. In this article, they will

be used to analyze Chinas foreign strategy since the time of open and reform. The

next three sections deal with the 1980s, the 1990s, and the 2000s.

The 1980sthe opening course as mainstream

It appears that it was the opening course that represented the mainstream of

Chinas foreign policy in the 1980s, although it included elements of the one-

nation course. The China-centric order course and the responsible-great-power

course did not emerge in any prominent fashion. This can be expressed schema-

tically as follows:

By way of comparison with the previous period, the most significant change was

the adoption of the open and reform policy after the Third Plenary Session of the

Figure 1 The four trends in Chinas foreign strategy

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Communist Party Central Committee, which was held at the end of 1978. This led

to the adoption in earnest of the opening course as foreign strategy, which then

became mainstream.

The Mao Zedong era was an era of war and revolution.8 In the 1970s, China

adopted a single-front foreign strategy under which it drew closer to the USA andprepared for confrontation with the Soviet Union. Preaching the theory of the

three worlds, China still ranked itself as a developing country and an oppressed

nation, and thus the notion of expanding its influence abroad carried little weight.

It could be argued that elements of aiming at the China-centric order course were

present: China envisaged the Soviet Union as its principal adversary, pursued to

highlight the rivalrous relationship among the USA, the Soviet Union, and

China, and was involved with the international communist movement. Overall,

however, Chinas participation in the global system was extremely limited, and,

in this sense, this was an era in which the one-nation course was predominant.Although tentative moves were also afoot to initiate the opening course, these

did not rise to the level of full-scale expansion.

On the contrary, once Deng Xiao-ping had assumed supreme power, there

was a realistic awareness that Chinas capabilities fell far short of those of the

superpowers, the USA and the Soviet Union. China brought in capital and technol-

ogy from the advanced nations of the West, adopted a course of attempting to

build up its national strength, and set great store by a stable international environ-

ment in which it could concentrate on building up its economy. That is, the devel-

opment and mainstreaming of the opening course is evident in the sense that Chinawas attempting to adopt the values of the international community while empha-

sizing domestic revitalization.

This is not to say, however, that China attempted to adopt the values of the

international community in all areas; this was mainly confined to the economic

sphere. By contrast, in the political realmthat is, as regards democracy and

human rightsChina consistently took a cautious attitude to the international

communitys values.

In its relations with the major powers, China switched from a foreign policy

of treating the Soviet Union as its main enemy and concluding a quasi-strategic

relationship with the USA, to a foreign policy of autonomy and independence

in which it did not maintain a strategic relationship with any great power. Essen-

tially, the US-China relationship changed for the better as the opening course

developed and became mainstream. After President Richard Nixons visit to

China in 1972, diplomatic relations between the USA and China were normalized

in 1979, and the two nations concluded a joint communiquein 1982. Until the Tia-

nanmen Square incident in 1989, US-China relations enjoyed a honeymoon

period. Japan-China relations were also essentially friendly. Japan commenced

official development assistance (ODA) to China in 1979, and China attached



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great importance to its relationship with Japan which provided capital and technol-

ogy. China focused its attention on Japan as a model of modernization. The more

important the opening course became, the more important Chinas relationship

was with Japan. Although problems did arisesuch as Chinas trade deficit

with Japan, textbook issues, and the Kokaryo dormitory issuegiven the impor-tance of Chinas relationship with Japan to the success of the opening course, these

were not problems that would irreparably harm the bilateral relationship.9

The 1990sthe seeds of great-power diplomacy

To summarize, during the 1990s China maintained the opening course as the cor-

nerstone of its foreign strategy (although there was some evidence of a shift

towards the one-nation course during the first half of the decade, the opening

course remained the basis of its policy). In the latter half of the decade, theseeds of the great-power course (the China-centric order course plus the respon-

sible-great-power course) became evident. In schematic terms, this can be rep-

resented as follows:

The events that first jolted Chinas foreign strategy during this period were the

Tiananmen Square incident of 1989 and the collapse of the socialist regimes in

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Deng Xiao-ping tried to bolster Chinas

foreign policy by directing that the nation should watch dispassionately, act

calmly, hide its talents, bide its time, and seek concrete achievements.10 Thesepronouncements were seen as emphasizing that China should guard against

peaceful evolution inspired by the West and keep a low profile in its foreign

policy. During this period, we witnessed emphasis on the national interest and

one-nation aspirationsas a result of the greater tension in relations between

China and the international community this can be seen as a shift towards the

one-nation course. Although there was some dispute about the appropriateness

of the open and reform policy as it related to the danger of peaceful evolution,

in 1992 Deng Xiao-ping used the speeches on his southern tour to issue the

command to speed up open and reform. As Ryosei Kokubun has pointed out,this represented a means of attempting to secure Chinas own survival by

instead joining in wholeheartedly with the international community.11 This can

be interpreted as further strengthening of the opening course, although it was

restricted to the economic area.12

In the early 1990s, China embarked on activating diplomacy with neighboring

countries, beginning by normalizing diplomatic relations and demarcating borders

with them. As Rumi Aoyama has pointed out, this entailed Chinas escape from its

international isolation against the backdrop of the hostile international environ-

ment produced by the Western nations criticism and sanctions after the Tianan-

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men Square incident and the collapse of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe

and the Soviet Union.13 In light of Chinas international awareness, the multipolar

structure that already existed in the Asia-Pacific region within the prevailing inter-

national power structure (which Seiichiro Takagi has analyzed as consisting of

one superpower and several major powers) probably represented an environ-ment that was more conducive for breaking out of Chinas post-Tiananmen

Square incident isolation.14

In the wake of the Tiananmen Square incident, improvements in US-China

relations did not come easily. Initially, the Clinton administration, which was

inaugurated in 1993, adopted an attitude that emphasized the importance of

improving human rights conditions and attempted to link this with the granting

of most-favored-nation status to China. It subsequently reviewed its policy

towards China, however, and in September 1993 switched to a policy of compre-

hensive engagement with China.15

As Emi Mifune has pointed out, cooperationwith China had become a necessity even for the USAbecause it had to take

into account the strength of the Chinese economy (fast becoming an epicenter

of growth), because it had an increasing need for Chinese cooperation on regional

security and weapons proliferation issues, and because the role of the United

Nations had increased in the post-Cold War era.16

Despite the occasional flare-up of short-lived tension, as Chinas strength as a

nation became more palpable, the need for Chinese cooperation came to serve as a

corrective force. As was evident from the delinking of most-favored-nation status

from human rights issues, this clearly gave China greater room to maneuver andenabled it to deal from a position of greater strength.

In the mid-1990s, Japan-China relations began to change significantly. After

reflection on the Tiananmen Square incident, China intensified its patriotic edu-

cation.17 Although this was not a policy that was specifically targeted at Japan,

the effect that it had on the sentiments of the Chinese people towards Japan did sub-

sequently serve to cast a shadow over Chinas relations with Japan. Furthermore,

the investment boom in China sparked by the intensification of the open and

reform policy in the wake of Deng Xiao-pings southern tour in 1992, and the pro-

gressive improvement in Chinas relations with Western nations meant that Chinano longer needed to rely on Japan alone. Under these circumstances, there was an

eruption of historical issues, such as that of civilian reparations. In the 1980s and

early 1990s, it would not have done for China to allow its relationship with

Japana relationship pivotal to the opening courseto deteriorate. Now,

however, China had more room to maneuver.

Starting in the late 1990s, China actively developed its diplomacy with neigh-

boring countries.18 To Chinas eyes, the strategic environment in East Asia had

changed, in light of events on the international stage such as the Taiwan Strait

Crisis and the US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security of 1996. In this context,



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it appears that Chinas aims in actively developing its diplomacy with neighboring

countries included attempting to avoid US-led containment and securing a base of

support and space to operate in neighboring countries.19 The establishment of the

Shanghai Five in 1996 and Chinas active participation in the ASEAN Regional

Forum in the latter half of the 1990s can be seen as concrete indications of this.In 1996, China also began developing partnership diplomacy,20 establish-

ing partnership relationship with Russia in 1996,21 the USA in 1997, and Japan

in 1998. This can be seen as a move towards the pro-active exercise of its

foreign influence, in that China was conducting active diplomacy in which it

treated each case on its merits even vis-a-vis great powers.

This partnership diplomacy and active development of diplomacy with neigh-

boring countries represented the seeds of great-power diplomacy. In light of

Chinas international awareness, it is evident that, on the one hand, China was

trying to increase its national strength while cooperating with the USA (in recog-nition of the reality of one superpower and several major powers), while, on the

other hand, it was securing a base of support and space to operate in neighboring

countries, and trying to exercise its foreign influence with a view to promoting

multipolarity.

The 2000sthe development of great-powerdiplomacy

In the 2000s, the great-power course (the China-centric order course plus theresponsible-great-power course) came into its own, with the opening course

also in evidence and serving as a conservative counterweight to the great-power

course. The one-nation course, however, was on the wane. Using the same type

of diagram as before, this can be shown schematically as follows:

Chinas confidence had been boosted by its handling of the Asian Currency Crisis

of 1997, and, in the China of the 2000s, there were frequent expressions of interest

in, and allusions to, the great power and great-power diplomacy concepts.

China was aware that it was now a great power, and the need grew for it to con-

sider ways to counter the notion of a menacing China in cases where it was con-

ducting itself as a great power. To meet this requirement, the concepts of Chinas

peaceful rise22 advanced by Zheng Bijian, President Hu Jintaos foreign policy

expert, as well as the concept of Chinas peaceful development.23 President

Hu Jintaos argument regarding a harmonious worldan expression he began

emphasizing in 2005was also partly intended to counter the notion of China

as a threat. These arguments included the notion that China should aim for the

establishment of what it perceives as a more appropriate world order, rather

than play its role to the full within the existing order.24 As Chinas awareness

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that it was a great power became more entrenched, the expression one super-

power and several major powers, which had been used frequently after the end

of the Cold War to describe the global power structure, fell into disuse.25

As this awareness of the nation as a great power grew more established, China

actively developed its diplomacy with neighboring countries.26

Chinas diplo-macy with neighboring countries has produced noteworthy developments in

three regions: Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Korean Peninsula. In

Central Asia, the former Shanghai Five was enlarged to become the Shanghai

Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2001, and it went on to undertake its activities

with renewed vigor.27 In Southeast Asia, Chinas specific focus on its relationship

with ASEAN is actively shaping the regional architecture of East Asia.28 On the

Korean Peninsula, the Six-Party Talks were started in August 2003, with China as

the chair.29 This contrasted most clearly with the passive attitude that China had

demonstrated at the time of the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993 and 1994.The USA had made known its expectations that China display a positive attitude,

and China followed through on its commitment to the USA to play a role

internationally.

Satoshi Amako has pointed out that Chinas active diplomacy with neighbor-

ing countries was not simply geared to expanding its influence but was also linked to

Chinas own grand strategy for forming a new global order.30 Thus, it bore the

hallmark of the China-centric order course as well as that of the responsible-

great-power course. As Akio Takahara has pointed out, this will encompass

frameworks both from which the USA is excluded and to which the USA isincluded.31 The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is an example of the former,

while the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Six-Party Talks are examples of the

latter. In the former instance, China was expanding itsown base of support and oper-

ational space in an area where the influence of the USA was weak.32 In the latter

instances, in the case of the ASEAN Regional Forum, China was dispelling the

fear among neighboring countries that it represented a threat, having maintained

its partnership with the USA,33 while in the case of the Six-Party Talks, China

was taking its own initiative on an issue in which the involvement of the USA

was inevitable, so as to ensure that there would not be an outcome that was undesir-able to China.

The development of relations with the USA served to boost the great-power

course. As China made the transition to a great power, US-China relations became

tense and then ease, alternately. The accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy

during the military intervention by NATO in Yugoslavia in 1999 caused the

relationship between the two nations to deteriorate, and there was further

tension due to the perception by the Bush administration (which was inaugurated

in 2001) of China as a strategic rival. On the other hand, the need for the USA

to have China as a partner in fighting terrorism in the wake of the terror attacks



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of 9/11 and the fact that even the USA had no choice but to develop its economicrelations with China led to improved US-China relations and upgraded mechan-

isms for dialogue and consultation.34 Specifically, the U.S.-China Strategic Dialo-

gue began in 2005 (which the USA dubbed the US-China Senior Dialogue), and

then in 2009 the two nations commenced the U.S.-China Strategic and EconomicDialogue, in addition to the economic discussions which they were holding. These

represent cooperation mechanisms between great powers. During this period, the

moves by the USA to encourage China to play a role and increase its awareness

within the international community (in line with Robert Zoellicks 2005 notion

of China as a responsible stakeholder)35 have been remarkable.

In the latter half of the 2000s, as Chinas presence on the global stage has been

felt ever more keenly, the idea of a G2 has been proposed, which would assume

the USA and China to play leading roles in the management of global issues.36 The

Chinese response to this has been wary. The Chinese appear to have concludedthat, given the burdens that accompany an international role and the perception

of China as a threat that exists among neighboring countries, there is no advantage

to engaging in these kinds of discussions head on.

There have also been vicissitudes in Chinas relationship with Japan. There

were anti-Japanese demonstrations in 2005, and Japan-China relations grew

chilly. However, in the October 2006 talks between Prime Minister Shintaro

Abe and President Hu Jintao, the bilateral relationship was characterized as a

mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interest, and the

relationship was back on the road to recovery. Japan and China stand side-by-side as great powers in East Asia. By being aware that the relationship encom-

passes various unresolved issues that could flare up easily, the two nations had

arrived at a point where they could sustain an amicable relationship only by mana-

ging the relationship with great care. The characterization of the bilateral relation-

ship as a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interest

expressed such perception of both countries.37

Starting in around 2006, China embarked on an effort to redefine its national

interests.38 Since the adoption of the policy of open and reform, the main objective

of Chinas foreign policy had been to create conditions that were advantageous foreconomic development. Since around 2006, however, China has added its national

sovereignty and security to the equation, and has come to exhibit the belief that its

foreign policy should be geared to safeguard its national sovereignty, security, and

development interests.39 The concept of core interests is also mentioned fre-

quently in this connection. Since 2007, the expression core interests has been

used in bilateral summit documents, attracting interest and attention when it

appeared in the US-China joint statement on the occasion of President Barack

Obamas visit to China in November 2009. This expression is used to convey

the concept of Chinas assertions that there is no room for compromise on

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issues such as Taiwan and Tibet, and there has also been debate on whether or not

China perceives the South China Sea as a core interest.40

These tendencies indicate that, as China makes the transition to a foreign strat-

egy predicated on the notion of itself as a great power, there is a possibility that it is

inclining towards the China-centric order course, which emphasizes Chinas ownset of inalienable values, rather than towards the responsible-great-power course,

with its respect for international values.

Where, then, is China headed? The following two sections will consider this

question from two different perspectivesa description of the players involved

in foreign relations and an analysis using theoretical international-relations

frameworks.

The players involved in foreign relationsWhen considering the question of where Chinas foreign strategy is headed, one

important perspective focuses on who the players involved in foreign relations are.

In fact, a striking trend in China in recent times has been the remarkable

diversification in the players involved in foreign relations. Akira Asano points

out that, while there were three principal actors in the Mao Zedong era (the Com-

munist Party, the State Council, and the Peoples Liberation Army), as open and

reform progressed the roles of regional administrations, companies, journalism,

and public opinion grew in importance.

41

While pointing out that the variousplayers power is compartmentalized, Jacobson and Knox focus on the media,

netizens, and the business community as the new players.42

The important consideration in this context is which of the foreign strategy

courses the players will opt for.

In any country, public opinion tends to be fairly hard-line regarding foreign

policy; this tendency is particularly pronounced in the opinions expressed on the

Internet, and China is no exception in this regard. It has been pointed out that the

nationalistic opinions of netizens influence the actions of the authorities,43 and

this tendency has also been in evidence in connection with Chinas relations withJapan at the time of the anti-Japanese demonstrations of 2005 and of the collision

incident off the Senkaku Islands of 2010. It has also been pointed out that, since

freedom of speech is restricted, in spheres such as patriotism, where it is more per-

missible to publish ones opinions, such opinions tend to be voiced forcefully. Thus,

public opinion would seem to support the China-centric order course.

With regard to another of the new players, the business community, it would

seem that sectors which have interests abroad (including large state-owned com-

panies, financial institutions, and energy-sector companies) do exert influence on

foreign policy.44



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For example, it has been pointed out that when the state-owned oil companies

make company investments overseas, because they then require the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs to protect their foreign interests, they effectively become an

interest group which exerts influence on foreign policy.45 In such a business

community with foreign interests, the majority would also seem to be advocatesof the China-centric order course.

In addition to these players, the Chinese military appears to be involved in an

increasing number of aspects of foreign relations (although it has long been a

player in this sphere), given the redefinition of state interests that has led to the

emphasis on state sovereignty and security alongside economic development.46

It has been pointed out that an uncompromising foreign-affairs course will be

replete with organizational benefits for the military, in that it will then be in a

stronger position to request increased defense spending, improved working con-

ditions, and better equipment from the Chinese leadership.47

The majority inthe military would also seem to be advocates of the China-centric order course.

There are some in the academic sphere who advocate the responsible-great-

power course. For example, Wang Yizhou,48 who cites responsibility as a basic

pillar of foreign policy alongside development and sovereignty, could probably

be described as the standard-bearer for the responsible-great-power course.

Among the players involved in foreign relations, there are also some who take a cau-

tious attitude to the great-power course. For example, it has been pointed out that,

among others, former Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and former Deputy Chief of

Staff of the Peoples Liberation Army Xiong Guangkai have insisted that China isstill a developing country and must concentrate on economic development.49

Although there is now greater diversity in the players involved in foreign

relations, in general the majority of the newly influential players tend to favor

the China-centric order course. As Jacobsen and Knox have pointed out, it is

now the case that among those engaged in foreign relationsboth veterans

and newcomers alikethe mainstream view is that the calls from the advanced

industrialized nations for China to contribute to the global public good represent

an attempt to delay the rise of China,50 and it appears that there is widespread

agreementparticularly among those newly involved in foreign policythat, inorder to protect these interests, China must aggressively draw up rules regarding

international commitments.51

Analysis using theoretical international-relationsframeworks

As is well-known, there are three main theoretical frameworks for understanding

international relations: realism, liberalism, and constructivism.52 Realism empha-

sizes the role of the sovereign state, the pursuit of national interests, and the

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exercise of national strength; it focuses on international relations in terms of power

struggles. Liberalism emphasizes international interdependence and functional

cooperation; it focuses on cooperative international relations. Constructivism

focuses on the notion that international relations are driven by the subjective rec-

ognition of norms and identities.In 2005, an article appeared in the journal International Securitytitled, The

Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?, Aaron Friedberg dis-

cusses the grounds for optimism and for pessimism from the perspective of

each of these three theoretical frameworks.53 As a matter of fact, each of the

three frameworks produces a different picture of both China and its engagement

with the rest of the world.

Which of these three theoretical frameworks can best be used to explain the

changes in Chinas foreign strategy, as described in this article? Might this examin-

ation also provide some suggestion as to the kind of path China will adopt in the future?

To state the conclusion at the outset, realism appears to be best able to explain

the changes in Chinas foreign strategy, as described in this article.

Specifically, the mainstreaming of the opening course from the 1970s until

the 1980s was a means of increasing its national strength by adoption of a

policy of introducing technology and expertise from the advanced nations.

Chinas shift to the great-power course from the 1990s to the 2000s represented

its intent to play a role as a great power, in keeping with its enhancement of its

national strength. The rise of the China-centric order course, which occurred in

the process, indicated that, as Chinas relative importance within the international

community grew, it sought to exercise its national strength and advance its inter-

ests by trying to form an international order that was more desirable in its own

view, rather than simply adhering to the existing international order. All these

phenomena are most easily explained from the perspective of realism.

They can also be partly explained in terms of liberalism and constructivism.

For example, since the development of cooperation under the opening course

served to advance functional cooperation, it can also be explained in terms of lib-

eralism. The responsible-great-power-course component within the shift to the

great-power course can also be explained in terms of liberalism, in that greater

international interdependence led to a larger role for China. This can also be

understood from the perspective of constructivism, if the focus is placed on the

enormous amount of activity that took place. In light of this viewpoint, some advo-

cates of liberalism believe China to be a status-quo power.54

On the other hand, it is difficult to explain the rise of the China-centric order

course in terms of liberalism or constructivism. Liberalism has it that participation

in international organizations and increased interdependence presage conciliation

with international values, while constructivism sees an enormous amount of



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activity as foreshadowing this same conciliation. In other words, despite the fact

that these two theories predict the opposite, in reality China seems to be accentuat-

ing its own values in an increasing number of areas.55

Since realism thus offers the best explanation, what is Chinas likely path in

the future from that perspective?Given that influencing the formation of an international order is conducive to

Chinas national interests, it can be predicted that China will step up its pursuit of

the China-centric order course. Furthermore, this suggests that as long as China

does not feel that the friction engendered by this path is disadvantageous to its

national interests, it will continue to proceed on this course.

Conclusion

Continuing the investigations of Samuel Kim, Kazuko Mouri has analyzed

changes in the attitude of Chinas international systems as follows: selective

system changes (1970s), followed by maintenance and active use of the systems

(1980s and first half of the 1990s), followed by attempts to create systems

(since the latter half of the 1990s).56 However, if these are classified using the

four trends defined in this article, the fulcrum of Chinas international strategy

shifted from the one-nation course to the opening course; with the adoption of

the policy of open and reform from the 1990s to the 2000s, it further shifted to

the great-power course (see Figure 2). As for the shift to the great-powercourse, the following features are noteworthy.

Figure 2 The shift of fulcrum of Chinas international strategy

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First, while the switch to the great-power course can be seen to include

aspects of both a shift to the responsible-great-power course and a shift to the

China-centric order course, a predominant trend in favor of the China-centric

order course (in line with Chinas increased national strength) is evident. In the

arena of diplomacy with neighboring countries, China has intensified its effortsto expand its own base of support and operational space in areas where the influ-

ence of the USA is weak, as exemplified by the 2001 transformation of the Shang-

hai Five (which had been established in 1996) into the Shanghai Cooperation

Organisation and by the renewed vigor with which this new organization has sub-

sequently undertaken its activities. On the doctrinal front, too, China has come to

make frequent use of the concept of core interestsan expression which

denotes issues on which China has no room for compromiseas it has been rede-

fining its national interests. In terms of specific incidents as well, since around

2009 there have been frequent cases of friction with other nations, as mentionedat the beginning of this article.

These can be categorized as follows:

. Pending issues of territorial claims and cases involving maritime activities (for

example, the collision incident off the Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea

issue). Cases involving the establishment of international rules (for example, Chinas

handling of COP15).

Cases involving Chinas own economic policies and economic activities (forexample, the rare-earth issue)

. Human rights issues (for example, Chinas handling of the award of the Nobel

Prize to Liu Xiaobo)

In each category, however, it appears that the friction occurred and became serious

because, rather than respecting the values of the international community, China

stubbornly asserted its own values and then took action on this basis. Thus, these

cases appear to be a consequence of the predominance of the trend towards the

China-centric order course.Second, the switch to the great-power course did not take place in stages, with

a shift to the responsible-great-power course as the first stage, followed by a shift

to the China-centric order course in line with Chinas increased national strength.

The move to make the transition to the China-centric order course could be seen

right from the outset in the mid-1990s, when the seeds of the great-power course

were evident. For example, both the Shanghai Five, which appeared to be geared

towards avoiding US-led containment and securing Chinas own base of support

and operational space in neighboring countries, and Chinas strategic partnership

with Russia (its first partnership relationship) were established in 1996.



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Third, China has been alternating between the responsible-great-power course

and the China-centric order course, depending on the country or region with which

it is dealing, or the field in which it is operating. In general, it is evident that China

tends to act in a conciliatory manner by touting the responsible-great-power course

when it is dealing with the might of the USA, and to adopt the China-centric ordercourse in regions where the USA has little interest, or in regions to which US power

does not extend. In this sense, Chinas dealings vary even in its diplomacy with

neighboring countries, depending on whether the forum is one in which the USA

participates (the ASEAN Regional Forum or the Six-Party Talks) or one in

which the USA does not participate (the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation).

What is important in the future is the direction that the great-power course

will takespecifically, whether the China-centric order course will predominate

even further or whether the brakes will be applied.

To judge from the dynamics of Chinas international relations at the presenttime, it seems that the China-centric order course will become more dominant as

Chinas national strength increases and its relative importance in the international

community grows. This is a structure in which a countrys tendency to accentuate

its own values acts as a strong lure (like a powerful magnet): If the possibility

arises for a country to increase its national power and gravitate towards this ten-

dency, it will get pulled into it. Chinas recent redefinition of its national interests

would seem to be a renewed example of this trend.

Supporting evidence for this kind of forecast is available, both in terms of the

players involved in international relations and the theoretical frameworks forunderstanding international relations. Among each of the individual categories

of players whose importance has grown (public opinion, the business community,

and the military), advocates of the China-centric order course are in the majority.

Looking back at the changes in Chinas international strategy up to this point, it

appears that among the theoretical frameworks for understanding international

relations, realism provides a better explanation than liberalism or constructivism.

Analysis from the perspective of realism suggests the possibility that, as long as

China does not feel that the friction engendered by following the China-centric

order course is disadvantageous to its national interests, it will plow on with it.

In this connection, it was notable that in his address at the 11th Conference of

Chinese Ambassadors in July 2009, President Hu Jintao spoke of actively

seeking concrete achievements, while steadfastly continuing to hide ones

talents and bide ones time.57 This trend probably needs to be interpreted in

the context of Chinas aforementioned redefinition of its national interests. In

other words, the notion of China attempting to safeguard its national interests

(national sovereignty, security, and development interests) while actively enga-

ging in the tasks of seeking concrete achievement can surely be understood as a

clear statement that China is adopting the China-centric order course.

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This is not the end of the matter, however. In the face of reality, China is con-

stantly receiving feedback regarding its foreign strategy in the form of unresolved

issues that arise, reaction from other countries, and domestic reaction, and it has to

make re-adjustments accordingly.

The Chinese leadership has been re-emphasizing the peaceful nature ofChinas foreign policy since around the end of 2010. This is understood to be

in reaction to the frequent instances of friction that have occurred as the results

of a series of uncompromising foreign policy stances taken by China. Specifically,

while Dai Bingguo, the state councilor responsible for diplomacy, states in his

article We Must Stick to the Path of Peaceful Development58 that no develop-

ment can be made at the cost of the important interests of the state, in particular its

core interests, he then goes on to say that the ideas of hiding ones talents and

biding ones time and seeking concrete achievements are in accord with peace-

ful development. This would seem to be an attempt to re-adjust Chinese foreign-strategy thinking by re-emphasizingboth at home and abroadthe peaceful

nature of China.

On the other hand, it is not entirely clear whether this attempt at re-adjustment

is serving as an effective brake on the aforementioned trend towards the China-

centric order course and the cases of friction that have arisen as a consequence.

This will depend on whether or not the players involved in Chinas foreign

relations share the view that the friction engendered by following the China-

centric order course is disadvantageous to Chinas national interests, and

whether or not decisions are then made in accordance with this view.The aforementioned transitions in Chinas foreign strategy, from one-nation

course to liberalization course to great-power course (comprising the China-

centric order course and the responsible-great-power course), in some ways call

to mind the path followed by Japan, particularly pre-war Japan. When shown

the above conceptual diagram by the author, an eminent international political

scientist from China wrote just course by responsible-great-power course

and military course by China-centric order course. The author continues to

hope that China will earnestly consider the risks inherent in the China-centric

order course and the significance of the responsible-great-power course.

Supplementary note

The author served as deputy director-general of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs

Bureau in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan when this article was

written. Although in writing this article he has drawn on his experiences during

the performance of his duties, the views and opinions expressed in the article

are the authors own and not those of the organization to which he belongs.



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This article is based on an article published in Japanese in the September 2011

electronic edition of International Affairs, the monthly journal published by the

Japan Institute of International Affairs.

Notes1 For a description of the various types of friction that China has been

encountering in its foreign policy since the end of 2009, see ThomasJ. Christensen, The Advantages of an Assertive China,Foreign Affairs,2011, March/April, and Yoshikazu Shimizu, The Domestic Politicsbehind Chinas Stubborn Attitude towards Other Countries, in RyoseiKokubun (ed.),China Now(Iwanami Shoten, 2011).

2 For example, see Ryoichi Hamamoto, Trends in ChinaTheTransformation of Hiding Ones Talents and Biding Ones Time That Lies

behind Chinas Unyielding Foreign Policy,East Asia, No. 522, December2010; Yoshikazu Shimizu op. cit.; and Akira Asano, Changes in theCourse of Chinas Foreign Policythe Process and the Decision-MakingMechanism, International Affairs, No. 602, June 2011.

3 Akira Asano, The Structure and Determination of Foreign Relations, inSatoshi Amako and Akira Asano (eds.),China and Taiwan(MinervaShobo, 2008); Linda Jacobson and Dean Knox,Chinas New ForeignPolicyWho is Determining It and How?(Iwanami Modern Library,2011).

4 Tatsumi Okabe,Chinas Foreign Strategy(University of Tokyo Press,

2002), p. 1.5 Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy andHow It Changed the World(Routledge, 2002).

6 Koji Murata,US Foreign PolicyAnguish and Aspiration(KodanshaModern Writers, 2005), pp. 3541.

7 Shin Kawashima, Chinas Foreign Policy and Japan in the Year 2010East Asia, No. 526 (April 2011).

8 Shin Kawashima and Kazuko Mouri, 150 Years of Foreign Policy, The Pathto a Global China(Iwanami Shoten, 2009), pp. 111137.

9 Chisako Masuo, Chinas Modernization and the Japanese ModelJapan-China Relations in the Deng Xiao-ping Era, Chou Koui, RumiAoyama, Chisako Masuo, and Emi Mifune,The Global Strategy in ChinasForeign Policy(Akashi Shoten, 2011).

10 For more details on Deng Xiao-pings foreign-policy directives, seeYoshifumi Nakai, A Rising China and the USARhetoric as a Vehicle forEconomic Development, Yoshifumi Nakai (ed.),The Foreign Relations ofa Rising China(Ochanomizu Shobo, 2009).

11 Ryosei Kokubun, Preface: Chinas Political Diplomacythe TiananmenSquare Incident and its Aftermath,International Politics, No. 145(August 2006).

12 Outside the economic sphere, during the 1990s China acceded to the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992, and signed the

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Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, the United NationsHuman Rights Covenant A in 1997, and the United Nations Human RightsCovenant B in 1998. On the other hand, given that China continued tomaintain an independent stance regarding issues of proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction and issues of human rights, in these two

areas China cannot really be adjudged to have changed course very muchin compliance with the values of the international community. JunichiAbe, Issues of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in US-ChinaRelations, Seiichiro Takagi (ed.),The Structure and Evolution of Post-Cold War US-China Relations(Japan Institute of International Affairs,2007), and Mao Asukata, Human Rights Issues in US-China Relations, inSeiichiro Takagi (ed.) op. cit.

13 Rumi Aoyama, Chinas Diplomacy with Neighboring Countries, ChouKoui, Rumi Aoyama, Chisako Masuo, and Emi Mifune,The Global

Strategy in Chinas Foreign Policy(Akashi Shoten, 2011).14

Seiichiro Takagi, Chinas International Awareness in the Post-Cold WarPeriodfrom the Theory of Peaceful Evolution to the Theory of the Endof the Transition Period, Seichiiro Takagi (ed.)Chinas Post-Cold WarForeign Policy and the Asia-Pacific Region(Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs, 2000), pp. 810.

15 This switch in policy was initiated by Anthony Lake, the presidentsnational security advisor. As part of the policy switch, President Clintonand President Jiang Zemin held their first summit conference at the APEC(Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) Economic Leaders Meeting, whichwas held in Seattle in November 1993. For a description of the

background to this summit conference, see James Mann,About Face: AHistory of Americas Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon toClinton (Kyodo News, 1999), pp. 412438.

16 Emi Mifune, Chinas Transition into a Rich and Mighty Great Power andUS-China Relations, Satoshi Amako and Emi Mifune (eds.),ChinasExpanding Foreign RelationsNeighboring Nations and the Pax Sinica(Keiso Shobo, 2011) pp. 239241.

17 Yoshikazu Shimizu, Why China Turned Anti-Japanese (BunshunShinsho, 2003), pp. 154178.

18 In an article titled, Act in Good Faith towards Neighboring Countries andBecome Partners with Them, in Qiushi Q4, (16 February 2003), ViceForeign Minister Wang Yi recalls how Chinas diplomacy withneighboring countries entered a new phase of full-scale development inthe mid-1990s.

19 A New View of Security, compiled in July 1996, has been identified asbeing behind this active development of diplomacy with neighboringcountries. For discussion of this, see Rumi Aoyama op. cit., Akio Takahara,Chinas New View of Security and Its Regional Strategy, Akio Igarashi,Hiroshi Sasaki, and Akio Takahara,New Developments in East Asian

Security(Akashi Shoten, 2005), and Seiichiro Takagi, Chinas New Viewof Security,National Institute for Defense Studies Bulletin(March

2003).



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20 For a discussion of partnership diplomacy, see Akira Asano op. cit. (2008).21 It is worth noting that Russia was the first nation with which China

formed a partnership. According to Yasuhiro Matsudas analysis, As faras China was concerned, Russia shared its multipolar world view, had acommon interest in containing the USA, and represented its potentially

closest and most solid partner. Yasuhiro Matsuda, Chinas MilitaryDiplomacy: a Combination of Military Security and Regional Strategy,Shin Kawashima (ed.),Chinas Foreign PolicySelf-Awareness andChallenges(Yamakawa Shuppansha, 2007), p. 97.

22 Zheng Bijians peaceful rise concept was presented in the form of aspeech at the Boao Forum for Asia (Zheng Bijian, Chinas Peaceful Risea New Path to a Peaceful Asian Future) (April 5, 2004) (,http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2003-11/24/content_1195240.htm.), andwas subsequently published as an article (Zheng Bijian, Chinas PeacefulRise to Great Power Status,Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005,

pp. 1824). See also Seiichiro Takagi, The Current Stage of ChinasPeaceful Rise Doctrine,International Affairs, No. 540 (March 2005).

23 The term rise in the context of the peaceful rise doctrine attractedsome criticism on the grounds that it instead carried overtones ofmenace. Thus, in 2004, the phrase peaceful development was adoptedin its place.

24 In a speech in August 2001, Jiang Zemin called for the establishment of afair and reasonable global political order, Harmonious Developmentwith Neighboring States and Amicable Neighborly Relations (August 6,2001), Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Volume 3, (Peoples Publishing

House, 2006), pp. 314317. Wang Yi op. cit. (2003) makes clear thatChina is aiming to democratize international relations while notdestroying or disavowing the current order. Although it is not entirelyclear exactly what these phrases mean or to what extent they encompassrevisionist assertions, it must be noted that they include nuances thattranscend the notion of the existing international order as beingimmutable.

25 Akira Asano op. cit. (2008), pp. 199 & 200.26 At the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the

expression Conclude Friendly Relations with Neighboring Countries andBecome Partners with Them was used for the first time in governmentreports. The previously cited 2003 article by Vice Foreign Minister WangYi makes the comment, The local area surrounding China represents thelynchpin vital to Chinas ability to protect its sovereignty and interests,and to demonstrate its international role.

27 Akira Ishii, China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, ShinKawashima (ed.), Chinas Foreign PolicySelf-Awareness and Challenges(Yamakawa Shuppansha, 2007).

28 Kazushi Shimizu, China and ASEAN, Shin Kawashima (ed.),ChinasForeign PolicySelf-Awareness and Challenges (Yamakawa Shuppansha,2007).

29 Hideya Kurata, The Korean Peninsula Six-Party Talks as Great-Power

Mitsuru Kitano
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Cooperation between the USA and China, Satoshi Amako and EmiMifune (eds.),Chinas Expanding Foreign RelationsNeighboringNations and the Pax Sinica(Keiso Shobo, 2011), pp. 239241.

30 Satoshi Amako, The Foreign Strategy of a Rising of China, SatoshiAmako and Emi Mifune (eds.),Chinas Expanding Foreign Relations

Neighboring Nations and the Pax Sinica(Keiso Shobo, 2011), p. 11.31 Akio Takahara, op. cit., pp. 211 & 212.32 Akio Takahara, op. cit., p. 206.33 Hideya Kurata, op. cit.34 Emi Mifune, op. cit., pp. 244248.35 Robert B. Zoellick, Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?

Remarks to National Commission on U.S.-China Relations, 21 September2005 ,http://ncuscr.org/articlesandsspeeches/Zoellick.htm..

36 It was C. Fred Bergsten, director of the Peterson Institute for InternationalEconomics, who sparked the G2 debate. For his arguments, see A

Partnership of Equals,Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, Issue 4, July/August2008, pp. 5769. For more on the behavior of the USA and China withregard to the notion of a G2, see Satoshi Amako op. cit., pp. 18 & 19 andEmi Mifune op. cit., pp. 272274.

37 For discussion of the implications of a strategic reciprocal relationship,see Yuji Miyamoto,How Japan Will Get Along with China in the Future(Nikkei Inc., 2011), pp. 136145.

38 Rumi Aoyama op. cit., p. 101.39 This phrase was used by President Hu Jintao in a meeting of the Central

Committee on Foreign Affairs in August 2006 (keynote address by Hu

Jintao to the Central Committee on Foreign Affairs in Beijing, 23 August2008 ,http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-08/23/content_4999294.htm.), and was re-iterated in political action reports at the17th National Congress of the Communist Party in 2007.

40 It is rumored that, in March 2010, China may well have given notice to theUSA that the South China Sea is also a core interest. On the other hand, inhis December 2010 article, Holding Fast to the Path of PeacefulDevelopment, Dai Bingguo, the state councilor responsible fordiplomacy, classifies core interests into three basic categories forsafeguarding: (1) the stability of Chinas national polity, system ofgovernment, and political affairsin other words, the leading role of theCommunist Party, the socialist system, and the path of socialism withChinese characteristics; (2) the unity of the state, territorial integrity, andthe safety of Chinese sovereignty; and (3) the sustainable development ofChina as an economic society (although he does preface this definition bystating that this is his own personal understanding of the expression). Inthis instance, the fact that the stability of Chinas national polity, systemof government, and political affairsin other words, the leading role ofthe Communist Party, the socialist system, and the path of socialism withChinese characteristics are cited as the first category is important in thatit indicated the perspective of the Communist Party leadership. The article

was published on 6 December 2010 on the website of the Chinese

http://ncuscr.org/articlesandsspeeches/Zoellick.htmhttp://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-08/23/content_4999294.htmhttp://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-08/23/content_4999294.htmhttp://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-08/23/content_4999294.htmhttp://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-08/23/content_4999294.htmhttp://ncuscr.org/articlesandsspeeches/Zoellick.htm


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About the author

Mitsuru Kitano is currently Assistant Vice-Minister in the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs of Japan. He served as Deputy Director-General of Asia and Pacific

Bureau of the Ministry, covering China, from April 2010 to August 2010. It was

during that period that this article was written. After joining the Ministry in 1980,he served in France, China, Switzerland (Geneva), Vietnam, and the U.S. He gradu-

ated from University of Tokyo in 1980, and earned a masters degree from Univer-

sity of Geneva (Graduate Institute of International Studies) in 1996. He was a

lecturer at Sofia University from 2001 to 2002. He is co-editor/author ofPublicDiplomacy: Diplomatic Strategy in the Age of Public Opinion (PHP Institute,

2007). This book was translated into Chinese in 2010. His earlier work also includes

The New China: Dynamism and Vulnerability published in The Pacific Review,

Routledge, 1994, Vol.7, No. 2.



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