2.6: Nuclear Weapons

Alex Montgomery

2.6: Nuclear Weapons• Definitions and concepts• Nuclear optimists• Nuclear pessimists• Cases• Discussion

Definitions• Coercion/Compellence: A threat to punish the enemy

or deny the enemy’s military objectives if the enemydoes not change its behavior

• Deterrence: A threat to punish the enemy if the enemychanges its behavior

• Defense: A threat to deny the enemy’s militaryobjectives if the enemy changes its behavior

Nuclear Buzzwords• Triad: Bombers, ICBMs, SLBMs• First-Strike: Ability to eliminate an enemy’s nuclear

forces w/o retaliation• Secure Second-Strike: Ability to inflict sufficient

damage on an enemy after absorbing a first strike• Preventive First-Strike: Striking an enemy’s forces

before they develop a secure second-strike capability.

Requirements for Nuclear Deterrence• Prevention of preventive

war during transitions• Development of survivable

second-strike forces• Avoidance of accidental

nuclear war

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1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

U.S.RUSSIAU.K.FRANCECHINAIsrael (Potential)India (Potential1)Pak (Potential)Nkorea (potential)

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1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

U.S.RUSSIAU.K.FRANCECHINAIsrael (Potential)India (Potential1)Pak (Potential)Nkorea (potential)

Nuclear Arsenals

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1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

U.K.FRANCECHINAIsrael (Potential)India (Potential1)Pak (Potential)Nkorea (potential)

Nuclear Optimists

Van Evera• When technology favors

defense, wars less frequent• Nuclear weapons favor

deterrence, not defense, butsame logic applies

Pape• Conventional

– Punishment: not effective– Risk: even less effective– Denial: sometimes effective– Takes time

• Nuclear– Punishment: not effective– Risk: can be successful– Denial: not useful– Requires superiority

Waltz• Preventive/preemptive

strikes difficult, rare• States have strong incentives

to make nukes safe & secure– Nuclear accidents are rare– Second-strike Nuclear

deterrence is cheap and easyto ensure

• Wars will be less frequentand more limited

Nuclear Pessimists

Sagan• Military organizations are

likely to lead to deterrencefailures, insecure secondstrikes, and deliberate oraccidental war, due to their:– common biases– inflexible routines– parochial interests

• Wars may be more likely:– Stability/Instability Paradox

• Wars may be worse:– Accidental escalation

Paul• States believe that other

states will not use nuclearweapons in marginalconflicts– Moral revulsion– Desire not to escalate– Historical precedent– Disproportionate response

Cases• Difficult to determine how affects start of wars• Deterrence is difficult to measure• Best case (Cold War) had other variables

– Bipolarity– No land border

• Even more difficult to measure how affects war– Not clear when nuclear threats worked

• Japan 1945, Korea 1952-3, Suez 1956, Cuban Missile Crisis 1962– Look instead at cases of non-nuclear power attacks

• Korea 1950-3, Suez 1956, Algeria 1954-62, Vietnam 1965-73,Yom Kippur 1973, Sino-Vietnamese 1979, Afghan 1979-1989,Falklands 1982, Lebanon 1983, Gulf War 1990

Requirements for Nuclear Deterrence• Prevention of preventive

war during transitions• Development of survivable

second-strike forces• Avoidance of accidental

nuclear war

India/Pakistan:Militaries start preventive wars

Pakistan: Kargil 1999India: Brasstacks 1986

India/Pakistan:Survivability undermined by SOPs

India/Pakistan: Accidents rather frequent

1973 Yom Kippur War• “To President Sadat and his

advisors, a limited attackconfined to the occupiedSinai would preclude the useof nuclear weapons byIsrael.” (707)

• Limited-aims strategy: CrossSuez, hold first line of Israelifortifications, dig in.

1982 Falklands War• “The Argentine calculations

prior to the war rested onthe premise that Britainwould not use nuclearweapons to protect a far-away island group with littledirect economic or strategicvalue.” (709)

• Limited-aims strategy:occupy islands, pursuenegotiations.

Discussion• Brian Head • John Panfil