2488870

The Attribution Process in Consumer Decision MakingAuthor(s): Richard W. Mizerski, Linda L. Golden, Jerome B. KernanSource: The Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 6, No. 2, Special Issue on Consumer DecisionMaking (Sep., 1979), pp. 123-140Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2488870Accessed: 18/04/2009 09:21

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The Attribution Process in Consumer

Decision Making

RICHARD W. MIZERSKI LINDA L. GOLDEN JEROME B. KERNAN*

Attribution, as a process, is related to consumer decision making by a descriptive model. Published papers that have applied attributional approaches to consumer scenarios are analyzed to highlight both existing problems and opportunities for enhanced understanding. An assessment of the potential for attribution theory in consumer research is offered.

* Why is the salesman telling me to buy this car?

* Why did I buy Brand B detergent?

* What causes my car to knock and miss sometimes, but not other times?

T hese are typical of the kinds of questions consumers ask about other people, about them-

selves, and about the objects around them. Moreover, the way in which consumers answer such questions is highly relevant to an understanding of their subsequent behavior.

As human beings search for order and meaning in their environment, they attempt to explain the causes of the events they observe. This quest to know and understand the world is the focus of attribution theory. As Kelley (1973, p. 107) defines it, "Attribution theory is a theory about how people make causal expla:3ations, about how they answer questions beginning with 'why?'." The theory attempts to describe the information people use in making causal inferences and how they use that information.

Attribution theory deals only with the processes by which attributions are derived from information input (Kelley 1973, p. 126). It encompasses the cognitive sequence from stimulus manipulation to the attribution, but strictly speaking, does not treat the consequences of the attribution. However, ""If one has managed to

alter an individual's attitude or self-attribution, it is not unreasonable to expect that this will induce consequent changes in other response systems" (Bem 1972, p. 45; also see Ajzen and Fishbein 1975). Kelley (1973) takes an even stronger stand by asserting that causal explanations play an important role in providing an impetus to action and in decisions among alternative courses of action (p. 127). Therefore, it is this extension (i.e., behavioral consequences) of attribution theory that makes the study of how people attribute causes germane to the analysis of consumer decision making.

MAJOR MODELS OF ATTRIBUTION THEORY

As evidenced by the following discussion, attribution theory is not a single theory, but an evolution of theories that form a set of major developments in the area of causal attribution. This section discusses these theories by presenting the major contributors and their paradigms. To facilitate comparisons along some important dimensions these models are summarized in the Table.

Attribution theory can be divided into three foci: person-perception (Heider, Jones and Davis, Kelley); self-perception (Bem, Kelley), and object-perception (Kelley). Since Heider is generally considered to be the "father of attribution theory," the discussion of the major theories begins with Heider and person- perception. I

*Richard W. Mizerski is Assistant Professor of Marketing and Jerome B. Kernan is Professor of Behavioral Analysis, both at the University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH 45221. Linda L. Golden is Associate Professor of Marketing Administration at the University of Texas, Austin, TX 78712.

'This is not necessarily to imply that Heider developed attribution theory independent of the work of others. However, Heider's work represents the earliest organized discussion of what is currently called attribution theory.

123 ? JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH * Vol. 6 * September 1979

124 THE JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH

TABLE

COMPARISON OF MAJOR PARADIGMS OF ATTRIBUTION THEORY

Contributors

Heider Jones and Davis Bem Kelley Dimension (1944, 1958) (1965) (1965, 1967, 1972) (1967, 1971, 1973)

Major contribution Originator of modern Made Heider's attribu- Extended attribution Extended attribution attribution theory tion theory amenable theory to self- theory to object and

to empirical test perception generalized perception

Data used for making Others' actions or Perceived effects of One's own behavior Actions or effects of attributions knowledge of others' others' actions actions (events)

actions Treatment of others' Implicit Implicit None Explicit-specifically

perceptions or attri- develops paradigm butions to reflect the pro-

cessing of information from others

Attributable causes of action Personal Intention, exertion Intention/knowledge, 'Tact" responses Intention

ability ability/possibility of action (i.e., "can")

Environmental Task difficulty Situation and role "Mand" responses Entities, modalities, persons

Basis for attribution Naive analysis of ac- Commonality and Perceived freedom Covariance; causal tion, using levels of desirability of effects of choice, salience schemata personal responsi- of initial attitudea bility

Output of attribution Judgment of extent Intention and under- Perception of personal Cause of an action or actor is personally lying disposition of or environmental effect responsible for the actor causality action

Major focus Person-perception Person-perception Self-perception Object and general perception

aOften operationalized through investigator inference.

Person-Perception

Heider's Naive Psychologist. Heavily affected by the Gestalt school of psychology, Heider's primary interest has been in the area of interpersonal relations, focusing specifically on how individuals understand and attempt to validate their perceptions of others, i.e., person-perception.

During an investigation with Simmel (1944), Heider noticed that a vast majority of their subjects interpreted the movements of simple inanimate geometric shapes as the actions of animated beings. Although this finding appears equivocal (Shaver 1975, p. 37), it prompted Heider to develop one of the major threads of attribution theory: the concept that individuals seem to operate as "naive psychologists" in understanding the behavior of others. He proposes that people do this by viewing others as the "prototypes of origins," i.e., that their actions best explain causality (Heider 1958).

Heider then focused on the rationalization process involved in distinguishing among degrees of personal responsibility for the action under consideration. Did the actor consciously try, as well as have the ability, to prompt this action (personal force), or was it something about the environment that prompted the action (environmental force)? Obviously, the more the

perceiver/observer felt that personal force was behind the action (a causal inference), the more s/he could infer from that action. Of special interest are Heider's "levels," or ways of determining personal responsibility, which bear close resemblance to many of the concepts later developed by Jones and Davis (1965) and Kelley (1967). Although Heider was a pioneer in de- veloping many of the basic concepts of attribution for person-perception, his work does not provide a ready framework for direct application to consumer analysis.

Jones and Davis' Correspondence of Inference. In continuing the work of Heider and attempting to make it more amenable to empirical tests, Jones and Davis (1965) focused on the effects of actions rather than the actions themselves. They proposed three basic criteria that individuals use personally, or when obtaining information about the actions from others, for making attributions.

1. Choice and effects-individuals are assumed to have a choice among actions (or inaction).

2. Commonality-only "noncommon effects" (those unique to specific actions) are useful for inferring personal, as opposed to environmental, causality.

3. Desirability-the more undesirable the action or the

ATTRIBUTION PROCESS 125

effects of the action, the more readily and more con- fidently causality can be inferred.

Consider the following example: Brian walks into a car dealership, possibly to purchase a new BX-70. The salesman spends 45 minutes discussing the purchase with Brian and,just as the sale is about to be completed, the salesman says that he is more interested in Brian's satisfaction than a sales commission. The salesman then details complaints received about the BX-70, and suggests that Brian could get a better value at a lower price with a BZ-59. Brian realizes that the salesman has invested considerable time, and will make significantly less commission on the sale of a BZ-59. In light of the salesman's actions (offering information about the BX-70), Brian (the observer) infers that the salesman (the actor) is a very honest, helpful and/or credible person (the potential correspondent inferences). This inference can be explained by the criteria of Jones and Davis.

The salesman chose to provide unfavorable information about the BX-70, and his choice appeared to be voluntary. The effects of this choice are shown in Figure A. Only the noncommon effects, those unique to each course of action, are used to infer the reasons (causes) that the actual choice was made, as the common effect (in this case, "may sell an automobile") could not have been decisive in the salesman's choice of action. Therefore, Brian would base his causal inferences on effects b, c, and d (noncommon effects). Some of these multiple effects are more desirable than others to the salesman and, thus, are less diagnostic of his intentions. In this example, spending more time on the sale and helping the consumer get a better deal (and

FIGURE A

CORRESPONDENT INFERENCE EXAMPLE

Salesman

(actor)

Says favorable Says unfavorable things about things about the BX-70 the BX-70

\S

a b a cd

(effects)*

*Effects:

a. May sell an automobile b. Makes a large commission c. Helps consumer d. Spends a long time on sale

at the cost of a larger commission) prompt Brian to infer that these effects (which are "undesirable" for salesmen) must reflect an underlying personal disposition of this salesman, or what Jones and Davis call "correspondence of inference."

High correspondence of inference tends to occur only with certain combinations of noncommon effects and assumed desirability for the actor. When the number of noncommon effects is high, the observer finds it extremely difficult to attribute behavior to a single personal disposition, because there are many competing explanations for the behavior. Even in this example Brian could not be certain which trait best explained the salesman's "stepping out of character." Was it his honesty, his altruism, or is he simply a credible source of information?

The concepts of noncommon and desirable effects are ultimately woven into what Jones and Davis call the "'action-attribute paradigm." This suggests the sequence of attribution and the influence of Heider' s concepts of actor knowledge and ability. Their model states that the actor must have knowledge of the effects that will be produced from his action, as well as the ability and intention to perform the action. Jones and Davis' focus is primarily person-perception, although person- perception may intervene in object-perception.

Self-Perception Daryl Bem's Radical Behavioralism. Just as

Heider proposed that people attempt to understand their environment by viewing others' actions to infer causation and disposition, Bem (1965; 1967; 1972) has argued that individuals also look to their own actions or verbal reports to judge inferences about themselves. For example, consumers judge others' attitudes about such issues as ecology in terms of those individuals' actions and the conditions in which they were observed. Similarly, consumers judge their own attitudes and beliefs about ecology by observing their own behavior and the conditions under which they feel it occurs. Bem believes that only slight differences exist between self- and person-perception in the type of information available, although others disagree (e.g., Fishbein and Ajzen 1975).

Bem's specific focus is on the process one uses to infer his/her "true" attitude from verbal reports or similar actions. His theoretical development employs a dis- tinct behavioralist flavor by employing Skinner's (1957) distinction between "tact" and "mand." This "radical behavioralist" position was developed as an alternative explanation for cognitive dissonance in early attitude- change studies. Bem's determination of whether a response had tact or mand properties involved a simple presence or absence test. The presence of a strong reward or threat would suggest mand properties, i.e., a strong inference of environmental causation. If no strong reinforcement was present, this would suggest


tact properties and lead the individual to infer an internal cause (e.g., his/her true attitude) for the behavior. Also implicit in the judgment of strong environmental reinforcement is that most people would react in the same way to that situation.

Bem's work in self-perception is readily adaptable to Kelley's covariance paradigm (Kelley 1967), and increases its usefulness to consumer reasearchers. Perhaps most influential in prompting increasing application is the recent work in low-involvement decision making (Calder 1977; Ray 1973) and compliance techniques (Reingen and Kernan 1977; 1979; Scott 1977; Swinyard and Ray 1977).

Object and Generalized Perception Kelley's attribution theory (1967; 1971; 1972; 1973) is

derived from the work of Heider, Jones and Davis, and Bem, although there is an interactive influence between Kelley and Bem. Kelley describes the attribution process within an analysis-of-variance framework and makes a distinction between the attributional process for two types of information: information from multiple observations over time and information from a single observation. In a multiple observation-over-time situation, the "covariation principle" of causal attribution is evoked. In the single inference situation, "configuration principles," or single inference rules, are evoked. Because of the widespread applicability of Kelley's contributions to consumer behavior, his principles are discussed in some detail.

Kelley's Covariance. Also developed within the person-perception literature, Kelly's information- processing approach has helped achieve a much broader application to all areas of social perception. His model, based on a perceptual analog of J. S. Mill's (1846) "method of difference," bears close resemblance to Heider's (1958) level of association-the effect (e.g., an action, product experience, product information) is attributed to the condition that is present when the effect is present, and absent when the effect is absent (Kelley 1967, p. 194).

This principle of covariance between effects and their potential causes is the major theme of Kelley's conceptual approach. Kelley delineates three dimensions of potential causal inference: (1) the stimulus object, which is placed on the entities dimension; (2) the observer(s) of the effects, placed along the person's dimension; and (3) the context, in terms of time and/or modality, in which an effect occurs. These dimensions appear to exhaust all the potential causes for an effect and offer a further partitioning of Heider's "environmental force" causation (Shaver 1975).

Kelley displays these dimensions in what is now referred to as the "Kelley Cube." The logic of this analysis is taken directly from the analysis-of-variance statistic and is illustrated in Figure B. The entities di-

FIGURE B

KELLEY'S MODELS OF COVARIANCE AND CONFIGURATION

Ga?,1ine] A

S

ES ( ,ZEL .F.)C. <~~~~~~S

Gasoline ~ ~ Coaiac Moe

Entitiesede iforato

A Gasoline A \ ; ,)

(limited informatilinen K

S S N K DISTINCTIVENESS

(En~titis) = e

K C=oegi nckn odks

*Affects the stability ot the attribution. NOTE: Adapted trom Settle, Faricy, and Warren (1971).

mension is placed along the vertical axis and refers to the person or object being observed-the target of the attribution, e.g., brands of gasoline. One horizontal dimension relates to the persons who interact with the entities. In the present example, the consumer is represented (self), along with other individuals who provide information about the product (other drivers: r s, 02,

03).2 The other horizontal dimension consists of the various times (twice for each type of driving condition) or modalities (ways to observe it, i.e., city and country driving) in which the entity can be observed. The interaction of these- dimensions leads to attributing causality to one or several of these factors.

There are four criteria the consumer/observer sup- posedly uses to ascertain whether the impression re- flects the inherent properties of the entity rather than some environmental influences.

1. Distititiveness the effect is attributed to the entity if it uniquely occurs when the entity is present and does not occur in its absence.

2. Consistency over t ime-eh tme the entity is present, the individual's reaction must be the same, or nearly so.

3. Consistency over modality the reaction must be

2Assurance reached by information from others is quite different from assurance reached through the consumer's direct experience, as the communicator's message is, in itself, an effect.


consistent even though the mode of interaction with the entity varies.

4. Consensus-actions or their effects are perceived the same way by all observers.

Kelley proposes that:

To the degree that a person's attributions fulfill these criteria, he feels confident that he has a true picture of his external world. He makes judgments quickly and with subjective confidence . . . When his attributions do not satisfy the criteria, he is uncertain in his views and hesi- tant in action (Kelley 1967, p. 197).

A consumer's product experience illustrates this concept. If Kathy observes that her car runs smoothly (the effect) on Brand A gasoline, but knocks and misses (also effects) with all other brands, she may think that smooth operation is uniquely associated with Brand A. If Kathy further finds that Brand A is associated with smooth operation every time she uses this brand, she should be more confident that her initial observations were valid. Similarly, she will also be more confident if she finds that this effect is present in both city and country driving. Finally, Kathy will have more confidence in her perceptions to the extent that other drivers recognize the same association between the brand and smooth engine performance.

In this example, Kathy observed that smooth engine operation was distinctive with Brand A gasoline, and consistently smooth during the four times she used it in both city and country driving. Her inference that the "'cause" for smooth engine operation must be something about Brand A is strengthened by the consensus information provided by other drivers.

Kelley's principle of covariance was later modified to evaluate situations of limited information processing, with his development of causal schemata (discussed in the next section). But Kelley's major contribution lies in his greater specificity of potential causes for action and his extension of the focus of attribution beyond the area's initial work with person-perception. As will be noted later, these factors make Kelley's model particularly applicable for a wide range of consumer investigations.

Summary This discussion has merely highlighted the work of

Heider, Jones and Davis, Bem, and Kelley, who are the pioneers in, but by no means the only contributors to, the development of attribution theory. Many facets of each of these models were not discussed, either because of space constraints or because they have less direct application in consumer analysis.3 For present

purposes, it is sufficient to note that the models differ in several important aspects (see Table).

ATTRIBUTIONS TO DECISIONS: A DESCRIPTIVE MODEL

As the preceding discussion revealed, the views of attribution theory are varied in both orientation and conceptual development. Also, little has been done to define how the process of attribution ultimately affects decision making. While it is clear that consumers can use causal inferences to establish the validity of their perceptions, how do different attributions ultimately influence actual purchase or other marketplace activity? This section integrates the various attribution models into a unified paradigm-a descriptive model that portrays the attribution process in a decisionmaking context.

Based on Kelley's Covariance Model For several reasons, Kelley's covariance concept

provides a promising framework for most consumer research. First, although person-perception can mediate object-perception, the majority of problems confronting consumers involve the evaluation of products, which requires the processing of information about goods and services, rather than about other persons. Second, Kelley's framework is capable of explaining the other models previously discussed (Kelley 1967; Shaver 1975; Harvey, Ickes, and Kidd 1976; 1978), yet the opposite is not true. Finally, most of the work in the consumer area has borrowed from, or is based on, the covariance model, which includes concepts of configuration or ""causal schemata."

The F-Statistic Analog. The covariance model is able to encompass the many diverse areas of attribution through Kelley's conceptualization of the way individuals use the attribution criteria of distinctiveness, consistency over time and modality, and consensus. In an extension of Heider's "pseudo-experimental" opera- tions, Kelley suggested that there be parallels between an index of attributional validity and statistical indices used in analyzing experimental data:

Naive F/information state = distinctiveness consistency over

time/modality, consensus.

The first criterion (distinctiveness) seems to correspond to the numerator or between-condition term in the usual F ratio, and the last three criteria (consistency over time, modality, and persons) correspond to the error or within-condition term.. . In conceiving the denominator of this ratio, we are assuming that both the person's own consistency evidence and the evidence from social consensus contribute to the stability of his own reaction. The attribution he makes on any given occasion depends on some sampling of the information available to him, both

3Several other authors have considered and compared these concepts in great depth, e.g. Kelley 1967; Shaver 1975; Harvey, Ickes, and Kidd 1976; and Ross 1977.


from his own present and recent experience, and from social sources. The more consistent this information is, the more stable his attribution will be. Insofar as this stability is high (or his variability in reaction is low), the "error term" in the ratio is small and, assuming he can make a more or less distinctive attribution to the entity, his information state is high. .. In brief, information level (Naive F) is high for a person who can make highly stable but differential attributions (Kelley 1967, p. 198).

This analogy is graphically represented in Figure B, which portrays the earlier example of determining which gasoline delivers the smoothest engine operation. Notice that Kathy attempted to gain a feel for the stability of the attribution by testing the gasoline several times in both city and country driving. The less distinctive the effects, the more a consumer would be expected to repeat the observation.4 Stability also is gained through processing information from other sources, but the effects and the resulting attribution process are somewhat different from those acquired through one's own observations.

Information Seeking and Persuasion. Given this concept of an index of information state or level of attribution stability (Naive F), consumers would be expected to seek product information from some specific source, if they believed that the information would increase their information state (or attribution stability) more than data from alternate sources. In fact, it seems plausible '. . . to assume that persons have conceptions of the level of information they may expect to achieve for various types of problems, tasks, or phenomena" (Kelley 1967, p. 199). For example, actual persuasion should result if the information source's message enables Kathy to achieve a higher level of distinctiveness, or increases the stability of her attribution by providing consistency and/or consensus information.

An information source could affect the stability of consumer's attribution through the consistency dimension by providing education or instruction. Some examples would be:

* provide new procedures for evaluating different modalities, e.g., suggest that driving up a steep hill will accentuate the potential for knocking or missing;

* provide new ways of interacting with the entity, e.g., suggest checking the spark plugs for carbon build-up;

* institute training in discrimination and judgment, e.g., show the consumer how to evaluate whether the spark plugs show carbon build-up;

* demonstrate the relevance of information that was previously ignored or weighted lightly, e.g., Shell Oil's automobile information booklets (Answer Book).

These techniques are likely to be effective because they increase attributional stability and may be used independent of the source who provided the instruction. Source credibility is not a critical factor in determining the consumer's acceptance of this education, although it might affect willingness to pay attention to the information source (Kelley 1967, p. 201).

This situation is quite different for the acceptance of consensus information when credibility is a very salient attribute (McArthur 1972). The question in this latter case is whether the consumer should accept the source's information when acceptance depends on how the message is attributed. Here the message is itself an effect, and the consumer's problem is whether to attribute it to the good or service being discussed (a i"' stimulus" attribution), orto some element of the environment (a "circumstance" attribution such as the salesman selling the item, or a "person" attribution possibly dealing with a perceived lack of expertise).

The elements of credibility are readily translated into the covariance model. Expertise involves the capability of attaining a high information level through one's own attributions by virtue of extensive interaction (time and/or modality) with the environment. Therefore, an expert's information is presumed to have high validity. The concept of trustworthiness implies the absence of irrelevant causal factors (e.g., personal motives, role demands) in the source's statements. It should be noted that the consumer's awareness of these factors is acquired through previous contacts (or information from others' contacts) with the source (see Kelley 1967; McArthur 1976; Wells and Harvey 1977; and Eagley, Wood, and Chaiken 1978 for extensive discussions of this process).

The covariance principle is most applicable for understanding how consumers learn to make attributions, particularly in extended information-processing/ attribution situations. However, it is generally too un- manageable for actual application in understanding a specific consumer response. Consumers rapidly learn to associate causes with events, and to generalize across similar attribution situations. These generalized causal expectancies and the attributional rules govern- ing the inference procedure are captured in the deriva- tives of the covariance model referred to as causal schemata or "configuration" concepts.

The Link Between Covariance and Configuration

The preceding description of the attribution process is undoubtedly idealized, as consumers often lack the necessary time and motivation to make multiple observations. In these situations, causal inferences are made on the basis of a single observation. The buyer rarely initiates this activity in complete ignorance. Similar effects have probably been observed in prior situations, and expectancies have developed of the potentially rel-

40ther factors, such as one's general product knowledge, also affect the need for stability. However, this area has had little study (Kelley and Thibaut 1969).


evant causes and how they may relate to the effect to be attributed. These types of attribution situations are conceptualized in terms of a "causal schema,' '-a con- ception of the way in which two or more causal factors interact to prompt an effect. A schema is developed from the individual's experience in observing cause and effect relationships, from experiments in which the consumer exercises deliberate control over causal factors, and from what s/he is taught about the causal structure of the world. As an individual matures, s/he builds a repertoire of schemata that enables him/her to make economical and fast attributional analyses by providing a framework within which bits of relevant information can be fitted (Kelley 1972, p. 2).

The difference between the covariance and configuration models is operationally and theoretically significant in determining which model applies in a specific attribution situation (Hansen and Scott 1976; Golden 1977). Unfortunately, a simple delineation by whether the situation affords single or multiple observation of events has led to various and conflicting interpre- tations. Although differences do encompass the number of observations, the critical factor is whether the consistency dimension (time and/or modality) is involved. This can be illustrated by referring back to Kelley's F-statistic analog.

Unless the consumer encounters unacceptable variances in distinctiveness or consensus (e.g., anything that does not lead to "highly stable but differ- entiated attributions") s/he can refer to past attribution experience over time and/or modalities. In a sense, the consistency dimension operates similar to repeated measures in an analysis of variance. As Kelley notes, ''. .. time's main significance lies in its permitting un- specified unstable causal factors to vary" (Kelley 1972, p. 161).

Figure B shows how the concept of causal schema relates to the full covariance paradigm. When the limited information situation (configuration model) is analyzed in terms of whether a particular brand of gasoline reduced engine noise, note that Kathy received information that did not detail the long-run stability or the differential effects of city versus country on engine operation. Nonetheless, she would tend to make a stimulus (or entity) attribution based on the high distinctiveness of the effects between gasolines and the strong consensus among other drivers. However, if either distinctiveness or consensus had substantially more variance, Kathy might be prompted to seek consistency data. The factors that would prompt a need for additional data have not been investigated in any detail, but elements such as product involvement (Merenski 1978), product type (Mizerski 1975; Mizerski and Weinberger 1977), the consumer's personality or cognitive style (Settle, Faricy, and Mizerski 1972; Mizerski 1978), and perceived risk would appear relevant.

Although causal schemata appear to capture a limited portion of the attribution process, they may prove to be

more applicable for understanding and predicting consumer behavior. If we know which configuration an individual will evoke, we will be able to predict the resultant causal attribution and the certainty with which it is made. This will require identification of the entire set of schemata commonly used and the conditions under which each schema is evoked (Kelley 1973).

The investigation of consumer causal schemata is a largely unexplored area, although two general types, multiple sufficient and compensatory schemata, appear to be evoked with such regularity that they have achieved the status of attribution principles. With the multiple sufficient schema or "discounting principle" (Kelley 1972; 1973), the attributor believes that any number of plausible causes could individually prompt an observed effect, with any specific cause discounted when the attributor believes other causes are also present. This can be illustrated by reviewing the automobile purchase example. The consumer (Brian) was attempting to infer the true motivation (causal attribution) for the salesman's unfavorable comments (the effect to be attributed) about the more expensive BX-70 automobile (the stimulus object). Notice Brian's perception of the plausible causes for a salesman providing favorable (Case I), as compared to unfavorable (Case II), information about the BX-70:

Observed Plausible Type of effect cause(s) attribution

Case I Says favor- Believes Stimulus able what he things says aboutthe Would lose Circumstance BX-70 his job if

he didn't Makes a Circumstance

higher commission on BX-70' s

Would say Person anything to sell a- BX-70

Case II Says un- Believes Stimulus favorable what he things says about the BX-70

These perceptions are derived from Brian's past experience with salesmen, information from other individuals, and other sources (e.g., Consumer Reports and home economics literature), using the covariance process. Brian has learned to believe that there are many plausible causes (nonstimulus attributions) other than the product's actual performance that could prompt the salesman to provide favorable product information. Therefore, Brian discounts the possibility of


FIGURE C

THE ATTRIBUTION PROCESS IN CONSUMER DECISION MAKING

High Involvement:

Self-Perception Feedback

STIMULI ATTRIBUTION BELIEF INTEGRATION OVERT (product experience, PROCESS FORMATION PROCESS -ATTITUDE BEHAVIOR -__ ommunications, etc.),

t ~OTHER VARIABLES Low Involvement: \ output of the (norms, other

attribution attitudes, etc.) { rocess

STIMiULI ATTRIBUTION BELIEF OVERT (product experience, PROCESS FORMATION BEHAVIOR ------- communications, etc.) .'

INTEGRATION ATTITUDE* PROCESS

Self-Perception Feedback

*May or may not occur under conditions of low involvement, NOTE: Adapted from Ray 1973; Mizerski 1975; and Calder 1977.

a stimulus cause-i.e., that the salesman was giving his honest opinion-and is unable to make a very strong or confident attribution for the salesman's comments.

Unfavorable information presents a substantially different plausible causal array. In Case II, Brian finds it difficult to think of any nonstimulus causes. Because this situation involves no discounting of the plausible stimulus cause, Brian would tend to infer that the BX- 70's poor performance prompted the unfavorable information. Either stimulus or nonstimulus causes can account for the effect, but the presence of both makes a strong and confident attribution difficult, if not impossi- ble.

Unlike the multiple sufficient schema, where a simple presence or absence of plausible causes determines the strongest attribution, a compensatory schema represents a learned causal configuration where two or more causes act in a compensatory manner. This type of schema is often referred to as the "augmentation principle" (Kelley 1971), or as the "principle of social desirability of effects" (Jones and Davis 1965). It operates in situations where the nonstimulus cause(s) may be inhibitory for the observed effect, i.e., where the presence of the nonstimulus cause(s), such as constraints, costs, sacrifices, or risks involved in taking an action,

serves to heighten the impression that a stimulus cause is present and is a potent force (Kelley 1973).5

Attribution, Cognition, and Decision Making When an attribution is made, whether by invoking a

discounting or augmentation schema or the more extensive covariance analysis-what is affected? And where does this fit into consumer decision making?

It appears that the attribution process has a cognitive output; specifically it seems to result in a person form- ing a belief. Kelley (1973, p. 107) notes that attribution is part of the process ". . . by which man 'knows' his world and has a sense that his beliefs and judgments are veridical." Consistent with many researchers, Fishbein (1965, p. 107) has stated that ". . . a belief about an object may be defined as the probability or improb- ability that a particular relationship exists between the object of belief and some other object, concept, or goal." In the example where Kathy was attempting to

51t should be noted that the schemata discussed are only two of a potentially infinite variety that can vary both in number of causal factors considered and in their method of interaction. (For extensive discussions of these possibilities, see Kelley 1972; 1973; Brickman, Ryan, and Wortman 1975.)


determine which brand of gasoline would deliver smooth engine operation, a stimulus (or entity) attribution was ultimately decided on, given the information available. It follows that this attribution to Brand A will manifest itself in a belief that a relationship exists between Brand A and those performance characteristics.

In Fishbein's terminology, the stimulus attribution suggests a high probability that the information (e.g., product attribute ratings) is related to the product. In general, the stronger the stimulus attribution, the stronger the belief formed. In situations where the consumer is unsure about the correct attribution, either because of the perceived lack of covariance between cause(s) and effect(s), or some idiosyncratic attribution style (Settle, Faricy, and Mizerski 1972; Mizerski 1978), the consumer will be unable to form a strong belief. In cases of person-perception or self-perception, the re- spective relevant beliefs deal with other persons (usually beliefs about personality traits or motives) or with one's own attitudes and motives (for discussions and tests of these assumptions see Mizerski 1975; Ajzen and Fishbein 1975; Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Mizerski 1978).

Figure C presents a general model of the way in which causal attributions may lead to consumer decisions. Consumers make attributions concerning incoming stimuli either through the full covariance approach or, if the situation is readily generalizable to past experiences, by calling on their repertoire of causal schemata. Beliefs are then formed as output of the attribution process. These beliefs have a different impact on the next stage depending on how involved the decision is to the consumer (Krugman 1965; 1977; Ray 1973). In the high involvement condition, the beliefs are integrated into the formation of affect or attitude. Low involvement conditions do not necessitate this step, and overt behavior, e.g., purchase, may occur before affect or attitude is formed. In either case, the consumer's resultant behavior is itself a source of stimuli that are subject to attribution through self-perception.

CONSUMER BEHAVIOR ATTRIBUTION LITERATURE

Since attribution theory was introduced into the consumer behavior literature in the early 1970's (Settle, Faricy, and Warren 1971), it has been loosely applied and sometimes misinterpreted. The Exhibit reviews 34 articles focusing specifically on attribution theory in consumer behavior. (Several studies that use self- perception to explain another theory or technique, such as foot-in-the-door, are discussed later.) The discussion of the matrix proceeds by descriptor category, which represents our attempt to summarize the state of investigations in attribution theory and to identify issues relevant to consumer behavior.

Attributional Focus One of the most critical aspects in consumer-oriented

attribution research is the choice of an attributional focus, i.e., object, person- or self-perception. Mis- specification will lead to an inappropriate theoretical paradigm. The determinant of the attributional focus should be the "object" of the attribution process, that is, the entity about which causal beliefs will be formed. In some consumer behavior situations, the "object" of the attribution process is obvious. For example, direct observation of a product's performance (leading to causal beliefs or attributions about why the product performed the way it did) is object-perception. Attribu- tions regarding why a particular person spoke favorably about a product would be person-perception (e.g., tes- timonials, endorsements, sales speeches). In both examples, the entity about which attributions are being made is relatively straightforward and would dictate the appropriate focus to be used.

Many consumer behavior situations are not as clear, however, particularly when the study investigates interactions between perceptual areas. There may be a series of causal belief processes, e.g., causal chains (Brickman, Ryan, and Wortman 1975), involving several attribution objects with more than one attributional focus. For example, the studies concerning how attributions about a source that provides product information affect perceptions (beliefs) about the product described may be approached in several ways. One would be to first apply principles of person-perception to assess beliefs concerning source credibility, and then to apply object-perception tojudge the effect of others' attributions on causal inferences and the ultimate beliefs formed about the product.

An alternative would be to utilize the object- perception paradigm from Kelley only, as Kelley's model specifically incorporates the way in which the opinions of others will affect object-perception. The latter approach was used by Settle and Golden (1974b) in their investigation of the effects of disclaiming on advertisement claim believability; however, Hansen and Scott (1976) prescribe the former two-stage approach. Unfortunately, the theory does not provide clear rules for selecting an attributional focus. To make matters more confusing, a combination of perceptual orientations may be best for some consumer situations.

Just as person-perception may influence object- perception, such as when investigating advertising and personal selling, the reverse might also be true. However, just because the perceptions of one entity influence the causal beliefs resulting from the attribution process for another entity, it does not necessarily follow that one is focusing on a two-stage causal chain. For example, several studies have focused on the way in which object-perception mediates person- perception, focusing on the dispositional or trait at-

132 THE JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH EXHIBIT

CONSUMER BEHAVIOR ATTRIBUTION LITERATURE

Z"~~~~~~~~~~~~5

Description ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ?,

T. Attributional focus ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 5 A. Ojectpercptio x xx x

- x x ixx.0I- .

- .. . 0 '. I , I

B. Person perception x x~~~~~~~~~5 I, - I . I&5 I x

D.Sl-escri ption 5,,55 x xI0

D. OtherII II. Theoretical source and paradigm or principleI II

A. Bern l I XX Xi X 1. Labeling I I I X

B. Heider XI xx xI I C. Jones and Davis XI xxxx

1. Correspondence x 2. Social desirability of effects x x x ix

D. Kelley xx xixixx xix Xx xx x x xxlx x x xlx x T. Configuration (schema) principles xL I

a. Discounting* x X x X xx x x xx b. Augmentation II xi

2. Covariance principle /x 3. Attribution validity

a. Distinctiveness xix b. ConsensusIx c. Consistency VIXI

III. Application of attribution theoryI A. Attribution framework formally developed xx xi x xi x xi xi xix x ix x x x x x xi x x x x xx xi B. Formal test of attribution process x XI xi x x x XI X- IXI x x _x X C. Test of theoretical implications only X X X X IxiIXI x X. X- X X- X X

IV. MeasurementIIII A. Attribution ?tated or measured V/ X I/ X xi xi x xi xi X xi X X x X XXX X

C. Internal causes stated or measured cv-AYXx y D. External causes stated or measured :N-X X X X-IIX xlx X_ E. Attributional confidence measured XX xX X X X X X X x

TT-At c-onfidenci-arrogat,e _____- x G. Actin folwing attribution measured J X XXIAA A H. Personality variable mneasuredII F

1. Locus of controlX X X 2. Inner-other directedness 3. OtherXX

I. Demographic variable measured 1 . Racial di fferencesX 2. Social class X 3. Sex X X X [X X 4. Other X X I X

V. Manipulations XIII I A. Information source X ix X x B.Information tyeor content aXx X x XX [X X [Xx X X X

1.Direct versus endorsedX 2.1 Positi~ve versus negative X i

C. Channel of communication D. Amount of informationX E . Choice condition (high or low) X F. Task outcome and effort X

VI. Product and brand scope A. Single _roduct, XX Xx X X X X B . Mul tip e __roducts XX X x ixi Xx X XI XX xiX C. Single brand xi x x I X IX XI Xxi IX D. Multiple brands XX XIi

V I1. Article type or desig n l A. Designed ex eriment xixXx x X x xXxx Xx TT-x X B. Survey X Xx XX X xi XX C. Review article, critical comment or rejoinderx

VIIILTopic classification A. Product dissatisfaction X xi xi Xx B. Symetry versus transitivity and verb strength XII C. Attributions from product cues I x X 1-X D. Personality factors and attribution infoi-eation deperndence XI E . Racial factors influencing attributions X F. Promotion--advertising and/or personal selling G. Physical attractiveness l x H. Information assurance/confidence ix I. Children--attribut,ion of advertising intent X J. Test of covariance PrincipleIIJ K. Information used in attributionsxx


tributions made about a consumer (actor), based on information about the brand purchased. Settle and Gibby (1972) investigated person-perception as influenced by the brand of automobile purchased, while Jolibert and Peterson (1976) investigated person-perception as influenced by the accessories purchased with the automobile.

Although perception of the brand or choice of accessories influenced the resultant person-perception in both studies, the appropriate attributional focus was person-perception and not object-perception preceding person-perception. The perceptions that had been formed about the product were inputs into person- perception, but the process by which the products' causal beliefs were formed was not an attributional focus in the studies. In these situations, only person- perception is appropriate because object- and person- perception attribution processes are not interacting, even though perceptions of the object may influence perceptions of the person.

If one is interested in the process by which traits are attributed to products (object-perception), alternate approaches also exist. Principles in person- perception have been formulated concerning the information expectancies individuals develop through their continued interactions with others. The Jones and Davis concept of "social desirability of effects" suggests that unfavorable information about others tends to be less expected than favorable information, and thus unfavorable information prompts stronger stimulus attributions, i.e., the individual discussed or observed actually has the attributed traits. Some studies (Mizerski 1975; Smith and Hunt 1978a,b) have used the concept of "'social desirability of effects" to explain causal inferences for object perception (usually products). However, simply extending principles of person-perception to the product area may not be appropriate if the same generalized information expectancies do not operate for products. In other words, is unfavorable information as unexpected when individuals discuss products as when they discuss people?

While object-perception, followed by person- perception, has received the most attention, investigations into self-perception, where attribution theory is the primary conceptual framework, are relatively recent and few. Two studies reflect the research in self- perception. Yalch (1975) investigated the behavioral and attitudinal influence of experimentally induced self-attribution, while Swinyard and Ray (1977) focused on the impact of labeling on the effectiveness of personal selling. Self-perception research is more prolific when these principles are used to explain another primary conceptual framework, as will be discussed later.

Although person-perception has been used to investigate attributions from product cues to other persons, self-perception has not been used to investigate the attributions made to the self from product purchase cues. The study of self-perception, with its potential

interactions with other attributional foci, suggests the same caveats as that for person- and object- perception.

Theoretical Source and Paradigm or Principle According to Kelley (1973), a certain set of condi-

tions evokes a particular paradigm of the attribution process. However, as with the choice of an attributional focus, the theory does not always provide a clear delineation of the appropriate paradigm or principle. This difficulty is most prevalent with Kelley's models of the attribution process, as he has developed the two related and often confused attribution principles of covariance and configuration.

The problem initially surfaced with Settle and Gol- den's study (1974a) of the potentially favorable effects of disclaiming (i.e., admitting a less than superior rat- ing) in advertising. They based their predictions-that disclaiming would increase the consumer's confidence in the claims for which superiority was asserted-on Kelley's covariance principle, noting that an effect (e.g., a product claim) is more likely to be attributed to the actual characteristics of the product if the claim covaries with product characteristics rather than with advertisers.

Hansen and Scott (1976) criticized their interpreta- tions and experimental manipulation of covariance, and stated that the design should evoke single inference rules (principles of configuration) rather than the covariation principle (based on multiple observations over time). In a rejoinder, Golden (1977) asserted that individuals attempt to validate their perceptions with available information that may entail reference to experiences previous to and outside of the experimental setting. This extended frame of reference would suggest predictions by the covariance principle, and further questions which paradigm is most appropriate. How- ever, it should be noted that simply presenting the re- spondent with multiple observations over time does not mean that the covariance principle was investigated (e.g., Kakkar 1974). The same caveat applies to several single observation studies (Settle 1972a; Settle and Gibby 1972; Peterson 1973).

Application of Attribution Theory The statement "attribution theory formally de-

veloped" in the matrix implies that the study was con- ceived within an attribution theory framework, and that this framework was formally presented in the article. Approximately 40 percent of the empirical investigations described in the matrix provide a formal test of attribution principles. Due to the breadth of the topics studied, however, it is difficult to point to a consensus among these studies, except for the relevance of attribution theory for consumer behavior investigations. Most research tested only the theoretical implications of attribution theory for consumer behavior and, there-


fore, the validity of the attribution explanation was not substantiated.

One of the difficulties with assignments in this category is that sometimes the author(s) will couch the discussion as though attribution theory concepts were being tested when this may not actually be the case. This is most obvious in articles assigned to the category "tests of theoretical implications only," but it may also be true of articles that purport to formally test attribution theory. For example, in the article by Mowen and Brown (1978), concepts developed by Heider are discussed, but this discussion is irrelevant to the hypotheses developed in the study. In fact, this article uses an attribution theory of performance and not the naive psychology of action as developed by Heider. Studies that purport to have applied attribution theory, also frequently have not done so, e.g., Settle and Carr 1972; Settle and Golden 1974b; Valle and Koeske 1977.

Many studies describe investigations of perceptions of an object or a person, but not the process of causal attribution with which attribution theory is concerned. This is particularly characteristic of the product dissatisfaction applications of attribution theory. When a perceived cause of dissatisfaction is isolated, these causes are labeled attributions and the investigation is labeled an attribution theory investigation. Causal beliefs are the output of the attribution process (see the Exhibit), simply to identify causes is not to investigate attribution theory; rather it is to identify causes (which may be representative of the output of the process or, depending on the methodology used, may be the evoked causal set from a pre-attribution cognitive stage).

Measurement Although a wide variety of attribution measures have

been used, they can be placed into four broad cate- gories:

1. measures of confidence, either in terms of the attribution(s) made or in the cognitive output (e.g., beliefs, affect, intention) proposed to be a result of the attribution process;

2. measures of "internal" attributions, i.e., attributions to the actor if used in person-perception, or " 'stimulus" attributions if applied in object- perception;

3. measures of "external" attributions, i.e., causal attributions to environmental or nonstimulus factors; and

4. measures of both internal and external causal attributions, elicited either with scales for each or by eliciting the total causal array.

Confidence was the first dimension measured largely because Jones and Davis (1965) had argued, without empirical justification, that extremity of attribution/ correspondent inference and confidence in the attribu-

tion were equivalent and inseparable measures. How- ever, serious challenges to this view have been raised by Newtson (1973) and Mizerski (1975), both of whom failed to find an isomorphic relationship between the two dimensions. If the two factors can operate inde- pendently in some situations, the validity of this technique appears doubtful.

Studies that attempt to "prove" an attribution explanation by measuring the subject's confidence that a product has certain attributes (Settle 1972a; Settle and Carr 1972) are simply evoking another method of measuring belief strength, a cognitive stage beyond the attribution process6 and potentially affected by past experiences and information obtained outside of experimental manipulation (Mizerski 1975; Golden 1977). However, there may be a relationship between attributional confidence and actions resulting from attributions, such that the higher the confidence, the more likely that actions will follow from attributions. This question has not been investigated previously.

Studies that measure only the internal or external causal attribution may lose substantial information, depending on the paradigm chosen. The Jones and Davis model proposes a limited internal versus external attribution (Shaver 1975), and therefore measures of either would appear sufficient. Applications of Kelley' s model, however, require thinking in terms of the number of causes the observer/consumer employs (Kel- ley 1973), as the overall causal array evoked may affect the way in which the consumer reacts to information in the marketplace (Mizerski 1978).

The attribution process does not have to be conscious, and information may be lost when it is brought to the conscious level. Further, each time an individual makes a causal attribution, s/he may not go through an elaborate attribution process. As in habitual purchasing behavior, attributions may be "learned" and a previously made attribution may be generalized from a similar situation to a "new" situation, saving the consumer time and energy. Attempts to make the process conscious may, in some cases, superimpose a nonexistent structure. Therefore, it becomes extremely important to develop measures with this problem in mind.

The measurement of actions following attributions, or at least behavioral intention, is germane to the application of attribution theory to consumer decision making. Most product dissatisfaction studies (Landon and Emery 1975; Settle and Golden 1974b; Valle and Koeske 1977; Valle and Wallendorf 1977) measure actions following attributions of product failure. All three studies of self-perception (Yalch 1975; Dholakia and Sternthal 1977; Swinyard and Ray 1977) assess actions or intentions following attribution, and three person- perception studies measure actions or intentions (Robertson and Rossiter 1974; Baker and Churchill

6Affect and intention are even further away and more readily affected by situational factors.


1977; Mowen and Brown 1978). With the exception of the product dissatisfaction literature, studies into object-perception usually do not investigate actions following attributions.

A number of variables specific to the individual have been shown to influence the attribution process (Settle 1973). The individual difference variables investigated are personality variables, such as locus of control, and demographic variables, including composite variables such as social class. While these variables have not been extensively investigated, they appear to have a strong influence on the attribution process.

Manipulations As attribution theory is concerned with the way in

which people process information, it is only reasonable that most researchers (with the exception of Calder and Burnkrant 1977) manipulate the choice condition in order to investigate the implications of this variable on attributions and interpersonal influence. Overwhelm- ingly, studies have tended to manipulate the content of the experimental exposure to determine the effect on attributions or the attribution process.

Attribution Object Attribution investigations have, more often than not,

involved multiple products, brands, or objects. How- ever, the intent of most studies has not been to compare differences across product situations, but rather to provide some type of repeated exposure to stimuli. Involvement with the product, the risk inherent in the purchase situation, and other potential variables might create differences in attributions for different product situations. Investigations that include several products would help to identify any differences in the behavioral effects of attributions across products and product types.

Article Type or Design The vast majority of attribution theory studies are

experiments, while survey research tends to be most prevalent in the product dissatisfaction area. Because attribution theory has been conceptualized within an analysis-of-variance experimental design (the Kelley Cube), and Kelley has been the source of much of the attribution theory development in consumer behavior, an experiment is almost a necessity to investigate the formal conceptual framework and the relevance of attribution theory to consumer decision making. On the other hand, survey research has focused on identifying the output of the attribution process (i.e., the causal beliefs), rather than making predictions from the theory about the output of the process and testing these predictions.

Topic Classification As evidenced by the matrix, applications of attribu-

tion theory to consumer behavior span a wide range of topics. Product dissatisfaction has received the most attention, though this area represents a loose application of the theory. As further evidenced by the matrix, attribution theory has not been directly related to consumer decision making. This is because the theory fo- cuses on the process by which one interprets his/her environment, not what is done behaviorally with the attributions. To extend the theory to behavioral aspects of decision making is to go beyond the theory as currently formulated in social psychology.

It has been argued (Hansen and Scott 1976; Scott 1978) that attribution theory should be more rigorously applied to consumer behavior; it should be applied as it has been formulated in social psychology. On the other hand, Calder and Bumkrant (1977) further assert that the current form of attribution theory is not rich enough to explain consumer behavior, and that there is a need for reanalyzing its assumptions. They allude to several things. First, there is a need to broaden the paradigms that have focused on consumer behavior. As indicated in the matrix, the covariance and the discounting principles have been the most frequently applied paradigms. Second, consideration of the assumptions observers make about prior choices implies the need to investigate causal chains as a perspective on the process of causal attribution. Also, there is a need for some adaptation of the attribution theories to the unique context of consumer behavior.

However, prior to extending or expanding attribution theory, consumer behaviorists need to correctly inter- pret the existing concepts. Attribution theory, because of its naive appeal, is vulnerable to being treated as a post hoc explanation for the results of research, although it may not have been considered in the original design of the experiment or study. Also, there is a tendency to use the attribution theory jargon without investigating attribution theory.

Me or Thee? Related Research in Self-Perception

While many self-perception studies have not been couched as "attribution theory investigations" per se and, hence, are not presented in the matrix (Exhibit), attribution theory has nonetheless provided a basis for the prediction and explanation of other findings. One of the most recent studies of this nature involves the impact of deals and deal retraction on brand switching (Dodson, Tybout, and Sternthal 1978).

A series of studies has focused on self-perception explanations for compliance situations, specifically the foot-in-the-door technique as a method of inducing compliance with a request (Reingen 1977a,b; Reingen and Kernan 1977; 1979; Scott 1976; 1977; Sternthal,


Scott, and Dholakia 1976; Tybout 1978). These studies and the underlying theoretical framework illustrate the direct relevance of attribution theory for topics currently in the consumer behavior literature.

The foot-in-the-door technique had its inception in social psychology when Freedman and Fraser (1966) demonstrated that obtaining compliance with a small request substantially increases the likelihood that a person will then comply with a larger request. The explanation for the effectiveness of the foot-in-the-door technique is in the self-perception theory-when a person complies with the first request, s/he begins to think of him/herself as the kind of person who "does this sort of thing." This self-attribution (following from self- observation) then leads to compliance with the larger request. Social psychological researchers have repli- cated the Freedman and Fraser study, and supported the effectiveness of the foot-in-the-door technique for inducing behavioral compliance (Cann, Sherman, and Elkes 1975; Pliner, Hart, Kohl, and Saari 1974; Selig- man, Bush, and Kirsch 1976).

The foot-in-the-door technique and the self- perception explanation have been investigated in several contexts in the consumer behavior literature. Reingen and Kernan (1977) found that foot-in-the-door was at least as effective in inducing compliance with a telephone interview as a monetary incentive, and as effective as prior telephone contact in inducing compliance with a mail questionnaire (Reingen and Kernan 1979). Scott (1977) demonstrated the usefulness of the technique for modifying socially conscious behavior. Specifically, gaining compliance with a small initial request under conditions of no incentive tended to en- hance the likelihood of positive behavior intentions for subsequent moderate and large requests; however, actual behavior tended to be affected only when the subsequent request was relatively moderate.

Tybout (1978) investigated the relative effectiveness of foot-in-the-door, door-in-the-face (the opposite of foot-in-the-door, whereby refusal of a large request should lead to compliance with a smaller request), and persuasion (personal selling and mass media) on en- rollment in a new social service. The results indicated no significant differences in effectiveness of the strategies. The foot-in-the-door technique was most effective when compliance had high salience and the communicator had low credibility. Studies by Reingen (1977a,b) further support the effectiveness of the foot-in-the-door technique, as well as the door-in-the- face technique, within the context of donations to the heart fund.

Two studies have investigated the foot-in-the-door technique in a commercial setting with subscriptions to a new newspaper. Sternthal, Scott, and Dholakia (1976) suggest that the foot-in-the-door strategy is a viable personal influence technique provided that the "appropriate" level of incentive (small) is used to motivate trial. Scott (1976) found that foot-in-the-door employing

large incentives was no more effective than cold- calling, or no initial request, in generating subsequent compliance with a purchase request. Due to the application of the technique, however, it is not clear that Sternthal, Scott, and Dholakia (1976) and Scott (1976) provided a valid test of the foot-in-the-door strategy for inducing compliance.

In the consumer behavior investigations, the efficacy of the foot-in-the-door technique appears to be influenced by conditions surrounding its use. Specifically, the size of the first request, the size of the second request, the communication channel, the timing of the second request with respect to the first request, and characteristics of the communicator may influence the effectiveness of this technique. Whereas, one explanation for the potential effectiveness of the foot-in-the- door technique lies in self-perception theory and self- observation of behavior as a cue for beliefs, attribution theory provides further insights into the situations that are likely to make the technique a more viable behavioral influence strategy.

For the foot-in-the-door technique to be explained by attribution theory, the initial compliance must result in a self-attribution about the cause of the compliance. If the behavior is believed to be caused by some plausible external factor, then internal factors can be discounted and no self-attributions will be formed (the discounting principle, Kelley 1973). This implies that the initial request cannot be so large that the person attributes initial compliance to the request rather than to characteristics of the self.

One study investigating the impact of the size of the first request conceptualized the self-perception prediction differently from the one advanced by the discounting principle. Seligman, Bush, and Kirsch (1976) investigated what they refer to as a self-perception prediction. They say that according to self-perception theory, the larger the size of the first request, the greater is the likelihood of compliance with the second request. Ac- cording to this interpretation, the strength of the self- attributions of commitment should increase with the size or cost of the initial compliant act. This hypothesis was supported by the research. The Seligman, Bush, and Kirsch prediction and the discounting principle prediction are not in conflict; rather, they suggest the necessity of having a first request strong enough to induce conformity, yet mild enough to evoke an internal attribution. Indeed, the studies by Scott (1976) and by Stemthal, Scott, and Dholakia (1976) suggest that the initial incentive offered may require an "optimum" level.

As with the size of the initial request, attribution theory, through the discounting principle, makes specific predictions regarding characteristics of the communicator. If an individual complies with a request from a high-credibility communicator, then a plausible external cause is present and internal causes (self- attributions to beliefs) for compliance may be dis-


counted. Sternthal, Scott, and Dholakia (1976) and Tybout (1978) generally support this attribution theory prediction for the effectiveness of the foot-in-the-door strategy under conditions involving a low-credibility communicator, although the salience of the compliance may influence the effects of source credibility on foot- in-the-door (Tybout 1978).

In general, investigators have inferred self- attributions on the basis of acceptance or non- acceptance of self-perception predictions. Sternthal, Scott, and Dholakia (1976), Scott (1976; 1977), Reingen and Kernan (1977; 1979), Reingen (1977a,b), and Tybout (1978) all report at least equivocal support for self-perception hypotheses regarding the effectiveness of foot-in-the-door. Scott (1977) explicitly measured self-attributions, but these measures offered no conclu- sive evidence of the self-perception process. The value of self-perception theory for predicting the effectiveness of the foot-in-the-door technique is apparent, but similar to other uses of attribution theory in consumer behavior research, the actual process and existence of the self-attribution phenomenon awaits validation.

CONCLUDING REMARKS Although this paper has focused on the role of attribu-

tion theory in understanding the information processing aspects of consumer decision making, it should not be assumed that attribution theory has no other relevance to consumer research. Indeed, there are many other applications that, although less direct, are nevertheless significant. For example, attribution theory offers an alternative explanation to cognitive dissonance (Bem 1967; Kelley 1967) and an explicit formulation for as- sessing self-fulfilling prophecy and social-stereotype phenomena (Heider 1944; Jones and Davis 1965; Snyder, Tanke, and Berscheid 1977). It offers insight into group-influenced decision making (Burnstein and Vinokaur 1975; Myers and Lamm 1976) and forms the basis for equity theory (Berkowitz and Walster 1976) and the foundation of much consumer satisfaction/ dissatisfaction research (Huppertz, Arenson, and Evans 1978).

Perhaps the most integral concept underlying attribution theory is learning. Individuals clearly learn to make attributions (Piaget 1948; Kelley 1973; Bettman 1979) as a way to validate their perceptions. The manner in which this validation takes place and the resultant cognitive output suggest that attribution theory may offer a vehicle to reconcile the often opposing views of behavioralists and cognitivists (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Rest 1976).

Yet, attribution theory is mute in some areas of consumer analysis where one might expect it to have a great deal to say. For example, it does not explain why consumers integrate information according to one cognitive algebra and not another (Anderson 1974). We must

content ourselves with the knowledge that an integration process occurs, without understanding why. Clearly, attribution theory is no panacea for the student of consumer behavior (Scott 1978).

Finally, attribution theory is not a single theory, but several related theories that provide a common approach to a large class of questions related to the cognitive processes. The associated absence of unified hypotheses and propositions might appear to be a weakness of attribution theory. However, this characteristic lends flexibility to the application of the theory, and the lack of specificity acts as a stimulus to expand research into the area. The breadth of the theory, coupled with the inevitable attempts to define and refine it, allow this approach to be applicable to a wide range of consumer situations. Thus, attribution theory may be classed as an "epitheory" (Jolibert 1975).7 In this regard, Jolibert has made an astute observation: attribution theory as an epitheory is best cited in two areas that are well known for their lack of unity, the behavioral sciences and consumer behavior.

[Received January 1979. Revised June 1979.]

7As defined by Bartels (1970), an epitheory is "a theory which integrates incongruent theories and is intended to resolve their differences.

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