Judicial Review

(Statutory Construction)

EVERY STATUTE IS PRESUMED VALID. An act of the legislature, approved by the President, is

presumed to be within the constitutional limitations. For the responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature and executive as well.

- The function of the legislature is to legislate law. - presumption of right and legality

To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution (not merely doubtful and argumentative implication)

In case of doubt: resolved in favor of the constitutionality of law.

JUDICIAL POWER

Vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Includes the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Tañada v. Angara

The court ruled, “where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.’

The court en banc unanimously stressed that in taking jurisdiction over petitions questioning an act of the political departments of government, it will not review the wisdom, merits or propriety of such action, and will strike it down only on either of two grounds:

(1) unconstitutionality or illegality and

(2) grave abuse of discretion.

The courts of justice determine the limits of the power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

Tanada vs. Cuenco,

It held that although under the constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress.

ANGARA vs. Electoral Commission

(cited in the case of Francisco vs. HRep)

judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.32

Principles of Constitutional Construction:

1. VERBA LEGIS, (PLAIN MEANING RULE/LITERAL INTERPRETATION) that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared: We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We

do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

When the language of the law is clear, it should be given its natural meaning.

2. ratio legis est anima (the reason of the law is the soul of the law), where there is ambiguity.

The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

3. ut magis valeat quam pereat (Such a construction is to be made that the thing may have effect rather than it should fail.).

The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:

x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that not one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)

Essential requisites for JUDICIAL REVIEW:

1. Existence of an APPROPRIATE CASE: Actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power

2. LOCUS STANDI ( LEGAL STANDING): An interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question.

The person challenging the act must have ‘standing’ to challenge it.

3. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity (RIPENESS)

4. The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case: (JUSTICIABILITY: necessity of deciding constitutionality)

APPROPRIATE CASE (actual case or controversy)

- must be a bona fide case: justiciable controversy, the resolution of which the court will have to choose between the Constitution and the challenged statute (or susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law).

Refers to matter which is appropriate for court review.

Necessity in the determination of real, actual, earnest and vital controversy between the litigants.

An actual case or controversy is one that involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; 

the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.  

Stated otherwise, it is not the mere existence of a conflict or controversy that will authorize the exercise by the courts of its power of review; more importantly, the issue involved must be susceptible of judicial determination

POLITICAL vs. JUSTICIABLE QUESTION"political question", as this Court has previously defined, refers to those questions which, under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government.

It is concerned with the issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. 

Connotes a question of policy

“justiciable question” Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested

act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political.

test: Whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies? If YES= JUSTICIABLE (courts are duty-bound to examine whther the branch or instrumentality of the government acted within such limits. (FRANCISCO vs. HREP)

What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. ( Sanidad vs. COMELEC)

POLITICAL vs. JUDICIABLE QUESTIONthe judiciary does not pass upon questions of

wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.68

Actual Case or Controversy: “ripeness” – a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal

claims susceptible of judicial determination. CASES •An actual case or controversy means an existing case or

controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory. It cannot be disputed that there is yet no actual case or

controversy involving all or any of the private respondents on one hand, and all or any of the petitioners on the other, with respect to rights or obligations under R.A. No. 8050. (Board of Optometry vs. Colet,GR 122241, July 30, 1996)

We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law.  Specifically, BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, even as the accused in a criminal action has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is charge with violating and of the proceedings taken against him, particularly as they contravene the Bill of Rights.  Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers.  As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of the legislative or the executive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation of a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its discussion.

It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally approved.  To doubt is to sustain.  The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act be struck down.

•premised on a contingent event: no actual case or controversy:

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements (requisites of judicial review). The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections;

that he would be re-elected in said elections; and

that he would seek re-election for the same post in the 1998 elections.

Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of  Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction

(Mariano vs.COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211).

In actions involving constitutional issues, the firmly settled rule is that a constitutional question will not be heard and resolved by the courts unless the following requirements of judicial inquiry are met:

(1)the existence of an actual case or controversy;

(2)the party raising the constitutional issue must have a personal and substantial interest in the resolution thereof;

(3)the controversy must be raised at the earliest reasonable opportunity; and

(4)that the resolution of the constitutional issue must, be indispensable for the final determination of the controversy. 

Appraising the present proceeding in terms of the foregoing requirements, the Solicitor General urges that the petition at bar does not present a justiciable for having been filed prematurely:

". . . petitioners, who claim to be performing artists, had not previously applied with the Secretary of Labor for exemption from the coverage of the Circular in line with the afore quoted provision. Said provision connotes that the prohibition is not at all permanent or absolute. It admits of exception . . . But to repeat, there is no allegation in the petition that petitioners had previously sought exemption from the Secretary of Labor, from the coverage of the Circular, before filing the instant petition.  Obviously, the petition must fail for prematurity.”

(Fernandez vs. Torres, 215SCRA 489)

.

An actual case or controversy

 means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. The power does not extend to hypothetical questions since any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.

An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requisite of ripeness.

the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff.

a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. (LAMP vs. Secretary of Budget and Mgt.)

In this case (LAMP vs. Exec. Sec), the petitioner contested the implementation of an

alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. According to LAMP, the practice of direct allocation and release of funds to the Members of Congress and the authority given to them to propose and select projects is the core of the laws flawed execution resulting in a serious constitutional transgression involving the expenditure of public funds. Undeniably, as taxpayers, LAMP would somehow be adversely affected by this. A finding of unconstitutionality would necessarily be tantamount to a misapplication of public funds which, in turn, cause injury or hardship to taxpayers. This affords ripeness to the present controversy.

The possibility of constitutional violations in the implementation of PDAF surely involves the interplay of legal rights susceptible of judicial resolution. For LAMP, this is the right to recover public funds possibly misapplied by no less than the Members of Congress. Hence, without prejudice to other recourse against erring public officials, allegations of illegal expenditure of public funds reflect a concrete injury that may have been committed by other branches of government before the court intervenes. The possibility that this injury was indeed committed cannot be discounted. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court.

“Legal standing” or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial

interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance.

The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges “such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing. (La Bugal B'laa, Tribal Assn. vs. DENRSecretary, GR 127882, Jan. 27, 2004)

LAMP vs. Sec. Anent locus standi, the rule is that the person who

impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.[18]  

In public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public, asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action.

The plaintiff may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person, and could be suing as a stranger, or as a citizen or taxpayer.[20] 

LAMP vs. Sec.  Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue

* where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or

* that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or

* that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.[21] 

Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.[22]

Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.

In allowing the direct allocation and release of PDAF funds to the Members of Congress based on their own list of proposed projects, did the implementation of the PDAF provision under the GAA of 2004 violate the Constitution or the laws?

NO.

In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. In Farias v. The Executive Secretary,[26] the Court held that:

Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. Every presumption should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality and the burden of proof is on the party alleging that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.

LOCUS STANDI/ LEGAL STANDINGPersonal and substantial interest in the case such that the

party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. (Francisco vs. Hrep)

INTEREST: material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree

Test: Whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional question. (Lozano vs. Nograles)

LOCUS STANDI/ LEGAL STANDING I. PRIVATE SUITS = REAL PARTIES-IN-INTEREST

-the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

EVERY ACTION MUST BE PROSECUTED OR DEFENDED IN THE NAME OF THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST.

II. PUBLIC SUITSplaintiff asserts a “public right” in assailing an alleged illegal official

action, does so as a representative of the general public.

he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection.

he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer”.

“Legal standing” or locus standi Right of appearance in a court of justice on a given

question.

Proper Party Constitutional question must be raised by the proper party –

one who has sustained or in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of.

i)Conventional standing (citizen) Ii) Representative standing

A. taxpayer’s suit D. Voters B. Legislators E. Concerned

Citizens C. Transcendental Importance to the public

LOCUS STANDI/ LEGAL STANDING

CITIZEN: (plaintiff is a mere instrument of the public concern)A. suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of

the allegedly illegal conduct of governmentB. injury is fairly traceable to the challenged actionC. injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action

LOCUS STANDI/ LEGAL STANDING

TAXPAYER: plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds or the tax measure is unconstitutional.

PUBLIC FUNDS have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the constitution.

A taxpayer’s suit is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.

a. Must show that he has sustained, or is in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a result of its enforcement. (concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is the indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast in in form traditionally capable of judicial resolution)

b. He must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the enforcement of the law has caused him or will cause him direct injury.

LAMP vs. Sec.  Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue

* where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or

* that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or

* that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.[21] 

Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.[22]

Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.

LOCUS STANDI/ LEGAL STANDING

GENERAL RULE: (TAXPAYER’S SUIT)

taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract

may therefore question the validity of laws requiring expenditure of public moneys.

failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:

x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protection against abuses of legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)

A taxpayer has not standing in one case involving a penal statute which does not even provide for any appropriation from Congress for its implementation. (Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council)

Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.

(cont. SHEN vs. Anti-Terrorism Council)

KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR,

petitioners in G.R. No. 178890, allege that they have been subjected to close security surveillance by state security forces, their members followed by suspicious persons and vehicles with dark windshields, and their offices monitored by men with military build. They likewise claim that they have been branded as enemies of the [S]tate.[14]

Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out that petitioners have yet to show any connection between the purported surveillance and the implementation of RA 9372.

BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD and Agham,

petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National Peoples Army (NPA). The tagging, according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the procedure under the law.

The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged tagging of petitioners.

No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial notice. Petitioners apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed against them, three years after its effectivity, belies any claim of imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-called tagging.

there is yet to be filed before the courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA 9372. Again, RA 9372 has been in effect for three years now. From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have conducted their activities fully and freely without any threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or proscription under RA 9372.

Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary[12] summarized the rule on locus standi, (as cited in Southern Hemisphere case) thus:

Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.

For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that

(1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government,

(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and

(3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

VOTERSThere must be a showing of obvious interest in

the validity of the election law in question.

LEGISLATORS

There must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.

BIRAOGO VS. Philippine Truth Commission

Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an assertion of a clear right that may justify his clamor for the Court to exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over presidential issuances in defense of the Constitution. 

LEGISLATORS

eg. Southern Hemisphere case

Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have been the subject of political surveillance, also lacks locus standi. Prescinding from the veracity, let alone legal basis, of the claim of political surveillance, the Court finds that she has not shown even the slightest threat of being charged under RA 9372. Similarly lacking in locus standi are former Senator Wigberto Tañada and Senator Sergio Osmea III, who cite their being respectively a human rights advocate and an oppositor to the passage of RA 9372. Outside these gratuitous statements, no concrete injury to them has been pinpointed.

As members of IBP Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their

claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution. The IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of RA 9372 directing it to render assistance to those arrested or detained under the law.

The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of

law does not, however, suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its members with standing.[27] The IBP failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute revolts against its constitutional rights and duties. Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not pointed to even a single arrest or detention effected under RA 9372.

Standing of members of Congress

•In Philippine Constitution Association v. Hon. Salvador Enriquez, G.R.No. 113105, August 19, 1994, the members of Congress

have the legal standing to question the validity of acts of  the Executive which injures them in their person or the institution of Congress to which they belong. An act of the Executive which injures the institution of

Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury which can be questioned by a member of Congress (Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F.Supp.353 [1976].

Standing of members of Congress

In the absence of a claim that the contract in question violated the rights of petitioners or impermissibly intruded into the domain of the Legislature, petitioners have no legal standing to institute the instant action in their capacity as members of Congress. However, petitioners can bring the action in their capacity as taxpayers under the doctrine laid down in Kilosbayan, Inc. v.Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994).

Under said ruling (KILOSBAYAN), taxpayers may question contracts entered into by the national government or government-owned or controlled corporations alleged to be in contravention of the law. As long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present action (Bagatsing vs. Committee on Privatization, GR 112399, July 14, 1995). 

Standing of Integrated Bar of the Philippines The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of s

tanding in this case. "Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a

personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term “interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.

The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi.  The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved.

xxxxThus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later

(IBP vs Zamora, GR 141284, Aug. 15, 2000)

TRANSCENDENTAL SIGNIFICANCE TO THE PEOPLEissues raised are of paramount importance to the public.

OPOSA vs. Factoran G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

: intergenerational responsibility (filed in behalf of the succeeding generations of Filipinos

TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE: determinants

1. the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case

2. the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government

3. the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. ( Philippine Bar Association, GR NO. 160403)

CLASS SUITS: must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit

=it must be binding on all members of the class whether or not they were before the court.

Transcendental importance OPOSA VS. FACTORAN

44 children, through their parents, sought to make the DENR Secretary stop issuing licenses to cut timber, invoking their right to a healthful environment. They brought the case in the name of all the children in the Philippines and in the name of the generations yet unborn!

FACTS: 

The petitioners, all minors, sought the help of the Supreme Court to order the respondent, then Secretary of DENR, to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs. They alleged that the massive commercial logging in the country is causing vast abuses on rain-forest.They further asserted that the rights of their generation and the rights of the generations yet unborn to a balanced and healthful ecology. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners have a locus standi.

OPOSA VS. FACTORAN

HELD:  The SC decided in the affirmative.

Locus standi means the right of the litigant to act or to be heard.

Under Section 16, Article II of the 1987 constitution, it states that: The state shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Petitioners, minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generation yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.

xxxx

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.

the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. This landmark case has been ruled as a class suit because the subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest, not just for several but for ALL CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES.

(lifted from Oposa case on political question) the political question doctrine is no longer, the

insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the (I)duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,

and (2) to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

 

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.

 

C. Transcendental Importance to the public

petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that these various litigants have. Petitioners assert an interest as taxpayers, but they do not meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v.Comelec, 95 SCRA 392, 403 (1980), to wit: While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is“ being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power ", or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC , or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per se, is no assurance of judicial review. As held by this Court in Tanvs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking through our present Chief Justice, this Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained. Petitioners' suit does not fall under any of these categories of taxpayers' suits (Kilosbayan vs.Morato (Recon), GR 118910, Nov. 16, 

LOCUS STANDI/ LEGAL STANDING

Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty. Soliman Santos Jr. in G.R. No. 178552 also conveniently state that the issues they raise are of transcendental importance, which must be settled early and are of far-reaching implications, without mention of any specific provision of RA 9372 under which they have been charged, or may be charged.

Mere invocation of human rights advocacy has nowhere been held sufficient to clothe litigants with locus standi. Petitioners must show an actual, or immediate danger of sustaining, direct injury as a result of the laws enforcement. To rule otherwise would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public. (Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network vs. Anti-Terrorism Council et. Al)

LOCUS STANDI

 

The case of David v. Arroyo[24] explained the deep-seated rules on locus standi. Thus:

Locus standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”

In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

“every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Accordingly, the “real-party-in interest”-> is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a “stranger,” or in the category of a “citizen,” or ‘taxpayer.” In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection.

he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.

LOCUS STANDI

 cont. David v. Arroyo

Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both “citizen” and “taxpayer” standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer’s suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen’s suit.

Taxpayer: plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds,

With respect to taxpayer’s suits, Terr v. Jordan held that “the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied.”

Citizen: plaintiff is but the mere instrument of the public concern.

As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: “In matter of mere public right, however…the people are the real parties…It is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offense be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied.”

LOCUS STANDI

 

However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent “direct injury” test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public.

This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” (VERA DOCTRINE)

The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers’ Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix. [Emphases included. Citations omitted]

c. Question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity.

General Rule

: must be raised in the pleadings.

Exceptions

:a. criminal cases – at any time at the discretion of the court

b. civil cases – at any stage of the proceedings if necessary for the determination of the case itself;

c. every case (except where there is estoppel– at any stage if it involves the jurisdiction of the court.

(ESTOPPEL: principle which precludes "a person from denying, or asserting anything to the contrary of, that which has, in contemplation of law, been established as the truth, either by the acts of judicial or legislative officers, or by his own deed, acts, or representations, either express or implied")  

RIPENESS AND PREMATURITY ( it must be raised at the earliest opportunity)

Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. that people should await the implementing evil to befall on them before they can question

acts that are illegal or unconstitutional.

In the unanimous en banc case Tañada v. Angara,[33]

this Court held that when an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this Court. By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. Said the Court:

"In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. 'The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.‘ (Pimentel vs. Aguirre,

RIPENESS AND PREMATURITY

Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy:[37]

"x x x Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.

The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where the statute violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act unconstitutional and void."

d. Constitutional question must the very"lis mota" of the case

–Determination of constitutionality of the statute must be necessary to a final determination of the case (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56). Therefore, the following must be avoided: Political questions; Advisory opinions; Moot and academic issues; No standing.

LIS MOTA (crux of controversy) means that the Court will not pass upon a question of unconstitutionality, although properly

presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the application of the statute or the general law. The petitioner must be able to show that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the constitutional question raised is determined.[30] This requirement is based on the rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality; [31] to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. (Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 157584, April 2, 2009)

It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:

x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of judicial review as summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:

1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case

2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case

3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground

4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute

5. that the parties are not in estoppel

6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.

Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.

x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but also political consequences. Those political consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows." 138

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public officers], under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs. ( P vs. Veneracion)

FRANCISCO vs. House of Representatives

FACTS:

on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide and 7 Associate Justices for culpable violation of the constitution, betrayal of public trust or other high crimes

. Endorsed by Rep. Suplico, Zamora and Dilangalen.

August 5, 2003, the complaint was referred to the House Committee on Justice

October 13, 2003 : Committee ruled that it was sufficient in form but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.

(Four months and three weeks after the filing of the first complaint)

on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.13

FRANCISCO vs. House of Representatives

ISSUE: W/N THE FILING OF THE 2ND IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT FALLS WITHIN THE 1 YR. BAR PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONSTITUTION.

Constitution provides that:

Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

x x x

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)

FRANCISCO vs. House of Representatives

RULE V of the House Impeachment Rules provides that:

Section 16. – Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initiated. – In cases where a Member of the House files a verified complaint of impeachment or a citizen files a verified complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the House through a resolution of endorsement against an impeachable officer, impeachment proceedings against such official are deemed initiated on the day the Committee on Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or resolution against such official, as the case may be, is sufficient in substance, or on the date the House votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the said Committee that the verified complaint and/or resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient in substance.

In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the case may be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the Members of the House, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of the filing of such verified complaint or resolution of impeachment with the Secretary General.

Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment Proceedings. – Within a period of one (1) year from the date impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as such, can be initiated against the same official. (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

FRANCISCO vs. House of Representatives

RULING:

considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."

FRANCISCO vs. House of Representatives

RULING:

the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

Judicial Review – the power of the courts to test the validity of executive

and legislative acts in light of their conformity with the Constitution.

CASES • This case establishes the Supreme Court's power of judi

cial review. That means that the Court has the right to review acts of Congress and, by extension, actions of the President. If the Court finds that the law is unconstitutional, it can overrule the law. Marshall argued that the Constitution is the “supreme law” of the land and that the Supreme Court has the final say over the meaning of the Constitution. He wrote, “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is (Marbury vs.Madison, 5 US 137, 2 L.Ed. 60).”

Judicial Review

 In this country the judicial supremacy is established, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, not only in justiceable but political questions as well. (Defensor-Santiago vs. Guingona, GR 134577, Nov. 18,1998)

JUDICIAL SUPREMACY VS. CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY 

Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy

Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as the weakest of the three departments of the government, the Judiciary is nonetheless vested with the power to annul the acts of either the Legislative or the Executive department or both when not conformable to the fundamental law

(Asso. Of Small Landowners of the Philippines vs. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).

When the judiciary allocates constitutional boundaries, it neither asserts superiority, non-nullifies an act of the legislative, it only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them

(Laurel, Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139).

JUDICIAL SUPREMACY VS. CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY

Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy

If a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution, that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative, or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purpose is null and void and without any force or effect.

CASES

• That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority. The power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts in light of their conformity with the Constitution. This is not an assertion of superiority by the courts over the other departments, but merely an expression of the supremacy of the Constitution

(Angara vs. Electroral Commission, 63 Phil.139)

Political Question -

has two (2) aspects:

1. Those questions which, under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or

2.In regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislature or executive branches of government (Tanada v. Cuenco,100 Phil 1101).

 

Justiciable Question –

a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal interest which may be resolved by a court of law through the application of a law

(Cataran v. DENR, GR No. 134958, January 3, 2001)

PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY 

o

Laws are presumed constitutional. To nullify a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The theory is that, as the joint act of the legislative and executive authorities, a law is supposed to have been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was finally enacted.

CASES

•The time-honored doctrine is that all laws (PD No. 771 included) are presumed valid and constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled by this Court.

Not only this; Article XVIII Section 3 of the Constitution states:

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked. 

There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised legislative powers

(Lim vs Pacquing, GR 115044, Jan. 27, 1995)

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION:

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[61] Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.  It must be grave abuse of discretion as :

when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and

must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[62] 

Failure on the part of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will result in the dismissal of the petition.[63] (TAÑADA VS. ANGARA)

Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld."

Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court(as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.”

The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters raised in the petition is clearly set out in the 1987 Constitution which emphasized the judicial department’s duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government including Congress.

As the Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it inappropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government.  (Tanada, et. al.vs. Angara, et. al., GR 118295, May 2, 1997)

d. Constitutional question must the very"lis mota" of the case

–Determination of constitutionality of the statute must be necessary to a final determination of the case (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56). Therefore, the following must be avoided: Political questions; Advisory opinions; Moot and academic issues; No standing.

Mootness

•A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. 

Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness.  The Court holds that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts?

  These are the vital issues that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that “an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative.”

 The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if

IS QUESTIONING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PDAF Moot and Academic (as to the reforms undertaken by the respondents?

NO.

A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.

the Court observes that respondents‘ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not

terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution

since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF

Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective

and existing. Neither will the President‘s declaration that he had already

―abolished the PDAF render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because

the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to

nullify or annul its legal existence.

Mootness

• The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:

first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;

second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;

third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and

fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review

(David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR 171396, May 03, 2006)

Mootness

• IS QUESTIONING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PDAF Moot and Academic (as to the reforms undertaken by the respondents? NO.

A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.

the Court observes that respondents‘ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not

terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution

since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF

Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective

and existing. Neither will the President‘s declaration that he had already

―abolished the PDAF render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because

the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to

nullify or annul its legal existence. (Belciga vs. Hon. Exec. Secretary Paquito Ochoa et. Al., GR 208566, 208493 & 209251, November 19, 2013)

DOCTRINE OF PURPOSEFUL HESITATION

This is about the Symbolic function of the court. It means that the court would not decide on matters which are considered political questions. This focus on the necessity of resolving Judicial Review. Furthermore, in questions of constitutionality, Supreme Court will not rule right away because the Supreme Court assumes that the Law passed the two departments already, thus, it went through process of determining its constitutionality

 G.R. No. 122241 July 30, 1996, BOARD OF OPTOMETRY v. HON. ANGEL B. COLET  the Supreme Court decided Concluded that:  It is also emphasized that every court, including this Supreme Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally approved.

The presumption of constitutionality can be surpassed by the clear showing that there was an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act be struck down.

DOCTRINE OF PURPOSEFUL HESITATION

 G.R. No. 122241 July 30, 1996, BOARD OF OPTOMETRY v. HON. ANGEL B. COLET  

R.A. No. 8050,[1] entitled “An Act Regulating the Practice of Optometry Education, Integrating Optometrists, and for Other Purposes,” otherwise known as the Revised Optometry Law of 1995, was a consolidation of House Bill (HB) No. 14100[2] and Senate Bill (SB) No. 1998,[3] which were respectively approved by both Houses and, thereafter, reconciled by the Bicameral Conference Committee.[4] The Reconciled Bill[5] was then separately ratified by both the Senate and the House of Representatives[6] and approved into law by the President on 7 June 1995.

RTC RULING: 25 August 1995, the trial court issued the challenged order,[12] the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court grants the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for until further orders of the Court, respondents and their officials, agents and employees, are restrained, enjoined, and prohibited from undertaking in any form or manner, the enforcement or implementation of the Revised Optometry Law [R.A. 8050] or any regulation or Code of Ethics issued thereunder.

Let the writ issue upon filing with this Court a bond in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND [P100,000.00] PESOS in favor of respondents, conditioned upon payment of damages sustained by respondents in case the writ is later adjudged to have been improvidently or improperly issued.

DOCTRINE OF PURPOSEFUL HESITATION

 G.R. No. 122241 July 30, 1996, BOARD OF OPTOMETRY v. HON. ANGEL B. COLET  

On 1 September 1995, respondent Judge Colet issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction,[14] the dispositive portion of which reads:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned that, until further orders, you, the said defendants, and all your attorneys, representatives, agents, and any other person assisting you refrain from enforcing and/or implementing R.A. No. 8050 or its Code of Ethics.

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS MAINTAIN THAT THEY HAVE locus standi “under the rule of Public Right” pursuant to Tanada vs. Tuver and “as taxpayers and citizens, under the concept of Public Right, to bar the enforcement of the law because it endangers the public’s health,” a danger “clearly seen from the oppositions to the law filed before both houses” of Congress and therefore considered as a class suit.

ISSUE: W/N the private respondents have the locus standi to question the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8050.

W/N the JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND/OR ACTED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DECREEING THAT PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY/INVALIDITY OF R.A. 8050 EXISTS WHICH WARRANT THE ENJOINMENT OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION

DOCTRINE OF PURPOSEFUL HESITATION

 G.R. No. 122241 July 30, 1996, BOARD OF OPTOMETRY v. HON. ANGEL B. COLET  

RULING:

The petitioners maintain that for a party to have locus standi to question the validity of a statute, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement.[15] 

private respondents do not have the requisite personal and substantial interest to assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8050 for, per the certifications of the SEC, private respondents COA(Cenevis Optometrist Association) and ACMO(Association of Christian-Muslin Optometrist) are not registered associations; and two of the alleged presidents of the respondent associations are not duly registered optometrists as certified to by the PRC.  Finally, the petitioners aver, the private respondents did not allege in their petition in Civil Case No. 95-74770, and in their Rejoinder to the Opposition therein, their capacity to bring suit as required by Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.

Rule 8 Sec. 4. Capacity.

Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party, must be averred. A party desiring to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, shall do so by specific denial, which shall include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge.

DOCTRINE OF PURPOSEFUL HESITATION

 G.R. No. 122241 July 30, 1996, BOARD OF OPTOMETRY v. HON. ANGEL B. COLET  

RULING:

1. There is serious doubt as to the existence of private respondents OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP.  For one, the body of the petition in Civil Case No. 95-74770 makes no mention of these associations nor states their addresses.  Further, nowhere is it claimed therein that they are juridical entities.

2. not even in the sworn statements[19] of the alleged presidents representing the “associations,” which were offered in evidence in support of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, were such “associations” mentioned or named.  Finally, in their Comment on the instant petition, the private respondents chose to remain silent on the issue of the juridical personality of their “associations.

For having failed to show that they are juridical entities, private respondents OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP must then be deemed to be devoid of legal personality to bring an action, such as Civil Case No. 95-74770.

they cannot, for obvious reasons, be deemed real parties in interest.

DOCTRINE OF PURPOSEFUL HESITATION

 G.R. No. 122241 July 30, 1996, BOARD OF OPTOMETRY v. HON. ANGEL B. COLET  

RULING:

NOT CONSIDERED AS A CLASS SUIT.

As a class suit, Civil Case No. 95-74770 must fail.  Not only did the private respondents fail to allege this in their petition, they likewise failed to allege the existence and prove the requisites of a class suit, viz., the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons, and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court

 An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory.[29] It cannot be disputed that there is yet no actual case or controversy involving all or any of the private respondents on one hand, and all or any of the petitioners on the other, with respect to rights or obligations under R.A. No. 8050.  This is plain because Civil Case No. 95-74770 is for declaratory relief.  Then, too, as adverted to earlier, the private respondents have not sufficiently established theirlocus standi to question the validity of R.A. No. 8050.

Presumption of Constitutionality:

Courts accord the presumption of constitutionality of legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.

Supremacy of Judicial Review

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.

Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented.

BASIC GUIDELINES IN THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS

Legislative intent (the vital part, the essence of the law)The object of all interpretation and construction of

statutes is to ascertain the meaning and intention of the legislature, to the end that the same may be enforced.

The meaning and intention must be sought first of all in the language of the statute. For it must be presumed that the means employed by the legislature to express its will are adequate to the purposes and do expresses that will correctly.

Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.

RAMIREZ VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GR No. 93833, September 25, 1995Legislative intent is determined principally from the

language of the statute. Where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would either be impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice.

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described:xxx

Section 1 of RA 4200 clearly and unequivocably makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication, to secretly record such communication by means of tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of qualifier “any”.

Even a persons privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter will qualify as a violator under this provision.

The provisions seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

II. The nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute. What RA 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein.

The mere allegations that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of RA 4200.

Private communications include private conversation. In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting which is broad enough to include to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of “meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1998, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter’s office.

FIRST AND FUNDAMENTAL DUTY OF THE COURT IS TO APPLY THE LAW. Pp vs. Mario Mapa

Pp vs. Patricio Amigo

COURT MAY NOT CONSTRUE A STATUTE THAT IS CLEAR AND FREE FROM DOUBT.

WHERE THE LAW SPEAK IN CLEAR AND CATEGORICAL LANGUAGE, THERE IS NO ROOM FOR INTERPRETATION. THERE IS ONLY ROOM FOR APPLICATION.

VERBA LEGIS derived from the maxim INDES ANIMI SERMO EST (speech is the index of intention) Rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute

correctly expresses its intention or will and preclude the court from construing it differently.

PLAIN MEANING RULE/VERBA LEGIS:

If the language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning, that meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning which the legislature intended to convey.

The statute must be interpreted literally.

Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Communications vs. NLRC, GR No. 82511, March 3, 1992

The wording of the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: “An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement… and to his full backwages.”

If the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly expresses its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it differently.

The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute.

VERBA LEGIS NON EST RECEDENDUM, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure. Neither does the court admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the court, there may be a ground or grounds for non-application of the above-cited provision, this should be by way of exception, such as when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations between the employer and the employee.

Basbacio vs. Office of the Secretary, GR NO. 109445, November 7, 1994

When the languare of the law is clear, it should be given its natural meaning.

 Under R.A. 7309, the following may ask for compensation with the DOJ Board of Claims: victims of violent crimes; a person unjustly detained and released without being charged; any victim of arbitrary or illegal detention; any person who was unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but subsequently acquitted and released.

The fact that his conviction is reversed and the accused is acquitted is not itself proof that the previous conviction was “unjust”. An accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons and his conviction by the trial court may, for any of these reasons be set aside.

Section 3 (a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of which the accused is unjustly imprisoned but in addition, to an unjust accusation.

/The accused must have been “unjustly accused, in consequence of which he is unjustly convicted and then imprisoned. It is important to note this because if from its inception the prosecution of the accused has been wrongful, his conviction by the court is , in all probability, also wrongful.

If the prosecution is not malicious, any conviction even though based on less than the required quantum of proof in criminal cases may be erroneous but not necessarily unjust.

STATUTE AS A WHOLE: A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that

legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not merely of a particular provision. For, taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might

easily convey a meaning which is different from the one actually intended. A general provision may actually have a limited application if read together with other provisions. Hence, a consideration of the law itself in its entirety and the proceedings of both Houses of Congress is in order. (PLDT, Inc. vs. City of Davao, GR NO. 143867, August 22, 2001)

A provision or section, which is unclear by itself, may be clarified by reading and construing it in relation to the whole statute.

STATUTE AS A WHOLE:

JMM Promotions and Management, Inc. vs. NLRC, GR NO. 109835, November 22, 1993

In interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every party be given effect.

Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. (Every part thereof should be given effect/ construction of the statute as a whole)

In addition to the monetary obligations of the overseas recruiter prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and escrow agreement under Section 17 f the same Rule, it is necessary to post the appeal bond required under Section 6 Rule V Book VIII of the POEA Rules, as a condition for perfecting an appeal form a decision of the POEA.

STATUTE AS A WHOLE:

In construing a statute, courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of the statute, if at all possible.

Ut res magis valeat quam pereat, that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute-its every word.

Court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof, operative and effective and harmonious with each other.

SPIRIT AND PURPOSE OF THE LAW

When the interpretation of a statute according to the exact and literal import of its words would lead to absurd or mischievous consequences, or would thwart or contravene the manifest purpose of the legislature in its enactment, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding or modifying, so far as may be necessary, the strict letter of the law.

The courts have the power to declare that a case which falls within the letter of a statute is governed by the statute, because it is not within the spirit and reason of the law and the plain intention of the legislature.

SALENILLAS vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS Between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the

purpose of the law should prevail. ISSUE: w/n pet. Have the right to repurch. ase the contested property

under Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act (if yes, w/5 their right of repurchase had already prescribed.

RULING: Sec. 119 of Public Land Act provides that “every conveyance of land

acquired under free patent or homestead provisions, when proper shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period of 5 years from the date of the conveyance.

It is explicit that 3 classes of persons are bestowed the right of repurchase : the applicant-patentees, his widow, or other legal heirs.

Ellen Salenillas is a legal heir of Encisos, thus, she may validly repurchase.

Sec. 119 makes no distinction as to who are the “legal heirs”.

UBE LEX NON DISTINGUIT NEC NOS DISTINGUERE DEBEMOS, where the law does not distinguish, the court should distinguish.

The purpose of Sec. 119 of the PLA is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the state gratuitously had given him as a reward for his labor in clearing and cultivating it.

In allowing Elena and her husband to repurchase the property would be more in keeping with the spirit of the law.

Between two statutory interpretations, that which serves the purpose of the law should prevail.

The 5 year period for the petitioners to repurchase their property had not yet prescribed.

TEST OF CONSTITUTIONALITY

What the Constitution provides in relation to what can or may be done under the statute ( not by what it has been done under it)

-not within the legislative power to enact

-it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles

-it allows something to be done which the fundamental law condemns or prohibits

-it validates a course of conduct the effect of which the Constitution specifically forbids.

Pdaf: Greco Antonios Belgica et.al vs. Hon Exec. Secretary Paquito Ochoa et. Al, GR 208566, 208493 & 209251, November 19, 2013

Pork Barrel refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district.7 Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer to legislative control of local

appropriations.8

―Pork Barrel‖ has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature,9 although, (it would evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive).

Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).

Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered11 as the earliest form of ―Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines since the utilization of the funds appropriated therein were subjected to postenactment legislator approval.

(area of fund release,)

Section 312 provides that the sums appropriated for certain public works

projects ―shall be distributed x x x subject to the approval of a joint

committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives

―[T]he committee from each House may [also] authorize one of its members

to approve the distribution made by the Secretary of Commerce and

Communications. (area of fund realignment), the same section provides that

the said secretary, ―with the approval of said joint committee, or of the authorized members thereof, may, for the purposes of said distribution, transfer unexpended portions of any item of appropriation under this Act to any other item hereunder.

1950

the pork barrel process commenced with local government councils, civil groups, and individuals appealing to Congressmen or Senators for projects. Petitions that were accommodated formed part of a legislator‘s allocation, and the amount each legislator would eventually get is determined in a caucus convened by the majority.

The amount was then integrated into the administration bill prepared by the Department of Public Works and Communications.

The Senate and the House of Representatives added their own provisions to the bill until it was signed into law by the President – the Public Works Act.17

1960‘s, pork barrel legislation reportedly ceased in view of the stalemate between the House of Representatives and the Senate.

B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).Congressional Pork Barrel‖ was apparently

discontinued in 1972 after Martial Law was declared, an era when ―one man

controlled the legislature. 1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already introduced

a new item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) called the ―Support for Local Development Projects (SLDP) under the article on ―National Aid to Local Government Unit. it under the SLDP that the practice of giving

lump-sum allocations to individual legislators began, with each assemblyman receiving P500,000.00.

PROCEDURE:> assemblymen - communicate their project preferences

to the Ministry of Budget and Management for approval. > Ministry of Budget and Management : release the allocation

papers to the Ministry of Local Governments, > Min. LG: turn, issue the checks to the city or municipal

treasurers in the assemblyman‘s locality.

Congressional Pork Barrel projects under the SLDP also began to cover not only public

works projects, or so-called ―hard projects, but also ―soft projects, or non-public works projects such as those which would fall under the categories of, among others, education, health and livelihood.

Post-Martial Law Era: Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).

―Congressional Pork Barrel‖

revived in the form of ―Mindanao Development Fund ( P480 Million)

―Visayas Development Fund (P240 Million)

created with lump-sum appropriations for the funding of development projects in the Mindanao and Visayas areas in 1989.

the clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon legislators for a similar funding, prompted the creation of the ―Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) which was integrated into the 1990 GAA with an initial funding of P2.3 Billion to cover ―small local infrastructure and other priority community projects.

GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992, CDF funds were, with the approval of the President, to be released directly to the implementing agencies but ―subject to the submission of the required list of projects and activities.

1992, Representatives were receiving P12.5 Million each in CDF funds, while Senators were receiving P18 Million each, without any limitation or qualification, and that they could identify any kind of project, from hard or infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and buildings to ―soft projects such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.

Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).

1993 the GAA explicitly stated that the release of CDF funds was to be made upon the submission of the list of projects and activities identified by, among others, individual

legislators. For the first time, the 1993 CDF Article included an allocation for the Vice-President.29 As such, Representatives were allocated P12.5 Million each in CDF funds, Senators, P18 Million each, and the Vice-President, P20 Million.

In 1994 – 1996, the GAAs contained the same provisions on project identification and fund release as found in the 1993 CDF Article.

Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was directed to submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations on the releases made from the funds.

1997 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice- President, in consultation with the implementing agency concerned, were directed to submit to the DBM the list of 50% of projects to be funded from their respective CDF allocations which shall be duly endorsed by

(a) the Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in the case of the Senate, and

(b) the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, in the case of the House of Representatives;

the list for the remaining 50% was to be submitted within six (6) months thereafter.

The same article also stated that the project list, which would be published by the DBM,35 ―shall be the basis for the release of funds” and that ―[n]o funds appropriated herein shall be disbursed for projects not included in the list herein required.

1998,36 the foregoing provisions regarding the required lists and endorsements were reproduced, except that the publication of the project list was no longer required as the list itself sufficed for the release of CDF Funds.

Other forms of ―Congressional Pork Barrel were reportedly fashioned and inserted into the GAA (called ―Congressional Insertions or ―CIs) in order to perpetuate the administration‘s political agenda.

CIs ―formed part and parcel of the budgets of executive departments, they were not easily identifiable and were thus harder to monitor. Nonetheless, the lawmakers themselves as well as the finance and budget officials of the implementing agencies, as well as the DBM, purportedly knew about the insertions.

The legislators had the power to direct how, where and when these appropriations were to be spent.

E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).

1999, the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3) separate forms of CIs, namely, the ―Food Security Program Fund,

the ―Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund,and t

the ―Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund,

all of which contained a special provision requiring “prior consultation” with the Members of Congress for the release of the funds.

2000 that the ―Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) appeared in the GAA. The requirement of ―prior consultation with the respective Representative of the District before

Procedural Issues.

Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy;

(b) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to judicial review;

(c) petitioners have legal standing to sue; and

(d) the Court‘s Decision dated August 19, 1994 inG.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, and 113888, entitled ―Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez‖114

(Philconsa) and Decision dated April 24, 2012 in G.R. No. 164987, entitled ―Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management‖115 (LAMP) bar the relitigation of the issue of constitutionality of the ―Pork Barrel System‖ under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis.

Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.

By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an

actual case or controversy. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which

pertinently states that ― [j]udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to

settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x.

an actual case or controversy -involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.

―[t]here must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.

- ripeness, meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication.

―A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action.

―Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions.

Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases.

RULING: there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases.

The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by

the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the ―Pork

Barrel System.

the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational;

hence,

there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the

unconstitutional use of these public funds.

Moot and academic issue:

PDAF:

the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.125 

Differing from this description, the Court observes that respondents‘

proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing.

Neither will the President‘s declaration that he had already "abolished the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence.

By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality. 

Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the moot and academic‘ principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case." The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if:

first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation

and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised

requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and

fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.129

Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.

the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which are within its province to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure."141 The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be any clearer: "The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. It includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." In Estrada v. Desierto,142 the expanded concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and its effect on the political question doctrine was explained as follows:143

To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. x x x (Emphases supplied)

Verba legis the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, this Court, speaking through

Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:

We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.

where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of

its framers.

Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary in this wise:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose

Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue, the court ruled:

The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.

ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.

Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court affirmed that:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.

APPROPRIATE CASE

Must be a justiciable controversy, the resolution of which the court will have to choose between the Constitution and the challenged statute.

JUDICIAL POWER is limited only to actual controversies, as a last resort and a necessity in the determination of real, actual, earnest, and vital controversy between litigants.

- it is appropriate for court review (issues which are inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law.

(justiciable question vs. a political question)

The political question being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the constitution.

Board of Optometry VS. Colet Only natural and juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a

civil action, and every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.[18] Under Article 44 of the Civil Code, an association is considered a juridical person if the law grants it a personality separate and distinct from that of its members.

A real party in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court is a party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Constitutionality of R.A. No. 8050,[1] entitled “An Act Regulating the Practice of Optometry Education, Integrating Optometrists, and for Other Purposes,” otherwise known as the Revised Optometry Law of 1995 every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before

declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally approved.  To doubt is to sustain.  The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act be struck down.

Mariano vs. COMELEC

To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of description was used in the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of the master serving the slave, instead of the other way around. This could not be the intendment of the law.

Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil., 141; Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active instrument of government, which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes (Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule must indubitably apply to the case at bar.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 51 states:

Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati.

We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. 5

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

Fernandez vs. Torres

Petitioners Adelpha Fernandez, Marissa Domingo, Eunice Ofrecia, Roselyn Mendoza, Arlene Caballero, Almira Miranda and Mary Christine Valenton seek certiorari and prohibition to prohibit and restrain the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment ("DOLE") and the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration ("POEA") from enforcing and implementing Item No. 1 of DOLE Circular No. 01-91 dated 20 November 1991 entitled "Prescribing Additional Requirements, Conditions and Procedures for the Deployment of Performing Artists."

Item No. 1 of the assailed DOLE Circular provides as follows:

1. No Filipino entertainer shall be deployed outside the Philippines except for legitimate performing artists consisting of musicians, singers and members of dance troupes. In all cases, the performing artists must have a track record of legitimate and reputable performance in the Philippines for at least one year. In no case shall the performing artists be below 23 years old.

The Secretary of Labor and Employment may, for justifiable reasons, exempt performing artists from coverage hereof.

the Solicitor General urges that the Petition at bar does not present a justiciable controversy for having been filed prematurely:

. . . petitioners, who claim to be performing artists, had not previously applied with the Secretary of Labor for exemption from the coverage of the Circular in line with the aforequoted provision. Said provision connotes that the prohibition is not at all permanent or absolute. It admits of exception. . . . But to repeat, there is no allegation in the petition that petitioners had previously sought exemption from the Secretary of Labor, from the coverage of the Circular, before filing the instant petition. Obviously, the petition must fail for prematurity. 4

The Court agrees with the Solicitor General. We note in the first place, that Item No. 1 of the challenged DOLE Circular does not establish an absolute and comprehensive prohibition of deployment abroad of entertainers below twenty-three (23) years of age. Item No. 1 itself provides that "the Secretary of Labor and Employment may, for justifiable reasons, exempt from performing artists from coverage hereof." The discretionary authority here asserted by the DOLE Secretary does not purport to be unlimited and arbitrary in nature. To the contrary, fairly explicit and precisely drawn grounds for exempting particular performing artists from the coverage of Item No. 1 are set out in a set of "Administrative Guidelines Implementing Department Circular No. 01-91.“

petitioners have failed to allege or have refrained from alleging, that they had previously applied to public respondent officials for exemption from the minimum age restriction imposed by Item No. 1 of DOLE Circular No. 01-91. Necessarily, therefore, petitioners also do not allege that public respondent officials have arbitrarily denied their applications for exemption from the minimum age requirement or from any other requirement establishment by Item No. 1. Neither have petitioners alleged that public respondents have continually threatened to deny all and sundry applications for exemption, so as to create a reasonable expectation that their applications would be immediately and arbitrarily denied, should they in fact file them. Petitioners do assert that the exemption clause of DOLE Circular No. 01-91 is "practically useless and [constitutes] empty verbiage." They have not, however, attempted to support this assertion.

The Court is not compelled to indulge in speculation that public respondent would deny any and all applications for exemption from coverage of DOLE Circular No. 01-91. Two (2) important presumptions are here applicable. The first is that administrative orders and regulations are entitled to the presumption of constitutionality. 6 The second is that official duty has been or will be regularly performed.

To engage in judicial review, under the facts and circumstances here obtained, in advance of official efforts to apply the provisions of the challenged circular, upon the supposition that petitioners' legal rights in the premises might be denied by public respondent officials, is too close to rendering an advisory opinion in a hypothetical case — an undertaking clearly beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. 10

We consider, therefore, that petitioners have failed to show the first requisite of a judicial inquiry, i.e., the existance of actual case or controversy. This failure renders unnecessary consideration of the other requisites of constitutional litigation.