FAS FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS

FAS 2015 Annual Report Page 1

© 2015 by the Federation of American Scientists. All rights reserved. For more information about FAS or publications and reports, please call 202-546-3300, e-mail fas@fas.org, or visit www.fas.org. Design, layout, and edits by Allison Feldman, FAS. Cover Photo: © Marina Sun, Shutterstock.

FAS 2015 Annual Report Page 2

Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................ 3

About FAS .......................................................................................................................................................... 5

Issues and Activities .......................................................................................................................................... 6

Publications ....................................................................................................................................................... 12

Special Reports ................................................................................................................................................. 12

Public Interest Reports ...................................................................................................................................... 14

News Media Coverage..................................................................................................................................... 16

Leadership ......................................................................................................................................................... 18

Board of Trustees .............................................................................................................................................. 18

Board of Experts .............................................................................................................................................. 18

FAS Staff ....................................................................................................................................................... 19

Adjunct Experts and Visiting Fellows ............................................................................................................. 19

Financials and Funding ................................................................................................................................... 21

Support ............................................................................................................................................................ 21

Organizational Budget for FY2016 ................................................................................................................. 22

Looking Forward ............................................................................................................................................. 23

FAS 2015 Annual Report Page 3

During the past 12 months, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) has continued to advance

its mission of scientifically based analysis applied to important issues and problems impacting

national and international security. The dedicated people who work at and with FAS believe in the

value of scientific inquiry and its necessity in forming sound public policy. Such policy requires

credible, relevant information and analysis. FAS is committed to providing reliable sources of

information and reasoned analysis to enhance the public’s and policymakers’ understanding of ways

to reduce risks to security.

FAS’s current programs have focused on preventing use and further proliferation of nuclear and

biological weapons, improving strategic nuclear stability between China and the United States,

assessing ways to improve safety and security of nuclear power for peaceful purposes, and working

to reduce the scope of official secrecy and to promote public access to national security information

by seeking reform of national security classification and declassification policies. To accomplish this

ambitious agenda, FAS has an organizational structure and experts’ network that consists of three

approaches.

First, FAS has built on the outstanding achievements of the almost quarter century-long Project on

Government Secrecy, which has received accolades from across the political spectrum, and the

Nuclear Information Project, which is entering its second decade as a highly trusted source of

information and analysis on nuclear weapons and governmental policies on use of these weapons.

People around the world depend on FAS to shine a spotlight on the practices of governments in

secrecy and nuclear weapons.

Second, during the past two years, FAS has created task forces that have brought together a diverse

set of technical and policy experts to examine critical security problems. The first two of these task

forces are already having profound effects on public policy. For example, the Task Force on Nuclear

Verification Capabilities on the Iranian Nuclear Agreement has counseled policymakers about how

to effectively implement the agreement with Iran. The Task Force on Naval Nuclear Propulsion and

Highly Enriched Uranium comprised a team of younger and more seasoned practitioners from the

physical sciences, nuclear engineering, and political science. This team guided policymakers with

practical recommendations to phase out the use of weapons-grade uranium in naval fuel so as to

prevent diversion of that material into nuclear weapons made by states or into improvised nuclear

explosives made by terrorists.

Third, FAS has benefited from having many world-class engineers, scientists, lawyers, and political

scientists work part-time as adjunct senior fellows and visiting research fellows. They have

contributed by writing insightful blog articles, op-eds, scholarly articles, and in-depth special reports,

and they have represented FAS in conferences and workshops around the world. FAS has also

FAS 2015 Annual Report Page 4

served as a host for research fellows from Japan who have devoted their fellowships to advancing

greater cooperation between the United States and Japan on nuclear safety, safeguards, and security.

Through networking, FAS has greatly extended its reach and enhanced its capacity to educate

policymakers about the value of science and scientific reasoning for a more secure world.

Moreover, FAS has published the Public Interest Report (PIR) for more than 40 years. The PIR and its

forerunner FAS newsletter (published from 1946 to the 1970s) have been a platform to explore

innovative ideas for arms control and global security and to educate fellow citizens who understand

the importance of science-based analysis and evidence in guiding public policy. This report lists

articles published in 2015.

We at FAS could not accomplish these programs without the support of our loyal members and the

generous contributions from government agencies and private foundations as mentioned and

thanked in this report. Thank you for your interest in and support of FAS!

FAS 2015 Annual Report Page 5

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) provides science-based analysis of and solutions to

protect against catastrophic threats to national and international security. Specifically, FAS works to

reduce the spread and number of nuclear weapons, prevent nuclear and radiological terrorism,

promote high standards for nuclear energy’s safety and security, illuminate government secrecy

practices, as well as prevent the use of biological and chemical weapons.

FAS was founded as the Federation of Atomic Scientists in November 1945 (and was rebranded as

the Federation of American Scientists in February 1946) by many of the Manhattan Project scientists

who wanted to prevent nuclear war, and it is one of the longest serving organizations in the world

dedicated to reducing nuclear and other catastrophic threats and informing the public debate by

providing technically-based research and analysis on these

issues.

FAS is a non-profit membership organization, with

members from the academic, non-profit, and government

communities as well as support from concerned citizens.

FAS hosts a wide range of events, including briefings and

symposiums, with government officials, policy experts, scientists, and engineers on issues related to

international and national security.

FAS convenes awards ceremonies to recognize and commend contributions by outstanding

scientists and political leaders to science and international security. The awards include the FAS

Public Service Award, the Hans Bethe Award, and the Richard L. Garwin Award.

FAS staff and adjunct fellows comprise a highly skilled and dedicated team with professional

experience in aeronautical engineering, biology, biochemistry, chemistry, environmental science, law,

nuclear engineering, physics, and political science. Members of the Board of Sponsors, including

over 60 Nobel laureates, are influential figures from the scientific and international communities

who endorse FAS’s mission. Advisory Board members work with FAS staff on projects of mutual

interest, share professional expertise, and provide other methods of support to enhance the

organization’s mission and programs.

FAS 2015 Annual Report Page 6

Listed in reverse chronological order from October 2015 to December 2014

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence released a transparency implementation plan on

October 27, 2015 that establishes guidelines for increasing public disclosure of information by and

about U.S. intelligence agencies. Based on a set of principles on transparency that were published

earlier this year, the plan prioritizes the objectives of transparency and describes potential initiatives

that could be undertaken. Its purpose is explicitly “to earn and retain public trust” of U.S.

intelligence agencies. Nonetheless, it has the potential to provide new grounds to challenge

unnecessary secrecy and to advance a corresponding “cultural reform” in the intelligence

community. Steven Aftergood, Director of the FAS Project on Government Secrecy, discusses the

plan and its implications here.

The ability of Congressional Research Service analysts to support congressional deliberations is

substantially enabled by (if not entirely predicated on) the confidentiality with which requests from

individual Members of Congress and the CRS responses to those requests are handled. A new CRS

policy statement embraces the “fundamental core value” of confidentiality, but then CRS ratchets it

up to the point of absurdity, stating: “Even in instances when a Member or committee publicly

releases a confidential memorandum that CRS has prepared, staff may not provide copies of the

memorandum to other congressional clients.” Many would say that the reports are not confidential

at all (and should not be deemed so), particularly since they do not implicate the views of any

individual Member of Congress. Read Aftergood’s October 2015 study of the recent policy

statement here.

In this issue of the November-December 2015 Nuclear Notebook, authors Hans Kristensen and

Robert S. Norris provided a current overview of Pakistan's nuclear forces to coincide with Pakistani

Prime Minister Sharif's visit to Washington on October 22, 2015. It is now estimated that Pakistan

has 110-130 warheads in its nuclear arsenal (an estimated increase of about 20 in 2011) and foreign

minister Aizaz Chaudhry has acknowledged for the record what everybody already knew: that

Pakistan has developed “low-yield, tactical” nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s archenemy, India, is also

modernizing and increasing its nuclear arsenal. With both Pakistan and India engaged in rapid and

broad buildup of their nuclear arsenals, it is essential that their governments, as well as other state

FAS 2015 Annual Report Page 7

leaders, increase efforts to limit the nuclear arms competition that is in full swing in South Asian.

Read the Nuclear Notebook here.

An op-ed published by former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry and former Assistant Secretary

of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs Andy Weber on October 15,

2015 in the Washington Post, called for canceling the Air Force’s new nuclear air-launched cruise

missile, challenging what many see as an important component of the modernization of the U.S.

nuclear triad of strategic weapons and a central element of U.S. nuclear strategy. The

recommendation to cancel the new cruise missile – known as the LRSO for Long-Range Standoff

weapon – is all the more noteworthy because it comes from two key players in the nuclear defense

field. A survey of statements made by defense officials over the past few years for why the LRSO is

needed reveals a concoction of justifications, ranging from warfighting scenarios of using nuclear

weapons and blasting holes in enemy air defenses to “the old missile is getting old, therefore we

need a new one.” Kristensen discusses Perry and Weber’s arguments and formulates his own

conclusions here.

In 2010, then-Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair convened a panel to review the

November 2009 Fort Hood shooting committed by Army Maj. Nidal Hasan and the Christmas Day

bombing attempt by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab aboard Northwest Flight 253. A redacted version

of the resulting panel report was finally declassified and released on September 29, 2015. Beyond a

detailed recitation of what was known by U.S. intelligence about the perpetrators (much of which

has been withheld), the report filled a gap in the literature of intelligence reform with a look at

systemic issues, such as the state of information technology in the intelligence community (as of

2011), the process of watch-listing, and disagreements over the handling of U.S. person information.

Aftergood’s complete examination in October 2015 can be found here.

During the fall of 2015, the first new Borei-class (sometimes spelled Borey) nuclear-powered ballistic

missile submarine (SSBN) is scheduled to arrive at the Rybachiy submarine base near Petropavlovsk

on the Kamchatka Peninsula. More are expected to follow over the next few years to replace the

remaining outdated Delta-III SSBNs currently operating in the Pacific. Satellite images reveal that in

preparation for the arrival of the new submarines, submarine base piers, missile loading piers, and

nuclear warhead storage facilities are also undergoing renovations. The influx of the Borei SSBNs

marks the first significant upgrade to the Russian Pacific Fleet SSBN force in more than three

decades. Kristensen discussed in September 2015 the possible implications and proposed

recommendations here.

FAS 2015 Annual Report Page 8

Recent commercial satellite images reveal that security upgrades are currently underway at Incirlik

Air Base in Turkey and Aviano Air Base in Italy, indications that U.S. nuclear weapons have been

deployed in Europe under unsafe conditions for more than two decades. Kristensen raises a

pertinent question: since NATO now has decided that it is necessary after all to enhance security

perimeters around underground vaults with nuclear weapons at Incirlik and Aviano, doesn’t that

imply that security at the four European national bases that currently store nuclear weapons (Büchel,

Ghedi, Kleine Brogel, and Volkel) is also inadequate? Read the full article from September 2015

here.

A 2013 Intelligence Community Directive was released the first week of September, “establishing

the baseline for CI [counterintelligence] programs across the Intelligence Community (IC).”

Counterintelligence is defined as “Information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive,

exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations

conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or their agents, or

international terrorist organizations or activities.” Counterintelligence Programs, Intelligence Community

Directive 750, was signed by DNI James R. Clapper on July 5, 2013, and was released by the Office

of the Director of National Intelligence in response to a Freedom of Information Act request. CI

programs within the Intelligence Community are directed to address CI analysis, awareness and

education, risk assessments, and critical asset protection. Aftergood examined in September 2015 the

Directive and potential ramifications of the release here.

Despite an explicit statutory requirement to keep Congress “fully and currently informed” about the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the President may withhold proliferation-related

information from Congress if he determines that doing so could harm the national security,

according to a sweeping opinion from the Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) that

was prepared in 2003. Aftergood discusses this OLC opinion and how it takes an “uncompromising

view of presidential authority” and seems “muddled and poorly argued (even to a layman).” Yet it

does have some positive features, including how, during the George W. Bush administration, it

prompted an inquiry, from the White House to OLC, indicating that the authority to withhold was

not self-evident. Read the full analysis from August 2015 here.

The Department of Energy issued twenty “declassification determinations” between April 2011 and

March 2015 to remove certain specified categories of nuclear weapons-related information from

FAS 2015 Annual Report Page 9

classification controls. As a result of such determinations, the specified information need no longer

be redacted from documents undergoing declassification review, and it can also now be

incorporated freely in any new unclassified documents. Aftergood notes how this will increase

transparency and further the publication of comprehensive, up-to-date information, such as the June

2012 release of The United States Plutonium Balance, 1944-2009; knowledge of current U.S. plutonium

balance and the locations of these materials is vital in understanding the Department’s plutonium

storage, safety, and security strategies. View the full list of declassification determinations and

Aftergood’s analysis from August 2015 here.

One of the biggest surprises in the Pentagon’s latest annual report on Chinese military power is the

claim that China’s ICBM force now includes the “multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicle

(MIRV)-equipped Mod 3 (DF-5).” Kristensen reports that this is (to his knowledge) the first time

the U.S. Intelligence Community has made a public claim that China has fielded a MIRVed missile

system. If so, China “joins the club” of four other nuclear-armed states that have deployed MIRV

for decades: Britain, France, Russia, and the United States. While not a significant increase, the

development and fielding of multiple warhead capability strains China’s claim of having a “minimum

nuclear deterrent,” another worrisome sign that China (like the other nuclear-armed states) is locked

in a dynamic technological nuclear arms competition. Kristensen discussed in May 2015 Chinese

MIRV history and the potential consequences of MIRV deployment here.

With the increasing build up of nuclear weapons in North Korea and continuing security tensions in

Northeast Asia, several security analysts and political leaders have been concerned that countries

without nuclear weapons might move to develop and deploy them if the nuclear arms race in the

region is left unabated. As part of a study sponsored by the Nonproliferation Policy Education

Center, FAS President Charles Ferguson examined how South Korea could cross the threshold from

having a peaceful nuclear energy program to a military nuclear weapons program. The May 2015

published book chapter is available here.

Russia is modernizing its strategic and nonstrategic warheads; it currently has 4,500 nuclear warheads

and 1,780 are deployed on missiles and bomber bases. Additionally, there are 700 strategic warheads

and 2,000 nonstrategic warheads in storage, and an estimated 3,200 retired but largely intact

warheads are awaiting dismantlement. In this edition of the Nuclear Notebook, Kristensen and Norris

examine Russia’s nuclear arsenal and strategy. Despite Russian nuclear threats, they are not building

up their arsenal, but appear to be leveling off the force within the next decade. However, there are

many uncertainties about the future development of Russian nuclear forces. Available information

FAS 2015 Annual Report Page 10

indicates that Russia is continuing to reduce strategic nuclear launchers well below the limit set by

the New START Treaty, and over the next decade all Soviet-era ICBMs will be retired. Depending

on the extent of modernization plans over the next decade and how many missiles Russia can

actually produce and deploy, the overall strategic force appears to be leveling off just below 500

launchers. Read the Nuclear Notebook here.

The number of persons holding security clearances for access to classified information decreased by

more than 635,000 (or 12.3 percent) last year, per a recently released report to Congress from the

Office of the Director of National Intelligence. This was the first reported drop in the total security-

cleared population since the government began collecting statistics on security clearances in 2010.

The majority of the reductions involved persons who had been cleared for access to classified

information, but did not in fact have such access. Aftergood writes that what makes the new

reductions particularly interesting is that they were not simply a statistical blip or an artifact of

changes in the budget. Rather, they were purposefully achieved through a “concerted effort” by

agencies seeking to reduce the number of security clearances. Read the article from April 2015 here.

Several U.S. defense and intelligence officials have stated for the record that China is planning to

build a significantly higher number of nuclear-powered missile submarines than previously assumed.

Recently, the commander of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), Admiral Samuel Locklear, stated

that in addition to the three Jin-class SSBNs currently in operation, “up to five more may enter

service by the end of the decade.” Production of five additional SSBNs by the end of the decade

would require fielding one SSBN per year for the next five years; a production pace that China has

yet to demonstrate. Kristensen writes that there are many questions related to the building of more

subs, including the timetable and operation, as China does not have much experience operating

SSBNs on lengthy patrols. Read the full analysis from April 2015 here.

It has become popular among military and congressional leaders to argue that the United States has

had a “procurement holiday” in nuclear force planning for the past two decades. During this

“holiday,” the United States has been busy modernizing and upgrading its nuclear forces, including:

submarines, bombers, missiles, cruise missiles, gravity bombs, reentry vehicles, command and

control satellites, warhead surveillance, and production facilities. Kristensen writes that with the next

cycle of upgrades, there needs to be a calm and intelligent assessment by policymakers to identify

how much modernization and what types of systems are needed. Read the article from January 2015

here.

FAS 2015 Annual Report Page 11

Everyone who uses the Internet is implicated in a web of data collection; it relies on user data to

produce tailored advertising revenue to support growth and free use. This digital profiling produces

“the black box society,” in which basic societal functions are performed in deliberate obscurity via

collection and algorithmic manipulation of personal data, such as location, age, and political

affiliation. In a new study, law professor Frank Pasquale examines how these algorithms impact

money and information, and how algorithmic decision-making is taking society to a dangerous place.

Aftergood examines Pasquale’s study and the impacts of personal data collection in a new article

published in Nature. The article is available here.

For the past 28 years, the Nuclear Notebook has provided policymakers and the public with critical,

unclassified estimates of worldwide nuclear arsenals. This includes research on what kind of

weapons are deployed, where they are located, stockpile trends, and methods of delivery. Notebook

authors Kristensen and Norris take a look at some of the major accomplishments of the Notebook

and the role it has played in the public debate. Read the Nuclear Notebook here.

The Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, the third in a series of

conferences organized by a growing number of countries and humanitarian organizations to discuss

the risks nuclear weapons pose to humanity, was held December 8-9, 2014, in Vienna. Kristensen

participated in the conference and gave two presentations. The first was to the ICAN Civil Society

Forum on the overall status of worldwide nuclear forces, and the second, presented by both

Kristensen and Matthew McKinzie from the Natural Resources Defense Council, highlighted

nuclear deterrence, nuclear war planning, and scenarios of nuclear conflict. Briefing slides are

available here.

FAS 2015 Annual Report Page 12

FAS reports deliver detailed, comprehensive, technical and policy analysis on specific security threats

facing the world today, while also providing the public and policymakers with recommendations on

how to address these threats.

While China has received growing attention for modernizing and expanding its strategic

offensive nuclear forces over the last decade, little attention has been paid to Chinese

activities in testing and developing ballistic missile defenses (BMD). Motivated to understand

the strategic implications of this testing and to learn Chinese views and interpretations,

Adjunct Senior Fellow and Professor Bruce MacDonald and FAS President Dr. Charles

Ferguson have studied these issues and have had extensive discussions with more than 50

security experts in China and the United States over the past twelve months. Ever since the

end of the Cold War, U.S. security policy has largely assumed that only the United States

would possess credible strategic ballistic missile defense capabilities with non-nuclear

interceptors. This tacit assumption has been valid for the last quarter century but may not

remain valid for long. Since 2010, China has been openly testing missile interceptors

purportedly for BMD purposes, but also useful for anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. Read the

full report published in September 2015 detailing their findings here.

In this FAS Special Report, FAS President Charles Ferguson, identifies the major factors

that will affect deployment of advanced reactors (often referred to as Generation IV

reactors) in the coming years to decades and analyzes what industry and governments must

do in order to reach the ultimate goal of widespread deployment of highly energy-efficient,

much safer, more proliferation-resistant, and economically-competitive nuclear power

systems. Moreover, the report examines the historical experience of Generation II and III

reactors to learn the reasons for the predominant use of light water reactors. It then seeks to

apply these “lessons learned” to current efforts to develop advanced nuclear energy systems.

In the process of that assessment, the report reviews the status of the global cooperative and

national efforts to develop and eventually deploy advanced nuclear energy systems. The

report serves a guide to policymakers in the form of findings that lay out potential pathways

FAS 2015 Annual Report Page 13

to forward deployment of one or more advanced nuclear power systems within the next ten

to twenty years. Access the full report published in August 2015 here.

Since the agreement reached in early July 2015 between the P5+1 (the United States, Russia,

China, France, the United Kingdom, and the European Union) and Iran, a non-partisan task

force convened by FAS published Six Achievable Steps for Implementing an Effective Verification

Regime for a Nuclear Agreement with Iran, a report that addresses anticipated implementation

challenges and offers findings and recommendations for strengthening the implementation

process both internationally and within the United States. The report was released to the

public on Thursday, August 6, 2015, and the Task Force hosted a panel discussion in

Washington, D.C., later that day to present their findings and discuss possible implications

of the agreement. Over 50 attendees from the political, scientific, and NGO circles gathered

to express their thoughts and share their opinions on the issue at hand. Read the full report

here.

The United States and other countries with nuclear navies have benefited from having

nuclear-powered warships. But do the continued benefits depend on indefinite use of highly

enriched uranium (HEU)—which can be made into nuclear weapons—as naval nuclear fuel?

With budgetary constraints bearing down on the U.S. Department of Defense, the Naval

Nuclear Propulsion Program is finding it difficult to address many competing needs

including upgrading aging training facilities, handling spent nuclear fuel, and designing the

next generation submarines to replace the Virginia-class attack submarines. FAS convened

an independent, nonpartisan task force of experts from the national security, nuclear

engineering, nonproliferation, and nuclear security fields to examine effective ways to

monitor and safeguard HEU and LEU in the naval sector, and consider alternatives to HEU

for naval propulsion so as to improve nuclear security and nonproliferation. The results of

the study are compiled in the report, Naval Nuclear Propulsion: Assessing Benefits and Risks. The

task force concluded that the U.S. Navy has strong incentives to maintain the continuing use

of highly enriched uranium and would be reluctant, or even opposed, to shift to use of low

enriched uranium unless the naval nuclear enterprise is fully funded and the Naval Nuclear

Propulsion Program has adequate financial resources to try to develop a life-of-ship reactor

fueled with LEU that would meet the Navy’s performance requirements. Read the full report

published in March 2015 here.

FAS 2015 Annual Report Page 14

FAS’s digital, quarterly science and security journal features articles by members of the FAS network

on issues related to foreign policy and national security. A complete archive of all the issues of the

Public Interest Report is available here.

President’s Message: Creating a Community for Global Change

Charles D. Ferguson

The Iran Deal: A Pathway for North Korea?

Manit Shah and Jose Trevino

A Social Science Perspective on International Science Engagement

Nasser Bin Nasser

Review of Benjamin E. Schwartz’s Right of Boom: The Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism

Edward A. Friedman

Marshall and the Atomic Bomb

Frank Settle

Rob Goldston: A Scientist on the Cutting Edge of Fusion and Arms Control Research

Allison Feldman

Not Much Below the Surface? North Korea’s Nuclear Program and the New SLBM

Robert Schmucker, Markus Schiller, and J. James Kim

Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction

Steven Starr

President’s Message: Mind the Empathy Gap

Charles D. Ferguson

Dual Use Research: Is it Possible to Protect the Public Without Encroaching Rights?

Tosin Fadeyi

Who was Willy Higinbotham?

Julie Schletter

FAS 2015 Annual Report Page 15

The False Hope of Nuclear Forensics? Assessing the Timeliness of Forensics Intelligence

Philip Baxter

President’s Message: Seeking China-U.S. Strategic Nuclear Stability

Charles D. Ferguson

Look to Texas Rather Than Nevada for a Site Selection Process on Nuclear Waste Disposal

Daniel Sherman

Reflections on the 70th Anniversary of the Manhattan Project: Questions and Answers

B. Cameron Reed

Nuclear Power and Nanomaterials: Big Potential for Small Particles

Lamar O. Mair

The Making of the Manhattan Project

Cynthia C. Kelly

FAS 2015 Annual Report Page 16

The FAS Project on Government Secrecy was cited or quoted in hundreds of news stories over the

course of the year involving national security classification policy. Project director Steven Aftergood

was called upon to explain or interpret disputes involving the handling of Hillary Clinton’s emails,

the Obama Administration’s so-called Insider Threat program, the pursuit of leakers of classified

information, whistleblower complaints, and declassification activities. His views on these topics were

presented in the New York Times, the Washington Post, NPR, Politico, and other national outlets.

FAS also helped to inform news coverage of a wide range of other policy issues by publishing

hundreds of previously undisclosed reports of the non-partisan Congressional Research Service.

These reports were used in news stories and editorials on a daily basis, often featuring a link to their

source on the FAS web site.

The FAS Project on Government Secrecy works to reduce the scope of official secrecy and to

promote public access to national security information by seeking reform of national security

classification and declassification policies. The Project also publishes previously undisclosed or hard-

to-find government documents of public policy interest, as well as resources on intelligence policy.

More information on this program can be found here.

Throughout the year, the FAS Nuclear Information Project was extensively used as a source for

factual and reliable information about nuclear weapons and was referenced in numerous news media

reports and publications circulated by institutes and organizations. Particularly newsworthy events in

2015 included an interview with Project director Hans Kristensen and the German ZDF television

station on the planned deployment of the B61-12 nuclear bomb in Germany, a prime-time interview

with CNN’s Situation Room on the B61-12 bomb and efforts to increase security at one of the bases

in Europe, and widespread coverage of the Pakistani Nuclear Notebook in connection with the state

visit of the Pakistani prime minister to Washington.

Other significant coverage included a feature story in the New York Times on the Chinese developing

multiple-warhead capability for one of their long-range missiles, a piece that followed an initial

article on the FAS Strategic Security blog, and several fact checker articles published by the Washington

Post and PolitiFact Florida. This past October, Kristensen led a briefing to the James Martin Center

for Nonproliferation Studies on nuclear weapons policy and arms control and participated in a joint

FAS-BASIC roundtable on the state of the UK and European debates on nuclear weapons. Overall,

FAS 2015 Annual Report Page 17

the Project reaffirmed its well-known status as the “go-to source” for factual information on the

sizes and trends of worldwide nuclear weapons arsenals.

The FAS Nuclear Information Project provides the public with reliable information about the status

and trends of the nuclear weapons arsenals of the world’s nuclear-armed countries. The Project also

conducts analysis of the role of nuclear weapons and provides recommendations for responsibly

reducing the numbers and role of nuclear weapons. More information on this program can be found

here.

Other FAS researchers were interviewed extensively throughout the past year. Links to FAS news

media activities can be found here.

FAS 2015 Annual Report Page 18

Members of FAS’s Board of Trustees and Board of Experts are prominent figures in the scientific,

academic, international security, business, and policymaking communities.

Charles D. Ferguson, FAS President

Gilman Louie, Chair; Partner of Alsop Louie Partners

Rosina M. Bierbaum, Vice Chair; Professor of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and

Professor of Environmental Health Sciences at University of Michigan

Stephen Paul Hamblen, Secretary/Treasurer; President of Fairview Builders, LLC; Environmental

Engineering LNO for the Joint Organization for Industrial Hazard Management

Jan Lodal, Chairman of Lodal and Company

Rodney W. Nichols, President Emeritus of the New York Academy of Sciences

Peter Thiel, President of Clarium Capital; Co-founder and Chairman of Palantir Technologies; Managing

Partner in Founders Fund

Ex Officio: Robert M. Solow, Frank N. von Hippel

Rosina M. Bierbaum, Chair; Professor of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Professor of

Environmental Health Sciences at University of Michigan

Alton Frye, Presidential Senior Fellow Emeritus at the Council on Foreign Relations

Lt. General Robert G. Gard, Jr., Chairman of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, President and Chief Executive Officer of LEG Inc.

Lawrence M. Krauss, Foundation Professor in the School of Earth and Space Exploration and Physics

Department, and Inaugural Director of the Origins Initiative at Arizona State University

FAS 2015 Annual Report Page 19

Martha Krebs, Executive Director for Energy and Environmental Research Development at the

University of California at Davis

Jan Lodal, Chairman of Lodal and Company

Rodney W. Nichols, President Emeritus of the New York Academy of Sciences

Scott Sagan, Chair; Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science; Senior Fellow at the Freeman

Spogli Institute and Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University

Maxine L. Savitz, Member of the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST);

former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Conservation at the U.S. Department of Energy

Michael L. Telson, Vice President of General Atomics Corporation

Valerie Thomas, Anderson Interface Associate Professor of Natural Systems with a joint appointment in

the School of Industrial and Systems Engineering and the School of Public Policy, at the Georgia Institute of

Technology

FAS staff come from a variety of scientific and academic backgrounds. With professional experience

in government, environmental science, physics, nuclear engineering, law, and political science, FAS

staff works to provide technical and skilled analysis on a variety of catastrophic threats to security

and to serve the community of concerned citizens and experts striving to reduce these security risks.

Charles D. Ferguson, President

Steven Aftergood, Director of the Government Security Project

Hans Kristensen, Director of the Nuclear Information Project

Pia Ulrich, International Nuclear Policy Analyst

Allison Feldman, Communications and Community Outreach Officer

Kevin Feltz, Financial Controller and Office Manager

FAS experts and affiliates are members of the FAS Network, comprised of leading specialists from

the scientific, policy, and academic communities who tackle vexing security challenges that affect

international security.

Christopher Bidwell, Senior Fellow for Nonproliferation Law and Policy

FAS 2015 Annual Report Page 20

David Hafemeister, Visiting Scientist

Martin Hellman, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Nuclear Risk Analysis

Bruce MacDonald, Adjunct Senior Fellow for National Security Technology

Jenifer Mackby, Senior Fellow for International Security

Yusei Nagata, Research Fellow from MEXT, Japan

Robert S. Norris, Senior Fellow for Nuclear Policy

Paul Sullivan, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Future Global Resources Threats

FAS 2015 Annual Report Page 21

FAS benefits tremendously from the support it receives from members and supporters, private

foundations, and the private sector. These contributions enable FAS to undertake its programs and

activities. FAS gratefully acknowledges the support of the following individuals, foundations,

corporations, and government agencies whose contributions enable FAS to apply scientifically based

thinking and action to create a more secure world.

Bauman Foundation

Carnegie Corporation of New York

CS Fund

Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate

Hewlett Foundation

John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation

Naval Postgraduate School’s Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass

Destruction (PASCC)

New Land Foundation

Open Society Institute

Ploughshares Fund

Richard Lounsbery Foundation

Stewart R. Mott Foundation

U.S. Department of State

Individual FAS members and donors

Individual members on the FAS Board of Trustees, Board of Experts, and Board of Sponsors

FAS 2015 Annual Report Page 22

Revenues Donations (unrestricted) 280,000 Donations (restricted) 12,500 Rental revenue from subtenants 174,000 Grants from private foundations 730,000 Government contracts and grants 275,000 Subcontracting to other organizations 24,000 Consulting and speaking fees from FAS president

22,000

Web advertising on FAS.org 13,200 Sponsorships for awards gala 25,000 Endowment interest 150,000

Total projects revenues 1,705,700

Expenses Marketing 10,000 Outreach events for existing and prospective members

38,000

Outsourced accounting and payroll processing 12,300 Auditing 30,000 FAS staff (6 full time employees) 697,800 Consultants 372,000 IT services 13,200 Website firm 21,600 Office supplies 2,400 Equipment depreciation 9,600 Rent 408,000 Media/info subscriptions 7,200 Printing of publications 7,900 Workshops, meetings, and travel for projects 48,000 Staff training 3,000 Bank and finance charges 7,200 Insurance 6,600

Total projected expenses 1,705,600

FAS 2015 Annual Report Page 23

In February 2016, the Federation of American Scientists will reach its 70th anniversary. In the Winter

Public Interest Report, FAS will publish a special issue with several prominent authors who will reflect

on FAS’s accomplishments while looking forward to opportunities in which FAS can further

advance the prospects for greater international security using scientifically based analysis. Moreover,

FAS is planning on convening a major symposium and awards ceremony in early fall 2016. The

symposium will have experts from the technical and policy communities offering advice to

government officials and non-governmental experts. The awards ceremony will honor leaders in

these communities who have made extraordinary contributions toward improving international

security.

In the coming years, FAS will continue its world-renowned projects on Government Secrecy and

Nuclear Information. Also, FAS will build on its new network model that will bring together experts

to work on task forces and study groups to apply their skills in science and policy analysis to major

problems concerning the risks of catastrophic threats to humanity. Specifically, FAS anticipates soon

receiving substantial resources to perform in-depth studies of the costs versus the benefits of using

low enriched uranium or highly enriched uranium in naval nuclear propulsion and of the verification

challenges in monitoring and safeguarding Iran’s nuclear program. FAS will seek further support to

launch additional urgent task force studies on important issues such as energy security, bio-security,

and cyber security. In particular, FAS is grateful for the support of some individual donors who have

provided funds for FAS to explore creating a new program on energy and international security. In

June 2015, FAS President Charles Ferguson convened a salon dinner for 16 experts to advise FAS

about what the organization could conceivably do in this field. FAS will continue to seek advice in

order to make wise decisions about these programmatic activities.

Moreover, FAS will continue to educate and train the next generation of leaders in science and

security studies. In particular, FAS is planning on starting soon a major project designed to engage

nuclear engineering students in nuclear security studies. This project will support the need for

professionals in nuclear power programs to understand what is needed to ensure that their work is

applied solely to peaceful purposes. FAS will also look for additional opportunities to educate

younger science and engineering professionals about the ethical dimensions of their work.