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Roots of Trust in CPS/IIoT

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Roots of Trust in CPS/IIoT

Why are we all here?Social Capital

(value of economic, social networks)

Metcalfe’s Law(value of telecom, internet)

StructuralValue is N2

Relational*assumes each node is of equal benefit

Cognitive*assumes each potential connection actually connects

Internet (connectivity)

CPS/IIoT(trust, cooperation)

Semantic Web (context)

Trustees: Transaction Support

Trustor B

Problem of Trust: Party A and B have too little reliability in a transaction and a high level of

risk.

Solution: Party C acts according to a trust agreement that spells out the rules both want

followed

Trustee C(Root of Trust)

Trustor A

Low Trust

Identity lifecycle (authentication, reset, etc.)

Trust Transacting on the Road

Trustor B

Trustee C(Root of Trust)

Trustor A

Low Trust

Identity lifecycle and transaction support (rules, records, etc.)

Industrial AgeTrustee C

(Root of Trust)

Trustor A

Low Trust

Way Back

Industrial Age

Size & Strength: Banks, Insurance, Nation States, etc.

Currency Event Compensation Identity

TIME

Information AgeTrustee C

(Root of Trust)

Trustor A

Low Trust

Way Back

Industrial Age

Cryptosystems: PKI, Symmetric, PGP

Currency Event Compensation Identity

TIME

SSL/HTTPS ConsumerEnterprise

Information Age

A Different Kind of StrengthStrength of a cipher can be measured in terms of information

entropy which has a unit of measure of bits.

Bob Laptop

2112 2128

280

Still Not Connected

Case Study: SDN

IETF ACTN Control of networks will reside with the admin of a particular network.

If abstracted networks are to be formed from various trust domains, then sharing of this control must be coordinated somehow between these controllers to enable holistic control of all network resources.

Statistics and Permutations

f(s)

Permutations

The Trustee, Trustee?

Trustor BQuality Focused

Trustee C(Root of Trust)

Trustor ACost Focused

Low Trust

?

Case Study: Zigbee Pro/SE

76,000,000

JP Morgan

Target110,000,000

Home Depot56,000,000

Who can we trust?

Trustees: A New ModelCharacteristics (Oxford): Reliability, Strength, Ability,

Truthfulness

New Trustee: Computerized (Bitcoin, ENT)

Reliability: Distribution, up-timeStrength: Quantifiable, easily upgradedAbility: Efficient, easier implementationTruthfulness: Unbiased

Easily Measured

Classic Trustee: Institutional (PKI)

Reliability: Age, resources, geographyStrength: Processes, physical securityAbility: Widely accepted, cost, trainingTruthfulness: Reputation, motivations

Not Easily Measured

Case Study: Bitcoin and CurrencyVendor Trustee User-owned Trustee

Problem: Fear of currency manipulation Solution: No manipulation possible

vs.

$4.8B in BTC in

circulation (coindesk.com)

Bitcoin: Fatally FlawedTRANSACTIONS

155,000/dayUNIQUE ADDRESSES

147,000TRANSACTION TIME

15 minPROCESSING

1.1

Exahashes/secSTORAGE

16 GB

EXISTENTIAL RISK

>50% powerBRITTLE

Loss permanentPRIVACY

Public onlyANARCHIC

No private controlEXPENSIVE

Requires currency

Trust in the Zeitgeist

• 76 million accounts breached in 2014

• Breach was discovered by luck• $1.1 billion set aside for legal

costs

Case Study: Chase doubles cyber security spend to $250M/yr

(wsj.com)

Case Study: GM hires first ever cyber security chief (fortune.com)• GM announces autonomous vehicles by

2017• "We have to look at [car technology] on a

critical systems level. We see [security] as a competitive advantage.“ (M. Reuss, VP Global Prod Dev)

• 69% of US executive are worried that cyber threats will impact growth and 59% are more worried this year than last. (PwC 17th annual global CEO survey)

• 17.8% more publicly traded firms listed cyber security as a major business risk in SEC filings in 2014 following a 46.5% increase in 2013. (wsj.com)

Business JustificationTarget (2013)Average cost: $78/customer

$214/credit card

Aite Group, 2014, Ponemon Institute, 2013

General Motors (imagining 2016)Average cost: $1.41 million/fatality

$78,900/injury$8,900/

propery damageNational Safety Counsel (nsc.org), 2014

Liability

• Paying cloud hosting costs to sell dishwasher data, forever, is not viable

• Sensors are getting cheaper and more widely available… raw data value is dropping

• Data as a product for non-IT companies is not sustainable without value added activities like analytics or aggregation

• Storage and processing power as commodities• Ultra-low margin services (computing costs are

born by the customer)

IBM VP, Paul Brody

Costs & New

Business Models

New Markets

• Process companies (eg. Walmart) threatened by lack of privacy & security• Traditional infrastructure has inherent distrust of digital IT systems (eg.

Energy)

Parker Hannifin Chief IoT Strategist, Scott Darnell

History Lessons

• Ebay refusing to use service puts “final nail” in the Passport coffin” (zdnet.com)

• “…never happened, primarily because of fears that Microsoft would end up controlling the Internet, in addition to our desktops.” (pcmag.com)

Proprietary: Microsoft Passport (2000)• “…no uniform user experience…

confuses the majority of people…” (webmonkey.com)

• “…complex solution to a problem most consumers don’t really have....” (Microsoft blogger)

Wrong Market: OpenID (2005)

1.844.VERINYM | [email protected] | www.ent.net

Q & A