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2014 Philippine Land Reform Monitoring Report:

Resource Conflicts and Human Rights Violations in the Philippines

The Asian NGO Coalition for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development

In Partnership with:

College of Social Work and Community Development Xavier Science Foundation

University of the Philippines Xavier University

With the support of:

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Asian NGO Coalition for Agrarian Reform

and Rural Development (ANGOC)

33 Mapagsangguni Street

Sikatuna Village, Diliman

Quezon City 1101

Philippines

Tel No.: (63-2) 351-0581

Telefax No.: (63-2) 351-0011

Website: www.angoc.org

Citation:

Asian NGO Coalition for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development. (2015). 2014 Philippine

Land Reform Monitoring Report: Resource conflicts and human rights violations in the

Philippines. Quezon City: Author.

This publication was made possible with the support of the International Land Coalition (ILC)

and Misereor. However, the views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views

and policies of ILC and Misereor.

This publication may be freely cited, quoted, reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval

system, or transmitted in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying,

recording, or otherwise) provided proper citation of the author is made.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

ANGOC would like to thank the following for their contributions to this research paper:

PEER REVIEWERS

College of Social Work and Community Development, University of the Philippines Diliman

Dr. Emmanuel M. Luna, Ph.D. Chairperson, Doctor of Social Development Program

Research and Extension for Development Office

Prof. Rainier V. Almazan, Director, REDO

Leah B. Angeles, University Researcher II, REDO

Celeste F. Vallejos, University Extension, REDO

Xavier Science Foundation, Xavier University

Prof. Roel R. Ravanera, Executive Director

KEY INFORMANTS

Department of Agrarian Reform

Atty. Justin Vincent La Chica, Assistant Secretary, Legal Affairs Office

National Commission on Indigenous Peoples

Atty. Jeanette A. Florita, Director, Legal Affairs Office

Ms. Dahlialyn D. Dait-Cawed, Office of Empowerment and Human Rights Office

Engr. Annabel Pinkihan, Ancestral Domains Office

Atty. Gillian S. Dunuan, Legal Affairs Office

Philippine Association For Intercultural Development

Dave De Vera, Executive Director

WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS

Amnesty International (Gemma Cunanan)

Asian Farmers’ Association for Sustainable Rural Development (Lorraine Ablan)

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Center for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (Joy Demaluan)

Commission on Human Rights (Atty. Marc Titus D. Cebreros)

Department of Agrarian Reform (Undersecretary Jose Z. Grageda)

Institute of Social Order (Marie Alum dela Rosa)

International Land Coalition-Asia (Erpan Faryadi and Anna Brillante)

NGO for Fisheries Reform (Erlo Matorres)

Pambansang Kilusan ng mga Samahang Magsasaka (Bobbet Corral)

Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates (Max de Mesa)

Philippine Association For Intercultural Development (Dave de Vera)

Philippine Partnership for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas

(Felicidad Corpus and Caridad Corridor)

Task Force Mapalad, Inc. (Raquel M. Abellon)

Tungo sa Kaunlaran ng Kanayunan at Repormang Pansakahan (Maricel Tolentino)

UP-CSWCD (Anne Di V. Berdin)

The Peoples’ Campaign for Agrarian Reform Network, Inc. (Wilson Requez)

SOURCES OF CASES

The Peoples’ Campaign for Agrarian Reform Network, Inc. (AR Now!)

Center for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (CARRD)

Institute of Social Order (ISO)

Philippine Association For Intercultural Development (PAFID)

Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates (PAHRA)

NGO for Fisheries Reform (NFR)

International Land Coalition

Misereor

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ACRONYMS USED

ALI Agrarian Law Implementation

ALS Agrarian Legal Services

AMGL Alyansa ng mga Magbubukid sa Gitnang Luzon

ANGOC Asian NGO Coalition for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development

ANIBAN Alyansa ng Nagkakaisang Mamamayan sa Hacienda Dolores

APECO Aurora Pacific Economic Zone and Freeport Act

ARB/ARBs agrarian reform beneficiary/ agrarian reform beneficiaries

AR Now! The Peoples’ Campaign for Agrarian Reform Network, Inc.

BFAR Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources

BSMA Banana Sales and Marketing Agreement

CADT Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title

CAO Compliance Adviser/Ombudsman

CAR Cordillera Administrative Region

CARL Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law

CARP Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program

CARPER Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program Extension with Reforms

CARRD Center for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development

CHR Commission on Human Rights

CLOA Certificate of Land Ownership Award

CoRe Group Conflict Resolution Group Foundation, Inc.

CPA Conservation Priority Area

CSO civil society organization

CTUHR Center for Trade Union and Human Rights

DA Department of Agriculture

DAR Department of Agrarian Reform

DENR Department of Environment and Natural Resources

DILG Department of Interior and Local Government

DND Department of National Defense

DOJ Department of Justice

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DSWD Department of Social Welfare and Development

ECC Environmental Clearance Certificate

EELHI Empire East Land Holdings, Inc.

EU European Union

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

FIDH The International Federation for Human Rights

FL FL Property Management Corp.

FLA Fishpond Lease Agreement

FPIC free, prior and informed consent

FPPI Filipinas Palm Oil Plantation, Inc.

HARBCO Hijo Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative

HIIK Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research

HPI Hijo Plantations, Inc.

ILC International Land Coalition

IPRA Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act

IPRV Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Violations

IPs Indigenous Peoples

IUU Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported

KARAPATAN Alliance for the Advancement of People’s Rights

KBA Key Biodiversity Area

KMBP Kilusang Magbubukid ng Bondoc Peninsula

LAPANDAY Lapanday Foods Corporation

LLL Leonardo Lachenal Leoncio Holdings

LWA Land Watch Asia

MDGs Millennium Development Goals

MOA Memorandum of Agreement

MRL Mindoro Resources Ltd.

NAPC National Anti-Poverty Commission

NCIP National Commission on Indigenous Peoples

NDC National Development Corporation

NES national engagement strategy

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NFFSM National Fact-Finding and Solidarity Mission

NGEI National Development Corporation - Guthrie Estates, Inc.

NGEI-MPC NDC Guthrie Estates Inc. Multipurpose Cooperative

NPC National Power Corporation

OMCT World Organization Against Torture

PAFID Philippine Association For Intercultural Development

PAHRA Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates

PhilDHRRA Philippine Partnership for the Development of Human Resources in Rural

Areas

PNP Philippine National Police

SDGs Sustainable Development Goals

SMI Sagittarius Mines Inc.

SNAPB SN Aboitiz Power Benguet, Inc.

TGC Tampakan Group of Companies

TWG technical working group

UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UNEP United Nations Environment Programme

UNHRC United Nations and Human Rights Council

USIP United States Institute of Peace

UP-CSWCD University of the Philippines, College of Social Work and Community

Development

WMC Western Mining Corporation

XU-XSF Xavier University, Xavier Science Foundation

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENT ............................................................................................................................... 3

ACRONYMS USED .................................................................................................................................... 5

I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 10

A. Background of the Study .................................................................................................................... 10

B. Statement of the Problem ................................................................................................................... 11

C. Objectives of the Study ...................................................................................................................... 13

D. Significance of the Study ................................................................................................................... 13

E. Scope and Limitations ........................................................................................................................ 15

II. METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................................. 15

III. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ......................................................................................................... 16

IV. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE ............................................................................................ 17

A. Defining Resource Conflict................................................................................................................ 18

B. Nature of Resource Conflict ............................................................................................................... 19

1. Conflict Actors ................................................................................................................................ 19

2. Causes of Conflicts ......................................................................................................................... 19

3. Intensity of Conflicts ....................................................................................................................... 20

C. Human Rights Violations as Causes and Consequences of Resource Conflict .................................. 21

V. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ........................................................................................................... 22

VI. FINDINGS ............................................................................................................................................ 24

A. Conflicts on Access to and Control of Agricultural Lands ................................................................ 24

1. Farmers Reclaiming Their Land in San Francisco, Agusan Del Sur .............................................. 27

2. Human Rights Violations against Farmers in Hacienda Dolores, Porac, Pampanga ...................... 28

3. Conversion of Farmlands into Real Estate Properties in Gimalas, Balayan, Batangas ................... 31

4. Land Grabbing through Agribusiness Venture Agreements with Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries in

Tagum, Davao del Norte ..................................................................................................................... 32

5. Victory of CARPER in the Bondoc Peninsula, Quezon Province .................................................. 33

B. Conflicts on Access to and Control of Ancestral Domains ................................................................ 36

1. Special Economic Zone APECO and the Agta/Dumagat Ancestral Domain Claim ...................... 39

2. Mamanwa in Barangay San Pablo, Jabonga, Agusan del Norte ..................................................... 40

3. Copper and Gold Mining in Tampakan, South Cotabato ................................................................ 40

4. Corporate Social Responsibility Accomplished in Ambuklao and Binga Dams ............................ 42

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C. Resource Conflict Involving Municipal Waters ................................................................................. 44

1. Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) Fishing in the Philippines .......................................... 45

2. Impacts of Aquaculture and Tourism in Calatagan, Batangas ........................................................ 46

V. ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................................................ 48

A. Nature of Conflicts Involving Agrarian Lands .................................................................................. 48

B. Nature of Resource Conflict Involving Ancestral Domains ............................................................... 53

C. Nature of Resource Conflict Involving Municipal Waters ................................................................. 56

D. Human Rights Violations as Cause of Resource Conflict .................................................................. 58

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................................................................................... 60

Specifically, for CSOs: ........................................................................................................................... 60

For the Government: ............................................................................................................................... 61

VII. REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................... 63

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background of the Study

In 2010, the Asian NGO Coalition for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ANGOC) and

its partners in the Land Watch Asia (LWA) campaign developed a framework for monitoring

people’s ownership and access to land and security of land tenure. The objectives of this land

reform monitoring initiative are: 1) to develop capacities of civil society organizations (CSOs)

in undertaking monitoring of land tenure and access to land in order to strengthen evidence-

based advocacy of CSOs; and 2) to enhance platforms, dialogue and common action on land-

related issues among CSOs, governments and intergovernmental organizations. The land

monitoring framework underwent several rounds of consultation and discussion at the regional

level, and an online consultation for gathering inputs. Consensus was arrived at on the set of

common indicators that the countries shall monitor, namely: disputes and evictions, land

grabbing, landownership, tenancy, budgets on land reform, and policies on marginalized groups

(e.g., women and indigenous peoples).

Since its conception in 2010, the CSO Land Reform Monitoring Initiative in the Philippines has

been describing and analyzing people’s access to land and resources by keeping track of the

government’s accomplishments in these areas. In the agrarian sector, monitoring was done

mostly by determining the number of hectares of agricultural land acquired and distributed under

the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). In the aquatic sector, the number of

Fishpond Lease Agreements (FLAs) issued were tracked, while for the indigenous community

sector, the number of Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles (CADTs) awarded was the

determinant of progress. While it is important to keep track of the accomplishment of targets set

by these reform programs, it is equally worthwhile for the CSOs to monitor as well what the

government usually overlooks.

In the previous land monitoring reports, data on land conflicts at the national level proved to be

difficult to obtain from the government, or were not available. There were no records on

overlapping claims on land, and cases of land-related human rights violations were

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underreported because they were not closely monitored (PhilDHRRA, 2013). The 2013 Land

Reform Monitoring Report prepared by the Philippine Partnership for the Development of

Human Resources in Rural Areas (PhilDHRRA) revealed that, although CSOs were able to

record cases on tenure-related violence, there were no official government records of it. Further,

although there were data on land-related human rights violations from the Commission on

Human Rights (CHR), these were limited to the cases reported to the police and other judicial

systems (PhilDHRRA, 2013).

In order to formulate effective measures to protect the rights of farmers, fishers and indigenous

communities, understanding the magnitude of tenurial insecurity by monitoring tenure rights

violations would be a good start. After all, the protection of rights and lives of land and water

resource beneficiaries is as important as giving them the right to access and control such

resources.

B. Statement of the Problem

Natural resources, like land and bodies of water, are inevitably essential for the survival of every

human being. We rely on these directly for food, water, shelter and income. For some

communities, their environment is an indispensable part of their identity and culture. However,

according to the UN Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action (2012), because of

various issues such as “who should have access to and control over resources, and who can

influence decisions regarding their allocation, sharing of benefits, management and rate of use”

(p.8), resources become the subject of conflict. Conflict begins when natural resources are

scarce, the number of people sharing them increases and competition becomes aggravated when

the people or groups sharing the resource have relative power and influence to control the

contested resource (Engel and Korf, 2005). The group that has greater power is able to maximize

their utilization of a resource and flourish, while the group with less power is repressed and

sometimes displaced.

The significance of resource conflict as a phenomenon can be illustrated using the Heidelberg

Institute for International Conflict Research’s (HIIK) Conflict Barometer. HIIK (2015) found

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that resource conflicts, along with national power conflicts, ranked second in the overall global

frequency of ten conflict items. Of the 674 cases of conflicts recorded globally, 96 cases

(14.24%) are resource conflicts, 159 cases (23.59%) are system/ideology conflicts and 90 cases

(13.35%) are sub-national predominance conflicts. Other items included are conflicts over

territory, secession, decolonization, autonomy, international power and others. The resource

conflict category includes conflicts where actors are pursuing the possession of natural resources,

raw materials, and the profit generated from these. In addition to this, in a study by Global

Witness published in 2014, it was found that the Philippines ranked third among countries with

the highest number of deaths among land and environmental defenders from 2002 to 2013. The

study drawing from the 2012 study of Global Witness entitled “A Hidden Crisis,” covered 35

countries and documented a total of 908 people who had died because of their work on the

environment and land issues (Global Witness, 2014a). There were also 11 people reported to

have disappeared under circumstances of force and presumed dead. The study also found that in

2002-2013 at least two people are killed every week, defending their resource rights (Global

Witness, 2014b). Most of the victims were members of indigenous communities, landless groups

and peasant movements. The primary cause of death among the land and environment defenders

was the victims’ opposition to land grabbing, unfair land ownership, large-scale mining

operations, deforestation, illegal logging or hydroelectric projects.

The study by Global Witness (2014a) also shows that deaths among land and environment

activists were most prevalent in Central and South America, with Brazil having 448 such deaths

and Honduras with 109. In Asia, the Philippines are the most affected country with 67 known

killings mostly due to mining conflicts. Among the 908 total deaths reported in the study, 656 of

these have no information about the suspected killer, 208 have very limited information about

the suspected killer, in 38 deaths the suspected killer has been named, and in only 6 has the

suspect been tried, convicted and punished (Global Witness, 2014b). These figures not only

show the prevalence of killings among people protecting land and environmental rights, but also

the slow progress or absence of justice for the victims.

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C. Objectives of the Study

Both the studies of HIIK and Global Witness demonstrate how increasing demand and

competition over land leads to violent disputes. In Global Witness’s study, numerous cases were

not even considered because of unavailability of published data and public sources of

information. Thus the number of deaths among land and environment defenders they recorded

may, in fact, be underreported. The prevalence of resource conflicts as described by the said

studies as well as the lack of complete information on the impacts of such conflicts points to the

importance of CSOs stepping in to monitor the phenomenon.

Hence, this 2014 land reform monitoring report aims to contribute to this pool of knowledge

through the following objectives:

1. Identify the nature of resource conflicts occurring in the Philippines among agrarian lands,

municipal waters and ancestral domains through case reports, specifically:

a. actors involved in resource conflicts

b. causes of resource conflicts

c. impacts of resource conflicts

d. intensity of resource conflicts

2. Describe what human rights violations were committed that have resulted to resource

conflicts.

3. Formulate recommendations to contribute to the process of managing and resolving resource

conflicts.

D. Significance of the Study

As the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are nearing their end, new goals are being

formulated following 2015, to complete the unfinished tasks. One lesson learned from the MDG

experience was to include in its design a broad range of stakeholder input (Clark, 2014). As a

result, the national and local context became significant in developing specific targets in each

area in the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). CSOs have now been given a vital role

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in representing the marginalized groups, as well as in developing and realizing monitoring

indicators for the new agendas to enable measurement of implementation (UN, 2013). They are

also responsible for making sure that governments and businesses act responsibly and make

genuine opportunities for the marginalized. CSOs have thus advocated for the inclusion of land

rights as part of the framework for the post-2015 SDGs. Good land governance is now

recognized as an important aspect in pursuing the SDGs.

As a CSO initiative, this monitoring report of land conflicts will encapsulate the challenges faced

by marginalized groups in the rural areas, specifically farmers, fishers and indigenous peoples, in

securing their land and resource rights—thereby providing local context to the SDG areas. The

present study will then demonstrate the urgency for related agencies to address such challenges

as well.

Conducting a monitoring report anchored on human rights also supports the resolution drafted by

Ecuador and South Africa at the 26th

session of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva in June

2014. The resolution supported by 20 countries, including the Philippines, leads “to establish an

open-ended intergovernmental working group with the mandate to elaborate an international

legally binding instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with

Respect to Human Rights” (Binding Treaty, n.d., para. 4). This resolution aims to provide an

instrument that clearly identifies the role of transnational corporations in terms of human rights.

The proposed binding treaty will formulate and provide guidelines on the responsibility and

accountability of transnational corporations and business enterprises on the protection of human

rights. This monitoring report will contribute to efforts in supporting the proposed treaty by

providing a review of literature of the tenure-related human rights violations perpetrated by

transnational and local business enterprises, in the context of the Philippines.

At the same time, this land monitoring initiative is part of the national engagement strategy

(NES) of the International Land Coalition (ILC), with the objective of creating conditions for

inclusive and people-centered land governance related policy change.

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E. Scope and Limitations

The present study focuses on monitoring resource conflicts involving agrarian lands, coastal

waters and ancestral domains. It concentrates on conflicts over resource use, access and control,

while it excludes shelter-related disputes and conflicts over resource use, access and control as a

result of natural calamities. The study makes use of secondary data generated by other CSOs,

government agencies, and media sources. Its literature review is limited to accessible data from

the local level about resource conflicts and land-related violent incidents.

Moreover, as the study illustrates how violation of human rights is both a foundation and a result

of resource conflict, it will not enumerate all possible human rights violations committed that

have resulted to a conflict.

II. METHODOLOGY

To fulfill its objectives, this study collected studies and other secondary materials generated by

CSOs and government agencies reporting cases of land and resource conflicts in the Philippines.

The study described cases of resolved and ongoing conflicts over resource use, access and

control involving farmers, coastal municipalities and indigenous communities.

The study underwent several phases to fulfill its objectives. In phase 1, face-to-face and

electronic consultations were conducted with the Research and Extension Development Office of

the College of Social Work and Community Development of the University of the Philippines

Diliman (UP-CSWCD) as well as the Xavier Science Foundation of Xavier University (XU-

XSF). The said institutions helped in formulating the objectives, design and methodology of the

current study.

Data were gathered through a review of literature of reports and case studies prepared by

government agencies and CSOs. Key informant interviews were conducted with the Department

of Agrarian Reform (DAR), National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), and

Philippine Association For Intercultural Development (PAFID).

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In the second phase of the study, a joint consultation workshop was organized to provide an

opportunity for other CSOs to share their feedback on the preliminary methodology,

recommendations and conclusions of the monitoring report for improvement. After the

workshop, the paper was revised accordingly. The second draft was presented and discussed

during the third quarterly meeting of the Philippine-based members of the International Land

Coalition (ILC). A peer-review ensued with UP-CSWCD and XU-XSF. The final draft was then

presented and discussed in a workshop jointly organized by ANGOC, UP-CSWCD and XU-

XSF, and participated in by government agencies and CSOs.

To fulfill its objectives, the study used both qualitative and quantitative secondary materials.

Various case studies, case reports and organizational statements were consolidated to complete

each story on an incident of resource conflict. These cases were then analyzed to understand the

nature of resource conflicts occurring in the Philippines, identify the perpetrators and victims of

the conflicts, and arrive at the causes, intensity and impacts that these conflicts had. Through

certain case stories in which the resource conflict was resolved, the study identified effective

conflict management and resolution strategies.

III. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The LWA monitoring framework follows a specific process from inputs to impacts as illustrated

in figure 1. This framework was adapted by LWA from Bending (2009) to guide CSOs on areas

for monitoring land reform (Bending as cited by ANGOC, 2014). The inputs refer to laws,

policies and budget allocation governing implementation of reform programs. Outputs are

accomplishments of the implementation, while outcomes are the consequences of the

accomplishment of the processes. The impacts are consequences requiring a higher level of

analysis.

Since the present study focuses on the nature of resource conflicts in the Philippines, the study

concentrated on outcome indicators, like tenure security, land disputes and violence brought by

resource conflicts. The land reform monitoring framework assumes that outcome indicators

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(such as tenure security and access to land) and impacts (such as food security and poverty

alleviation) are results or consequences of the three preceding indicators and their

implementation. Monitoring the outcomes somehow provides a perspective on the status of

implementation of resource programs. For instance, if the outcome indicators show that people

have security over their access to and control of resources, then it may be assumed that laws and

reform programs are being implemented effectively.

Figure 1. Conceptual Land Reform Monitoring Framework.

Source: (ANGOC, 2014)

IV. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Natural resources are defined as the “actual or potential sources of wealth that occur in a natural

state, such as timber, water, fertile land, wildlife, metals, stones, and hydrocarbons” (UNEP,

2009, p. 7). Their importance is evident given the dependence of various living things upon it,

human beings specifically. It provides us food for consumption, metals for machinery, timber for

shelter and water for survival. For some communities their environment, such as land and bodies

of water, is an irrevocable part of their history, identity and culture. Other than shelter and source

INPUTS

Land Laws, Policies, Public Expenditures

PROCESSES

Agrarian Reform Programs, Resolution

of Disputes, Formalizing of Land

Claims

OUTPUTS

Land Titles. Property Rights, Support

Services

OUTCOMES

Tenure Security, Access to Land

IMPACTS

Food Securty, Poverty Alleviation

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of income, their beliefs, traditions and way of life are embedded in their environment and taking

it away disrupts their sense of identity. A natural resource, such as land, is also an important

source of power as it has economic, social and emotional importance (United Nations

Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action, 2012a).

However as countries struggle to implement programs aiming to achieve socio-economic

development, natural resources are put in jeopardy. Rapid urbanization, population growth,

unequal access to and limited availability of land, and increasing demand for resources are

factors contributing significantly to initiating and intensifying resource conflict. This section will

discuss the definition of resource conflict, identify types of resource conflicts, the perpetrators,

the intensity of conflict, and enumerate various conflict management strategies to further

understand the context of resource conflicts in the Philippines.

A. Defining Resource Conflict

The value and management of natural resources varies among people as they have different

needs and interests. Some value the conservation of their heritage, some use their land to produce

food for domestic consumption and as a source of income, while some see the economic

opportunities offered by tourism, commercial development and residential use. These

differences in interests contribute to the development and intensity of conflict. For Fisher et al,

conflict is a relationship that occurs when people or different groups believe that they have

different interests and goals (Fisher et al, 2000 as cited in Engel and Korf, 2005). Conflicts are

not necessarily negative relationships, as these can lead to social change and development,

especially in the case of non-violent conflicts where the constituents trust that their governing

structures, society and institutions are capable of managing and resolving incompatible interests

(United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action, 2012b). Through this

definition, it is clear that resource conflict is brought about by people’s differences in interests

regarding the use and management of resources.

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B. Nature of Resource Conflict

1. Conflict Actors

Resource conflict being defined as a result of contradicting interests over use and management of

land and other resources implies that the primary actors are those who have differences in goals.

According to the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), varying interests among stakeholders

such as local communities, governments, and outside actors could initiate or aggravate conflicts

(2007). Local communities’ lives are deeply involved with their environment as they depend on

it not only for economic opportunities but for culture and identity as well. The government has

the overall authority to manage resources. It has the power to regulate trade and development,

grant licenses and extraction rights, obtain taxes from resource industries, produce and

implement reform programs (USIP, 2007). The government has the capacity to help local

communities acquire and secure their tenurial rights as much as it can give companies rights to

acquire massive land areas for industrial or residential use. Finally, outside parties who have

enough influence over natural resource management such as powerful governments of rich

countries, international organizations, businesses, industries, NGOs and other resource users are

also conflict actors as they take part in initiating, aggravating or resolving resource conflicts

depending on their interests.

2. Causes of Conflicts

As mentioned earlier, the primary cause of resource conflict is when different individuals or

groups of people have varying interests in using and managing resources. And as the population

grows, the number of people with varying interests over resources increases, and competition

over access and control of resources increases as well. This competition can be further

influenced by the scarcity of a natural resource, the extent to which it is shared by two or more

groups, the relative power those groups have and the degree of dependence of these groups on

that natural resource (Engel and Korf, 2005). Scarcity of a resource leads to competition;

however if those who compete have different socio-economic status and relative power and

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influence, this may mean advantage for one group, while for another group it means loss of

income or displacement. Institutional failure in managing assets and resources also contributes in

aggravating resource conflicts (Engel and Korf, 2005). The lack of policies or poor

implementation of resource management programs leads to unequal distribution of resources and

conflict. Conflicts also arise when stakeholders, especially those who have less power and

influence, are left out during natural resource management (Food and Agriculture Organization

of the United Nations, 2000).

3. Intensity of Conflicts

According to Engel and Korf (2005), conflict is a dynamic and interactive social process. Most

conflicts share patterns and stages of development although no two conflicts are identical. As

shown in figure 2 below, there are three stages of conflict: latent, manifest and violent. The latent

stage can be described as a state of hidden or undeveloped social tensions, differences and

disagreements. It can remain this way because of fear, distrust, peer pressures or financial

reasons. It can also develop to the manifest stage, and become a public issue. In this stage, the

differences and disagreements become central to the groups’ dynamics and serve as a driving

force for the mobilization of each other’s interests. The manifest stage can then escalate and

become violent, often producing counter-violence, leading to further escalation.

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Figure 2. Conflict Stages.

Source: Engel, A. and Korf, B. (2005). Negotiation and Mediation Techniques for

Resource Management. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations:

Rome.

According to Engle and Korf (2005), conflicts should be managed in the latent stage during

which negotiations can easily ensue as the differences among parties are not yet manifested. In

the manifest and violent stages, it would be more difficult to modify a group’s position on a

conflict as it becomes an integral part of their group dynamics.

C. Human Rights Violations as Causes and Consequences of Resource Conflict

For Parlevliet (1999, in Dudouet, V. and Schmelzle, 2010), conflicts can be characterized using

the illustration of an iceberg, which shows how human rights violations can be both causes and

consequences of violent conflicts. In conflicts, symptoms or manifestations such as verbal and

physical abuse, intimidation, disappearances, evictions and degrading treatments are easily

identifiable. Like the tip of an iceberg, the consequences or effects of a conflict are more visible

than their causes. The submerged, usually larger in mass part of the iceberg, symbolizes the

violations of human rights as causes of conflict. The diagram shows the ongoing relationship of

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violent conflict and human rights. The denial of human rights as a cause of conflict can lead to

further human rights violations.

Figure 2. Human Rights Violations as Causes and Consequences of Violent Conflict

Source: Parlevliet (1999 in Dudouet, V. and Schmelzle, 2010)

V. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Based on the literature cited above, this monitoring report examines cases of resource conflict

among agrarian lands, ancestral domains and municipal waters based on the following:

1. Nature of conflict involving agrarian lands, ancestral domains and municipal waters. The

present study analyzes the attributes of resource conflicts in the Philippines. It covers conflicts

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involving actors’ struggles to acquire or secure rights to access and control resources under asset

reform programs such as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program Extension with Reforms (CARPER), the Indigenous

Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) and the Fisheries Code. Resource actors, as used in this report, are

direct and indirect participants initiating, exacerbating or managing resource conflicts. By

identifying the actors involved in a resource conflict, we are able to understand how these actors

perceive conflict and the mechanisms they use to deal with it. From this, we are able to recognize

their varying interests and pinpoint the causes of conflict. The mechanisms used by the actors to

pursue their motives and manage the conflict likewise enable us to identify the intensity of

conflict. A comprehensive understanding of these attributes is important in devising an

appropriate and effective resolution strategy.

2. Human rights violations as causes and consequences of a resource conflict. From the iceberg

diagram developed by Parlevliet (1999, in Dudouet, V. and Schmelzle, 2010), we are able to

understand how human rights violations can be both causes and consequences of resource

conflict. This study identifies the extent of human rights violations brought about by resource

conflict. Human rights violations, as referred to by this monitoring report, are abuses or

deprivation of basic human rights as described in any Universal Declaration of Human Rights

(UDHR) treaty or other international human rights laws. This study will also identify how

deprivation and violation of human rights trigger resource conflicts. The usually unnoticed

submerged part of an iceberg is likened to how human rights violations, such as uneven access to

resources and non-inclusive participation in public affairs, actually lead to conflict. This

framework shows that denial of human rights is the result and, simultaneously, the foundation of

conflicts. In this regard, we are made aware of the importance of protection and promotion of

human rights and its significance to people’s access to and control of resources.

24

VI. FINDINGS

A. Conflicts on Access to and Control of Agricultural Lands

In a desk research conducted by Global Witness in 2012, it was found that 711 individuals were

killed worldwide from 2002-2011 defending human rights related to the environment,

specifically involving land and forests. The study found that, in many countries, systematic

collection of information on killings is deficient, as is specialized monitoring at the international

level. On a more significant note, the study found that the Philippines is one of the countries with

the highest reports of land-related killings. From 2002-2011, the Philippines accounted for 50

cases (7.03%) of the total number of killings recorded in 26 countries worldwide, followed by

Colombia with 70 cases (9.84%), Peru with 123 cases (17.30%) and Brazil with 365 cases

(51.33%) (Global Witness, 2012). Moreover, convictions and credible investigations of such

killings are low, thereby empowering oppressors and encouraging further abuse. Concentration

of land ownership favoring the powerful and influential, contested land and forests, large

populations of poor people dependent on land or forests for livelihood, and high awareness levels

of one’s rights are some factors to which the said figures are ascribed.

In an extension of Global Witness’s study, an additional 197 cases of deaths from 2012-2013

were reported, placing the Philippines third among countries with the highest number of deaths

among land and environment defenders (Global Witness, 2014a).

The prevalence of land conflicts in the Philippines and the intensity of their repercussions can

also be seen in the cases of agrarian conflicts filed in the Commission on Human Rights (CHR)

and the accomplishment report on Agrarian Legal Services (ALS) of the Department of Agrarian

Reform (DAR).

In 2014 alone, a total of 77 cases of agrarian/land-related conflicts (see Table 1.) were recorded

by the CHR (CHR, 2015a). The highest number of conflicts filed was in Northern Mindanao

with 14 cases, followed by CARAGA and Zamboanga peninsula with 13 and 10 cases,

25

respectively. Moreover, eight cases of eviction/forced eviction (CHR, 2015b) and one case of

harassment (CHR, 2015c) in CARAGA were filed with the CHR. CARAGA is the only region

with reports of eviction and harassment due to land or agrarian-related conflicts filed with the

CHR in 2014. Meanwhile, the CHR (2015d) has recorded three cases of victims killed due to

land or agrarian-related conflicts in Central Luzon and one case in CARAGA. The reported cases

were filed between 1 January 2014 and 31 December 2014. As noted by the CHR, the data may

contain multiple case types in one complaint filed, which means that there may be more than one

victim in a case. Also, the reported case may be land related, but may not specifically constitute

an agrarian conflict.

Table 1. Breakdown of Number of Agrarian/Land-related Cases of Conflicts Filed with the

Commission on Human Rights in 2014 (CHR, 2015a).

Region Total number of complaint filed

Ilocos 8

Central Luzon 4

CALABARZON 7

Western Visayas 4

Zamboanga Peninsula 10

Northern Mindanao 14

Davao 9

SOCCKSARGEN 8

CARAGA 13

TOTAL 77

Source: Commission on Human Rights. (2015a). Breakdown of Number of Victims Killed in Agrarian/Land Conflict

Related Complaints/Cases Filed with the CHR. Quezon City

On the other hand, the Agrarian Legal Services accomplishment report shows that many cases of

disputes or conflicts are being processed or have been resolved by the DAR. Although the

department is able to describe the need of agrarian reform beneficiaries (ARBs) for legal

assistance, it does not specifically identify in which specific situations they require such

assistance the most. It does not describe the nature of conflict in detail, nor identify who the

perpetrators are and indicate the number of victims. The accomplishment report likewise does

26

not illustrate the types of conflicts that the DAR resolves, to what extent these conflicts violate

victims’ tenurial rights and if there is violence or harassment involved.

In an interview with DAR’s Legal Affairs Assistant Secretary, Atty. Justin Vincent La Chica, it

was explained that monitoring and eliminating or resolving land conflicts in the Philippines is

not the major role of the Department. DAR only passively records cases of land conflicts that are

reported to them. According to La Chica, there are three ways DAR is able to monitor cases of

agrarian-related conflicts: (i) cases that are filed with DAR; (ii) cases where DAR provides free

legal assistance to beneficiaries who seek it commonly because of a landowner’s resistance to

implement the agrarian reform program; and (iii) cases where mediation is sought between

beneficiaries commonly contesting who is the rightful beneficiary or how many hectares of land

they may actually acquire.

The agrarian legal service of DAR was primarily clustered into two forms of service; the

agrarian legal assistance and the adjudication of cases (see Table 2). The first provides assistance

in terms of amicable mediation of disputes as an alternative strategy to avoid conflicts reaching

the courts. It also provides legal assistance by providing ARBs with DAR lawyers before judicial

and quasi-judicial bodies, and resolving agrarian law implementation (ALI) cases. Meanwhile,

the adjudication of cases involves resolving cases of agrarian-related conflicts by the DAR

adjudication board.

On average, DAR processes and resolved 51,127 ALI cases in the last five years, represented

1,642 and 16,568 ARBs in judicial courts and quasi-judicial courts, respectively, since 2011,

mediated and reconciled 47,870 agrarian disputes via alternative strategies since 2012, and

settled 21,060 cases in the DAR adjudication board. Although these accomplishments of DAR

are commendable, the number of conflicts they settle each year is alarming and ambiguous.

Thus, a more detailed report of these numbers must be sought to know the magnitude of the

disputes involved.

Recognizing this lack, this monitoring report narrates selected actual experiences of farmers and

agrarian reform beneficiaries struggling to acquire their land or secure their right to tenure.

27

Table 2. Agrarian Legal Services Accomplishment of DAR from 2010 to 2014.

Agrarian Legal Services 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Agrarian Legal Assistance 67, 894

Resolution of ALI cases 52,075 56,338 37,790 56,428 53,005

ARB Representation in the Judicial Courts 4,203 1,078 648 639

ARB Representation in Quasi-Judicial

Courts

14,787 16,930 18,674 15,884

Mediation of Agrarian Disputes 44,704 45,258 54,646

Adjudication of Cases 19,409 19,006 23,432 21,640 21,816

Source: (DAR, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2015)

1. Farmers Reclaiming Their Land in San Francisco, Agusan Del Sur

On 9 August 2014, Armando Campos, a Manobo and an agrarian reform beneficiary, was shot to

death in Barangay Ebro, San Francisco in Agusan Del Sur on his way to participate in an activity

to reclaim their tenurial rights over an almost 4,000 ha piece of land (Philippine Alliance of

Human Rights Advocates, 2014). According to the Philippine Alliance of Human Rights

Advocates (PAHRA) (2014), the suspect in the killing, Anecito Ortiz, is the manager of the

Filipinas Palm Oil Plantation Inc. (FPPI), the biggest palm oil operator in Mindanao. Ortiz was

said to be accompanied by Arnold Guloran and one aliased as Junie Maltos.

According to a study by the Center for Trade Union and Human Rights (CTUHR), the land

where palm oil industries are operating in CARAGA region was previously inhabited by

indigenous communities and farmers (2012). The displacement of settlers and the conversion of

land into palm oil plantations occurred during the Martial Law era. Through focus group

discussions, CTUHR (2012) found out that a so-called “Lost Command” group, believed to be

private armies of palm oil operators NDC-Guthrie (now FPPI), killed farmers and their families

to clear out any claimants of the land they were about to occupy. Some farmers were forced to

sell their lands while others moved out of their villages to escape the harassment. However, some

were constrained to stay in their lands and become farm workers because they had nowhere else

to go. The farm workers who stayed were deprived of appropriate wages, benefits and the right

28

to security of tenure (Asia Monitor Resource Centre, 2013). In 1988, when the Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) was passed, the palm oil plantation areas were subjected to land

reform. The land was ordered to be transferred to the beneficiaries through a collective CLOA

(AMRC, 2013). The beneficiaries then formed a cooperative and leased their land to FPPI for the

period of 1990 to 2009, which was later extended until 2032 (AMRC, 2013).

On 11 July 2014, about a month before the said murder, Campos and other members of the NDC

Guthrie Estates Inc. Multipurpose Cooperative (NGEI-MPC) gave notice to the FPPI

management of the termination of their lease contract which had started in 1990. Campos was

among the 937 NGEI-MPC agrarian reform beneficiaries aspiring to regain control of their land

(Focus on the Global South, 2014). With an annual rental rate of PhP 635 per ha and PhP 1,800

share from net sales, the agrarian reform beneficiaries could no longer wait until 2032 to exercise

control of their land (Focus on the Global South, 2014).

2. Human Rights Violations against Farmers in Hacienda Dolores, Porac,

Pampanga

“Hindi makapasok sa sariling binubungkal na lupa yung mga magsasaka. Sa ngayon, sila’y

naghihirap na. Wala silang makain dahil nga halos ang trabaho nila ay magsasaka lamang at

nagkataon, itong sinasaka nila, eh, binakuran pa ng kompanya at hindi pinapapasok at

maraming security guard ang humaharang sa kanila.”

-Kagawad Cornelio “Ka Cornie” Pineda, Porac, Pampanga (in Focus on the Global South et al.,

2015b).

For 50 years, about 300 farming families have been tilling the 2,000-ha (AMGL, 2014)

agricultural land in Hacienda Dolores in Porac, Pampanga. Out of this total area, they are only

requesting 761.1 ha for their portion of land (Pabillo and Tria-Tiron, 2014). However, in 2005,

their productivity was interrupted when the DAR exempted their land from agrarian reform

coverage as it was deemed unproductive and unfit for agricultural use (Focus on the Global

South, et al., 2015b). Its proximity to the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway and the tourism

hotspot, Mt. Pinatubo volcanic crater-lake, makes it attractive for big developers to convert into

residential, commercial and recreational areas, which would entail massive land conversion and

29

displacement (Focus on the Global South, et al., 2015b). After being deemed unfit for

production, the land was claimed by Leonardo-Lachenal-Leoncio Holdings (LLL) and FL

Property Management Corp. (FL), both partner corporations of Ayala Land, Inc. (Focus on the

Global South, et al., 2015b). LLL started claiming 298 ha of land in 2005 while, in 2007, FL

Corp. started claiming 456 ha of land including ancestral lands of Ayta communities (AMGL,

2013).

By 2015, farmers were unable to harvest their produce because the so-called “developers” had

barricaded the property and installed security personnel, some of whom were armed, to keep the

farmers away (Focus on the Global South, et al., 2015a). The farmers had made several requests

for DAR to conduct an ocular inspection in order for their land to be covered by the land reform

program, but nobody came to inspect (Focus on the Global South, et al., 2015b). Within the

barricaded area, trees were cut down by the developers’ personnel to show that the land is

unfertile. A new park called Sandbox and a new community called Alviera in Porac have already

been constructed in the area. The farmers, who rely solely on income through farming, have been

experiencing difficulties and hunger ever since the claimants came (Focus on the Global South,

et al., 2015b). They are being threatened with bogus criminal accusations. They fear for their

lives as life-threatening incidents have occurred among their peers.

Antonio “Apung Tony” Tolentino was the barangay chairperson of Hacienda Dolores leading the

resistance against the companies displacing the farmers and depriving them of their farmlands.

He was initially arrested on 13 January 2014, with his son Ener, due to a confrontation which

turned violent between farmers and the private security installed by the land developers in the

area (Focus on the Global South, et al., 2015a). The land developers’ security personnel fired

gunshots at the farmers, resulting in the death of Armando Lumibao Padino, a member of

Alyansa ng Nagkakaisang Mamamayan sa Hacienda Dolores (ANIBAN) and injured father and

son, Noel and Raymond Tumali on 12 January 2014 (Punto!, 2014). The next day, Apung Tony

and Ener were arrested and posted bail on charges of slight physical injuries and grave threats

(KARAPATAN, 2014). Although Apung Tony did not initiate the violence, he was charged with

various crimes including murder, which were false according to the residents of the area

(KARAPATAN, 2014). On another note, according to the Alliance for the Advancement of

30

People’s Rights (KARAPATAN), later on 16 April 2014, Apung Tony was arrested again by 30

members of the San Francisco City and Porac City PNP in combat gear, on carnapping charges.

He was also charged with kidnapping with physical injuries, administrative complaint for grave

misconduct, oppression, abuse of authority and acts prejudicial to public service

(KARAPATAN, 2014). Two days after Apung Tony’s arrest, the policemen came back to

Hacienda Dolores and conducted an operation charging all of Apung Tony’s sons, Tirso, Ener,

Ed, Erwin and Eddie, with carnapping but no arrests were made. Residents informed

KARAPATAN that along with the policemen conducting the operation who came in combat

gear without nameplates, were some security personnel of LLL and the Porac PNP Chief Miro

In a separate incident on May 2, 2014, Menelao “Ka Melon” Barcia, a Barangay Councilor and a

farmer leader of ANIBAN monitoring Apung Tony’s charges and helping unite the farmers to

defend their land, was killed by unidentified armed men while on his way home with his wife

and niece (KARAPATAN, 2014). His wife, Maria, also suffered gunshot wounds. According to

an interview with Arthur Barcia conducted by Focus on the Global South et al. (2015a), the

assailants failed in their attempt to take certain documents from the bag of Ka Melon’s niece. He

also said that, prior to Ka Melon’s murder, there were talks that he would be attending a meeting

about the conflict in Poracay, Pampanga. Seeking justice for the death of the farmer leader and

the trauma it has caused his wife as well as his constituents is difficult, as witnesses are afraid to

testify against the assailants. They fear that they will end up with the same fate as Ka Melon if

they talk. The frequency of killings and harassments occurring in Hacienda Dolores is alarming,

but cases are still unresolved because no suspects have been identified and witnesses are afraid to

testify.

These are only the latest reported incidents of violence related to the arrival of LLL, FL and

Ayala Land, Inc. and the displacement of farmers in Hacienda Dolores. Earlier in 2013, 30

ANIBAN members were charged with grave threats, grave coercion and usurpation of real rights

in real property by the security personnel of LLL (KARAPATAN, 2014). This was because,

during an assembly of ANIBAN at which members were discussing strategies to stop the

developers from taking their farm lands, LLL security guards tried to construct barricades around

the farmers’ lands. The farmers were able to stop them, however, and the guards failed to present

31

a legal permit proving their right to barricade the area upon the demand of village councilors Ka

Melon and Ka Cornie (KARAPATAN, 2014). The guards were forced to leave but they

retaliated months later by pressing charges against the farmers.

From 30 to 31 October 2013, a National Fact-Finding and Solidarity Mission (NFFSM), led by

AMGL, ANIBAN, KARAPATAN-Central Luzon, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP),

and Anakpawis Party-list, was conducted to investigate the land grabbing and displacement cases

in Porac, Pampanga perpetrated by LLL, FL Corp. and Ayala Land, Inc. (AMGL, 2013). In LLL

and FL Corp.’s claiming of 754 ha of land, the NFFSM group documented on 4 November 2011,

26 cases of destruction and divestment of properties affecting 21 farmers, 5 peasant women, and

causing the mass arrest of 12 farmers who were illegally arrested and detained. The NFFSM

group also documented cases of harassment, threat and intimidation where farmers were coerced

into signing waivers yielding their land rights voluntarily. On 24 August 2013, 20 unidentified

men surrounded the house of Ruben Zalta, a 79 year-old farmer cultivating 10.5 ha of land in

Hacienda Dolores, and coerced him and his wife, Teresita, to sign a waiver of voluntary

surrender of their land.

The struggle faced by farmers of Hacienda Dolores vividly portrays how large corporations are

favored because of their promises of profit far beyond anything produced by small-scale farmers.

Farmers and movement leaders have been imprisoned, intimidated, harassed and killed but

justice seems nowhere to be found. Suspects for the cases of murder have not been identified.

Former residents of the hacienda now fear for their lives and their future as they toil to find other

sources of income because their land has become inaccessible.

3. Conversion of Farmlands into Real Estate Properties in Gimalas, Balayan,

Batangas

In Gimalas, Balayan, Batangas subdivisions and other development projects have replaced once

productive farmlands. One project site, which was originally a retention area for landowners who

leased the land to farmers for 25% of their income from harvests, was sold to Empire East Land

Holdings, Inc. (EELHI), a company of Megaworld, to turn into a 31-ha Science Park and port

(CARRD, 2014). For the sale to occur, the landowners needed the farmers to waive their rights

32

and access to their land. The farmers were offered PhP 350,000 to PhP 550,000 per ha to leave

their farms and an additional PhP 400,000 to construct their homes in a relocation site to be

provided (CARRD, 2014). They were also promised jobs in the development projects being

constructed, which made the offer more enticing.

Although the figures seemed fair, these did not match the constant income that the farmers would

obtain from future annual harvests. Moreover, because the farmers were not an organized group,

some had limited negotiating capacity, thus resulting in varied compensation packages. Some

were able to receive 140 m2

lots while others only received 35 m2

(CARRD, 2014). Although the

process was peaceful and the farmers were compensated, it should be noted that the farmers were

bombarded with various enticing promises that made the offer seem an easy solution to their

issues, such as fear about not holding Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) over their

lands as well as growing debts. While the farmers may initially enjoy the compensation that they

have received, it is actually insufficient to ensure their long-term welfare. Now landless, they are

not able to farm, having lost that most important asset sustaining their lives.

4. Land Grabbing through Agribusiness Venture Agreements with Agrarian

Reform Beneficiaries in Tagum, Davao del Norte

In Tagum, Davao del Norte, 724 agrarian reform beneficiaries belonging to the Hijo Agrarian

Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative (HARBCO) lost control of their land as their collective CLOA

for 570 ha was subjected to a local agribusiness venture (AR Now!, 2014). Their land was

originally part of the 1,469 ha property owned by Hijo Plantation, Inc. (HPI) which was offered

by HPI for coverage under CARP through a voluntary offer to sell. The property, primarily used

for production of export quality bananas, was valued at P 1.03 million per ha by the courts (AR

Now!, 2014).

In 1998, HARBCO entered into a 10-year Banana Sales and Marketing Agreement (BSMA) with

HPI. The HARBCO membership was divided over this contract agreement as some ARBs were

not willing to enter into a BSMA with HPI. According to a focus group discussion conducted by

The Peoples’ Campaign for Agrarian Reform Network, Inc. (AR Now!) with the officers of

HARBCO in 2014, the divide among HARBCO members occurred partly because those who

were not willing to enter the agreement were in control of around 40% of the land, harvesting

33

and selling their produce to DOLE-Stanlifico. This disagreement led to violent confrontations

between the two factions of HARBCO until April 1999, when a reconciliation process resulted in

the re-joining of some anti-BSMA HARBCO ARBs back into the main group. By June 1999,

HPI gave its rights over the BSMA to Lapanday Foods Corporation (LAPANDAY). This was

followed by the most violent clash between the two factions, causing the death of two HPI

employees and injury of about 30 ARBs (AR Now!, 2014).

In 2000-2003, HARBCO experienced growth through the BSMA. However, this was disrupted

in 2004 when farm production decreased allegedly due to an aerial spraying sabotage (AR Now!,

2014). In 2008, LAPANDAY took over the operations of the cooperative’s farm as HARBCO’s

liabilities to LAPANDAY increased, resulting to a total debt of PhP 115 million. This transition

pushed through as part of the BSMA, where LAPANDAY, as agreed, would have the right to

take over and handle farm operations of HARBCO if crop success is jeopardized by HARBCO’s

failure to follow LAPANDAY’s prescribed cultural practices. In LAPANDAY’s take over, a

framework executed by both parties established the guidelines to be followed. The take-over was

set for two years, subject to extension should HARBCO remain unable to pay its debt. As of

2012, their debt had grown to PhP 290.8 million (AR Now!, 2014). Some ARBs who were not

employed by LAPANDAY as farm workers were forced to find income elsewhere, not even

being able to set foot on their land, except within the housing areas.

5. Victory of CARPER in the Bondoc Peninsula, Quezon Province

Bondoc Peninsula is located at the southernmost part of Quezon province. Since the 1950s, copra

has been the major crop, and agriculture the main way of life in the area (Carranza, 2011). In a

1989 study by the Asian Institute of Management, it was found that the concentration of land

ownership in the 1970s was heavily skewed, with 44% of the area’s agricultural lands being

owned by 1.1% of the population (as cited by Carranza, 2011). By 1988, the year CARP took

effect, the biggest haciendas in the area were Hacienda Reyes (estimated at 8,000-12,000 ha), the

Uy-claimed areas (about 3,500 ha) and the Hacienda Matias (2,500 ha) (Carranza, 2011). As the

farmers learned about their rights under CARP and began to organize, violence occurred

incessantly in the area. The landlords hired armed personnel to harass and intimidate the

peasants, who were forcibly displaced, their houses and crops destroyed, and their farm animals

34

taken. Peasant leaders were attacked, killed, or charged with made-up allegations. By the end of

2009, the landlords filed a total of 326 criminal cases against 228 leaders and members of the

Kilusang Magbubukid ng Bondoc Peninsula (KMBP), the district-wide federation of 48 hacienda

organizations in the peninsula (Carranza, 2011). With the concentration of land ownership and

the evident intimidation of peasants in the peninsula, Bondoc is unmistakably a “hotbed” of

agrarian reform conflicts.

In 1999, 155 ha of land owned by the Reyes family were distributed through the peasant

movement (Carranza, 2011). This success gave peasants hope that land-ownership is possible

under the agrarian reform program. By 2009, more than 10,000 ha of agricultural land producing

coconuts were collectively controlled by 3,800 family members of KMBP (Carranza, 2011). In

October 2012, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) urged the Philippine government

through DAR to uphold the rights of the landless farmers of Hacienda Matias by implementing

CARP and ending human rights violations perpetuated by the landowners (FIAN International,

n.d., para. 28). In June 2014, the Office of the President declared coverage and redistribution of

1,829 ha of coconut lands in San Francisco, Quezon under CARP (FIAN International, n.d., para.

50). By the end of 2014, 312 tenants were given a maximum of three ha of land each, from the

639 ha portion of Hacienda Matias, while 102 tenants were given a total of 190 ha from the

estate owned by Juanito Tan, also in San Francisco, Quezon (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2014).

In spite of the success of the peasant movement in acquiring their right to land, peasants continue

to suffer harassment from landowners. Up until February 2015, CLOA holders in Hacienda

Matias in the villages of Butanglad and Don Juan Vercelos were prohibited by the hired security

personnel of the landowners to harvest the copra produced in the land awarded to them (Mallari,

2015a). Maribel Luzara, president of KMBP, told Inquirer Southern Luzon that most of the

agrarian reform beneficiaries were forced to leave behind their copra produce to avoid facing

criminal charges (Mallari, 2015a). Instead, the landowner sold the copra and gave farmers only a

third of the total price.

In April 2015, the farmers demanded from DAR the completion of land survey processes in an

attempt to end harassments in the area (FIAN International, n.d., para. 56). Luckily for the 288

35

uninstalled agrarian reform beneficiaries of Hacienda Matias, DAR came through to ensure the

assertion of their rights (Rural Poor Institute for Land and Human Rights Services, Inc., 2015).

During the first attempt to install ARBs in May 2015, they were accompanied by representatives

from DAR, the Department of National Defense (DND), the Department of Social Welfare and

Development (DSWD), the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC), the CHR and the PNP

to help take down the barbed wire and steel gates installed by the landowners prohibiting farmers

to enter their land (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2014). However, this was unsuccessful as the

representatives from the different sectors only issued warning notices to the Hacienda Matias

landowners’ security personnel (Mallari, 2015b). The installation was interrupted because the

gate was blocked with drums and a herd of cattle by the hacienda workers (Mallari, 2015b).

Victory was only attained when Undersecretary for Legal Affairs Luis Pangulayan and other

DAR officials and representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of

Interior and Local Governance (DILG), DSWD, CHR, municipal agrarian reform officials and

the court sheriff, accompanied by 200 policemen and army soldiers arrived on 2 July 2015

(Mallari, 2015b). They demolished the concrete and steel barriers that had been constructed by

the landowners and resumed the formal installation of 283 agrarian reform beneficiaries (Mallari,

2015b). Moreover, Guillermo Catandihan, Hacienda Matias’ overseer and workers’ leader, was

arrested together with his brother Aladin Sr. and nephew Aladin Jr. for obstruction of CARP

implementation (Mallari, 2015b).

This situation proves that acquiring title to land does not guarantee security of tenure. Despite

beneficiaries holding legal documents proving their right to access and control land, they were

still barred by powerful landowners unwilling to give up their land despite lawful acquisition.

Land reform does not end with giving out titles to peasants. Continuous protection of their rights

should be ensured as well. These cases also demonstrate that, if government institutions would

coordinate and perform their responsibilities, implementation of the law and the protection of

peoples’ land rights are possible.

36

B. Conflicts on Access to and Control of Ancestral Domains

From 2009-2012, the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) recorded seven

clusters of IP rights violations/IPRVs (as shown in figure 4). “Civil and political rights” include

IPRVs involving extra-judicial killings, enforced disappearances, tortures, murders and

homicides. “Complaints on Ancestral Domains Rights” are IPRVs related to encroachments,

displacement due to conflicts with settlers, development activities, and demolitions. It also

includes violation of rights to clean environment. IPRVs on “militarization and private armed

groups” refer to violations brought about by displacement and/or harassment due to military

operations, paramilitary groups and private armed groups. “Benefit sharing” includes violations

due to distribution and misappropriation of royalties, complaints on the implementation of

agreements, and complaints related to misunderstandings regarding MOAs. Notice that the

second most frequently recurring complaint recorded by NCIP are IPRVs related to ancestral

domains rights.

Figure 4. Indigenous Peoples' Rights Violations Complaints per Cluster (2009-2012).

Source: “Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in Practice and Quick Response for IP Rights Violations: A Human Rights

Report of the 5th

NCIP-CEB” (2012)

39.83

15.58 6.93

4.33

14.72

3.46 15.15

Indigenous People's Rights Violations Complaints Per Cluster (2009-2012)

Civil and Political Rights

Ancestral Domains Rights

Militarization and Private ArmedGroups

Benefit Sharing

Free, Prior and Informed Consent(FPIC) issues

Complaints on MandatoryRepresentative

Complaints against NCIP Staff andother Government Agencies

37

Moreover, table 3 below shows a detailed version of NCIP’s data on IPRVs, indicating how

many complaints are recorded per region. It can be gleaned that Region XIII has the greatest

number of complaints and Regions V and VIII have no record at all. More significantly, it shows

that from 2009-2012, NCIP had recorded 68 cases of ancestral domains rights violations. This

cluster accounts for 15.58% of the total number of complaints related to IPRVs recorded for this

sector. It also indicates that Region XIII accounts for majority of the complaints related to

ancestral domains rights violations recorded.

Table 3. Number of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Violations Complaints per Region from

2009-2012.

Type of

Complaint

Number of Complaints Per Region CAR I II III IV V VI &

VII

VIII IX X XI XII XIII Total

Civil and

political Rights

1 4 6 1 9 23 10 19 19 92

Ancestral

Domains Rights

1 3 6 6 2 2 6 1 5 36 68

Militarization

and Private

Armed Groups

1 1 2 5 8 17

Benefit Sharing 1 2 2 1 2 3 11

FPIC Issues 3 3 7 10 5 4 32

Complaints on

Mandatory

Representative

1 2 5 8

Complaints

against NCIP

staff and other

Government

Agencies

1 1 9 10 6 14 41

Total 7 1

0

1

3

13 2 3

1

51 21 32 89 269

Source: “Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in Practice and Quick Response for IP Rights Violations: A Human Rights

Report of the 5th

NCIP-CEB” (2012)

Moreover, table 4 shows the alleged violators of indigenous peoples’ rights as recorded by the

NCIP in 2012. It can be gleaned that from 2009-2012, IP rights violations are mostly committed

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by armed groups and militia with 83 cases recorded, followed by mining corporations,

plantations, hydro corporations, farmers’ associations, universities, communication projects,

business establishments and resorts with 70 cases of IPRVs recorded. It should also be noted that

IP rights violations are also committed by government agencies, military, police and security

forces and even other indigenous peoples, whether clans or individuals.

Table 4. Alleged Violators of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights (2009-2012).

Perpetrators Number of Cases Percentage

Armed Group/Militia 83 33.47%

Mining Corporations, Plantations,

Hydro Corporations, Farmers’

Associations, Universities,

Communication Projects, Business

Establishments, and Resorts

70 28.26%

Government Agencies 50 20.16%

Military, Police and Security

Forces

22 8.87%

Indigenous Peoples (Clans or

Individuals)

15 6.05%

Non-Indigenous Peoples / Ranch

Owners

5 2.02%

Unidentified 3 1.21% Source: “Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in Practice and Quick Response for IP Rights Violations: A Human Rights

Report of the 5th NCIP-CEB” (2012)

From the 2012 report of NCIP, it can be concluded that the most frequently occurring indigenous

peoples’ rights violations are abuses against civil and political rights and ancestral domains

rights. Region XIII has the greatest number of complaints followed by Regions X and XII, while

there is no record of complaints in Region V and VIII. Finally, these IPRVs are perpetrated by

armed groups or militia, mining corporations, plantations, hydro corporations, farmers’

associations, universities, communication projects, business establishments, resorts, government

agencies, military, police and security forces and even other indigenous peoples, clans or

individuals. In monitoring and protecting the rights of indigenous peoples, it should be noted that

these are the violations they should be protected from in the said areas, as well as from the

identified perpetrators. Having this information on hand is helpful in more effectively monitoring

and resolving IP rights violations.

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1. Special Economic Zone APECO and the Agta/Dumagat Ancestral Domain Claim

In an unpublished case study by De Vera and Libre (2015), the experiences of the Agta/Dumagat

in Casiguran, Aurora upon the legislation in 2010 of Republic Act 10083—also known as the

Aurora Pacific Economic Zone and Freeport Act (APECO)–were described. Initially, it was

through Republic Act 7916 or the Special Economic Zone of 1995 that the transformation of

selected areas into highly developed agro-industrial, tourist/recreational, commercial, banking,

investment, and financial centers was legislated. It was through RA 7916 that in 2010, APECO

was approved, making way for the establishment of a special economic zone and free port in

Aurora (De Vera and Libre, 2015).

According to De Vera and Libre (2015), in the course of implementation of this Act, around 250

Agta/Dumagat and over a thousand non-Agta families in five barangays of Casiguran were

affected. The said Act aims to convert a total of 13,852 ha of rice lands, coconut plantations,

forests, coastal areas and human settlements in five barangays of Casiguran into an industrial

complex—an economic zone and free port complete with industrial parks, airport, hotels, ship

anchorage and recreational facilities (De Vera and Libre, 2015).

The proponents of the said law continue to insist that rights of indigenous communities were not

violated by denying the existence of indigenous communities in the affected areas. Because of

APECO, the remaining Agta/Dumagat are facing impending extinction as their population is

declining by 40%, according to Headland (as cited by De Vera and Libre, 2015). They suffer

from malnutrition and various diseases because they are losing important traditional food

components from the forest and coast. Continuous influx of migrants also contributes to their

marginalization. APECO is in violation of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) as the

Agta/Dumagat ancestral domain in the San Ildefonso Peninsula was taken over without the

proper consultation and the free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) from the IPs as mandated by

IPRA (De Vera and Libre, 2015). APECO further hinders the recognition of ancestral domains

that the Agta/Dumagat submitted way back in 1995. Lastly, their claim is further weakened as

group polarization ensues among IPs, where some prominent leaders have sided with APECO

and endorse its acceptability.

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2. Mamanwa in Barangay San Pablo, Jabonga, Agusan del Norte

For the Mamanwa of Dinarawan, land and water are more than just sources of food and income.

They, along with other indigenous communities, consider themselves as an integral part of the

ecosystem, interacting with it and with one another. They see the significance of their

environment in shaping their spiritual and cultural traditions. This harmonious relationship with

the environment was disrupted when the Mamanwa community learned of the impending mining

operations of Mindoro Resources Ltd. (MRL), a Canadian mining company exploring nickel,

copper and gold in the Philippines (De Vera, 2014).

The 8,000-ha ancestral domain of the Mamanwa indigenous community composed of 67

households covers terrestrial and lakeshore areas (De Vera, 2014). This community comprises

the majority of the population of Sitios Dinarawan and Bunga in Barangay San Pablo, Jabonga,

Agusan del Sur. Their settlement covers Lake Mainit, the fourth largest lake in the Philippines,

and the forests of Mt. Hilong-hilong and Mt. Mabalao (De Vera, 2014). Meanwhile, the mining

tenement given to MRL covers the areas of Mt. Hilong-hilong, a key biodiversity area (KBA)

spanning four provinces and 20 municipalities, including Jabonga and Lake Mainit, which is also

a KBA candidate and a Conservation Priority Area (CPA) (De Vera, 2014).

In 2011, the Mamanwa community filed a complaint before the Compliance Adviser

Ombudsman (CAO) of the International Finance Corporation, one of MRL’s major shareholders,

to address the entrance of MRL employees into the sacred grounds of the Mamanwas without

their FPIC (De Vera, 2014). The local government of Jabonga actively supports and promotes

the operation of MRL in the municipality, encouraging the Mamanwa community to allow the

mining operation to proceed with the promise of royalty payments and job opportunities that will

be available to them once it starts operating. This and the lack or incomprehensibility of

information on the nature of MRL’s operations and its impacts on the environment triggered the

division within the Mamanwa community.

3. Copper and Gold Mining in Tampakan, South Cotabato

In Mindanao, four provinces (South Cotabato, Saranggani, Davao del Sur and Sultan Kudarat)

are under threat as the operation of an estimated 10,000-ha mining area approaches (UNHRC,

2014). According to a written statement presented by Europe-Third World Centre (CETIM) and

41

Franciscans International at the 26th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations

Human Rights Council on 6 June 2014, the Tampakan Copper-Gold Project is the seventh largest

undeveloped copper mine in the world, and will be the largest copper-gold mine in South East

Asia once it becomes operational. Its ownership has recently been acquired by Filipino-owned

Alsons Prime Investment Corporation from Anglo-Swiss Glencore Plc (Philippine Alliance of

Human Rights Advocates, 2015). It is operated by a local subsidiary, Sagittarius Mines Inc.

(SMI). From SMI’s environmental impact assessment conducted in 2011, its operation will

directly affect 5,000 people, mostly indigenous peoples, requiring resettlement (UNHRC, 2014).

The mining project will directly affect five watersheds, around 4,000 ha of old-growth forest and

five ancestral domains of IPs (UNHRC, 2014). It will particularly affect a substantial portion of

ancestral domains of the Bla’an.

In a study by Goodland and Wicks (2008 as cited by UNHRC, 2014), the mining operation in the

said area should be banned considering the risks it poses to the environment and its negative

impacts involving food insecurity, seismic geo-hazard and the presence of armed conflict. The

absence of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) from the Bla’an is also considered a major

issue, being a necessary requirement under IPRA before allowing a project that affects lands

owned by IPs (UNHRC, 2014). In addition to this, human rights violations related to the

Tampakan mining project started upon the arrival of Western Mining Corporation (WMC) in

partnership with Tampakan Group of Companies (TGC), the original owners of the mining

contract. Since 1997, the mining operation has committed human rights violations including

displacement, lack of consultation, misinformation, threats and harassment, and the failure to

secure FPIC (UNHRC, 2014).

A fact-finding mission conducted by Tampakan Forum in April 2012 (as cited by UNHRC,

2014) proved that military and security forces in the area are increasing because of the growing

opposition of the Bla’an to the mining project. This presence has instilled fear among the Bla’an,

restricting their freedom of movement. The mission also proved that the mining project operators

violated a Philippine government order to abstain from development activities while its

application for an environmental clearance was still being appealed. The mining project failed to

fully implement the provisions of the Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC) issued by the

42

DENR. The fact-finding mission also established that the following human rights violations have

been done: the destruction and burning of crops, farms and houses for a road widening project; at

least four incidents of harassment in 2012 perpetrated by the police and military; violation and

disruption of cultural practices and religious beliefs; and five cases of extra-judicial killings,

where all the victims were relatives of Daquil Capion, the Bla’an chief, defending their ancestral

lands against the mining operation. In 2014, a military incursion led to exchange of gunfire

between the military and the indigenous people (UNHRC, 2014).

The Tampakan Project is on “down-scaled status,” with the foreign divestment of Anglo-Swiss

Glencore Plc in 2015, the temporary re-positioning of military personnel in the area as a result of

a CHR investigation, and after undergoing an 80% reduction in its programmed funds and

staffing for 2014, the mining project is not yet suspended and the operators are committed to

obtain the regulatory requirements to start their operation (PAHRA, 2015).

4. Corporate Social Responsibility Accomplished in Ambuklao and Binga Dams

In the 1950s, one of the first hydroelectric power plants in the Philippines was built by the

National Power Corporation (NPC) in the vicinity of Ambuklao and Binga, Bokod, Benguet. For

some, this meant economic opportunity, while for the Ibaloi, indigenous residents of Bokod

Benguet, it meant displacement and conversion of their fertile land into a dam. A documentary

entitled “Making Monkey Business” conducted by the John F. Kennedy School of Government

at Harvard University narrates how peace between the Ibaloi of Ambuklao and Binga dams and

the builders of the power plants was attained.

Although compensation procedures were initiated by the government, these were not enough to

ease the affected community’s resentment about what happened to their beloved land. Because of

the construction of the dam, the residents’ native rice, kintoman red rice, ceased to be produced.

Moreover, the compensation procedures were not executed very well. The affected residents

were told they would be receiving lands in Isabela and Palawan but resettlement assistance was

not provided, forcing them to resettle by themselves above the dam. The company’s resistance to

listen and negotiate with the community about their needs also contributed to the residents’

anger.

43

About 60 years later, the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank Group financed

the sale of the plants to SN Aboitiz Power Benguet, Inc. (SNAPB). Along with the purchase of

the property came the bitterness of the residents over the land and livelihood they had lost. With

the help of the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO) of the World Bank Group and the

Conflict Resolution Group Foundation, Inc. (CoRe Group) in the Philippines, a mediated

dialogue was facilitated among the stakeholders to discuss and resolve each party’s issues.

Members of the community chose the following in the dialogue: NPC, Private Sector Assets and

Liabilities Management Group, SNAPB, two representatives of the municipal government, two

representatives from the barangay government, two Indigenous Peoples’ Organizations and a

representative from the office of the Governor.

The mediated dialogue started with a capacity-building workshop, leveling everyone’s

negotiation skills, making connections and thus enabling the exchange of ideas and opinions.

The five-day workshop allowed the different stakeholders to get to know each other, set aside

prejudices towards other parties, listen, understand and accept each other’s concerns. It took

seven months of smaller sessions for the stakeholders to negotiate a comprehensive

Memorandum of Agreement signed in May 2009. Individually, the parties discussed with the

mediators the issues they wanted addressed in the agreement. The indigenous people were asked

what their land means to them, and from that the agreement was constructed. For them, land

means three things: (i) it symbolizes the recognition and respect of their culture; (ii) it is a source

of opportunity; and (iii) it provides security. Henceforth, it was agreed that NPC will surrender

its control of the indigenous community’s surrounding lands to establish a Cultural Heritage Site.

SNAPB agreed to provide financial assistance for the community’s development and

environmental protection, and to collaborate with the community members in conducting

programs to address their needs. The different government offices agreed to consult with the IP

Organizations before forming development projects; while the IP Organizations, in turn, agreed

to communicate their needs with the development councils of the barangay and the province.

In the end, the community learned to accept what had been done to their land and the company

acknowledged its responsibilities. Stakeholders learned to communicate their needs, recognizing

44

that a peace agreement is a continuous process. The experience of the Ibaloi of Bokod, Benguet

shows that, with a genuine sense of corporate social responsibility, peace between conflicting

parties can be attained. Although the land taken cannot be given back nor returned to its original

state, significant improvement was made in the community as the corporation operating within

the ancestral lands learned to communicate with the IPs, assist them with their needs, and respect

their culture.

C. Resource Conflict Involving Municipal Waters

In a study conducted by Lim (n.d.), fishers were identified as belonging to three categories:

municipal fishers, commercial fish workers and aquaculture workers. Municipal fishers are those

living in coastal municipalities and who directly depend on marine resources for food and

income. Similar to indigenous communities, the significance of their source of livelihood extends

to its value as an integral part of their culture and identity. Commercial fish workers are those

who catch fish for mass production. They perceive fishing as a means to earn income and view

bodies of water as sources of marine products. Aquaculture workers are those who work for

aqua-farm enterprises, cultivating marine products.

Municipal fishers value water resources not only for the income they produce but also for their

long-term productivity and their capacity to ensure the sustenance of their family and future

generations. They are more inclined to protect marine resources, compared to commercial fishers

whose inclination is to increase production to meet international and domestic demands for fish

products and to have better wages (Lim, n.d.). Moreover, to meet market demands, commercial

fishers resort to the use of destructive fishing methods and highly efficient fishing practices

which result to overfishing. In this regard, the disparate interests of municipal fishers and

commercial fishers in using and managing marine resources can be seen. Adding to these

conflicting interests are the effects of practices by aquaculture enterprises, which adversely affect

both commercial fishers and municipal fishers. As aquaculture requires large areas of water

resources for optimum efficiency, mangroves are converted into fishponds and areas near the

bays are fenced, thereby reducing municipal and commercial fishers’ access to their fishing

grounds. The conversion of mangrove areas, which are the breeding ground of several marine

45

species, contributes to the depletion of fish stocks, consequently decreasing the amount of fish

caught by both municipal and commercial fishers.

According to Lim (n.d.), this conflict in interest between the groups of fishers becomes more

intense because of the communal nature of access to marine resources. Thus, in order to resolve

issues of access to marine resources, RA 8550 or the Fisheries Code of 1998 was used to identify

which groups of fishers are allowed to use specific fishing areas based on the gross weight of

fishing boats they are using. It designated marine waters up to 15 kilometers from the shoreline

as municipal waters, indicating the priority of its use by municipal fishers and their

organizations.

1. Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) Fishing in the Philippines

In June 2014, the European Union issued a “yellow card” warning to the Philippines due to its

reluctance to rectify illegal fishing activities. In this regard, our country was given six months to

take action and improve our legal and monitoring system concerning our aquatic resources.

Being the world’s biggest fish importer, the European Union aims to ensure that its market

includes only legally and sustainably caught fish (Bauzon, 2014). The warning was issued based

on the European Union’s Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) Regulation of 2010, which

was developed to combat IUU fishing practices. Of the EUR 5.1 billion total exports to the

European Union, the Philippines’ fishery export to EU amounted to EUR 170 million in 2013

(Bauzon, 2014).

In April 2015, this warning was revoked as the EU acknowledged the Philippines’ efforts to

improve its fisheries governance and to address IUU fishing practices. Republic Act 10654,

which amends the Philippine Fisheries Code, was passed into law on 27 February 2015. It aims

to “prevent, deter and eliminate IUU” fishing in the Philippines, by imposing higher penalties for

violations and stricter rules on commercial fishing. The amended law also authorized the creation

of an adjudication committee under the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), to

speed up the determination of liability of violators and imposition of penalties (Oceana, 2015). In

this regard, a 41-member technical working group (TWG) was formed to draft the implementing

rules and regulations to be finished by September 2015. However, concerns from the

46

stakeholders regarding the imbalance in the composition of the TWG were relayed to BFAR.

The TWG is comprised of 20 commercial fishing sector representatives, nine government

representatives, three from NGOs, six from municipal fishers, two from the academe and one

from the aquarium fish exporters. Hopefully, the amended law would be well enforced to enable

the replenishment of the country’s fish stocks.

2. Impacts of Aquaculture and Tourism in Calatagan, Batangas

In a case study conducted by Calvan and Ablola (2011), the privatization and commercialization

of foreshore areas in the Municipality of Calatagan in Batangas were documented to describe the

experience of artisanal fishers as they reclaim their foreshore lands, fishery and inland resources.

The study also assessed the impacts of aquaculture and commercialization of foreshore areas on

the access to and use of marine resources by municipal fishers.

In Calatagan, Batangas, municipal waters and shoreline, once used as traditional routes to fishing

grounds and boat docks, are now enclosed and converted into private and commercial beach

resort developments. Moreover, mangroves have been converted into fish and shrimp ponds,

endangering marine biodiversity and threatening fishers’ income. Aquaculture was promoted by

the local government of Calatagan to address the diminishing number of fish caught and to

provide alternative jobs for displaced or marginalized fishers (Calvan and Ablola, 2011).

One prominent case of aquaculture development in Calatagan, the Juan Lorenzo Vergara (JLV)

Shrimp Farm owned by a lawyer-businessman living in Metro Manila, is located in what used to

be a mangrove forest and stretching further to foreshore lands. In the expansion of JLV Shrimp

Farm, around 30,000 mangrove trees have been destroyed, according to the estimates of

Samahan ng mga Maliit na Mangingisda sa Calatagan (SAMMACA) (as cited in Calvan and

Ablola, 2011), affecting around 3,000 fishing families who extract seashells and shrimps for

household consumption. Although JLV started its operation in 1986, they were not able to secure

the foreshore and fishpond lease agreement (FLA) permits required by the Philippine Fisheries

Code of 1998 or RA 8550 until October 2005. SAMMACA members inquired at the central

office of DENR and the local government of Calatagan about issues concerning the management

of foreshore lands and mangrove forests. They also questioned how JLV was able to secure an

47

Environment Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the DENR and an FLA from BFAR when the

construction of its ponds involved the obliteration of the area. The responses they were given

were not satisfactory.

In addition, it was found that out of the 20 beach resorts found in Calatagan, only two had

approved Foreshore Lease Agreements, proving that majority of the tourism establishments were

unregistered and built without proper authorization (de Los Reyes, as cited by Calvan and

Ablola, 2011). The Golden Sunset Resort in Barangay Uno, owned by renowned stylist and TV

personality, Ricky Reyes, and constructed within deforested mangrove areas, is one of the resorts

in Calatagan, Batangas. The 4,667-square meter resort has been the subject of protests by

SAMMACA because of the construction of seawalls enclosing the foreshores, intimidation of

seaweed farmers from using foreshore areas, and seaweed destruction allegedly caused by the

release of contaminated water into the seaweed farms. A dialogue was conducted with Reyes,

resulting to the local government ordering the resort to stop further expansion and development

as it violates laws on the use of disposable and alienable public lands (Calvan and Ablola, 2011).

This case shows how the privatization of inland areas next to the foreshore results in the

reclamation of such areas, and the limiting of fishers’ access to the foreshores and to their fishing

grounds.

In 2014, BFAR rendered 120 legal and advisory services under its fisheries and aquatic resources

regulation services (DA, 2014). Although BFAR records did not mention the specifics of the

causes or the needs to render such services, this number provides an idea of the frequency of

conflicts involving the use of and access to municipal waters. In a separate data set requested

from BFAR’s Law Enforcement Quick Response Team (LE-QRT) (2015), maritime incidents

and issues involving commercial fishing vessels in 2014 were enumerated per region. Most of

the incidents recorded were poaching, illegal fishing, apprehension of commercial fishing

vessels, and non-compliance with the Fisheries Code. Poaching incidents were recorded in

Regions I and II, while in Region I, seven Vietnamese poachers were apprehended in territorial

waters. Illegal fishing and non-compliance with the Fisheries Code were recorded in Regions III,

IVb, VII, ARMM and CARAGA. There were no records of maritime incidents in Regions IVa,

V, VI, VIII, IX, XI, XII, XIII and the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR). Violations

48

committed by commercial fishing vessels, mostly Chinese, occurred in Regions III, X and the

Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Region III alone had a case of harassment

by the Chinese coast guard of some Philippine commercial fishing vessels operating in the

contested Scarborough Shoal. Although the data given by BFAR does not say how many people

were involved in the recorded maritime issues, the kinds of issues involving access to and use of

aquatic resources are clearly seen.

These include poaching, illegal fishing, and violation of RA 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries

Code by commercial fishing vessels.

In conclusion, conflicts involving municipal waters are brought about by varying interests of

municipal fishers, commercial fishers and aquaculture enterprises in the use and management of

marine resources. Some fishers protect marine resources to ensure meeting their needs and the

sustenance of future generations, while others work hard to meet the international demand for

marine products, despite damaging the ecosystem and hindering other fishers from accessing

marine resources in the process.

V. ANALYSIS

A. Nature of Conflicts Involving Agrarian Lands

Actors involved - Using the United States Institute for Peace’s framework on the types of actors

that could initiate or aggravate conflicts, it was gleaned from the five cases of agrarian conflict

included in this report that: (1) local community actors are comprised of (a) individual farmers or

farmers in an organized group and their families struggling to acquire rights to access and control

agricultural lands, (b) agrarian reform beneficiaries trying to secure or gain back control of their

lands, (c) landowners resisting the installation of ARBs into their acquired land, and (d) farmers

in disagreement with other local farmers concerning land management; (2) government actors

include the Department of Agrarian Reform being responsible for the overall implementation of

laws on the Agrarian Reform Program as well as the local government units of communities; and

(3) outside actors are comprised of (a) agribusinesses and (b) real estate developers.

49

Victims and perpetrators of conflict - In most cases, local communities are the victims of

conflict. Being the group with less influence and power, they are usually the ones displaced,

manipulated or barred from their rights. For example, the farmers of Hacienda Dolores in Porac,

Pampanga, having less economic and social status compared to the large corporations who took

over their land, ended up being displaced, marginalized, intimidated and in some cases, dead. In

the case of Gimalas, Balayan, Batangas, even though the take-over process was peaceful, it

proceeded because the farmers were given options too attractive to resist in exchange for rights

to land whose acquisition was ambiguous. In the cases of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur and

Tagum, Davao del Norte, the communities lost control of their land because of unforeseen

repercussions of the agribusiness agreement they entered into.

Local community actors can also be perpetrators of conflict. As seen in the case of Tagum,

Davao del Norte, because of a disagreement in entering into an agribusiness venture, the

organized farmers group was divided into two factions, resulting in destruction of fields,

harassments and killings. In the case of Bondoc Peninsula, landowners were able to resist the

installation of ARBs by deploying armed personnel and constructing fences to intimidate them.

The actions of government actors likewise determine the success of the local community actors

or the outside actors, having the impartial authority to manage resources. In the case of Porac,

Pampanga, the large corporations involved were successful in claiming the title of the 2,000-ha

land, including the 761.1 ha the farmers had been petitioning for, because it was deemed

unsuitable for agricultural use by DAR in spite of the presence of crops and trees grown by the

local community. The case of Bondoc Peninsula in Quezon Province, on the other hand, shows

how government actors helped in the success of local community actors. Through the joint

movement of DAR, DOJ, DILG, DND, DSWD, NAPC, CHR and the PNP to put down the

barricades of the landowners of Hacienda Matias, the installation of ARBs became possible.

Finally, outside actors are frequently the perpetrators of conflict. Between the local community

actors and outside actors, the latter have more power and influence to pursue their interests

involving the control and management of resources. They enter a local community, assess its

potential for producing profits, and entice its residents with riches in exchange for allowing the

50

industries and businesses to own, control or manage their resources. For example, in the case of

Gimalas, Balayan in Batangas, the Empire East Land Holdings Inc. (EELHI) saw Gimalas’

potential as a park and port. The developers successfully persuaded the farmers to waive their

rights and access to land in exchange for monetary compensation. In other cases, communities

resisted the incursion of industries into their area. As a result, locals were then intimidated by

hired military or armed personnel resulting in displacement, violence and even death of victims.

The case of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur shows how outside actors enter and assert their

interests by displacing local communities through intimidation and destruction of properties. The

case of farmers and residents of Hacienda Dolores in Porac Pampanga shows how resistance to

industrial occupation often leads to intimidation, harassment and death.

Causes of conflict - As evidenced by the five cases included in this report, conflicts occurred

because of: (i) varying interests in using and managing resources, (ii) relative power of the

conflict actors, (iii) institutional failure, and (iv) non-inclusive natural resource management.

In most cases, varying interests in using and managing agrarian lands is a cause of conflict. For

the farmers of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur and Tagum, Davao del Norte, conflict occurred

because they no longer saw that their agreement with FPPI and HPI-LAPANDAY, respectively,

in managing the land was just. As a result, they wanted to gain back their right to control and

manage the land as they deemed fit. The farmers of Hacienda Dolores in Porac, Pampanga,

meanwhile, wanted their land to remain agricultural under their management, while the LLL, FL

Corp. and Ayala Land saw its potential for real estate development and commercial use.

The relative power of conflict actors also determines the success or failure of the pursuance of

their interests. Outside actors such as agribusiness and real estate developers, having greater

social, political and economic resources, often use these to their advantage, while local

community actors use whatever resources they have to fight these large corporations. The

farmers of Porac, Pampanga were overpowered by LLL, FL Corp. and Ayala Land in acquiring

control of their land because the latter’s projected income was far greater than that of the small

farmers. Similarly, the farmers of Gimalas, Balayan, Batangas did not pursue their acquisition of

land rights because EELHI was able to offer an opportunity that appeared to solve their issues

51

and debts more easily. In the case of the ARBs of the Bondoc Peninsula, their aspiration to be

installed in the land awarded to them was successful because of the support of various

government institutions, using their authority to implement the law. This account shows that

government actors can intervene and wield greater power than the conflict perpetrators because

they have the overall authority regarding management of resources.

“Institutional failure” was seen as a cause of conflict in agribusiness ventures as well. ARBs who

entered into agreements with agribusiness industries failed to thoroughly understand the

implications of the agreements they were entering into. They were made to believe that entering

into such agreements would be of greater benefit to them than managing the land on their own.

In truth, this merely resulted in unjust treatment from their partners and loss of control over their

land. Another example was the failure to implement CARP in Hacienda Dolores, Porac,

Pampanga to cover the land for acquisition and distribution, thus making way for real estate

developers to claim the land and convert it to non-agricultural property.

Non-inclusive natural resource management as a cause of conflict was observed in Hacienda

Dolores, Porac, Pampanga where local communities were marginalized as the lands they had

been tilling for generations became parks and villages without their consideration.

Results of conflict - These conflicts over agrarian lands resulted to: (1) land use conversion, (2)

land grabbing, (3) displacement, and (4) human rights violations. Land use conversion from

agricultural lands to real estate properties occurred in the 2000-ha land in Hacienda Dolores,

Porac, Pampanga and the 31 ha in Gimalas, Balayan, Batangas as a result of varying interests in

resource management.

Land grabbing—where, according to the 2011 Tirana Declaration, the process of land acquisition

involves violation of human rights, is not based on free, prior and informed consent of all the

actors involved, is not based on a comprehensive assessment, disregarding its social, economic

and environmental impacts, and is not based on inclusive participation (International Land

Coalition Assembly Members, 2011)—was a result of agrarian land conflict in San Francisco in

Agusan del Sur; Gimalas in Balayan, Batangas; Hacienda Dolores in Porac, Pampanga; and

52

Tagum, Davao del Norte. Farmers of San Francisco and Tagum lost control of the land they

collectively owned because of a decision of a minority in the past to lease the land to a

corporation. They were deceived into entering a contract they thought would make their lives

easier but instead made them poorer and subject to oppression. These cases qualify as a form of

land grabbing because the acquisition agreements were not based on a comprehensive

assessment. The same was experienced by farmers of Gimalas, Balayan, Batangas. Instead of

pursuing the acquisition of their right to land, they waived their rights in exchange for financial

compensation as a result of their limited negotiating capacity. Instead of having access to secure

annual income from farming if they pursued their tenurial rights, they were deceived into

accepting a short-term solution incomparable to what they could have gained from continuing to

cultivate the land. The farmers of Hacienda Dolores experienced intimidation and threats in their

attempt to claim their tenurial rights amidst the competition with big corporations claiming the

land. Their participation in land management was also disregarded.

Resource conflict involving agrarian lands also resulted to the displacement of original settlers in

San Francisco, Agusan del Sur and Hacienda Dolores, Porac Pampanga. This was mainly

because of the incidence of violent conflict and intimidation in the area, thus forcing the people

to flee their homes. Moreover, conflicts also resulted in illegal detention, harassment,

intimidation and killings.

Intensity of conflict - Regarding the intensity of conflicts involving agrarian lands, most of the

cases reached the violent stage (see figure 5) where resource actors resorted to physically

aggressive actions—such as intimidation, harassments, destruction of properties and killings— to

pursue their interests. For example, in the case of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, conflict

perpetrators resorted to killing an ARB, while intimidating other ARBs to stop their plea to

revoke the lease contract. The cases of Porac, Pampanga and Bondoc, Quezon reached the

violent stage as well as these involved multiple cases of human rights violations such as

intimidations, harassments and killings. Among the cases included in this study, that of Porac,

Pampanga had the highest number of human rights violations, with two people actively involved

in pursuing the farmers’ rights were killed allegedly by the conflict perpetrators in 2014. In the

case of Tagum, Davao del Norte, although there is no recent record of violence, two HPI

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employees were killed and 30 ARBs injured because of the conflict between the two HARBCO

factions—definite evidence of escalation to the violent stage. The conflict that occurred in

Gimalas, Balayan, Batangas, however, was only in the latent stage because the conflict remained

hidden or undeveloped. Disagreements between the conflict actors regarding resource use and

management were not expressed, because of the farmers’ fear about not having CLOAs over the

lands they inhabit and the pressure of growing debts. In the end, they accepted compensatory

offers.

Figure 5. Intensity of conflict involving agrarian lands.

B. Nature of Resource Conflict Involving Ancestral Domains

Actors involved – Actors involved in ancestral domain conflicts are comprised of: (1) local

community actors such as indigenous communities of Agta/Dumagat in Casiguran, Aurora, the

Mamanwa of Jabonga, Agusan del Norte, the Bla’an of Tampakan, South Cotabato and the

Ibaloi of Bokod, Benguet; (2) government institutions such as the National Commission on

Indigenous Peoples, being the overall authority on the management of ancestral domains and

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protection of the rights of indigenous communities; and (3) outside actors including extractive

industries, state security personnel and non-government organizations.

Victims and perpetrators of conflict - In conflicts involving ancestral domains, similar to those

over agrarian land, local communities are usually the victims, while both government institutions

and outside actors are the conflict perpetrators. This is because outside actors and government

institutions are usually the ones disrupting the peace among local communities through

extractive activities, exploration or legislations enacted without considering the welfare of

affected indigenous communities. For example, MRL’s exploration in the area of the Mamanwa

of Jabonga, Agusan del Norte without FPIC threatened the conservation and protection of their

8,000-ha ancestral land, including sacred, terrestrial and lakeshore areas. In addition, the LGU of

Jabonga encouraged the Mamanwa community to allow the mining operation through royalty

compensations. MRL’s presence in the indigenous communities caused social tension for the IPs

as well, as their ancestral domains not only serve as shelter and a source of food, but also

embody their identity and cultural history. The same was observed in the case of the Bla’an in

Tampakan, South Cotabato. In the experience of the Agta/Dumagat of Casiguran, Aurora, what

has threatened their access to and security of rights to land and resources is a legislation making

way for the conversion of their ancestral domains into special economic zones and a free port.

Causes of conflict - Conflicts involving ancestral domains, just like agrarian conflicts, are

caused by: (1) varying interests in using and managing ancestral domains; (2) relative power of

the conflict actors; (3) institutional failure; and (4) non-inclusive natural resource management.

The indigenous communities want their ancestral domain respected, conserved and protected

because their history and identity is embedded in it, while conflict perpetrators see the area’s

potential for extractive industries and commercial use. Conflicts also arise because the actors

have varying socio-economic status. For example, the conflict perpetrators in the case of

Casiguran, Aurora are government institutions which are denying the existence of indigenous

communities and passing a law allowing the conversion of ancestral domains into economic

zones. In the case of Tampakan, South Cotabato, where there is an impending extractive

operation by the Tampakan Copper-Gold Project, the conflict perpetrators, having greater power

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and resources, are able to hire military and security forces to quell the growing opposition from

the Bla’an.

Institutional failure is found in most of the cases with regard to managing assets and resources

through formulating or implementing policies or programs, thus leading to conflict. Examples of

institutional failure in the cases involving ancestral domains comprise of the refusal to

acknowledge the presence of indigenous people within an area and non-compliance of outside

actors, such as APECO, with the FPIC process required before exploring or starting a project.

Most cases included in this report reveal how conflict perpetrators eyeing the economic gains of

bringing extractive industries into ancestral domains have FPIC issues, showing how they

disregard the consent and perception of the affected communities towards their operations.

Results of conflict - Among the results of conflicts involving ancestral domains are: land

conversion of settlements, farms, and conservation areas of indigenous communities into

hydroelectric power plants, as in the case of Bokod, Benguet. If mining operators would

commence operation and if APECO would start its implementation, massive land conversion of

ancestral domains to commercial areas and extractive industries would occur, covering: (i)

13,852 ha of rice lands, coconut plantations, forests, coastal areas and human settlements in

Casiguran, Aurora; (ii) 8,000 ha of ancestral domains of the Mamanwa in Jabonga, Agusan del

Norte, including key biodiversity areas; and (iii) 4,000 ha of old-growth forests, five ancestral

domains of IPs and five watersheds in Tampakan, South Cotabato. Moreover, in the case of

Casiguran, Aurora, a divide is occurring among the Agta/Dumagat as some prominent leaders

are siding with APECO and endorsing its acceptability. Another impact of conflicts involving

ancestral domains is human rights violations. In the case of Tampakan, South Cotabato, cases of

extra-judicial killings, harassments, violation and disruption of cultural practices and religious

beliefs were recorded. In addition, marginalization of IPs is occurring in Casiguran, Aurora

because of the influx of migrants. IPs are likewise being displaced in Tampakan, South Cotabato

because of the presence of security personnel employed by the mining operators.

Intensity of conflict - Most of the cases of conflicts involving ancestral domains included in this

report only reached the manifest stage and did not escalate to the violent stage, except for the

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case of Tampakan, South Cotabato (see figure 6). The cases of Casiguran, Aurora, Jabonga,

Agusan del Norte and Bokod, Benguet, all manifested their disagreement over the intrusion of

outside actors. In Tampakan, South Cotabato, the conflict was classified as violent with extra

judicial killings and harassments resulting from disagreements between the conflict actors.

Mining operators in this area had resorted to bringing in military forces to intimidate local

communities and to pursue their interest to convert the land into a mining area.

Figure 6. Intensity of conflicts involving ancestral domains

C. Nature of Resource Conflict Involving Municipal Waters

The nature of conflicts involving municipal waters differs from conflicts involving agrarian lands

and ancestral domains because of such waters being a communal resource. No one exclusively

owns or controls marine resources. Thus, everyone can access them. However, through the

Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 or RA 8550, local community fishers were given priority to

access municipal waters and fish production became regulated.

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Actors involved - Actors involved in municipal water conflicts are comprised of: (1) local

community actors such as municipal fishers, commercial fishers and aquaculture workers; (2)

government actors such as local government units, the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic

Resources (BFAR) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR); and (3)

outside actors such as the European Union, aquaculture farm owners, and beach resort owners.

Victims and perpetrators of conflict - Local community actors, especially the municipal

fishers, are usually the conflict victims. Because of unregulated, destructive, and overly efficient

fishing methods employed by commercial fishers to meet the global demand for marine products,

municipal fishers have reduced fish catch for the sustenance and income of their families. In

addition, the study conducted by Calvan and Ablola (2011) illustrated how the establishment of

aquaculture and tourism enterprises within offshore areas limits or threatens local communities’

access to and use of marine resources. In Calatagan, Batangas, for instance, because of the

conversion of shorelines into private and commercial beach resorts, traditional routes to fishing

grounds and boat docks are now enclosed and inaccessible to municipal fishers. Moreover, in the

expansion of aquaculture areas, mangrove forests used by local communities for household

consumption and as a source of marine products are destroyed.

Government actors such as BFAR and DENR, meanwhile, decide whether the livelihood of

municipal farmers will be promoted and protected, or if aquaculture and beach resorts will be

allowed to deforest mangrove areas and operate within foreshores used by municipal fishers. In

the case of IUU in the Philippines, BFAR helped to impose stricter rules on commercial fishing

methods through the amendment of the Fisheries Code, preventing unsustainable and destructive

fishing methods. This is one step towards promoting and protecting the livelihoods of municipal

fishers by ensuring that future generations would still be able to rely on marine products for

income and household sustenance. This is with the help of an outside actor, the European Union,

which emphasized that the Philippine Government should address its unsustainable fishing

practices to avoid a trade ban with EU that would have cost our country 173 million Euros of

export to the European Market (Greenpeace, 2015). Furthermore, conflict perpetrators include

fishers practicing IUU fishing, as well as aquaculture operators and beach resort owners

destroying mangrove forests and occupying foreshores without proper authority.

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Causes of conflict - Conflicts concerning marine resources are also caused by: (1) varying

interests in using and managing marine resources; (2) relative power of the conflict actors; and

(3) institutional failure. Municipal fishers see the importance of ensuring that future generations

would still be able to rely on marine resources for food and livelihood, while commercial fishers

and aquaculture owners aim for higher fish catch, sometimes using destructive and overly

efficient methods which deplete the fish population. This difference in interests results in

competition between the users and further depletion of marine resources. Another example of

varying interests occurs between resort owners and fishers. For the former, foreshores are used as

an attraction for tourists, while for the latter, these are used to grow seaweed farms. Because

beach resort owners have more power to influence the management of foreshores, they are able

to intimidate and marginalize these seaweed farmers, barring them from their livelihood.

Furthermore, failure to implement regulatory instruments also leads to conflicts because it allows

the commercialization of foreshores and mangrove forests without compliance with proper

procedures, thus barring local communities from using foreshores and harvesting mangrove

forest products.

Intensity of conflict – The conflicts involving municipal waters included in this report were only

in the manifest stage in which the conflict had become a public issue. These did not escalate to

the violent stage where actors with varying interests on the use and management of marine

resources would resort to physical aggression to assert their stands.

D. Human Rights Violations as Cause of Resource Conflict

From the cases of resource conflict included in this study, the common causes of conflict are:

varying interests in using and managing resources, relative power of conflict actors, institutional

failure and non-inclusive natural resource management. From the iceberg diagram developed by

Parlevliet (1999), we are able to understand how human rights violations can be both causes and

consequences of resource conflict. The usually unnoticed submerged part of an iceberg is likened

to how human rights violations, such as uneven access to resources and non-inclusive

participation in public affairs, actually lead to conflict. Thus, this framework shows that denial of

human rights is both the result and the foundation of conflicts. In this regard, we are able to

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understand the importance of protection and promotion of human rights and their significance in

relation to people’s access to and control of resources.

Land is an important resource for everyone. Although international human rights instruments do

not necessarily include a human right to land, excluding the indigenous peoples’ right to land and

territory, “land rights stand as a key human right issue, as the fulfillment of many human

rights depend directly on land, including the rights to adequate housing, food, health, or to

self-determination” (FIDH and OMCT, 2014 p.7 par 2). Security of access to and control over

land and its resources is key to people’s survival. Thus, conflicts over access to and control over

land is inevitably a human rights issue as well. Although development is a constant objective of

the state, it can serve as a double-edged sword (FIDH and OMCT, 2014). Development projects

can improve the lives and fulfill the human rights of people and communities, but they can also

take away opportunities and hinder the fulfillment of human rights. Land grabbing and land

conversion may generate jobs for people and make communities thrive economically but these

also displace people and take away opportunities for communities to thrive socially and

culturally.

Human rights laws and advocacies mainly protect individuals from actions that would threaten

their civil, political, economic, social and cultural freedoms. As mentioned earlier, for the

indigenous communities, land and resources do not only mean income and shelter, but also

history, culture and identity. As industries enter the territories of indigenous communities

without going through appropriate procedures to obtain their consent and acceptance, the lives

and tenurial security of IPs are threatened. In this case, human rights violations such as extra-

judicial killings, harassments, intimidation and displacement are manifestations of conflicts

resulting from the violation of indigenous communities’ rights to uphold their cultural identity

and heritage, which is embedded in their environment.

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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

This section builds on the proposals forwarded and agreed upon in the two consultation

workshops where the draft monitoring report was presented and discussed. The

recommendations called on CSOs:

to document and effectively use land-conflict data to muster public support,

to reframe the land monitoring process in the light of a rights-based approach, and

to enhance the capacities of farmers and IPs to evaluate business contracts.

At the same time, the recommendations urged the government:

to officially recognize land rights as basic human rights,

to practice responsible land governance through proper enforcement of FPIC and SEIA

not only for ELCs but for all forms of land takeover,

to establish monitoring systems and dispute resolution mechanisms in collaboration with

the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) and all government agencies with a land-

governance mandate and support one another in institutional building in line with a

rights-based approach, and

to institute accessible and affordable mechanisms at the local level for lodging of

complaints and for dispute and conflict resolution—including traditional dispute

management mechanisms in the communities.

Specifically, for CSOs:

Document and make public the voices of the people

Civil society organizations should document cases of conflict to hasten the conflict management

and resolution process. Comprehensive fact-finding missions validating the series of events

within a community afflicted by resource conflict can help in bolstering their claims. Avenues

should then be organized to ensure that these cases are heard in order to generate public

awareness and support.

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Re-strategize the land rights campaign to link with the human rights movement

As the incidence of land conflicts continues to increase, human rights violations against farmers,

indigenous peoples and fisherfolk likewise escalate, often to the violent stage. At the same time,

the cases in this report reveal that conflicts involving ancestral domains mostly cover massive

areas of public lands, where areas ranging from 4,000 to 13,000 ha are under threat of conversion

for use by extractive industries. Given these realities, CSOs and fellow-advocates of land rights,

IP rights, and environmental justice must now re-strategize their efforts as a fundamental fight

for the basic human rights of the affected communities. With actual physical safety and lives

clearly at stake, as well as the means to survive, not only policy intervention is called for, but the

formation of a coalition of human rights defenders. Such a coalition should include partners in

the academe and must now reframe land monitoring in the light of a rights-based approach and

enhance the capacities of all rights defenders.

Enhance capacities of farmers and IPs in understanding business contracts

Capacities of farmers and IP communities should be enhanced to improve their ability to

comprehend policies, raise their awareness of their tenurial rights and improve their negotiating

skills in conversing with government institutions and business corporations in asserting their

rights. This is to ensure that they are not deceived and manipulated by agreements with business

corporations.

For the Government:

Recognize land rights as basic human rights

Given the overlapping land claims and weak governance over all lands, but particularly in

ancestral domain areas, the consensus is that land conflicts would tend to progress from latent to

manifest and become violent. Thus, the participants agreed it is imperative that the Philippine

Government officially recognize land rights as human rights.

Implement responsible land governance

Agricultural investments should be regulated by responsible agencies. The consent process (free,

prior and informed consent) of affected communities should be ensured not only in the case of

ancestral domain areas, but in all communities prior to investors coming in. A rigid and

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participatory conduct of social and environmental impact assessments (SEIAs) should be

enforced, just as there should be access to accurate and relevant information, establishment of

mechanisms for dispute settlement, and regular monitoring of expired FLAs, among others.

What is particularly lacking is the monitoring of agreements of government agencies, especially

those directly entered into between the farmers, IPs and local communities and investors.

Establish monitoring systems and conflict resolution mechanisms

An effective monitoring system for compliance is needed to reduce or eliminate unfair treatment

of farmers and IPs in the process of implementing projects, and prevent conversion of lands to

uses not agreed upon in the contracts. Government should also refrain from unhealthy practices

like requiring investors to finance compliance monitoring. In essence, the Commission on

Human Rights (CHR) and CSOs have agreed to give special focus on land conflicts in three

ways: (i) setting up of human rights desks in all government agencies having a mandate of

governing land and other natural resources, (ii) assigning a Commissioner to look specifically

into issues related to land rights, and (iii) assistance by CSOs to government agencies (such as

DAR, DENR, NCIP, and BFAR) through providing venues for inputs and discussions and other

needed support, such as training on human rights approaches as part of institutional building, and

orientation of CHR on the various asset reform measures such as CARPER, IPRA, and the

Fisheries Code.

At the same time, informal, inexpensive and readily accessible dispute resolution mechanisms

should be created at the local level to help facilitate the processes for resolving land-related

complaints more efficiently. These mechanisms should not rely solely on legal edicts but must

recognize the critical dynamics among land, property, culture and human rights. Moreover, such

mechanisms should recognize and strengthen traditional and community-based institutions that

have been successful in facilitating dialogue and management of conflicts in resource access.

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