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8/4/2019 20110916 weekly
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/20110916-weekly 1/10
Markets for the Week ending
16-Sep-2011 1.00 0.09 1.50 0.50 - 0.10 4.75 2.25 21.50
9-Sep-2011 1.00 0.09 1.50 0.50 - 0.10 4.75 2.25 21.50
30-Jun-2011 1.00 0.07 1.25 0.50 0.25 0.10 4.75 2.25 21.50
31-Dec-2010 1.00 0.13 1.00 0.50 0.25 0.10 4.75 2.25 18.50
weekly change - - - - - - - - -
YTD change - (0.04) 0.50 - (0.25) - - - 3.00
1yr forward (OIS) (0.22) (0.03) (0.21) (0.14) 0.03 (1.40)
16-Sep-2011 1.04 1.56 2.28 2.92 2.11 0.00 0.17 0.92 2.06
9-Sep-2011 0.79 1.29 2.11 2.81 2.11 0.01 0.17 0.80 1.92
30-Jun-2011 1.59 2.33 3.11 3.55 2.52 0.02 0.46 1.76 3.16
31-Dec-2010 1.68 2.42 3.12 3.53 2.41 0.13 0.60 2.01 3.30
52-week closing high 1.94 2.90 3.50 3.87 2.70 0.17 0.85 2.40 3.74
52-week closing low 0.79 1.29 2.11 2.81 2.09 (0.01) 0.17 0.80 1.92 weekly change 0.25 0.26 0.17 0.11 0.01 (0.01) - 0.12 0.14
QTD change (0.56) (0.78) (0.83) (0.63) (0.40) (0.01) (0.29) (0.84) (1.10)
YTD change (0.64) (0.87) (0.84) (0.61) (0.30) (0.12) (0.43) (1.09) (1.23)
change from 52wk high (0.91) (1.34) (1.22) (0.95) (0.59) (0.16) (0.68) (1.48) (1.68)
change from 52wk low 0.25 0.26 0.17 0.11 0.03 0.01 - 0.12 0.14
China
Reserve
Requirement
US 10yr
September 16,
Royal Bank
of Australia
China
Rediscount
Rate Braz
Bank of
Canada
U.S. Federal
Reserve
European
Central Bank
Bank of
England
Swiss Bank
Rate
Bank of
Japan
US 2yr US 5yrGoC 10yr GoC 30yr RRB BEIR
Monetary Policy
North American
Bond Yields GoC 2yr GoC 5yr US 3mth
16-Sep-2011 0.91 0.92 1.04 1.02 0.89 0.89 1.02 1.00 2.67
9-Sep-2011 0.91 0.93 1.05 1.03 0.89 0.90 1.03 1.01 2.65 30-Jun-2011 0.73 0.81 0.82 0.87 0.76 0.76 0.86 0.84 2.29
31-Dec-2010 0.67 0.80 0.78 0.87 0.74 0.73 0.87 0.85 2.15
52-week closing high 0.92 0.94 1.05 1.03 0.91 0.91 1.04 1.02 2.78
52-week closing low 0.64 0.73 0.72 0.79 0.65 0.65 0.78 0.77 2.03
weekly change (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 0.02
QTD change 0.18 0.11 0.22 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.38
YTD change 0.24 0.12 0.26 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.52
change from 52wk high (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.11)
change from 52wk low 0.27 0.19 0.31 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.64
16-Sep-2011 1.01 2.48 1.86 2.60 5.51 5.29 11.18 21.19 1.01
9-Sep-2011 1.01 2.26 1.77 2.48 5.41 5.16 11.14 20.56 1.01
30-Jun-2011 1.73 3.38 3.03 3.41 4.88 5.45 10.90 16.34 1.14
31-Dec-2010 1.72 3.40 2.96 3.36 4.82 5.45 6.60 12.47 1.13
52-week closing high 2.16 3.88 3.49 3.78 6.20 6.32 13.38 25.68 1.36
52-week closing low 0.87 2.19 1.74 2.48 3.73 3.98 5.53 8.78 0.85
weekly change 0.00 0.22 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.04 0.64 0.01
QTD change (0.72) (0.90) (1.16) (0.81) 0.63 (0.16) 0.28 4.85 (0.13)
YTD change (0.71) (0.91) (1.10) (0.76) 0.70 (0.17) 4.58 8.72 (0.12)
Moody's
Corp Avg -
US 10s
JapanGreece A
10yr Quebec long Quebec long BClong Ontario
Spain Portugal
Credit Spreads 10yr Ontario
International 10yr Rates Swiss UK Germany France Italy
long MB long NB long NS
Co
change from 52wk high (1.15) (1.40) (1.63) (1.18) (0.68) (1.03) (2.20) (4.49) (0.34) change from 52wk low 0.14 0.30 0.12 0.12 1.78 1.31 5.65 12.41 0.17
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Markets for the Week ending
16-Sep-2011 50 79 83 169 451 374 1,061 5,047 125
9-Sep-2011 50 80 84 180 467 413 1,136 3,400 111
30-Jun-2011 50 61 43 80 171 270 745 1,952 91
31-Dec-2010 42 72 58 101 238 350 500 1,074 72
52-week closing high 65 88 87 193 504 430 1,216 5,047 125
52-week closing low 36 48 32 62 127 197 336 666 53
weekly change (0) (1) (1) (11) (16) (39) (75) 1,648 14
QTD change (0) 19 40 89 280 104 316 3,095 34
YTD change 8 7 24 68 212 24 561 3,973 52
change from 52wk high (15) (8) (4) (23) (54) (56) (155) - -
change from 52wk low 14 32 51 107 324 176 725 4,382 72
16-Sep-2011 31 0.35 0.27 0.08 0.75 2,867 2,086 1,907 4,149
9-Sep-2011 39 0.33 0.26 0.07 0.83 2,862 2,086 1,838 4,195 30-Jun-2011 17 0.23 0.13 0.11 0.20 2,869 1,972 1,413 4,608
31-Dec-2010 18 0.18 0.12 0.06 0.41 2,423 2,004 1,773 4,745
52-week closing high 48 0.35 0.28 0.12 0.85 2,882 2,086 2,784 4,971
52-week closing low 15 0.13 0.10 - 0.14 2,298 1,866 1,043 3,986
weekly change (7) 0.02 0.02 0.00 (0.08) 5 - 3.8% -1.1%
QTD chan e 15 0.12 0.15 0.03 0.55 2 114 35.0% -10.0%
Japan
S&P ASX
200 indexOIS-Tbill
Global 5yr CDS U.S. U.K.
Risk VIX TED
September 16,
Germany France Italy Spain Portugal Greece
LIBOR-OIS
Euribor -
EUR swap
Fed balance
sheet
ECB balance
sheet Baltic Dry
Blo
G
. . . . . .
YTD change 13 0.17 0.15 0.02 0.35 444 82 7.6% -12.6%
change from 52wk high (17) - (0.01) (0.05) (0.09) (15) - -31.5% -16.5%
change from 52wk low 17 0.22 0.18 0.08 0.62 569 220 82.8% 4.1%
16-Sep-2011 0.979 76.63 1.38 1.58 0.88 76.84 1.037 6.38 117.6
9-Sep-2011 0.997 77.19 1.37 1.59 0.88 77.61 1.047 6.39 118.4
30-Jun-2011 0.963 74.30 1.45 1.61 0.84 80.56 1.072 6.46 118.9
31-Dec-2010 0.998 79.03 1.34 1.56 0.94 81.12 1.023 6.61 116.5
52-week closing high 1.034 81.40 1.48 1.67 1.02 85.86 1.102 6.73 120.2
52-week closing low 0.943 72.93 1.29 1.54 0.72 76.55 0.936 6.38 113.2
weekly change (0.02) (0.57) 0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.77) (0.01) (0.00) (0.77)
QTD change 0.02 2.32 (0.07) (0.03) 0.04 (3.72) (0.04) (0.08) (1.23)
YTD change (0.02) (2.40) 0.04 0.02 (0.06) (4.28) 0.01 (0.22) 1.16
16-Sep-2011 329.6 87.96 87.98 1,810 40.65 404.2 1,027 3.83 3.66
9-Sep-2011 334.2 87.24 87.24 1,856 41.47 409.8 1,016 3.92 3.67
30-Jun-2011 338.1 95.42 96.50 1,500 34.69 427.8 1,091 4.37 3.57
31-Dec-2010 332.8 91.38 94.42 1,421 30.91 448.2 1,177 4.41 3.05
52-week closing high 370.6 113.93 114.82 1,900 48.44 466.5 1,362 4.85 3.97
52-week closing low 278.4 72.66 79.67 1,274 20.75 354.1 978 3.29 2.69
weekly change -1.4% 0.8% 0.8% -2.5% -2.0% -1.4% 1.0% -2.3% -0.4%
Currencies C$ / US$ US$ index
yuan (¥) /
US$
C$ EEx
Commodities
CRB US
Spot Raw
Industrials
WTI Crude
Oil Spot
Price Oil Futures Gold Silver Copper Nickel Natural Gas CR
US$ / euro
(€)
US$ / GBP
(£) CH₣ / US$yen (¥) /
US$ US$ / AU$
Bloomberg /JPM Asia-$
index
US Regular
Average Gas
Price
QTD change -2.5% -7.8% -8.8% 20.6% 17.2% -5.5% -5.9% -12.6% 2.4% YTD change -1.0% -3.7% -6.8% 27.4% 31.5% -9.8% -12.8% -13.2% 20.0%
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Markets for the Week ending
16-Sep-2011 12,274 696 1,216 11,509 2,622 38.7 673 714 599
9-Sep-2011 12,388 706 1,154 10,992 2,468 36.2 639 674 569
30-Jun-2011 13,301 764 1,321 12,414 2,774 48.3 734 827 669
31-Dec-2010 13,443 769 1,258 11,578 2,653 52.2 697 784 639
52-week closing high 14,271 819 1,364 12,811 2,874 55.6 758 865 694
52-week closing low 11,671 666 1,119 10,595 2,303 35.1 617 648 552
weekly change -0.9% -1.4% 5.4% 4.7% 6.3% 6.8% 5.3% 6.0% 5.2%
QTD change -7.7% -8.9% -7.9% -7.3% -5.5% -19.9% -8.4% -13.7% -10.5%
YTD change -8.7% -9.4% -3.3% -0.6% -1.2% -25.9% -3.4% -8.8% -6.3%
change from 52wk high -14.0% -15.0% -10.8% -10.2% -8.7% -30.5% -11.3% -17.4% -13.7%
change from 52wk low 5.2% 4.5% 8.6% 8.6% 13.9% 10.2% 9.0% 10.3% 8.5%
16-Sep-2011 4,000 4,654 5,664 4,452 1,767 5,368 5,574 14,547 8,864
9-Sep-2011 3,880 4,553 5,496 4,416 1,818 5,215 5,190 14,020 8,738 30-Jun-2011 4,531 5,505 7,004 4,842 2,083 5,946 7,376 20,187 9,816
31-Dec-2010 4,290 5,226 6,391 4,938 2,062 5,900 6,914 20,173 10,229
52-week closing high 4,707 5,776 7,401 5,136 2,177 6,091 7,528 23,178 10,858
52-week closing low 3,839 4,421 5,320 4,295 1,746 5,007 5,072 13,474 8,519
weekly change 3.1% 2.2% 3.1% 0.8% -2.8% 2.9% 7.4% 3.8% 1.4%
TD chan e -11.7% -15.5% -19.1% -8.0% -15.2% -9.7% -24.4% -27.9% -9.7%
Nikkei 225
Russell
Large-Cap
Value
FTSE 100 DAX 30
MSCI
Europe
MSCI Pacific
Rim
MSCI
Emerging
MarketsMSCI EAFE
North American
Equities S&P/TSX S&P/TSX 60 S&P 500
Dow Jones
Industrials Nasdaq
FTSE MIB 40 S
KBW Bank
index
Russell
Large-Cap
Russell
Small-Cap
La
International
Equities MSCI World
September 16,
- . - . - . - . - . - . - . - . - .
YTD change -6.8% -10.9% -11.4% -9.8% -14.3% -9.0% -19.4% -27.9% -13.3%
change from 52wk high -15.0% -19.4% -23.5% -13.3% -18.8% -11.9% -26.0% -37.2% -18.4%
change from 52wk low 4.2% 5.3% 6.5% 3.7% 1.2% 7.2% 9.9% 8.0% 4.1%
16-Sep-2011 2,684 3,883 1,208 912 1,681 1,544 654 135 921
9-Sep-2011 2,671 4,053 1,196 888 1,665 1,544 634 150 928
30-Jun-2011 3,085 3,689 1,423 1,069 1,739 1,737 761 159 933
31-Dec-2010 3,140 4,101 1,297 1,095 1,674 1,666 488 230 844
52-week closing high 3,504 4,208 1,431 1,139 1,797 1,812 809 271 949
52-week closing low 2,596 3,455 1,178 874 1,573 1,509 442 129 830
weekly change 0.5% -4.2% 1.0% 2.7% 1.0% 0.0% 3.1% -10.0% -0.8%
QTD change -13.0% 5.2% -15.1% -14.7% -3.3% -11.1% -14.1% -15.3% -1.2%
YTD change -14.5% -5.3% -6.8% -16.7% 0.4% -7.3% 34.0% -41.4% 9.2%
16-Sep-2011 499 217 276 298 319 174 382 402 124
9-Sep-2011 479 208 260 279 309 164 369 376 119
30-Jun-2011 559 246 322 318 323 207 411 411 134
31-Dec-2010 507 240 301 296 304 215 365 405 129
52-week closing high 598 255 335 329 334 231 421 439 136
52-week closing low 404 199 251 257 286 161 346 358 115
weekly change 4.0% 4.5% 6.4% 6.9% 3.4% 6.0% 3.7% 7.1% 4.5%
Telecom
Telecom
Energy Materials Industrials Cons Disc
Cons
Staples Financials
Energy Materials Industrials Cons Disc
Cons
Staples Financials Healthcare Tech
S&P/TSX sectors Healthcare Tech
S&P 500 sectors
QTD change -10.9% -11.6% -14.2% -6.2% -1.0% -15.9% -7.0% -2.1% -7.3% YTD change -1.6% -9.3% -8.3% 0.9% 5.2% -19.0% 4.8% -0.5% -3.3%
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Markets for the Week ending September 16, 2011
1.0
1.5
2.0
Bank of Canada U.S. Federal Reserve European Central Bank
‐
0.5
1.0
16‐Sep 16‐Nov 16‐Jan 16‐Mar 16‐May 16‐Jul 16‐Se
GoC 2yr GoC 5yr GoC 10yr GoC 30yr BoC
3.0
3.5
4.0
GoC 2yr GoC 5yr GoC 10yr GoC 30yr BoC
2.0
2.5
3.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.5
2.6
GoC 10yr
‐
0.5
5‐Mar 5‐Apr 5‐May 5‐Jun 5‐Jul 5‐Aug 5‐Sep
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.0
2.1
2.2
15‐Aug 22‐Aug 29‐Aug 5‐Sep 12‐Sep
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Markets for the Week ending September 16, 2011
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
Germany (2yr) France (2yr) Italy (2yr) Spain (2yr)
‐
1.0
.
5‐Mar 5‐Apr 5‐May 5‐Jun 5‐Jul 5‐Aug 5‐Sep
40
60
80
Swiss (2yr) Portugal (2yr) Greece (2yr)
‐
20
40
5‐Mar 5‐Apr 5‐May 5‐Jun 5‐Jul 5‐Aug 5‐Sep
400
SOVX WEST EUROPEAN SOV CDS CDX EM SOV 5YR
1,000200
100
200
300
16‐Sep 16‐Oct 16‐Nov 16‐Dec 16‐Jan 16‐Feb 16‐Mar 16‐Apr 16‐May 16‐Jun 16‐Jul 16‐Aug 16‐Sep
SOVX WEST EUROPEAN SOV CDS CDX EM SOV 5YR
250
500
750
1,000
50
100
150
200
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
EUROPE IG CORP CDS 5YR EUROPE XOVER (HY) CORP CDS
250 50
16‐Sep 16‐Oct 16‐Nov 16‐Dec 16‐Jan 16‐Feb 16‐Mar 16‐Apr 16‐May 16‐Jun 16‐Jul 16‐Aug 16‐Sep
150
300
450
600
100
200
300
400
EUROPE SNR FIN CDS 5YR EUROPE SUB FIN CDS 5YR
‐
150
‐
100
16‐Sep 16‐Oct 16‐Nov 16‐Dec 16‐Jan 16‐Feb 16‐Mar 16‐Apr 16‐May 16‐Jun 16‐Jul 16‐Aug 16‐Sep
600
800
125
150
CDX NA IG 5YR CDX NA HY 5YR
200
400
600
75
100
125
16‐Sep 16‐Oct 16‐Nov 16‐Dec 16‐Jan 16‐Feb 16‐Mar 16‐Apr 16‐May 16‐Jun 16‐Jul 16‐Aug 16‐Sep
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Markets for the Week ending September 16, 2011
13,00
14,00
1,300
1,400
S&P 500 S&P/TSX
10,00
11,00
12,00
13,00
1,000
1,100
1,200
1,300
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
12,500
12,750
13,000
S&P/TSX
10,001,000
16‐Sep 16‐Nov 16‐Jan 16‐Mar 16‐May 16‐Jul 16‐Sep
11,500
11,750
12,000
12,250
12,500
1,200
1,225
1,250
S&P 500
11,500
15‐Aug 22‐Aug 29‐Aug 5‐Sep 12‐Sep
1,100
1,125
1,150
1,175
,
15‐Aug 22‐Aug 29‐Aug 5‐Sep 12‐Sep
101.5
102.0
102.5
103.0
US$ / C$
1,100
15‐Aug 22‐Aug 29‐Aug 5‐Sep 12‐Sep
100.0
100.5
101.0
101.5
15‐Aug 22‐Aug 29‐Aug 5‐Sep 12‐Sep
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Weekly Recap
Monday September 12
- Chinese exports up 24.5% YoY, beating expectations of 21.9%; Chinese imports up 30.2% YoY vs anticipated 21%; so trade balance
unexpectedly fell to $17.8B vs $24.6B expected for August
- Italian industrial production down 4.6% YoY through July; Egyptian CPI 8% YoY, 7% on core; Spanish housing transactions down 35% Y
- C$ briefly traded below par on risk-off trade, as Euribor-OIS, USD LIBOR and ECB deposit facility usage all at yearly highs; 10yr Italian
bonds back north of 5.50%; Greek 1yr bonds at 139%- US Treasury sold $32 billion in 3-year bonds at a yield of 0.334% (which is actually below 3mth LIBOR); bid-to-cover was 3.15
- French bank stocks down 10-12%, with expectations of imminent downgrade by Moodys; Italian financials down over 5%, including Intes
whose trading was halted when it was down 8%; many European lenders trading at 50% of book value, as investors’ suspicion of accura
of book value increases (are those net assets really worth what companies claim? Nomura analysts estimate that the 90 banks that
underwent European stress tests would face capital shortfall of 350 billion euros if PIIGS govt bonds were marked to market)
- Gold stocks and banks weigh on TSX; Shares in Goldman drop out of triple digit range for first time since March 2009
- Rumours that China will buy Italian bonds drives late-day equity rally (but China is no white-knight; if they buy European bonds, its in an
effort to keep the EUR elevated and maintain their favourable trade terms; by intervening in this way, China would be protecting its trade
surplus with Europe, which reduces eurozone aggregate demand, which makes problem of too much debt even worse and makes auste
measures bite even harder, which means debt trajectories will get worse instead of better; i.e. no solution, just more can-kicking)
Tuesday September 13
- French and UK inflation a bit higher than expected; use of ECB deposit facility surged to €198 billion on Monday
- Italian bond auction wasn’t particularly successful; sold €3.9 billion of 5-year notes at 5.60% (up from 4.93% at previous 5yr auction in J
also sold €1.2 billion of 4% 9-year bonds at a 10-point discount price of 90.2.
- Rumours-on / rumours-denied drive risk-on / risk-off trade; WSJ says BNP no longer has access to $ funding markets, which BNP then
denies; & how many times can we rally on the same rumour --- of China buying European sovereign debt? & why is every rumour of a
Merkel-Sarkozy emergency meeting a market-moving news-item? And now rumours of Russia buying euro common bonds?!
- Ceridian UCLA Pulse of Commerce index remains in idle, down 1.4% in August after falling 0.2% in July
- US Census Bureau reported 15.1% of people living in poverty in 2010, matching 1993 and 1983 as highest ratio since the ‘60s
- US Treasury auctioned $27 billion 4-week bills and $21 billion 10-year bonds, the latter at a yield of 2.00%
Wednesday September 14
- BRICs may be discussing co-ordinating purchases of Eurozone debt
- Eurozone industrial production softer than expected in July but still up 4.2% YoY; Canadian capacity utilization didn’t drop as much as
expected, falling to 78.4% from 79%; US PPI as expected (headline flat in August, but up 6.5% YoY; core up 2.5% YoY); US retail sales
bit softer, up just 0.1% in August ex-autos&gas and flat on the headline (retail sales ex-gas up 5.7% YoY)
- Canadian auctioned $3.5 billion of 2-year bonds, and US Treasury auctioned off $13 billion of 30-year bonds at 3.31%
Thursday September 15
- UK retail sales negative YoY; Eurozone CPI as expected (2.5% YoY, 1.2% YoY core); US CPI higher than expected (3.8% YoY, 2.0% Y
core); weekly jobless claims higher than forecast yet again; Empire even worse than last month, in contrast to hope of less soft # ; Philly
Fed managed to do in September what Empire didn’t, retracing half of its August plunge; industrial production up a bit in August but CAP
lower than expected (77.4); Bloomberg weekly consumer comfort index 2nd-worst print since August 2010; RBNZ left rates unch @ 2.5%- But economic data, which was pretty much disappointing across the board, takes back seat to globally-co-ordinated announcement by
central banks to create (or, for ECB, expand) programs to lend in $$s --- gold down almost $150 since Sept 6 to $1775; stocks up; yields
up; spreads in; don’t expect the risk-on to last --- this swap announcement is an acknowledgment of the weakness of funding markets in
Europe --- how can that be good news? And it comes 2 days after BNP categorically “confirmed that it is fully able to obtain USD funding
the normal course of business”; right, that’s why this new program was necessary!; (comes on 3-year anniversary of LEH failure)
- RIMM trounced after-hours after disappointing earnings report
Friday September 16
- Canadian international securities transactions showed net bond buying in July;
- UoM consumer sentiment ticked up on current conditions, but future expectations hit lowest level since 1980
- Relatively quiet day; S&P 500 makes posts its 5 th straight green day
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Non-Mainstream News and Views
Quote of the Week1:“[Trichet & Co.] were wrong. They now have a choice. They can admit that they were wrong. Then they will probably have to resign, and then snubbed worldwide. Nobody likes a loser. Alternatively, they can double down. Their reputations right now are underwater. What do they havelose reputation-wise by saying more absurd nonsense? And there is a chance that tomorrow the confidence fairy will appear, wave her magicwand, and the V-shaped recovery will start.... they are reputationally-bankrupt zombies gambling for resurrection.”Brad DeLong. http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2011/09/understanding-trichet-and-conpany-a-note.html
QOTW2:David Rosenberg: “Assuming that the House Republicans do not accept the Obama spending measures, and half of the tax relief goes intosavings and debt reduction, then we are talking about the grand total of $35 billion of net new stimulus from this "jobs plan". That's... because smuch of it is merely extending what is already in the system. At an annual rate, that is a 0.2% boost to baseline GDP growth.”
An e-book with many distinguished contributors, published by Wharton: Life in the eurozone, with or without sovereign defaulthttp://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/FIC/FICPress/eurozone.pdf
George Magnus of UBS:“In the Eurozone, it is hard to keep track of the moving parts, which include: faltering economic growth in the core and recession in the periphery stressed bank liquidity and funding markets, and total reliance on a reluctant and split ECB to purchase sovereign bonds so as to prevent
contagion parliamentary approval of the redesign of the EFSF, and possible changes to economic governance allowing existing institutions to play a
stronger crisis management role the terms of the IMF’s next loan tranche to a non-compliant Greece, the Finns’ demands for adequate collateral, the implementation of the
Greek debt swap terms, and how and when a Greek default might be managed.”http://www.bearmarketinvestments.com/ubs-george-magnus-says-european-viability-is-far-from-assured
Buttonwood on shorter cycles“Economists are pretty reluctant to forecast a recession, despite some fairly gloomy data, the damaging effect on confidence of the euro zonecrisis and the message sent by ultra-low bond yields. Of course, economists are generally hopeless at predicting recessions”http://www.economist.com/blogs/buttonwood/2011/09/global-economy
Willem Buiter of Citibank, via Buttonwood’s notebook:“Greece's exit would create a powerful and highly visible precedent. As soon as Greece has exited, we expect the markets will focus on thecountry or countries most likely to exit next from the euro area. Any non-captive/financially sophisticated owner of a deposit account.... willwithdraw his deposits from countries deemed at risk - even a small risk - of exit. Any non-captive depositor who fears a non-zero risk of the futintroduction of a New Escudo, a New Punt, a New Peseta or a New Lira would withdraw his deposits at the drop of a hat and deposit them in thhandful of countries likely to remain in the euro area no matter what - Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria and Finland. The fundistrike and deposit run out of the periphery euro area member states (defined very broadly) would create financial havoc and most likely causefinancial crisis followed by a deep recession in the euro area broad periphery.”http://www.economist.com/blogs/buttonwood/2011/09/european-debt-crisis
Bill O’Donnell and John Briggs of RBS:
“I’m not surprised by the pervasive pessimism given what history tells us about deleveraging processes. McKinsey Global Institute cites historythat suggests the sovereign de-levering process takes around 6-7 years to work through, once started. They then add that the debt problems ithe developed world today are more diffuse and deep than they’ve ever been before. Meanwhile, taxpayers are smart and know that any fiscalbone thrown them today will most likely be snatched back in the future.... The only logical outcome to the looming sovereign and householddeleveraging here in the US is a lower standard of living. Yeah, we lived beyond our means for years but nobody likes to go backwards after gsteadily forward for much of their adult lives. It’s just one of those things where change matters more to consumer psychology than level, and Ihighly doubt that Twisting the Fed’s balance sheet is going to do much to alter consumer, bank or business perceptions. These are just theconditions to foster recessions and that risk will no doubt keep bond yields low for an extended period. For example, we recently printed 10yr yields at levels not seen since 1950. Recall that the Fed capped rates for 9 years from 1942 to 1951 so there is precedent for a Japan-likecompression in rates that persists for years. Anchoring short rates through mid-2013 (at least) was just a hat tip to the realities of our time and aacknowledgement that time (a lot of it most likely) is the next best healer as the Fed throws their arm out and the administration is forced to bowthe realities of a bloated budget. Treasuries are thus one of the best places to be for this long haul. Buy dips when offered up.”
http://pragcap.com/deep-thoughts-by-rbs
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Jefferies chief market strategist Devid Zervos“The bottom line is that it looks like a Lehman like event is about to be unleashed on Europe WITHOUT an effective TARP like structure fully inplace. Now maybe, just maybe, they can do what the US did and build one on the fly – wiping out a few institutions and then using an expandedEFSF/Eurobond structure to prevent systemic collapse. But politically that is increasingly feeling like a long shot. Rather it looks like we will get TARPs – one for each country. That is going to require a US style socialization of each banking system – with many WAMUs, Wachovias, AIGsand IndyMacs along the way. The road map for Europe is still 2008 in the US, with the end game a country by country socialization of their commercial banks. The fact is that the Germans are NOT going to pay for pan European structure to recap French and Italian banks - eventhough it is probably a more cost effective solution for both the German banks and taxpayers. Where the losses WILL occur is at the ECB, whethe Germans are on the hook for the largest percentage of the damage. And these will not just be SMP losses and portfolio losses. It will also brepo losses associated with failed NON-GERMAN banks. Of course in the PIG nations, the ability to create a TARP is a non-starter – they cannraise any euro funding. The most likely scenario for these countries is full bank nationalization followed by exit and currency reintroduction.”http://www.zerohedge.com/news/jefferies-describes-endgame-europe-finished
Michael Pettis: Why U.S. and Europe are not turning Japanese; but why recent Japanese history is relevant for China.“Japan’s problem was that during the 1980s it was so addicted to investment-led growth and artificially cheap financing that it misallocated caon a massive scale and failed to include the resulting implicit losses in its GDP calculations. Especially after the Plaza Accord, Japan went oninvestment binge that left it with a huge amount of wasted capital. Because of this overinvestment Japan grossly overstated its true GDP durimuch of the 1980s.... This is not the problem that that the US or Europe is suffering from. They suffer from a typical debt-fueled overconsumpboom, whereas Japan suffered from a typical debt-fueled over-investment boom, and Japan’s period of over-investment was much, much moextreme (centralized investment booms can last much longer and go much further than decentralized consumption booms). This is why I thinthe Japanese experience tells us almost nothing about what Europe and the US will go through. On the other hand, it might tell us a lot about
what China will go through.”http://mpettis.com/2011/09/big-in-japan/
International Finance Review: US banks have become the unlikely saviours of their ailing European counterparts, signing private agreements lend them billions of dollars in recent weeks after an exodus of nervous money market funds left many without ready access to short-term fundhttp://www.ifre.com/us-banks-privately-lending-billions-to-support-european-lenders/1606560.article
Surprise, surprise: IMF’s research department says contractionary policies are contractionary; i.e. austerity doesn’t workhttp://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2011/09/Ball.htm
George Soros on whether the euro has a futurehttp://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/oct/13/does-euro-have-future/
OECD composite leading indicators signal widespread slowdown in economic activityhttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/5/48658623.pdf
Kyle Bass of Hayman Capital Partners on CNBC
http://paul.kedrosky.com/archives/2011/09/kyle-bass-on-the-euro.html
Satyajit Das believes the world is experiencing an enormous debt bubble that took over 30 years to build and will take nearly as long to end.http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000045528
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The European Dis-Union
EU President Herman Van Rompuy:
"The euro has never had the infrastructure that it requires."
Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder:
"The current crisis makes it relentlessly clear that we cannot have a common currency zone without a common fiscal, economic and so
policy"
German President Christian Wulff:
"I regard the huge buy-up of bonds of individual states by the ECB as legally and politically questionable. Article 123 of the Treaty on th
EU’s workings prohibits the ECB from directly purchasing debt instruments, in order to safeguard the central bank’s independence"
Prince Hermann Otto zu Solms-Hohensolms-Lich, the Bundestag's Deputy President:
"We must consider whether it would not be better for the currency union and for Greece itself to go for debt restructuring and an exit fro
the euro"
Polish finance minister Jacek Rostowski:
"European elites, including German elites, must decide if they want the euro to survive - even at a high price - or not. If not, we shouldprepare for a controlled dismantling of the currency zone."
Bank of England Governor Mervyn King:
"Dealing with a banking crisis was difficult enough, but at least there were public-sector balance sheets on to which the problems could
moved. Once you move into sovereign debt, there is no answer; there's no backstop."
Daniel Dăianu, liberal Member of the European Parliament (MEP) and former Finance Minister of Romania:
“Fundamentally, I’m in favour of issuing eurobonds. However, my reading of the crisis is that just imposing stronger fiscal rules and deb
breaks is quite insufficient. And this is not related to the current state of the Single Currency, in my view; it’s rather about the whole
construction of the Eurozone. One has to think about the flaws of the Eurozone. And I’m referring to the lack of a common treasury. Not
only world experience, but also theory indicates that an economic union cannot function properly unless a single currency is underpinne
simultaneously by – not simply fiscal rules – but by fiscal integration. Fiscal integration is not equivilant to fiscal rules. An economic unio
needs mechanisms for dealing with assymetric shocks. Dealing with assymetric shocks boils down to what national governments can d