2011 Annual Revision Cycle Report on Proposals - NFPA€¦ · Information on NFPA Codes and Standards Development ... 704 Standard System for the Identification of the Hazards of

Report onProposals

2011 Annual Revision Cycle

NOTE: The proposed NFPA documents addressed in this Report on

Proposals (ROP) and in a follow-up Report on Comments (ROC) will only be

presented for action when proper Amending Motions have been submitted to

the NFPA by the deadline of April 8, 2011. The June 2011 NFPA Conference

& Expo will be held June 12–16, 2011 at the Boston Convention & Exhibition

Center, Boston, MA. During the meeting, the Association Technical

Meeting (Tech Session) will be held June 15–16, 2011. Documents that

receive no motions will not be presented at the meeting and instead will be

forwarded directly to the Standards Council for action on issuance. For more

information on the rules and for up-to-date information on schedules and

deadlines for processing NFPA documents, check the NFPA website (www.

nfpa.org) or contact NFPA Standards Administration.

ISSN 1079-5332 Copyright © 2010 All Rights Reserved

NFPA and National Fire Protection Association are registered trademarks of the National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA 02169.

National Fire Protection Association®1 BATTERYMARCH PARK, QUINCY, MA 02169-7471

A compilation of NFPA® TechnicalCommittee Reports on Proposals for public review and comment

Public Comment Deadline: September 3, 2010

Information on NFPA Codes and Standards Development

I. Applicable Regulations. The primary rules governing the processing of NFPA documents (codes, standards, recommended practices, and guides) are the NFPA Regulations Governing Committee Projects (Regs). Other applicable rules include NFPA Bylaws, NFPA Technical Meeting Convention Rules, NFPA Guide for the Conduct of Participants in the NFPA Standards Development Process, and the NFPA Regulations Governing Petitions to the Board of Directors from Decisions of the Standards Council. Most of these rules and regulations are contained in the NFPA Directory. For copies of the Directory, contact Codes and Standards Administration at NFPA Headquarters; all these documents are also available on the NFPA website at “www.nfpa.org.”

The following is general information on the NFPA process. All participants, however, should refer to the actual rules and regulations for a full understanding of this process and for the criteria that govern participation.

II. Technical Committee Report. The Technical Committee Report is defined as “the Report of the Technical Committee and Technical Correlating Committee (if any) on a document. A Technical Committee Report consists of the Report on Proposals (ROP), as modified by the Report on Comments (ROC), published by the Association.”

III. Step 1: Report on Proposals (ROP). The ROP is defined as “a report to the Association on the actions taken by Technical Committees and/or Technical Correlating Committees, accompanied by a ballot statement and one or more proposals on text for a new document or to amend an existing document.” Any objection to an action in the ROP must be raised through the filing of an appropriate Comment for consideration in the ROC or the objection will be considered resolved.

IV. Step 2: Report on Comments (ROC). The ROC is defined as “a report to the Association on the actions taken by Technical Committees and/or Technical Correlating Committees accompanied by a ballot statement and one or more comments resulting from public review of the Report on Proposals (ROP).” The ROP and the ROC together constitute the Technical Committee Report. Any outstanding objection following the ROC must be raised through an appropriate Amending Motion at the Association Technical Meeting or the objection will be considered resolved.

V. Step 3a: Action at Association Technical Meeting. Following the publication of the ROC, there is a period during which those wishing to make proper Amending Motions on the Technical Committee Reports must signal their intention by submitting a Notice of Intent to Make a Motion. Documents that receive notice of proper Amending Motions (Certified Amending Motions) will be presented for action at the annual June Association Technical Meeting. At the meeting, the NFPA membership can consider and act on these Certified Amending Motions as well as Follow-up Amending Motions, that is, motions that become necessary as a result of a previous successful Amending Motion. (See 4.6.2 through 4.6.9 of Regs for a summary of the available Amending Motions and who may make them.) Any outstanding objection following action at an Association Technical Meeting (and any further Technical Committee consideration following successful Amending Motions, see Regs at 4.7) must be raised through an appeal to the Standards Council or it will be considered to be resolved.

VI. Step 3b: Documents Forwarded Directly to the Council. Where no Notice of Intent to Make a Motion (NITMAM) is received and certified in accordance with the Technical Meeting Convention Rules, the document is forwarded directly to the Standards Council for action on issuance. Objections are deemed to be resolved for these documents.

VII. Step 4a: Council Appeals. Anyone can appeal to the Standards Council concerning procedural or substantive matters related to the development, content, or issuance of any document of the Association or on matters within the purview of the authority of the Council, as established by the Bylaws and as determined by the Board of Directors. Such appeals must be in written form and filed with the Secretary of the Standards Council (see 1.6 of Regs). Time constraints for filing an appeal must be in accordance with 1.6.2 of the Regs. Objections are deemed to be resolved if not pursued at this level.

VIII. Step 4b: Document Issuance. The Standards Council is the issuer of all documents (see Article 8 of Bylaws). The Council acts on the issuance of a document presented for action at an Association Technical Meeting within 75 days from the date of the recommendation from the Association Technical Meeting, unless this period is extended by the Council (see 4.8 of Regs). For documents forwarded directly to the Standards Council, the Council acts on the issuance of the document at its next scheduled meeting, or at such other meeting as the Council may determine (see 4.5.6 and 4.8 of Regs).

IX. Petitions to the Board of Directors. The Standards Council has been delegated the responsibility for the administration of the codes and standards development process and the issuance of documents. However, where extraordinary circumstances requiring the intervention of the Board of Directors exist, the Board of Directors may take any action necessary to fulfill its obligations to preserve the integrity of the codes and standards development process and to protect the interests of the Association. The rules for petitioning the Board of Directors can be found in the Regulations Governing Petitions to the Board of Directors from Decisions of the Standards Council and in 1.7 of the Regs.

X. For More Information. The program for the Association Technical Meeting (as well as the NFPA website as information becomes available) should be consulted for the date on which each report scheduled for consideration at the meeting will be presented. For copies of the ROP and ROC as well as more information on NFPA rules and for up-to-date information on schedules and deadlines for processing NFPA documents, check the NFPA website (www.nfpa.org) or contact NFPA Codes & Standards Administration at (617) 984-7246.

i

2011 Annual Revision Cycle ROP Contents

by NFPA Numerical Designation

Note: Documents appear in numerical order.

NFPA No. Type Action Title Page No.

1 P Fire Code ........................................................................................................................................................... 1-1

3 N Recommended Practice on Commissioning and Integrated Testing of Fire Protection and

Life Safety Systems ........................................................................................................................................... 3-1

15 P Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection ........................................................................ 15-1

30 P Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code .................................................................................................... 30-1

30A P Code for Motor Fuel Dispensing Facilities and Repair Garages ................................................................. 30A-1

54 P National Fuel Gas Code .................................................................................................................................. 54-1

59 P Utility LP-Gas Plant Code .............................................................................................................................. 59-1

70E® P Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace®........................................................................................ 70E-1

80A P Recommended Practice for Protection of Buildings from Exterior Fire Exposures ................................... 80A-1

90A P Standard for the Installation of Air-Conditioning and Ventilating Systems ............................................... 90A-1

90B P Standard for the Installation of Warm Air Heating and Air-Conditioning Systems ................................... 90B-1

92 N Standard for Smoke Management Systems .................................................................................................... 92-1

92A W Standard for Smoke-Control Systems Utilizing Barriers and Pressure Differences ................................... 92A-1

92B W Standard for Smoke Management Systems in Malls, Atria, and Large Spaces .......................................... 92B-1

99 P Standard for Health Care Facilities ................................................................................................................. 99-1

(will be redesignated as NFPA 99, Health Care Facilities Code)

101® P Life Safety Code® .......................................................................................................................................... 101-1

220 P Standard on Types on Building Construction ............................................................................................... 220-1

221 P Standard for High Challenge Fire Walls, Fire Walls, and Fire Barrier Walls ............................................. 221-1

232 P Standard for the Protection of Records ......................................................................................................... 232-1

318 P Standard for the Protection of Semiconductor Fabrication Facilities .......................................................... 318-1

407 P Standard for Aircraft Fuel Servicing ............................................................................................................. 407-1

414 P Standard for Aircraft Rescue and Fire-Fighting Vehicles ............................................................................ 414-1

484 C Standard for Combustible Metals ................................................................................................................. 484-1

664 P Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and

Woodworking Facilities ................................................................................................................................ 664-1

703 P Standard for Fire-Retardant Treated Wood and Fire-Retardant Coatings for Building Materials .............. 703-1

704 P Standard System for the Identification of the Hazards of Materials for Emergency Response ................... 704-1

720 P Standard for the Installation of Carbon Monoxide (CO) Detection and Warning Equipment .................... 720-1

790 N Standard for Competency of Third-Party Field Evaluation Bodies ............................................................. 790-1

791 N Recommended Practice and Procedures for Unlabeled Electrical Equipment Evaluation .......................... 791-1

820 P Standard for Fire Protection in Wastewater Treatment and Collection Facilities ........................................ 820-1

ii

1081 P Standard for Industrial Fire Brigade Member Professional Qualifications ................................................ 1081-1

1125 P Code for the Manufacture of Model Rocket and High Power Rocket Motors .......................................... 1125-1

1141 P Standard for Fire Protection Infrastructure for Land Development in Suburban and Rural Areas ........... 1141-1

(will be redesignated as NFPA 1141, Standard for Fire Protection Infrastructure for Land Development

in Wildland, Rural, and Suburban Areas)

1142 P Standard on Water Supplies for Suburban and Rural Fire Fighting ........................................................... 1142-1

2112 P Standard on Flame-Resistant Garments for Protection of Industrial Personnel Against Flash Fire .......... 2112-1

2113 P Standard on Selection, Care, Use, and Maintenance of Flame-Resistant Garments for Protection

of Industrial Personnel Against Flash Fire ................................................................................................. 2113-1

(will be redesignated as NFPA 2113, Standard on Selection, Care, Use, and Maintenance of

Flame-Resistant Garments for Protection of Industrial Personnel)

5000® P Building Construction and Safety Code® ................................................................................................... 5000-1

TYPES OF ACTION

P Partial Revision C Complete Revision N New Document R Reconfirmation W Withdrawal

iii

2011 Annual Revision Cycle ROP

Committees Reporting

Type Action Page No.

Air Conditioning

90A Standard for the Installation of Air-Conditioning and Ventilating Systems P 90A-1

90B Standard for the Installation of Warm Air Heating and Air-Conditioning Systems P 90B-1

Aircraft Fuel Servicing

407 Standard for Aircraft Fuel Servicing P 407-1

Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting

414 Standard for Aircraft Rescue and Fire-Fighting Vehicles P 414-1

Automotive and Marine Service Stations

30A Code for Motor Fuel Dispensing Facilities and Repair Garages P 30A-1

Building Code

5000 Building Construction and Safety Code® P 5000-1

Building Construction

220 Standard on Types of Building Construction P 220-1

221 Standard for High Challenge Fire Walls, Fire Walls, and Fire Barrier Walls P 221-1

Structures, Construction, and Materials

703 Standard for Fire-Retardant Treated Wood and Fire-Retardant Coatings for Building Materials P 703-1

Classification and Properties of Hazardous Chemical Data

704 Standard System for the Identification of the Hazards of Materials for Emergency Response P 704-1

Cleanrooms

318 Standard for the Protection of Semiconductor Fabrication Facilities P 318-1

Combustible Metals and Metal Dusts

484 Standard for Combustible Metals C 484-1

Commissioning Fire Protection Systems

3 Recommended Practice on Commissioning and Integrated Testing of Fire Protection and

Life Safety Systems N 3-1

Electrical Equipment Evaluation

790 Standard for Competency of Third-Party Field Evaluation Bodies N 790-1

791 Recommended Practice and Procedures for Unlabeled Electrical Equipment Evaluation N 791-1

Electrical Safety in the Workplace

70E Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace® P 70E-1

Exposure Fire Protection

80A Recommended Practice for Protection of Buildings from Exterior Fire Exposures P 80A-1

Fire Code

1 Fire Code P 1-1

Flammable and Combustible Liquids

30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code P 30-1

Flash Fire Protective Garments

2112 Standard on Flame-Resistant Garments for Protection of Industrial Personnel Against Flash Fire P 2112-1

2113 Standard on Selection, Care, Use, and Maintenance of Flame-Resistant Garments for Protection of

Industrial Personnel Against Flash Fire

P

2113-1

Forest and Rural Fire Protection

1141 Standard for Fire Protection Infrastructure for Land Development in Suburban and Rural Areas P 1141-1

1142 Standard on Water Supplies for Suburban and Rural Fire Fighting P 1142-1

Health Care Facilities

99 Standard for Health Care Facilities P 99-1

iv

LP-Gases at Utility Gas Plants

59 Utility LP-Gas Plant Code P 59-1

National Fuel Gas Code

54 National Fuel Gas Code P 54-1

Professional Qualifications

Industrial Fire Brigades Professional Qualifications

1081 Standard for Industrial Fire Brigade Member Professional Qualifications P 1081-1

Pyrotechnics

1125 Code for the Manufacture of Model Rocket and High Power Rocket Motors P

1125-1

Record Protection

232 Standard for the Protection of Records P 232-1

Safety to Life

101® Life Safety Code® P 101-1

Signaling Systems for the Protection of Life and Property

Carbon Monoxide Detection

720 Standard for the Installation of Carbon Monoxide (CO) Detection and Warning Equipment P 720-1

Smoke Management Systems

92 Standard for Smoke Management Systems N 92-1

92A Standard for Smoke-Control Systems Utilizing Barriers and Pressure Differences W 92A-1

92B Standard for Smoke Management Systems in Malls, Atria, and Large Spaces W 92B-1

Wastewater Treatment Plants

820 Standard for Fire Protection in Wastewater Treatment and Collection Facilities P 820-1

Water Spray Fixed Systems

15 Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection P 15-1

Wood and Cellulosic Materials Processing

664 Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking

Facilities P 77-1

v

COMMITTEE MEMBER CLASSIFICATIONS1,2,3,4

The following classifications apply to Committee members and represent their principal interest in the activity of the

Committee.

1. M Manufacturer: A representative of a maker or marketer of a product, assembly, or system, or portion thereof,

that is affected by the standard.

2. U User: A representative of an entity that is subject to the provisions of the standard or that voluntarily uses the

standard.

3. IM Installer/Maintainer: A representative of an entity that is in the business of installing or maintaining a product,

assembly, or system affected by the standard.

4. L Labor: A labor representative or employee concerned with safety in the workplace.

5. RT Applied Research/Testing Laboratory: A representative of an independent testing laboratory or independent

applied research organization that promulgates and/or enforces standards.

6. E Enforcing Authority: A representative of an agency or an organization that promulgates and/or enforces

standards.

7. I Insurance: A representative of an insurance company, broker, agent, bureau, or inspection agency.

8. C Consumer: A person who is or represents the ultimate purchaser of a product, system, or service affected by the

standard, but who is not included in (2).

9. SE Special Expert: A person not representing (1) through (8) and who has special expertise in the scope of the

standard or portion thereof.

NOTE 1: “Standard” connotes code, standard, recommended practice, or guide.

NOTE 2: A representative includes an employee.

NOTE 3: While these classifications will be used by the Standards Council to achieve a balance for Technical Committees,

the Standards Council may determine that new classifications of member or unique interests need representation in order to

foster the best possible Committee deliberations on any project. In this connection, the Standards Council may make such

appointments as it deems appropriate in the public interest, such as the classification of “Utilities” in the National Electrical

Code Committee.

NOTE 4: Representatives of subsidiaries of any group are generally considered to have the same classification as the parent

organization.

FORM FOR COMMENT ON NFPA REPORT ON PROPOSALS 2011 ANNUAL REVISION CYCLE

FINAL DATE FOR RECEIPT OF COMMENTS: 5:00 pm EDST, September 3, 2010

For further information on the standards-making process, please contact the Codes and Standards Administration at 617-984-7249 or visit www.nfpa.org/codes.

For technical assistance, please call NFPA at 1-800-344-3555.

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

Log #:

Date Rec’d:

Please indicate in which format you wish to receive your ROP/ROC electronic paper download (Note: If choosing the download option, you must view the ROP/ROC from our website; no copy will be sent to you.)

Date 8/1/200X Name John B. Smith Tel. No. 253-555-1234

Company Email

Street Address 9 Seattle St. City Tacoma State WA Zip 98402

***If you wish to receive a hard copy, a street address MUST be provided. Deliveries cannot be made to PO boxes.

Please indicate organization represented (if any) Fire Marshals Assn. of North America

1. (a) NFPA Document Title National Fire Alarm Code NFPA No. & Year NFPA 72, 200X ed.

(b) Section/Paragraph 4.4.1.1

2. Comment on Proposal No. (from ROP): 72-7

3. Comment Recommends (check one): new text revised text deleted text

4. Comment (include proposed new or revised wording, or identification of wording to be deleted): [Note: Proposed text should be in legislative format; i.e., use underscore to denote wording to be inserted (inserted wording) and strike-through to denote wording to be deleted (deleted wording).]

Delete exception.

5. Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Comment: (Note: State the problem that would be resolved by your recommendation; give the specific reason for your Comment, including copies of tests, research papers, fire experience, etc. If more than 200 words, it may be abstracted for publication.)

A properly installed and maintained system should be free of ground faults. The occurrence of one or more ground faults should be required to cause a ‘trouble’ signal because it indicates a condition that could contribute to future malfunction of the system. Ground fault protection has been widely available on these systems for years and its cost is negligible. Requiring it on all systems will promote better installations, maintenance and reliability.

6. Copyright Assignment

(a) I am the author of the text or other material (such as illustrations, graphs) proposed in the Comment.

(b) Some or all of the text or other material proposed in this Comment was not authored by me. Its source is as follows: (please identify which material and provide complete information on its source)

I hereby grant and assign to the NFPA all and full rights in copyright in this Comment and understand that I acquire no rights in any publication of NFPA in which this Comment in this or another similar or analogous form is used. Except to the extent that I do not have authority to make an assignment in materials that I have identified in (b) above, I hereby warrant that I am the author of this Comment and that I have full power and authority to enter into this assignment.

Signature (Required)

PLEASE USE SEPARATE FORM FOR EACH COMMENT

Mail to: Secretary, Standards Council ∙ National Fire Protection Association 1 Batterymarch Park ∙ Quincy, MA 02169-7471 OR

Fax to: (617) 770-3500 OR Email to: [email protected] 5/14/2010

mailto:[email protected]

FORM FOR COMMENT ON NFPA REPORT ON PROPOSALS 2011 ANNUAL REVISION CYCLE

FINAL DATE FOR RECEIPT OF COMMENTS: 5:00 pm EDST, September 3, 2010

For further information on the standards-making process, please contact the Codes and Standards Administration at 617-984-7249 or visit www.nfpa.org/codes.

For technical assistance, please call NFPA at 1-800-344-3555.

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

Log #:

Date Rec’d:

Please indicate in which format you wish to receive your ROP/ROC electronic paper download (Note: If choosing the download option, you must view the ROP/ROC from our website; no copy will be sent to you.)

Date Name Tel. No.

Company Email

Street Address City State Zip

***If you wish to receive a hard copy, a street address MUST be provided. Deliveries cannot be made to PO boxes.

Please indicate organization represented (if any)

1. (a) NFPA Document Title NFPA No. & Year

(b) Section/Paragraph

2. Comment on Proposal No. (from ROP):

3. Comment Recommends (check one): new text revised text deleted text

4. Comment (include proposed new or revised wording, or identification of wording to be deleted): [Note: Proposed text should be in legislative format; i.e., use underscore to denote wording to be inserted (inserted wording) and strike-through to denote wording to be deleted (deleted wording).]

5. Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Comment: (Note: State the problem that would be resolved by your recommendation; give the specific reason for your Comment, including copies of tests, research papers, fire experience, etc. If more than 200 words, it may be abstracted for publication.)

6. Copyright Assignment

(a) I am the author of the text or other material (such as illustrations, graphs) proposed in the Comment.

(b) Some or all of the text or other material proposed in this Comment was not authored by me. Its source is as follows: (please identify which material and provide complete information on its source)

I hereby grant and assign to the NFPA all and full rights in copyright in this Comment and understand that I acquire no rights in any publication of NFPA in which this Comment in this or another similar or analogous form is used. Except to the extent that I do not have authority to make an assignment in materials that I have identified in (b) above, I hereby warrant that I am the author of this Comment and that I have full power and authority to enter into this assignment.

Signature (Required)

PLEASE USE SEPARATE FORM FOR EACH COMMENT

Mail to: Secretary, Standards Council ∙ National Fire Protection Association 1 Batterymarch Park ∙ Quincy, MA 02169-7471 OR

Fax to: (617) 770-3500 OR Email to: [email protected] 5/14/2010

mailto:[email protected]

Sequence of Events Leading to Issuance of an NFPA Committee Document

Step 1 Call for Proposals

▼ Proposed new document or new edition of an existing document is entered into one of two yearly revision cycles, and a Call for Proposals is published.

Step 2 Report on Proposals (ROP)

▼ Committee meets to act on Proposals, to develop its own Proposals, and to prepare its Report.

▼ Committee votes by written ballot on Proposals. If two-thirds approve, Report goes forward. Lacking two-thirds approval, Report returns to Committee.

▼ Report on Proposals (ROP) is published for public review and comment.

Step 3 Report on Comments (ROC)

▼ Committee meets to act on Public Comments to develop its own Comments, and to prepare its report.

▼ Committee votes by written ballot on Comments. If two-thirds approve, Report goes forward. Lacking two-thirds approval, Report returns to Committee.

▼ Report on Comments (ROC) is published for public review.

Step 4 Association Technical Meeting

▼ “Notices of intent to make a motion” are filed, are reviewed, and valid motions are certified for presentation at the Association Technical Meeting. (“Consent Documents” that have no certified motions bypass the Association Technical Meeting and proceed to the Standards Council for issuance.)

▼ NFPA membership meets each June at the Association Technical Meeting and acts on Technical Committee Reports (ROP and ROC) for documents with “certified amending motions.”

▼ Committee(s) vote on any amendments to Report approved at NFPA Annual Membership Meeting.

Step 5 Standards Council Issuance

▼ Notification of intent to file an appeal to the Standards Council on Association action must be filed within 20 days of the NFPA Annual Membership Meeting.

▼ Standards Council decides, based on all evidence, whether or not to issue document or to take other action, including hearing any appeals.

The Association Technical Meeting

The process of public input and review does not end with the publication of the ROP and ROC. Following the completion of the Proposal and Comment periods, there is yet a further opportunity for debate and discussion through the Association Technical Meeting that takes place at the NFPA Annual Meeting.

The Association Technical Meeting provides an opportunity for the final Technical Committee Report (i.e., the ROP and ROC) on each proposed new or revised code or standard to be presented to the NFPA membership for the debate and consideration of motions to amend the Report. The specific rules for the types of motions that can be made and who can make them are set forth in NFPA’s rules, which should always be consulted by those wishing to bring an issue before the membership at an Association Technical Meeting. The following presents some of the main features of how a Report is handled.

The Filing of a Notice of Intent to Make a Motion. Before making an allowable motion at an Association Technical Meeting, the intended maker of the motion must file, in advance of the session, and within the published deadline, a Notice of Intent to Make a Motion. A Motions Committee appointed by the Standards Council then reviews all notices and certifies all amending motions that are proper. The Motions Committee can also, in consultation with the makers of the motions, clarify the intent of the motions and, in certain circumstances, combine motions that are dependent on each other together so that they can be made in one single motion. A Motions Committee report is then made available in advance of the meeting listing all certified motions. Only these Certified Amending Motions, together with certain allowable Follow-Up Motions (that is, motions that have become necessary as a result of previous successful amending motions) will be allowed at the Association Technical Meeting.

Consent Documents. Often there are codes and standards up for consideration by the membership that will be noncontroversial and no proper Notices of Intent to Make a Motion will be filed. These “Consent Documents” will bypass the Association Technical Meeting and head straight to the Standards Council for issuance. The remaining documents are then forwarded to the Association Technical Meeting for consideration of the NFPA membership.

What Amending Motions Are Allowed. The Technical Committee Reports contain many Proposals and Comments that the Technical Committee has rejected or revised in whole or in part. Actions of the Technical Committee published in the ROP may also eventually be rejected or revised by the Technical Committee during the development of its ROC. The motions allowed by NFPA rules provide the opportunity to propose amendments to the text of a proposed code or standard based on these published Proposals, Comments, and Committee actions. Thus, the list of allowable motions include motions to accept Proposals and Comments in whole or in part as submitted or as modified by a Technical Committee action. Motions are also available to reject an accepted Comment in whole or part. In addition, Motions can be made to return an entire Technical Committee Report or a portion of the Report to the Technical Committee for further study.

The NFPA Annual Meeting, also known as the NFPA Conference & Expo, takes place in June of each year. A second Fall membership meeting was discontinued in 2004, so the NFPA Technical Committee Report Session now runs once each year at the Annual Meeting in June.

Who Can Make Amending Motions. NFPA rules also define those authorized to make amending motions. In many cases, the maker of the motion is limited by NFPA rules to the original submitter of the Proposal or Comment or his or her duly authorized representative. In other cases, such as a Motion to Reject an accepted Comment, or to Return a Technical Committee Report or a portion of a Technical Committee Report for Further Study, anyone can make these motions. For a complete explanation, the NFPA Regs should be consulted.

Action on Motions at the Association Technical Meeting. In order to actually make a Certified Amending Motion at the Association Technical Meeting, the maker of the motion must sign in at least an hour before the session begins. In this way a final list of motions can be set in advance of the session. At the session, each proposed document up for consideration is presented by a motion to adopt the Technical Committee Report on the document. Following each such motion, the presiding officer in charge of the session opens the floor to motions on the document from the final list of Certified Amending Motions followed by any permissible Follow-Up Motions. Debate and voting on each motion proceeds in accordance with NFPA rules. NFPA membership is not required in order to make or speak to a motion, but voting is limited to NFPA members who have joined at least 180 days prior to the Association Technical Meeting and have registered for the meeting. At the close of debate on each motion, voting takes place, and the motion requires a majority vote to carry. In order to amend a Technical Committee Report, successful amending motions must be confirmed by the responsible Technical Committee, which conducts a written ballot on all successful amending motions following the meeting and prior to the document being forwarded to the Standards Council for issuance.

Standards Council Issuance

One of the primary responsibilities of the NFPA Standards Council, as the overseer of the NFPA codes and standards development process, is to act as the official issuer of all NFPA codes and standards. When it convenes to issue NFPA documents, it also hears any appeals related to the document. Appeals are an important part of assuring that all NFPA rules have been followed and that due process and fairness have been upheld throughout the codes and standards development process. The Council considers appeals both in writing and through the conduct of hearings at which all interested parties can participate. It decides appeals based on the entire record of the process as well as all submissions on the appeal. After deciding all appeals related to a document before it, the Council, if appropriate, proceeds to issue the document as an official NFPA code or standard. Subject only to limited review by the NFPA Board of Directors, the decision of the Standards Council is final, and the new NFPA code or standard becomes effective twenty days after Standards Council issuance.

70E-1

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Report of the Technical Correlating Committee on

National Electrical Code®

(NEC-AAA)

James W. Carpenter, Chair International Association of Electrical Inspectors, NC [E]

Mark W. Earley, Secretary (Staff-Nonvoting)National Fire Protection Association, MA

Jean A. O’Connor, Recording Secretary (NV)National Fire Protection Association, MA

James E. Brunssen, Telcordia, NJ [UT] Rep. Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions Merton W. Bunker, Jr., US Department of State, VA [U] VL to Document: 110, Document: 111, Document: 70, Document: 70B, Document: 70E, Document: 79, Document: 790, Document: 791 James M. Daly, General Cable, NJ [M] Rep. National Electrical Manufacturers Association William R. Drake, Marinco, CA [M] William T. Fiske, Intertek Testing Services, NY [RT] Stanley J. Folz, Morse Electric Company, NV [IM] Rep. National Electrical Contractors Association Palmer L. Hickman, National Joint Apprentice & Training Committee, MD [L] Rep. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers David L. Hittinger, Independent Electrical Contractors of Greater Cincinnati, OH [IM] Rep. Independent Electrical Contractors, Inc. John R. Kovacik, Underwriters Laboratories Inc., IL [RT] Neil F. LaBrake, Jr., National Grid, NY [UT] Rep. Electric Light & Power Group/EEI Danny Liggett, The DuPont Company, Inc., TX [U] Rep. American Chemistry Council

Alternates

Thomas L. Adams, Engineering Consultant, IL [UT] (Alt. to Neil F. LaBrake, Jr.) Lawrence S. Ayer, Biz Com Electric, Inc., OH [IM] (Alt. to David L. Hittinger) Larry D. Cogburn, Cogburn Bros, Inc., FL [IM] (Alt. to Stanley J. Folz) James T. Dollard, Jr., IBEW Local Union 98, PA [L] (Alt. to Palmer L. Hickman) Ernest J. Gallo, Telcordia Technologies, Inc., NJ [UT] (Alt. to James E. Brunssen) Daniel J. Kissane, Legrand/Pass & Seymour, NY [M] (Alt. to James M. Daly) Michael E. McNeil, FMC Bio Polymer, ME [U] (Alt. to Danny Liggett) Mark C. Ode, Underwriters Laboratories Inc., AZ [RT] (Alt. to John R. Kovacik) Richard P. Owen, Oakdale, MN [E] (Alt. to James W. Carpenter)

Nonvoting

Richard G. Biermann, Biermann Electric Company, Inc., IA [IM](Member Emeritus) D. Harold Ware, Libra Electric Company, OK [IM](Member Emeritus)

Staff Liaison: Mark W. Earley

Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents on minimizing the risk of electricity as a source of electric shock and as a potential ignition source of fires and explosions. It shall also be responsible for text to minimize the propagation of fire and explosions due to electrical installations.

Report of the Committee on

Electrical Safety in the Workplace (EEW-AAA)

David A. Dini, ChairUnderwriters Laboratories Inc., IL [RT]

Allen H. Bingham, Bingham Consults, GA [SE]William Bruce Bowman, Fox Systems, Inc., GA [IM] Rep. Independent Electrical Contractors, Inc. Thomas A. Carpenter, Aerospace Testing Alliance, TN [IM] Carey J. Cook, S&C Electric Company, IL [M] Drake A. Drobnick, Saline, MI [SE] Bobby J. Gray, Hoydar/Buck, Inc., WA [E] Lee R. Hale, Alcoa, Inc., IA [M] Rep. The Aluminum Association, Inc. Paul S. Hamer, Chevron Energy Technology Company, CA [U] Rep. American Petroleum InstitutePalmer L. Hickman, National Joint Apprentice & Training Committee, MD [L] Rep. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Michael J. Hittel, GM Worldwide Facilites Group, MI [U] John Luke, The ESCO Group, IA [IM] Rep. National Electrical Contractors Association Daleep C. Mohla, DCM Electrical Consulting Services, Inc., TX [SE] Rep. Institute of Electrical & Electronics Engineers, Inc. Dennis K. Neitzel, AVO Training Institute, Inc., TX [SE] David A. Pace, Olin Corporation, AL [U] Rep. American Chemistry Council Vincent J. Saporita, Cooper Bussmann, MO [M] Rep. National Electrical Manufacturers Association Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab, IL [U] James G. Stallcup, Grayboy, Inc., TX [SE] Terry Tiede, Square D Company/Schneider Electric, IA [M] David M. Wallis, US Department of Labor, DC [E] John M. Weber, Kone, Inc., IL [IM] Rep. National Elevator Industry Inc. Ron Widup, Shermco Industries, Inc., TX [IM] Rep. InterNational Electrical Testing Association Kathleen Wilmer, Duke Energy, NC [U] Rep. Edison Electric Institute

Alternates

Lawrence S. Ayer, Biz Com Electric, Inc., OH [IM] (Alt. to William Bruce Bowman).Louis A. Barrios, Shell Global Solutions, TX [U] (Voting Alt. to API Rep.) John F. Boothroyd, Entergy Fossil Operations, TX [U] (Alt. to Kathleen Wilmer) Belinda K. Cannon, US Department of Labor, DC [E] (Alt. to David M. Wallis) Daryld Ray Crow, DRC Consulting, Ltd., WA [M] (Alt. to Lee R. Hale) Paul Dobrowsky, Innovative Technology Services, NY [SE] (Alt. to Daleep C. Mohla) James T. Dollard, Jr., IBEW Local Union 98, PA [L] (Alt. to Palmer L. Hickman) Keith D. Gershon, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, CA [U] (Alt. to Keith W. Schuh) Danny Liggett, The DuPont Company, Inc., TX [U] (Alt. to American Chemistry Council Rep.) Kevin J. Lippert, Eaton Corporation, PA [M] (Alt. to Vincent J. Saporita)Mark McNellis, Sandia National Laboratories, NM [U] (Voting Alt. to SNL Rep.)Thomas D. Norwood, AVO Training Institute, TX [SE] (Alt. to Dennis K. Neitzel)Larry D. Perkins, US Department of Energy, TN [E] (Alt. to Bobby J. Gray) Thomas J. Rege, San Diego Gas & Electric Company, CA [SE] (Alt. to Allen H. Bingham) Jerry E. Rivera, National Electrical Contractors Association, MD [IM] (Alt. to John Luke) Anthony A. Selk, Ford Motor Co. MI [U] (Voting Alt. to Ford Motor Co.)James W. Stallcup, Jr., Grayboy, Inc., TX [SE] (Alt. to James G. Stallcup)Rodney J. West, Square D Company/Schneider Electric, OH [M] (Alt. to Terry Tiede) James R. White, Shermco Industries, Inc., TX [IM] (Alt. to Ron Widup)

70E-2

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Nonvoting

Mike Doherty, Infrastructure Health & Safety Association, Canada [U] Rep. Canadian Standards Association (Alt. to Kerry Heid)Kerry Heid, Magna Electric Corporation, Canada [U] (Alt. to Mike Doherty) Rep. Canadian Standards Association James R. Tomaseski, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, DC [L] Rep. National Electrical Safety Code

Staff Liaison: Jeffrey S. Sargent

Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents for work practices that are necessary to provide a practical safe workplace relative to the hazards associated with electrical energy. This Committee shall have primary jurisdiction, but shall report to Technical Correlating Committee of the National Electrical Code.

These lists represent the membership at the time each Committee was balloted on the text of this report. Since that time, changes in the membership may have occurred. A key to classifications is found at the front of the document.

The Report of the Committee on Electrical Safety in the Workplace is presented for adoption, as follows:

This Report was prepared by the Technical Committee on Electrical Safety in the Workplace and proposes for adoption, amendments to NFPA 70E®, Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace® 2009 edition. NFPA 70E-2009 is published in Volume 5 of the 2010 National Fire Codes and in separate pamphlet form.

This Report has been submitted to letter ballot of the Technical Committee on Electrical Safety in the Workplace, which consists of 25 voting members. The results of the balloting, after circulation of any negative votes, can be found in the report.

This Report on Proposals has also been submitted to theTechnical Correlating Committee on National Electrical Code® (TCC) in two parts. Part 1 is a letter ballot on the TCC Actions, if any; and Part 2 is an informational letter ballot on the Report as a whole. The TCC, which consists of 12 voting members, voted as follows:

Part 1: 12 voted affirmatively.

Part 2: 12 voted affirmatively.

70E-3

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-1 Log #7 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (Entire Document) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: The Technical Correlating Committee directs the committee to reconsider this proposal because the “Forward” is outside the scope of the committee. The committee should consider relocating the recommended text into Article 90. This action will be considered as a public comment. Submitter: Palmer L. Hickman, National Joint Apprentice & Training Committee Recommendation: Revise text as follows: This edition of NFPA 70E, Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace, was prepared by the Technical Committee on Electrical Safety in the Workplace and released by the Technical Correlating Committee on National Electrical Code®, and acted on by NFPA® at its June Association Technical Meeting held June 2–5, 2008, in Las Vegas, NV. It was issued by the Standards Council on July 24, 2008, with an effective date of September 5, 2008, and supersedes all previous editions. It is not the intent that this standard become effective until 180 days from the date of issue by the Standards Council. Substantiation: The present wording in the 2009 edition of NFPA 70E indicates that 70E has an effective date that is the same date as the issue date by Standards Council. A 180 implementation date is proposed to allow users to update procedures and training in accordance with any changes that have occurred in the standard. This delayed implementation is line with what is done with other codes and standards such as OSHA and the NESC. It is the intent that the dates for the NFPA® Association Technical Meeting and Standards Council issuance in the proposed text above be changed to reflect the actual dates associated with the next edition of NFPA 70E. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: I have concern regarding the ability of users to make alterations to program in this time frame. The language proposed came after discussion and guidance from Standards Council (Leona) and is thought to be an acceptable format. The committee action should have been AIP and reworded the change to read: “ It is the intent that this standard become effective 180 days after the date of issue by the Standards Council.” This language is in the affirmative and is more clear than the suggested wording. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: The action should have been to accept in principle, in part. Do not accept the deletion of “with an effective date of September 5, 2008” because this date is associated with the previous edition. Modify the last statement to “The Standard becomes effective 180 days after the issue date.” This modification meets the intent of the submitter and is rewritten in positive language _______________________________________________________________ 70E-2 Log #2 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Entire Document) _______________________________________________________________ Note: TCC Hold from A2008 ROC Comment #70E-1 (Log #13) on Proposal 70E-1. Submitter: Technical Correlating Committee on National Electrical Code ®, Recommendation: The Technical Correlating Committee directs that the definitions used in more than one article be relocated to Article 100. Otherwise, the definition will be located in the article where it is used in accordance with the NEC Style Manual. This action will be considered by the committee as a public comment. Substantiation: This is a direction from the Technical Correlating Committee on the National Electrical Code in accordance with 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 of the Regulations Governing Committee Projects. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee respectfully requests that the definitions remain as they are currently located (in the 2009 edition) for the 2012 edition. Because there is a single technical committee responsible for NFPA 70E, the management of definitions is less cumbersome than for larger projects, with multiple technical committees, such as is the case with NFPA 70. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-3 Log #CP9 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (Entire Document) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: The Technical Correlating Committee directs that the action on this proposal be reconsidered and clarified as to which extracts and references are being revised, if any. This action will be considered as a public comment. Submitter: Technical Committee on Electrical Safety in the Workplace, Recommendation: Review entire document to: 1) Update any extracted material by preparing separate proposals to do so, and 2) review and update references to other organizations documents, by preparing proposal(s) as required. Substantiation: To conform to the NFPA Regulations Governing Committee Projects. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-4 Log #79 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Entire Document) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James A. Elias, Jr., Campbell Soup Company Recommendation: Address how an evaluation of equipment for Arc Flash should be conducted. Substantiation: No guidelines exist for evaluation. A piece of electrical equipment such as a switchboard can be given two different categories 4 and 0 by calculating the main breaker as a separate device even if it feeds the distribution section with bus duct within the same enclosure. This procedure can be done to motor control centers also. This is a false analysis and will put the employee at risk. I have checked with one major electrical panel manufacturer and their reply was to address it as one piece of equipment. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: This proposal does not contain recommended text as is required by Section 4.3.3(c) of the NFPA Regulations Governing Committee Projects. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HITTEL, M.: Reading into the substantiation given by the submitter, it seems that he is stating that there is some confusion regarding whether the “line side exposure” should be included. This is a wide-spread problem with application of hazard/risk assessment. There certainly are standards and other reference resources for guidance on arc flash hazard evaluation. Line-side exposure issues are unique to each installation. Issues associated with “what zone(s) of protection” should be addressed through a risk assessment process. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-5 Log #188 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (Entire Document) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Alvin Havens, e-Hazard Management, LLC Recommendation: Before any reference to “Flame Resistant” or the initials “FR” insert Arc-Rated or AR as applicable. Substantiation: The definition of Flame-Resistant (FR) does not refer to any material property or attribute value in terms of the material’s performance when exposed to an electrical arc. The definition of Arc Rating does refer to that attribute. Therefore, whenever the 70E Standard’s text is referring to the arc rating of materials, the term Arc-Rated or AR needs to be inserted before FR. Materials can be flame resistant without being arc rated. Domestic draperies are a good example. They are flame resistant but not arc resistant. All arc rated materials are flame resistant. Not all flame resistant materials are arc rated. It is my opinion that it is imperative that 70E consistently refers to the arc-rating of materials, whether or not it refers to the flame resistant characteristic of the materials. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-55 addresses the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

70E-4

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-6 Log #83 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (90.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas Doyle, Industrial Safety Integration Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: The purpose of this Standard is to provide a practical guidance with regard to establishing a safe working area environment for employees relative to... Substantiation: This standard provides guidance. It does not provide “a practical safe working area.” Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The proposed text does not provide additional clarity. The requirements in NFPA 70E provide a practical safe working area. Based on 90.5(A), the standard is written in mandatory language. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: DROBNICK, D.: I disagree with the committee’s action to reject these two proposals. I believe acceptance and the combination of Mr. Doyle’s two proposals provides a more accurate Purpose statement than that found in the current language. Since 70E by itself has no statute authority, the standard provides “how to” guidance dealing with the risk associated when interacting with electricity in the workplace. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: COOK, C.: The submitter’s revision adds clarity and, with one suggested change, the sentence will read better. The change: Change the word “environment” back to the original word “area”. The 70E Standard is a mix of mandatory rules (90.5(A)), permissive rules (90.5(B)), and explanatory material (90.5(C)). _______________________________________________________________ 70E-7 Log #84 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (90.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas Doyle, Industrial Safety Integration Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: ...the hazards and risks arising from interaction with and/or the use of electricity and its associated apparatus. Substantiation: This clause does not mention interaction with electrical systems. I think this is a very important point to make early in the document. The safe use of electricity is generally addressed though conformity with the National Electrical Code as applicable. Interaction with electrical system, apparatus, and equipment is not addressed in the National Electrical Code; therefore, it must be included in the “Purpose” of this standard. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommended text does not add clarity to the existing provision. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: DROBNICK, D.: See my negative comment on Proposal 70E-7. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-8 Log #22 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (90.2) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: The Technical Correlating Committee directs that this proposal be reconsidered. The intent of this proposal was to delete 90.2(A)(1) through (4). The revisions to 90.2(B)(5) in the 2011 NEC should be correlated with this section in NFPA 70E. In addition, the Technical Correlating Committee directs that further consideration be given to the comments expressed in the voting. This action will be considered as a public comment. Submitter: National Electrical Code Technical Correlating Committee, Recommendation: 90.2 Scope. (A) Covered. This standard addresses electrical work practices for employees that are necessary to provide a practical safe workplace relative to the hazards associated with electrical energy during activities such as the installation, operation, maintenance, and demolition of electric conductors, electric equipment, signaling and communications conductors and equipment, and raceways. This standard also includes safe work practices for employees performing other work activities that can expose them to electrical hazards. (B) Not Covered. This standard does not cover work practices for: (1) Installations in ships, watercraft other than floating buildings, railway rolling stock, aircraft, or automotive vehicles other than mobile homes and recreational vehicles (2) Installations underground in mines (and self-propelled mobile surface mining machinery and its attendant electrical trailing cable

(3) Installations of railways for generation, transformation, transmission, or distribution of power used exclusively for operation of rolling stock or installations used exclusively for signaling and communications purposes (4) Installations of communications equipment under the exclusive control of communications utilities located outdoors or in building spaces used exclusively for such installations (5) Installations under the exclusive control of an electric utility where such installations: a. Consist of service drops or service laterals, and associated metering, or b. Are located in legally established easements or rights-of-way designated by or recognized by public service commissions, utility commissions, or other regulatory agencies having jurisdiction for such installations, or c. Are on property owned or leased by the electric utility for the purpose of communications, metering, generation, control, transformation, transmission, or distribution of electric energy. Substantiation: The reason for the proposed revisions to the Document Scope are as follows: The revisions to subdivision (B), the revisions to the first sentence in (A), and the list items in 90.2(A), were made to make it clear that the standard covers work practices, rather than installations. The second sentence in (A) was added to cover employees who could be exposed to electrical hazards while performing other non electrical work, such as a painter who could come into contact with an energized conductor. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee respectfully requests that the TCC clarify and substantiate the recommended action for 90.2. The committee is not clear whether it is the TCC’s intent to delete 90.2(A) (1) through (4). The committee understands that there are revisions to 90.2(B)(5) for the 2011 NEC and wants to ensure that the TCC correlates these changes between the two documents. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 3 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HICKMAN, P.: We are voting Negative on the action to Reject. Our comments are as follows: The action on this proposal should have been to Accept in Principle. This proposal to revise 90.2 is submitted by the NEC TCC to revise the scope of NFPA 70E as suggested by the NEC TCC Task Group on 70E. These proposed changes were made to provide clarity to the user of the document, making it clear that the standard covers work practices, and does not contain installation requirements. It is apparent that the Task Group’s legislative text was not transcribed properly for the 70E Technical Committee’s action. Additionally, 90.2(B)(5) must be revised to correlate with the 2011 NEC. This proposal should have been “Accepted in Principle” and modified as follows: “90.2 Scope. (A) Covered. This standard addresses electrical work practices safety requirements for employees that are necessary to provide a practical safe workplace relative to the hazards associated with electrical energy for the practical safeguarding of employees during activities such as the installation, operation, maintenance, and demolition of electric conductors, electric equipment, signaling and communications conductors and equipment, and raceways. the following:. This standard also includes safe work practices for employees performing other work activities that can expose them to electrical hazards. (B) Not Covered. This standard does not cover work practices for: (1) Installations in ships, watercraft other than floating buildings, railway rolling stock, aircraft, or automotive vehicles other than mobile homes and recreational vehicles (2) Installations underground in mines and self-propelled mobile surface mining machinery and its attendant electrical trailing cable (3) Installations of railways for generation, transformation, transmission, or distribution of power used exclusively for operation of rolling stock or installations used exclusively for signaling and communications purposes (4) Installations of communications equipment under the exclusive control of communications utilities located outdoors or in building spaces used exclusively for such installations (5) Installations under the exclusive control of an electric utility where such installations: a. Consist of service drops or service laterals, and associated metering, or bc. Are on property owned or leased by the electric utility for the purpose of communications, metering, generation, control, transformation, transmission, or distribution of electric energy., or cb. Are located in legally established easements or rights-of-way designated by or recognized by public service commissions, utility commissions, or other regulatory agencies having jurisdiction for such installations, or d. Are located by other written agreements either designated by or recognized by public service commissions, utility commissions, or other regulatory agencies having jurisdiction for such installations. These written agreements shall be limited to installations for the purpose of communications, metering, generation, control, transformation, transmission, or distribution of electric energy where legally established easements or rights-of-way cannot be obtained. These installations shall be limited to Federal Lands, Native American Reservations through the U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of

70E-5

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Indian Affairs, Military bases, lands controlled by port authorities and State agencies and departments, and lands owned by railroads.” REGE, T.: Committee action should have been Accept in Principle based on the following two reasons. Item 1. The revised the 90.2(A) items were to be in concert with the new Committee Scope for NFPA 70E based on the NEC TCC Task Group on 70E Scope. These proposed changes were made to make it clear that the standard covers work practices, rather than installations. It is apparent that the Task Group’s legislative text was not transcribed properly for the 70E Technical Committee’s action. Item 2. In addition, the NFPA 70 Code-making Panel No. 1 has unanimously accepted Comment 1-23 on 90.2(B)(5) for the 2011 National Electrical Code, which is the consensus of the NEC-NESC Ad Hoc on this section. The result of this action will require correlation of the scopes of NFPA Standards 70E and 70. This would result in the following text: 90.2 Scope. (A) Covered. This standard addresses electrical work practices safety requirements for employees that are necessary to provide a practical safe workplace relative to the hazards associated with electrical energy for the practical safeguarding of employees during activities such as the installation, operation, maintenance, and demolition of electric conductors, electric equipment, signaling and communications conductors and equipment, and raceways the following:. This standard also includes safe work practices for employees performing other work activities that can expose them to electrical hazards. (B) Not Covered. This standard does not cover work practices for: (1) Installations in ships, watercraft other than floating buildings, railway rolling stock, aircraft, or automotive vehicles other than mobile homes and recreational vehicles (2) Installations underground in mines and self-propelled mobile surface mining machinery and its attendant electrical trailing cable (3) Installations of railways for generation, transformation, transmission, or distribution of power used exclusively for operation of rolling stock or installations used exclusively for signaling and communications purposes (4) Installations of communications equipment under the exclusive control of communications utilities located outdoors or in building spaces used exclusively for such installations (5) Installations under the exclusive control of an electric utility where such installations: a. Consist of service drops or service laterals, and associated metering, or b. Are on property owned or leased by the electric utility for the purpose of communications, metering, generation, control, transformation, transmission, or distribution of electric energy., or c. Are located in legally established easements or rights-of-way d. Are located by other written agreements either designated by or recognized by public service commissions, utility commissions, or other regulatory agencies having jurisdiction for such installations. These written agreements shall be limited to installations for the purpose of communications, metering, generation, control, transformation, transmission, or distribution of electric energy where legally established easements or rights-of-way cannot be obtained. These installations shall be limited to Federal Lands, Native American Reservations through the U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Indian Affairs, Military bases, lands controlled by port authorities and State agencies and departments, and lands owned by railroads.” WILMER, K.: Committee action should have been Accept in Principle based on the following two reasons. Item 1. The revised the 90.2(A) items were to be in concert with the new Committee Scope for NFPA 70E based on the NEC TCC Task Group on 70E Scope. These proposed changes were made to make it clear that the standard covers work practices, rather than installations. It is apparent that the Task Group’s legislative text was not transcribed properly for the 70E Technical Committee’s action. The TCC proposal for 90.2 as prepared by the Task Group is excerpted below: “90.2 Scope. (A) Covered. This standard addresses electrical work practices safety requirements for employees that are necessary to provide a practical safe workplace relative to the hazards associated with electrical energy for the practical safeguarding of employees during activities such as the installation, operation, maintenance, and demolition of electric conductors, electric equipment, signaling and communications conductors and equipment, and raceways the following:. This standard also includes safe work practices for employees performing other work activities that can expose them to electrical hazards. (B) Not Covered. This standard does not cover work practices for: (1) Installations in ships, watercraft other than floating buildings, railway rolling stock, aircraft, or automotive vehicles other than mobile homes and recreational vehicles (2) Installations underground in mines and self-propelled mobile surface mining machinery and its attendant electrical trailing cable (3) Installations of railways for generation, transformation, transmission, or distribution of power used exclusively for operation of rolling stock or installations used exclusively for signaling and communications purposes (4) Installations of communications equipment under the exclusive control of communications utilities located outdoors or in building spaces used exclusively for such installations (5) Installations under the exclusive control of an electric utility, where such installations:

a. Consist of service drops or service laterals, and associated metering, or b. Are located in legally established easements or rights-of-way designated by or recognized by public service commissions, utility commissions, or other regulatory agencies having jurisdiction for such installations, or c. Are on property owned or leased by the electric utility for the purpose of communications, metering, generation, control, transformation, transmission, or distribution of electric energy.” Item 2. In addition, the NFPA 70 Code-making Panel No. 1 has unanimously accepted Comment 1-23 on 90.2(B)(5) for the 2011 National Electrical Code, which is the consensus of the NEC-NESC Ad Hoc on this section. The result of this action will require correlation of the scopes of NFPA Standards 70E and 70. The action of the Technical Committee should have been to accept 70E-8 in principle with this change to 90.2(B)(5): “(5) Installations under the exclusive control of an electric utility where such installations: a. Consist of service drops or service laterals, and associated metering, or bc. Are on property owned or leased by the electric utility for the purpose of communications, metering, generation, control, transformation, transmission, or distribution of electric energy., or cb. Are located in legally established easements or rights-of-way designated by or recognized by public service commissions, utility commissions, or other regulatory agencies having jurisdiction for such installations, or d. Are located by other written agreements either designated by or recognized by public service commissions, utility commissions, or other regulatory agencies having jurisdiction for such installations. These written agreements shall be limited to installations for the purpose of communications, metering, generation, control, transformation, transmission, or distribution of electric energy where legally established easements or rights-of-way cannot be obtained. These installations shall be limited to Federal Lands, Native American Reservations through the U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Indian Affairs, Military bases, lands controlled by port authorities and State agencies and departments, and lands owned by railroads.” Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-9 Log #360 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (90.2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Paul Dobrowsky, Innovative Technology Services Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: (A) Covered. This standard addresses electrical safety requirements for employee workplaces that are necessary for the practical safeguarding of employees during activities such as the installation, operation, maintenance, and demolition, and inspection of electric conductors, electric equipment, signaling and communications conductors and equipment, and raceways for the following: Substantiation: Inspection activities need to be included in this section. Electrical inspectors can be exposed to hazards during inspections of installations and are covered by this standard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the recommendation to read: (A) Covered. This standard addresses electrical safety requirements for employee workplaces that are necessary for the practical safeguarding of employees during activities such as the installation, inspection, operation, maintenance, and demolition, and inspection of electric conductors, electric equipment, signaling and communications conductors and equipment, and raceways for the following: Committee Statement: The committee has moved the location of “inspection” for clarity. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-10 Log #510 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (90.2(A)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Paul Dobrowsky, Holley, NY Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 90.2 Scope. (A) Covered. This standard addresses electrical safety requirements for employee workplaces that are necessary for the practical safeguarding of employees during activities such as the installation, operation, maintenance, and demolition of electric conductors, electric equipment, signaling and communications conductors and equipment, and raceways and for activities that involve unqualified persons that are or can be exposed to electrical hazards for the following: Substantiation: The standard also addresses requirements for unqualified persons and should be included in the scope. I realize this makes for a very long sentence, but I don’t have a better solution at this point. Other trades work in proximity to overhead lines and in areas where live parts are exposed by

70E-6

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E qualified persons. Employers need to ensure that unqualified persons are aware of the hazards. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The proposed text does not provide additional clarity to the document scope. Based on 90.1 “the purpose of this standard is to provide a practical safe working area for employees relative to the hazards arising from the use of electricity”. Employees include qualified and unqualified persons. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: The committee action should have been Accept in Principle and changed to “and for non-electrical activities that can expose unqualified persons to electrical hazards”. The proposal clarifies that employees may also be exposed to electrical hazards even if they are not installing, operating, maintaining and demolishing electrical equipment, etc. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-11 Log #456 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (90.2(A)(4)) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: It was the action of the Technical Correlating Committee that this proposal be reconsidered and correlated with the action taken on Proposal 70E-8. This action will be considered as a public comment. Submitter: Danny Liggett, DuPont Recommendation: Revise 90.2(A)(4) to read as follows: (4) Installations used by the electric utility, such as office buildings, warehouses, garages, machine shops, and recreational buildings, that are not an integral part of a generating plant, substation, or control center Substantiation: Even if the facilities listed in 90.2(A)(4) are part of a generating plant, substation or control center in the installations should be covered by NFPA 70E. Neither the physics of electricity nor the hazards associated with the installations of lighting circuits or control circuits change because they are at one of these facilities. Any electrical work associated with an office at a generating plant should be covered by NFPA 70E. The current wording would imply that this work would not be covered. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 3 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: COOK, C.: The deleted phrase adds clarity and context. If the location is NOT an integral part of the... it’s covered (90.2(A)). If the location IS an integral part of the ... it’s not covered (90.2(B)). The deleted phrase removes the words “integral part of the” and thus renders section (90.2(A)(4)) less clear to the reader. HITTEL, M.: I have a concern that this proposal crosses over into the utility systems where the risk assessment is different as it applies to “shutting down where it is possible.” If the office building is the “grid control center” I don’t think this is appropriate. REGE, T.: Committee action should have been reject. It is not appropriate to delete the language “that are not an integral part of a generating plant, substation, or control center.” Work in installations that are an integral part of a generating plant, substation, or control center is already covered by the work rules of the NESC. Utility workers are trained on NESC and OSHA requirements, not NFPA 70E requirements. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: BOWMAN, W.: While I agree with the proposed changes to this section, this is a TCC Scope issue. Scope changes are the jurisdiction of the TCC and must be reviewed by them. MOHLA, D.: Removing this text adds a gray area as to how far the NFPA 70E applies to utility related installations, where the National Electrical Safety Code (NESC) already may have rules for trained employees. It is recognized that the NFPA 70E safety related work practices may apply to such installations since these facilities may be occupied by personnel not necessarily directly involved in installation, operation and maintenance of electrical supply and communication lines. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-12 Log #522 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (90.5 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: T David Mills, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC Recommendation: Insert New 90.5 and renumber the remaining sections. 90.5 Enforcement. This standard is intended to be suitable for mandatory application by governmental bodies that exercise legal jurisdiction over electrical installations and safe work practices. The authority having jurisdiction for enforcement of the standard has the responsibility for making

interpretations of the rules, for deciding on the approval of the work practices and methods, and for granting the special permission contemplated in a number of the rules. By special permission, the authority having jurisdiction may waive specific requirements in this standard or permit alternative methods where it is assured that equivalent objectives can be achieved by establishing and maintaining effective safety. Substantiation: There is no enforcement provision in NFPA 70E, which makes it difficult for the AHJ to make field decisions that cannot directly correlate with the standard text. Since the passage of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR851, which invokes NFPA 70E as law, the implementation the standard has become untenable for certain field conditions. Allowing the same type of enforcement allowances as the NEC does will make the task of enforcement more reasonable and would not reduce the safety of workers. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: This document is a consensus standard suitable for adoption by employers. The entity (employer) that adopts NFPA 70E is responsible for enforcement of the requirements in the standard. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: GRAY, B.: The committee action on this proposal should be to accept. The committee statement does not support the action to reject. The submitter has presented a valid argument to support the proposal. The committee statement merely reiterates the fact presented in the definition of Authority Having Jurisdiction in Article 100 that the property owner or his or her designated agent may assume the role of AHJ. However, the Standard does not address the responsibilities or authorities of the AHJ, except in isolated cases [e.g. 130.7(C)(15)]. The committee statement implies that governmental bodies do not adopt a Standard as law. To the contrary, the NFPA “Regulations Governing Committee Projects” states that Standards are to be written in mandatory language “…for adoption into law.” Unfortunately, NFPA 70E contains language which, although supportive of the Standard’s purpose, is philosophical, subjective, or ambiguous; and necessitates a knowledgeable person to apply the intent of the rule to ensure appropriate results are recognized. Following are three examples that support the need for someone designated by the implementing agency to determine when a requirement is met: 1. NFPA 70E, 110.7(B) states that “The program [electrical safety] shall instill safety principles and controls.” This rule certainly is a worthy philosophical goal, but is qualitative without clear criteria as to when the rule has been met. 2. NFPA 70E, 120.2(F)(2)(f)(4) states that the procedure shall establish “A requirement to retest for absence of voltage when circuit conditions change or when the job has been left unattended.” The word “unattended” is considered subjective when users attempt to comply. They ponder whether a job is unattended when a worker retrieves a tool from a different location, takes a restroom break, takes lunch, or leaves to complete another short task before returning to this job. 3. NFPA 70E, 130.3(B)(1) states “…the employer shall document, the incident energy exposure of the worker (in calories per square centimeter).” So, documenting the exposure in Joules would literally be violating this requirement. If the Standard is adopted into law, as implied by the Regulations Governing Committee Action, the result could be serious legal consequences. I understand the perspective of most TC members and users comes from an environment where application of the specific rules in NFPA 70E is optional with regards to applying common sense to the literal wording of the rules. However, there are a vast number of potential users of the Standard that do not have that luxury. There are foreign governments, companies operating outside the United States, and governmental bodies within the US that need to apply strict compliance with the document and need to understand that a knowledgeable AHJ is a critical element in compensating for the weaknesses in human communication. Without a knowledgeable designated authority that can make informed field decisions on the numerous questions that arise when implementing the work practices of NFPA 70E. MCNELLIS, M.: I agree with the submitter’s substantiation that the document needs an enforcement provision. The AHJ function will provide this for sites that require70E compliance without impacting other agencies/disciplines where compliance is not mandatory. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We recognize that other entities other than employers may choose to adopt NFPA 70E. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-13 Log #181 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (90.5(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Michael J. Johnston, National Electrical Contractors Association Recommendation: Revise Section 90.5(C) as follows: (C) Explanatory Material. Explanatory Material, such as references to other standards, references to related sections of this standard, or information related to a Code rule, is included in this standard in the form of informational notes

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E fine print notes (FPNs). Fine print notes Such notes are informational only and are not enforceable as requirements of this standard. Brackets containing section references to another NFPA document are for informational purposes only and are provided as a guide to indicate the source of the extracted text. These bracketed references immediately follow the extracted text. FPN Informational Note: The format and language used in this standard follow guidelines established by NFPA and published in the NEC Style Manual. Copies of this manual can be obtained from NFPA. Change the term “fine print note” and the acronym “(FPN)” to informational note in all locations where it currently appears in NFPA 70E-2009 and revisions that suggest a new informational note. Substantiation: This change is proposed to provide consistency between the NEC and NFPA 70E. The term “fine print note” and the acronym “(FPN)” should be replaced with the term “Informational Note” globally throughout NFPA 70E. The same substantiation used to change the NEC can be used to justify this revision in NFPA 70E. Fine print notes (FPNs) can be mistaken as fine print or smaller print and this does not provide clear distinction between other notes in the Standard that are applicable and enforceable as requirements but are to provide users information only to assist in applying the rules. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-13a Log #CP10 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (100 Appliance) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Electrical Safety in the Workplace, Recommendation: Delete the term “appliance” from Article 100. Substantiation: The definition does not comply with Section 2.2.2.1 of the NEC Style Manual (2003 Edition), which requires that a term be used in two or more articles before a definition is provided in Article 100. The term “appliance” does not appear elsewhere in the 70E standard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-14 Log #CP1 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (100.Appliance) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Electrical Safety in the Workplace, Recommendation: Adopt the preferred definition from the NFPA Glossary of Terms as follows: Appliance. Utilization equipment, generally other than industrial, normally built in standardized sizes or types, that is installed or connected as a unit to perform one or more functions such as clothes washing, air conditioning, food mixing, deep frying, and so forth. (73, 2006) Substantiation: This definition is the preferred definition from the Glossary of Terms. Changing the secondary definition to the preferred definition complies with the Glossary of Terms Project. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70e-13a deletes the definition of “appliance”. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: DROBNICK, D.: Deleting unused definitions is the correct course of action. Additional removals at the Comment stage should include; Ampacity, Bonded, Grounded, Solidly, Neutral Conductor, Service Conductor, and Service Point. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-15 Log #148 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (100.Arc (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Bobby J. Gray, Hoydar/Buck, Inc. Recommendation: Add a new definition to read as follows: Arc. A continuous discharge of electricity across an insulating medium, usually accompanied by the partial volatilization of the electrodes. Substantiation: The document uses the term in many places including definitions and requirements. It is important to define the term to avoid misunderstanding between this word and similar words, (e.g., arc flash, arc blast, etc.), that represent a definitive electrical hazard. An arc may or may not be hazardous, depending on context. Committee Meeting Action: Reject

Committee Statement: The committee does not agree with the recommendation because an arc is not always continuous and not all discharges across an insulating medium are arcs. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: I disagree with the Committee Action and Statement. The definition should be “accepted in principle” with the word “luminous” inserted before the word “discharge” to conform to the IEEE Standard Dictionary of Terms. There is a need to differentiate between an “arc,” which may not radiate significant energy, and an “arc flash,” which does. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-16 Log #149 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (100.Arc Blast) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Bobby J. Gray, Hoydar/Buck, Inc. Recommendation: Add a new definition to read as follows: Arc Blast. A condition associated with the explosive effects of an arc flash event. It is usually expressed with the excessive release of pressure, sound, shrapnel, molten metal, and other elements at a high rate of speed. Substantiation: The document uses the term in many places including definitions and requirements. It is important to define the term to avoid misunderstanding between this word and similar words, (e.g., arc flash, arc blast, etc.), to ensure protection is considered for all electrical hazards, not just the thermal effects of an event (See 130.7(A) FPN No. 1). Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Annex K provides insight on what an arc blast is. The recommended definition introduces new terms such as “excessive pressure” and “high rate of speed” which are not defined in the standard. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-17 Log #150 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (100.Arc Flash (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Bobby J. Gray, Hoydar/Buck, Inc. Recommendation: Add a new definition to read as follows: Arc Flash. An event that is accompanied by an uncontrolled release of energy in the form of exceptionally high heat and light, and may include arc blast. It is a self-sustaining arc that creates ionization of the air in the vicinity of the initiating arc and will continue until the current flow to the location is interrupted. Substantiation: The document uses the term in many places including definitions and requirements. It is important to define the term to avoid misunderstanding between this word and similar words, (e.g., arc flash, arc blast, etc.), to ensure protection is considered for all electrical hazards. It is critical to ensure appropriate controls are applied commensurate with the actual hazards. Some would consider the sparks generated by a fault at low (>208) voltages an arc flash event and prescribe the same levels of protection as for an actual arc flash event. This misunderstanding creates a loss of confidence in the standard by experienced workers that are exposed to electrical hazards and must apply the prescribed protection schemes. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Annex K provides insight on what an arc flash is. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: I disagree with the Committee Action and Statement. There is a need for the proposed definition, and this proposal should be accepted. See my comment on Proposal 70E-15. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-18 Log #189 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Part (100.Arc Flash Hazard) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: The Technical Correlating Committee understands that the committee action on Proposal 70E-195 relocates the text in FPN No. 3 in 130.1 into Informational Note No. 3 in 130.3. Submitter: Daleep C. Mohla, DCM Electrical Consulting Services, Inc. Recommendation: Revise the FPN No. 1 and add a new FPN No. 2. Renumber the existing FPN No. 2 as FPN No. 3, Delete the existing FPN No. 3. Arc Flash Hazard. A dangerous condition associated with the possible release of energy caused by an electric arc.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E FPN No. 1: An arc flash hazard may exist when energized electrical conductors or circuit parts are exposed or when they are within equipment in a guarded or enclosed condition, provided a person is interacting with the equipment in such a manner that could cause an electric arc. Under normal operating conditions with no interaction, enclosed energized equipment that has been properly installed and maintained is not likely to pose an arc flash hazard. FPN No. 2: The occurrence of arcing fault inside an enclosure produces a variety of physical phenomena very different from a bolted fault. For example, the arc energy resulting from an arc developed in air will cause a sudden pressure increase and localized overheating. Equipment and design practices are available to minimize the energy levels and the number of at-risk procedures that require an employee to be exposed to high level energy sources. Proven designs such as arc-resistant switchgear, remote racking (insertion or removal), remote opening and closing of switching devices, high-resistance grounding of low voltage and 5 kV (nominal) systems, current limitation, and specification of covered bus within equipment are techniques available to reduce the hazard of the system. FPN No. 2: 3 See Table 130.7(C)(9) for examples of activities that could pose an arc flash hazard. FPN No. 3: See 130.3 for arc flash hazard analysis information. Substantiation: FPN No. 1 has been clarified by addition of “with no interaction”. Section 130.1, FPN No. 3 has been relocated as new FPN No. 2. Existing FPN No. 2 has been renumbered as FPN No. 3. Existing FPN No. 3 has been proposed to be relocated under the definition of Arc Flash Hazard Analysis. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Part The committee accepts the deletion on Fine Print Note No. 3 and rejects the remainder of the recommendation. Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-195 adds the recommended new text in this proposal to be Fine Print Note No. 3 to 130.1. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: Article 130 is where the FPN belongs and not relocate to article 100. Even with interaction, enclosed energized equipment that has been properly installed and maintained is not likely to pose an arc flash hazard. There are numerous interactions with equipment daily that don’t result in any exposure. The existing text is an accurate statement dealing with probability. should be AIP Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-19 Log #190 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (100.Arc Flash Hazard Analysis) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Daleep C. Mohla, DCM Electrical Consulting Services, Inc. Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Arc Flash Hazard Analysis. A study investigating a worker’s potential exposure to arc-flash energy, conducted for the purpose of injury prevention and the determination of safe work practices, arc flash protection boundary, and the appropriate levels of PPE. Informational Note: See 130.3 for arc flash hazard analysis information. Substantiation: The existing FPN No. 3 from the Definition of Arc Flash Hazard has been relocated as a new Informational Note. This note provides additional information on Arc Flash Hazard Analysis, not Arc Flash Hazard. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommended fine print note does not provide additional understanding to this definition. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: The definition of Arc Flash Hazard Analysis should be revised as follows to more accurately reflect the provisions of 130.3 especially since a FPN was added referencing 130.3: Arc Flash Hazard Analysis. A study investigating a worker’s potential exposure to arc-flash energy, conducted for the purpose of injury prevention and the determination of safe work practices, incident energy or Hazard/Risk Category, arc flash boundary, and the appropriate levels of PPE either by matching arc rating with the incident energy analysis or by matching the Hazard/Risk Category from Table 130.7(C)(9) with the protective clothing and personal protective equipment in Table 130.7(C)(10)..

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-20 Log #268 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (100.Arc Flash Hazard Analysis) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: The Technical Correlating Committee directs that further consideration be given to the comments expressed in the voting. The use of the two terms “Arc Flash Hazard Analysis” and “Incident Energy Analysis” could result in a lack of correlation within the document. This action will be considered as a public comment. Submitter: Carey J. Cook, S&C Electric Company Recommendation: Add new text to read as follows: Arc Flash Hazard Analysis. A study investigating a worker’s potential exposure to arc-flash energy, conducted for the purpose of injury prevention and the determination of safe work practices, arc flash protection boundary, and the appropriate levels of PPE. IN: An incident energy analysis is a method used to predict the incident energy of an arc flash for a specified set of conditions: it’s used in the arc flash hazard analysis. Substantiation: The purpose of the Information Note (IN) is to clarify the relationship between an incident energy analysis (not defined in 70E-2009) and an arc flash hazard analysis. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the recommendation to create an new definition as follows: Incident Energy Analysis. A study used to predict the incident energy of an arc flash for a specified set of conditions. Committee Statement: The committee notes that the proposed informational note is better suited as a defined term. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: An improved definition would be as follows, since it would not use the defined term “incident energy” within the definition: Incident Energy Analysis. A study used to predict the heat flux of an arc flash, over a period of time, for a specified set of conditions. Informational Note: The conventional units of heat flux over time is either joules/cm^2 or calories/cm^2. HICKMAN, P.: We are voting Affirmative on the action to Accept in Principle. Our comments are as follows: We agree a new definition is necessary for “Incident Energy Analysis.” We believe that proposed definition must be further modified for clarity and usability. In this action we clearly separate the use of the tables from an “incident energy analysis” to ensure that the user of the standard applies all applicable requirements in 130.7. We must provide clarity for the user of the standard so they understand that an “incident energy analysis” is but one component of an “arc flash hazard analysis.” The proposed definition should be modified in the ROC stage as follows: “Incident Energy Analysis. A component of an arc flash hazard analysis, used to predict the incident energy of an arc flash for a specified set of conditions.” _______________________________________________________________ 70E-21 Log #447 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (100.Arc Flash Hazard Analysis) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Mark Rucker, Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. Recommendation: Revise to read as follows: Arc Flash Hazard Analysis. A study conducted for the determination of safe work practices, arc flash protection boundary, incident energy or hazard risk categories and the appropriate levels of arc flash PPE. Substantiation: This proposal harmonizes the definition of AFHA with the requirements of 130.3. 130.3 is the primary section that sets requirements for the AFHA. 130.3(A) gives requirements for determining the Arc Flash Protection Boundary. Section 130.3(B) establishes the requirement for calculating incident energy or hazard risk categories from which arc flash (only) PPE is selected. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation does not improve the clarity or application of the term. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HICKMAN, P.: We generally agree with recommendation of the submitter. See our recommended text in our affirmative comment on Proposal 70E-19. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-22 Log #428 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (100.Arc Flash Suit) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: The Technical Correlating Committee directs that the committee clarify the committee action taken on this proposal. This action will be considered as a public comment. Submitter: Elihu “Hugh” Hoagland IV, ArcWear.com/e-Hazard.com Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Arc Flash Suit. A complete FR arc-rated clothing and equipment system that covers the entire body, except for the hands and feet. FPN: This may includes pants or overalls, jacket, or a coverall and beekeeper-type hood fitted with a face shield. The full body coverage must be accomplished in all working conditions the worker may be in for the task. Long coats with leggings may be acceptable if they are accomplish full body coverage in the work condition. Ignitable underlayers will preclude the use of many ensembles. Balaclava/goggle assemblies may be used if they meet ASTM F2178 for the arc flash conditions and the AHJ has determined the exposure does not require a full facepiece. Substantiation: This definition is design restrictive. With the changes above, we offer more guidance and allow the definition to be non-restrictive in it’s language. ASTM F2178 now allows the use of both bee-keeper style hoods and balaclava/goggle combinations. In some work environments fabric hoods OVER a dielectric hard hat could be a shock hazard. One instance was a low hanging buss bar in an old paper mill. Workers could hit the buss bar when walking through the area and a flash suit hood was unacceptable so they opted for a balaclava/goggle to meet 40 cal/cm² full face coverage. See ASTM F2178, ANSI Z87.1 and public data on Goggle/Balaclava systems tested to F2178. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Accept the recommendation to revise the definition and modify the recommended FPN to read: FPN: An arc-flash suit This may include pants or overalls, jacket, or a coverall and beekeeper-type hood fitted with a face shield. The full body coverage must be accomplished in all working conditions the worker may be in for the task. Long coats with leggings may be acceptable if they are accomplish full body coverage in the work condition. Ignitable underlayers will preclude the use of many ensembles. Balaclava/goggle assemblies may be used if they meet ASTM F2178 for the arc flash conditions and the AHJ has determined the exposure does not require a full facepiece. Committee Statement: The committee has revised the recommended informational note to remove mandatory text. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HICKMAN, P.: We would like to address three points. First, it is not clear if this action has deleted the second sentence of the definition as it appears in the 2009 edition of NFPA 70E or has only modified the existing first sentence by replacing “FR” with “arc-rated.” It does not appear that the submitter of this Proposal has deleted the second sentence in his recommendation. If the second sentence remains, then the the committee meeting action text in the FPN conflicts with the text of the second sentence of the definition as it appears in the 2009 edition of NFPA 70E. Regardless, we do not believe that the new FPN enhances clarity or usability. Examples of what the components of the clothing system might consist of are not necessary or useful. Second, the examples provided in the new FPN contradict the requirements of 130.7(C)(13) where the flash suit design shall permit “easy and rapid removal by the wearer.” This seems to strongly suggest that a combination of arc-rated shirts, pants, overalls, and coveralls does not substitute for a flash suit jacket and flash suit pants. It is hard to imagine that several individual layered garments will facilitate easy and rapid removal as required by 130.7(C)(13) where an arc flash suit is required in Table 130.7(C)(10). Third, we disagree with the portion of the substantiation that asserts that a goggle/balaclava combination is a substitute for a beekeeper-type hood. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-23 Log #192 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (100.Arc Rating) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Daleep C. Mohla, DCM Electrical Consulting Services, Inc. Recommendation: Revise the definition as below: Arc Rating. The value attributed to materials that describes their performance to exposure to an electrical arc discharge. The arc rating is expressed in cal/cm2 and is derived from the determined value of the arc thermal performance value (ATPV) or energy of breakopen threshold (EBT) (should a material system exhibit a breakopen response below the ATPV value) derived from the determined value of ATPV or EBT. FPN: Breakopen is a material response evidenced by the formation of one or more holes in the innermost layer of flame resistant material that would allow flame to pass through the material. Informational Note: ATPV is defined in ASTM F 1959, Standard Test Method for Determining the Arc Thermal Performance Value of Material for Clothing,

as the incident energy on a material or a multilayer system of materials that results in a 50% probability that sufficient heat transfer through the tested specimen is predicted to cause the onset of a second-degree skin burn injury based on the Stoll curve, cal/cm2. EBT is defined in ASTM F1959 as the incident energy on a material or material system that results in a 50% probability of breakopen. Breakopen is a material response evidenced by the formation of one or more holes in the innermost layer of flame-resistant material that would allow flame to pass through the material. Arc rating is reported as either ATPV or EBT, whichever is the lower value. Substantiation: Existing FPN from Table 130.7(C)(11) has been relocated here as it applies to all PPE not necessarily PPE required by table 130.7(C)(11). Existing FPN is deleted as the text in the existing FPN is included in the new Informational Note. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-24 addresses the recommendation of this proposal. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-24 Log #398 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (100.Arc Rating) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas E. Neal, Neal Associates Ltd. Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Arc Rating. The value attributed to materials that describes their performance to exposure to an electrical arc discharge. The arc rating is expressed in cal/cm2 and is derived from the determined value of the arc thermal performance value (ATPV) or energy of breakopen threshold (EBT) (should a material system exhibit a breakopen response below the ATPV value) derived from the determined value of ATPV or EBT. Arc rating is reported as either ATPV or EBT whichever is the lower value. FPN No. 1: Breakopen is a material response evidenced by the formation of one or more holes in the innermost layer of flame-resistant material that would allow flame to pass through the material.. FPN No. 2: ATPV is defined in ASTM F 1959-06 as the incident energy on a material or a multi-layer system of materials that results in a 50% probability that sufficient heat transfer through the tested specimen is predicted to cause the onset of a second-degree skin burn injury based on the Stoll curve, cal/cm2. FPN No. 2: EBT is defined in ASTM F 1959-06 as the incident energy on a material or material system that results in a 50% probability of breakopen. Breakopen is defined as a hole with an area of 1.6 cm2 (0.5 in2) or an opening with a 2.5 cm (1.0 in.) in any dimension. Substantiation: The words deleted from the current definition are carried over from a typographical error in ASTM F1959-06 standard need to be removed to avoid confusion. The added information regarding ATPV and EBT is currently only found in the note appended to hazard/risk category Table 130.7(C)(11), however, the information applies to all users of the document, not just those that use the hazard/risk category method. Including information regarding the two different types of arc ratings under the definition for arc rating provides clarity and enhances usability of the document. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Committee Statement: The committee notes that there are three Fine Print Notes in the recommendation. Two of the fine print notes are identified as “Fine Print Note” No.2. The second one should be Fine Print Note No. 3. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-25 Log #3 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (100.Automatic) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Glossary of Terms Technical Advisory Committee, Recommendation: Replace the definition of automatic with the following definition: Automatic. Performing a function without the necessity of human intervention. Automatic. Self-acting, operating by its own mechanism when actuated by some impersonal influence, as, for example, a change in current, pressure, temperature, or mechanical configuration. Substantiation: This proposal is intended to generate consistent definitions and minimize the number of duplicate definitions in the NFPA Glossary of Terms in accordance with the scope of the NFPA Glossary of Terms Technical Advisory Committee. Similar proposals are being submitted to NFPA 70, 96, 99, 101, 101B, 550, and 901.

70E-10

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-26 Log #CP2 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (100.Automatic) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Electrical Safety in the Workplace, Recommendation: Adopt the preferred definition from the NFPA Glossary of Terms as follows: Automatic. That which provides a function without the necessity of human intervention. (101, 2009) Substantiation: This definition is the preferred definition from the Glossary of Terms. Changing the secondary definition to the preferred definition complies with the Glossary of Terms Project. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-25 addresses the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-27 Log #429 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (100.Balaclava (Sock Hood)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Elihu “Hugh” Hoagland IV, ArcWear.com/e-Hazard.com Recommendation: Delete text as follows: Balaclava (Sock Hood). An arc-rated FR hood that protects the neck and head except for facial area of the eyes and nose. Substantiation: FR is redundant at best and confusing at worst. See justification for removing definition of FR from the standard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-28 Log #CP3 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (100.Barrier) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Electrical Safety in the Workplace, Recommendation: Adopt the preferred definition from the NFPA Glossary of Terms as follows: Barrier. A physical obstruction that is intended to prevent contact with equipment or energized electrical conductors and circuit live parts or to prevent unauthorized access to a work area. (79, 2007) Substantiation: This definition is the preferred definition from the Glossary of Terms. Changing the secondary definition to the preferred definition complies with the Glossary of Terms Project. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The definition of the term “barrier” is appropriate within the context of this standard. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-29 Log #191 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (100.Boundary, Arc Flash Protection) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Daleep C. Mohla, DCM Electrical Consulting Services, Inc. Recommendation: Add a new Informational Note under the definition: Informational Note. A second degree burn is possible by an exposure of an unprotected skin to an electric arc flash above the incident-energy level of 5 J/cm2 (1.2 cal/cm2). Substantiation: To clarify the relationship between incident energy and the onset of a second degree burn. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Committee Statement: The committee notes that the use of “an” prior to “unprotected” is grammatically incorrect and directs staff to delete it. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A.

Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: Editorially modify for clarity: Informational Note. A second degree burn is possible if unprotected skin is exposed to an electric arc flash of an incident-energy level of 5 J/cm2 (1.2 cal/cm2), or greater. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-30 Log #512 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (100.Boundary, Arc Flash Protection) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Paul Dobrowsky, Holley, NY Recommendation: Revise the term by deleting the word “Protection”. 100, Boundary, Arc Flash Protection Substantiation: The shock boundaries do not use the word “protection” although they are used to minimize the risk of shock. The boundary does not provide protection but is the distance where the incident energy is 1.2 cal/cm2. Protection may be desired at a greater distance to reduce the possibility of any level of injury. The definition itself is unchanged by this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Committee Statement: The committee directs staff to implement this revision throughout the standard. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: This proposal should have been rejected. The present wording of the definition accurately reflects that protection is required when within the boundary. This is a widely used and understood term. Deletion of “protection” may impact the clarity of the term and definition. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-31 Log #124 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (100.Boundary, Arc Flash Protection Boundary) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: E. W. Buss, Mashpee, MA Recommendation: Revise as follows: “...distance from a prospective arc source an exposed energized electrical conductor or circuit part... Substantiation: Since “exposed live part” was deleted in 2009, there is confusion when energized circuit parts are behind equipment panels. An enclosed disconnect switch is a prospective arc source. If the committee rejects this proposal and reverts to the existing wording, the worker must assume a straight line distance (as if the metal enclosure does not exist) from the arc source to the worker when determining PPE. Note that the three remaining “boundaries” require exposed energized electrical conductor... Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Exposed energized conductors present a shock hazard and perhaps an arc flash hazard. Conversely, energized parts that are not exposed could pose an arc flash hazard but not a shock hazard. The current language is accurate. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: Boundary is a calculated value that is not achievable with existing calculation methodologies. (a closed door) does not have an AFB. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-32 Log #151 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (100.Boundary, Limited Approach) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Bobby J. Gray, Hoydar/Buck, Inc. Recommendation: Revise definition to read as follows: Boundary, Limited Approach. An approach limit at a distance from an exposed energized electrical conductor or circuit part within which a shock hazard exists for an unqualified person. Substantiation: The standard considers an unqualified person at risk of electrical shock within the Limited Approach Boundary and prohibits that person from crossing the boundary unless continuously escorted by a qualified person (130.2(D)). It does not place the same restriction on the qualified person, nor does it require any shock protection PPE (excluding insulated tools and handing equipment under certain conditions in 130.7(D)) for a qualified person until the qualified person crosses the Restricted Approach Boundary. This change is necessary to clarify that the qualified person is not at risk of electrical shock under normal conditions until crossing the Restricted Approach Boundary due to the criteria for qualification and training as described and mandated by 110.6. Committee Meeting Action: Reject

70E-11

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Committee Statement: The limited approach boundary applies to qualified and unqualified persons. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: MCNELLIS, M.: The committee action to reject this proposal is clearly in conflict with the requirements identified in the document. If the committee feels that there is a shock hazard for a qualified worker within the Limited Approach Boundary then the standard ought to be modified to require shock PPE when broaching that boundary instead of the Restricted Approach Boundary. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-33 Log #51 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (100.Boundary, Limited Approach; Boundary, Prohibited Approach; & Boundary, Restricted Approach) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas A. Carpenter, Aerospace Testing Alliance Recommendation: Revise the Boundary definitions as follows: Boundary, Limited Approach. An approach limit at a distance from an exposed energized electrical conductor or circuit part within which a shock hazard exists. Unqualified persons crossing this boundary must be escorted by at least one qualified person. Boundary, Prohibited Approach. An approach limit at a distance from an exposed energized electrical conductor or circuit part within which work is considered the same as making contact with the electrical conductor or circuit part. Only qualified persons may cross this boundary. Boundary, Restricted Approach. An approach limit at a distance from an exposed energized electrical conductor or circuit part within which there is an increased risk of shock, due to electrical arc over combined with the inadvertent movement, for personnel working in close proximity to the energized electrical conductor or circuit part. Only qualified persons may cross this boundary. Substantiation: Existing definitions did not provide guidance on how to use or apply them. The added verbiage provides this guidance. This information matches what is provided in Section 130.2 and Annex C. Also, deleted reference to “arc over” in the restricted approach boundary definition as an arc does not increase the risk of shock. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee concludes, per Section 2.2.2 of the NEC Style Manual, that definitions shall not contain requirements or recommendations. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-34 Log #152 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (100.Boundary, Prohibited Approach) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Bobby J. Gray, Hoydar/Buck, Inc. Recommendation: Revise definition as follows: Boundary, Prohibited Approach. An approach limit at a distance from an exposed energized electrical conductor or circuit part within which work any uninsulated part of a person’s body or extension of a person’s body by an uninsulated conductive object is considered the same as making contact with the electrical conductor or circuit part. Substantiation: The term “work” implies that a person is intentionally making contact or working on energized circuit parts. This clarification will include the inadvertent contact by a person. Additionally, this change is necessary to distinguish between “working on” and crossing the Prohibited Approach Boundary. This will help clarify the requirement in 130.2(C) when a qualified person must don shock protection PPE. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The boundary doesn’t change based upon whether the person’s body is insulated or not, or whether the extension is insulated or not. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: GRAY, B.: Committee action should be accept. The committee statement implies that the Prohibited Approach Boundary changes if a person is not doing “work,” the term the proposal replaces. The boundary should not be dependent on the activity of the person, but whether the person crosses the boundary intentionally or otherwise. As currently written, a person does not cross the boundary unless they are performing work. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-35 Log #153 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (100.Boundary, Restricted Approach) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Bobby J. Gray, Hoydar/Buck, Inc. Recommendation: Revise definition as follows: Boundary, Restricted Approach. An approach limit at a distance from an exposed energized electrical conductor or circuit part within which there is an increased risk of shock, due to electrical arc over combined with inadvertent movement, for qualified personnel working in close proximity to the energized conductor or circuit part. Substantiation: Adding the qualifying term “qualified” reinforces the requirement that the restricted Approach Boundary is reserved for qualified persons. This proposal will provide correlation with the requirements listed in 130.2(C) and information found in Annex C since an unqualified worker is not allowed to work within the Restricted Approach Boundary without escort by the qualified worker. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The restricted approach boundary applies to qualified and unqualified persons. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: MCNELLIS, M.: The committee action to reject this proposal is clearly in conflict with the requirements identified in the document. If the committee feels that there is a shock hazard for a qualified worker within the Limited Approach Boundary then the standard ought to be modified to require shock PPE when broaching that boundary instead of the Restricted Approach Boundary. By definition a qualified worker has been trained to “distinguish exposed live parts from other parts of electrical equipment” and has the the skills and techniques necessary to determine the nominal voltage of exposed live parts and the proper clearance distances. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-36 Log #203 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (100.Branch Circuit Overcurrent Device) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Carey J. Cook, S&C Electric Company Recommendation: Delete term: Branch Circuit Overcurrent Device Branch-Circuit Overcurrent Device. A device capable of providing protection for service, feeder, and branch circuits and equipment over the full range of overcurrents between its rated current and its interrupting rating. Branch-circuit overcurrent protective devices are provided with interrupting ratings appropriate for the intended use but no less than 5,000 amperes. Substantiation: Definition does not comply with Section 2.2.2.1 of the NEC Style Manual (2003 Edition), which requires that a term be used in two or more articles before a definition is provided in Article 100. The term “Branch Circuit Overcurrent Device” does not appear elsewhere in the 70E standard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-37 Log #CP4 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (100.Building) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Electrical Safety in the Workplace, Recommendation: Adopt the preferred definition from the NFPA Glossary of Terms as follows: Building. Any structure used or intended for supporting or sheltering any use or occupancy. [101, 2009] Substantiation: This definition is the preferred definition from the Glossary of Terms. Changing the secondary definition to the preferred definition complies with the Glossary of Terms Project. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

70E-12

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-38 Log #204 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (100.Conductor, Bare) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Carey J. Cook, S&C Electric Company Recommendation: Delete term: Conductor, Bare Conductor, Bare. A conductor having no covering or electrical insulation whatsoever. Substantiation: Definition does not comply with Section 2.2.2.1 of the NEC Style Manual (2003 Edition), which requires that a term be used in two or more articles before a definition is provided in Article 100. The term “Conductor Bare” does not appear elsewhere in the 70E standard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: The proposal should be rejected, since “bare … conductor” exists many places. See Table 130.7(C)(9), for example. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-39 Log #205 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (100.Conductor, Covered) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Carey J. Cook, S&C Electric Company Recommendation: Delete term: Conductor, Covered Conductor, Covered. A conductor encased within material of composition or thickness that is not recognized by this standard as electrical insulation. Substantiation: Definition does not comply with Section 2.2.2.1 of the NEC Style Manual (2003 Edition), which requires that a term be used in two or more articles before a definition is provided in Article 100. The term “Conductor, Covered” does not appear elsewhere in the 70E standard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: This proposal should be rejected. It is very important to retain the distinction that a “covered conductor” is not the same as an “insulated conductor.” (A Committee Comment may necessary to add the term to 130.1(A)(3), FPN No. 3, in order to retain the present definition: Add to 130.1(A)(3), FPN No. 3: “…high-resistance grounding of low voltage and 5 kV (nominal) systems, current limitation, and specification of covered bus or conductors within equipment are techniques available to reduce the hazard of the system.”) Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-40 Log #206 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (100.Conductor, Insulated) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Carey J. Cook, S&C Electric Company Recommendation: Delete term: Conductor, Insulated Conductor, Insulated. A conductor encased within material of composition and thickness that is recognized by this standard as electrical insulation. Substantiation: Definition does not comply with Section 2.2.2.1 of the NEC Style Manual (2003 Edition), which requires that a term be used in two or more articles before a definition is provided in Article 100. The term “Conductor, Insulated” does not appear elsewhere in the 70E standard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: This proposal should be rejected. The term “insulated conductor” is used in the standard, e.g., in the definition of Open Wiring on Insulators, and could reasonably be applied to the term “insulated cable” in Table 130.7(C)(9). It is very important to define what an “insulated conductor” is to distinguish it from a “covered conductor.” Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-41 Log #207 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (100.Coordination (Selective)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Carey J. Cook, S&C Electric Company Recommendation: Delete term: Coordination (Selective) Coordination (Selective). Localization of an overcurrent condition to restrict outages to the circuit or equipment affected, accomplished by the choice of overcurrent protective devices and their ratings or settings.

Substantiation: Definition does not comply with Section 2.2.2.1 of the NEC Style Manual (2003 Edition), which requires that a term be used in two or more articles before a definition is provided in Article 100. The term “Coordination (Selective)” does not appear elsewhere in the 70E standard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-42 Log #208 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (100.Current-Limiting Overcurrent Protective Device) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Carey J. Cook, S&C Electric Company Recommendation: Delete term: Current-Limiting Overcurrent Protective Device Current-Limiting Overcurrent Protective Device. A device that, when interrupting currents in its current-limiting range, reduces the current flowing in the faulted circuit to a magnitude substantially less than that obtainable in the same circuit if the device were replaced with a solid conductor having comparable impedance. Substantiation: Definition does not comply with Section 2.2.2.1 of the NEC Style Manual (2003 Edition), which requires that a term be used in two or more articles before a definition is provided in Article 100. The term “Current-Limiting Overcurrent Protective Device” does not appear elsewhere in the 70E standard. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The term “current-limiting” is used numerous times in the standard as a description for some fuses and some circuit breakers. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-43 Log #221 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (100.Electric Shock (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John McAlhaney, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions Recommendation: Add a new definition with a Fine Print Note to Article 100, Definitions, for Electric Shock as follows: Electric Shock Stimulation of the nerves and possible convulsive contraction of the muscle caused by the passage of an electric current through the human body. FPN: An electric shock may be classified as a primary or secondary shock. A primary shock is a shock of such a magnitude that it may produce direct physiological harm. The results of primary shock are fibrillation, respiratory tetanus, and muscle contraction. A secondary shock is a shock of a magnitude such that it will not produce direct physiological harm, but may cause involuntary muscle reactions. The results of secondary shock are annoyance, alarm, and aversion. Substantiation: A definition is currently not provided in Article 100 to clearly define an electric shock so as to provide differentiation between a hazardous and non-hazardous shock. All electric shocks should not necessarily be considered hazardous to a person. A challenge in a laboratory environment of other similar industry where reporting of electrical events may be required is the differentiation between these hazardous and non-hazardous electrical energy. A new definition for “electric shock” will provide the differentiation in level of a shock based on the potential for direct physiological harm. The proposed definition is consistent with the current definition provided in the IEEE 100, The Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms, Seventh Edition. IEEE Paper No. ESW-23, “A Complete Electrical Hazard Classification System and Its Application” presented at the 2009 Electrical Safety Workshop provides the technical basis for electric shocks that may be classified as non-hazardous. The paper discusses specific high voltage/low current applications and other applications such as capacitors that may not constitute an electrical shock hazard since they can not cause injury. The paper states “Examples of equipment with high voltage, very low shock currents include radiation detection circuits, small photo detectors, mass spectrometers and in general any instrument that uses a high voltage electric field to accelerate charged particles. Typical voltages are in the 1 to 5 kVm, and typically the currents are in the 10 to 100 microampere range. Although mild shocks from such equipment are well known in the laboratory, there is no known injury from such shocks” Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation limits the defined term to only certain physiological effects and the terms introduced in the recommended fine print note are not used in the standard. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A.

70E-13

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: The committee action should be accept in principle. The submitter introduces better understanding of the intent as it applies to direct harm vs. indirect harm as both are important. In the context of this standard, the term should be defined as the passage of electric current through the human body caused by an external source. See the Committee Statement on Proposal 70E-75 where it states: “There may be involuntary reaction to small levels of current that indirectly cause injury.” Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-44 Log #371 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (100.Electric Shock (as it relates to personnel) (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Ron Widup, Shermco Industries, Inc. / Rep. InterNational Electrical Testing Association (NETA) Recommendation: Add definition for “Electric Shock”: Electric Shock (as it relates to personnel). The act of contacting an energized electrical source sufficient to cause current flow. Substantiation: Many news stories and industry-related articles that communicate electrical injury and/or death improperly identify the incident as an electrocution, when it was actually an “electrical shock” event. The problem has been accentuated in recent years with the advent of internet-based news reporting and news outlets. This creates confusion and misrepresents the electrical injury event. Clarifying the meaning of the terms within the 70E will provide a point of reference as to the proper use of the terms. See related proposal for the definition of “Electrocution”. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Electric shock is not necessarily limited to only contact incidents and additionally is not an “act”. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-45 Log #370 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (100.Electrocution (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Ron Widup, Shermco Industries, Inc. / Rep. InterNational Electrical Testing Association (NETA) Recommendation: Add definition for “Electrocution”: Electrocution. The incident of death caused by an electric shock. Substantiation: Many news stories and industry-related articles that communicate electrical injury and/or death improperly identify the incident as an electrocution, when it was actually an “electrical shock” event. The problem has been accentuated in recent years with the advent of internet-based news reporting and news outlets. This creates confusion and misrepresents the electrical injury event. Clarifying the meaning of the terms within the 70E will provide a point of reference as to the proper use of the terms. See related proposal for the definition of “Electric Shock (as it relates to personnel)”. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The term does not appear within the standard other than in Annex K. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-46 Log #425 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (100.Employee (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Michael A. Anthony, University of Michigan / Rep. APPA.ORG - Association of Education Facility Executives Recommendation: Add one of the following definitions for “employee”: 1· Employee. Any person hired by an employer to do a specific “job”. The term employee refers to a specific defined relationship between an individual and a corporation, which differs from those of customer, or client. 2· Employee. One employed by another usually for wages or salary and in a position below the executive level. 3 Employee. An individual who provides labor to a company or another person. Substantiation: The terms we propose appear in NFPA 70E dozens, if not hundreds of times and therefore meet a necessary condition for inclusion in a list of definitions as stated in the NFPA Rules Governing Committee Projects. Our industry would benefit from language that distinguishes an electrician from an employee. In many cases, our employees -- such as security guards or

general maintenance personnel -- are exposed to electrical hazards. In some cases, electricians working on our campuses are permanent employees of other organizations. Other definitions for employee and employer appear in a separate, but related, proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The submitter has not substantiated that the lack of a definition has resulted in misapplication of this commonly understood term. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-47 Log #424 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (100.Employee, Employer (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Michael A. Anthony, University of Michigan / Rep. APPA.ORG - Association of Education Facility Executives Recommendation: Add the following new definitions: Employee. An employee of an employer who is employed in the business of that employer which affects interstate commerce. Employer. A person engaged in a business who has employees, but does not include the United States (not including the United States Postal Service,) or any state or political subdivision of a state. Substantiation: These definitions originate in OSHA documents at the following link: http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9686 The terms we propose appear in NFPA 70E dozens, if not hundreds of times and therefore meet a necessary condition for inclusion in a list of definitions as stated in the NFPA Rules Governing Committee Projects. Our industry would benefit from language that distinguishes an electrician from an employee. In many cases, our employees -- such as security guards or general maintenance personnel -- are exposed to electrical hazards. In some cases, electricians working on our campuses are permanent employees of other organizations. Since the driver for NFPA 70E is OSHA legislation, it seems appropriate that the committee consider the relevance of OSHA definitions. Other definitions for employee and employer appear in a separate, but related, proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The submitter has not substantiated that the lack of a definition has resulted in misapplication of these commonly understood terms. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-48 Log #426 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (100.Employer (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Michael A. Anthony, University of Michigan / Rep. APPA.ORG - Association of Education Facility Executives Recommendation: Add the following definitions for “employer” : Employer. A person, firm or other entity which pays for or hires the services of another person. Substantiation: The terms we propose appear in NFPA 70E dozens, if not hundreds of times and therefore meet a necessary condition for inclusion in a list of definitions as stated in the NFPA Rules Governing Committee Projects. Recognizing that not every word used hundreds of times in this standard necessarily needs a definition, and that understanding the meaning of a requirement is often clear in context, our industry would still benefit from language that distinguishes different employer-employee relationships. In many cases, our employees -- such as security guards or general maintenance personnel -- are exposed to electrical hazards. In some cases, electricians working on our campuses are permanent employees of other organizations. Other definitions to continue discussion of this concept appear in a separate, but related, proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The submitter has not substantiated that the lack of a definition has resulted in misapplication of this commonly understood term. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

70E-14

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-49 Log #CP5 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (100.Enclosed) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Electrical Safety in the Workplace, Recommendation: Adopt the preferred definition from the NFPA Glossary of Terms as follows: Enclosed. Surrounded by a case, housing, fence, or wall(s) that prevents persons from accidentally contacting energized parts. [70, 2008] Substantiation: This definition is the preferred definition from the Glossary of Terms. Changing the secondary definition to the preferred definition complies with the Glossary of Terms Project. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: The committee actions should be Accept in Principle and modified to read “... from accidentally contacting energized electrical conductors or circuit parts” in order to be consistent with the remainder of the Standard where these terms are used. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-50 Log #210 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (100.Explosionproof Apparatus) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Carey J. Cook, S&C Electric Company Recommendation: Delete term: Explosionproof Apparatus Explosionproof Apparatus. Apparatus enclosed in a case that is capable of withstanding an explosion of a specified gas or vapor that may occur within it and of preventing the ignition of a specified gas or vapor surrounding the enclosure by sparks, flashes, or explosion of the gas or vapor within, and that operates at such an external temperature that a surrounding flammable atmosphere will not be ignited thereby. Substantiation: Definition does not comply with Section 2.2.2.1 of the NEC Style Manual (2003 Edition), which requires that a term be used in two or more articles before a definition is provided in Article 100. The term “Explosionproof Apparatus” does not appear elsewhere in the 70E standard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-51 Log #154 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (100.Exposed (as applied to energized electrical conductors or circuit parts)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Bobby J. Gray, Hoydar/Buck, Inc. Recommendation: Revise definition as follows: Exposed (as applied to energized electrical conductors or circuit parts). Capable of being inadvertently touched or approached nearer than a safe distance by a person. It is applied to electrical conductors or circuit parts that are not suitably guarded, isolated, or insulated. Visible. Substantiation: The term exposed is used throughout the standard in places where the clear definition of the term is critical in applying the rule in which it is used. Unfortunately, the definition is virtually ignored by many when using the term. For example, 235.2, which provides rules for maintaining equipment and installations in classified locations, states in 235.2(1) that: “No energized parts are exposed.” However, according to the definition of “Exposed” as currently written, parts could be behind an open ventilated screen that does not allow a person to inadvertently touch them and not be considered “exposed.” Clearly, energized conductors open to a classified environment is not a safe condition, yet as written, the standards would allow it. The current definition contains ambiguous terms that are subject to the opinion of the user and enforcer. For example, the term “Capable” means different things to different people. Some would consider “capable” as “possible” without consideration of any mitigating circumstances. Others would credit the skills and techniques required to be demonstrated by a qualified worker in 110.6 as a means to differentiate between what may be “capable” for an unqualified worker, yet not “capable” for a qualified worker. The term plays a critical role in determining when energized parts must be placed into an electrically safe work condition. Both 110.8(A)(1) and 130.1 require only those parts to which an employee might be “exposed” to be placed into electrically safe work conditions, yet as written, it is not clear which parts this is referring to. This change will remove all misunderstanding as to the intent of the Committee that if an energized conductor insulated or not, energized parts guarded by finger-safe barriers, and overhead lines regardless of height; must be considered “exposed” for the purposes of applying the rules in NFPA 70E if they are visible.

Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Visibility alone is not an acceptable criteria for inadvertently touching or approaching energized circuit parts. Exposed parts may be behind panels where a person reaching blindly could come in contact. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HITTEL, M.: This would expand what would be considered as exposed beyond the purpose of the standard. Finger-safe components are not exposed according to the existing definition and should remain as so. Also, the committee statement contemplates a situation involving blind reaching which is not allowed and is not appropriate as a part of the reason for rejection. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-52 Log #CP6 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (100.Externally Operable) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Electrical Safety in the Workplace, Recommendation: Adopt the preferred definition from the NFPA Glossary of Terms as follows: Externally Operable. Capable of being operated without exposing the operator to contact with live parts. [70, 2008] Substantiation: This definition is the preferred definition from the Glossary of Terms. Changing the secondary definition to the preferred definition complies with the Glossary of Terms Project. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: See the committee action on Proposal 70E-53 which deleted the definition of “externally operable.” Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-53 Log #209 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (100.Externally Operable) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Carey J. Cook, S&C Electric Company Recommendation: Delete term: Externally Operable Externally Operable. Capable of being operated without exposing the operator to contact with energized electrical conductors or circuit parts. Substantiation: Definition does not comply with Section 2.2.2.1 of the NEC Style Manual (2003 Edition), which requires that a term be used in two or more articles before a definition is provided in Article 100. The term “Externally Operable” does not appear elsewhere in the 70E standard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: The committee action should be reject. In the context of the standard, the term adds clarity to discussions regarding when a hazard may be present especially when dealing with “unqualified persons.” Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-54 Log #211 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (100.Feeder) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Carey J. Cook, S&C Electric Company Recommendation: Delete term: Feeder Feeder. All circuit conductors between the service equipment, the source of a separately derived system, or other power supply source and the final branch-circuit overcurrent device. Substantiation: Definition does not comply with Section 2.2.2.1 of the NEC Style Manual (2003 Edition), which requires that a term be used in two or more articles before a definition is provided in Article 100. The term “Feeder” does not appear elsewhere in the 70E standard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

70E-15

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-55 Log #520 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (100.Flame Resistant) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Paul Dobrowsky, Holley, NY Recommendation: Delete the term Flame Resistant in Article 100. Use the term Arc Rated in place of Flame Resistant or FR throughout the standard and delete FR where used with the term Arc Rated. Substantiation: Using the term Flame Resistant and its acronym is misleading in NFPA 70E. All Arc Rated clothing and equipment is tested for exposure to an electrical arc. A wide variety of FR clothing and equipment is available in the market place but they are not suitable for electrical worker protection. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Implement the recommendation except as noted in the committee actions on Proposals 70E-349 and 70E-354. Committee Statement: The actions on Proposals 70E-349 and 70E-354 to Table 130.7(C)(10) remove “FR” from before “protective equipment” and the committee does not intend that “Arc Rated” be inserted in those locations. The committee also notes that this action does not change the title of any documents referenced within the standard that use the term “Flame-Resistant”. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: The proposal should have been rejected. The term is used and is needed for the standard. Broad deletion of such a frequently used and understood term in the Standard may have unintended consequences in the Standard. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-56 Log #430 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (100.Flame-Resistant (FR)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Elihu “Hugh” Hoagland IV, ArcWear.com/e-Hazard.com Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Flame-Resistant (FR). The property of a material whereby combustion is prevented, terminated, or inhibited following the application of a flaming or non-flaming source of ignition, with or without subsequent removal of the ignition source. FPN: Flame resistance can be an inherent property of a material, or it can be imparted by a specific treatment applied to the material. Substantiation: This definition is very general. We now have “arc-rated” standards for all PPE which used to be described as “FR”. Generically this term is very abused in labeling. If the clothing meets ASTM F1506, F2178, F1891 as listed in the standard, it is flame resistant but more it is “arc-rated” and appropriate for use. Many items such as polyester, nylon, acrylic and others which are prohibited by this standard have “FR” labels in them. Eliminating this language will go far to ending confusion. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-55 deletes the definition of “Flame-Resistant”. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: The proposal should have been accepted. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-57 Log #CP7 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (100.Ground Fault) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Electrical Safety in the Workplace, Recommendation: Adopt the preferred definition from the NFPA Glossary of Terms as follows: Ground Fault. An unintended current that flows outside the normal circuit path, such as (a) through the equipment grounding conductor; (b) through conductive material in contact with lower potential (such as earth), other than the electrical system ground (metal water or plumbing pipes, etc.); or (c) through a combination of these ground return paths. [921, 2008] Substantiation: This definition is the preferred definition from the Glossary of Terms. Changing the secondary definition to the preferred definition complies with the Glossary of Terms Project. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The current definition is extracted from NFPA 70 and is appropriate to its use in this standard. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-58 Log #1 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (100.Ground-Fault Circuit-Interrupter (GFCI)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James M. Daly, Upper Saddle River, NJ Recommendation: Add a hyphen between “Circuit” and “Interrupter” and revise the definition of Ground-Fault Circuit Interrupter as shown: Ground-Fault Circuit-Interrupter (GFCI). A device intended for the protection of personnel that functions to de-energize a circuit or portion thereof within an established period of time when a fault current to ground exceeds some predetermined value that is less than that required to operate the overcurrent protective device of the supply circuit. the values established for a Class A device. This device will not provide personnel protection from electrocution resulting from line-to-line contact since the nature of line-to-line loads cannot be distinguished. Delete the FPN. Substantiation: The revised definition complies with the following sections in the NFPA Manual of Style: 2.3.2.2 Definitions shall be in the format of a bold term followed by the definition phrase to form a single paragraph unit. 2.3.2.3 Definitions shall not contain requirements. 2.3.2.4 References to other documents or sections of a document, notes, lists, footnotes, cautions, warnings, or figures shall not be permitted in definitions. The revised definition also complies with 2.2.2 of the NEC Style Manual which also states that: “Definitions shall not contain requirements or recommendations.” While the NEC Style Manual permits Fine Print Notes within the document, it does not specifically authorize their use in definitions so the NFPA Manual of Style governs and it does not authorize the use of FPNs nor multiple paragraphs in definitions. It is essential that a class A GFCI be specified, then it should be done in the main body of the Standard since there may be more than one class of GFCIs. The addition of the last sentence is safety information to the user of the Standard. This proposal is also intended to generate consistent definitions and minimize the number of duplicate definitions in the NFPA Glossary of Terms. The proposed wording should meet the intent of 3 preferred and 2 secondary definitions used in 8 NFPA Standards. Similar proposals have been submitted to NFPA 70, 70B, 73, 99, 99B, 302, and 1901. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The current definition is extracted from NFPA 70 and is appropriate for use in this standard. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-59 Log #78 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (100.Ground-Fault Circuit-Interrupter (GFCI)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Bob Eugene, Underwriters Laboratories Inc. Recommendation: Revise text as follows: 100 Definitions Ground-Fault Circuit-Interrupter (GFCI). A device intended for the protection of personnel that functions to de-energize a circuit or portion thereof within an established period of time when a current to ground exceeds the values established for a Class A device. [70, 2008] FPN: Class A ground-fault circuit-interrupters trip when the current to ground is 6 mA or higher and do not trip when the current to ground is less than 4 mA. For further information, see ANSI/UL 943, Standard for Ground-Fault Circuit Interrupters. Substantiation: Add ANSI approval designation to UL 943 in FPN. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-60 Log #212 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (100.Grounding Conductor) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Carey J. Cook, S&C Electric Company Recommendation: Delete term: Grounding Conductor Grounding Conductor. A conductor used to connect equipment or the grounded circuit of a wiring system to a grounding electrode or electrodes. Substantiation: Definition does not comply with Section 2.2.2.1 of the NEC Style Manual (2003 Edition), which requires that a term be used in two or more articles before a definition is provided in Article 100. The term “Grounding Conductor” does not appear elsewhere in the 70E standard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25

70E-16

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-61 Log #155 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (100.Live Parts) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Bobby J. Gray, Hoydar/Buck, Inc. Recommendation: Delete the definition as follows: Live Parts. Energized conductive components. Substantiation: The term is no longer needed since the 2009 edition replaced the term in the body of the text. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: The proposal should have been rejected. The term still appears in several locations within the standard, and unless it is deleted by other proposals or comments, the definition needs to be retained. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-62 Log #213 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (100.Neutral Point) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Carey J. Cook, S&C Electric Company Recommendation: Delete term: Neutral Point and associated FPN Neutral Point. The common point on a wye-connection in a polyphase system or midpoint on a single-phase, 3-wire system, or midpoint of a single-phase portion of a 3-phase delta system, or a midpoint of a 3-wire, direct-current system. FPN: At the neutral point of the system, the vectorial sum of the nominal voltages from all other phases within the system that utilize the neutral, with respect to the neutral point, is zero potential Substantiation: Definition does not comply with Section 2.2.2.1 of the NEC Style Manual (2003 Edition), which requires that a term be used in two or more articles before a definition is provided in Article 100. The term “Neutral Point” does not appear elsewhere in the 70E standard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-63 Log #214 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (100.Open Wiring on Insulators) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Carey J. Cook, S&C Electric Company Recommendation: Delete term: Open Wiring on Insulators Open Wiring on Insulators. An exposed wiring method using cleats, knobs, tubes, and flexible tubing for the protection and support of single insulated conductors run in or on buildings. Substantiation: Definition does not comply with Section 2.2.2.1 of the NEC Style Manual (2003 Edition), which requires that a term be used in two or more articles before a definition is provided in Article 100. The term “Open Wiring on Insulators” does not appear elsewhere in the 70E standard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-64 Log #156 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (100.Safe Distance (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Bobby J. Gray, Hoydar/Buck, Inc. Recommendation: Add a new definition as follows: Safe Distance. A distance at which no electrical hazard exists. A safe distance for an unqualified person is the greater of the Arc Flash Protection Boundary or Limited Approach Boundary. A safe distance for a qualified worker is the greater of the Arc Flash Protection Boundary or Restricted Approach Boundary. Substantiation: The term “safe distance” is used in the definition of “exposed” and determines when an employer must establish an electrically safe work condition, a critical requirement. However, the term is not defined and therefore is subjective and is left to the user or enforcer to define as an opinion.

Previous technical committees have made it obvious in Annex C and 130.2 that a safe distance is different for a qualified and unqualified person. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The shock protection boundaries and arc-flash protection boundary are separate concepts and need to be separately addressed. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: MCNELLIS, M.: The term “safe distance” is used in the document, however, the document fails to provide a definition. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HITTEL, M.: Exposed conductors that are not guarded and accessible to unqualified persons is already a violation of other standards (NEC 110.26 and 27) and therefore in this context does not make sense. Also, this would creates a problematic issue in relation to operation of disconnecting means in the standard as “safe distance” includes the AF Boundary by our action in the last revision. This language would suggest that the qualified employee may, at minimum, hesitate to operate the disconnecting means to mitigate a dangerous condition on a piece of equipment because the employee may be exposed to a hazard while operating the disconnect. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-65 Log #215 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (100.Separately Derived System) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Carey J. Cook, S&C Electric Company Recommendation: Delete term: Separately Derived System Separately Derived System. A premises wiring system whose power is derived from a source of electric energy or equipment other than a service. Such systems have no direct electrical connection, including a solidly connected grounded circuit conductor, to supply conductors originating in another system. Substantiation: Definition does not comply with Section 2.2.2.1 of the NEC Style Manual (2003 Edition), which requires that a term be used in two or more articles before a definition is provided in Article 100. The term “Separately Derived System” does not appear elsewhere in the 70E standard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-66 Log #216 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (100.Service) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Carey J. Cook, S&C Electric Company Recommendation: Delete term: Service Service. The conductors and equipment for delivering electric energy from the serving utility to the wiring system of the premises served. Substantiation: Definition does not comply with Section 2.2.2.1 of the NEC Style Manual (2003 Edition), which requires that a term be used in two or more articles before a definition is provided in Article 100. The term “Service” does not appear elsewhere in the 70E standard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-67 Log #217 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (100.Service Equipment) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Carey J. Cook, S&C Electric Company Recommendation: Delete term: Service Equipment Service Equipment. The necessary equipment, usually consisting of a circuit breaker(s) or switch(es) and fuse(s), and their accessories, connected to the load end of service conductors to a building or other structure, or an otherwise designated area, and intended to constitute the main control and cutoff of the supply. Substantiation: Definition does not comply with Section 2.2.2.1 of the NEC Style Manual (2003 Edition), which requires that a term be used in two or more articles before a definition is provided in Article 100. The term “Service Equipment” does not appear elsewhere in the 70E standard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25

70E-17

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-68 Log #218 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (100.Service-Entrance Conductors, Overhead System) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Carey J. Cook, S&C Electric Company Recommendation: Delete term: Service-Entrance Conductors, Overhead System Service-Entrance Conductors, Overhead System. The service conductors between the terminals of the service equipment and a point usually outside the building, clear of building walls, where joined by tap or splice to the service drop. Substantiation: Definition does not comply with Section 2.2.2.1 of the NEC Style Manual (2003 Edition), which requires that a term be used in two or more articles before a definition is provided in Article 100. The term “ Service-Entrance Conductors, Overhead System” does not appear elsewhere in the 70E standard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-69 Log #219 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (100.Service-Entrance Conductors, Underground System) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Carey J. Cook, S&C Electric Company Recommendation: Delete term: Service-Entrance Conductors, Underground System Service-Entrance Conductors, Underground System. The service conductors between the terminals of the service equipment and the point of connection to the service lateral. Substantiation: Definition does not comply with Section 2.2.2.1 of the NEC Style Manual (2003 Edition), which requires that a term be used in two or more articles before a definition is provided in Article 100. The term “Service-Entrance Conductors, Underground System” does not appear elsewhere in the 70E standard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-70 Log #157 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (100.Shock Hazard) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Bobby J. Gray, Hoydar/Buck, Inc. Recommendation: Revise definition as follows: Shock Hazard. A dangerous condition associated with the possible release of energy caused by contact or approach by uninsulated body parts of a person to energized electrical conductors or circuit parts. Substantiation: The proposed changes make the term accurate and understandable without subjectivity. Shock is not associated with the release of energy, but by the flow of electricity through a person. The purpose of insulating the worker from energized parts according to 130.2 is to prevent shock, so the definition should clarify that the shock hazard exists only when the person is not insulated from the energized parts. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Electric shock hazards are not necessarily limited to only contact incidents. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HICKMAN, P.: We conclude that the correct action would have eliminated the phrase/concept “release of energy.” Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: The Committee Statement is not clear, and should explain that shock hazards can involve “arc-over” to a person from energized electrical conductors or circuit parts.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-71 Log #CP8 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (100.Structure) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Electrical Safety in the Workplace, Recommendation: Adopt the preferred definition from the NFPA Glossary of Terms as follows: Structure. That which is built or constructed and limited to buildings and nonbuilding structures as defined herein. [5000, 2009] Substantiation: This definition is the preferred definition from the Glossary of Terms. Changing the secondary definition to the preferred definition complies with the Glossary of Terms Project. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The current definition is extracted from NFPA 70 and is appropriate for its use in this standard. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-72 Log #220 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (100.Voltage to Ground) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Carey J. Cook, S&C Electric Company Recommendation: Delete term: Voltage to Ground Voltage to Ground. For grounded circuits, the voltage between the given conductor and that point or conductor of the circuit that is grounded; for ungrounded circuits, the greatest voltage between the given conductor and any other conductor of the circuit. Substantiation: Definition does not comply with Section 2.2.2.1 of the NEC Style Manual (2003 Edition), which requires that a term be used in two or more articles before a definition is provided in Article 100. The term “Voltage to Ground” does not appear elsewhere in the 70E standard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-73 Log #158 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (100.Working On) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Bobby J. Gray, Hoydar/Buck, Inc. Recommendation: Revise definition as follows: Working On. Intentionally Ccoming in contact with energized electrical conductors or circuit parts with the hands, feet, or other body parts, with tools, probes, or with test equipment, regardless of the personal protective equipment a person is wearing. There are two categories of “working on”: Diagnostic (testing) is taking readings or measurements of electrical equipment with approved test equipment that does not require making any physical change to the equipment; repair is any physical alteration of electrical equipment (such as making or tightening connections, removing or replacing components,etc.). Substantiation: The proposed changes make the term accurate and understandable without subjectivity. A person could come in contact with energized conductors or circuit parts inadvertently when they are not working on the parts. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HICKMAN, P.: We no not agree with adding “intentionally” to the definition of “working on.” We believe that one would be “working on” whether “coming in contact” occurred intentionally or unintentionally. In addition, we suggest the following revised text for the definition of “Working On”: Working On (energized electrical conductors or circuit parts). Coming in contact with energized electrical conductors or circuit parts with the hands, feet, or other body parts, with tools, probes, or with test equipment, regardless of the personal protective equipment a person is wearing. There are two categories of “working on”: Diagnostic (testing) is taking readings of measurements of electrical equipment with approved test equipment that does not require making any physical change tool equipment; repair or installation is any physical alteration of electrical equipment (such as making or tightening connections, removing, or replacing, or installing conductors and/or components, etc.). Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

70E-18

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-74 Log #123 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (100.Arc Flash Hazard Analysis, FPN (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: E. W. Buss, Mashpee, MA Recommendation: Add A FPN after definition of Arc Flash Hazard Analysis: The incident energy analysis and flash protection boundary calculation (Annex D) are only one part of the Arc Flash Hazard Analysis. Substantiation: This will eliminate the misconception some users have that the calculations are all that is required for the Arc Flash Hazard Analysis. In reality, there are other factors including when the last time the equipment was maintained, the training of the worker, etc. that are part of the Arc Flash Hazard Analysis. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The proposed fine print note does not improve the understanding of this term. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-75 Log #222 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (100.Shock Hazard, FPN (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John McAlhaney, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions Recommendation: Revise the definition of ‘Shock Hazard” to include a new FPN as follows: Shock Hazard. A dangerous condition associated with the possible release of energy caused by contact or approach to energized electrical conductors or circuit parts. FPN: Some electrical equipment or circuit parts may not present a shock hazard due to insufficient source current or energy to cause an injury. Substantiation: “Shock hazard” is currently defined as a “dangerous condition associated with possible release of energy caused by contact or approach...”. and is used throughout NFPA 70E to drive other requirements and controls such as the shock hazard analysis and emergency training for methods of release (110.6(C)). The FPN will clarify the term so that all electrical equipment or circuit parts are not necessarily characterized as hazardous with potential to create a dangerous condition. IEEE Paper No. ESW-23, “A Complete Electrical Hazard Classification System and Its Application” presented at the 2009 Electrical Safety Workshop provides the technical basis for electrical circuit parts that may be classified as non-hazardous. The paper discusses specific high voltage/low current applications and other applications such as capacitors that may not constitute an electrical shock hazard since they can not cause injury. The paper states “Examples of equipment with high voltage, very low shock currents include radiation detection circuits, small photo detectors, mass spectrometers and in general any instrument that uses a high voltage electric field to accelerate charged particles. Typical voltages are in the 1 to 5 kVm, and typically the currents are in the 10 to 100 microampere range. Although mild shocks from such equipment are well known in the laboratory, there is no known injury from such shocks” The paper furthers states that one national laboratory with over 60 years history of research has not experienced injury from electrical shock on these type instruments. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The proposed fine print note does not improve the understanding of this term. There may be involuntary reaction to certain levels of current that can result in injury. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-76 Log #412 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (105.1 through 105.4) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: The Technical Correlating Committee advises that Article Scope statements are the responsibility of the Technical Correlating Committee and the Technical Correlating Committee “Accepts” the committee action. The Technical Correlating Committee directs that the committee clarify the committee action on this proposal to comply with the NEC Style Manual. Specifically, the proposed text has been removed from Article 110 and moved to new Article 105 without providing a suggested rewrite of Article 110 or providing a scope and introduction for revised Article 110. In addition, the Technical Correlating Committee notes that a title is required for this new Article. The Technical Correlating Committee also directs that the action taken on this proposal be correlated with the action taken on Proposal 70E-77. This action will be considered as a public comment. Submitter: Mark McNellis, Sandia National Laboratories

Recommendation: Add new text to read as follows: 105.1 Scope. Chapter 1 covers electrical safety-related work practices and procedures for employees who are exposed to an electrical hazard in workplaces covered in the scope of this standard, Electric circuits and equipment not included in the scope of this standard might present a hazard to employees not qualified to work near such facilities, Requirements have been included in Chapter 1 to protect unqualified employees from such hazards, 105.2 Purpose. These practices and procedures are intended to provide for employee safety relative to specific identified electrical hazards in the workplace, Employers with electrical hazards outside of this standard shall create procedures that have the necessary controls and PPE for the specific hazard, FPN: For general categories of electrical hazards, see Annex K, 105.3 Responsibility. The safety-related work practices contained in Chapter 1 shall be implemented by employees, The employer shall provide the safety-related work practices and shall train the employee who shall then implement them. 105.4 Organization. Chapter 1 of this standard is divided into four article. Article 100 provides definitions for terms used in one or more of the chapters of this document. Article 110 provides general requirements for electrical safety-related work practices. Article 120 provides requirements for establishing an electrically safe work condition. Article 130 provides requirements for work involving electrical hazards. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the Article 110 task group after discussion with liason Jeff Sargent and Chair David Dini, the first four sections in Article 110 pertain to chapter one- not specifically Article 110. Additionally the introduction and format of Article 110 is not consistent with the introduction of chapters two, and three. This proposal and three others submitted by the task group are submitted to rectify these inconsistencies. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Relocate existing Sections 110.1 through 110.4 to a new Article 105. Application of Safety-Related Work Practices 105.1 Scope. Chapter 1 covers electrical safety-related work practices and procedures for employees who are exposed to an electrical hazard in workplaces covered in the scope of this standard. Electric circuits and equipment not included in the scope of this standard might present a hazard to employees not qualified to working near such facilities. Requirements have been included in Chapter 1 to protect unqualified employees from such hazards. 105.2 Purpose. These practices and procedures are intended to provide for employee safety relative to specific identified electrical hazards in the workplace. FPN: For general categories of electrical hazards, see Annex K. 105.3 Responsibility. The safety-related work practices contained in Chapter 1 shall be implemented by employees. The employer shall provide the safety-related work practices and shall train the employee who shall then implement them. 105.4 Organization. Chapter 1 of this standard is divided into four articles. Article 100 provides definitions for terms used in one or more of the chapters of this document. Article 110 provides general requirements for electrical safety-related work practices. Article 120 provides requirements for establishing an electrically safe work condition. Article 130 provides requirements for work involving electrical hazards. Committee Statement: The revisions made to the recommendation result from the committee actions on Proposals 70E-77 and 70E-80 and the meeting action clarifies that this text is relocated from Article 110. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-77 Log #52 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (110.1) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: It was the action of the Technical Correlating Committee that this proposal be reconsidered and correlated with the action taken on Proposal 70E-76. See the Technical Correlating Committee Note on Proposal 70E-76. This action will be considered as a public comment. Submitter: Thomas A. Carpenter, Aerospace Testing Alliance Recommendation: Revise section as shown below: Electric circuits and equipment not included in the scope of this standard might present a hazard to employees not qualified to working near such facilities. Requirements have been included in Chapter 1 to protect unqualified employees from such hazards. Substantiation: Revised the first sentence above because the hazards exist for both qualified and unqualified employees. Deleted the second sentence above as it doesn’t make any sense. You can’t put in requirements for equipment that is not in the scope of the standard.

70E-19

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Committee Meeting Action: Accept Committee Statement: The committee does not agree with all of the substantiation provided with this proposal. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 3 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: The committee action should have been to reject this proposal. Deleting the second sentence as proposed now renders the preceding sentence meaningless and unnecessary. What is left is the statement “Electric circuits and equipment not included in the scope of this standard might present a hazard to employees working near such facilities”. If that is the case, then the scope of the standard should address these hazards. It is better to state in 110.1 “Chapter 1 covers electrical safety-related work practices and procedures for employees who are exposed to an electrical hazard in workplaces covered in the scope of this standard.” Deleting the last two sentences more clearly meets the intent of the submitter. HICKMAN, P.: We recommend that “working near” be replaced with “working where exposed to electrical hazards.” PACE, D.: While I agree with the need to change this section, the revision should have been to accept the changes to the second sentence of this section. The third sentence should be retained and revised. An example of requirements contain in 70E for facilities not covered by 70E is a utility overhead line. While installation of the overhead line is not covered by 70E non-utility personnel who may work near that line need precautions. The section should have been revised to read as follows. 110.1 Scope. Chapter 1 covers electrical safety-related work practices and procedures for employees who are exposed to an electrical hazard in workplaces covered in the scope of this standard. Electric circuits and equipment not included in the scope of this standard might present a hazard to employees not qualified to working near such facilities. Requirements have been included in Chapter 1 to protect unqualified employees from such electrical hazards. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-78 Log #492 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (110.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Jerry Grant, Argonne National Laboratories Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 110.1 Scope. Chapter 1 covers electrical safety-related work practices and procedures for employees who are exposed to an electrical hazard in workplaces covered in the scope of this standard. Electric circuits and equipment not included in the scope of this standard might present a hazard to employees not qualified to work near such facilities. Requirements have been included in Chapter 1 to protect unqualified employees from such electrical hazards. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the Article 110 task group after discussion with liaison Jeff Sargent and Chair David Dini, the text is revised to cover all hazards and workers. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The recommendation is addressed by the committee action on Proposal 70E-77. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HICKMAN, P.: See our comment on affirmative on Proposal 70E-77. PACE, D.: While I agree with the need to change this section, the revision should have been to accept the changes to the second sentence of this section. The third sentence should be retained and revised. An example of requirements contain in 70E for facilities not covered by 70E is a utility overhead line. While installation of the overhead line is not covered by 70E non-utility personnel who may work near that line need precautions. The section should have been revised to read as follows. 110.1 Scope. Chapter 1 covers electrical safety-related work practices and procedures for employees who are exposed to an electrical hazard in workplaces covered in the scope of this standard. Electric circuits and equipment not included in the scope of this standard might present a hazard to employees not qualified to working near such facilities. Requirements have been included in Chapter 1 to protect unqualified employees from such electrical hazards. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: Deletion of the second two sentences in this section and retaining only the first simplifies this section and meets the intent of the submitter. Refer to my negative comment on Proposal 70E-77.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-79 Log #493 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Jerry Grant, Argonne National Laboratories Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 110.2 Purpose. These practices and procedures are intended to provide for employee safety relative to specific identified electrical hazards in the workplace. Employers with electrical hazards outside of this standard shall create procedures that have the necessary controls and PPE for the specific hazard. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the Article 110 task group after discussion with liaison Jeff Sargent and Chair David Dini, the text is revised to cover all hazards and workers. This helps make this section consistent with the wording in Article 130 “Work Involving Electrical Hazards”. The hazards identified in NFPA 70E do not address all hazards in the workplace and internationally. This provision makes 70E adaptable to all work environments. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Hazards that are not specifically addressed by the standard must still be addressed by the requirement of 110.1. The term “necessary controls” is vague relative to its application and implementation. The recommended text does not improve clarity. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: DROBNICK, D.: The correct action on this proposal should be Accept in Part see Committee action on 70E-76 as we have accepted the submitter’s inclusion of the words “specific identified” into 105.2 Purpose and rejected the rest of the proposal. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-80 Log #17 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (110.3) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: It was the action of the Technical Correlating Committee that this proposal be correlated with the action taken on Proposal 70E-76. See the Technical Correlating Committee Note on Proposal 70E-76. This action will be considered as a public comment. Submitter: Palmer L. Hickman, NJATC Recommendation: Revise text as follows: The safety related work practices contained in Chapter 1 shall be implemented by employees. The employer shall provide the safety-related work practices and shall train the employee who shall then implement them. Substantiation: The first sentence appears to be redundant to what is required in the second sentence. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 3 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: CARPENTER, T.: I agree that the two sentences appear to be redundant. However, by removing the first sentence, we have removed the employee’s responsibility to work safely in accordance with the Chapter 1 requirements, unless he is trained on them by the employer. What if the employer’s training misses something? With the revised wording, the employee is not required to meet the requirement. HALE, L.: The current text provides clarity and references that all work practices in chapter 1 shall be implemented. Deleting the first sentence as proposed creates confusion, “what safety work practices” shall be implemented. PACE, D.: There is a clear difference between the first sentence and the second sentence therefore is not redundant. The first sentence requires that employees be implement the requirements of Chapter 1 of NFPA 70E. In order to do this they must know what the requirements are, which speaks to training. A similar requirement contained OSHA 1910.332 requires employees to be familiar with the requirements of OSHA 1910.331-335. the second sentence in this section of 70E requires the employer to provide safety-related work practices and to train employees on them. These are two distinctly different requirements. They are not redundant. Removal of this sentence would leave workers ignorant of the requirements of NFPA 70E and no way to require employers to train their employees in the requirements of NFPA 70E. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-81 Log #85 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas Doyle, Industrial Safety Integration Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: The safety-related work practices contained in Chapter 1 shall be implemented carried out by employees. The employer shall provide and implement the safety-related work practices and shall train the employee who shall then implement carry them out. Together, both the employer and the workers shall ensure that the safety-related work practices are carried out. Substantiation: “implemented by employees” is a rather onerous assignment to be give to the “employee” within the context of the way the word “employee” is used in the rest of the document. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation does not add clarity or enhance usability. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-82 Log #193 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (110.5) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Daleep C. Mohla, DCM Electrical Consulting Services, Inc. Recommendation: Add a new (A)(2). Renumber exisitng (A)(2) to (A)(3) (2) The information provided in (A)(1) shall be documented. Substantiation: Information provided by host employer needs to be documented. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-89 meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-83 Log #260 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part (110.5) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: It was the action of the Technical Correlating Committee that this proposal be correlated with the action taken on Proposal 70E-89 because the text in Proposal 70E-89 is different than the text in this proposal. This action will be considered as a public comment. Submitter: Daryld Ray Crow, DRC Consulting, Ltd. Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 110.5 Relationships with Contractors (Outside Service Personnel, etd,) 110.5 Multiemployer Relationship. (A) Safe Work Practices. On multiemployer worksites (in all industry sectors), more than one employer may be responsible for hazardous conditions that violate safe work practices. (B) Relationships with Contractors (Outside Service Personnel, etc.). Whenever outside servicing personnel are to be engaged in activities covered by the scope and application of this standard, the on-site employer and the outside employer(s) shall inform each other of existing hazards, personal protective equipment/clothing requirements, safe work practice procedures, and emergency/evacuation procedures applicable to the work to be performed. This coordination shall include a meeting and documentation. (C) Host Employer Responsibilities…. Substantiation: Item (A) above adds clearly to the fact that more than one employer may be responsible for hazardous conditions in the workplace. The requirement that a meeting to discuss possible hazards in the workplace must be held and documented in item (B) above is critical. The above wording existed in the 2004 addition of NFPA 70E and should be added to the 2012 addition. No vote was held to eliminate the requirement that this meeting shall be documented. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle in Part The committee accepts only the last sentence in (B) of the recommendation that reads: “This coordination shall include a meeting and documentation” and this is integrated as a new 110.5(C) based on the committee action on Proposal 70E-89. Committee Statement: The committee rejects the remainder of the recommendation because the language in the 2009 edition is more closely related to OSHA requirements. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A.

Explanation of Negative: REGE, T.: Committee action should be Reject. The standard should not require documentation of meetings between host employers and contractors. Employers should be allowed to determine if documentation is necessary. WILMER, K.: Committee action should be Reject. The standard should not require documentation of meetings between host employers and contractors. Employers should be allowed to determine if documentation is necessary. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: See our comment on affirmative on Proposal 70E-89. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-84 Log #26 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.5(A)(1)a.) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: R. Dee Jones, AVO Training Institute Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 110.5(A)(1)a. Known hazards that are covered by this standard, that are related to the contract employer’s work, and that might not by recognized by the contract employer or its employees Substantiation: This requirement requires the host employer to presume as to what the contract employer and employee would recognize. The host employer should not be required to presume. The requirement would be better stated to refer to site specific hazards known by the host, but as stated it is ambiguous. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The current requirement provides the contract employer with important information unique to a specific site. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: CARPENTER, T.: The committee action should have been to accept. The current wording requires the host employer to “assume” what hazards the contract employer will or won’t recognize. The proposed wording would have corrected this. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-85 Log #494 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.5(A)(1)a.) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Jerry Grant, Argonne National Laboratories Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 110.5 Relationships with Contractors (Outside Service Personnel, etc.). (A) Host Employer responsibilities. (1) The host employer shall inform contract employers of: a. All K known electrical hazards that are covered by this standard, that are related to the contract employer’s work, and that might not be recognized by the contract employer or its employees. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the article 110 task group after discussion with liaison Jeff Sargent and Chair David Dini, the text is revised to cover all hazards and workers. This helps make this section consistent with the wording in Article 130 “Work Involving Electrical Hazards”. The hazards identified in NFPA 70E do not address all hazards in the workplace and internationally. This provision makes 70E adaptable to all work environments. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation does not improve readability or enhance usability. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-86 Log #113 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.5(A)(1)b.) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: E. W. Buss, Mashpee, MA Recommendation: Add the following “including appropriate power system information (such as: arc fault current levels and clearing times) or arc flash information so the contract employer can appropriately protect his/her workers”. Substantiation: The only way to determine appropriate PPE is to have an understanding of the power system parameters. Even for a contractor to use Table 130.7(C)(9), the short circuit information and clearing times (see Notes in that table) are required. This is a very common situation; many commercial, institutional and light industrial facilities are managed by non electrical people

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E who do not know that the contractor needs this information. With this included in the document, the contractor who asks for the information is given a level playing field when competing with other contractors that overlook the requirement. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Hazard information will be addressed in disclosure requirements. See the committee action on Proposal 70E-89. Creating a list of what is needed for information increases the risk of omissions. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HICKMAN, P.: We agree that the existing requirements lack clarity and with the intent of the submitter to add clarity and enhance usability. We suggest that the following revised wording: b. Information about the host employer’s installation that the contract employer needs to make the assessments required by Chapter 1 such as the available fault current and upstream overcurrent protective device opening time, including its condition of maintenance. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-87 Log #443 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (110.5(A)(3) (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Jerry E. Rivera, National Electrical Contractors Association Recommendation: Insert the following new text. (A)(3) Communication between the host employer and contract employer under this section shall be documented in writing and made available for review to both parties while work is in progress. The record keeping time for such documents shall be determined by the employer. Substantiation: Documentation of host and employer communication should be documented to ensure compliance with this standard. If written documentation is not required, the host employer and contact employer might not be motivated to engage dialog. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-89 meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: REGE, T.: Committee action should be Reject. The standard should not require documentation of meetings between host employers and contractors. Employers should be allowed to determine if documentation is necessary. WILMER, K.: Committee action should be Reject. The standard should not require documentation of meetings between host employers and contractors. Employers should be allowed to determine if documentation is necessary. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-88 Log #114 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part (110.5(C) (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: E. W. Buss, Mashpee, MA Recommendation: New text to read as follows: (C) Joint Responsibilities (1) Meeting minutes between the two parties shall be documented. (2) The information flow between the two parties required above shall be documented. (3) Missing information shall be tracked by each party until all information is available Substantiation: The requirement for coordination and documentation was a part of the 2004 edition [110.4(B)] and was deleted when the section was extensively revised. The deletion may have been inadvertent. Many electrical contractors want to do the right thing but have trouble explaining why the information is required. With the requirements in 70E, it will help them explain to the non electrical facility managers why they need this information. It will also alert these facility owners that contractors that do not request the information are not as “safety alert” as they should be. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle in Part The committee accepts in principle item (1) of the recommendation and rejects adding items (2) and (3) and the title. Committee Statement: Items (2) and (3) is the process of how the documentation is to be recorded and is not appropriate for this standard. The committee rejects the recommended title because the one accepted in the action on Proposal 70E-89 is more appropriate. The committee action on Proposal 70E-89 meets the intent of the recommendation for item (1). Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: REGE, T.: Committee action should be Reject. See 70E-87

WILMER, K.: Committee action should be Reject. See my comment on Proposal 70E-8.7 Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We do not necessarily agree with the potion of the committee statement indicating that the documentation process is “not appropriate” for 70E. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-89 Log #513 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (110.5(C) (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: It was the action of the Technical Correlating Committee that this proposal be correlated with the action taken on Proposal 70E-83 because the text in Proposal 70E-83 is different than the text in this proposal. This action will be considered as a public comment. Submitter: Paul Dobrowsky, Holley, NY Recommendation: Add a new 110.5(C) to read as follows: 110.5(C) This coordination shall include a meeting and documentation. Substantiation: This will add the requirement for having a meeting and documenting it as appeared in the 2004 edition. No substantiation was provided to delete this requirement. Documentation of the meeting provides evidence that it was held and what issues need to be addressed. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the recommendation to read: (C) Documentation. There shall be a documented meeting between the host employer and the contract employer. Committee Statement: The committee has added a title to the first level subdivision and clarified what is required by this provision. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: REGE, T.: Committee action should be Reject. See 70E-87 WILMER, K.: Committee action should be Reject. See my comment on Proposal 70E-8.7 Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We are unclear as to how the quoted text in the committee meeting action on Proposal 70E-83 “integrates” into the committee meeting action on this proposal and, therefore, how the final wording of 110.5(C) will appear. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-90 Log #86 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.6) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas Doyle, Industrial Safety Integration Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: The training requirements contained in this section shall apply to employees who face a risk are at risk of being exposed to electrical hazards that is not reduced to a safe level by the applicable electrical installation requirements. Substantiation: What is “face a risk?” This will need to be defined. Even with the “the applicable electrical installation requirements” electricity is still hazardous if work is being performed. Within the context of “General Requirements for Electrical Safety-Related Work Practices” all employees working in close proximity to electricity should be trained. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation does not add clarity or enhance usability of the current requirement. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-91 Log #457 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.6(B)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Danny Liggett, DuPont Recommendation: Revise 110.6(B) to read as follows: (B) Type of Training. The training required by this section shall be classroom or and on-the-job type, or a combination of the two. The degree of training provided shall be determined by the risk to the employee. Substantiation: One element of electrical safety training must be classroom type. NFPA 70E is revised every 3 years the same as NFPA 70. Most electrical licensing jurisdictions are requiring some number of hours of certified training

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E in order to renew the license each year. Electrical safety training should be held in the same high regard. The pace of advances in electrical safety is at a point where the changes are outpacing the ability of on-the-job-training to be current with the latest technology and requirements. It used to be that old electricians taught the younger electricians. Today the older electricians are teaching the young electricians bad habits and practices. This is due to a general lack of knowledge of the latest requirements. Class room training is needed to help assure the latest technology and safe work practices are being past on to the electricians in the field. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Depending on the task and type of equipment some training is better suited to on the job while other training is better suited to a classroom. The current provision allows the employer to develop the necessary type of training for the specific tasks. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 3 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HALE, L.: Classroom training is important, the proposal does not specify an amount, just that the classroom component is important and required. The current text allows for bad habits to be continued via “quick” on the job discussions. This proposal aligns this standard with what is already required by many locations for licensing of electricians and engineers. The proposal should be accepted.’ See committee action on 70E-104 where it is acknowledged that refresher training is required. HAMER, P.: The proposal should have been accepted. PACE, D.: The committee statement did not address the concerns of the submitter. I agree that there are some things that are better suited for on the job training. However, much of the electrical safety concepts and work practices are better suited for classroom training. The concepts of the arc flash hazard, as an example, cannot be taught on the job with any expectation of being understood or appreciated. Without understanding the safe work practices related to arc flash will not be implemented in the field unless forced. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We are supportive of requiring both classroom and on-the-job training. It is hard to imagine where both would not be required. REGE, T.: Committee action was correct. The proposal should be rejected. Employers should be allowed to determine the type of training necessary for their employees. WILMER, K.: Committee action was correct. The proposal should be rejected. Employers should be allowed to determine the type of training necessary for their employees. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-92 Log #24 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (110.6(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Drake A. Drobnick, Saline, MI Recommendation: Insert “and Automatic External Defibrillator (AED) use” into the last sentence as follows: ... including cardiopulmonary resuscitation and Automatic External Defibrillator (AED) use shall be... Substantiation: AED administration is an emergency procedure required to reverse the effects of sudden cardiac arrest caused by electrical shock. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: REGE, T.: Committee action should be Reject. Employers should not be required arbitrarily to train employees on Automatic External Defibrillator use. There is no requirement that employers have AED units. Many employers rely on local emergency squads to provide that service. Employers who do not have AEDs should not be required to train their employees on them. WILMER, K.: Committee action should be Reject. Employers should not be required arbitrarily to train employees on Automatic External Defibrillator use. There is no requirement that employers have AED units. Many employers rely on local emergency squads to provide that service. Employers who do not have AEDs should not be required to train their employees on them. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: An additional enhancement would be to require (by an addition to 130.2(C)) that an AED be present in the work area when a person plans to encroach on the Restricted Approach Boundary as part of a task. This, in addition to a requirement for an “electrical standby person” to be able to apply the AED if needed, would increase personnel safety in the case of an inadvertent shock.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-93 Log #87 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Part (110.6(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas Doyle, Industrial Safety Integration Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Employees exposed to shock hazards responsible for taking action in case of emergency shall be trained in methods of release of victims from contact with exposed energized electrical conductors or circuit parts. Employees shall be regularly instructed in methods of first aid and emergency procedures, such as approved methods of resuscitation, emergency treatment of burns, etc. if their duties warrant such training. Substantiation: Employees “exposed to shock” will not be the ones who need the training regarding rescue. I think it would serve the reader of the standard to have some mention of how to deal with burns in this clause. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Part The committee accepts the recommended revision of the first sentence and rejects the recommendation for the second sentence. Committee Statement: The committee rejects the recommendation to add “emergency treatment of burns, etc.” because the committee does not want to create a list of the required types of first aid training. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 19 Negative: 4 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: BOWMAN, W.: The proposal should be rejected. Acceptance of revisions to the first sentence would limit the number of people who would be trained in methods of release. Jobsite personnel may change on a daily basis for a variety of reasons such as illnesses or vacations. Certainly situations would then be created when a shock event occurs, where non-trained personnel may be left without a person trained in emergency response. All workers exposed to shock hazards should be trained. HICKMAN, P.: We disagree with the committee action. While we agree that those responsible for taking action should be trained, we conclude that this provision should apply to any worker exposed to electrical hazards. Accordingly, we recommend the following proposed text for the first sentence of 110.6(C): Employees exposed to electrical hazards and those responsible for taking action in case of emergency shall be trained in methods of release of victims from contact with exposed energized electrical conductors or circuit parts. PACE, D.: This should have in “Accepted in Principle in Part” The existing language should have been retained and the new wording added. In most cases electrical personnel do not work alone. There are too many instances where the only personnel around to provide assistance are the other electrical personnel. I is important that electrical personnel have the training required by this section. I agree that the new wording should be added and the first sentence should be revised to read as follows Employees exposed to shock hazards and those responsible for taking action in case of emergency shall be trained in methods of release of victims from contact with exposed energized electrical conductors or circuit parts. SAPORITA, V.: Proposed text could be interpreted to require only emergency personnel to be trained in the methods of release. It could be interpreted that electricians would not need to be so trained. Preferred wording would be “Employees exposed to shock hazards and those employees responsible for taking action in case of emergency...” Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. However, I have the following comment on the committee statement for this action: The revision drops the requirement that someone actually be trained without any explanation in the substantiation or committee statement. Comment on Affirmative: HITTEL, M.: This resolves long-standing confusion in the standard as it is the personnel that delivers the emergency response services that shall be trained here. It is hard to argue the logic that the training is wasted on person laying on the ground injured. Training in emergency treatment of burns is not warranted. The focus should be to ensure that appropriate service get rendered in a reasonable time frame for the life threatening injuries. WIDUP, R.: Accept in Part is the correct action, and by deleting “emergency treatment of burns, etc.” keeps the proposal from becoming a specific list, thereby avoiding confusion if an item was not “on the list”. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-94 Log #182 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.6(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Michael J. Johnston, National Electrical Contractors Association Recommendation: Revise the last sentence of Section 110.6(C) as follows: Training of employees in approved methods of resuscitation, including cardiopulmonary resuscitation, shall be certified by the employer annually authorized providers on an annual basis. Informational Note: Examples of authorized providers of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) training include the American Red Cross or the American Heart Association.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Substantiation: This proposal seeks to clarify the entity that certifies employees are trained. The employer has a responsibility to make sure that employees are trained, but is typically not the certifying entity in this case. The new informational note helps users recognize that there are organizations that are qualified as authorized providers of such training required in this rule. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The intent of this section is to hold the employer accountable for ensuring the proficiency of the provider. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HICKMAN, P.: We agree with the intent of the submitter. We do not believe that it is the intent of 70E to require that the employer be the certifying body for CPR and the like. We suggest that the intent of the submitter can be met with the use of the word “documented.” PACE, D.: This Proposal should have “Accepted in Principle”. The submitter is correct that the employer cannot certify this kind of training. The sentence should be revised to read as follows Employers shall provide employees certified training in approved methods of resuscitation, including cardiopulmonary resuscitation, on an annual basis. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-95 Log #495 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.6(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Jerry Grant, Argonne National Laboratories Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 110.6 Training Requirements. (C) Emergency Procedures. Employees exposed to electrical shock, arc flash or other hazards shall be trained for the appropriate emergency response. Emergency response procedures may include: in methods of release of victims from contact with exposed energized electrical conductors or circuit parts. , Employees shall be regularly instructed in methods of first aid and emergency procedures such as approved methods of resuscitation, if their duties warrant such training. Training of employees in approved methods of resuscitation, including cardiopulmonary resuscitation, shall be certified by the employer annually. Other emergency procedures shall be certified on an established interval or when the hazard conditions change. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the Article 110 task group after discussion with liaison Jeff Sargent and Chair David Dini, the text is revised to cover all hazards and workers. This helps make this section consistent with the wording in Article 130 “Work Involving Electrical Hazards”. The hazards identified in NFPA 70E do not address all hazards in the workplace and internationally. This provision makes 70E adaptable to all work environments. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The submitter has not provided sufficient substantiation to support the recommendation. See the committee action on Proposal 70E-93. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: While we agree that the submitter did not provide adequate substantiation, we agree that 110.6(C) should apply to electrical hazards other than shock. See our comment on negative on Proposal 70E-93 where the phrase “Employees exposed to electrical hazards and those responsible for taking action in case of emergency” is recommended. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-96 Log #62 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.6(D)(1), FPN (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James A. Childers, US Army Recommendation: Add a new FPN to include the following: FPN: See 29 CRF Part 1910 & Part 1926 for OSHA requirements. Substantiation: A reference for a host employer to ensure contract employees meet the requirements of 29 CRF 1910 & 29 CRF 1926. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: In this case, the committee concludes that NFPA 70E is a stand-alone document and it is not necessary to reference OSHA standards. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We agree with the concept of recognizing and updating 70E to OSHA requirements where appropriate. Accordingly, rather than a general FPN reference to OSHA 1910 and 1926, we suggest that the definition of “Qualified Person” be modified in Article 100 to enhance the understanding of qualified person training in 110.6(D)(1). Accordingly we recommend that the definition of “Qualified Person” be modified in Article 100 as one of the following to accomplish the intent of this proposal as it relates to qualified persons: Qualified person. One who has received training in and has demonstrated skills and knowledge in the construction and operation of electric equipment and installations and the hazards involved. Qualified person. One who has received training to recognize and avoid associated electrical hazards and has demonstrated skills and knowledge in the construction and operation of the electrical equipment and installations. In addition, we recommend the following revised text to meet the intent of the submitter in this proposal and for correlation as it relates to qualified persons: 110.6(D)(1) Qualified person. A qualified person shall be trained and knowledgeable of the construction and operation of equipment or a specific work method and be trained and has demonstrated skills to recognize and avoid electrical hazards that might be present with respect to that equipment or work method. 110.6(D)(1)(a) Such persons shall have demonstrated skills and knowledge of special precautionary techniques, personal protective equipment, including arc-flash, insulating and shielding materials, and insulated tools and test equipment. A person can be considered qualified with respect to certain equipment and methods for still being unqualified for others. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-97 Log #255 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (110.6(D)(1)c.) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: The Technical Correlating Committee directs that this proposal be reconsidered and correlated with the action taken on Proposal 70E-98. This action will be considered as a public comment. Submitter: David A. Pace, Olin Corporation Recommendation: Add new text to read as follows: (b) An employee who is undergoing on-the-job training for the purpose of obtaining the skills and knowledge necessary to be considered a qualified person and who, in the course … Substantiation: The existing text has been interpreted to mean that an unqualified person can perform work otherwise required to be performed by a qualified person, as long as a qualified person is supervising. This interpretation has included unqualified persons such as process machine operators or mechanics where there is no intention of them obtaining the training, skills, and knowledge necessary to become a qualified person. While this can be argued that if people have the wrong intentions they can interpret the words as they want to meet their objectives, the existing text can be changed to make the intent more clear and less likely to be inappropriately applied. I do not believe it was the intent of the 70E committee to allow this practice. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Committee Statement: The committee note that the recommendation is for 110.6(D)(1)(c). Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: The proposal seeks to presuppose what the “intentions” of an employer may be and would thus be unenforceable. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-98 Log #458 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (110.6(D)(1)c.) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: The Technical Correlating Committee directs that this proposal be reconsidered and correlated with the action taken on Proposal 70E-97. This action will be considered as a public comment. Submitter: Danny Liggett, DuPont Recommendation: Revise 110.6(D)(1)(c) to read as follows: (c) An employee who is undergoing on-the-job training and who, in the course of such training, has demonstrated an ability to perform specific duties safely at his or her level of training and who is under the direct supervision of a qualified person shall be considered to be a qualified person for the performance of those specific duties. Substantiation: The current wording is broad and could lead to an interpretation that would allow a person undergoing on the job training to be considered as “qualified” beyond the abilities of the person. By adding the word “specific” the requirement becomes less unambiguous.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-99 Log #496 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.6(D)(1)c.) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Jerry Grant, Argonne National Laboratories Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 110.6 Training Requirments. (D) Employee Training. (1) Qualified Person. (c) An employee who is undergoing on-the-job training and who, in the course of such training, has demonstrated an ability to perform duties safely at his or her level of training and who is under the direct supervision of a qualified person shall be considered to be a qualified person for the performance of those duties. This training shall be documented per 110.6(E). Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the article 110 task group after discussion with liaison Jeff Sargent and Chair David Dini, the text is revised to tie this section together with 110.6(E) as a clarification. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: It is not necessary to provide the cross-reference contained in this recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: The proposal has redundant requirements as the documentation is already required per 110.6 (E). This does not enhance usability or clarity of the standard. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-100 Log #361 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (110.6(D)(1)(f) (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Dennis K. Neitzel, AVO Training Institute, Inc. Recommendation: Add new text to read as follows: 110.6(D)(1)(f) The employer shall determine, through regular supervision and through inspections conducted on at least an annual basis that each employee is complying with the safety-related work practices required by this standard. Substantiation: The current 110.6(D)(3)(a) requires “the supervision or annual inspection” which refers to something that does not currently exist in NFPA 70E. In the requirement for supervision’s annual inspection, OSHA 29 CFR 1910.269(a)(2)(iii) states this requirement for “regular supervision and through inspections conducted on at least an annual basis”. Adding the new 110.6(D) will make this requirement complete, as well as making it compatible with the OSHA requirement. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 18 Negative: 5 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: CARPENTER, T.: The committee action should have been to reject. The substantiation does not provide any evidence of a safety issue, it only quotes an OSHA requirement. It is the job of this committee to determine what we believe to be electrical safety requirements, not to re-quote OSHA requirements. If we are going to mimic OSHA, why not just delete the existing contents of the standard and replace with one line stating, “Follow OSHA electrical safety requirements.”. If we don’t agree with OSHA, we should say so and use this as justification in a request to get the OSHA requirements changed. Also, section 110.7(H) already requires auditing of the electrical safety program. Now we are mandating an annual supervisor inspection and the auditing. HAMER, P.: The wording accepted should have been: “The employer shall determine, through regular supervision OR through inspections conducted on at least an annual basis that each employee is complying with the safety-related work practices required by this standard.” This would be consistent with the current section 110.6(D)(3)(a). Requiring inspection annually is unreasonable. HITTEL, M.: The committee action should be reject. The proposal does not belong in 110.6(D)(1) as the requirement addresses issues found during regular supervision or annual inspections (which would suggest that the employee has been trained initially because the employee is already working in order to be supervised or inspected) and is appropriately contained in 110.6(D)(3)(a) under retraining.

REGE, T.: Committee action should be Reject. The submitter is proposing to adopt a requirement found in OSHA 1910.269 related to regular supervision and inspections. The regulation 1910.269 does not apply to most employers who are covered by the Scope of 70E. This requirement should not be enforced on those employers. WILMER, K.: Committee action should be Reject. The submitter is proposing to adopt a requirement found in OSHA 1910.269 related to regular supervision and inspections. The regulation 1910.269 does not apply to most employers who are covered by the Scope of 70E. This requirement should not be enforced on those employers. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: WIDUP, R.: The proposal clarifies the tie between OSHA requirements and 70E requirements, which assists the employer with overall training guidance. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-101 Log #497 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (110.6(D)(2)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Jerry Grant, Argonne National Laboratories Recommendation: Delete text to read as follows: 110.6 Training Requirements. D) Employee Training 2) Unqualified Persons. Unqualified persons shall be trained in and be familiar with any of the electrical safety-related practices that might not be addressed specifically by Chapter 1 but are necessary for their safety. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the article 110 task group after discussion with liaison Jeff Sargent and Chair David Dini. The text is revised to cover the electrical hazards for unqualified workers necessary for their safety. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the recommendation to read: (2) Unqualified persons. Unqualified persons shall be trained in and be familiar with any of the electrical safety-related practices that might not be addressed specifically by chapter 1 but are necessary for their safety Committee Statement: The committee has made editorial revisions for clarity. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-102 Log #498 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.6(D)(3)a.) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Jerry Grant, Argonne National Laboratories Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 110.6 Training Requirements. (D) Employee Training. (3) Retraining. An employee shall receive additional training (or retraining) under any of the following conditions: (a) If the supervision or electrical safety audit annual inspections indicate that the employee is not complying with the safety-related work practices. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the article 110 task group after discussion with liaison Jeff Sargent and Chair David Dini, the text is revised to tie this section together with 110.7(H) as a clarification. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: There is no substantiation provided to support the recommended revision. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-103 Log #25 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (110.6(D)(3)d.) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Drake A. Drobnick, Saline, MI Recommendation: Add new bullet (d) as follows: (d) within one year following the publication of the standard’s latest revision. Substantiation: This language will help employees’ remain current on additional safe work practice requirements developed during the revision cycle. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-104 meets the intent of the recommendation covering updates of training. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A.

70E-25

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Explanation of Negative: WILMER, K.: See my comment on Proposal 70E-104. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We would support annual retraining, where appropriate, and retraining with a reasonable time after 70E is adopted. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-104 Log #459 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (110.6(D)(3)e.) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Danny Liggett, DuPont Recommendation: Add a new (e) to 110.6(D)(3) as follows: (e) Retraining shall be performed at intervals not to exceed three years. Substantiation: Electrical safety is advancing a pace that requires retraining on regular frequency. Many local jurisdictions are requiring certified training in order to renew electrical licenses. Electrical safety should held in the same regard. The only way to assure that new technology and safe work practices is successfully disseminated is by requiring retraining. NFPA 70E is on a three revision cycle. Each cycle numerous revisions are made that need to get to the workers in the field. Unless it is required on some frequency will not be done. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Committee Statement: The committee notes that this will be 110.6(D)(3)(d). Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 3 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: The committee action should be reject. The submitter’s substantiation states “NFPA 70E is on a three revision cycle. Each cycle numerous revisions are made that need to get to the workers in the field.” In this context, the requirement is already contained in 110.6 (D)(3) (b) where it states that retraining is required “If new technology, new types of equipment, or changes in procedures necessitate the use of safety-related practices that are different from those that the employee would normally use.” If the revision introduces any of these triggers (as is the justification in the substantiation), retraining is already required by the existing language. REGE, T.: Committee action should be Reject. NFPA 70E should not arbitrarily require that employers retrain employees every 3 years. Employers should be allowed to determine the frequency of training necessary for their employees. WILMER, K.: Committee action should be Reject. NFPA 70E should not arbitrarily require that employers retrain employees every 3 years. Employers should be allowed to determine the frequency of training necessary for their employees. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: DROBNICK, D.: Should we specify a requirement for the minimum number of contact hours of retraining to be delivered? HALE, L.: The writer supports this proposal as the next good step and would submit, when do establish guidelines relative to the amount of contact hours required? When there is an accident on the job the first thing everyone runs for is the training records, when?, was the person current?, the content?, was the person properly trained for the task?, etc,etc. SAPORITA, V.: This would be a good location for a FPN suggesting local or state requirements for a minimum of 30 PDHs or 3 CEUs every three years for electrical licenses. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-105 Log #460 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (110.6(E)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Danny Liggett, DuPont Recommendation: Revise the last sentence of 110.6(E) to read as follows: The documentation shall contain the content of the training, each employee’s name and dates of training. Substantiation: The content of the training should be included in the training documentation. It has been long understood that the content of the training needs to be included in order to comply with the requirements of OSHA 1910.332. This is required in order to prove that the appropriate training has been provided. NFPA 70E should contain this requirement to provide clarity in meeting the requirements of both NFPA 70E and OSHA 1910.332. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 3 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: The appropriate committee action should be Accept in Principle and revise the word “content” to “description” REGE, T.: Committee action should be Reject. NFPA 70E should not require employers to document “content of training”.

WILMER, K.: Committee action should be Reject. NFPA 70E should not require employers to document “content of training”. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: The committee action should have been to Accept in Principle, and change “content” to “description”. Including the “content” of the training in the records could be interpreted as meaning training materials, presentations, tests, videos, etc. A brief description of the training should satisfy the submitter’s intent. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-106 Log #499 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.6(E)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Jerry Grant, Argonne National Laboratories Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 110.6 Training Requirements. (E) Training Documentation. The employer shall document that each employee has received the training required by paragraph 110.6(D). This documentation shall be made when the employee provides employment records that indicate that acceptable training or demonstrates proficiency in the work practices involved and shall be maintained for the duration of the employee’s employment. The documentation shall contain each employee’s name and dates of training. FPN: Employment records that indicate that an employee has received the required training are an acceptable means of meeting this requirement. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the article 110 task group after discussion with liaison Jeff Sargent and Chair David Dini, the text is revised to tie this section together with the 110.6(E) FPN as a clarification. This is at the request of the NFPA staff recommendation that the FPN here is not a true FPN. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommended action is not consistent with OSHA requirements. Employee records may not necessarily demonstrate proficiency and that is conveyed with the current wording in the informational note. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: The action should be AIP and revise the text to read “provides employment records that indicate that acceptable training the employee has demonstrated proficiency” as the submitter is trying to establish that it is appropriate to accept employment records that indicate that the requirements in 110.6(E) have been fulfilled. Currently, this language is in the FPN and the submitter is merely trying to put it into the body where it is appropriately placed. If the TC does not agree, then the FPN should be deleted entirely. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: The Committee Statement appears to conflict with the FPN that will be retained by the action. The committee statement indicates “employee records may not necessarily demonstrate proficiency”, while the FPN says “employment records that indicate that an employee has received the required training are an acceptable means of meeting this requirement.” _______________________________________________________________ 70E-107 Log #500 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Part (110.7(A)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Jerry Grant, Argonne National Laboratories Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 110.7 Electrical Safety Program. (A) General. The employer shall implement and document an overall electrical safety program that directs activity appropriate for the electrical hazards, voltage, energy level, and circuit conditions. The electrical safety program shall safely mitigate the electrical hazards. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the article 110 task group after discussion with liaison Jeff Sargent and Chair David Dini, the text is revised to cover all hazards and workers. This helps make this section consistent with the wording in Article 130 “Work Involving Electrical Hazards”. The hazards identified in NFPA 70E do not address all hazards in the workplace and internationally. This provision makes 70E adaptable to all work environments. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Part The committee accepts the revision to the first sentence and rejects the recommended second sentence. Committee Statement: The recommended second sentence adds text that is ambiguous.

70E-26

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-108 Log #502 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part (110.7(B)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Jerry Grant, Argonne National Laboratories Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 110.7 Electrical Safety Program. (B) Awareness and Self-Discipline. The electrical safety program shall be designed to provide an awareness of the potential electrical hazards to employees who possibly might from time to time work in an environment influenced by with the presence of electrical hazards energy. The program shall be developed to provide the required self-discipline for all employees who occasionally must perform work that may involve electrical hazards. The program shall instill a safe working environment for all workers affected by electrical hazards safety principles and controls. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the article 110 task group after discussion with liaison Jeff Sargent and Chair David Dini, the text is revised to cover all hazards and workers. This helps make this section consistent with the wording in Article 130 “Work Involving Electrical Hazards”. The hazards identified in NFPA 70E do not address all hazards in the workplace and internationally. This provision makes 70E adaptable to all work environments. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle in Part The committee accepts in principle the revisions to the first and second sentences and rejects the recommendation to revise the last sentence. The revised text is to read: (B) Awareness and Self-Discipline. The electrical safety program shall be designed to provide an awareness of the potential electrical hazards to employees who occasionally might from time to time work in an environment influenced by with the presence of electrical hazards energy. The program shall be developed to provide the required self-discipline for all employees who occasionally must perform work that may involve electrical hazards. Committee Statement: The Committee revision removes vague and unenforceable text. The committee rejects the revisions to the last sentence because it adds ambiguous text. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-109 Log #503 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.7(C), (D), and FPN) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Jerry Grant, Argonne National Laboratories Recommendation: Delete the following text: C Electrical Safety Program Principles. The electrical safety program shall identify the principles upon which it is based. FPN: For examples of typical electrical safety program principles, see Annex E. D Electrical Safety Program Controls. An electrical safety program shall identify the controls by which it is measured and monitored. FPN: For examples of typical electrical safety program controls, see Annex E. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the article 110 task group after discussion with liaison Jeff Sargent and Chair David Dini. This text is vague and unclear in purpose. Due to this lack of added value we are requesting the deletion of this text. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The Committee affirms that program principles and controls are necessary in order to develop a complete electrical safety program and the submitter has not provided sufficient substantiation to support the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-110 Log #461 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.7(E)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Danny Liggett, DuPont Recommendation: Revise 110.7(E) to read as follows: (E) Electrical Safety Program Procedures. Before work is started the an electrical safety program shall identify the procedures for working that will or may expose employees to electrical hazards such as work within the Limited Approach Boundary of energized electrical conductors and circuit parts

operating at 50 volts or more, or where an other electrical hazards exists before work is started. Substantiation: The current wording was confusing and difficult to understand. The revised wording is an attempt to clarify the wording and make it easier to understand. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The substantiation does not specify how the current wording is being confused. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-111 Log #504 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (110.7(E)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Jerry Grant, Argonne National Laboratories Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 110.7 Electrical Safety Program. (E) Electrical Safety Program Procedures. An electrical safety program shall identify the procedures for working with electrical hazards including but not limited to shock and arc flash within the Limited Approach Boundary of energized electrical conductors and circuit parts operating at 50 volts or more or where an electrical hazard exists before work is started. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the article 110 task group after discussion with liaison Jeff Sargent and Chair David Dini, the text is revised to cover all hazards and workers. This helps make this section consistent with the wording in Article 130 “Work Involving Electrical Hazards”. The hazards identified in NFPA 70E do not address all hazards in the workplace and internationally. This provision makes 70E adaptable to all work environments. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle (E) Electrical Safety Program Procedures. An electrical safety program shall identify the procedures for working within the limited approach boundary and for working within the arc flash boundary of energized electrical conductors and circuit parts operating at 50 volts or more or where an electrical hazard exists before work is started. Committee Statement: The revisions clarify the proposed requirement and meet the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: If my comment on Proposal 70E-30 is considered, “arc flash boundary” should be changed to “arc flash protection boundary.” _______________________________________________________________ 70E-112 Log #88 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.7(F)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas Doyle, Industrial Safety Integration Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: An electrical safety program shall include the identification of identify a hazard(s)/ and a risk assessment/evaluation procedure to be used before work is started within the Limited Approach Boundary of energized electrical conductors and circuit parts operating at 50 volts or more or where an electrical hazard exists The procedure shall describe the hazard analysis process and the potential risk mitigation strategies shall identify the hazard/risk process that shall be used by employees used to evaluate risk associated with the tasks before work is started. Substantiation: The program can not have the ability to identify. Hazard identification is an action to be taken which is one of the program elements. “Hazard/risk process”—Hazard and risk are not processes. Come to think of it “Hazard/risk” isn’t even a word. Risk needs to be assessed, including evaluation, in order to decide whether the risk is low enough to accept. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation does not improve clarity of the existing provisions. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: The action should be Accept in Part with the parts “the potential risk mitigation strategies” and “risk associated with the” accepted. These are key elements of a risk assessment process and need to be included in the procedure. The proposed terminology is more appropriately and accurately used in this context.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-113 Log #505 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (110.7(F)) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: The Technical Correlating Committee directs that the committee clarify the action on this proposal, and that further consideration be given to the comments expressed in the voting. This action will be considered as a public comment. Submitter: Jerry Grant, Argonne National Laboratories Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 110.7 Electrical Safety Program. (F) Hazard/Risk Evaluation Procedure. An electrical safety program shall identify a hazard/risk evaluation procedure to be used before work is started within the Limited Approach boundary of energized electrical conductors and circuit parts operating at 50 volts or more or where an electrical hazard electrical hazards including but not limited to shock and arc flash exists. The procedure shall identify the hazard/risk process that shall be used by employees to evaluate tasks before work is started. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the article 110 task group after discussion with liaison Jeff Sargent and Chair David Dini, the text is revised to cover all hazards and workers. This helps make this section consistent with the wording in Article 130 “Work Involving Electrical Hazards”. The hazards identified in NFPA 70E do not address all hazards in the workplace and internationally. This provision makes 70E adaptable to all work environments. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle (F) Hazard/Risk Evaluation Procedure. An electrical safety program shall identify a hazard/risk evaluation procedure to be used before work is started within the Limited Approach boundary and before work is started within the arc flash boundary of energized electrical conductors and circuit parts operating at 50 volts or more or where an electrical hazard exists. Committee Statement: The revisions clarify the proposed requirement and meet the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: BOWMAN, W.: Acceptance of the proposed wording would imply that two hazard/risk evaluations need to take place independently of each other: one for the limited approach boundary and one for the arc flash boundary. The boundaries may overlap each other and should be considered together. The text should be revised for usability and clarity to read as follows: (F) Hazard/Risk Evaluation Procedure. An electrical safety program shall identify a hazard/risk evaluation procedure to be used before work is started within the Limited Approach boundary and before work is started within the Arc Flash Boundary of energized electrical conductors and circuit parts operating at 50 volts or more or where an electrical hazard exists. HAMER, P.: See my comment on Proposal 70E-111. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-114 Log #442 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.7(G)(1)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Jerry E. Rivera, National Electrical Contractors Association Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: (G)(1) General. Before starting each job, the employee competent person in charge shall conduct a job briefing with the employees involved. Substantiation: Competent person is an acceptable term recognized by the safety and employer community. The term can be found in OSHA 1926.32(f) and throughout ANSI/ASSE A10 standards. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The term “competent person” is not defined in Chapter 1. The substantiation does not adequately support the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: There is merit to this proposal. A Public or a Committee Comment is required to add the OSHA 1926.32(f) definition to Article 100, or in an Informational Note to this section: Competent person. One who is capable of identifying existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working conditions which are unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous to employees, and who has authorization to take prompt corrective measures to eliminate them. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We agree with the attempt made by the submitter to better

clarify this requirement. We recommend the following definition from OSHA 1910.399 (Part 1901 Subpart S, Electrical) be considered in Article 100 or any appropriate place in Chapter 1 of NFPA 70E: “Competent Person. One who is capable of identifying existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working conditions that are unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous to employees and who has authorization to take prompt corrective measures to eliminate them.” _______________________________________________________________ 70E-115 Log #506 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.7(G)(1)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Jerry Grant, Argonne National Laboratories Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 110.7 Electrical Safety Program. (G) Job Briefing. ( 1) General. Before starting each job, the employee in charge shall conduct a job briefing with the employees involved. The briefing shall cover such subjects as include electrical hazards associated with the job, work procedures involved, special precautions, energy source controls, and personal protective equipment requirements. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the article 110 task group after discussion with liaison Jeff Sargent and Chair David Dini, the text is revised to cover all hazards and workers. This helps make this section consistent with the wording in Article 130 “Work Involving Electrical Hazards’. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The current provision is clear and not limiting. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We agree with the committee action and suggest that 110.7(G)(1) should modified to additionally include text requiring that the work permit be covered during the job briefing as follows: “The briefing shall cover such subjects as the information on the energized electrical work permit, hazards associated with the job...” _______________________________________________________________ 70E-116 Log #462 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (110.7(G)(2)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Danny Liggett, DuPont Recommendation: Relocate the last sentence of 110.7(G)(2) to a new 110.7(G)(2). Renumber the existing 110.7(G)(2), without the last sentence, to 110.7(G)(3). Renumber the remaining sections as required. Substantiation: Additional job briefing should apply to all work. The existing text would imply that additional briefings are only required for repetitive or similar tasks. Over 50% of injuries occur because something changed in the plan. Anytime a plan changes or when things are not as the plan indicated then the work must stop and be re-planned. An additional briefing must be required. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the recommendation to read: (1) General. Before starting each job, the employee in charge shall conduct a job briefing with the employees involved. The briefing shall cover such subjects as hazards associated with the job, work procedures involved, special precautions, energy source controls, and personal protective equipment requirements. Additional job briefings shall be held if changes that might affect the safety of employees occur during the course of the work. (2) Repetitive or Similar Tasks. If the work……..Additional job briefings shall be held if changes that might affect the safety of employees occur during the course of the work. Committee Statement: The revision improves clarity and meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-117 Log #507 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.7(G)(2)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Jerry Grant, Argonne National Laboratories Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows; 110.7 Electrical Safety Program. (G) Job Briefing. (2) Repetitive or Similar Tasks. If the work or operations to be performed during the work day or shift are repetitive and similar, at least one job briefing shall be conducted before the start of the first job of the day or shift. Additional

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E job briefings shall be held when any new employees are added to the task and if changes that might affect the safety of employees occur during the course of the work. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the article 110 task group after discussion with liaison Jeff Sargent and Chair David Dini, the text is revised to cover all hazards and workers. This is a clarification of a potential change with the job briefing process that can be easily overlooked. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation does not improve clarity of the existing provision. Adding a new employee to the task is a change. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Negative: 0 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-118 Log #463 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.7(G)(3)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Danny Liggett, DuPont Recommendation: Delete 110.7(G)(3). Substantiation: Routine work has not been defined. This paragraph is counter to what is needed in electrical safety. Routine work is where most of the injuries occur. It is this type of work that people have the tendency to let their guard down. It is important to provide reminders of what the hazards are and what precautions should be taken. Subparagraph (1) discusses “particularly hazardous”. In electrical work it is hazardous or it isn’t. Subparagraph (2) discusses whether the person can recognize the hazards. If the person can’t recognize the hazards the person is not qualified to do the work. This paragraph needs to be removed. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The Committee concludes that there are some tasks that could be addressed through a short discussion and removing this option could result in a pre-job briefing not being conducted. See the committee action on Proposal 70E-119. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 3 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: The action should be to accept the proposal. The points made by the proposer in the Substantiation are valid. HICKMAN, P.: We agree with the concerns of the submitter. Many “routine tasks” become incidents. SAPORITA, V.: NEMA supports deleting the allowance to skip the job briefing for routine work. Safety would be improved if a briefing were always required. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: REGE, T.: Committee action was correct. Paragraph 110.7(G)(3) should not be deleted. WILMER, K.: Committee action was correct. Paragraph 110.7(G)(3) should not be deleted. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-119 Log #508 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (110.7(G)(3)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Jerry Grant, Argonne National Laboratories Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 110.7 Electrical Safety Program. (G) Job Briefing. (3) Routine Work. A brief discussion before starting the job shall be satisfactory if the work involved is routine and if the employee, by virtue of is qualified with the training and experience for the task with electrical hazards. , can reasonably be expected to recognize and avoid the hazards involved in the job. A more extensive discussion shall be conducted if either of the following apply: Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the article 110 task group after discussion with liaison Jeff Sargent and Chair David Dini, the text is revised to cover all hazards and workers. This is a clarification of a potential change with the job briefing process that can be easily overlooked. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the recommendation to read: (3) Routine Work. Prior to starting work a brief discussion shall be satisfactory if the work involved is routine and if the employee, by virtue of training and experience, is qualified for the task and can reasonably be expected to recognize and avoid the hazards involved in the job. A more extensive discussion shall be conducted if either of the following apply: Existing (1) and (2) remain unchanged. Committee Statement: The revisions improve clarity and meet the intent of the recommendation.

Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HICKMAN, P.: We are concerned that the phrase “qualified for the task” is not defined and its intent may be unclear. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-120 Log #90 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (110.7(H)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas Doyle, Industrial Safety Integration Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Where the audit results are used to determines that the principles and procedures of the electrical safety program are not being followed, or are proved to be ineffective, appropriate revisions shall be made and corrective actions shall be taken in order to ensure the effectiveness of the program. Substantiation: An audit cannot make a determination but the results of an audit can be used to make a determination. Let’s not just blame the people here. The program content might be ineffective as well. Appropriate revisions speaks only to the documentation of the electrical safety program. It does not speak to the actions required to correct the situation. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-122 meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-121 Log #414 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (110.7(H)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: William K. Shinn, E-Hazard Management, LLC Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 110.7(H) An electrical safety program shall be audited to help ensure that the principles and procedures of the electrical safety program are being followed. The frequency of the audit shall be determined by the employer, based on the complexity of the procedures and the type of work being covered, but in no case shall the frequency exceed five years. Where the audit determines that the principles and procedures of the electrical safety program are not being followed, appropriate revisions shall be made and retraining shall be conducted. Substantiation: The current wording of 110.7(H) is open ended as related to audit frequency. Once every five years for a program should be an absolute minimum. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-122 meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-122 Log #464 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (110.7(H)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Danny Liggett, DuPont Recommendation: Revise 110.7(H) to read as follows: (H) Electrical Safety Auditing. (1) The electrical safety program shall be audited to help ensure that the principles and procedures of the electrical safety program are still in compliance with the latest requirements and regulations. The frequency of the audit shall not exceed three years. (2) Auditing of field work shall be performed to help assure that the requirements contained in the procedures of the electrical safety program are being followed. Where the auditing determines that the principles and procedures of the electrical safety program are not being followed, the appropriate revisions to the training program or revisions to the procedures shall be made. Substantiation: There are two components of auditing that must be considered. The first is the audit of the electrical safety program itself to help assure it is in compliance with the latest requirements of documents such as NFPA 70E. The second component is auditing the work activity to determine if the procedures contained within the electrical safety program are being followed. Field audits of work provide information on what should be addressed through training or what procedures need to be modified based upon what the audit indicates.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the recommendation to read: (H) Electrical Safety Auditing. (1) Electrical Safety Program. The electrical safety program shall be audited to help ensure that the principles and procedures of the electrical safety program are still in compliance with the latest requirements and regulations. The frequency of the audit shall not exceed three years. (2) Field Work. Auditing of field work shall be performed to help assure that the requirements contained in the procedures of the electrical safety program are being followed. Where the auditing determines that the principles and procedures of the electrical safety program are not being followed, the appropriate revisions to the training program or revisions to the procedures shall be made. Committee Statement: Titles have been added to the second level subdivisions for style manual compliance. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 3 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: The Committee Action should have been “Accept in Principle in Part.” Accept the proposed revisions, except reject the last sentence of the proposed (H)(1). The employer should not be restricted to a set schedule. The audit schedule is based on the “… complexity of the procedures and the type of work being covered...” according to the existing requirements. Change the last sentence of proposed (H)(1) to what is in the present requirements: (1) The electrical safety program shall be audited to help ensure that the principles and procedures of the electrical safety program are still in compliance with the latest requirements and regulations. The frequency of audit shall be determined by the employer, based on the complexity of the procedures and the type of work being covered. REGE, T.: Committee action should have been reject. The language in the current 110.7(H) was adequate and gave employers the flexibility to design their own audit programs. NFPA 70E should not specify the content of the audits. WILMER, K.: Committee action should have been reject. The language in the current 110.7(H) was adequate and gave employers the flexibility to design their own audit programs. NFPA 70E should not specify the content of the audits. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We are concerned that the phrase “field work” is not defined and its intent may be unclear. We also wonder what work would be considered to be other than “field work” and that work that is other than field work would not be subject audit. TIEDE, T.: Wording should say the electrical safety program is “reviewed” every three years instead of “audited”. Also, it is unclear what is meant by “latest requirements and regulations”. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-123 Log #509 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (110.7(H)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Jerry Grant, Argonne National Laboratories Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 110.7 Electrical Safety Program. (H) Electrical Safety Auditing. An electrical safety program shall be audited to help ensure that the principles and procedures of the electrical safety program are being followed. The frequency of audit shall be determined by the employer, based on the complexity of the procedures and the type of work being covered. Where the audit determines that the principles and procedures of the electrical safety program are is not being followed, appropriate revisions and actions shall be made. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the article 110 task group after discussion with liaison Jeff Sargent and Chair David Dini, the text is revised to cover all hazards and workers. This is a clarification of the electrical safety auditing process. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-122 meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: See my comment on Proposal 70E-122.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-124 Log #514 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (110.7(H)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Paul Dobrowsky, Holley, NY Recommendation: Add a new last sentence to read as follows: The audit shall be documented. Substantiation: Without documentation no evidence that an audit was done exists. Documentation helps identify trends and provides information for corrective action. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Committee Statement: The recommended text is added as a new 110.7(H)(3) in Proposal 70E-122 with the title “Documentation”. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-125 Log #501 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.7(A), FPN ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Jerry Grant, Argonne National Laboratories Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 110.7 Electrical Safety Program. (A) General. FPN No. 1: Safety-related work practices are just one component of an overall electrical safety program. For examples of typical electrical safety program principals, controls and procedures see Annex E. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the article 110 task group after discussion with liaison Jeff Sargent and Chair David Dini. This clarification helps to tie this section together with Annex E. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation is already covered in the fine print note to 110.7(C). Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-126 Log #89 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.7(F), FPN 1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas Doyle, Industrial Safety Integration Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: The hazard analysis and/or risk mitigation strategy hazard/risk evaluation procedure may need to include identifying when a second person could be situations where more than one person could be required is required to participate in the electrical work process, as well as the training and personal protective equipment that should person should have be provided to employees. Substantiation: Using the term “hazard/risk” could make the reader think that they are synonyms. They are different and their evaluation or analysis procedures are not the same. Why limit the number of people to two? Add the words “electrical work” in order to clarify who needs the training and equipment. Add the words “personal protective” in order to clarify the meaning of the term “equipment”. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The Committee concludes that “risk mitigation strategy” is not defined and may confuse the users of this standard, and does not add clarity. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We agree with the intent of the submitter to clarify when more than worker is required. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-127 Log #364 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (110.8) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Rodney J. West, Square D Company/Schneider Electric Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 1) Add two FPNs – One to 110.8 (A)(1) and one to 110.8(A)(2) 2) Move the current language out of 110.8(B)(4) to create a new 130.6(L). Language to remain unchanged. 3) Delete the remainder of 110.8.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E The proposed 110.8 text will then read as follows: “110.8 Working While Exposed to Electrical Hazards. (A) General. Safety-related work practices shall be used to safeguard employees from injury while they are exposed to electrical hazards from electrical conductors or circuit parts that are or can become energized. The specific safety related work practices shall be consistent with the nature and extent of the associated electrical hazards. (1) Energized Electrical Conductors and Circuit Parts— Safe Work Condition. Energized electrical conductors and circuit parts to which an employee might be exposed shall be put into an electrically safe condition before an employee works within the Limited Approach Boundary of those conductors or parts, unless work on energized components can be justified according to 130.1. FPN: See Article 120 for information related to Establishing an Electrically Safe Work Condition (2) Energized Electrical Conductors and Circuit Parts— Unsafe Work Condition. Only qualified persons shall be permitted to work on electrical conductors or circuit parts that have not been put into an electrically safe work condition. FPN: See Article 130 for information related to Work Involving Electrical Hazards.” The newly created 130.6(L) will read as follows: “130.6(L) (4) Safety Interlocks. Only qualified persons following the requirements for working inside the Restricted Approach Boundary as covered by 130.2(C) shall be permitted to defeat or bypass an electrical safety interlock over which the person has sole control, and then only temporarily while the qualified person is working on the equipment. The safety interlock system shall be returned to its operable condition when the work is completed.” Substantiation: This proposal is one of two being submitted by an Article 130 sub-task group assigned to 110.8. The members of this sub-task group are Rod West, Daleep Mohla, and Kathy Wilmer. This proposal does not eliminate 110.8 entirely, but rather leaves the present “general” language found in 110.8(A) in Article 110 which is titled “General Requirements for Electrical Safety-Related Work Practices”. The proposal does remove specific information from 110.8. These removed or relocated sections are addressed one by one as follows: 110.8(B) and 110.8(B)(1): While not verbatim from other sections, this text is unnecessary given the content of NFPA 70E 120.1, 120.2, 120.3, 130.1 & 130.2. The newly added FPNs in 110.8(A) above will clearly direct the reader to the appropriate section(s). 110.8(B)(1)(a): This section is redundant with 130.2(A) and should be deleted. 110.8(B)(1)(b): This section is redundant with 130.3 and should be deleted. 110.8(B)(2): This section is redundant with 130.1(B) and should be deleted. 110.8(B)(3): This section is redundant with 130.2(D) and should be deleted. 110.8(B)(4): This section is not redundant, but is improperly located. The language should be moved, unchanged, to create a new section 130.6(L). Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: See the committee action on Proposal 70E-129 which meets the intent of the recommendation. Deleting or relocating sections as recommended is accomplished by the committee action on Proposal 70E-129. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-128 Log #431 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (110.8) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Daleep C. Mohla, DCM Electrical Consulting Services, Inc. Recommendation: Relocate text of 110.8(A), (A)(1), 110.8(B) and B(1) to new section 130.2. Delete Section 110.8(B)(1)(a), 110.8(B)(1)(b), 110.8(B)(2), and 110.8(B)(3) Renumber 130.2 and 130.3 as new 130.3 and 130.4. Relocate existing 130.4 to 110.9 General

110.8 Key Action

130.4 Relocate to 110.9 General

110.8 (A) New 130.2 (A)

110.8(A) (1) New 130.2 (A)(1)

110.8 (A)(2) combine with new 130.2 (A)(1)

110.8 (B) New 130.2 (B)

110..8 (B)(1) New 130.2 (B)(1)

110.8(B))1)(b) Deleted ( Redundant with 130.2 (A)

110.8(B))1)(a) Deleted ( redundant with 130.3)

110.8(B)(2) Deleted ( redundant with 130.1 (B)

110.8(B)(3) Deleted ( redundant with 130.2 (D)

110.8(B)(4) Make it 110.8 Title Interlocks

Existing 130.2 New 130.3

Existing 130.3 New 130.4

Existing 130.4 Relocate to 110.9

(See table on the following pages.)Substantiation: This proposal is based on the work of a TG consisting of Rod West, Kathy Wilmer and Daleep Mohla. TG opted to provide two proposals. One to only delete the requirements in 110.8 which are duplicated elsewhere and the second to delete the duplicated requirements and relocate the remaining requirements in Article 130. 110.8(B)(1)(a): This section is redundant with 130.2(A) and should be deleted. 110.8(B)(1)(b): This section is redundant with 130.3 and should be deleted. 110.8(B)(2): This section is redundant with 130.1(B) and should be deleted. 110.8(B)(3): This section is redundant with 130.2(D) and should be deleted. If this proposal is accepted, references to 110.8, 130.2, 130.3 and 130.4 need to be change to reflect new numbers Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: See the committee action on Proposal 70E-129 which meets the intent of the recommendation. Deleting or relocating sections as recommended is accomplished by the committee action on Proposal 70E-129. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HICKMAN, P.: See our negative statement on Proposal 70E-129. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E

Proposal 70E-128 (Log #431) Recommendation

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Proposal 70E-128 (Log #431) Recommendation (continued)

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-129 Log #515 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (110.8) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Paul Dobrowsky, Holley, NY Recommendation: Relocate existing 110.8 to Article 130 as a new 130.2 (130.3 if my other proposal to add a new 130.1 is accepted). Renumber the remaining sections in 130. Delete subdivisions 110.8(B)(1)(a), 110.8(B)(1)(b), 110.8(B)(2), and 110.8(B)(3). Re-identify 110.8(B)(4) as (B)(2) Substantiation: These requirements more appropriately belong in Article 130 where they correspond with that title. Article 110 should contain only general requirements. The subdivisions proposed to be deleted already exist in Article 130 and do not need to be redundantly repeated. 110.8(B)(1)(a) = 130.2(A) 110.8(B)(1)(b) = 130.3 110.8(B)(2) =130.1(B)(1) 110.8(B)(3) = 130.2(D) Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HICKMAN, P.: We are concerned that the committee action of Accept action is not clear. The submitter offered a choice of actions. We suggest that an Accept in Principle might have been more appropriate with the final action(s) provided. In addition, we are concerned that we are moving what appear to be “redundant” provisions out of Article 110 and “merging/consolidating them into Article 130 where they will no longer apply generally. PACE, D.: This Proposal should have been Rejected. The existing text should remain where it is. Article 110 establishes the general requirements and references other Articles for information in how the requirement can be met. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-130 Log #159 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.8(A)(1)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Bobby J. Gray, Hoydar/Buck, Inc. Recommendation: Energized electrical conductors and circuit parts to which an employee might be exposed shall be put into an electrically safe work condition before an employee works within the Limited Approach Boundary approaches nearer than a safe distance of those conductors or parts, unless work on energized components can be justified according to 130.1 Substantiation: The revision is in concert with a companion proposal to define “safe distance” and will ensure that all employees will be protected from shock and arc flash hazards whether or not they are actually “working” within the Limited Approach Boundary. This proposal also will remove the ambiguity of the word “exposed.” Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Replacing “Limited Approach Boundary” with “safe distance” does not add clarity to the standard. See the committee action on Proposal 70E-64. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: PACE, D.: This Proposal should have been Accepted in Principle in Part. The submitter is correct that the current language does not address the arc flash hazard. See my comments on Proposal 70E-131 Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: GRAY, B.: Although the section is redundant and deleting it will improve the quality of the Standard, the action removes the general information decision point that directed the user to either Article 120 or 130 based on the existence of adequate justification for energized work. Hopefully, a comment will replace that link now missing with this action. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-131 Log #273 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (110.8(A)(1)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Louis A. Barrios, Shell / Rep. API (American Petroleum Institute) Recommendation: Modify 110.8(A)(1) as follows: (1) Energized Electrical Conductors and Circuit Parts — Safe Work Condition. Before an employee works within the Limited Approach Boundary, Eenergized electrical conductors and circuit parts to which an employee might be exposed shall be put into an electrically safe work condition before an employee works within the Limited Approach Boundary of those conductors or parts, unless work on energized components can be justified according to 130.1.

Substantiation: The proposed change is editorial in nature intended to improve the usability of the Standard. The modified text adds clarity and is less likely to be mis-interpreted. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Committee Statement: The committee notes that this action will be incorporated into the action taken on Proposal 70E-129. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: PACE, D.: This should have been an Accept in Principle and this section should have modified to address the arc flash hazard as well. (1) Energized Electrical Conductors and Circuit Parts – Safe Work Condition Before an employee works within the Limited Approach Boundary or within the arc flash boundary, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts to which an employee might be exposed shall be put into an electrically safe work condition, unless work on energized components can be justified according to 130.1. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-132 Log #448 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.8(A)(1)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Mark Rucker, Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Energized Electrical Conductors and Circuit Parts - Safe Work Condition. Energized electrical conductors and circuit parts to which an employee might be exposed shall be put into an electrically safe work condition before an employee works within the Limited Restricted Approach Boundary of those conductors or parts, unless work on energized components can be justified according to 130.1. Substantiation: 110.8(A)(1), as it exists, conflicts with 130.2(C) which has the Restricted Approach Boundary as the limit for approach to exposed energized electrical conductors or circuit parts at 50V or more. Using the proposed statement will harmonize 110.8(A)(1) with 130.2(C). Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Section 130.2(C) is not in conflict with 110.8A(1). These are different requirements. Section 110.8(A)(1) instructs the employee to place electrical parts in an electrically safe condition or justify work on energized parts when they are inside the Limited Approach Boundary. If an employee has justified work on energized parts and obtained the Energized Work Permit, then the employee is subject to 130.2(C) which tells the employee what to do if the employee is inside the Restricted Approach Boundary. If energized work is justified and the permit is completed, then workers are allowed to work on energized parts if they comply with one of the 3 items in 130.2(C) - that is either (1) wear rubber gloves; (2) cover the part with rubber blankets or (3) doing live line bare hand work. There is no conflict. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-133 Log #465 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (110.8(A)(1)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Danny Liggett, DuPont Recommendation: Revise 110.8(A)(1) to read as follows: (1) Energized Electrical Conductors and Circuit Parts — Safe Work Condition. Energized electrical conductors and circuit parts to which an employee might be exposed shall be put into an electrically safe work condition before an employee works within the Limited Approach Boundary or the arc flash protection boundary of those conductors or parts, unless work on energized components can be justified according to 130.1. Substantiation: 110.8 covers work that exposes personnel to electrical hazards. 110.8(1) does not address the arc flash hazard. The arc flash hazard needs to be recognized and considered when creating a safe work condition. An Electrical Work Safe Condition has not been established if an arc flash hazard is present. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-190 meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: An “electrically safe work condition” is principally concerned with the shock hazard, according to the present definition. (Electrically Safe Work Condition. A state in which an electrical conductor or circuit part has been disconnected from energized parts, locked/tagged in accordance with established standards, tested to ensure the absence of voltage, and grounded if determined necessary.) The proposal should be rejected.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E PACE, D.: This Proposal should have been Accepted in Principle. See my comments on Proposals 70E-130 and 131. Article 110 set the general requirements. Both the arc flash hazard and the shock hazard must be addressed in all places where requirements are established for approaches to exposed energized conductors or circuit parts. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-134 Log #413 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.8 and 110.9) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Mark McNellis, Sandia National Laboratories Recommendation: Renumber articles 110.8 and 100.9 to place 110.8 as the last section in the article. No change in text, only order. Text to read as follows: 110.8 Use of Equipment. (A) Test Instruments and Equipment. (1) Rating. Test instruments, equipment, and their accessories shall be rated for circuits and equipment to which they will be connected. FPN: See ANSI/ISA-61010-1 (82.02.01)/UL 61010-1, Safety Requirements for Electrical Equipment for Measurement, Control, and Laboratory Use - Part I: General Requirements, for rating and design requirements for voltage measurement and test instruments intended for use on electrical systems 1000 volts and below. (2) Design. Test instruments, equipment, and their accessories shall be designed for the environment to which they will be exposed. and for the manner in which they will be used. (3) Visual Inspection. Test instruments and equipment and all associated test leads, cables, power cords, probes, and connectors shall be visually inspected for external defects and damage before each use. If there is a defect or evidence of damage that might expose an employee to injury, the defective or damaged item shall be removed from service, and no employee shall use it until repairs and tests necessary to render the equipment safe have been made. (4) Operation Verification. When test instruments are used for the testing for the absence of voltage on conductors or circuit parts operating at 50 volts or more, the operation of the test instrument shall be verified before and after an absence of voltage test is performed. (B) Portable Electric Equipment. This section applies to the use of cord-and-plug-connected equipment. including cord sets (extension cords). (1) Handling. Portable equipment shall be handled in a manner that will not cause damage. Flexible electric cords connected to equipment shall not be used for raising or lowering the equipment. Flexible cords shall not be fastened with staples or hung in such a fashion as could damage the outer jacket or insulation. (2) Grounding-Type Equipment. (a) A flexible cord used with grounding-type utilization equipment shall contain an equipment grounding conductor. (b) Attachment plugs and receptacles shall not be connected or altered in a manner that would interrupt continuity of the equipment grounding conductor. Additionally, these devices shall not be altered in order to allow use in a manner that was not intended by the manufacturer. (c) Adapters that interrupt the continuity of the equipment grounding conductor shall not be used. (3) Visual Inspection of Portable Cord-and-Plug Connected Equipment and Flexible Cord Sets. (a) Frequency of Inspection. Before each use, portable cord-and-plug-connected equipment shall be visually inspected for external defects (such as loose parts or deformed and missing pins) and for evidence of possible internal damage (such as a pinched or crushed outer jacket). Exception: Cord-and-plug-connected equipment and flexible cord sets (extension cords) that remain connected once they are put in place and are not exposed to damage shall not be required to be visually inspected until they are relocated. (b) Defective Equipment. If there is a defect or evidence of damage that might expose an employee to injury, the defective or damaged item shall be removed from service, and no employee shall use it until repairs and tests necessary to render the equipment safe have been made. (c) Proper Mating. When an attachment plug is to be connected to a receptacle, the relationship of the plug and receptacle contacts shall first be checked to ensure that they are of mating configurations. (d) Conductive Work Locations. Portable electric equipment used in highly conductive work locations (such as those inundated with water or other conductive liquids) or in job locations where employees are likely to contact water or conductive liquids shall be approved for those locations. In job locations where employees are likely to contact or be drenched with water or conductive liquids, ground-fault circuit-interrupter protection for personnel shall also be used. (4) Connecting Attachment Plugs. (a) Employees’ hands shall not be wet when plugging and unplugging flexible cords and cord-and-plug-connected equipment if energized equipment is involved. (b) Energized plug and receptacle connections shall be handled only with insulating protective equipment if the condition of the connection could provide a conductive path to the employee’s hand (if, for example, a cord connector is wet from being immersed in water).

(c) Locking-type connectors shall be secured after connection. (C) GFCI Protection Devices. GFCI protection devices shall be tested per manufacturer’s instructions. (D) Overcurrent Protection Modification. Overcurrent protection of circuits and conductors shall not be modified, even on a temporary basis, beyond that permitted by applicable portions of electrical codes and standards dealing with overcurrent protection. FPN: For further information concerning electrical codes and standards dealing with overcurrent protection, refer to Article 240 of NFPA 70, National Electrical Code. ARTICLE 120 Establishing an Electrically Safe Work Condition 110.9 Working While Exposed to Electrical Hazards. (A) General. Safety-related work practices shall be used to safeguard employees from injury while they are exposed to electrical hazards from electrical conductors or circuit parts that are or can become energized. The specific safety related work practices shall be consistent with the nature and extent of the associated electrical hazards. (1) Energized Electrical Conductors and Circuit Parts- Safe Work Condition. Energized electrical conductors and circuit parts to which an employee might be exposed shall be put into an electrically safe work condition before an employee works within the Limited Approach Boundary of those conductors or parts, unless work on energized components can be justified according to 130.1. (2) Energized Electrical Conductors and Circuit Parts- Unsafe Work Condition. Only qualified persons shall be permitted to work on electrical conductors or circuit parts that have not been put into an electrically safe work condition. (B) Working Within the Limited Approach Boundary of Exposed Electrical Conductors or Circuit Parts that Are or Might Become Energized. Prior to working within the Limited Approach Boundary of exposed electrical conductors and circuit parts operating at 50 volts or more, lockout/tagout devices shall be applied in accordance with 120.1, 120.2, and 120.3. If, for reasons indicated in 130.1, lockout/tagout devices cannot be applied, 130.2(A) through 130.2(0)(2) shall apply to the work. (1) Electrical Hazard Analysis. If the energized electrical conductors or circuit parts operating at 50 volts or more are not placed in an electrically safe work condition, other safety-related work practices shall be used to protect employees who might be exposed to the electrical hazards involved. Such work practices shall protect each employee from arc flash and from contact with energized electrical conductors or circuit parts operating at 50 volts or more directly with any part of the body or indirectly through some other conductive object. Work practices that are used shall be suitable for the conditions under which the work is to be performed and for the voltage level of the energized electrical conductors or circuit parts. Appropriate safety related work practices shall be determined before any person is exposed to the electrical hazards involved by using both shock hazard analysis and arc flash hazard analysis. (a) Shock Hazard Analysis. A shock hazard analysis shall determine the voltage to which personnel will be exposed, boundary requirements, and the personal protective equipment necessary in order to minimize the possibility of electrical shock to personnel. FPN: See 130.2 for the requirements of conducting a shock hazard analysis. (b) Arc Flash Hazard Analysis. An arc flash hazard analysis shall determine the Arc Flash Protection Boundary and the personal protective equipment that people within the Arc Flash Protection Boundary shall use. FPN: See 130.3 for the requirements of conducting an arc flash hazard analysis. (2) Energized ElectricalWork Permit. When working on energized electrical conductors or circuit parts that are not placed in an electrically safe work condition (i.e., for the reasons of increased or additional hazards or infeasibility per 130.1), work to be performed shall be considered energized electrical work and shall be performed by written permit only. FPN: See 130.ICB) for the requirements of an energized electrical work permit. (3) Unqualified Persons. Unqualified persons shall not be permitted to enter spaces that are required to be accessible to qualified employees only, unless the electric conductors and equipment involved are in an electrically safe work condition. (4) Safety Interlocks. Only qualified persons following the requirements for working inside the Restricted Approach Boundary as covered by 130.2(C) shall be permitted to defeat or bypass an electrical safety interlock over which the person has sole control, and then only temporarily while the qualified person is working on the equipment. The safety interlock system shall be returned to its operable condition when the work is completed. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the Article 110 task group. The group felt that Article 110.8 should be the last section of the article. The group felt that having Article 110.8 as the last section in 110 was a more natural progression to the following chapters by posing the question as to whether the work is justified or not then leading the reader to either Article 120 - establishing an electrically safe work condition if the work is not justified or to Article 130 working while exposed to electrical hazards. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-129 deletes or relocates all of the text of 110.8. The recommendation only reverses the position of 110.8 and 110.9.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-135 Log #67 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.8(B)(1)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Drake A. Drobnick, Saline, MI Recommendation: Insert new language after the last sentence and before (a). It is the responsibility of the equipment owner to ensure that the required shock hazard analysis (130.2)(A), arc flash hazard analysis (130.3), and incident energy analysis (130.3)(B)(1) has been completed. Information from these analyses shall be placed on the equipment label. Substantiation: This requirement clarifies the party responsible for completing the electrical hazard analysis and placing the information onto the equipment label. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The Committee does not concur that the tasks listed by the submitter are always the responsibility of the equipment owner. The tasks are outlined in 130.2(A), 130.3, and 130.3(B)(1). The Committee does not want to identify who is responsible for these tasks as the responsibility could vary depending on the situation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: DROBNICK, D.: I disagree with the committee’s action to reject this proposal. The current standard provides no user guidance for situations in which the employer does not own, but works on or interacts with electrical equipment owned by another party. I suggest the proposal be amended to read as follows: “110.8 (B) (1) Insert into last sentence before (a). The authority having jurisdiction will ensure that an Electrical Hazard Analysis has been completed in accordance with this section. Substantiation: This proposal clarifies which party has the prime responsibility for ensuring compliance with this section of the standard”. HITTEL, M.: The appropriate action should be accept. This proposal addresses confusion in industry that is occurring. In some cases, the equipment manufacturer is being asked to label equipment that is purchased, but cannot label an electrical panel w/o detailed installation information. In addition, ultimately it is the owner that is responsible to ensure that the analysis and labeling is performed. This proposal explicitly defines this responsibility. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-136 Log #449 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.8(B)(1)b.) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Mark Rucker, Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. Recommendation: Revise to read as follows: Arc Flash Hazard Analysis. An arc flash hazard analysis shall determine the Arc Flash Protection Boundary, incident energy or hazard risk categories and the personal protective equipment that people within the Arc Flash Protection Boundary shall use. Substantiation: This proposal harmonizes the definition of AFHA with the requirements of 130.3. Section 130.3 is the primary section that sets requirements for the AFHA. 130.3(A) gives requirements for determining the Arc Flash Protection Boundary. 130.3(B) establishes the requirement for calculating incident energy or hazard risk categories from which arc flash (only) PPE is selected. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: This committee action is based on its action on Proposal 70E-129 to delete 110.8(B)(1)(b) because it is redundant to 130.3. Section 130.3 contains the information about incident energy analysis and hazard risk categories that the recommendation proposes to include in 110.8(B)(1)(b). This information is found in existing 130.3(B)(1) and (2). Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We agree that the submitters contention that arc flash hazard analysis additionally includes determination of incident energy or hazard risk categories.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-137 Log #274 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Part (110.8(B)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Louis A. Barrios, Shell / Rep. API (American Petroleum Institute) Recommendation: Delete text to read as follows: Delete 110.8(B) and renumber the sections of 110.8 as shown below. Everything else remains unchanged for this proposal. 110.8 Working While Exposed to Electrical Hazards. (A) General. Safety-related work practices shall be used to safeguard employees from injury while they are exposed to electrical hazards from electrical conductors or circuit parts that are or can become energized. The specific safety related work practices shall be consistent with the nature and extent of the associated electrical hazards. (1B) Energized Electrical Conductors and Circuit Parts — Safe Work Condition. Energized electrical conductors and circuit parts to which an employee might be exposed shall be put into an electrically safe work condition before an employee works within the Limited Approach Boundary of those conductors or parts, unless work on energized components can be justified according to 130.1. (2C) Energized Electrical Conductors and Circuit Parts — Unsafe Work Condition. Only qualified persons shall be permitted to work on electrical conductors or circuit parts that have not been put into an electrically safe work condition. (B) Working Within the Limited Approach Boundary of Exposed Electrical Conductors or Circuit Parts that Are or Might Become Energized. Prior to working within the Limited Approach Boundary of exposed electrical conductors and circuit parts operating at 50 volts or more, lockout/tagout devices shall be applied in accordance with 120.1, 120.2, and 120.3. If, for reasons indicated in 130.1, lockout/tagout devices cannot be applied, 130.2(A) through 130.2(D)(2) shall apply to the work. (1) Electrical Hazard Analysis. If the energized electrical conductors or circuit parts operating at 50 volts or more are not placed in an electrically safe work condition, other safety-related work practices shall be used to protect employees who might be exposed to the electrical hazards involved. Such work practices shall protect each employee from arc flash and from contact with energized electrical conductors or circuit parts operating at 50 volts or more directly with any part of the body or indirectly through some other conductive object. Work practices that are used shall be suitable for the conditions under which the work is to be performed and for the voltage level of the energized electrical conductors or circuit parts. Appropriate safety related work practices shall be determined before any person is exposed to the electrical hazards involved by using both shock hazard analysis and arc flash hazard analysis. (a) Shock Hazard Analysis. A shock hazard analysis shall determine the voltage to which personnel will be exposed, boundary requirements, and the personal protective equipment necessary in order to minimize the possibility of electrical shock to personnel. FPN: See 130.2 for the requirements of conducting a shock hazard analysis. (b) Arc Flash Hazard Analysis. An arc flash hazard analysis shall determine the Arc Flash Protection Boundary and the personal protective equipment that people within the Arc Flash Protection Boundary shall use. FPN: See 130.3 for the requirements of conducting an arc flash hazard analysis. (2) Energized Electrical Work Permit. When working on energized electrical conductors or circuit parts that are not placed in an electrically safe work condition (i.e., for the reasons of increased or additional hazards or infeasibility per 130.1), work to be performed shall be considered energized electrical work and shall be performed by written permit only. FPN: See 130.1(B) for the requirements of an energized electrical work permit. (3) Unqualified Persons. Unqualified persons shall not be permitted to enter spaces that are required to be accessible to qualified employees only, unless the electric conductors and equipment involved are in an electrically safe work condition. (4) Safety Interlocks. Only qualified persons following the requirements for working inside the Restricted Approach Boundary as covered by 130.2(C) shall be permitted to defeat or bypass an electrical safety interlock over which the person has sole control, and then only temporarily while the qualified person is working on the equipment. The safety interlock system shall be returned to its operable condition when the work is completed. Substantiation: The requirements of 110.8(B) are redundant, not necessary and increases the complexity of the Standard. The requirements for lockout/tagout are already established as part of establishing an electrically safe work condition in 110.8(A)(1). Repeating lockout/tagout requirements in 110.8(B) as another subheading is not necessary. The sub articles that follow 110.8(B), (1) Electrical Hazard Analysis, (2) Energized Electrical Work Permit, (3) Unqualified Persons, and (4) Safety Interlocks all address the situation where

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E electrical conductors and circuit parts have not been placed in an electrically safe work condition. They do not address lockout/tagout and therefore should not be subheadings under a section addressing lockout/tagout. Also, the last sentence in 110.8(B) indicates that 130.1 provides reasons why lockout/tagout cannot be applied. This is not true. Section 130.1 provides exceptions to when energized electrical conductors and circuit parts do not need to be placed in an electrically safe work condition. The present 110.8(B) provides incorrect information and introduces confusion in the requirements of 110.8 and should be removed. A simple way for addressing the renumbering of the subheadings is provided in the proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Part The committee accepts the deletion of the requirement in 110.8(B), but retains the title for correlation with their action on Proposal 70E-129. Committee Statement: The committee action meets the intent of the recommendation and provides correlation with the relocated text of 110.8. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-138 Log #115 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.8(B)(1)b., FPN (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: E. W. Buss, Mashpee, MA Recommendation: Add a second sentence to the FPN as follows: “See Article 100 definitions for other aspects of an Arc Flash Hazard Analysis” Substantiation: The Arc Flash Hazard Analysis includes more than just calculation of the boundary and determining the PPE. Safe work practices equipment maintenance (as noted in 3rd paragraph of 130.3) are some of the other items making up the Arc Flash Hazard Analysis. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: See the committee action on Proposal 70E-129 which deleted 110.8(B)(1)(b). The information about other aspects of an arc flash analysis are in new section 130.3(B)(1) and (2) which accomplishes the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-139 Log #48 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.8(B)(2)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Palmer L. Hickman, National Joint Apprentice & Training Committee Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 110.8(B)(2) Energized Electrical Work Permit. If When working on energized electrical conductors or circuit parts that are not placed in an electrically safe work condition (i.e., for the reasons of increased or additional hazards or infeasibility per 130.1), work to be performed shall be considered energized electrical work and shall be performed by written permit only. Substantiation: This proposal is intended to restore that unanimous action that the 70E Technical Committee took on Comment 70E-360 on the ROC ballot for the 2009 Edition of 70E, thus, eliminating conflicting information in the standard. The need for an energized electrical work permit is not only necessary when “working on” energized equipment. There is also a need for an energized electrical work permit any time workers are exposed to electrical hazards, even if they are not “working on” energized equipment. This is substantiated by information including, but not limited to, the following: Arc Flash Hazard. A dangerous condition associated with the possible release of energy caused by an electric arc. FPN No. 1: An arc flash hazard may exist when energized electrical conductors or circuit parts are exposed or when they are within equipment in a guarded or enclosed condition, provided a person is interacting with the equipment in such a manner that could cause an electric arc. Under normal operating conditions, enclosed energized equipment that has been properly installed and maintained is not likely to pose an arc flash hazard. FPN No. 2: See Table 130.7(C)(9) for examples of activities that could pose an arc flash hazard. Electrical Hazard. A dangerous condition such that contact or equipment failure can result in electric shock, arc flash burn, thermal burn, or blast. FPN No. 1 above offers information recognizing that it is well established that an arc flash hazard may exist, not only when energized electrical conductors or circuit parts are exposed, but also when they are within equipment in a guarded or enclosed condition, especially when someone is interacting with the equipment or if the equipment has not been maintained properly. FPN No. 2 above points to Table 130.7(C)(9) where specific examples of where PPE is required for tasks even where the covers are on and doors are closed (i.e., breaker or fused switch operation with doors closed and

racking in or out). In addition, the definition of “electrical hazard” above clearly recognizes that an electrical hazard (electric shock, arc flash burn, thermal burn, or blast) could exist by either contact (presumably it would need to be exposed to be a hazard from contact) or equipment failure (presumably even with the covers on and/or the doors closed). In addition, the recommendation in this proposal is the same text that was unanimously approved by the 70E Technical Committee in Comment 70E-360. This action did not change the intent of “working on or near”. It retained “working on” and replaced “or near” with the hazard or hazards intended so that 70E would be technically correct and not require less than OSHA does. Note that OSHA still uses the phrase “working on or near” and requires a written hazard assessment for selection of PPE as indicated in 29 CFR 1910.132: 1910.132(d) Hazard assessment and equipment selection. 1910.132(d)(1) The employer shall assess the workplace to determine if hazards are present, or are likely to be present, which necessitate the use of personal protective equipment (PPE). If such hazards are present, or likely to be present,... 1910.132(d)(2) The employer shall verify that the required workplace hazard assessment has been performed through a written certification that identifies the workplace evaluated; the person certifying that the evaluation has been performed; the date(s) of the hazard assessment; and, which identifies the document as a certification of hazard assessment. In summary, the Energized Electrical Work Permits is the NFPA 70E “how to” for the OSHA-required written hazard assessment. There is still, clearly, a need for a written hazard assessment and selection of PPE even when covers are on and doors are closed as pointed out in the information related to the definitions of electrical hazard and arc flash hazard. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: See the committee action on Proposal 70E-129 which deletes 110.8(B)(2) because it was redundant to 130.1(B)(1). Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HITTEL, M.: I agree with the committee action, but believe that the submitter is bringing up some legitimate issues vis-à-vis a potential conflict with regards to when permitting is required. As stated in the submitters’ substantiation there is also a need for an energized electrical work permit any time workers are exposed to electrical hazards, even if they are not “working on” energized equipment. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-140 Log #39 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.8(B)(3)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: R. Dee Jones, AVO Training Institute Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Unqualified persons shall not be permitted to enter spaces that are required to be accessible to qualified employees only, unless the electric conductors and equipment involved are in an electrically safe work condition, or as allowed in 130.2(D)(2). Substantiation: 110.8(B)(3) does not permit unauthorized persons inside of areas restricted to qualified persons unless an electrically safe work condition exists, whereas, 130.2(D)(2) allows unqualified persons within the limited approach boundary when continuously escorted and oriented on the hazards by a qualified person. These statements are in conflict. The proposed change will eliminate this conflict. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee action on sequence 70E-129 deletes 110.8(B)(3) as it is redundant to 130.2(D). The recommendation proposes to add a note to 110.8(B)(3) referring to 130.2(D) and this is not necessary because 110.8(B)(3) was deleted. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-141 Log #516 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.9) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Paul Dobrowsky, Holley, NY Recommendation: Relocate 110.9 to 130.X as a new last section Substantiation: These requirements more appropriately belong in Article 130 where they correspond with that title. Article 110 should contain only general requirements. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The provisions in 110.9 are more suitable as general requirements in Article 110.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-142 Log #264 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (110.9 and 130.4) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Daleep C. Mohla, DCM Electrical Consulting Services, Inc. Recommendation: Delete 130.4 and relocate existing wording on test equipment requirements to 110.9. 110.9 Use of Equipment. A. Test Instruments and Equipment. 1. General: Only qualified persons shall perform testing work within the Limited Approach Boundary of energized electrical conductors or circuit parts operating at 50 volts or more. Substantiation: At present, test equipment requirements are split in two different places in 70E. This will consolidate all requirements at one location. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: DROBNICK, D.: Add the words “or Arc Flash Boundary whichever distance is greater” after Limited Approach Boundary. This addition will clarify that only Qualified Persons shall perform testing within the greater distance of the Arc Flash or Shock Approach Boundary. HICKMAN, P.: While we agree that having provisions located in Article 110 makes them apply generally (thus expanding their applicability), we are at the same time concerned that moving this provision out of Article 130 may make them less likely to be recognized and applied by users of NFPA 70E. However, we do generally support the move to make Article 130 provisions apply more broadly by placing them in Article 110, where appropriate. Also see our negative statement on Proposals 70E-128 and 70E-129. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-143 Log #34 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.9(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Charles Helmick, AVO Training Institute, Inc. Recommendation: “590.6 Ground-Fault Protection for Personnel’” from 2008 NEC or “410.4 Ground-Fault Circuit-Interrupter Protection for Personnel” from the NFPA 70E 2004 edition should be included in context with equipment usage. Substantiation: When Chapter 4 of the 2004 edition of 70E was deleted in the 2009 edition, the work procedures involving the use of GFCI for temporary work was deleted. As a result, there is no requirement in 70E to use GFCI for temporary wiring. This is a very necessary safe work practice and should not be overlooked in the Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation does not contain specific text as is required by Section 4.3.3(c) of the NFPA Regulations Governing Committee Projects. See the committee action on Proposal 70E-147. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-144 Log #35 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.9(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Charles Helmick, AVO Training Institute, Inc. Recommendation: 590.3(A)-(D) in the 2008 NEC or 420.1(B)(1)(a)-(d) NFPA 70E 2004 should be added to the context of equipment usage. Substantiation: When Chapter 4 of the 2004 edition of 70E was deleted in the 2009 edition, the time constraint definitions, involving the use of temporary wiring, was deleted Temporary wiring needs to be defined for work procedures especially GFCI requirements. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation does not contain specific text as is required by Section 4.3.3(c) of the NFPA Regulations Governing Committee Projects. See the committee action on Proposal 70E-147. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A.

Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-145 Log #141 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.9(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Shantu Shah, All Star Facility Services, Inc. Recommendation: (C) GFCI Protection Devices. GFCI Protection devices shall be tested (periodically as follows) per manufacturer’s instructions. Required testing: Before first use. Before first use after repair. Before use after any event that could cause damage. At least every three months (six months for fixed cord sets and receptacles not exposed to damage). Record all tests by identifying each cord, receptacle, or piece of equipment and it’s test date or test interval. Use whatever method you choose for this identification. Keep the test record until a new record replaces it using logs, color coding, or other means. These records must be available on the job site. Substantiation: Without a specific interval test, testing would be delayed for months and ground fault could develop. If device is faulty, circuit would not trip and it would be dangerous to use it. Oregon OSHA requested testing of GFCI outlets as listed herein. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation may conflict with manufacturer’s listing and labeling instructions. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: The appropriate action should be accept in principle as the submitter is attempting to identify a “test before each use” program as meeting, if not exceeding, the intent of the requirement. See my negative comment on Proposal 70E-146. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-146 Log #185 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.9(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James Durnan, Brookhaven National Laboratory Recommendation: Revise text as follows: (C) GFCI Protection Devices. GFCI protection devices shall be tested per manufacturer’s instructions or there shall be a test prior to use program. Substantiation: The problem is that for permanently installed GFCI receptacle outlets and GFCI circuit breakers, UL recommends a monthly testing cycle which is reflected in each manufacturer’s instructions. If the GFCI is not used within the testing cycle this monthly testing is time consuming and adds no benefit in the workplace or to the occasional user. Also, a GFCI could fail during the monthly cycle from a voltage spike and not protect a user who doesn’t know to test prior to use. For portable GFCIs UL recommends that the units be tested before each use so the user will be protected at time of use. This proposal would correct the problems listed above and would require that there be a training program for workers. A further benefit would be that workers will most likely take the knowledge to test GFCI’s prior to use away from the work place and train their families for safety’s sake. In the manufactures instructions they list the monthly testing as a user requirement but at the work place this will be performed by an electrician or other worker for documentation reasons. In a product safety tip on the UL web site the test procedure is described as “simple” and requires no special equipment. The reason for a GFCI “test-before-use” program is based on the following concepts. These concepts are the basis for the opinion that a “test-before-use” program exceeds the intent of monthly testing recommendations. 1. A GFCI testing program should satisfy the intent of the Standards and Code by meeting or exceeding the provided level of safety to the user, testing GFCI’s prior to use exceeds the level of safety of monthly testing. 2. The possibility of using a faulty GFCI device increases with the length of time since the last test. 3. Testing immediately prior to use provides a measure of safety greater than testing monthly and is consistent with the requirements for testing portable GFCI devices. 4. The electrical risk posed by using equipment plugged into a receptacle is proportional to use, GFCI’s that are never used pose no risk. 5. The GFCI testing plan should be made as simple as possible (consideration for human performance factors). 6. At some places of business they are removing convenience receptacles from rest rooms to eliminate the burden of monthly testing. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation may conflict with manufacturer’s listing and labeling instructions. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Explanation of Negative: CARPENTER, T.: The committee action should have been to accept. The existing standard requirements can be very arduous and do not necessarily add to employee safety. What safety benefit is there to testing a GFCI every month that is not used for many months, even years? Some manufacturers put in excessive test requirements to protect them from liability during lawsuits. Requiring the GFCI to be tested prior to use would actually promote safety in that a GFCI could fail between it’s monthly test and its use. HITTEL, M.: The appropriate action should be accept in principle with the following exception: “Supervised Industrial Installation where conditions of maintenance and engineering supervision ensure that only qualified persons monitor and service the system, the testing shall be test before each use for the following installations: 1. GFCI’s located in areas designated as confined space. 2. GFCI’s installed as convenience receptacles.” For exception 1, it makes no sense to create a monthly maint. task that has inherent risk issues with a goal of mitigating some other risk when the goal (proper function of the GFCI) can be determined before each use. For exception 2, many of these convenience receptacles were installed to enhance the safety of the users, not because of any regulatory requirement, are now being reconsidered as this adds a maint. requirements that are disproportionate to the benefits gained. This is a more reasonable approach. It could be supplemented for clarity where the outlet is not a convenience outlet such as a vending machine by a requiring a testing interval as recommended by the manufacturer for those installations. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-147 Log #362 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (110.9(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Dennis K. Neitzel, AVO Training Institute, Inc. Recommendation: Add new text to read as follows: All 125-volt, single-phase, 15-, 20-, and 30-ampere receptacle outlets that are not a part of the permanent wiring of the building or structure and that are in use by personnel shall have ground-fault circuit-interrupter protection for personnel. If a receptacle(s) is installed or exists as part of the permanent wiring of the building or structure and is used for temporary electric power, ground-fault circuit-interrupter protection for personnel shall be provided. For the purposes the this section, cord sets or devices incorporating listed ground-fault circuit-interrupter protection for personnel identified for portable use shall be permitted. Substantiation: NFPA 70E-2009, 110.9, Use of Equipment, (C) should also address the GFCI requirements of NEC 590.6(A) since Chapter 4 was removed from NFPA 70E-2009, which deleted this requirement for temporary wiring. Extension cords are used on a daily basis in commercial and industrial applications where wet or damp conditions exist. GFCI protection must be used to protect employees. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the recommendation to read: (C) GFCI Protection. Employees shall be provided with GFCI protection where required by applicable state, federal or local codes and standards. Listed cord sets or devices incorporating listed ground-fault circuit-interrupter protection for personnel identified for portable use shall be permitted. (1) Devices. GFCI protection devices shall be tested per manufacturer’s instructions. (2) Outdoors. GFCI protection shall be provided when an employee is outdoors and operating or using cord and plug connected equipment supplied by 125 volt, 15-, 20-, or 30-ampere circuits. Where employees working outdoors operate or use equipment supplied by other than 125 volt, 15-, 20-, or 30-ampere circuits, an assured equipment grounding conductor program shall be implemented. Committee Statement: The recommendation has been revised to implement text that does not contain the installation requirements from 590.6 of NFPA 70. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: CARPENTER, T.: The committee action should have been to reject. The proposal adds a requirement that already exists in the NEC. The APR action revised the wording to remove the NEC installation requirements. However, the wording now only requires safety (i.e. requiring a GFCI) when mandated by government bodies. It should be the committees responsibility to require what is safe irregardless of what a state, local, etc. body requires. HITTEL, M.: The appropriate action should be accept in principle. The proposal contains requirements that exist in installation standards. The TC performed many actions that took out installation requirements. Also, see my negative comments on Proposal 70E-146 Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative:

HAMER, P.: The committee should not accept the new section “(2) Outdoors,” because the first sentence is redundant and is already addressed in the first statement “Employees shall be provided with GFCI protection where required by applicable state, federal or local codes and standards.” Also the second sentence in “(2) Outdoors” now sets up conflicting requirements with NEC 590.6(B). This section should be revised to read: “(C) GFCI Protection. Employees shall be provided with GFCI protection where required by applicable state, federal or local codes and standards. Listed cord sets or devices incorporating listed ground-fault circuit-interrupter protection for personnel, identified for portable use, shall be permitted. GFCI protection devices shall be tested per manufacturer’s instructions.” TIEDE, T.: There may be some structural issues with this proposal as the requirements in item (2) attempt to outline the code requirements discussed in the proposed main section 110.9(C). _______________________________________________________________ 70E-148 Log #275 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (110.9(A)(4)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Louis A. Barrios, Shell / Rep. API (American Petroleum Institute) Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Delete the “the” before “testing” and the “for” before “the absence” as shown below. (4) Operation Verification. When test instruments are used for the testing for the absence of voltage on conductors or circuit parts operating at 50 volts or more, the operation of the test instrument shall be verified before and after an absence of voltage test is performed. Substantiation: The proposed change is editorial to improve readability of the Standard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-149 Log #259 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (110.9(B)(3)d. (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: David A. Pace, Olin Corporation Recommendation: Add new text to read as follows: (d) Work Done in Conductive or Wet Locations. While it is recognized that some conditions may require that work involving electrically operated tools and equipment be done in conductive or wet locations, every effort shall be made to avoid using this equipment in conductive or wet locations. Where an alternative is available to use tools and equipment powered from a power source such as batteries, air, hydraulics, etc. that does not pose an electrical hazard, and that will perform the task to be done, these alternative tools or equipment shall be used to remove the potential for injury from electrical hazards. Re-name the existing 110.9(B)(3)(d) to 110.9(B)(3)(e). Substantiation: Even if the equipment is suitable for use in conductive or wet locations, the individuals using it are trained and use proper safe work practices, and they use personal protective equipment, the use of electrically operated tools and equipment in these locations creates a significantly higher risk for injury to employees as compared to using this equipment in non-conductive or dry locations. A lot of alternatives are available today and the text should require them where they can be used. Use of this equipment in conductive or wet locations should be a last resort after all other tools and equipment have been ruled out as not being suitable for the task to be done. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Add a new Informational Note to 110.9(B)(3)(d) Conductive Work Locations, to read: Informational Note: The hazard/risk evaluation procedure could also include identifying when the use of portable tools and equipment powered by sources other than 120 volts ac such as batteries, air, hydraulics, etc. should be used to minimize the potential for injury from electrical hazards for tasks performed in conductive or wet locations. Committee Statement: The committee concludes that the concept covered in the recommendation has merit and is better conveyed as an informational note and not a mandatory requirement. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: The appropriate committee action should be reject as the requirements that currently exist in 110.9(B)(3)(D) addresses the submitters concern adequately. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We are additionally concerned about voltages other than 120 V. We recommended that the committee action be revised as one of the following: Informational Note: The hazard/risk evaluation procedure could also include identifying when the use of portable tools and equipment powered by sources other than 120 volts ac and over such as batteries, air, hydraulics, etc. should be used to minimize the potential for injury from electrical hazards for tasks performed in conductive or wet locations. Informational Note: The hazard/risk evaluation procedure could also include identifying when the use of portable tools and equipment powered by sources 50 volts ac and over such as batteries, air, hydraulics, etc. should be used to minimize the potential for injury from electrical hazards for tasks performed in conductive or wet locations. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-150 Log #270 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (110.10 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Michael A. Anthony, University of Michigan / Rep. APPA.ORG - Association of Education Facility Executives Recommendation: New text to read as follows: 110.10 (NEW) Reduction of Incident Energy. It shall be permitted to reduce incident energy by modifying an existing power delivery system with a combination of product application and system design methods that can include, but not be limited, by the following: a) reduction of transformer kVA b) addition of impedance elements c) change out of protective devices Substantiation: This proposal conforms to the explicit purpose and scope of NFPA 70E as written in Sections 90.1 and 90.2 and is an extension of installation safety concepts that appear in NFPA 70, the National Electrical Code. Substantiation for each of the recommended methods is as follows: a. Reduction of transformer kVA. Over several NEC update cycles, knowledgeable industries such as the chemical and educational facilities industry, have observed that the branch circuit, feeder and service sizing rules of NEC Chapter 2 result in significant oversizing of service transformers. Although these proposals have been rejected for lack of technical substantiation that was satisfactory to the committees, our industry stands behind its “anecdotal” evidence that a significant number of service transformers, under a variety of ownership arrangements, are significantly oversized. Under engineering supervision these service transformers could be changed out -- not only for energy conservation reasons, but to reduce hazard risk category at the point where the system requires live work. It is understood that transformer changeout, where possible and economically feasible, may present a set of new problems that would have to be evaluated against the benefits of incident energy reduction (e.g. – motor starting, arc flash increases because the protective device takes excessive time to operate, etc). b. Addition of impedance elements. The addition of impedance elements (resistors to accomplish low resistance grounding (at medium voltage) and high resistance grounding (at low voltage) will increase electrician safety by reducing ground fault current. c. Changeout of protective devices. Depending upon the fault current minimum and maximums -- owing to the dynamic nature of fault impedances, the reduction of clearing times and reduction of hazard risk category could be accomplished with carefully selected fuses and/or breakers. All of the foregoing cost money and it is highly likely that this approach would not be cost effective in most cases. But NFPA technical committees attempt to be agnostic about cost in service of safety. This proposal is crafted in non-mandatory language intended to alert the management of employee workplaces that in a limited number of situations, a reduction in energy loss and an increase in electrician safety may be simultaneously accomplished. Inclusion of this proposal into the 2012 version of NFPA 70E may provide a brighter path for designing safer systems than the National Electrical Code. Portions of this proposal were derived from an October 2009 IEEE Industry Applications Society paper authored by David D. Shipp & David M. Wood, “Innovative Techniques for Mitigating Arc Flash Exposure” – as presented at the IEEE IAS conference in Houston, 110/09 (IEEE #IAS16P3) Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The concept introduced by the recommendation is not prohibited by the standard. The recommendation may be more suitable for inclusion in Annex O. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We agree that the concepts in this recommendation are not prohibited. However, we support safe design and are not convinced that recommendations such as these must be placed in an Annex.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-151 Log #466 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (110.10 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Danny Liggett, DuPont Recommendation: Add new section 110.10 to read as follows: 110.10 Underground Electrical Lines and Equipment. Before excavation starts and where there exists reasonable possibility of contacting electrical or utility lines or equipment, the local area supervision shall take the necessary steps to contact the appropriate owners or authorities to identify and mark the location of the electrical lines or equipment. A hazard analysis will be performed to identify the appropriate safe work practices shall be utilized during the excavation. Substantiation: The only place in 70E that excavations are mentioned is in Annex N. There are hazards inherent to performing excavations in the vicinity of underground electrical lines and equipment. There should be requirements for identifying the location of underground electrical lines and equipment and, for performing a hazard analysis to determine if any safe work practices need to be utilized while performing the excavation. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the recommendation to read: 110.10 Underground Electrical Lines and Equipment. Before excavation starts and where there exists reasonable possibility of contacting electrical or utility lines or equipment, the local area supervision employer shall take the necessary steps to contact the appropriate owners or authorities to identify and mark the location of the electrical lines or equipment. A hazard analysis will shall be performed to identify the appropriate safe work practices that shall be utilized during the excavation. Committee Statement: The revision to the recommendation enhances clarity and implements terminology used within this standard. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-152 Log #396 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (120.2(A)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas E. Neal, Neal Associates Ltd. Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 120.2(A) General. All electrical circuit conductors and circuit parts shall be considered energized until the source(s) of energy is (are) removed and the conductors and circuit parts tested to ensure that they do not have a potential different from that of the earth, at which time they shall be considered deenergized. All electrical conductors and circuit parts shall not be considered to be in an electrically safe work condition until all of the applicable requirements of Article 120 have been met. Substantiation: Per the definition of deenergized, a conductor or circuit part is not deenergized until it is free from a potential difference from that of the earth: “Deenergized. Free from any electrical connection to a source of potential difference and from electrical charge; not having a potential different from that of the earth.” In order to ensure that a conductor or circuit part is not deenergized until it is free a potential difference from that of the earth it needs to be tested. This is not the same as creating an electrically safe work condition, where the “electrical conductor or circuit part has been disconnected from energized parts, locked/tagged in accordance with established standards, tested to ensure the absence of voltage, and grounded if determined necessary. Adding the phrase requiring testing to the statement that uses the term “deenergized” makes the statement consistent with the definition of the term and provides clarity. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The proposed requirement does not add clarity and may actually introduce confusion between “deenergized” and “electrically safe work condition”. By definition, a “de-energized” state is established when electrical connections to a source of potential difference are removed. An electrically safe work condition is established when the deenergized state of electrical conductors or circuit parts is verified with test equipment and the other requirements of Article 120 are met. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: GRAY, B.: The submitter has provided a technically sound argument and provides clarity. Committee action should be to accept this proposal. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-153 Log #91 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (120.2(B)(2)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas Doyle, Industrial Safety Integration Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: All persons who could be exposed to electrical hazards shall be trained to understand the potential hazards associated with the work, established procedure(s) intended to control the energy, and their responsibility in executing the procedure. Substantiation: A clear understanding of electrical hazards is critical to ensuring the consistent use of the appropriate PPE. There could also be multiple procedures to be followed. The procedures are intended to aid in the control of risk. They can’t by themselves control the energy. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Section 120.2(B)(2) applies specifically to training associated with the principles of Lockout/Tagout execution. The proposed requirement for persons to be trained to “understand the potential hazards associated with the work”, is already required and more appropriately covered in 110.6 and does not need to be repeated in 120.2(B)(2). Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-154 Log #92 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (120.2(B)(4)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas Doyle, Industrial Safety Integration Recommendation: Delete text to read as follows: All sources of electrical energy shall be controlled in such a way as to minimize employee exposure to electrical hazards. Substantiation: This item provides no useful guidance. Exposure is a function of the task to be performed. The control of electrical energy is a function of the design of the electrical system. If the committee chooses to keep it the words “minimize” and “control” will need to be explained. Assuming that the frequency of exposure to electrical hazards is as infrequent as possible, does “minimize” in this context refer to the occurrence of arc flash? The standard should also describe how to “minimize” in order for this section to be useful to the reader. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 3 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: This section has meaning in the context of the title, “(B) Principles of Lockout/Tagout Execution” and should not be deleted. HICKMAN, P.: We are concerned that removing this provision offers a lesser degree of safety. In addition, we do not necessarily agree with all of the substantiation of the submitter. PACE, D.: This proposal should have been Rejected. Article 120 establishes the requirements for Lockout/Tagout of electrical systems (Establishing an Electrically Safe Work Condition). OSHA 1910.147 uses the phrase “Control of Hazardous Energy”. Electricity is a hazardous energy. As part of the Lockout/Tagout for electricity is the need to “control” the electrical energy. Section 120.2(B) contains the Principles for electrical Lockout/Tagout. A necessary element of Lockout/Tagout is to control the energy. We do this by isolating the energy from the employees. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-155 Log #276 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (120.2(C)(2)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Louis A. Barrios, Shell / Rep. API (American Petroleum Institute) Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: (2) Form of Control. Three Two forms of hazardous electrical energy control shall be permitted: individual employee control, simple lockout/tagout, and complex lockout/tagout. [See 120.2(D).] For the individual employee control and the simple lockout/tagout, the qualified person shall be in charge. For the complex lockout/tagout, the person in charge shall have overall responsibility. FPN: For an example of a lockout/tagout procedure, see Annex G. Substantiation: The removal of “individual employee control” as an exception to requiring the use of lockout/tagout to properly isolate electrical equipment harmonizes with OSHA 1910.333(b)(2). OSHA 1910 Subpart S currently does not recognize “individual employee control” as a safe alternative to applying lockout/tagout to electrical equipment that has been de-energized. This is part I of companion proposals that deletes 120.2(D)(1) and modifies the first sentence in 120.2(D)(2). This proposed change is submitted on behalf of the NFPA 70E Article 120 Task Group consisting of: Louis Barrios, Terry Tiede, Tom Norwood, and Lee Hale.

Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: CARPENTER, T.: See my negative comment on Proposal 70E-158. HITTEL, M.: See my negative comment associated with Proposal 70E-157. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-156 Log #467 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (120.2(C)(3)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Danny Liggett, DuPont Recommendation: Revise 120.2(C)(3) to read as follows: (3) Audit Procedures. An audit shall be conducted at least annually by a qualified person and shall cover at least one lockout/tagout in progress and the procedure details. The audit shall be designed to correct deficiencies in the established electrical lockout/tagout procedure or in employee understanding. Substantiation: This revision is to clarify that the audit is intended to correct deficiencies in the lockout tagout procedure that has been established by the employer. It also aligns this section with other sections that refer to the “established” procedure. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-157 Log #33 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (120.2(D)(1)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Charles Helmick, AVO Training Institute, Inc. Recommendation: (1) Individual qualified employee control procedure. Move this whole section to article 130 and count it as energized work. Substantiation: OSHA 29 CFR 1910.333.(b) states that “Conductors and parts of electric equipment that have been deeneregized but have not been locked out or tagged in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section shall be treated as energized parts.” If electrical equipment has no lock, tag or verifiable air gap, it must be counted as energized. Energized work requires PPE with a standard operating procedure or an energized work permit. The problem is that this section as stated seems to be in clear violation of OSHA regulations and it is in violation of most industry safe work practices. I teach electrical safety and 70E and I have to apologize every time I go over this. It takes away from 70E’s credibility. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: See committee action on Proposal 70E-158, which deletes this section instead of relocating to Article 130. The action on Proposal 70E-158 meets the intent of this recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: The action should be reject. This is a common industry practice and is consistent with ANSI Z244.1 part 5.4.3.1 that reads: “Exclusive Personal Control. The user shall provide a means of exclusive personal control to prevent exposure to the hazardous energy. Examples include...proximity to control devices.” The purpose of the lock is to grant “exclusive control” to the person who requires energy control. Under the conditions of this section, the person has that control. It would be quite different if the isolating device was located remotely from the work area. When a service person has exclusive control of the energy isolation device, it (the isolating device) is effectively rendered inoperative by the workers presence in the panel. Just because OSHA does not specifically identify this practice, does not mean that OSHA specifically disallows this practice. In addition, the submitter has not provided substantiation that this allowance has caused even ONE injury. Further, although not in the context of this provision, the term “exclusive control” IS used OSHA 1910.147(c)(4)(i). Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: BOWMAN, W.: I agree with committee actions; however, OSHA lockout/taggout refers to visible air gap and NFPA 70E makes no reference to visible air gap as a recognized lockout/taggout method for making an electrically safe work condition.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-158 Log #277 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (120.2(D)(1)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Louis A. Barrios, Shell / Rep. API (American Petroleum Institute) Recommendation: Delete text to read as follows: Delete 120.2(D)(1) and renumber remaining sections as necessary. (D) Hazardous Electrical Energy Control Procedure. (1) Individual Qualified Employee Control Procedure. The individual qualified employee control procedure shall be permitted when equipment with exposed conductors and circuit parts is deenergized for minor maintenance, servicing, adjusting, cleaning, inspection, operating conditions, and the like. The work shall be permitted to be performed without the placement of lockout/tagout devices on the disconnecting means, provided the disconnecting means is adjacent to the conductor, circuit parts, and equipment on which the work is performed, the disconnecting means is clearly visible to the individual qualified employee involved in the work, and the work does not extend beyond one shift. Substantiation: The removal of “individual employee control” as an exception to requiring the use of lockout/tagout to properly isolate electrical equipment harmonizes with OSHA 1910.333(b)(2). OSHA 1910 Subpart S currently does not recognize “individual employee control” as a safe alternative to applying lockout/tagout to electrical equipment that has been de-energized. This is part 2 of companion proposals that also modified 120.2(C)(2) and the first sentence in 120.2(D)(2). This proposed change is submitted on behalf of the NFPA 70E Article 120 Task Group consisting of: Louis Barrios, Terry Tiede, Tom Norwood, and Lee Hale. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: CARPENTER, T.: The committee action should have been to reject. No substantiation was given that the existing “Individual Employee Control” allowance is unsafe or has caused any injury. The only substantiation is that it is not recognized by OSHA. It is the job of this committee to determine what we believe to be electrical safety requirements, not to re-quote OSHA requirements. If we are going to mimic OSHA, why not just delete the existing contents of the standard and replace with one line stating, “Follow OSHA electrical safety requirements.”. If we don’t agree with OSHA, we should say so and use this as justification in a request to get the OSHA requirements changed. HITTEL, M.: See my negative comment associated with Proposal 70E-157. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: WIDUP, R.: While the previous wording in 120.2(D)(2) has been in the 70E for quite some time, the proposal provides harmonization with existing OSHA standards and avoids conflicting language between OSHA and the 70E. WILMER, K.: Committee action was correct. The section on Individual Qualified Employee Control Procedure should be deleted. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-159 Log #278 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (120.2(D)(2)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Louis A. Barrios, Shell / Rep. API (American Petroleum Institute) Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Delete first sentence of 120.2(D)(2). (2) Simple Lockout/Tagout Procedure. All lockout/ tagout procedures that are not under individual qualified employee control according to 120.2(D)(1) or complex lockout/tagout according to 120.2(D)(3) shall be considered to be simple lockout/tagout procedures. All lockout/tagout procedures that involve only a qualified person(s) deenergizing one set of conductors or circuit part source for the sole purpose of performing work within the Limited Approach Boundary electrical equipment shall be considered to be a simple lockout/tagout. Simple lockout/tagout plans shall not be required to be written for each application. Each worker shall be responsible for his or her own lockout/tagout. Substantiation: This proposed change is editorial in nature intended to simplify the standard. The first sentence is unnecessary. Section 120.2(C)(2) already states that there are three forms of hazardous electrical energy control – 1) “individual qualified employee control”, 2) “simple lockout/tagout”, and 3) “complex lockout/tagout”. One could reasonably conclude that lockout/tagout procedures that don’t fall under “individual qualified employee control” or “complex lockout/tagout” would be “simple lockout/tagout” without having to state this in 120.2(D)(2). As shown above, the first sentence of 120.2(D)(2) will define what “simple lockout/tagout” is instead of what it is not. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A.

Explanation of Negative: CARPENTER, T.: See my negative comment on Proposal 70E-158. HITTEL, M.: See my negative comment associated with Proposal 70E-157. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-160 Log #279 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (120.2(D)(2)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Louis A. Barrios, Shell / Rep. API (American Petroleum Institute) Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Modify second sentence to read as follows: “All lockout/tagout procedures that involve only a qualified person(s) deenergizing one set of conductors or circuit part source for the sole purpose of safeguarding employees from exposure to electrical hazards performing work within the Limited Approach Boundary electrical equipment shall be considered to be a simple lockout/tagout.” Substantiation: During the 2009 revision cycle, the NFPA 70E Words/Phrases task group was chartered to clean up the use of the terms “live”, “live parts”, “energized”, “exposed” and phrases such as “working on or near”. In most locations the phrase “work on or near” was replaced with the phrase “work within the Limited Approach Boundary”. In most cases, this change was appropriate. However, in the second sentence of 120.2(D)(2), the change left us with the phrase “performing work within the Limited Approach Boundary electrical equipment…” Editorially, “electrical equipment” may be removed and the change makes sense. However, by definition, work within the Limited Approach Boundary means exposure to exposed and energized electrical conductors and circuit parts. If the equipment is de-energized, locked and tagged for simple lockout/tagout, then the work is no longer working within the Limited Approach Boundary. Therefore, in this case, a simple replacement of the phrase “work on or near” with “work within the Limited Approach Boundary” was not appropriate. The proposed change removes the phrase “performing work within the Limited Approach Boundary electrical equipment” and replaces it with “safe guarding employees from exposure to electrical hazards”. The phrase “safeguarding employees from exposure to electrical hazards” was chosen instead in order to be consistent with the scope and purpose of this article stated in 120.2. This proposed change is submitted on behalf of the NFPA 70E Article 120 Task Group consisting of: Louis Barrios, Terry Tiede, Tom Norwood, and Lee Hale. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-161 Log #280 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (120.2(D)(2)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Louis A. Barrios, Shell / Rep. API (American Petroleum Institute) Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Modify first sentence in 120.2(D)(2) to read as follows. (21) Simple Lockout/Tagout Procedure. All lockout/ tagout procedures that are not under individual qualified employee control according to 120.2(D)(1) or complex lockout/tagout according to 120.2(D)(32) shall be considered to be simple lockout/tagout procedures. Substantiation: The removal of “individual employee control” as an exception to requiring the use of lockout/tagout to properly isolate electrical equipment harmonizes with OSHA 1910.333(b)(2). OSHA 1910 Subpart S currently does not recognize “individual employee control” as a safe alternative to applying lockout/tagout to electrical equipment that has been de-energized. This is part 3 of companion proposals that also modified 120.2(C)(2) and deleted 120.2(D)(1). This proposed change is submitted on behalf of the NFPA 70E Article 120 Task Group consisting of: Louis Barrios, Terry Tiede, Tom Norwood, and Lee Hale. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: See committee action on Proposal 70E-159, which removes the first sentence of 120.2(D)(2) and meets the intent of this recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: CARPENTER, T.: See my negative comment on Proposal 70E-158. HITTEL, M.: I do not agree with the removal of the individual qualified employee control provisions. See my negative comments associated with Proposal 70E-157. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-162 Log #186 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part (120.2(D)(3)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James Durnan, Brookhaven National Laboratory Recommendation: Revise text as follows: (3) Complex Lockout/Tagout Procedure. (a) A complex lockout/tagout plan shall be permitted where one or more of the following exist: (1) Multiple energy sources (2) Multiple crews (3) Multiple crafts (4) Multiple locations (5) Multiple employers (6) Different disconnecting means (7) Particular sequences (8) A job or task that continues for more than one work period (b) All complex lockout/tagout procedures shall require a written plan of execution that identifies the person in charge. (c) The complex lockout/tagout procedure shall vest primary responsibility in an authorized qualified employee for a set number of employees working under the protection of a group lockout or tagout device (such as an operation lock). The person in charge shall be held accountable for safe execution of the complex lockout/tagout. (d) Each authorized qualified employee shall affix a personal lockout or tagout device to the group lockout device, group lockbox, or comparable mechanism when he or she begins work, and shall remove those devices when he or she stops working on the machine or equipment being serviced or maintained. (e) The complex lockout/tagout procedure shall address all the concerns of employees who might be exposed. All complex lockout/tagout plans shall identify the method to account for all persons who might be exposed to electrical hazards in the course of the lockout/tagout Substantiation: The problem is the word Authorized is undefined in NFPA 70E and leaves the interpretation to the reader. The solution is changing “authorized” to “qualified” and that will require that the person performing the complex lockout/tagout has the skills and knowledge related to the construction and operation of the electrical equipment and installations and has received safety training to recognize and avoid the hazards involved. This change will also verify that persons attaching their locks are trained in the requirements of OSHA 1910.147(f)(3) Group lockout/tagout which defines authorized employee. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle in Part In 120.3(D)(3)(c) the committee accepts the first revision of adding the term “qualified” and also replaces “employee” with “person”. In addition revise “an” to “a” prior to qualified. In 120.3(D)(3)(d) the committee rejects the second recommendation to replace “authorized” with “qualified”. Committee Statement: The committee rejects the recommendation for 120.2(D)(3)(d) because it is not necessary for a person to be “qualified” in order to apply a lock to an electrical disconnecting means. In 120.2(D)(3)(c) the committee has revised “employee” to “person” to use the defined term (qualified person) and corrected grammar by changing “an” to “a”. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: CARPENTER, T.: The committee action should have been to reject. The primary responsibility for a complex lockout/tagout may lie with a supervisor/manager level employee, who may not be “qualified”. HITTEL, M.: The term “authorized” is widely used in the application of the LOTO standards. In OSHA 1910.147(b) it is defined as “Authorized employee. A person who locks out or tags out machines or equipment in order to perform servicing or maintenance on that machine or equipment. An affected employee becomes an authorized employee when that employee’s duties include performing servicing or maintenance covered under this section.” In addition, the TC used an undefined term (electrical lockout) in the committee statement as was agreed to at the TC meeting (which does not appear in this ballot). Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: DROBNICK, D.: I agree with the Committee’s action to include the words Qualified Person however I believe the word authorized should have been retained. Not all Qualified Persons are authorized by the employer to be the designated coordinator for the purpose of performing Complex (Group) Lockout. HAMER, P.: The following definitions (per the OSHA definitions) may need to be added within this Article to make the intent clear. Affected employee. An employee whose job requires him/her to operate or use a machine or equipment on which servicing or maintenance is being performed under lockout or tagout, or whose job requires him/her to work in an area in which such servicing or maintenance is being performed. Authorized employee. A person who locks out or tags out machines or

equipment in order to perform servicing or maintenance on that machine or equipment. An affected employee becomes an authorized employee when that employee’s duties include performing servicing or maintenance covered under this section. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-163 Log #133 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (120.2(D)(3)a.) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James Durnan, Brookhaven National Laboratory Recommendation: Add text to read as follows: (a) A complex lockout/tagout plan shall be permitted when one or more of the following exist: (1) Multiple energy sources (2) Multiple crews (3) Multiple crafts (4) Multiple locations (5) Multiple employers (6) Different disconnecting means (7) Particular sequences (8) A job or task that continues for more than one work period, that is, new workers Substantiation: One work period is undefined, i.e.. one shift? one 24 hour day? Or until the assigned work task is completed? The common interpretation of one work period is a workers shift. Using the definition of one work period as one work shift, without this new text a Simple Lockout/Tagout procedure for repair of equipment becomes a Complex lockout/Tagout Procedure if the repair takes the worker longer than one day. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The proposed text does not add clarity to the phrase “one work period” and may introduce more confusion.Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: The action should be accept in principle with the following change “one work period where a different set of workers are involved”. My interpretation of a “work period” is the “shift” concept described in the substantiation. In this context, the proposed language is getting at the central interpretation issue. As an alternative, number (8) could be revised to read “when the lockout is to remain in place across shifts where a different set of workers are involved.” Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-164 Log #134 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (120.2(D)(3)a.) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James Durnan, Brookhaven National Laboratory Recommendation: Add text to read as follows: (a) A complex lockout/tagout plan shall be permitted when one or more of the following exist: (1) Multiple energy sources (2) Multiple crews (3) Multiple crafts (4) Multiple locations (5) Multiple employers (6 )Multiple Different disconnecting means (7) Particular sequences (8) A job or task that continues for more than one work period Substantiation: The word “different” is undefined and leaves interpretation to the reader. Changing “different” to “multiple” aligns this requirement with OSHA 1910.147(c)(4)(i) exception number (5). A single lockout device will achieve a locked-out condition. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-165 Log #254 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (120.2(D)(3)a.) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: David A. Pace, Olin Corporation Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: (a) A complex lockout/tagout plan shall be required permitted where one or more of the following conditions exist: … Substantiation: If conditions exist as described in this article, a complex lockout/tagout plan should be required, not just permitted. Very few will actually be done if the existing text remains. Following the requirements for a complex lockout/tagout is essential to employee safety when the conditions described in the article exist.

70E-45

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Complex lockout/tagout is an alternative to simple lockout/tagout when one or more of the conditions stated in 120.2(D)(3)(a) exists. Therefore, the phrase “shall be permitted” is correctly used in accordance with Section 3.1.2 of the NEC Style Manual. The existing text does not relax the requirements for creating an electrically safe work condition using lockout/tagout. It permits an alternative method to placing a large number of individual locks on single or multiple disconnecting means as long as the requirements in 120.2(D)(3) are met. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: PACE, D.: This Proposal should have been Accepted. OSHA 1910.147(f)(3) has additional requirements when a lockout/tagout becomes more complex. One example of this is the requirement for what NFPA 70E calls “person in charge”. As the submitter has stated, this should be a requirement, not just permitted, where one of the condition listed in 120.2(D)(3)(a) exists. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HITTEL, M.: I do not agree that one of items listed would require a complex lockout to be used. It is currently not a required practice in OSHA 1910.147 where it states: “For more complex systems, more comprehensive procedures may need to be developed, documented, and utilized.” “group LOTO” is an OSHA term that may be referenced. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-166 Log #418 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (120.2(D)(3)f. (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Michael A. Anthony, University of Michigan / Rep. APPA.ORG - Association of Education Facility Executives Recommendation: New text to read as follows: 120.2 (D)(3)(f). Where the job or task continues for more than one work period with multiple crews, each succeeding crew shall be permitted to repeat the necessary steps in the lock-out/tagout procedure of the previous work period performed by the previous crew in order to ensure an understanding of the safety procedures in effect. Substantiation: This is a way to get more specific about what a complex lock-out/tagout procedure may involve. I am familiar with one fatality that involved the transition of work over multiple time periods with multiple crews. While complex lock-out/tagout procedures are covered in this section, the industry would benefit from more detail about what a complex LOTO procedure might look like. The assumption, of course, is that more risk is reduced by stepping back through the work of the previous crew, than risk increased by doing the same. Specific language indicating the previous three or four steps may be actually repeated to ensure seamless transition is appropriate for this discussion but I have opted to leave the number of steps to be repeated to be scaled by the requirements of the work. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommended addition does not add clarity or improve the safety of complex lockout/tagout. Requirements for lockout/tagout planning, coordination and shift change are already given in 120.2(F)(2)(h). Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-167 Log #356 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (120.2(D)(5)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Louis A. Barrios, Shell / Rep. API (American Petroleum Institute) Recommendation: Delete text to read as follows: (5) Training and Retraining. Each employer shall provide training as required to ensure employees’ understanding of the lockout/tagout procedure content and their duty in executing such procedures. Substantiation: This proposed change is editorial in nature intended to simplify the standard. The training requirements for lockout/tagout in Section 120.2(D)(5) are redundant to 120.2(B)(2). It is not necessary to repeat these requirements, therefore 120.2(D)(5) should be deleted. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HICKMAN, P.: We disagree the recommendation is editorial and that the existing text is redundant. One occurrence of the text requires training for principles and the other requires training for procedures. We recommend that the deleted text be placed into 120.2(A) as a general requirement so that

concerns of redundancy can be addressed without losing the protection afforded by the existing provisions. PACE, D.: This proposal should have been Rejected. Section 120.2(B)(2) pertains to the principles of lockout/tagout execution. Section 120.2(D)(5) provides the requirements of the Hazardous Energy Control Procedure. Removing the training requirements from Section 120.2(D)(5) could be interpreted as no longer being required in the Hazardous Energy Control Procedure. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-168 Log #468 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (120.2(D)(5)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Danny Liggett, DuPont Recommendation: Add the following sentence to the end of the 120.2(D)(5): Retraining shall be required as the established procedure is revised. Substantiation: 120.2(C)(3) requires that the established procedure is to be audited annually and any deficiencies to be addressed. As revisions are made to the procedure it is imperative that personnel who use the procedure be retrained on the revisions. Adding this sentence clarifies the need to retrain personnel after the procedure is revised. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Relocate recommended additional text to 120.2(B)(2). Committee Statement: Section 120.2(D)(5) was deleted by the committee action on Proposal 70E-167. The relocation of the proposed additional text to 120.2(B)(2) meets the intent of this recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HICKMAN, P.: See our negative statement on Proposal 70E-167. PACE, D.: This Proposal should have been Accepted as submitted. See my comments on Proposal 70E-167. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-169 Log #355 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (120.2(E)(4) Exception) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Louis A. Barrios, Shell / Rep. API (American Petroleum Institute) Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Exception to (a), (b), and (c): A “hold card tagging tool”on an overhead conductor in conjunction with a hotline tool to install the tagout device safely on a disconnect that is isolated from the worker(s). (d)A “hold card tagging tool” on an overhead conductor in conjunction with a hotline tool to install the tagout device safely on a disconnect that is isolated from the work(s) shall be permitted. Substantiation: This proposed change is editorial in nature intended to simplify the standard. The existing exception is not a complete sentence. Rewording the exception in positive language is more consistent with the NEC Style Manual. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Committee Statement: The committee notes that this revision will be 120.2(E)(4)(e). Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-170 Log #258 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (120.2(E)(7) (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: David A. Pace, Olin Corporation Recommendation: Add new text to read as follows: (7) Separation of equipment. Where possible, conductors and circuit parts that pose risk of injury to employees due to electrical hazards shall be separated from non-hazardous conductors and circuit parts by enclosures, barriers, guards, or other suitable means to positively isolate the employee from those hazards while working on non-hazardous conductors and circuit parts. FPN: An example of separation of hazardous and non-hazardous equipment would be to have non-hazardous controls circuits, IT circuits, metering or pilot devices in a separate enclosure totally isolated from hazardous circuits such as primary power feeders so that unqualified persons working on IT equipment, or qualified persons working on non-hazardous portions of the circuit could perform their duties without being exposed to electrical hazards. Substantiation: Separating hazardous and non-hazardous equipment will significantly increase the level of safety for employees, both unqualified persons that have no knowledge of the risks and for qualified persons by not being exposed to the risk. All work done by unqualified persons, and a large portion of work done by qualified persons can be made essentially risk free by

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E this separation. Considering the time spent of the qualified person’s work on this non-hazardous equipment, this represents a significant exposure reduction. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommended requirement addresses equipment installation practices and in this case is not appropriate for Chapter 1 Safety-Related Work Practices of NFPA 70E. Refer to 110.27 of NFPA 70, National Electrical Code. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: PACE, D.: This Proposal should have been Accepted in Principle. The submitted text should have been placed in Annex O as section O.2.3 Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HITTEL, M.: The part of the proposal associated with temporary barriers to guard energized conductors in the same enclosure or area where work is to be performed is useful in the context of creating an electrically safe work condition. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-171 Log #252 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part (120.2(F)(1)a.) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: David A. Pace, Olin Corporation Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: (a) Locating Sources. Up-to-date single-line drawings shall be considered a the primary reference source for such information. When If it is recognized that up-to-date drawings are not available, the employer shall: 1) be responsible for ensuring that an equally effective means of locating all sources of energy is employed to satisfy the immediate need and 2) shall create or make necessary revisions to bring the drawings up-to-date in a timely manner. Substantiation: The proposed text provides requirements for up-to-date drawings when not already available. The existing text allows drawings to be non-existent or incorrect and does not require that employers ever supply up-to-date drawings. This information is essential for employees to have in understanding where all sources of energy are. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle in Part The committee accepts the addition of the word “all” before “sources” and rejects the remainder of the proposal. Committee Statement: Embedding a requirement to maintain and update drawings in a timely manner in 120.2(F)(1)(a) is not the appropriate location from a usability standpoint. Section 205.2 under General Maintenance Requirements already includes a requirement for maintaining single line diagrams. The proposed additional wording does not add clarity to the existing requirements. The submitter did not substantiate why single-line drawings shall be considered “the” primary reference for locating source information instead of “a” primary reference. Documentation other than single-line drawings may be equally effective for locating sources. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: PACE, D.: The proposal should have been accepted in Principle. NFPA 70E should clearly state the requirements for up-to-date documentation or drawings to facilitate lockout/tagout. Lockout/tagout is needed for more than maintenance. The section should be revised as follows. (a) Locating Sources. Up-to-date single-line drawings shall be considered a primary reference source for such information. If it is recognized that up-to-date documentation or drawings are not available: (1) the employer shall be responsible for ensuring that an equally effective means of locating all sources of energy is employed to satisfy the immediate need and (2) the owner shall create or make necessary revisions to bring the documentation or drawings up-to-date in a timely manner. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-172 Log #354 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (120.2(F)(1)d.) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Louis A. Barrios, Shell / Rep. API (American Petroleum Institute) Recommendation: Delete text to read as follows: (1) Planning. The procedure shall require planning, including 120.2(F)(1)(a) through 120.2(F)(2)(n). (a) Locating Sources. Up-to-date single-line drawings shall be considered a primary reference source for such information. When up-to-date drawings are not available, the employer shall be responsible for ensuring that an equally effective means of locating sources of energy is employed.

(b) Exposed Persons. The plan shall identify persons who might be exposed to an electrical hazard and the personal protective equipment required during the execution of the job or task. (c) Person In Charge. The plan shall identify the person in charge and his or her responsibility in the lockout/tagout. (d) Individual Qualified Employee Control. Individual qualified employee control shall be in accordance with 120.2(D)(1). (de) Simple Lockout/Tagout. Simple lockout/tagout procedure shall be in accordance with 120.2(D)(2). (ef) Complex Lockout/Tagout. Complex lockout/tagout procedure shall be in accordance with 120.2(D)(3). Substantiation: The removal of “individual employee control” as an exception to requiring the use of lockout/tagout to properly isolate electrical equipment harmonizes with OSHA 1910.333(b)(2). OSHA 1910 Subpart S currently does not recognize “individual employee control” as a safe alternative to applying lockout/tagout to electrical equipment that has been de-energized. This is a companion proposal to three others that modified 120.2(C)(2), deleted 120.2(D)(1), and modified 120.2(D)(2). This proposed change is submitted on behalf of the NFPA 70E Article 120 Task Group consisting of: Louis Barrios, Terry Tiede, Tom Norwood, and Lee Hale. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: CARPENTER, T.: See my negative comment on Proposal 70E-158. HITTEL, M.: See my negative comment associated with Proposal 70E-157. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-173 Log #469 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (120.2(F)(2)f..2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Danny Liggett, DuPont Recommendation: Revise 120.2(F)(2)(f)(2) to read as follows: (2) A requirement to define the boundary of the work area electrical safe work condition Substantiation: A work area and the electrical safe work condition are two separate things. The electrical safe work condition is the “safe” area that has been created by the lockout/tagout. A large number of injuries are caused by a change in planning that will drive a person outside the electrical safe work condition. This is the boundary that should be defined. The “work area” could encompass an area larger than what has been de-energized and locked out. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee reaffirms that “work area” is the correct term to use. A qualified person working on conductors and circuit parts must first establish the area in which, and the equipment on which he/she will be working. Testing is used to verify that the established electrically safe work condition encompasses the entire work area. Not verifying the absence of voltage with test equipment in the entire work area may expose the worker to electrical hazards if errors were made in establishing an electrically safe work condition. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: PACE, D.: This proposal should have been Accepted. An Electrical Safety Work Condition is a state. But that “state” has a boundary. What is in that “state” and what is not in that “state” defines that boundary. The term “work area” is not defined in the standard and is used in many industries differently. There is not a common understanding of the term as the Committee has tried explaining in their statement. The work area could be the Electrical Control Room as defined on a work permit. What is important is determining and defining what is locked out and what is not locked out. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-174 Log #470 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (120.2(F)(2)f..3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Danny Liggett, DuPont Recommendation: Revise 120.2(F)(2)(f)(3) to read as follows: (3) A requirement to test before touching every exposed conductor or circuit part(s) within the defined boundary of the work area electrical safe work condition Substantiation: The “work area” could encompass an area larger than what was de-energized and locked out. What should be tested are conductors and circuit parts that have been de-energized, locked out and are going to be touched. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: See committee action and statement on Proposal 70E-173.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: PACE, D.: This proposal should have been Accepted. See my comment on Proposal 70E-173 Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-175 Log #170 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (120.2(F)(2)g.) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Michael J. Johnston, National Electrical Contractors Association Recommendation: Revise Section 120.2(F)(2)(g) as follows: (g) Grounding. Grounding requirements for the circuit shall be established, including whether the protective grounding equipment grounds shall be installed for the duration of the task or temporarily are established by the procedure. Grounding needs or requirements shall be permitted to be covered in other work rules and might not be part of the lockout/tagout procedure. Substantiation: The term “ground” is defined as “the earth” in Article 100. Literally this section would read...whether the earths shall be installed for the duration of the task... This revision is proposed to promote consistent use of terms throughout NFPA 70E to assist all users in understanding the meaning of rules using defined terms. The more appropriate term here would appear to be protective grounding equipment or safety grounding equipment. The term “protective grounding equipment” is used by OSHA in a few rules as in the following example: 1910.269(n)(4) “Protective grounding equipment.” 1910.269(n)(4)(i) Protective grounding equipment shall be capable of conducting the maximum fault current that could flow at the point of grounding for the time necessary to clear the fault. This equipment shall have an ampacity greater than or equal to that of No.2 AWG copper. Note: Guidelines for protective grounding equipment are contained in American Society for Testing and Materials Standard Specifications for Temporary Grounding Systems to be used on De-Energized Electric Power Lines and Equipment, ASTM F855-1990. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the recommendation to read: (g) Grounding. Grounding requirements for the circuit shall be established, including whether the temporary protective grounding equipment grounds shall be installed for the duration of the task or temporarily are established by the procedure. Grounding needs or requirements shall be permitted to be covered in other work rules and might not be part of the lockout/tagout procedure. Committee Statement: The committee has revised the recommendation to include terminology currently used in the standard. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-176 Log #171 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (120.2(F)(2)m.) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Michael J. Johnston, National Electrical Contractors Association Recommendation: Revise Section 120.2(F)(2)(m) as follows: (m) Release for Return to Service. the procedure shall identify steps to be taken when the job or task requiring lockout/tagout is completed. Before electric circuits or equipment are reenergized, appropriate tests and visual inspections shall be conducted to verify that all tools, mechanical restraints and electrical jumpers, shorts-circuits, and ground faults have been removed, so that the circuits and equipment are in a condition to be safely energized. (Remainder unchanged). Substantiation: The term “ground” is defined as “the earth” in Article 100. The term “ground fault” is defined in Article 100 and seems more appropriate here, and the term short circuit is not defined but seems more accurate in this section. This revision is to clarify what is intended by using the correct terms in this requirement. This proposed revision provides consistency with the same wording use in a similar provisions in 110.7 of the NEC. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the proposed text from “ground faults” to “temporary protective grounding equipment”. Retain the proposed change from “shorts” to “short circuits”. Committee Statement: In this section, the term “ground” refers to “temporary protective grounding equipment” and not “ground fault”. The modification more correctly states the intent of this section and meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A.

Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: The terms used in the proposal are not the intent of this section. To make the intent clear, “Accept in Principle and in Part,” and reword the sentence to read: “Before electric circuits or equipment are reenergized, appropriate tests and visual inspections shall be conducted to verify that all tools, mechanical restraints and electrical jumpers, temporary short-circuit shunts, and safety grounds have been removed, so that the circuits and equipment are in a condition to be safely energized.” HICKMAN, P.: We additionally suggest changing the last word in “(m)” to “reenergized” rather than “energized” to be consistent with the use of the term used earlier in the paragraph. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-177 Log #66 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (120.2(O)(3)a.) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Timothy J. Convery, City of Cleveland / Rep. Local #38 IBEW Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: A complex lockout/tagout plan shall be permitted required where one or more of the following exists: Substantiation: This wording would make it clear that under the conditions listed, a complex lockout/tagout procedure is mandatory. Section 120.2(D)(2) states that plans not under individual control according to 120.2(D)(1) or complex lockout/tagout according to 120.2(D)(3) shall be considered simple lockout/tagout procedures. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Section 120.2(O)(3)(a) does not exist. The committee assumes that this is a misprint and that the submitter is referring to 120.2(D)(3)(a). See the committee action and statement on Proposal 70E-165. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: PACE, D.: This proposal should have been Accepted. See my comment on Proposal 70E-165 Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-178 Log #65 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (120.2(O)(3)c.) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Timothy J. Convery, City of Cleveland / Rep. Local #38 IBEW Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: The person in charge shall be a qualified individual who is specifically appointed with overall responsibility to ensure that all energy sources are under lockout/tagout and to account for all persons working on the job/task. The person in charge shall be held accountable for safe execution of the complex lockout/tagout. Substantiation: The person in charge has a huge responsibility and the execution of a complex lockout procedure requires someone with knowledge of safety standards and familiarity with the equipment. Without the requirement to be qualified, any employee could be given this job. That is a dangerous situation. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Section 120.2(O)(3)(c) does not exist. The committee assumes that this is a misprint and that the submitter is referring to 120.2(D)(3)(c). The submitter’s recommendation is not clear in that it states to revise the text in the section but does not address the first sentence in the section. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-179 Log #419 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (120.2(X) (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Michael A. Anthony, University of Michigan / Rep. APPA.ORG - Association of Education Facility Executives Recommendation: New text to read as follows: Start a new subsection to include methods of moving people further away from the hazard. 120.2+ Remote Operation of Equipment. The use of devices to operate equipment physically outside the flash hazard boundary shall be permitted. These devices may include, but not be limited, to the following: a) Remote power racking mechanisms b) Remote switching mechanisms

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Substantiation: This is one of a series of product solution proposals from our industry intended raise the level of debate on a number of innovations that present disruptive, but possibly cost-effective, solutions to the electrical safety problem presented by flash hazard. The use of non-mandatory language extends the platform of safety possibilities for equipment specifiers who are frequently constrained by minimum code conformity of first cost building budgets. In other words, organizations it may be easier to finance this technology if it is driven by NFPA 70E than by the National Electrical Code. Item a) refers to standard “umbilical cord” type racking mechanisms. Item b) refers to so-called “chicken switches”, which fit over a pistol grip operator, and effectively gets the electrician outside the flash protection boundary. Chicken switches, available from more than one manufacturer, run about $100-$1000,and can be used to operate several different types of control switch handles. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The concept introduced by the recommendation is not prohibited by the standard. The recommendation may be more suitable for inclusion in Annex O. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We agree that the concepts in this recommendation are not prohibited. However, we support safe design and are not convinced that recommendations such as these must be placed in an Annex. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-180 Log #175 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (120.3(A)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Michael J. Johnston, National Electrical Contractors Association Recommendation: Revise to read: 120.3 Temporary Protective Grounding Equipment. (A) Placement. Temporary protective grounding equipment grounds shall be placed at such locations and arranged in such a manner as to prevent each employee from being exposed to hazardous differences in electrical potential. Substantiation: The term “ground” is defined as “the earth” in Article 100. Literally this section would read...whether the earths shall be installed for the duration of the task... This revision is proposed to promote consistent use of terms throughout NFPA 70E to assist all users in understanding the meaning of rules using defined terms. The more appropriate term here would appear to be protective grounding equipment or safety grounding equipment. The term “protective grounding equipment” is used by OSHA in a few rules as in the following example: 1910.269(n)(4) “Protective grounding equipment.” 1910.269(n)(4)(i) Protective grounding equipment shall be capable of conducting the maximum fault current that could flow at the point of grounding for the time necessary to clear the fault. This equipment shall have an ampacity greater than or equal to that of No. 2 AWG copper. Note: Guidelines for protective grounding equipment are contained in American Society for Testing and Materials Standard Specifications for Temporary Grounding Systems to be used on De-Energized electric Power Lines and Equipment. ASTM F855-1990. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-181 Log #176 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (120.3(B)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Michael J. Johnston, National Electrical Contractors Association Recommendation: Revise Section 120.3(B) as follows: (B) Capacity. Temporary protective grounding equipment grounds shall be capable of conducting the maximum fault current that could flow at the point of grounding for the time necessary to clear the fault. Substantiation: The term “ground” is defined as “the earth” in Article 100. Literally this section would read...whether the earths shall be installed for the duration of the task...This revision is proposed to promote consistent use of terms throught NFPA 70E to assist all users in understanding the meaning of rules using defined terms. The more appropriate term here would appear to be protective grounding equipment or safety grounding equipment. The term “protective grounding equipment” is used by OSHA in a few rules as in the following example:

1910.269(n)(4) “Protective grounding equipment.” 1910.269(n)(4)(i) Protective grounding equipment shall be capable of conducting the maximum fault current that could flow at the point of grounding for the time necessary to clear the fault. This equipment shall have an ampacity greater than or equal to that of No. 2 AWG copper. Note: Guidelines for protective grounding equipment are contained in American Society for Testing and Materials Standard Specifications for Temporary Grounding Systems to be used on De-Energized electric Power Lines and Equipment. ASTM F855-1990. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-182 Log #177 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (120.3(D)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Michael J. Johnston, National Electrical Contractors Association Recommendation: Revise Section 120.3(D) as follows: (D) Impedance. Temporary protective grounds grounding equipment and connections shall have an impedance low enough to cause immediate operation of protective devices in case of accidental energizing of the electric conductors or circuit parts. Substantiation: The term “ground” is defined as “the earth” in Article 100. Literally this section would read...whether the earths shall be installed for the duration of the task...This revision is proposed to promote consistent use of terms throughout NFPA 70E to assist all users in understanding the meaning of rules using defined terms. The more appropriate term here would appear to be protective grounding equipment or safety grounding equipment. The words “and connections” were included because connections introduce impedance in the circuit. The connections also have to be made in a manner that keeps the total impedance low. The term “protective grounding equipment” is used by OSHA in a few rules as in the following example: 1910.269(n)(4) “Protective grounding equipment.” 1910.269(n)(4)(i) Protective grounding equipment shall be capable of conducting the maximum fault current that could flow at the point of grounding for the time necessary to clear the fault. This equipment shall have an ampacity greater than or equal to that of No. 2 AWG copper. Note: Guidelines for protective grounding equipment are contained in American Society for Testing and Materials Standard Specifications for Temporary Grounding Systems to be used on De-Energized electric Power Lines and Equipment. ASTM F855-1990. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-183 Log #271 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (120.4 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Michael A. Anthony, University of Michigan / Rep. APPA.ORG - Association of Education Facility Executives Recommendation: New text to read as follows: 120.4 (NEW) Maintenance Switch for Arc-Flash Incident Energy Reduction. It shall be permitted to temporarily disable selectivity to reduce incident energy with switches that over-ride time delays in breaker protection schemes. Substantiation: A significant amount of discussion about document scope and arc flash calculations has taken place in this document over the past few cycles. This is one of a series of product solution proposals intended raise the level of debate on a number of innovative solutions to the electrical safety problem and to get them written into the 2012 edition of NFPA 70E. The term “maintenance switch” is applied as a generic term for innovations originating from at least two manufacturers. The basic operation of the maintenance switch is to lower incident energy at downstream protective devices. When an electrician wants to perform maintenance, he or she operates the maintenance switch, which automatically over-rides all of a breaker’s delay functions. It would cause selected breakers to trip without any intentional delay whenever a fault is detected. This would presumably be for the period in which maintenance is being performed on energized equipment downstream from the main switchgear. Next, he or she uses its lockout features and applies a lock for normal lockout – tag-out procedures. Upon completion of the maintenance, the lock is

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E removed, the maintenance switch is manually opened, and all previous trip unit settings are again re-activated, without need for recalibration. A similar method is to reduce the instantaneous trip settings of the upstream breaker feeding this equipment during maintenance. Lowering the instantaneous pick-up setting is functionally equivalent to lowering the short time delay pick-up setting. This option can be retrofitted or purchased new in low voltage and medium voltage protective devices. Apart from the analytic study that would be recommended to accompany application of this technology, the firmware, conduit and wiring is relatively inexpensive. Because zone selective technology has been widely available for well over 20 years, and is essentially “settled science”, almost all manufacturers would be able to provide it as part of a building substation package, for example. The electrical industry needs to roll in these innovations at greater pace and a non-mandatory statement is a good start. NFPA 70E may be a better place to start since its enforcement structure may permit adoption of newer technologies faster than the enforcement structure of NFPA 70. Portions of this proposal were derived from two sources: 1. “Square D Preferred Methods for Arc-Flash Incident Energy Reduction”, Doc# 3000DB0810R6/08 2. An October 2009 IEEE Industry Applications Society paper authored by David D. Shipp & David M. Wood, “Innovative Techniques for Mitigating Arc Flash Exposure” – as presented at the IEEE IAS conference in Houston, 110/09 (IEEE #IAS16P3) These documents have been submitted as part of this proposal and are available for public review. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The concept introduced by the recommendation is not prohibited by the standard. The recommendation may be more suitable for inclusion in Annex O. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We agree that the concepts in this recommendation are not prohibited. However, we support safe design and are not convinced that recommendations such as these must be placed in an Annex. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-184 Log #477 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130, Annex D, and Annex H) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Roger F. Parry, The DuPont Company Recommendation: Revise all occurrences of “...Hazard/Risk Category...” in Article 130, Annex D and Annex H. Eliminate 130.7(C)(9) FPN No. 1 Replace all “Hazard/Risk Cateogry” entries in Table 130.7(C)(9) with calculated arc hazard values without application of risk assessment reductions. Substantiation: The application of a NFPA 70E technical committee based risk assessment to reduce PPE requirements for the tasks identified in Table 130.7(C)(9) is inappropriate - it represents only a small piece of what is required for the risk assessment process (in this case it represents the “Expert Opinion” component only). In addition, no documentation is provided that would allow a person reading the standard to understand what PPE requirements were changed (reduced) and why. Simply stating in 130.7(C)(9) FPN No. 1 that it represents the committee’s collective opinion is inadequate in addressing applicability for specific jobs/tasks identified in the table. An arc hazard risk assessment requires a substantial amount of other job/site/company specific knowledge for development, including material that is not present in Annex F (best practice methodology examples are found in a variety of other industrial application literature, e.g., see Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis, CCPS 2000). Items such as operating and maintenance philosophies, specific job/task procedures, levels of personnel training for specific job/tasks, initiating event analysis, equipment specifics including environment and layout and geometry, facility/field specific equipment failure rate data, equipment reliability and predictive failure data, consequence analysis (to include injury as well as secondary factors), escalation potential, suitability of engineered and administrative controlled mitigation scenarios, individual company risk tolerance values, generic equipment failure data, expert opinion, and a “validity evaluation of assumptions” are all crictical factors that must be considered. Essentially, only the end-user who is adequately trained in the risk assessment process and possesses the information noted above should address the risk for a specific task for the purpose of reducing or altering flash PPE requirements. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee concludes that the recommended revision to Table 130.7(C)(9) will decrease the usability of the task based table. The recommended revisions to Article 130, Annex D, and Annex H are rejected because “risk” is a component of the task based tables. The fine print note is retained as it provides necessary information for the user of the task based tables.

Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. However, I have the following comment on the committee statement for this action: Proposals 70E-184, 70E-317, 70E-336, and 70E-338 provide technical substantiation that reducing the level of protection based on (1) lower probability of occurrence or (2) the presence of covers is inappropriate. The committee continues to use nontechnical justifications, such as “risk is a component of the task based tables.” The fact that it is a component does not justify that risk should be used to lower protection. The likelihood that an arc flash will occur is not relevant to how much protection should be provided but only to whether protection should be required at all. The committee has not explained in technical terms how an employee wearing clothing insufficient for the heat energy will be protected when a low-probability event does occur. Committee experience and opinion is insufficient justification in the face of the technical substantiation from these submitters. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-185 Log #450 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Mark Rucker, Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 130.1 Justification for Work. (A) General. Energized electrical conductors and circuit parts to which an employee might be exposed shall be put into an electrically safe work condition before an employee works within the Limited Restricted Approach Boundary of those conductors or parts. Substantiation: 130.1 conflicts with 130.2(C), Approach to Exposed Energized Electrical Conductors or Circuit Parts Operating at 50 volts or More. No qualified person shall approach or take any conductive object closer to exposed energized electrical conductors or circuit parts operating at 50 volts or more than the Restricted Approach Boundary set forth in Table 130.2(C). Harmonizing 130.1 and 130.2 not only clarifies at which boundary PPE and insulated tools are required, but makes it easier for personnel to remember. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Risk is an intended portion of this categorization. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: DROBNICK, D.: I do not believe our Committee Statement clarifies why we rejected this proposal. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-186 Log #517 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.1 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Paul Dobrowsky, Holley, NY Recommendation: (1) Add the following as a new 130.1 General: 130.1 General. All requirements of this article shall apply for both an incident energy analysis or if the tables are used in lieu of an incident energy analysis (2) Change the title of existing 130.1(A) to Electrically Safe Working Conditions and renumber as 130.2. Renumber the remaining sections in Article 130. Substantiation: Presently, Article 130 does include direction as to its layout or application. Individuals commonly go right to the tables without applying the rest of the article such as providing justification for not putting equipment into an ESWC or completing the energized permit. Adding this language will help ensure the article is properly applied. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the recommendation to read: All requirements of this article shall apply whether an incident energy analysis is completed or if the tables 130.7(C)(9) and (C)(10) are utilized in lieu of an incident energy analysis in accordance with 130.3 Exception No. 2. Insert this recommendation as 130.1 (new) and renumber rest of article. Existing 130.1 becomes 130.2. The committee action on 70E-129 moves to new 130.3 as a result of this committee action. Existing 130.2 becomes 130.4 and renumber rest as necessary. Committee Statement: The recommendation was revised for clarity. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: The committee should have been to reject this proposal. The committee’s action to insert a new 130.1 with the amended text now implies that Article 130 only applies to arc flash hazards, which is not the case.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E PACE, D.: This Proposal should have been Rejected. The requirements of this Article already apply and there is no need for this new text. If the users are not reading the rest of the Article when applying the tables then they will not read this new text either. Changing the title of 130.1(A) does not improve the readability of this article and could confuse the readers. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: BOWMAN, W.: While we agree with the concept of the added text, it would be more appropriate to revise the text to read as follows: All requirements of this article shall apply whether an incident energy analysis is completed in accordance with 130.3(B)(1) or if Tables 130.7(C)(9) and (C)(10) are utilized in lieu of an incident energy analysis in accordance with 130.3 Exception No. 2. The added text clarifies the appropriate section for an incident energy analysis is 130.3(B)(1). The term “Tables” was removed to clarify that the exception No. 2 refers to both the Tables and the text in (C) (9) and (C) (10). To provide even more clarity to the 70E document, the heading of section 130.7.c.9 “Selection of Personal Protective Equipment When Required for Various Tasks” should be renumbered and moved to a new 130.8. The existing text contained within 130.7.c.9 would then be relocated under a new 130.8(A) General. The Tables would then be renumbered as 130.8(A)(1) and 130.8(A)(2). This change would clearly delineate that 130.7 should be used to determine PPE when performing an incident energy analysis and 130.8 should be used when using the HRC Tables. HICKMAN, P.: We recommend revising the text to additionally recognize shock hazard analysis. Revise the recommendation to read: All requirements of this article shall apply whether an incident energy analysis is completed or if the tables 130.7(C)(9) and (C)(10) are utilized in lieu of an incident energy analysis in accordance with 130.3 Exception No. 2. All requirements of this article shall apply whether a shock hazard analysis is completed or if the tables 130.7(C)(9) and (C)(10) are utilized. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-187 Log #54 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.1(A)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas A. Carpenter, Aerospace Testing Alliance Recommendation: Add the following to the end of the paragraph. Note, if the electrical equipment is not being worked on, simply walking through an area that has energized electrical equipment does not constitute work and Arc Flash PPE is not required to be worn. Substantiation: It was clearly discussed and agreed upon at the last NFPA-70E Technical Committee meeting that simply walking past an energized piece of equipment did not require wearing Arc Flash PPE if no work was being performed on the equipment. However, this is not clearly stated in the document and much confusion exists in the industry over this issue. Adding this verbiage will clear up the confusion. There FPN No. 1 under the definition of Arc Flash Hazard in Article 100 supports this as well. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The proposal could allow an unqualified worker to approach exposed energized parts at a dangerous distance. The proposal is unclear as to the state of the equipment (exposed or unexposed parts) and the applicability of the suggested note. The substantiation does not provide details. There is potential for the recommendation to be applied too broadly. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 3 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: CARPENTER, T.: The committee action should have been accept in principle and the proposed wording revised to, “Simply walking through an area that has energized electrical equipment does not constitute work and Arc Flash PPE is not required if the electrical equipment is not being worked on and has no exposed energized conductors or circuit parts.” This revision would have provided the necessary clarification requested by the proposer and cleared up the committee concern that was the basis for the rejection. HITTEL, M.: The submitter’s intent is that walking by equipment does not involve hazards, but recommends putting it in the article entitled “Work Involving Electrical Hazards” The submitter’s text does not belong in article 130 but rather in 110. The action should be AIP. WIDUP, R.: The intent and language of the proposal is acceptable and there is definitely a need for clarification in industry, however the placement of the proposal in 130.1(A) is not the best location. The proposed wording should be placed in 110.8(G)(1) General as a last sentence in the paragraph. This is a more appropriate location for this important wording. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-188 Log #160 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.1(A)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Bobby J. Gray, Hoydar/Buck, Inc. Recommendation: General. Energized electrical conductors and circuit parts to which an employee might be exposed shall be put into an electrically safe work condition before an employee works within the Limited Approach Boundary approaches nearer than a safe distance of those conductors or parts. Substantiation: The revision is in concert with a companion proposal to define “safe distance” and will ensure that all employees will be protected from shock and arc flash hazards whether or not they are actually “working” within the Limited Approach Boundary. This proposal also will remove the ambiguity of the word “exposed.” Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The Committee does not agree with replacing “Limited Approach Boundary” with safe distance. Introducing a new term (“safe distance”) will not add clarity to the standard. See the committee action on Proposals 70E-64 and 70E-130. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: GRAY, B.: With the action taken on 70E-190, this action should have been Accept In Principle In Part. However, 70E-190 continues to use the ambiguous term “exposed” and creates a conflict within the rule. See my negative comment on 70E-190. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-189 Log #353 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.1(A)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Louis A. Barrios, Shell / Rep. API (American Petroleum Institute) Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 130.1 Justification for Work. (A) General. Before an employee works within the Limited Approach Boundary, Eenergized electrical conductors and circuit parts to which an employee might be exposed shall be put into an electrically safe work condition. before an employee works within the Limited Approach Boundary of those conductors or parts. Substantiation: The proposed change is editorial in nature intended to improve the usability of the Standard. The modified text adds clarity and is less likely to be mis-interpreted. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-190 meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: See my negative comments associate with Proposal 70E-190. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-190 Log #471 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.1(A)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Danny Liggett, DuPont Recommendation: Revise 130.1(A) to read as follows: (A) General. Energized electrical conductors and circuit parts to which an employee might be exposed shall be put into an electrically safe work condition before an employee works within the Limited Approach Boundary or the arc flash protection boundary of those conductors or parts. Substantiation: The arc flash hazard should be a consideration in determining whether conductors and circuit parts should be de-energized. According to the U.S. Labor Department’s Bureau of Labor Statistics approximately 40% of nonfatal electrical injuries are from electrical arc flash. It is imperative that documents such as NFPA 70E place as much emphasis on electrical arc flash hazards as is placed on electrical shock. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the recommendation to read: 130.1 Justification for Work. (A) General. Energized electrical conductors and circuit parts to which an employee might be exposed shall be put into an electrically safe work condition before an employee works within the Limited Approach Boundary of those conductors or parts. if any of the conditions in 130.1(A)(1) through 130.1(A)(3) exist: (1) The employee is within the Limited Approach Boundary. (2) The employee is within the Arc Flash Boundary. (3) The employee interacts with equipment where conductors or circuit parts are not exposed, but an increased risk of arc flash hazard exists.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Informational Note: See definition of arc flash hazard in Article 100. Committee Statement: Safety requirements in the standard are improved by specifically prescribing the shock and arc flash conditions that require justification for energized work. The committee action meets the intent of the recommendation. Other changes were made to improve clarity. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 3 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: GRAY, B.: While I agree with the intent to include a requirement to justify why an arc flash hazard cannot be removed before allowing a worker to work within the arc flash boundary, the proposed language creates a conflict by using the term “exposed” to qualify when action must be taken. According to the definition of “exposed (as applied to energized conductors or circuit parts),” it applies to parts that are not suitably guarded. An Arc Flash Boundary or arc flash hazard can exist from energized parts that are suitably guarded. So, both conditions (2) and (3) could create a situation where only those parts not suitably guarded must be placed into an electrically safe work condition, but the arc flash hazard remains. I don’t think this is the intent of the Committee. HAMER, P.: This proposal should be rejected. This section is associated with shock hazards. If personnel are wearing arc-rated PPE for the applicable incident energy and is within the Arc Flash Protection Boundary, there is no reason for the parts to be put in an electrically safe work condition. Adding a requirement to have an Energized Electrical Work Permit for all work within the Arc Flash Protection Boundary will actually dilute the effort to address shock hazards and prevent shock injuries and electrocutions. See my comment on Proposal 70E-133. HITTEL, M.: The committee action should not include “Employee is within the Arc Flash Boundary” without some other conditions. At minimum, the requirement should say “...within the AFB of exposed conductors.” In any event, it may not be necessary to obtain a permit for observation or infrared inspections (that happen to place the worker inside of the Arc Flash Boundary that may be several feet from the conductors) where the task does not involve interacting with the equipment as is referred to in #3. When doing a risk assessment, those factors specific to the task need to be evaluated to determine what is appropriate. The proposal expands the permitting requirements to levels that are disproportionate to the benefits gained. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-191 Log #93 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.1(A)(1)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas Doyle, Industrial Safety Integration Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: (1) Greater Hazard. Energized work shall be permitted where the employer can demonstrate that deenergizing introduces additional hazards or increased risk hazards. Substantiation: What is “increased hazards?” Is this referring to the number of hazards or the severity of each hazard? Working on energized parts does not typically result in increased “hazards.” Working on energized parts does typically increase the risk by increasing the probability of harm. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The existing language aligns with consistent use of the term throughout the document. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: The committee action should have been to Accept. The term “risk” is correct as proposed by the submitter. HITTEL, M.: The appropriate action should be accept. The proposer is brining up a valid issue with the appropriate use of terminology. The committee statement did not refute the claim that the standard uses this term inappropriately. As stated, the TC is saying that the term is consistently used incorrectly. The committee statement does not address the substantiation. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-192 Log #116 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.1(A)(2), FPN (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: E. W. Buss, Mashpee, MA Recommendation: Add a FPN as follows: See Annex J--Energized Electrical Work Permit, Part III Approvals, for examples of those who should approve in the decision to use “infeasibility” as a reason to justify energized work. Substantiation: No substantiation provided with this proposal Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The proposal does not meet 4.3.3 (d) of the NFPA Regulations Governing Committee Projects. No substantiation was provided to support the recommendation.

Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-193 Log #18 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (130.1(A)(3)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Charles Mecham, General Physics Corp. Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: (3) Less Than 50 Volts. Energized electrical conductors and circuit parts that operate at less than 50 volts to ground shall not be required to be deenergized where the capacity of the source and any overcurrent protection between the energy source and the worker are considered and it is determined that there will be no increased exposure to electrical burns or to explosion due to electric arcs. Substantiation: Other locations in 70E-2009, for example, section 110.6(D)(1)(b), use the term “50 volts or more”, with no reference “to ground”; and, in fact, the other references are correct. Adding the words “to ground” has caused some confusion with our engineering staff. The proposed correction should bring NFPA 70E into consistent use of the term “50 volts”. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Committee Statement: In addition to accepting the recommendation, the committee directs staff to make this correction in Annex E (2.2) and Annex F (Figure F1 top). Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: The proposal should have been “Accepted in Principle.” A voltage 50 volts or more - either “conductor-to-conductor“ or “conductor to ground” - could present a shock hazard. Revise the first part of the sentence to read: “Energized electrical conductors and circuit parts that operate at less than 50 volts to ground or less than 50 volts conductor-to-conductor shall not be required to be deenergized…” HICKMAN, P.: We do not believe that this recommendation is editorial in nature and that it was adequately substantiated. 50 volts to ground is much different than 50 volts phase to phase. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-194 Log #94 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.1(A)(3), FPN 1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas Doyle, Industrial Safety Integration Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: FPN No. 1: Examples of increased or situations where additional hazards could be created or increased risk could be realized include, but are not limited to, interruption of life support equipment, deactivation of emergency alarm systems, and shutdown of hazardous location ventilation equipment. Substantiation: What is “increased hazards?” Is this referring to the number of hazards or the severity of each hazard? The examples are situations that need to be assessed. Working on energized parts does not typically result in increased “hazard.” Working on energized parts does typically increase the risk by increasing the probability of harm. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The existing language aligns with consistent use of the term throughout the document. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: The proposal should be accepted. HITTEL, M.: The appropriate action should be accept. The proposer is bringing up a valid issue with the appropriate use of terminology. The committee statement did not refute the claim that the standard uses this term inappropriately. As stated, the TC is saying that the term is consistently used incorrectly. The committee statement does not address the substantiation. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-195 Log #41 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (130.1(A)(3), FPN 3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Palmer L. Hickman, NJATC Recommendation: Revise text as follows: Relocate 130.1 FPN No. 3 as a FPN No. 3 to 130.3 FPN No. 3: The occurrence of arcing fault inside an enclosure produces a variety of physical phenomena very different from a bolted fault. For example, the arc energy resulting from an arc developed in the air will cause a sudden pressure increase and localized overheating. Equipment and design practices

70E-52

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E are available to minimize the energy levels and the number of at-risk procedures that require an employee to be exposed to high level energy sources. Proved designs such as arc-resistant switchgear, remote racking (insertion or removal), remote opening and closing of switching devices, high-resistance grounding of low voltage and 5 kV (nominal) systems, current limitation, and specification of covered bus within equipment are techniques available to reduce the hazard of the system. FPN No. 3: The occurrence of arcing fault inside an enclosure produces a variety of physical phenomena very different from a bolted fault. For example, the arc energy resulting from an arc developed in the air will cause a sudden pressure increase and localized overheating. Equipment and design practices are available to minimize the energy levels and the number of at-risk procedures that require an employee to be exposed to high level energy sources. Proven designs such as arc-resistant switchgear, remote racking (insertion or removal), remote opening and closing of switching devices, high-resistance grounding of low voltage and 5 kV (nominal) systems, current limitation, and specification of covered bus within equipment are techniques available to reduce the hazard of the system. Substantiation: The FPN No. 3 to 130.1 contains important information and is well suited as information in a FPN. However, the information contained in that FPN does not seem to help justify when energized work is justified (unfeasible or a greater hazard to deenergize). The important information in the FPN seems better suited as a FPN to 130.3 (arc flash hazard analysis) or 110.7(F) (determining the risk associated with a hazard). Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-196 Log #194 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (130.1(A)(3), FPN 3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Daleep C. Mohla, DCM Electrical Consulting Services, Inc. Recommendation: Delete existing FPN No. 3. FPN No. 3: The occurrence of arcing fault inside an enclosure produces a variety of physical phenomena very different from a bolted fault. For example, the arc energy resulting from an arc developed in air will cause a sudden pressure increase and localized overheating. Equipment and design practices are available to minimize the energy levels and the number of at risk procedures that require an employee to be exposed to high level energy sources. Proven designs such as are resistant switchgear, remote racking (insertion or removal), remote opening and closing of switching devices, high resistance grounding of l ow voltage and 5 kV (nominal) systems, current limitation, and specification of covered bus within equipment are techniques available to reduce the hazard of the system. Substantiation: FPN No. 3 should be relocated to the Article 100 definition of Arc Flash Hazard as this FPN clarifies the definition. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Committee Statement: The committee does not agree with the substantiation that it should be relocated to Article 100. See committee action on Proposal 70E-195. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-197 Log #53 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.1(A)(4)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas A. Carpenter, Aerospace Testing Alliance Recommendation: Add a new sub-section to the end of the existing section: (4) Same or less Hazard. Energized work shall be permitted when the work to be performed creates the same or less hazard as the act of testing to see if the circuit is de-energized (when it is not). Substantiation: Testing of a circuit to see if it is de-energized carries risk as the circuit may not still be energized – thus the reason for testing it. Some work carries no more risk than this so it should be allowed by the standard. Examples of this are connecting test equipment, i.e. wattmeter, or simply opening a door to perform infrared thermography. With the existing standard wording, an argument could be made that a circuit must be de-energized just to test the voltage. That is (1) de-energize the circuit, (2) connect the voltmeter, (3) re-energize the circuit, (4) verify the voltage, (5) de-energize the circuit, (6) disconnect the voltmeter, and (7) re-energize the circuit. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The submitter has not provided adequate substantiation. The suggested text lacks clarity.

Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-198 Log #444 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.1(B)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Steven J. Abbott, Stark Safety Consultants Recommendation: New and revised text as follows: 130.1(B) Energized Electrical Work Permit Justification. (1) Where Required. When working on energized electrical conductors or circuit parts that are not placed in an electrically safe work condition(i.e., for the reasons of increased or additional hazards or infeasability per 130.1), work to be performed shall be considered energized electrical work and shall be performed by written Permit Justification only. (2) Elements of Work Permit Justification. The energized electrical work Permit Justification shall include, but not be limited to, the following items: (1) A description of the circuit and equipment to be worked on and their location. (2) Justification for why the work must be performed in an energized condition (130.1). (3) A description of the safe work practices to be employed [110.8(B)]. (4) Results of the shock hazard analysis [110.8(B)(1)(a)]. (5) Determination of shock protection boundaries [130.2(B) and Table 130.2(C)]. (6) Results of the arc flash hazard analysis (130.3). (7) The arc flash protection boundary [130.3(A)]. (8) The necessary personal protective equipment to safely perform the assigned task [130.3(B), 130.7(C)(9), and Table 130.7(C)(9)]. (9) Means employed to restrict the access of unqualified persons from the work area [110.8(A)(2)]. (10)Evidence of completion of a job briefing, including a discussion of any job-specific hazards [110.7(G)]. (11) Energized work approval (authorizing or responsible management, safety officer, or owner, etc.) signature(s). (3) Exemptions to Work Permit Justification. Work performed within the Limited Approach Boundary of energized electrical conductors or circuit parts by qualified persons related to tasks such as testing, troubleshooting, voltage measuring, etc., shall be permitted to be performed without an written energized electrical work Permit Justification, provided appropriate safe work practices and personal protective equipment in accordance with Chapter 1 are provided and used. If the purpose of crossing the Limited Approach Boundary is only for visual inspection and the Restricted Approach Boundary will not be crossed, then an written energized electrical work Permit Justification shall not be required. Substantiation: Safety Concern. 130.1(B), as it is currently written is misleading by reference to a permit. This creates a misconception to some that by completing said permit gives you the authorization or “permits” you to perform a task on equipment that is energized. By changing the title of 130.1(B) to an “Energized Electrical Work Justification” it clarifies that the purpose of the written document, which is to document how the task is “justified” as outlined in 130.1(A). Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The term “permit” is intended to identify a written document. Justification is a component of the permit process. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We generally agree with the concerns of the submitter and suggest that replacing “permit” with “authorization” would meet the intent of the submitter. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-199 Log #49 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.1(B)(1)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Palmer L. Hickman, National Joint Apprentice & Training Committee Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 130.1(B)(1) Where Required. If When working on energized electrical conductors or circuit parts that are not placed in an electrically safe work condition (i.e., for the reasons of increased or additional hazards or infeasibility per 130.1), work to be performed shall be considered energized electrical work and shall be performed by written permit only. Substantiation: It is important to note that the 2004 Edition, Article 130 provisions did not limit the need for an energized work permit to cases where energized equipment is exposed. It simply stated that if the circuit or part was not in an electrically safe work condition then the need for a permit existed.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E This proposal is intended to restore the unanimous action that the 70E Technical Committee took on Comment 70E-403 on the ROC ballot for the 2009 Edition of 70E, thus eliminating conflicting information in the standard. The need for an energized electrical work permit is not only necessary when “working on” (coming in contact with) energized equipment. There is also a need for an energized electrical work permit any time workers are exposed to electrical hazards, even if they are not “working on” (coming in contact with) energized equipment. This is substantiated by information including, but not limited to, the following: Arc Flash Hazard. A dangerous condition associated with the possible release of energy caused by an electric arc. FPN No. 1: An arc flash hazard may exist when energized electrical conductors or circuit parts are exposed or when they are within equipment in a guarded or enclosed condition, provided a person is interacting with the equipment in such a manner that could cause an electric arc. Under normal operating conditions, enclosed energized equipment that has been properly installed and maintained is not likely to pose an arc flash hazard. FPN No. 2: See Table 130.7(C)(9) for examples of activities that could pose an arc flash hazard. Electrical Hazard. A dangerous condition such that contact or equipment failure can result in electric shock, arc flash burn, thermal burn, or blast. FPN No. 1 above offers information recognizing that it is well established that an arc flash hazard may exist, not only when energized electrical conductors or circuit parts are exposed, but also when they are within equipment in a guarded or enclosed condition, especially when someone is interacting with the equipment or if the equipment has not been maintained properly. FPN No 2 above points to Table 130.7(C)(9) where specific examples of where PPE is required for tasks even where the covers are on and doors are closed (i.e., breaker or fused switch operation with doors closed and racking in or out). In addition, the definition of “electrical hazard” above clearly recognizes that an electrical hazard (electric shock, arc flash burn, thermal burn, or blast) could exist by either contact (presumably, it would need to be exposed to be a hazard from contact) or equipment failure (presumably, even with the covers on and/or the doors closed). The recommendation in this proposal is the same text that was unanimously approved by the 70E Technical Committee in Comment 70E-403. This action did not change the intent when an energized work permit is required. That action has the dual benefit of keeping 70E technically accurate and at the same time not requiring less than OSHA does. Note that OSHA still requires a written hazard assessment for selection of PPE as indicated in 29 CFR 1910.132: 1910.132(d) Hazard assessment and equipment selection. 1910.132(d)(1) The employer shall assess the workplace to determine if hazards are present, or are likely to be present, which necessitate the use of personal protective equipment (PPE). If such hazards are present, or likely to be present,... 1910.132(d)(2) The employer shall verify that the required workplace hazard assessment has been performed through a written certification that identifies the workplace evaluated; the person certifying that the evaluation has been performed; the date(s) of the hazard assessment; and, which identifies the document as a certification of hazard assessment. In summary, the Energized Electrical Work Permit is the NFPA 70E “how to” for the OSHA-required written hazard assessment. There is still, clearly, a need for a written hazard assessment and selection of PPE even when covers are on and doors are closed as pointed out in the information related to the definitions of electrical hazard and arc flash hazard when workers have the potential to be exposed to electric shock, arc flash burn, thermal burn, or blast. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the recommendation to read: 130.1(B)(1) When Where Required. If When working within the limited approach boundary or the arc flash boundary of exposed on energized electrical conductors or circuit parts that are not placed in an electrically safe work condition (i.e., for the reasons of increased or additional hazards or infeasibility per 130.1), work to be performed shall be considered energized electrical work and shall be performed by written permit only. Committee Statement: The revisions clarify when the energized work permit is required and meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 17 Negative: 6 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: CARPENTER, T.: The committee action should have been to reject. The provided substantiation goes to great length in describing how a hazard is determined, but does not provide justification as to why a work permit is required for those hazards. Electrical hazards exist everywhere so do we require a work permit for everything? With the way the standard will now read, we will now need a permit to plug in our coffee maker since, according to Table 130.2(C), the limited approach boundary for 120V is 3 ft. 6 in. The substantiation also references the committee action to Comment 70E-403 for the 2009 standard which changed “live” to “energized electrical conductors or circuit”. However, the committee action to Comment 70E-404 for the 2009 standard revised the wording to what is now in the standard. In the Committee Statement to Comment 70E-404 for the 2009 standard, it states, “In addition,

the committee understands that this action modifies the action taken on Comment 70E-403.” The vote on this was 24 Affirmative, 1 Negative, and 1 Abstain, which clearly indicates the committees belief that the existing wording was intended. HAMER, P.: The wording change of this Committee Meeting Action should be rejected. The Committee Meeting Action introduces requirements for work within the Limited Approach Boundary that have not been substantiated. The levels of protection should be as follows: a) when working within the Limited Approach Boundary, a person must be qualified, b) when working within the Restricted Approach Boundary, a qualified person must use shock protection, c) when working within the Prohibited Approach Boundary, except as permitted by the Standard, an Energized Electrical Work Permit is required that includes management approval. The Committee Meeting Action also introduced unsubstantiated requirements for work within the “arc flash boundary.” If a worker is wearing arc-rated PPE for the applicable incident energy and is within the Arc Flash Protection Boundary, there is no reason to require that the parts to be put in an electrically safe work condition. HITTEL, M.: The “working on” part of this language was carefully selected in the last cycle. Now, some unintended consequences of this change are emerging. The intent was to focus on when an employee is servicing equipment while energized. The amount of discussion surrounding this topic by the TC members in the ROP meeting only highlights that our intent is not being well understood by the public. It is the intent that appropriate hazard assessment occur WHENEVER there is hazard exposure. However, the permitting process intent is to drive the review of the risk assessment to a higher level where the intention is to “work on” (see definition of “working on”). The panel action statement is not accurate as this is a change and is not clarification. REGE, T.: Committee action should have been reject. The revised language will significantly expand the tasks for which energized work permits are needed. All work within the limited approach boundary or arc flash boundary will require a work permit. Previously, permits were required when “working on” conductors, which was defined as coming in contact. The new requirement could be interpreted as requiring work permits for operating switches and other tasks where no conductors are exposed. TIEDE, T.: The proposed action reduces clarity and has unintended consequences. The new wording proposed by the committee will require an energized work permit, approved by management, to turn off an enclosed safety switch, open the cover (exposing the line side conductors) and replace a fuse. The wording as written in the 2009 edition should remain unchanged. WILMER, K.: Committee action should have been reject. The revised language will significantly expand the tasks for which energized work permits are needed. All work within the limited approach boundary or arc flash boundary will require a work permit. Previously, permits were required when “working on” conductors, which was defined as coming in contact. The new requirement could be interpreted as requiring work permits for operating switches and other tasks where no conductors are exposed. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: DROBNICK, D.: I concur with the Committee’s action to include limited approach and arc flash boundaries to this proposal. I believe the term “of exposed” should be located (or deleted entirely) after limited approach boundary rather than in its current location. Shock approach boundaries exist only when energized parts are exposed while arc flash boundaries exist whether energized parts are exposed or not. See Committee action on Proposal 70E-207. GRAY, B.: By recognizing that arc flash is a hazard that requires justification, this Committee action should have generated a companion proposal to revise 130.7(E)(2) to extend the barricade for unqualified workers to the greater of the Arc Flash Boundary or Limited Approach Boundary. HICKMAN, P.: We agree with the Accept in Principle action but suggest that the title should be changed to “Permit Applicability” or “Permit Application” (or some variation) rather than “When Required.” _______________________________________________________________ 70E-200 Log #95 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.1(b)(1)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas Doyle, Industrial Safety Integration Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: ... work to be performed shall be considered energized electrical work and shall be performed by only after a written permit, specific to the work, has been obtained by the employee(s). Substantiation: A “written permit” can not actually perform work as it is only a piece of paper. Obtaining the work permit is an action to be taken prior to starting the work. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-199 meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: See my negative comments associate with Proposal 70E-199. Additionally, this proposal seems to be in conflict with the allowed exemptions in 130.2(B)(3). Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-201 Log #184 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.1(B)(2).6) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Palmer L. Hickman, NJATC Recommendation: Revise as follows: (6) Results of the arc flash hazard analysis (130.3) __________available short-circuit current __________fault clearing time Substantiation: 130.7(C)(9) FPN No.4 offers information as to what is to be documented in (6) on the energized electrical work permit. 130.1(B)(2)(7) and 130.1(B)(2)(8) require the AFPB distance and PPE once the AFPB is crossed to be documented on the permit in (7) and (8). However, it is not obvious what is to be documented in 130.1(B)(2)(6) {results of the arc flash hazard analysis} without the aid of the information in 130.7(C)(9) FPN No. 4. This recommendation is intended to editorially add a space for the inclusion of the available short-circuit current and the fault clearing time as clarified by 130.7(C)(9) FPN No.4. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the recommendation as follows: 1. Delete (7) and (8) and revise (6) to read as follows: (6) Results of the arc flash hazard analysis. (130.3) a. The arc flash boundary b. The necessary personal protective equipment to safely perform the assigned task. c. The available incident energy or Hazard Risk Category. 2. Delete FPN 4 from 130.7C(9). Committee Statement: The committee action meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We agree with the Accept in Principle action but suggest that the text be modified as follows: (4) Results of the shock hazard analysis a. The limited approach boundary b. The limited restricted approach boundary c. The prohibited approach boundary d. The necessary shock personal and other protective equipment to safely perform the assigned task. (5) Determination of shock protection boundaries [130.2(B) and Table 130.2(C)] (65) b The necessary arc flash personal and other protective equipment to safely perform the assigned task. ***Renumber the remaining list items*** HITTEL, M.: I agree with the committee action, but would prefer the order of (b) and (c) to be reversed for better flow of the information on the permit. The necessary PPE (b) would follow logically from the information in (c). _______________________________________________________________ 70E-202 Log #172 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.1(B)(3)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Michael J. Johnston, National Electrical Contractors Association Recommendation: Editorially revise Section 130.1(B)(3) as follows: (3) Exemptions to work Permit. An energized electrical work permit shall not be required for tasks such as testing, troubleshooting, and voltage measurements that are performed by qualified persons within the Limited Approach Boundary in accordance with the following: 1. Appropriate safe work practices and personal protective equipment in accordance with Chapter 1 are provided and used. 2. Work in the Limited Approach Boundary is for visual inspection only and the Restricted Approach Boundary is not crossed. Work performed within the Limited Approach Boundary of energized conductors or circuit parts by qualified persons related to tasks such as testing, troubleshooting, voltage measuring, etc. shall be permitted to be performed without an energized electrical work permit, provided appropriate safe work practices and personal protective equipment in accordance with Chapter 1 are provided and used. If the purpose of crossing the Limited Approach Boundary is only for visual inspection and the Restricted Approach Boundary will not be crossed, then an energized electrical work permit shall not be required. Informational Note: FPN: For an example of an acceptable energized electrical work permit, see Annex J.

Substantiation: The proposal seeks to revise this section editorially and restructures the requirement into a list format. No technical changes are proposed in this suggested revision. The term “such as” leaves the requirement open-ended to provide coverage for tasks not specifically mentioned in the rule without having an inclusive list. The term “etc.” is not necessary. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The current requirement clearly states where exemptions are appropriate. The editorial revision makes unintended technical consequences. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: BOWMAN, W.: I agree with the committee action to reject. The task list should be edited to remove the “etc”. GRAY, B.: Correct committee action may have been Accept In Part since the change from “FPN” to “Informational Note” will be accepted. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-203 Log #351 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.1(B)(3)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Louis A. Barrios, Shell / Rep. API (American Petroleum Institute) Recommendation: Delete text to read as follows: (3) Exemptions to Work Permit. Work performed within the Limited Approach Boundary of energized electrical conductors or circuit parts by qualified persons related to tasks such as testing, troubleshooting, voltage measuring, etc., shall be permitted to be performed without an energized electrical work permit, provided appropriate safe work practices and personal protective equipment in accordance with Chapter 1 are provided and used. If the purpose of crossing the Limited Approach Boundary is only for visual inspection and the Restricted Approach Boundary will not be crossed, then an energized electrical work permit shall not be required. Substantiation: 130.1(B)(1) requires the use of an energized electrical work permit when working on energized conductors or circuit parts that are not placed in an electrically safe work condition. Conducting visual inspections within the Limited Approach Boundary but outside the Restricted Approach Boundary by definition would not be considered “working on”. Therefore this exemption stated in the last sentence is not necessary because an energized electrical work permit would not be required anyway. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The action taken by the committee on Proposal 70E-199 makes the text recommended to be deleted necessary. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: BOWMAN, W.: The term “exposed” has been added to 130.1(B) (1) in proposal 70E-199. The same term should be added to the first sentence of 130.1(B)(3) and should read as follows:(3) Exceptions to Work Permit. Work performed within the Limited Approach Boundary of exposed energized electrical conductors or circuit parts…. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-204 Log #352 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.1(B)(3)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Louis A. Barrios, Shell / Rep. API (American Petroleum Institute) Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: (3) Exemptions to Work Permit. Work performed within the Prohibited Approach Boundary Limited Approach Boundary of energized electrical conductors or circuit parts by qualified persons related to tasks such as testing, troubleshooting, voltage measuring, etc., shall be permitted to be performed without an energized electrical work permit, provided appropriate safe work practices and personal protective equipment in accordance with Chapter 1 are provided and used. If the purpose of crossing the Limited Approach Boundary is only for visual inspection and the Restricted Approach Boundary will not be crossed, then an energized electrical work permit shall not be required. Substantiation: 130.1(B)(1) requires the use of an energized electrical work permit when working on energized conductors or circuit parts that are not placed in an electrically safe work condition. The definition of “working on” is “coming in contact with energized electrical conductors or circuit parts with the hands, feet, or other body parts, with tools, probes, or with test equipment, regardless of the personal protective equipment a person is wearing.” Since the definition of Prohibited Approach Boundary is “considered the same as making contact with the electrical conductor or circuit part”, the correct term to use in 130.1(B)(3) is “Prohibited Approach Boundary” instead of “Limited Approach Boundary”. Also, any qualified person performing the tasks such as testing, troubleshooting, and voltage measuring will need to make direct contact, or

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E near contact if proximity devices are used, thus further supporting the use of the term “Prohibited Approach Boundary”. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Section 130.1(B)(1) has been revised to indicate the energized electrical work permit requirement when working within Limited Approach Boundary. See the committee action on Proposal 70E-199. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: The Energized Electrical Work Permit should only be applicable to work within the Prohibited Approach Boundary. Even though the term “exposed” was added to qualify the Arc Flash Protection Boundary in Proposal 70E-199, the committee’s changes can reduce the effectiveness of the Energized Electrical Work Permit at preventing “hot work”. To paraphrase the Standard, the levels of protection are as follows: a) when working within the Limited Approach Boundary, a person must be qualified, b) when working within the Restricted Approach Boundary, a qualified person must use shock protection, c) when working within the Prohibited Approach Boundary, except as permitted by the Standard, an Energized Electrical Work Permit is required that includes management approval. Also see my comments on Proposal 70E-199. HITTEL, M.: The exemption is for the task of testing, troubleshooting, and voltage measuring does, by definition, require the qualified person to cross the prohibited approach boundary. The substantiation is accurate. This change aligns the intent of the exemption with the appropriate boundary definition. The action should be accept. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-205 Log #472 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.1(B)(3)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Danny Liggett, DuPont Recommendation: Revise the first sentence of 130.1(B)(3) to read as follows: (3) Exemptions to Work Permit. Work performed within the Limited Prohibited Approach Boundary of energized electrical conductors or circuit parts by qualified persons related to tasks such as testing, troubleshooting, voltage measuring, etc., shall be permitted to be performed without an energized electrical work permit, provided appropriate safe work practices and personal protective equipment in accordance with Chapter 1 are provided and used. Substantiation: The current text of this section is not aligned with 130.1(B)(1). This misalignment is creating confusion in understanding what is required. 130.1(B)(1) requires a permit when “working on” energized electrical conductors or circuit parts. “Working on” is defined in Article 100 as essentially working within the Prohibited Approach Boundary. This change aligns both sections. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Section 130.1(B)(1) has been revised to indicate the energized electrical work permit requirement when working within Limited Approach Boundary. See the committee action on Proposal 70E-199. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: The exemption is for the task of testing, troubleshooting, and voltage measuring does, by definition, require the qualified person to cross the prohibited approach boundary. The substantiation is accurate. This change aligns the intent of the exemption with the appropriate boundary definition. The action should be accept. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-206 Log #527 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (130.2(B)) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: The Technical Correlating Committee directs that this proposal be reconsidered and correlated with the action taken on Proposal 70E-207. This action will be considered as a public comment. Submitter: Bobby J. Gray, Hoydar/Buck, Inc. Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Shock Protection Boundaries. The shock protection boundaries identified as Limited, Restricted, and Prohibited Approach Boundaries are shall be applicable to the situation in which where approaching personnel are exposed to energized electrical conductors or circuit parts. See Table 130.2(C)(1) shall be used for the distances associated with various ac system voltages. Table 130.2(C)(2) shall be used for the distances associated with various dc system voltages. Substantiation: This proposal is the work of NFPA 70E 2012 DC Hazards Task Group whose members include: Tom Carpenter, Jim Coady, Gary Dreifuerst, Dan Doan, Lloyd Gordon, Bobby Gray, Mike Hittel, Hugh Hoagland, Greg Leask, Mark Ode, and PK Sen.

Currently, the requirement to complete a Shock Hazard Analysis directs the user to Table 130.2(C) to determine the approach distances and appropriate PPE. Table 130.2(C) is not applicable to dc sources since the voltage ranges are listed Phase-to-Phase and phase-to-ground. This proposal will provide the user with another table established by a companion proposal for determination of the appropriate approach boundary for work with exposure to de shock hazards. Existing language is changed to comply with manual of style and readaibility. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-207 Log #397 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (130.2(B), FPN ) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: The Technical Correlating Committee directs that this proposal be reconsidered and correlated with the action taken on Proposal 70E-206. This action will be considered as a public comment. Submitter: Thomas E. Neal, Neal Associates Ltd. Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 130.2(B) Shock Protection Boundaries. The shock protection boundaries identified as Limited, Restricted, and Prohibited Approach Boundaries are applicable to the situation in which approaching personnel are exposed to energized electrical conductors or circuit parts. See Table 130.2(C) for the distances associated with various system voltages. FPN: In certain instances, the Arc Flash Protection Boundary might be a greater distance from the exposed energized electrical conductors or circuit parts than the Limited Approach Boundary. The Shock Protection Boundaries and the Arc Flash Hazard Boundary are independent of each other. Substantiation: Per the revised definition of arc flash protection boundary found in the 2009 Edition of the Standard, the Arc Flash Protection Boundary exists whether or not energized electrical conductors or circuit parts are exposed: “Boundary, Arc Flash Protection. When an arc flash hazard exists, an approach limit at a distance from a prospective arc source within which a person could receive a second degree burn if an electrical arc flash were to occur.” The FPN contradicts the definition. Deleting the word “exposed” provides clarity to users of the document. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: Consistent with the definition of “Arc Flash Protection Boundary,” the wording should be changed to: “FPN: In certain instances, the Arc Flash Protection Boundary might be a greater distance from the exposed energized electrical conductors or circuit parts (or from a prospective arc source that may not be exposed) than the Limited Approach Boundary. The Shock Protection Boundaries and the Arc Flash Protection Boundary are independent of each other.” It is important to retain the concept of a prospective arc source that is not “exposed,” by definition (see Article 100). _______________________________________________________________ 70E-208 Log #71 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.2(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Kenneth E. Cybart, Littlefuse, Inc. Recommendation: Delete Avoid Contact under the Restricted Approach Boundary and under the Prohibited Approach Boundary for Nominal Systems Voltage Range of 50 to 300. Substantiation: According to Section 130(C), no qualified person shall approach or take any conductive object closer to exposed energized electrical conductors or circuit parts operating at 50 volts or more than the Restricted Approach Boundary set forth in Table 130.2(C). Where actual distances are stated in the table, such as 1 ft. (for voltages between 301 to 750), workers must use insulated gloves and tools and equipment, etc. The term, “Avoid Contact”, for voltages of 50 to 300, does not give workers and safety managers adequate guidance when to use insulated gloves and tools, etc. when performing work on energized circuits under 300 volts. Table 130.7(C)(9) requires insulated gloves for voltage testing and certain tasks performed on equipment rated under 240V, however, if a task is not listed in the table, or if the table is not or cannot be used to determine the hazard category, workers and safety managers need some guidance concerning use of insulated gloves and equipment. One possible solution may be to delete the 50 to 300 volt category and change the 301 to 750 category to read 50 to 750. Committee Meeting Action: Reject

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Committee Statement: The committee concludes that the words “avoid contact” do provide guidance. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-209 Log #239 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.2(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas A. Carpenter, Aerospace Testing Alliance Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows:

Substantiation: Note that the strike-through feature does not show up on the number 4. As such, where a number 4 is being deleted, it is also bolded. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The numbers were converted in the 2009 edition per the direction of NFPA staff. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

Table 130.2(C) Approach Boundaries to Energized Electrical Conductors or Circuit Parts for Shock Protection (All dimensions are distance from energized electrical conductor or circuit part to employee.)

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Nominal System Voltage Range, Phase to Phase2

Limited Approach Boundary1 Restricted Approach Boundary1; Includes

Inadvertent Movement Adder

Prohibited Approach Boundary1

Exposed Movable Conductor3 Exposed Fixed Circuit Part

Less than 50 Note specified Not specified Not specified Not specified

50 to 300 3.105 m (10 ft 0 in.) 1.107 m (3 ft 6 in.) Avoid contact Avoid contact

301 to 750 3.105 m (10 ft 0 in.) 1.107 m (3 ft 6 in.) 304.8 mm (1 ft 0 in.) 25.4 mm (0 ft 1 in.)

751 to 15 kV 3.105 m (10 ft 0 in.) 1.53 m (5 ft 0 in.) 660.4 mm (2ft 2 in.) 1787.8 mm (0 ft 7 in.)

15.1 kV to 36 kV 3.105 m (10 ft 0 in.) 1.83 m (6 ft 0 in.) 787.4 mm (2 ft 7 in.) 254 mm (0 ft 10 in.)

36.1 kV to 46 kV 3.105 m (10 ft 0 in.) 2.44 m (8 ft 0 in.) 838.2 mm (2 ft 9 in.) 4321.8 mm (1 ft 5 in.)

46.1 kV to 72.5 kV 3.105 m (10 ft 0 in.) 2.44 m (8 ft 0 in.) 1.0 m (3 ft 3 in.) 660 mm (2 ft 2 in.)

72.6 kV to 121 kV 3.325 m (10 ft 8 in.) 2.44 m (8 ft 0 in.) 1.329 m (3 ft 4 in.) 838 mm (2 ft 9 in.)

138 kV to 145 kV 3.436 m (11 ft 0 in.) 3.105 m (10 ft 0 in.) 1.215 m (3 ft 10 in.) 1.02 m (3 ft 4 in.)


230 kV to 242 kV 4.03.97 m (13 ft 0 in.) 4.03.97 m (13 ft 0 in.) 1.71 m (5 ft 8 in.) 1.657 m (5 ft 2 in.)




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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-210 Log #432 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.2(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Elihu “Hugh” Hoagland IV, ArcWear.com/e-Hazard.com Recommendation: New text to read as follows: Table 130.2(C) - Approach Boundaries to Energized Electrical Conductors or Circuit Parts for Shock Protection (All dimensions are distance from energized electrical conductor or circuit part to employee.)(See Table 130.2(C) below.)Substantiation: SI units by ISO and EU norms have an implied precision of +/- the last integer. So 1.07 m implies a precision of.01 m or give or take a mm. This is NOT our intent and gives the EU and all other countries issues with this standard because it requires extreme precision on the boundaries. We have done a “hard conversion” which is a direct calculation of the distances. We should do a “soft conversion” so that the boundaries are more realistic for an end user. Millimeters should never be used in the boundaries since they imply even more extreme precision. Use only meters and give to the closest meter or 0.1 m at the most. We’ve been trying to get this right since Thomas Jefferson proposed to congress to move to the metric system. At least let’s look like we know what we are talking about. I’ll keep putting this one in until we fix it. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The table is correct because soft conversions were used in accordance with the NEC Style Manual. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: The action should be to accept the proposal. There are specific circumstances where the application of the NEC Style Manual is not appropriate. I believe that this is one of those circumstances. A hard conversion would result in a number that is easier to work with and remember. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

Table 130.2(C) - Approach Boundaries to Energized Electrical Conductors or Circuit Parts for Shock Protection (All dimensions are distance from energized electrical conductor or circuit part to employee.)

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Nominal System VoltageRange, Phase to Phase2

Limited Approach Boundary1 Restricted Approach Boundary1, Includes

Inadvertent Movement Adder Prohibited Approach Boundary1Exposed Movable

Conductor3Exposed Fixed

Circuit PartLess than 50 Not specified Not specified Not specified Not specified

50 to 300 3.0 m (10 ft 0 in) 1 m (3 ft 6 in) Avoid contact Avoid contact301 to 750 3.0 m (10 ft 0 in) 1 m (3 ft 6 in) 0.3 m (1 ft 0 in) 0.1 m (0 ft 1 in)

15.1 kV to 36 kV Etc. Etc. Etc. Etc.36.1 kV to 46 kV

46.1 kV to 72.5 kV72.6 kV to 121 kV138 kV to 145 kV161 kV to 169 kV230 kV to 242 kV345 kV to 362 kV500 kV to 550 kV765 kV to 800 kV

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Table 130.2(C) Approach Boundaries to Energized Electrical Conductors or Circuit Parts for Shock Protection (All dimensions are distance from energized electrical conductor or circuit part to employee.)

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)Nominal System Voltage Range, Phase to Phase2

Limited Approach Boundary1 Restricted Approach Boundary1; Includes

Inadvertent Movement Adder

Prohibited Approach Boundary1

Exposed Movable Conductor3

Exposed Fixed Circuit Part

Less than 50 Not specified Not specified Not specified Not specified

50 V to 300 V 3.005 m (10 ft 0 in.) 1.007 m (3 ft 6 in.) Avoid contact Avoid contact

301 V to 750 V 3.005 m (10 ft 0 in.) 1.007 m (3 ft 6 in.) 3004.8 mm (1 ft 0 in.) 25.4 mm (0 ft 1 in.)

751 V to 15 kV 3.005m (10 ft 0 in.) 1.53 m (5 ft 0 in.) 6650.4 mm (2 ft 2 in.) 1757.8 mm (0 ft 7 in.)

15.1 kV to 36 kV 3.005m (10 ft 0 in.) 1.83 m (6 ft 0 in.) 787.4800 mm (2 ft 7 in.) 2504 mm (0 ft 10 in.)

36.1 kV to 46 kV 3.005m (10 ft 0 in.) 2.445 m (8 ft 0 in.) 838.240 mm (2 ft 9 in.) 431.825 mm (1 ft 5 in.)

46.1 kV to 72.5 kV 3.005m (10 ft 0 in.) 2.445 m (8 ft 0 in.) 1.0 m (3 ft 3 in.) 6650 mm (2 ft 2 in.)

72.6 kV to 121 kV 3.325m (10 ft 8 in.) 2.445 m (8 ft 0 in.) 1.029 m (3 ft 4 in.) 83840 mm (2 ft 9 in.)



230 kV to 242 kV 4.03.97 m (13 ft 0 in.) 4.03.97 m (13 ft 0 in.) 1.71 m (5 ft 8 in.) 1.657 m (5 ft 2 in.)




_______________________________________________________________70E-211 Log #529 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.2(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Bobby J. Gray, Hoydar/Buck, Inc. Recommendation: Revise table as follows below. Substantiation: This proposal is to revise the units to hard conversion to make the table more usable. Soft conversion metric units in this application are unrealistic and unenforceable. This application meets the NEC Style Manual guidance for “hard” conversion and the proposed SI Units in Annex C of the NEC Style Manual. Additionally, the V is added to the Column 1 units to make them technically accurate. Note: Supporting Material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The table is correct because soft conversions were used in accordance with the NEC Style Manual. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: The action should be to accept the proposal. There are specific circumstances where the application of the NEC Style Manual is not appropriate. I believe that this is one of those circumstances. A hard conversion would result in a number that is easier to work with and remember. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

70E-59

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E ______________________________________________________________ 70E-212 Log #530 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (Table 130.2(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Bobby J. Gray, Hoydar/Buck, Inc. Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Table 130.2(C)(1) Approach boundaries to Energized Electrical Conductors or Circuit Parts for Shock Protection For AC Systems (All dimensions are distance from energized electrical conductor or circuit part to employee.) [Remainder of table unchanged.] Substantiation: This proposal is the work of NFPA 70E 2012 DC Hazards Task Group whose members include: Tom Carpenter, Jim Coady, Gary Dreifuerst, Dan Doan, Lloyd Gordon, Bobby Gray, Mike Hittel, Hugh Hoagland, Greg Leask, Mark Ode, and PK Sen. Currently, the requirement to complete a Shock Hazard Analysis directs the user to Table 130.2(C) to determine the approach distances and appropriate PPE. Table 130.2(C) is not applicable to DC sources since the voltage ranges are listed Phase-to-Phase or phase-to-ground. This proposal will provide new numbering for the table as a second table is introduced with a companion proposal and clarifies that is for AC systems. This proposal is companion to other proposals on this subject. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: BOWMAN, W.: Renumbering Table 130.2(C) to 130.2(C)(1) will require the reference in Annex C to the same table to be renumbered. GRAY, B.: All references to Table 130.2(C) throughout the Document (e.g. 130.7(E)(2), Annex C) should be revised based on the change to the title of the table. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-213 Log #73 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.2(C), Line 8) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Marion G. Wilde, Sandia National Laboratories Recommendation: Revise text as follows: 72.6 kV to 121 kV 3.25 m (10 ft 8 in) 2.44 m (8 ft 0 in) 1.29 m (3 ft 4 in) (4 ft 3 in) 838 mm (2 ft 9 in) Substantiation: The units conversion from meters to feet / inches has two digits transposed. The feet / inches equivalent of 1.29 meter is 4 ft 3 in. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: This error was corrected in a subsequent printings of the 2009 edition of the standard. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-214 Log #187 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (130.2(C)(1)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Luke, The ESCO Group Recommendation: Revise Section 130.2(C)(1) as follows: (1) The qualified person is insulated or guarded from the energized electrical conductors or circuit parts operating at 50 volts or more, and no uninsulated part of the qualified person’s body crosses the Prohibited Approach Boundary set forth in Table 130.2(C). insulating gloves or insulating gloves and sleeves are considered insulation only with regard to the energized parts upon which work is being performed. Substantiation: This will make it clear that rubber insulating gloves are required when crossing the Restricted Approach Boundary. The current language could be interpreted that rubber insulating gloves are required at the Prohibited Approach Boundary. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HICKMAN, P.: We agree that the existing text is confusing. However, we are concerned that eliminating the text referencing the Prohibited Approach Boundary may have the unintended consequence of deleting an additional level of safety. We recommend the following revised text to retain the original level of safety and improve clarity: (1) The qualified person complies with both a and b a. The qualified person is insulated or guarded from the energized electrical conductors or circuit parts operating at 50 volts or more b. No uninsulated part of the qualified person’s body crosses the Prohibited Approach Boundary set forth in Table 130.2(C). Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-214a Log #CP11 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (Table 130.2(C)(2) New) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Electrical Safety in the Workplace, Recommendation: Add a new Table 130.2(C)(2) as shown below. Substantiation: This proposal is the work of NFPA 70E 2012 DC Hazards Task Group whose members include: Tom Carpenter, Jim Coady, Gary Dreifuerst, Dan Doan, Lloyd Gordon, Bobby Gray, Mike Hittel, Hugh Hoagland, Greg Leask, Mark Ode, and PK Sen. Currently, the requirement to complete a Shock Hazard Analysis directs the user to Table 130.2(C) to determine the approach distances and appropriate PPE. Table 130.2(C) is not applicable to dc sources since the voltage ranges are listed as Phase-to-Phase. This proposal will provide a table for dc sources that have a technical basis described in the paper: “A COMPLETE ELECTRICAL HAZARD CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM AND ITS APPLICATION” by LB Gordon and L Cartelli. The paper was presented at the 2009 IEEE IAS Electrical Safety Workshop. This proposal is a companion to others on the same subject. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA headquarters.

Table 130.2(C)(2) - Approach boundaries1 to energized electrical conductors or circuit parts for Shock Protection, DC Voltage Systems

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)Nominal Potential

Difference Limited Approach Boundary Restricted Approach

Boundary, Includes Inadvertent Movement

Adder

Prohibited Approach BoundaryExposed Movable

Conductor2Exposed Fixed Circuit

Part

Less than 100 V Not specified Not specified Not specified Not specified100 V to 300 V 3.0 m (10 ft 0 in) 1.0 m (3 ft 6 in) Avoid contact Avoid contact301 V to 1 kV 3.0 m (10 ft 0 in) 1.0 m (3 ft 6 in) 300 mm (1 ft 0 in) 25 mm (0 ft 1 in)1.1kV to 5 kV 3.0 m (10 ft 0 in) 1.5 m (5 ft 0 in) 450 mm (1 ft 5 in) 100 mm (0 ft 4 in)5 kV to 15 kV 3.0 m (10 ft 0 in) 1.5 m (5 ft 0 in) 660 mm (2 ft 2in) 180 mm (0 ft 7 in)15.1 kV to 45 kV 3.0 m (10 ft 0 in) 2.5 m (8 ft 0in) 800 mm (2 ft 9 in) 440 mm (1 ft 5 in)45.1 kV to 75 kV 3.0 m (10 ft 0 in) 2.5 m (8 ft 0 in) 1.0 m (3 ft 2 in) 650 mm (2 ft 1 in)75.1 kV to 150 kV 3.4 m (10 ft 8 in) 3.0 m (10 ft 0 in) 1.2 m (4 ft 0 in) 1.0 m (3 ft 2 in)150.1 kV to 250 kV 4.0 m (11 ft 8 in) 4.0 m (11 ft 8 in) 1.6 m (5 ft 3 in) 1.5 m (5 ft 0 in)250.1 kV to 500 kV 6.0 m (20 ft 0 in) 6.0 m (20 ft 0 in) 3.5 m (11 ft 6 in) 3.3 m (10 ft 10 in)500.1 kV to 800 kV 8.0 m (26 ft 0 in) 8.0 m (26 ft 0 in) 5.0 m (16 ft 5 in) 5.0 m (16 ft 5 in)

Notes:

1) All dimensions are distance from exposed energized electrical conductors or circuit parts to worker.

2) A condition in which the distance between the conductor and a person is not under the control of the person. The term is normally applied to overhead line conductors supported by poles.

70E-60

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HICKMAN, P.: We are concerned that adequate technical substantiation has not been submitted to justify the addition of this table. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-215 Log #38 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.2(D)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: R. Dee Jones, AVO Training Institute Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Unqualified persons shall not be permitted to enter spaces that are required to be accessible to qualified employees only, unless the electric conductors and equipment involved are in an electrically safe work condition, or as allowed in 130.2(D)(2). Substantiation: 130.2(D) does not permit unauthorized persons inside of areas restricted to qualified persons unless an electrically safe work condition exists, whereas, 130.2(D)(2) allows unqualified persons within the limited approach boundary when continuously escorted and oriented on the hazards by a qualified person. These statements are in conflict. The proposed change will eliminate this conflict. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-216 meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-216 Log #161 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.2(D)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Bobby J. Gray, Hoydar/Buck, Inc. Recommendation: Unless permitted by 130.2(D)(2), no unqualified person may approach nearer than the Limited Approach Boundary of energized conductors and circuit parts. Unqualified persons shall not be permitted to enter spaces that are required to accessible to qualified employees only, unless the electric conductors and equipment involved are in an electrically safe work condition. Substantiation: The proposed wording will establish the requirement that is implied in 130.2 (D)(2) and clarify which spaces are prohibited to entry by an unqualified person. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the recommendation to read: Unless permitted by 130.2(D)(2), no unqualified person may shall be permitted to approach nearer than the Limited Approach Boundary of energized conductors and circuit parts. Committee Statement: The revisions were made for compliance with the NEC Style Manual relative to the use of permissive language. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-217 Log #56 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas A. Carpenter, Aerospace Testing Alliance Recommendation: Add new verbiage as follows: (3) The transformer supplying the circuit is rated less than 125 kVA. The arc flash hazard for a circuit with the above characteristics is considered to be so low as to not required protection. As such, only level 0 PPE is required when working on them. Note that the shock hazard still exists and must be protected against. Substantiation: The existing verbiage allows not performing an arc flash hazard for a specific case, but does not give the requirements if such a case exists. The added words provide the guidance. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: This exception has been deleted by the committee action on Proposal 70E-223. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A.

Explanation of Negative: CARPENTER, T.: The committee statement that the Exception was deleted by Proposal 70E-223 is correct. However, a FPN was added by this same Proposal that states that some situations exist that may not require an arc flash hazard analysis, which is basically what the exception stated. The purpose of this Proposal was to provide guidance on what should be done in this event. The need for guidance still exists, but not was given by rejecting this Proposal. Since requirements can not be included in FPNs, the correct action to Proposal 70E-223 should have been to reject or to reword the exception to what is now in the FPN. Then this Proposal should have been accepted or accepted in principle with proper rewording so that the required guidance for this situation is provided. HAMER, P.: The Committee acted incorrectly by assuming that the the deletion of the Exception (Proposal 70E-223) will occur in subsequent actions. The action should have been “Accept in Principle.” This is more appropriate as an Informational Note. Reword as: “Informational Note: The arc flash hazard for a circuit with the above characteristics is considered to be very low and arc-rated protective equipment is not needed. A shock hazard still exists.” Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-218 Log #57 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas A. Carpenter, Aerospace Testing Alliance Recommendation: Add the following verbiage at the end of Exception No. 2: …in lieu of a detailed incident energy analysis when the equipment meets the limitation requirements identified in the notes to Table 130.7(C)(9). Substantiation: This addition will provide better clarification as to when the sections/table can be used in lieu of an arc flash analysis. This also matches the clarifying information in Section 130.7(C)(9). Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The notes have been incorporated into the tables. See the committee action on Proposal 70E-331. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-219 Log #168 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Richard D. Reese, HHMI Corporation Recommendation: The arc flash hazard analysis shall be performed by a Qualified Person and Professional Electrical Engineer registered in the state where the analysis takes place, and the Engineer shall not be an employee of or affiliated with an electrical equipment manufacturer. Substantiation: The current versions of NFPA 70 and 70E is rather vague regarding the qualifications of those performing shock and arc flash hazard analyses (AFHA). This has created several issues in recent studies conducted by equipment manufacturers that ultimately could negatively impact employee safety. For example, in one case, the equipment manufacturer’s engineer performing the AFHA did not understand the consequences of assuming infinite bus in lieu of actual available short circuit currents at the utility’s point of supply. In the same case and others were a general contractor relies on the project’s major electrical equipment manufacturer to perform the AFHA, the contractor has ended up tasked with providing the engineer with the equipment and site data needed to complete the AFHA. This leads to data collection by unqualified persons, unwarranted exposure to shock and arc hazards, and data errors. In addition to the foregoing shortcomings that can lead to less than adequate PPE designations, electrical equipment manufacturers are in business to manufacture and sell equipment. In performing AFHA in existing facilities in particular, this has led to a shift in focus away from personnel safety and more toward selling a customer new equipment. Electrical safety would be greatly improved if AFHA provider qualification requirements are clearly defined as proposed. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Sufficient substantiation has not been provided to restrict the persons permitted to conduct the arc-flash hazard analysis. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

70E-61

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-220 Log #173 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Michael J. Johnston, National Electrical Contractors Association Recommendation: Revise Section 130.3 as follows: 130.3 Arc Flash Hazard Analysis. (A) An arc flash hazard analysis shall determine the Arc Flash Protection Boundary and the personal protective equipment that people within the Arc Flash Protection Boundary shall use. The arc flash hazard analysis shall comply with (1), (2), and (3) below: (1) Available Fault Current. The arc flash hazard analysis shall be calculated based on the available fault current at the line terminals of the equipment. The short-circuit current rating of equipment or the ampere interrupting current (A/C) rating of overcurrent devices shall not be used in the arc flash hazard analysis calculations. (2) Overcurrent Device Characteristics. The analysis shall also take into consideration the design of the overcurrent protective device, operating characteristics, and its opening time, including its condition of maintenance. (3) Modifications. The arc flash hazard analysis shall be updated when a major modification or renovation takes place. It shall be reviewed periodically, not to exceed five years, to account for changes in the electrical distribution system that could affect the results of the arc flash hazard analysis. Exception No. 1 (no changes). Exception No. 2 (no changes). Informational Note No. 1: See 130.1(B)(2)(6) for required available fault current values and overcurrent device clearing times necessary on an Energized Work Permit. Informational Note FPN No. 21: Improper or inadequate maintenance can result in increased opening time of the overcurrent protective device, thus increasing the incident energy. Informational Note FPN No. 32: For additional direction for performing maintenance on overcurrent protective devices, see Chapter 2, Safety-Related Maintenance Requirements. Substantiation: This proposal seeks to restructure this section into a list format to comply with the NFPA Style Manual and improve clarity and usability by providing essential information for users. List item (1) specifically addresses the needed value of available fault current that should be used as a starting point for the calculations required in this section if neither exception is applied. The new second sentence in list item (1) clarifies that equipment and overcurrent device ratings are not to be used for the calculations required by this section. List item (3) has been revised slightly to include the words “operating characteristics” to indicate other considerations that may have to be taken into account in addition to clearing times of the overcurrent device(s). No revisions are proposed to the two exceptions. The new informational Note No. 1 creates the needed correlation back to the Energized Work Permit covered in 130.1(B), specifically the information required in list item (6) of the permit. The other two existing Informational Notes have been renumbered in sequence. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommended additions do not improve clarity. Other documents are available that describe calculation methods and what factors to consider. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HITTEL, M.: AFH Analysis is a process that includes incident energy calculations AS WELL AS other risk factors such as probability of an arc event and avoidance factors. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-221 Log #420 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Michael A. Anthony, University of Michigan / Rep. APPA.ORG - Association of Education Facility Executives Recommendation: Revise a portion of Section 130.3 as follows: 130.3 Arc Flash Hazard Analysis. An arc flash hazard analysis shall determine the Arc Flash Protection Boundary and the personal protective equipment that people within the Arc Flash Protection Boundary shall use. The arc flash hazard analysis shall be updated when a major modification or renovation takes place. It shall be reviewed periodically, not to exceed five years, to account for changes in the electrical distribution system that could affect the results of the arc flash hazard analysis. The arc flash hazard analysis shall take into consideration the design of the overcurrent protective device and its opening time, including its condition of maintenance. Flash hazard analysis for energized work of limited scope and of a one-time nature shall be permitted. Exception No. 1: An arc flash hazard analysis shall not be required where all of the following conditions exist:

(1) The circuit is rated 240 volts or less. (2) The circuit is supplied by one transformer. (3) The transformer supplying the circuit is rated less than 125 kVA. Exception No. 2: The requirements of 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10), and 130.7(C)(11) shall be permitted to be used in lieu of a detailed incident energy analysis. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted on behalf of an APPA.ORG member institution that needs language to limit the scope of a flash hazard study to solve an immediate problem in a specific part of their distribution system. It represents a fairly common concern. While flash study experts understand that lumped parameter models for a short circuit analysis requires significant information about sources, impedances, source impedances and the like; some -- not all -- of these same experts are confusing facility managers about the control boundaries of the study required to conform to NFPA 70E. Explicit, clearer, non-mandatory language in this document may even the playing field for facility managers and experts in the flash protection industry when it comes to how to scale engineering effort according to the immediate job at hand. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The standard does not currently prohibit the recommendation proposed by the submitter. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: In light of the action on Proposal 223 which deletes this exception, the committee statement does not make sense. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-222 Log #473 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (130.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Danny Liggett, DuPont Recommendation: Revise the first sentence of 130.3 to read as follows: 130.3 Arc Flash Hazard Analysis. An arc flash hazard analysis shall determine the Arc Flash Protection Boundary, the incident energy at the working distance, and the personal protective equipment that people within the Arc Flash Protection Boundary shall use. Substantiation: The appropriate personal protective equipment cannot be defined until the incident energy at the working distance is determined. This should be included as a required part of the arc flash hazard analysis. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: This proposal should be rejected, as the proposed wording would not permit Sections 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10), and 130.7(C)(11) to be used as presently permitted by 130.3(B)(2). An “Incident Energy Analysis,” by the very nature of arc behavior, is only a rough estimate of incident energy. The proposed added requirement to determine the “incident energy at the working distance” should not supersede the ability to use Sections 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10), and 130.7(C)(11), which is an equally valid methodology for determining the PPE required for a task. Following is proposed wording for the existing first sentence of 130.3 that better reflects the intent of this section: “130.3 Arc Flash Hazard Analysis. An arc flash hazard analysis shall determine the Arc Flash Protection Boundary. The analysis, which includes the methods of 130.3(B), shall be used to determine the protective clothing and personal protective equipment for use within the Arc Flash Protection Boundary.” Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We generally agree with the intent of the submitter to make the provisions as accurate as possible but suggest that that effort is incomplete. The text should be further modified to reflect all of what is addressed by 130.3. We additionally suggest that 130.3 (AFA) does not determine PPE but rather determines incident energy or HRC which is used to select PPE. Accordingly, we suggest the following revised text: Revise the first sentence of 130.3 to read as follows: An arc flash hazard analysis shall determine the Arc Flash Boundary, the incident energy or Hazard/Risk Category, and the appropriate levels of PPE either by matching the arc rating of arc rated garments (clothing) to meet or exceed the incident energy analysis or by matching the Hazard/Risk Category from Table 130.7(C)(9) with the protective clothing and personal protective equipment in Table 130.7(C)(10).

70E-62

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-223 Log #75 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (130.3 Exception No. 1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Palmer L. Hickman, NJATC Recommendation: Delete 130.3 Exception No. 1 and replace with a fine print note No. 3, and editorially renumber existing Exception No. 2. Exception No. 1: An arc flash hazard analysis shall not be required where all of the following conditions exist: (1) The circuit is rated 240 volts or less. (2) The circuit is supplied by one transformer. (3) The transformer supplying the circuit is rated less than 125 kVA. Exception No. 2: The requirements of 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10), and 130.7(C)(11) shall be permitted to be used in lieu of a detailed incident energy analysis. FPN No. 3: An arc flash hazard analysis may not be necessary for some three-phase systems rated less than 240 volts. See IEEE 1584 for more information. Substantiation: This recommendation is from the work of a Task Group conference call and was contained in a 9/28/09 email from the NFPA 70E Staff Liaison to members of that Task Group as a result of the work of that Task Group call. That Task Group was charged with exploring the need for developing a proposal and/or a TIA related to 130.3 Exception No. 1. Removal of the exception and replacing it with a fine print note was the consensus reached during that conference call as a result of discussions that took place during that call. My notes indicate that the exception was incorrectly taken from IEEE 1584 and was taken out of context from its use in IEEE 1584. The concept to add a FPN rather than an exception emerged during the Task Group call as a result of a review of proposals in the ROP for the 2009 edition of NFPA 70E. This ROP review uncovered a proposal recommending a FPN (rather than exception) to alert users of 70E that there may be cases where an arc flash hazard analysis may not be necessary. The recommendation to add a reference to IEEE 1584 is necessary so that those doing an arc flash hazard analysis know where guidance is available to make an informed decision about when an arc flash hazard may not be necessary. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 18 Negative: 5 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: CARPENTER, T.: The committee action should have been to Reject or, at most, Accept in Principle and have the new wording continue to be an exception. See additional comments on Proposal 70E-217. GRAY, B.: If the existing language contains an error as the submitter states, then the error should be corrected and the valuable section should remain. HAMER, P.: The proposal should be rejected. An important point to consider is that arcs are extremely difficult to sustain on low-capacity systems rated 120 volts to ground (i.e., the normal context of a 120/240 volt, or a “240 volt” single-phase system; or a 208Y/120 volt three-phase system). Experience in the field has validated this. The wording of the exception could be improved (see Proposal 70E-224 and my ballot comment) so it would apply only to systems rated at or below 120 volts, nominal, to ground, but the deletion of this exception would create confusion. In the extreme, without the present exception or a similar exception, an arc flash hazard analysis would be required even for work on a residential, single-phase, 120/240 volt panelboard. HITTEL, M.: The standard does not prescribe how to perform an arc flash hazard analysis; it states that it must be performed. The details are handled in the standard of reference for the persons performing the calculations, but this exception is useful to the audience that have no need for the details (the employee that is exposed). We should provide some guidance similar to what is currently in the standard as to the threshold/scope of the AFH Analysis. Also, I see no substantiation given that systems covered by this exemption have caused any significant arc flash injuries. See my negative comments associated with Proposal 70E-224. TIEDE, T.: We do not agree that 130.3 Exception No. 1 should be deleted. However, it is recognized that the current exception, which was represented to comply with IEEE 1584, does contain some errors. In order to accurately convey the committee’s intent these errors can, and should, be corrected as shown in Proposal 70E-226. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: BOWMAN, W.: There is a voltage below which it is difficult to sustain an arc. This occurs regardless of whether the system is three phase or single-phase. The FPN should be revised as follows to include single-phase: FPN No. 3: An arc flash hazard analysis may not be necessary for some single and three- systems rated less than 240 volts. See IEEE 1584 for more information. DROBNICK, D.: I concur with the Committee’s action to remove this exception. During this cycle there were many differing proposals concerning this exclusion. Clearly more research is needed on the sustainability of three phase arcs and their incident energy yields for equipment operating at and less than 240 volts.

REGE, T.: The committee action is correct.-Removing the generic exception for 240V and below is appropriate. However, the FPN should be modified to include exception for some single phase 120/240V systems. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-224 Log #164 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3 Exception No. 1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Paul S. Hamer, Chevron Energy Technology Company Recommendation: Revise text as follows: Exception No. 1: An arc flash hazard analysis shall not be required where all of the following conditions exist: (1) The circuit is rated 240 120 volts, nominal, to ground or less (2) The circuit is supplied by one transformer. (3) The maximum available short circuit current from the transformer supplying the circuit is rated less than 125 kVA 10 kA for a bolted three-phase or line-to-ground fault. Substantiation: Arcs are very difficult to sustain on low-short-circuit capacity systems rated 120 volts to ground (i.e., the normal context of a 120/240 volt, or “240 volt” single-phase system). See the IEEE paper, “Arching Fault Protection for Low-Voltage Power Distribution Systems - Nature of the Problem” by R. H. Kaufmann and J.C. Page, Paper 60-83, June 1960 (available through IEEE Xplore). This is why the requirement for “ground fault protection of equipment” was added to the NEC (215.10) in the 1970’s for 480Y/277 volt systems (277 volts to ground), where sustained arcs were common. At international locations, 400Y/230 volt systems are common and the application of the present exception with the 240 volt limitation would not be appropriate, since arcing faults are likely to be sustained at 230 volts to ground. This is the reason to change the exception from “240 volts or less” to “120 volts, nominal, to ground or less.” The existing “125 kVA” limit is only a general measure of an arc-flash hazard. Using the available short-circuit is better. Consider that the proposed “maximum 10 kA available fault exception” would encompass, for example, a residential 200 ampere 240/120 V single-phase service, and up to approximately a 400 ampere, 208Y/120 volt panel (fed by a 112.5 kVA three-phase transformer). Sustained arc-flash incidents are very unlikely for these applications. The 10 kA short-circuit limit would cover the intent of a “low capacity” system and include most residential 240/120 services and many 208 volt lighting transformer fed panels (e.g., a three-phase lighting transformer of 112.5 kVA rating with approximately 3% impedance). Typical single-phase systems may be limited to a 50 - 75 kVA transformer size with the 10 kA short circuit limitation. Consider the typical circuit breakers in residences or the circuit breakers in 208 volt lighting panels in many commercial buildings. These circuit breakers’ short-circuit ratings are predominantly 10 kA, and a requirement for an arc-flash hazard analysis would be excessive and unnecessary for these situations. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Sufficient testing has not been conducted to substantiate the short-circuit current limits recommended in the proposal. See the committee action on Proposal 70E-223. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 3 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: GRAY, B.: The submitter has provided a technically sound argument and corrected a perceived error in the information. Committee action should be to accept this proposal. HAMER, P.: This proposal should have been accepted. The Committee Statement is essentially asking to prove a negative. Arcs are extremely difficult to sustain on equipment installed on low-capacity systems rated 120 volts to ground. I encourage Public Comments documenting any actual sustained arcs within installed equipment that have been experienced on low capacity (less than 10 kA available short circuit current) systems rated at or below 120 volts, nominal, to ground. HITTEL, M.: The committee action should be accept. There were two central issues that were questionable about the existing exception that were addressed in this proposal. The first is the possibility of 208V systems ability to produce injurious levels of arc flash hazard energy. This is dealt with by limiting it to 120v in which there is significant evidence that arcs are very difficult to sustain on systems rated 120V to ground. Also, there was much discussion regarding the bolted fault current levels of these “smaller” systems that was limited to 10kA by this proposal. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-225 Log #224 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3 Exception No. 1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John McAlhaney, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions Recommendation: Revise the voltage threshold in Article 130.3, Exception 1, from 240 volts to 208 volts as provided below: Exception No. 1: An arc flash hazard analysis shall not be required where all of the following conditions exist: (1) The circuit is rated 208 240 volts or less.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E (2) The circuit is supplied by one transformer. (3) The transformer supplying the circuit is rated less than 125 kVA. Substantiation: IEEE Standard 1584a-2004, IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations, nor any other national consensus standard provides a technical basis for no arc flash concern at 240 volts. IEEE 1584a states that the arc-flash hazard should not be a concern for large 208 V systems fed by transformers smaller than 125 kVA. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Sufficient testing has not been conducted to substantiate the limits recommended in the proposal. See the committee action on Proposal 70E-223. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-226 Log #366 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3 Exception No. 1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Rodney J. West, Square D Company/Schneider Electric Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Exception No. 1: An arc flash hazard analysis shall not be required where all of the following conditions exist: (1) The three phase circuit is rated less than 240 volts or less. (2) The circuit is supplied by one low impedance (<3%) transformer. (3) The transformer supplying the circuit is rated less than 125 kVA. Substantiation: As evidenced by TIA 981 (which is out for voting) it is known that the current NFPA 70E 130.3 Exception 1 does not match IEEE 1584 as it was intended to do. Since the NFPA 70E committee added the wording into the 2009 edition of 70E, albeit without verifying that it matched IEEE 1584 verbatim, it is obvious that the committee recognized a benefit of adding this exception. In order to accurately convey the committee’s intent of adding the exception, the errors can, and should, be corrected. The corrected wording matches Section 4.2 of IEEE 1584-2002. However, the proposed text does include “(<3%)” which has been balloted to the IEEE 1584 committee, but the results have not been released as of the January 5, 2010 deadline for NFPA 70E Proposals. In the event that the ballot is successful, the value is included in this proposal so that that it is not considered “new material”. If the IEEE ballot is unsuccessful, the NFPA 70E committee may wish to omit the “(<3%)” part of the proposal in order to maintain correlation between the documents. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Sufficient testing has not been conducted to substantiate the limits recommended in the proposal. See the committee action on Proposal 70E-223. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: TIEDE, T.: This proposal should be accepted as it corrects the errors that exist in 130.3 Exception No. 1 by correlating the information with IEEE 1584. Further, we do not agree with the committee statement that IEEE 1584 does not substantiate the limits recommended. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-227 Log #403 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3 Exception No. 1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas E. Neal, Neal Associates Ltd. Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Exception No. 1: An arc flash hazard analysis shall not be required where all of the following conditions exist: (1) The circuit is rated 240 volts or less. (2) The circuit is supplied by one transformer. (3) The transformer supplying the circuit is rated less than 125 kVA. Exception No. 1: An arc flash hazard analysis shall not be required for equipment below 240 V unless it involves at least one 125 kVA or larger low impedance transformer in its immediate power supply (see IEEE 1584 Clause 4.2). Substantiation: Exception No. 1 is an incorrect and potentially misleading translation of IEEE 1584-02 Clause 4.2 paragraph 5, which states: “Equipment below 240 V need not be considered unless it involves at least one 125 kVA or larger low-impedance transformer in its immediate power supply.” If not carefully read the note could be misinterpreted to indicate that 208 V systems are exempt from the requirement to perform an arc flash hazard analysis. Paraphrasing the statement found in the source document as closely as possible using the necessary mandatory language provides clarity to the user of the document.

Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Sufficient testing has not been conducted to substantiate the limits recommended in the proposal. See the committee action on Proposal 70E-223. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: The proposal should be accept. The submitter more accurately reflects the intent of the exception as stated in IEEE 1584. The concern was that with the existing language, 208V systems could be interpreted to be exempted under all conditions. This language clarifies that this is not the case. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: BOWMAN, W.: This proposal is the closest to the exact language of IEEE 1584 and should be accepted. HICKMAN, P.: We suggest that the correct action would have an Accept in Part since the committee did delete the existing exception in the action on Proposal 70E-223 as the submitter suggests in this proposal. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-228 Log #408 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3 Exception No. 1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James J. Toth, III, Delta Power Systems Engineering, PC Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Exception No. 1: An arc flash hazard analysis shall not be required where all of the following conditions exist: (1) The circuit is rated 240 volts or less. (2) The circuit is supplied by one transformer. The calculated bolted three-phase momentary symmetrical fault current is less than 10 kA. (3) The transformer supplying the circuit is rated less than 125 kVA. Substantiation: The calculation of incident energy is a function of the bolted fault current. There may be instances when a large transformer (e.g., 150 kVA, 480V-208Y/120V, 6% impedance) may be included in an arc flash hazard analysis calculation, but a smaller transformer (e.g., 112.5 kVA, 480V-208Y/120V, 2.1% impedance, or a 75 kVA, 480V-208Y/120V, 1.4% impedance – these impedances were obtained from a manufacturer’s impedance data) may be excluded. In reality, the smaller transformer may have had a higher available fault current and a better chance of sustaining an arc. If the intent of this exception was to determine a point where detailed arc flash hazard analysis modeling and calculations were not required, using fault current instead of transformer kVA size would be more appropriate. (This would require a similar change to IEEE Std 1584-2002.) This would require two changes to a previously submitted proposal: (i) 30 cal /cm2 if the calculated bolted three-phase momentary symmetrical fault current is greater than 8.04 kA and less than 10 kA for grounded electrical systems. (v) 37 cal /cm2 if the calculated bolted three-phase momentary symmetrical fault current is greater than 5.76 kA and less than 10 kA for ungrounded electrical systems. A recent IEEE paper (“Effect of Insulating Barriers in Arc Flash Testing”, IAS, vol. 44, no. 5, pp 1354-1359, September/October 2008) documented sustaining (for 0.1 seconds - the test station breaker was set to open after 6 cycles) a 4500A arc with a 12.7 mm gap at 208V and a 10,000A arc with a 32 mm gap at 208V. Additional testing may indicate maximum arcing times which can be used to define maximum incident energies for various magnitudes of fault current. For short-circuit studies of 208-volt electrical systems, fault current calculations are generally not required once the calculated fault current falls below 10 kA if all of your protective devices have a minimum interrupting rating of 10 kA. (Based on the X/R ratio at the point of fault, you may need to have your calculated fault currents below 10 kA for proper application.) Using a similar constraint would also allow you to limit the scope of your arc flash hazard analysis modeling. Once you knew the fault current was below a certain level and a maximum arcing time for that current was known, a maximum incident energy level can be assigned. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Sufficient testing has not been conducted to substantiate the limits recommended in the proposal. See the committee action on Proposal 70E-223. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: See my ballot comment on Proposal 70E-224. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-229 Log #476 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (130.3 Exception No. 1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Kolak, Praxis Corp. Recommendation: Delete the exception suggesting that 240 volt transformers less than 125 kVA do not present an arc-flash hazard. Substantiation: I was a Journeyman Lineman for 13 years and received first-degree burns on my face and neck while working on a 120/240 volt SINGLE PHASE circuit fed by a 50 KVA pole-mounted transformer. I have since become an Electrical Engineer and seen several occasions where 112.5 kVA transformer installations have failed catastrophically. Unless the committee members are willing to take a crescent wrench and stick it between the terminals of a 208v 112.5 kVA transformer wearing only street clothes, I don’t think you should connote in the 70E that these installations present no arc-flash hazard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: The action on the proposal should be to “Reject.” Systems rated 240 volts can experience an arc from an accidental short circuit, but the arc does not sustain itself beyond approximately one cycle (0.016 second). An arc of this duration gives off some heat and may expel some metal splatter, but is not an “arc flash hazard” by the definition of this standard. With respect to the injury described, a first degree burn is the equivalent of a sunburn and is a relatively minor injury. It does not meet the criteria for the Arc Flash Protection Boundary (i.e., When an arc flash hazard exists, an approach limit at a distance from a prospective arc source within which a person could receive a second degree burn if an electrical arc flash were to occur.) See the proposed definitions for Arc (Proposal 70E-15) and Arc Flash (Proposal 70E-17). What the proposer experienced appears to have been an “arc,” considering the content of the substantiation. The exception is not meant to address catastrophic failures of transformers, which are isolated events where a person is not likely to be present, but only the need for an arc flash hazard analysis when work is being done. HITTEL, M.: The action should be to reject the proposal. The submitter uses a personal experience with a first degree burn as substantiation to change the existing language. The standards for arc flash hazard calculation do not purport to protect anyone from a first degree burn. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: DROBNICK, D.: “Bravo” to the submitter of this proposal. Thanks for providing your “real world” experience. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-230 Log #528 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3 Exception No. 1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Bobby J. Gray, Hoydar/Buck, Inc. Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Exception No.1: An arc flash hazard analysis shall not be required where all of the following conditions exist: (1) The circuit is rated 240 volts or less. (2) The circuit is supplied by one transformer or dc power source. (3) The transformer or dc power source supplying the circuit is rated less than 125 kVA. Substantiation: This proposal is the work of NFPA 70E 2012 DC Hazards Task Group whose members include: Tom Carpenter, Jim Coady, Gary Dreifuerst, Dan Doan, Lloyd Gordon, Bobby Gray, Mike Hittel, Hugh Hoagland, Greg Leask, Mark Ode, and PK Sen. Currently, the exception to conduct an arc flash hazard analysis applies only to AC systems. This proposal will expand the application to DC systems as well. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Sufficient testing has not been conducted to substantiate the limits recommended in the proposal. See the committee action on Proposal 70E-223. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-231 Log #29 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3 Exception No. 2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Charles Helmick, AVO Training Institute, Inc. Recommendation: Exception No. 2: The requirements of 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10), and 130.7(C)(11) shall be permitted to be used in lieu as an interim measure before the completion of a detailed incident energy analysis. Substantiation: The problem is that some people are of the opinion that the task tables are exhaustive in their scope to perform an arc flash analysis. The shock analysis is based on known nominal voltages. The arc flash analysis is based on known fault currents and clearing times. The tables are based on assumptions of fault current and clearing times which are, at best, an interim measure until the actual fault currents and clearing times can be determined by an analysis. It should also be noted that an analysis according to the first sentence of 130.3 “shall determine an arc flash protection boundary” and the tables do not provide that information. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: It is not the intent of the committee to disallow the use of the Tables 130.7C(9), C(10), and C(11) if used within their limitations. Use of the “table method” is necessary in many instances where the worker does not have access to the results of a detailed incident energy analysis. In an ideal world, where all electrical equipment was marked with available incident energy, the table could be eliminated, but until that time, the availability of the “table method” will reduce injuries and save lives. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: PACE, D.: This Proposal should have been Accepted. The Tables should not be allowed to be used indefinitely in lieu of performing a detailed incident energy analysis. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-232 Log #122 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3 Exception No. 2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: E. W. Buss, Mashpee, MA Recommendation: Change exception as fiollows: “...shall be permitted to be used in lieu of a detailed incident energy analysis if the short circuit currents and fault clearing times at the location of the work meet the requirements of the notes in Table 130.7(C)(9).” Substantiation: Incident energy analysis is not defined in article 100. Adding the reminder here that fault clearing times and short circuit currents are required even if using the Table reminds users that the Table is not a “free pass” to use when they do not have power system data. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Tables can be used in lieu of incident energy analysis, not the arc flash hazard analysis. A definition of “Incident Energy Analysis” was added by the committee action on Proposal 70E-20. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We would have supported an Accept in Part by deleting “detailed” as indicated in the recommendation. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-233 Log #451 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3 Exception No. 2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Mark Rucker, Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. Recommendation: Revise text to read: Exception No. 2: The requirements of 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10), and 130.7(C)(11) shall be permitted to be used in lieu of a detailed incident energy analysis arc flash hazard analysis. Substantiation: “Incident energy analysis” is defined in 130.3(B)(1) as determining “the incident energy exposure of the worker.” “Arc flash hazard analysis” includes in its definition the selection of PPE within the arc flash protection boundary. Since Tables 130.7(C)(9)(10) and (11) deal with the selection of PPE, then the use of “arc flash hazard analysis” is correct in this instance. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Tables can be used in lieu of incident energy analysis, not the arc flash hazard analysis.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: BOWMAN, W.: The action taken on Proposal 70E-331 will now place arc flash boundary information into Table 130.7(C) (9) for each task. 130.3 Exception No. 2 should be correlated with those actions to notify the user that they can use the arc flash boundary information in those tables. Table 130.7(C) (10) has been joined with Table (C)(11), therefore the reference to (C)(11) should be deleted. Exception No. 2 should be revised as follows: The requirements of 130.7(C)(9), and 130.7(C)(10), and 130.7(C)(11) shall be permitted to be used in lieu of a detailed incident energy analysis and shall be permitted to be used to determine the arc flash boundary. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-234 Log #474 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3 Exception No. 2) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: It was the action of the Technical Correlating Committee that this proposal be reported as “Reject” since less than two-thirds of the members eligible to vote have voted in the affirmative. Submitter: Danny Liggett, DuPont Recommendation: Revise Exception No. 2 of 130.3 to read as follows Exception No. 2: The requirements of 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10), and 130.7(C)(11) shall be permitted to be used in lieu of a detailed incident energy analysis only where the conditions outlined in the notes of the respective table are met. All facilities built after January 1, 2012 will be required to have a detailed arc flash hazard analysis. Substantiation: The exception is a loophole that is being abused and endangering electricians. Employers are using this exception to avoid performing a detained arc flash hazard analysis. The table 130.7(C)(9) is not being applied correctly. In one example, an employer has used the table which indicates requiring only 8 cal/cm2 arc flash protection. A detailed analysis determined the incident energy was over 40 cal/cm2. This kind of abuse will continue until a limit is set on how long this exception can be used. Committee Meeting Action: Reject The committee does not accept the recommended revision to the first sentence because the notes have been moved into the table by the committee action on Proposal 70E-331. The committee revises the accepted portion of the recommendation by deleting the word “detailed”. Committee Statement: The notes have been deleted and moved by the committee action on Proposal 70E-331. The committee action to recommend the requirement for arc flash hazard analysis to be performed is to move toward calculating incident energy for new facilities and not to rely on the task tables. The committee encourages public comment on the accepted portion of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 14 Negative: 9 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: BOWMAN, W.: We are voting Negative on the action to Accept Proposal 70E-234. While the concept of requiring detailed incident energy calculations is commendable there are several reasons why this is not practical. First, the 70E is a safety standard and is typically not enforceable by law. Second, even if the language was accepted as written there would still be a much larger percentage of buildings that do not have and never will have an incident energy analysis performed on their electrical system. While the tables are not perfect, they are another tool to assist the contractor and electrical worker to quickly understand and identify where the electrical hazards may exist in a facility regardless of whether a calculation is performed or if a sticker is placed on the equipment. CARPENTER, T.: The committee action should have been to reject. Adding an arbitrary date adds no value to the standard. GRAY, B.: As written, this would exclude facilities built before the date identified as requiring an arc flash analysis. I don’t think this was the intent of the proposal. HAMER, P.: This proposal should be “Rejected.” The state-of-the-art of the calculation methods used to calculate incident energy has not matured to the point where it can be stated that the analysis can be made definitively and with precision. In fact, this may never be the case due to the random behavior of arcs. The added requirement for an “arc flash hazard analysis” after 2012 may actually result in a false sense of security and a less safe work place because the calculation method is undefined and is most likely undefinable. This proposal seems to drive the employer to a zero risk environment, and the only way to do this is to work in a world without electricity. For example, the hazard may be high (in the case of unpredictable equipment failure) but the frequency of the event (risk) is extremely low. See Article 130.7(C)(9), FPN No. 1. This judgment and experience of the Technical Committee has stood the test of time through usage of the hazard /risk approach for various tasks since

the introduction of the approach in the 2000 Edition. No specific incidents are cited in the substantiation that electricians have been endangered by the use of Table 130.7(C)(9). HICKMAN, P.: We are voting Negative on the action to Accept in Part, Proposal 70E-234. Our comments are as follows: We are in favor of an arc flash analysis (AFA) being performed for all equipment covered by 130.3 but have concerns with the application, enforcement, and usability of the accepted text. We recognize that this would include determination of the Arc Flash Boundary per 130.3(A), determination of either the incident energy or HRC per 130.3(B), and a label in accordance with 130.3(C). However, we are concerned with some of the accepted text. We are not certain what “all facilities” means. Is it an entirely new facility, an addition to an existing facility, the addition of new electrical equipment (such as switchboards, panelboards, or MCCs) in an existing facility, or something else. We are also not certain as to what is expected when someone works in a facility after January 1, 2012 and wants to be in compliance with 70E. If the facility was a “new facility” after January 1, 2012 and an AFA was not performed, what is expected of the person or entity that performs the work at the time. Are they to wait for the owner of the facility to have the AFA performed before work is performed or is something else? REGE, T.: The committee action should be reject. This proposal is outside the scope of the document. NFPA 70E has no jurisdictional authority over “all facilities built after January 1, 2012” as stated in the accepted portion of the proposal. SAPORITA, V.: Proposed text would require an arc-flash analysis for “all facilities”. No substantiation has been provided that would justify the need for even single family residences. We also understand that the submitter intended to require “an incident energy analysis” after 1/1/12, rather than the “arc flash hazard analysis”. TIEDE, T.: This proposal is outside the scope of the document and should be rejected. NFPA 70E has no enforcement authority over installations in “all facilities built after January 1, 2012”. WILMER, K.: Committee action should be reject. This proposal is outside the scope of the document. NFPA 70E has no authority to require “all facilities” built after an arbitrary date to have arc flash hazard analysis. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HITTEL, M.: For clarity, if the action passes, the following will be added: “All facilities built after January 1, 2012 will be required to have an arc flash hazard analysis.” WIDUP, R.: Requiring a facility to perform a detailed arc flash hazard analysis if built after January 2012 is an important requirement and is not onerous to the builder or owner of the facility. Who better to perform an arc flash hazard analysis than those involved with the design and build out of facility? At this stage of the project the data is available and “not lost” and the study can be performed in the most efficient manner. Quantifying the hazard from Day One will help the electrical worker in the field assess the hazards he or she will be exposed to on a daily basis. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-235 Log #365 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3 Exception No. 3 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Rodney J. West, Square D Company/Schneider Electric Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Exception No. 3: Where the electrical system and associated arc flash hazard analysis is maintained under qualified engineering supervision, a new arc flash hazard analysis shall not be required where the equipment has been field marked with a label containing the available incident energy or required level of PPE. (C) Equipment Labeling. Equipment shall be field marked with a label containing the available incident energy or required level of PPE. Substantiation: The value of field labeling electrical equipment only exists if the arc flash analysis does not have to be repeated by the next electrical worker performing work on the equipment and if the information on the label is being used in a controlled environment. No provision exists in the present language for the electrical worker to use an existing equipment label in place of performing a complete arc flash analysis each time work is performed. The proposed Exception (3) relocates language to allow the use of an existing label directly in lieu of re-performing the arc flash analysis on a system that is in a controlled environment maintained by a qualified engineer. The proposed language revision provides a means to retain a safe work environment and generates value from the enhanced efficiencies of not needing to perform an arc flash analysis each time work is performed. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The existing requirement does not mandate that a new arc-flash analysis be completed each time work is performed. Arc flash hazard analysis updating is addressed in 130.3. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Explanation of Negative: TIEDE, T.: This proposal should be accepted. The label formats accepted in proposal 70E-260 now contain even more components of an arc flash hazard analysis. The proposed Exception (3) would relocate the labeling language to allow the use of existing labels on equipment that is in a controlled environment maintained by a qualified engineer. If the label is not in a controlled, maintained environment, then it’s value is questionable at best and inaccurate at worst. Labels in such environments may actually reduce worker safety. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-236 Log #9 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3(A)) _______________________________________________________________ Note: This proposal appeared as Comment 70E-468 (Log #509) which was held from the Annual 2008 ROC on Proposal 70E-218. The recommendation in Proposal 70E-218 reads as follows: Revise 130.3(A) as follows: 130.3(A) Flash Protection Boundary. For systems that are 600V or less, the Flash Protection Boundary shall be 4.0 ft, based on the product of the clearing time of 6 2 cycles (0.033 second) and the available bolted fault current of 50kA or any combination not exceeding 300 100kA cycles (5000 1667 ampere seconds). For clearing times and bolted fault currents other than 300 100kA cycles, or under engineering supervision, [...]. Submitter: Gordon Robertson, American Petroleum Institute (API) Recommendation: Reject the proposal and use the wording suggested below (the underlines and strikeouts are of the original text from NFPA 70E-2004): “(1) Voltage Levels Between 50 and 600 Volts. For systems that are rated between 50 and 600 volts or less, the Flash Protection Boundary shall be 4.0 ft for an arc in open air based on a maximum clearing times of 6 cycles (0.1 second) and the a maximum available bolted fault current of 50 kA or any combination not exceeding 300 kA cycles (5000 ampere seconds). For situations where the potential arc flash is directed out of a cubicle or enclosure toward the worker (an “arc in a box” situation), the Flash Protection Boundary shall be 10.0 ft based on a maximum clearing time of 6 cycles (0.1 second) and a maximum available bolted fault current of 50 kA. For clearing times and bolted fault currents other than 300 kA cycles, or under engineering supervision, the Flash Protection Boundary shall alternatively be permitted to be calculated in accordance with the following general formula:” [delete the formula; see ROP 70E-208] ” Continue this section with (in the spirit of accepted Proposal 70E-222) with the following sentence: “For clearing times or bolted fault currents exceeding 6 cycles (0.1 second) or 50 kA, respectively, the Flash Protection Boundary shall be calculated.” Continue 130.3(A) with: (2) Voltage Levels Above 600 Volts. At voltage levels above 600 volts… [ROP 70E-200 and NFPA Style Manual]. Substantiation: Refer to the equation of Annex D, “D.6.1 Arc in Open Air.” Substituting 50 kA and a clearing time of 0.1 second, the calculated incident energy at a distance of 4 feet is 1.2 cal/cm2 (the incident energy value for the Flash Protection Boundary). It is just not “… any combination not exceeding 300 kA cycles (5000 ampere seconds).” Further, if the “Arc in a Cubic Box” calculation of D.6.2 is used for a current of 50 kA and a clearing time of 0.1 second, the distance required Flash Protection Boundary is almost 10 feet (the exact calculation results in a 111 inch distance from the arc to result in an incident energy of 1.2 cal/cm2), so the Flash Protection Boundary needs to be greater than 4 feet for an “arc in a box” situation. A distance of 10 feet is suggested in the recommended wording of this comment. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-237 deletes the text that is the subject of this recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: This should be an “Accept in Principle.” To account for text changes in the 2009 Edition, make the following changes to the existing 2009 Edition text based on this proposal: (A) Arc Flash Protection Boundary. (1) Voltage Levels Between 50 Volts and 600 Volts. In those cases where detailed arc flash hazard analysis calculations are not performed for systems that are between 50 volts and 600 volts, the Arc Flash Protection Boundary shall be 4.0 ft for an arc in open air, based on a maximum the product of clearing time of 6 cycles (0.1 sec) 2 cycles (0.033 sec) and the a maximum available bolted fault current of 50 kA. or any combination not exceeding 100 kA cycles (1667 ampere seconds). For situations where the potential arc flash is directed out of a cubicle or enclosure toward the worker (an “arc in a box” situation), the Arc Flash Protection Boundary shall be 10.0 ft based on a maximum clearing time of 6 cycles (0.1 second) and a maximum available bolted fault current of 50 kA. When the product of clearing times and bolted fault current exceeds 100 kA cycles, the Arc Flash Protection Boundary shall be calculated. For clearing times or bolted fault currents exceeding 6 cycles

(0.1 second) or 50 kA, respectively, the Arc Flash Protection Boundary shall be calculated. Also to account for changes in the 2009 Edition, the Annex section numbers have changed and this proposal’s substantiation should read: “Refer to the equation of Annex D, “D.5.1 Arc in Open Air.” Substituting 50 kA and a clearing time of 0.1 second, the calculated incident energy at a distance of 4 feet is 1.2 cal/cm2 (the incident energy value for the Flash Protection Boundary). It is just not “… any combination not exceeding 300 kA cycles (5000 ampere seconds).” Further, if the “Arc in a Cubic Box” calculation of D.5.2 is used for a current of 50 kA and a clearing time of 0.1 second, the distance required Flash Protection Boundary is almost 10 feet (the exact calculation results in a 111 inch distance from the arc to result in an incident energy of 1.2 cal/cm2), so the Flash Protection Boundary needs to be greater than 4 feet for an “arc in a box” situation. A distance of 10 feet is suggested in the recommended wording of this comment.” Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-237 Log #395 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part (130.3(A) and Table 130.7(C)(9) Notes 1-4) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas E. Neal, Neal Associates Ltd. Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: (A) Arc Flash Protection Boundary. (1) Voltage Levels Between 50 Volts and 600 Volts. In those cases where detailed arc flash hazard analysis calculations are not performed for systems that are between 50 volts and 600 volts, the Arc Flash Protection Boundary shall be 4.0 ft, based on the product of clearing time of 2 cycles (0.033 sec) and the available bolted fault current of 50 kA or any combination not exceeding 100 kA cycles (1667 ampere seconds). When the product of clearing times and bolted fault current exceeds 100 kA cycles, the Arc Flash Protection Boundary shall be calculated. (2) Voltage Levels Above 600 Volts. At voltage levels above 600 volts, the Arc Flash Protection Boundary shall be the distance at which the incident energy equals 5 J/cm2 (1.2 cal/cm2). For situations where fault-clearing time is equal to or less than 0.1 sec, the Arc Flash Protection Boundary shall be the distance at which the incident energy level equals 6.24 J/cm2 (1.5 cal/cm2). The Arc Flash Protection Boundary shall be the distance at which the incident energy equals 5 J/cm2 (1.2 cal/cm2). FPN: For information on estimating the Arc Flash Protection Boundary, see Annex D or Notes 1-4 in Table 130.7(C)(9). Table 130.7(C)(9) Specific Notes (as referenced in the table): 1. Parameters: Maximum of 25 kA short circuit current available; maximum of 0.03 sec (2 cycle) fault clearing time. Arc Flash Protection Boundary for equipment rated 240 V and below using above parameters: solidly grounded system = 16 inches; ungrounded system = 19 inches Arc Flash Protection Boundary for equipment rated >240 V and up to 600 V (with molded case or insulated case circuit breakers)using above parameters: solidly grounded system = 26 inches; ungrounded system = 30 inches 2. Parameters: Maximum of 65 kA short circuit current available; maximum of 0.03 sec (2 cycle) fault clearing time. Arc Flash Protection Boundary for equipment rated up to 600 V using above parameters: solidly grounded system = 46 inches; ungrounded system = 53 inches 3. Parameters: Maximum of 42 kA short circuit current available; maximum of 0.33 sec (20 cycle) fault clearing time. Arc Flash Protection Boundary for equipment rated up to 600 V using above parameters: solidly grounded system = 142 inches; ungrounded system = 165 inches 4. Parameters: Maximum of 35 kA short circuit current available; maximum of up to 0.5 sec (30 cycle) fault clearing time. Arc Flash Protection Boundary for 600 V Class Switchgear (with power circuit breakers or fused switches) using above parameters: solidly grounded system = 196 inches; ungrounded system = 233 inches. Substantiation: As stated in 130.3(A) A default arc flash protection boundary has been set at 48 inches for individuals that do not perform incident energy calculations. These same individuals are likely to use the hazard/risk category method of selecting PPE found in Tables 130.7(C)(9) to 130.7(C)(11). The 2 cycles (0.033 sec) and the available bolted fault current of 50 kA parameters referred to in 130.3(A) are not found in the notes in Table 130.7(C)(9). Further, as can be seen in the proposed new text, when the arc flash protection boundary is calculated using the notes in Table 130.7(C)(9) the arc flash protection boundary in some instances significantly exceeds the “default” 48 inch dimension. This leads to confusion and a potentially dangerous situation for users of the hazard/risk category method. Deleting the “default” 48 inch arc flash protection boundary and directing users of the document to Annex D for calculation methods or to the revised notes 1-4 in Table 130.7(C)(9) will provide clarity and enhance safety for the users of the document. The arc flash protection boundaries were calculated using the IEEE 1584 method.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E As stated in 130.3(A) A default arc flash protection boundary has been set at 48 inches for individuals that do not perform incident energy calculations. These same individuals are likely to use the hazard/risk category method of selecting PPE found in Tables 130.7(C)(9) to 130.7(C)(11). The 2 cycles (0.033 sec) and the available bolted fault current of 50 kA parameters referred to in 130.3(A) are not found in the notes in Table 130.7(C)(9). Further, as can be seen in the proposed new text, when the arc flash protection boundary is calculated using the notes in Table 130.7(C)(9) the arc flash protection boundary in some instances significantly exceeds the “default” 48 inch dimension. This leads to confusion and a potentially dangerous situation for users of the hazard/risk category method. Deleting the “default” 48 inch arc flash protection boundary and directing users of the document to Annex D for calculation methods or to the revised notes 1-4 in Table 130.7(C)(9) will provide clarity and enhance safety for the users of the document. The arc flash protection boundaries were calculated using the IEEE 1584 method. (spreadsheet shown in Supporting Material). Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle in Part The committee action is as follows: 1. The committee accepts in principle the addition of arc flash boundaries. 2. The committee accepts the deletion of 130.3(A)(1) & (2). 3. Revise the recommendation for 130.3(A) to read: The arc flash boundary for systems 50 volts and greater shall be the distance at which the incident energy equals 5 J/cm2 (1.2 cal/cm2). 3. The committee rejects the revision to the FPN. Committee Statement: The committee rejects the addition to the FPN because the specific notes have been incorporated into Table 130.7(C)(9) by their action on Proposal 70E-331. The committee has met the intent of the submitter with respect to adding arc flash protection boundaries for individual parts of Table 130.7(C)(9). See the committee action and statement on Proposal 70E-331. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: This proposal should be rejected. The text of this section should not be deleted. See my comment on Proposal 70E-236. IEEE Std 1584 is only one of many methods that can be used to determine the Arc Flash Protection Boundary and it is misleading to list the additional proposed information in the notes of Table 130.7(C)(9). Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We suggest to additional revisions as recommendations to be handled as Comments in the ROC meeting: 1. Globally in the 70E standard [in locations including, but not limited to, 130.3(A), 130.7(C)(5) and Table 130.7(C)(11)] delete the parallel reference to J/cm2 adjacent to cal/cm2 since the arc rating of arc rated clothing is only indicated as cal/cm2 2. Add an Informational Note to 130.3(A): Informational Note: See Table 130.7(C)(9) for the Arc Flash Boundary when an incident energy analysis is not performed. STALLCUP, J.: We feel the arc flash protection boundaries are necessary for smaller facilities who do not have the staff or means to perform the calculations in detail. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-238 Log #74 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3(A)(1)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Palmer L. Hickman, National Joint Apprentice & Training Committee Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Voltage Levels Between 50 Volts and 600 Volts. The Arc Flash Protection Boundary shall be 4.0 ft based on the product of any combination of clearing time and available bolted fault current not exceeding 100 kA cycles (1667 ampere seconds). The Arc Flash Protection Boundary shall also be permitted to be calculated. Substantiation: This proposal is intended to editorially increase usability. The words “for systems that are between 50 volts and 600 volts” are proposed to be deleted since the title sets those voltage parameters and it seems redundant. The words “based on 2 cycles (0.033 sec)...and 50 kA” are proposed to be deleted since any combination not exceeding 100 kA cycles seems to be the intent of the provisions of 130.3(A)(1). The words “in those cases where detailed arc flash analysis calculations are not performed” are proposed to be deleted since it is not clear what “detailed” arc flash hazard analysis calculations are. In addition, it is permissible to either use the conditional 4 ft. boundary or calculate the arc flash protection boundary. It seems that calculating the arc flash protection boundary might be an example of detailed arc flash hazard analysis calculations and therefore would contradict the text of 130.3(A)(1) in the 2009 edition. The words “When the product of clearing times and bolted fault current exceeds 100 kA cycles” are proposed to be deleted since the intent of 130.3(A)

(1) seems to allow the arc flash protection boundary to be calculated both when the product of clearing times and bolted fault current exceeds 100 kA cycles and also when it does not. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-237 deletes the text that is the subject of this recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: See my comments on Proposal 70E-236 for changes that should be incorporated into this section as an “Accept in Principle.”. The text of the section should not be deleted. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-239 Log #531 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3(A)(1)) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: It was the action of the Technical Correlating Committee that this proposal be reported as “Reject” to correlate with the action taken on Proposal 70E-237. Submitter: Bobby J. Gray, Hoydar/Buck, Inc. Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: AC Voltage Levels Between From 50 Volts and Through 600 Volts. [Remainder of section unchanged.] Substantiation: This proposal is the work of NFPA 70E 2012 DC Hazards Task Group whose members include: Tom Carpenter, Jim Coady, Gary Dreifuerst, Dan Doan, Lloyd Gordon, Bobby Gray, Mike Hittel, Hugh Hoagland, Greg Leask, Mark Ode, and PK Sen. Currently, the requirement to complete an Arc Flash Hazard Analysis using 130.3(A) is not adequate for dc systems. The calculations to determine the Arc Flash Protection Boundary are based on the product of bolted fault current and clearing time in cycles. The evaluation has a basis in the techniques described in Annex D, which are all ac system evaluations. This proposal specifies the application is for ac systems and is companion to other proposals that will provide specific criteria related to dc arc flash exposure. Existing language changed to comply with manual of style and readability. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: BOWMAN, W.: This proposal should have been rejected since proposal 70E-237 deleted 130.3(A) (1). Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-240 Log #390 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3(A)(1) and 130.3(A)(2)) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: The Technical Correlating Committee directs that the committee clarify the action on this proposal with respect to the action taken on Proposal 70E-237. This action will be considered as a public comment. Submitter: David A. Pace, Olin Corporation Recommendation: Change 130.3(A)(1) to 130.3(A) having the title “Arc Flash Protection Boundary,” deleting the title “Voltage Levels Between 50 Volts and 600 Volts.” Add a sentence to the end of the new 130.3(A) paragraph to read as follows: In those cases when detailed arc flash hazard analysis calculations are performed for systems operating between 50 Volts and 600 volts, or above 600 Volts, the Arc Flash Protection Boundary shall be the distance at which the incident energy equals 5 J/cm2 (1.2 cal/cm2). Substantiation: The reality is that all methods used to predict the incident energy levels using calculations are just that, approximations and predictions using the best available knowledge to do so. None of the methods can be proven to be exact nor can the energy released during an incident be measured with the degree of accuracy to determine the level to within.3 cal/cm2. Also, it is impractical with these limitations to expect people implementing these requirements to determine to within.3 cal/cm2 the energy that would be present. There would be no difference in the injury sustained should someone be exposed to either level. Clearly there are differences between lower and higher voltage events but providing two incident energy levels only.3 cal/cm2 apart is unreasonable. This introduces a source of confusion and complication that serves no good purpose. This proposed change removes this from the document and provides guidance at the more conservative level. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-237 deletes the text that is the subject of this recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: The proposal should be rejected, but for a different reason than stated (i.e., the action on Proposal 70E-237). The present distinction for faults of less than 0.1 second for the burn effects on human skin is valid and was well documented during prior revision cycles of NFPA 70E. See my comments on Proposal 70E-236 for changes that require separate considerations for 50 to 600 volts and above 600 volts. HICKMAN, P.: We suggest that the correct action may have been Accept in Principle in Part since part of the recommendation was accepted in the parent text of 130.3(A) in the action on Proposal 70E-237. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-241 Log #61 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3(A)(2)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Palmer L. Hickman, National Joint Apprentice & Training Committee Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 130.3(A)(2) Voltage Levels Above 600 Volts. At voltage levels above 600 volts, the arc flash protection boundary shall be the distance at which the incident energy equals 5 J/cm2 (1.2 cal/cm2). For situations where fault clearing time is equal to or less than 0.1 see, the Arc Flash Protection Boundary shall be the distance at which the incident energy level equals 6.24 J/cm2 (1.5 cal/cm2). Substantiation: This proposal is intended to eliminate an inconsistency within 130.3(A)(2). NFPA 70E defines an arc flash protection boundary where an arc flash hazard exists as an approach limit at a distance from a prospective arc source within which a person could receive a second degree burn if an electrical arc flash were to occur. The first sentence of 130.3(A)(2) indicates that arc flash protection boundary is the distance where a worker would be exposed to 1.2 cal/cm2. The fault-clearing time is factored into that incident energy exposure determination. Since a second-degree burn will occur at 1.2 cal/cm2 it is inconsistent to allow the higher exposure of a 1.5 cal/cm2 calorie exposure as the determination of the onset of a second degree burn. The 0.1 second clearing time indicated in the second sentence of 130.3(A)(2) is factored into incident energy determination. Since a second degree burn will occur 1.2 cal/cm2, as indicated in the first sentence of 130.3(A)(2), it is recommended that the second sentence be deleted to eliminate inconsistent information. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-237 deletes the text that is the subject of this recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: See my comment on Proposal 70E-240. HICKMAN, P.: We suggest that the correct action may have been Accept in Principle in Part since part of the recommendation was accepted in the parent text of 130.3(A) in the action on Proposal 70E-237. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-242 Log #532 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3(A)(2) (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Bobby J. Gray, Hoydar/Buck, Inc. Recommendation: (1) New new 130.3(A)(2) to read as follows: DC Voltage Levels Above 50 Volts Through 600 Volts. In those cases where detailed arc flash hazard analysis calculations are not performed for systems that are above 50 volts through 600 volts, the Arc Flash Protection Boundary shall be 4.0 ft, based on the product of an arc duration of 0.25 sec with an available bolted fault current of 25 kA or any combination not exceeding 6250 ampere-seconds. Where the product of the clearing time and bolted fault current exceeds 6250 ampere-seconds, the Arc Flash Protection Boundary shall be calculated. Informational Note No.1: DC arc flash is a recognized hazard that is difficult to analyze. Researchers are working on this hazard, and up-to-date information can be obtained at the IEEE/NFPA Research Project website: http://standards.ieee.org/esrc/arcflash/index.html. Informational Note No.2: See Annex D for best available methods of calculation. (2) Renumber existing 130.3(A)(2) to 130.3(A)(3) Substantiation: This proposal is the work of NFPA 70E 2012 DC Hazards Task Group whose members include: Tom Carpenter, Jim Coady, Gary Dreifuerst, Dan Doan, Lloyd Gordon, Bobby Gray, Mike Hittel, Hugh Hoagland, Greg Leask, Mark Ode, and PK Sen. Currently, the requirement to complete an Arc Flash Hazard Analysis using 130.3(A) is not adequate for dc systems. As a technical substantiation, this proposal uses information contained in the attached papers: “Arc Flash

Calculations for Exposures to DC Systems” by DR Doan; “DC Arc Models and Incident Energy Calculations” by RF Ammerman et. al.; and “DC Arc Hazard Assessment Phase II” by C. Keyes and C. Maurice. This approach to DC arc flash analysis is used currently in Canada to establish protection schemes for workers potentially exposed to DC arc flash hazards. The informational notes will provide an explanation that until more accurate testing can be accomplished, the best available theoretical modeling is provided to aid the user in attempting to protect the worker adequately. A companion proposal will place alternate calculation methods in Annex D. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-237 has removed the conditional arc flash protection boundary. The committee concludes that the arc flash protection boundary for ac and dc systems is to be calculated. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: Since there is no industry consensus standards for how to perform calculations on DC systems, we are creating a condition where the user cannot conform to the requirements. I support us driving the technical community to give us this tool, but have reservations when we require it before there is a method. We have included a method in the Annex, but it is not a requirement when placed in an Annex. The action should be accept in principle and in part accepting that there is no way, at this time, to perform this calculation. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: The proposal should be rejected, but for a different reason than stated (i.e., the action on Proposal 70E-237). Since this is new information based on recent research and measurements regarding dc, suggest that this possibly be included as an informative Annex rather than mandatory text. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-243 Log #533 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3(A)(2)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Bobby J. Gray, Hoydar/Buck, Inc. Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: AC and DC Voltage Levels Above 600 Volts. [Remainder of section unchanged.] Substantiation: This proposal is the work of NFPA 70E 2012 DC Hazards Task Group whose members include: Tom Carpenter, Jim Coady, Gary Dreifuerst, Dan Doan, Lloyd Gordon, Bobby Gray, Mike Hittel, Hugh Hoagland, Greg Leask, Mark Ode, and PK Sen. Currently, the requirement to complete an Arc Flash Hazard Analysis using 130.3(A) is not adequate for dc systems. The calculations to determine the Arc Flash Protection Boundary are based on the product of bolted fault current and clearing time in cycles. The evaluation has a basis in the techniques described in Annex D, which are all ac system evaluations. This proposal specifies the application is for ac systems and is companion to other proposals that will provide specific criteria related to dc arc flash exposure. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-237 has removed the voltage based provision for arc flash calculation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: See my comment on Proposal 70E-242. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-244 Log #120 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (130.3(B)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: E. W. Buss, Mashpee, MA Recommendation: Add to the end of the paragraph...”protective equipment : for each work task: Substantiation: Some users interpret the existing paragraph to mean that the choice of either an incident energy analysis or the use of the tables is a facility wide decision; that if you do an incident energy analysis for most of the facility, you cannot use the tables for other parts of the facility. This proposal eliminates this interpretation; a user will be able to use either for a specific task. The method used still needs to be documented as noted earlier in the paragraph “... and the employer shall document”. Even when a complete system calculation is done, it does not mean that the calculation has to extend down to each and every 120 v circuit. For those cases the use of the tables should be acceptable. Committee Meeting Action: Accept

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: The additional wording actually introduces confusion rather than improving clarity. HICKMAN, P.: We agree with the intent of the submitter but are concerned that the accepted text will literally require an incident energy calculation for each “work task” if (B)(1) is used to comply with 130.3(B). Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-245 Log #243 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (130.3(B)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James T. Dollard, Jr., IBEW Local 98 Recommendation: New text to read as follows: Add a statement to 130.3(B) indicating that the requirements of Article 130.7 apply regardless of the method(s) used to select the equipment. (B) Protective Clothing and Other Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for Application with an Arc Flash Hazard Analysis. Where it has been determined that work will be performed within the Arc Flash Protection Boundary identified by 130.3(A), one of the following methods shall be used for the selection of protective clothing and other personal protective equipment. The requirements of 130.7 shall apply regardless of the method used to select the equipment. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the Tables Task Group appointed by NFPA 70E Chairman Dave Dini. The task group consisted of Larry Ayer, Palmer Hickman, Jim White, Ron Widup, Vince Saporita, Daniel Roberts, Mike Doherty, Tom Neal, Paul Dobrowsky, John Luke, David Wallace, Daleep Mohla, Paul Hamer, Eric Glaude and Jim Dollard. It is not readily apparent to users of the document that the requirements of 130.7 Personal and Other Protective Equipment apply when PPE is selected using the “task tables” hazard/risk category method. The statement clarifies that the requirements 130.7 apply regardless of the method used to select PPE. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: BOWMAN, W.: Proposal 70E-245 needs to be rejected. Section 130.7(C)(9) and (C)(10) only applies when using the HRC Tables. However, adding the last sentence in 130.3(B) as proposed may confuse users that Tables 130.7(C) (9) and 130.7(C)(10) apply equally to persons who need to determine PPE when performing an incident energy analysis. This would not be an accurate statement. HICKMAN, P.: We are voting Negative on the action to Accept proposal 70E-245. Our comments are as follows: The committee action should have been to Accept in Principle. The committee action on proposal 70E-186 satisfies the intent of the submitter. There is no need to redundantly sate that all of 130.7 applies. Alternatively, an Informational Note could be added to 130.3(B) as follows: Informational Note: All provisions of this article apply whether an incident energy analysis is completed or if Tables 130.7(C)(9) and (C)(10) are utilized in lieu of an incident energy analysis. See 130.1 Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-246 Log #391 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3(B)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: David A. Pace, Olin Corporation Recommendation: Revise 130.3(B) to read as follows: Where is has been determined that work will be performed within the Arc Flash Protection Boundary identified by 130.3(A), one of either or both of the following methods shall be permitted to be used for the selection of personal protective clothing and other personal protective equipment. Substantiation: There are cases when methods to calculate incident energy are not available and the only method left is through use of the tables. Also, even when calculations are used, PPE determined to be suitable for use is derived from the tables based on the calculated energy level. Information input into software packages on proper PPE comes from the tables in 70E. To say the analysis has to be done by one method or the other, but not a combination of both, is impractical as it is essentially being done already. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: NFPA 70E does not permit mixing methods of selecting personal protective equipment. If incident energy calculations are performed, Tables 130.7(C)(9), (C)(10), and (C)(11) cannot be used for selection of personal protective equipment. Incident energy values shall be used for selection of proper PPE.

Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: PACE, D.: This proposal should have been Accepted. The committee statement does not address the submitter’s substantiation. If there is no method available to calculate incident energy, as is the case with some equipment, there is no other method other than the tables. Using the committee statement’s logic, every electrical distribution system would have to use the tables rather than calculations because not all equipment is covered by calculation methods, and the mix of the two is prohibited. This is being done today as there is no other source for the information. Using the tables to assign a HRC number does not impact the selection of PPE. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-247 Log #249 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.3(B)(1)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James T. Dollard, Jr., IBEW Local 98 Recommendation: New text to read as follows: 130.3(B)(1) FPN: For information on estimating the incident energy, see Annex D. For guidance on selection of arc-rated FR clothing and other personal protective equipment (PPE), see Table H.2 in Annex H. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the Tables Task Group appointed by NFPA 70E Chairman Dave Dini. The task group consisted of Larry Ayer, Palmer Hickman, Jim White, Ron Widup, Vince Saporita, Daniel Roberts, Mike Doherty, Tom Neal, Paul Dobrowsky, John Luke, David Wallace, Daleep Mohla, Paul Hamer, Eric Glaude and Jim Dollard. This is the first of three related proposals; the others relate to 130.7(C)(13)(a) & (b), Annex H title & H.2 and Table H.2. The existing guidance offered by the NFPA 70E-09 is inadequate for users selecting protective clothing and equipment when using the selection method based on incident energy determined in a hazard analysis. This is particularly the case for face/head protection. At present, the guidance provided by the NFPA 70E-09 for the selection of face/head protection while using this method is that the PPE must be selected based on the incident energy exposure associated with the specific task. Using both PPE selection methods (Method (1) Incident Energy Analysis, and Method (2) Hazard/Risk Categories, results in the reverse engineering of Table 130.7(C)(10). Users currently have no other alternative because aside from the information contained in Table 130.7(C)(10) there is limited clarification provided for the type of face protection and body protection required. For instance, the potential exists for users to select arc rated goggles & ski mask type balaclava or faceshield & balaclava to meet the requirements of 130.7(C)(3) and 130.7(C)(4). This creates protection issues since the use of goggles and a balaclava does not provide protection against projectiles, and modified arc testing of face and head PPE from a range of orientations has shown that the use of a faceshield with a balaclava for exposures above 12 cal/cm2 can lead to convective heat exposures to the eyes, nose and mouth areas when the arc exposure is coming from behind or from side angles. In these exposures from behind or from side angles, the back edges of the faceshield tend to direct the convective portion of the arc incident energy into the facial areas that are not fully covered by the balaclava. Those who use the Hazard/Rick Category method of hazard analysis are required to use arc rated arc flash suit hoods for HRC3 and higher as indicated in Table 130.7(C)(10). Similar guidance is needed for users who determine incident energy exposure with a hazard analysis. The need for increased guidance in PPE selection also applies to protective clothing and other protective equipment for the body, hands and feet for users who determine incident energy exposure with a hazard analysis. The proposed Annex H table to which this FPN directs users provides the needed guidance for protective clothing and equipment selection for users who determine incident energy exposure with a hazard analysis. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Add a second sentence to informational note to read: For guidance on selection of arc-rated clothing and other personal protective equipment (PPE), see Table H.3 in Annex H. Committee Statement: The committee accepts the addition of the informational note but changes the Table number to correlate with the actions take on 70E-522a (Log #CP15). Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We suggest that the accepted action be modified by replacing “guidance’ with ”information” to match existing text in 1st sentence. What is being recommended in the proposal is information rather than guidance. STALLCUP, J.: We feel the tables are necessary for smaller facilities that do not have the staff or means to perform the calculations in detail. The tables should remain in the main body of text.

70E-70

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-248 Log #373 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.3(B)(1), FPN ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Mike Doherty, Infrastructure Health & Safety Association / Rep. CSA Z462 Technical Committee Recommendation: Add text to read as follows: 130.3(B)(1) FPN: For information on estimating the incident energy, see Annex D. For guidance on selection of arc-rated FR clothing and other personal protective equipment (PPE), see Table H.2 in Annex H.4.Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the CSA Z462 Workplace Electrical Safety full Technical Committee. This is the first of three related proposals; the others relate to 130.7(C)(13)(a) & (b), Annex H title & H.2 and Table H.2. The existing guidance offered by the NFPA 70E-09 is inadequate for users selecting protective clothing and equipment when using the selection method based on incident energy determined in a hazard analysis. This is particularly the case for face/head protection. At present, the guidance provided by the NFPA 70E-09 for the selection of face/head protection while using this method is that the PPE must be selected based on the incident energy exposure associated with the specific task. Using both PPE selection methods (Method (1) Incident Energy Analysis, and Method (2) Hazard/Risk Categories, results in the reverse engineering of Table 130.7(C)(10). Users currently have no other alternative because aside from the information contained in Table 130.7(C)(10) there is limited clarification provided for the type of face protection and body protection required. For instance, the potential exists for users to select arc rated goggles & ski mask type balaclava or faceshield & balaclava to meet the requirements of 130.7(C)(3) and 130.7(C)(4). This creates protection issues since the use of goggles and a balaclava does not provide protection against projectiles, and modified arc testing of face and head PPE from a range of orientations has shown that the use of a faceshield with a balaclava for exposures above 12 cal/cm2 can lead to convective heat exposures to the eyes, nose and mouth areas when the arc exposure is coming from behind or from side angles. In these exposures from behind or from side angles, the back edges of the faceshield tend to direct the convective portion of the arc incident energy into the facial areas that are not fully covered by the balaclava. Those who use the Hazard/Rick Category method of hazard analysis are required to use arc rated arc flash suit hoods for HRC3 and higher as indicated in Table 130.7(C)(10). Similar guidance is needed for users who determine incident energy exposure with a hazard analysis. The need for increased guidance in PPE selection also applies to protective clothing and other protective equipment for the body, hands and feet for users who determine incident energy exposure with a hazard analysis. The proposed Annex H table to which this FPN directs users provides the needed guidance for protective clothing and equipment selection for users who determine incident energy exposure with a hazard analysis. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: See the committee action on Proposal 70E-247. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: STALLCUP, J.: We feel the tables are necessary for smaller facilities that do not have the staff or means to perform the calculations in detail. The tables should remain in the main body of text. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-249 Log #55 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3(B)(2)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas A. Carpenter, Aerospace Testing Alliance Recommendation: Add the following verbiage at the end of the paragraph: …of personal and other protective equipment when the equipment meets the limitation requirements identified in the notes to Table 130.7(C)(9). Substantiation: This addition will provide better clarification as to when the sections/table can be used in place of an arc flash analysis. This also matches the clarifying information in Section 130.7(C)(9). Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-331 results in the deletion of the specific table notes. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-250 Log #119 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3(B)(2)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: E. W. Buss, Mashpee, MA Recommendation: Add a second sentence: The employer shall document the current and clearing time at the location of the work task to confirm the notes in Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) have been met for that location. Substantiation: The documentation is required for the incident energy analysis so it should also be required for those cases when the tables are being used. The documentation will make the user check to make sure the application they choose meets the requirements of the notes. I realize that reminder appears elsewhere. It can be of benefit here also since the user is choosing between the “calculations” in (1) and “Tables” and realizes that some calculations are necessary even if the Tables are used. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-201 addresses the concern expressed in this proposal and the recommended text is not necessary. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-251 Log #523 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3(B)(2)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: T David Mills, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC Recommendation: Delete this section. (2) Hazard/Risk Categories. The requirements of 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10), and 130.7(C)(11) shall be permitted to be used for the selection and use of personal and other protective equipment. Substantiation: After several years of dealing with the confusion in the work force about why there is a different requirement for certain tasks that are also calculated to have a higher arc flash incident energy than the table allowed PPE, it has become more of a liability than aid. Simply requiring the calculation as is already part of section 130.3(B)(1) without the allowance of the table values will make the presentation of requirements more meaningful to the worker and to those who enforce the requirements. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Use of the “table method” is necessary in many instances where the worker does not have access to the results of a detailed incident energy analysis. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-252 Log #11 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part (130.3(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Note: This proposal appeared as Comment 70E-503 (Log #734) which was held from the Annual 2008 ROC on Proposal 70E-300. The recommendation in Proposal 70E-300 reads as follows: Revise text to read as follows: 130.7(C)(9) Selection of Personal Protective Equipment. (a) When Required for Various Tasks. When selected in lieu of the flash hazard analysis of 130.3(A), Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) shall be used to determine the hazard/risk category for a task. The assumed short-circuit current capacities and fault clearing times for various tasks are listed in the text and notes to Table 130.7(C)(9)(a). For tasks not listed, or for power systems with greater than the assumed short-circuit current capacity or with longer than the assumed fault clearing times, a flash hazard analysis shall be required in accordance with 130.3. The available short-circuit current and fault clearing time of the overcurrent device shall be documented on the Energized Electrical Work Permit and on a label on the equipment. Submitter: Mike Doherty, Rep. Canadian Standards Assn. (CSA) TC - Z462 Workplace Recommendation: This proposal should be Accepted in Principal with the following modification made as suggested in voter comments and the Committee Action to this and other proposals: 130.3(C) Equipment Labeling. Equipment shall be field marked with a label containing the available incident energy or required level of PPE and date of evaluation. Substantiation: This comment has been developed by the Canadian Standards Association (CSA) Z462 Workplace Electrical Safety Standard Harmonization Subcommittee under the direction of the Z462 Technical Committee (TC).

70E-71

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E As pointed out in the comment of Mr. Hichman to 70E-96, the Committee Action for 70E-96 should have been to accept in part since a part of the proposal was accepted in another Committee Action (70E-300). It is the opinion of the CSA Z462 TC that the Committee Action on 70E-300 should have included the requirement to date the label, as suggested in Proposal 70E-96. The Committee Action on 70E-300 to require a label without requiring a date on the label is inconsistent with the Committee Action to reject 70E-96, in part, over concerns of an outdated label. Further, the Committee Action on 70E-203, which requires that an arc flash analysis be reviewed every five years, implies that a date should be on the label. Without a date on the label, it would be impossible to determine when the review should be completed. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle in Part The committee accepts date of evaluation based on their action on Proposal 70E-260 and rejects the remainder of the recommendation. Committee Statement: See the committee action on Proposal 70E-201 relative to the rejection of the concepts in the submitter’s proposal 70E-300 for the 2009 revision cycle. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: See my explanation of negative vote on Proposal 70E-260. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-253 Log #23 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.3(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Drake A. Drobnick, Saline, MI Recommendation: Revise 130.3 (C) Equipment Labeling as follows: “... with a label containing the voltage magnitude, incident energy in Cal/cm2 at a reference distance, the arc flash protection boundary distance, and the required personal protective equipment.” Substantiation: The standard’s current minimum requirements foster inconsistent labeling schemes which lack important safety information. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-260 meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: See my explanation of negative vote on Proposal 70E-260. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-254 Log #30 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.3(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Charles Helmick, AVO Training Institute, Inc. Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Equipment Labeling. Equipment shall be field marked with a label containing the required arc flash protection boundary and the available incident energy or the required level of PPE. Substantiation: According to the first sentence of 130.3 “An arc flash hazard analysis shall determine an Arc Flash Protection Boundary...”. The way the labeling requirement is worded at present it appears that the only requirement is incident energy or PPE level and nothing else can be listed on the label. The most important information that comes out of the arc flash analysis is the means to protect workers. The boundary is determined to protect workers in the area and the boundary is established for the qualified worker to know when to wear PPE determined for the working distance. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-260 meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: See my explanation of negative vote on Proposal 70E-260. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-255 Log #31 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.3(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Charles Helmick, AVO Training Institute, Inc. Recommendation: Add text to read as follows: Equipment Labeling. Equipment shall at a minimum be field marked with a label containing the available incident energy or the required level of PPE.

Substantiation: It has been indicated in the safety community that the “or” in this text is an exclusive “or”, where you must have one piece of information, but not the other and no other information may be included on the label such as flash boundary or shock boundaries. If an arc flash analysis has been completed with a finding of 6.5 cal/cm2 at the working distance of 18 in., there should be no impediment for an employer to place that information on a warning label with the requirement to where ATPV 8 cal/cm2 FR clothing or HRC 2, with an arc flash boundary determined by the analysis to be 48 in. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-260 meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: The action should be accept. I would agree that the label could contain other information as deemed necessary by the specific employers electrical safety program and we should not prohibit this. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-256 Log #117 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part (130.3(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: E. W. Buss, Mashpee, MA Recommendation: Replace existing wording with: “Equipment Labeling. Electrical equipment likely to require examination, adjustment, servicing or maintenance shall be field marked to warn qualified persons of potential electric arc flash hazards. Testing for presence of voltage in the “test before touch” sequence is considered a form of examination. The marking requirements of ANSI Z535.4 Product Safety Signs and Labels shall be used. Equipment specific information including required PPE or incident energy level must be available for the employee either on the warning label or the warning label shall indicate the location of the information. The information shall be a part of the safety documentation and the location a part of safety training for qualified persons.” Substantiation: There can be different PPE levels for different tasks at the same location. The facility arrangement can change. The results of the NFPA/IEEE study may provide different PPE requirements. Some facilities may prefer not to repeatedly change their equipment labels. For most cases, an electrical work permit is required. A part of the information for the permit is PPE choice. If a facility safety training program includes teaching employees where to find the required information it should not be required to be put on the equipment if a facility safety program provides the information in a location easy to find and trains the worker how to find and use the information. Instead of hinting (via FPN) at a typical warning label, the industry should require that they all look the same. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle in Part The committee accepts the principle of the first sentence in their action on Proposal 70E-260. The committee rejects the remainder of the recommendation. Committee Statement: The committee accepts the principle of the first sentence in their action on Proposal 70E-260. The documentation requirements suggested are not appropriate for Equipment Labeling section. The committee does not consider testing to be examination. Reference to ANSI Z535 as a mandatory requirement is not accepted because there is no substantiation to make it a mandatory requirement. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: WILMER, K.: See my comment on Proposal 70E-260. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-257 Log #121 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: E. W. Buss, Mashpee, MA Recommendation: Delete the entire paragraph Substantiation: NEC 110.16 requires certain equipment to have arc flash warning labels. The existing 70E requirement is too vague as follows: “equipment” includes conduit and fittings, etc (see art 100). There could be various tasks at a specific equipment location which have different working distances and therefore different PPE and incident energy levels (note Table 130.7(C) has different PPE levels for the same type of equipment). The label size, coloring, etc. are not even mentioned. The label does not even need to indicate warning or arc flash (pre 2002 equipment may not have the NEC 110.16 label). This section needs to have TCC input since they are supposed to coordinate the NEC and 70E. A generic NEC 110.16 label with facility safety training and facility documentation (see B above) is the best way to get the correct PPE on the worker for the task at a location. The facility safety program

70E-72

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E may include commercially available labels. IF THAT IS THE WAY THE FACILITY WRITES THEIR PROCEDURE, but don’t make everybody do it the same, it will never happen. I agree that the ANSI Z 495 mentioned in the NEC should be mandated, but not the specific info on that label. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee concludes that the labeling requirements are essential for safety. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-258 Log #145 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.3(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Drake A. Drobnick, Saline, MI Recommendation: 130.3(C) Equipment Labeling. Equipment shall be field marked with a label containing the available incident energy, voltage potential, and or the required level personal protective equipment (PPE) PPE. Substantiation: Equipment installed using the National Electrical Code (NFPA 70) present minimal shock hazards during normal use. Work practices such as those found in NFPA 70E ( i.e. troubleshooting) require a qualified person to remove covers or open enclosures to access energized parts exposing them to shock hazards. Warning labels alert the worker to the potential hazards in time to take appropriate action. All the hazards and the PPE should be listed on the label. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-260 meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: See my explanation of negative vote on Proposal 70E-260. WILMER, K.: See my comment on Proposal 70E-260. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-259 Log #169 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.3(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Bill Rieth, Salisbury Electrical Safety by Honeywell Recommendation: Equipment shall be field marked with a label containing the available incident energy and/or required level of PPE. Substantiation: The section is causing confusion in the industry. They way it is written now only allows for either the incident energy or the HRC category not both. Many companies have done their analysis and use the incident energy level and then use the HRC level as a way of informing their workers as to what PPE is required. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-260 meets the intent of the recommendation. The committee does not agree with the all of submitter’s substantiation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-260 Log #223 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.3(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John McAlhaney, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions Recommendation: Revise 130.3 (C) as shown: (C) Equipment Labeling. Electrical equipment such as switchboards, panelboards, industrial control panels, meter socket enclosures and motor control centers that are likely to require examination, adjustment, servicing or maintenance while energized shall be field marked with a label containing the available incident energy or required level of PPE. Substantiation: The current wording requires field marking of all “electrical fittings, devices, appliances, luminaries, apparatus, machinery….” based on the literal definition for “Equipment” provided under Article 100. The proposed wording provides a clearer understanding of the requirement and is consistent with the field marking requirement in NFPA 70, National Electric Code, Article 110.16 Flash Protection. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle The Committee accepts the actions in the recommendation and makes the following revisions: Revise 130.3 (C) as shown: (C) Equipment Labeling. Electrical equipment such as switchboards,

panelboards, industrial control panels, meter socket enclosures and motor control centers that are likely to require examination, adjustment, servicing or maintenance while energized shall be field marked with a label containing all the following information: (1) Only one of the following: a. Available incident energy b. Minimum arc rating of clothing (2) Date of arc flash hazard analysis (3) Nominal system voltage (4) Arc flash boundary Committee Statement: The committee has accepted the recommendation in principle and in addition incorporates the recommendations from Proposals 70E-253, 254, 255, 258, 259,263, 264, 265, 267, and 268. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 19 Negative: 4 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: The appropriate action is accept. The action taken is procedurally erroneous as the committee did exactly as the submitter requested in this proposal and chose this proposal to use a vehicle to include other “wish list items” from other proposals. If the committee wishes to add the other items into the standard, it should have created a committee proposal to do it. That said, I oppose the additional labeling requirements being added here. I oppose adding the date of the study. as it serves no value to the electrician that we are trying to protect. The label should not be designed to serve an auditing function. It is also unclear whether the intention here is to force re-labeling after a new arc flash hazard analysis is performed even if the new study did not change any of the other information on the label. I also oppose the voltage labeling as it is already required by other product/installation standards. Also, it is difficult to make a case that a qualified person (by our own definition) would not be able to determine the voltage level w/o it being on this particular label. Human factors studies show that the more information contained in signage, the less effective it is. It is also problematic that one must choose between listing the incident energy and the type of PPE required. The committee statements on proposal 261 states “The Committee does not intend to allow both incident energy and level of PPE” to be listed on the label but does not explain why that is the case. I would support a proposal that includes the PPE requirements because this is useful information to the employees who are exposed (“what do I have to do, wear, etc..”). REGE, T.: Committee action should have been Accept in Principle in Part. NFPA 70E has no grandfathering clause. Changing the required content of equipment labels will require relabeling for employers. That is a significant burden to employers, many of whom just spent considerable time and money labeling equipment since the last revision of 70E. Any revision to 130.3(C) should include this statement “130.3(C)(1))(b), 130.3(C)(2), 130.3(C)(3), and 130.3(C)(4) apply only to labels installed after the effective date of the standard.” TIEDE, T.: This proposal should be rejected. While we recognize and support the advantages that properly labeled electrical equipment can provide, we also recognize the issues associated with mandating the application of labels on all electrical equipment. See voting comment on proposal 70E-235. Further, the proposed wording does not match the NEC 110.16 which specifically excludes dwelling occupancies. WILMER, K.: Committee action should have been Accept in Principle in Part. NFPA 70E has no grandfathering clause. Changing the required content of equipment labels will require relabeling for employers. That is a significant burden to employers, many of whom just spent considerable time and money labeling equipment since the last revision of 70E. Any revision to 130.3(C) should include this statement “130.3(C)(1))(b), 130.3(C)(2), 130.3(C)(3), and 130.3(C)(4) apply only to labels installed after the effective date of the standard.” Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: DROBNICK, D.: Providing labeling guidance will create consistency throughout the community of users and mitigate content errors commonly found in today’s workplace. This proposal clarifies the requirement for an equipment label regardless of the method used to determine the required personal protective equipment. A sample label based upon the accepted proposal has been provided. Note: Supporting Material (sample label) is available for review at NFPA headquarters. HICKMAN, P.: The text accepted in the action is incomplete. Revise 130.3 (C) as shown: Electrical equipment such as switchboards, panelboards, industrial control panels, meter socket enclosures and motor control centers that are likely to require examination, adjustment, servicing or maintenance while energized shall be field marked with a label containing all the following information: (1) Only one of the following: a. Available incident energy b.HRC Minimum arc rating of clothing (2) Date of arc flash hazard analysis (3) Nominal system voltage (4) Arc flash boundary

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-261 Log #232 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Jim Phillips, T2G / Brainfiller.com Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Equipment shall be field marked with a label containing the available incident energy and / or required level of PPE. Substantiation: The text should be changed to “and/or” to permit the option of categorizing incident energy with HRCs of Table 130.7(C)(11). It is understood the change in the 2009 Edition was to prohibit mixing Table 130.7(C)(9) with incident energy calculations. However the use of the word “or” in its present context, also prohibits the ability to categorize incident energy with Table 130.7(C)(11). This correlation is widely used by industry as part of arc flash studies to simplify the PPE selection based on categories. This method is also used by a majority of arc flash computer programs for label generation. This same categorization method was also used in the development of the “calculation factor” used in the IEEE 1584 incident energy equation. The “calculation factor” was derived by categorizing incident energy levels based on 4, 8, 25, 40 cal/cm2 which are the same values given in Table 130.7(C)(11). In an informal survey conducted 4th Quarter 2009 at www.ArcFlashForum.com, 94 percent of the participants responded that they list the calculated incident energy and HRC on arc flash warning labels based on Table 130.7(C)(11). Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The Committee does not intend to allow both incident energy and level of PPE. See the committee action on Proposal 70E-260. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: The appropriate action should be accept. The committee does not explain why it does not intend to allow both incident energy and level of PPE on the label. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-262 Log #236 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Terry W. Becker, ESPS Inc. Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Change wording as indicated below. 130.3(C) Equipment Labeling Equipment shall be field marked with a label containing the available incident energy, shock approach boundaries, and or the required level personal protective equipment (PPE) PPE. Substantiation: Equipment installed using the National Electrical Code (NFPA 70) presents a limited shock hazard during normal use. Work practices such as troubleshooting while energized require a qualified person to remove covers or open enclosures to access energized conductors or circuit parts exposing them to a potential shock hazard. Warning labels located on the electrical equipment alert the worker to the potential hazards in time to take appropriate action. Both of the electrical hazards of arc flash and shock, and some indication of the required PPE should be listed on the label. A clarification is also required that the arc flash PPE is not specified by a “level,” the PPE for arc flash protection would be specified on the arc rating of the clothing required. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Equipment labeling is contained in the arc flash section and labeling of shock protection boundaries are not required. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-263 Log #359 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.3(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Louis A. Barrios, Shell / Rep. API (American Petroleum Institute) Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: (C) Equipment Labeling. Equipment that poses a potential arc flash hazard shall be field marked with a label containing the available incident energy or required level of PPE. Substantiation: The present requirement added in the 2009 edition to require arc flash labeling of all equipment is overly restrictive. “Equipment” is defined in NFPA 70E and the NEC as “a general term, including material, fittings, devices, appliance, luminaires, apparatus, machinery, and the like used as part of, or in connection with, an electrical installation.” Not all equipment poses an arc flash hazard. For example, fittings do not pose an arc flash hazard, but under the present requirements are required to be labeled with either the

available incident energy or required level of PPE. The new definition of “Arc Flash Hazard” provides us with improved guidance of when an arc flash hazard may exist. Therefore, only equipment that may pose an arc flash hazard to employees should be provided with an arc flash warning label. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-260 meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-264 Log #407 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part (130.3(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James J. Toth, III, Delta Power Systems Engineering, PC Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: (C) Equipment Labeling. Electrical equipment, such as switchboards, panelboards, industrial control panels, meter socket enclosures, and motor control centers, operating at 50 volts or more shall be field marked with a label containing the available incident energy or required level of PPE. based on one of the following methods: (1) Incident Energy Analysis. (a) When an incident energy analysis has been performed, the label shall show the available incident energy from that calculation. (b) When an arc flash hazard analysis is not performed based on 130.3 Exception No. 1, the incident energy shown on the label shall be: (i) 39 cal/cm2 if the calculated bolted three-phase momentary symmetrical fault current is greater than 8.04 kA and less than or equal to 15 kA for grounded electrical systems. (ii) 24 cal/cm2 if the calculated bolted three-phase momentary symmetrical fault current is greater than 2.61 kA and less than or equal to 8.04 kA for grounded electrical systems. (iii) 7.5 ca /cm2 if the calculated bolted three-phase momentary symmetrical fault current is greater than 1.65 kA and less than or equal to 2.61 kA for grounded electrical systems. (iv) 3.5 cal/cm2 if the calculated bolted three-phase momentary symmetrical fault current is less than or equal to 1.65 kA for grounded electrical systems. (v) 39 cal/cm2 if the calculated bolted three-phase momentary symmetrical fault current is greater than 5.76 kA and less than or equal to 10.74 kA for ungrounded electrical systems. (vi) 24 cal/cm2 if the calculated bolted three-phase momentary symmetrical fault current is greater than 1.87 kA and less than or equal to 5.76 kA for ungrounded electrical systems. (vii) 7.5 cal/cm2 if the calculated bolted three-phase momentary symmetrical fault current is greater than 1.18 kA and less than or equal to 1.87 kA for ungrounded electrical systems. (viii) 3.5 cal /cm2 if the calculated bolted three-phase momentary symmetrical fault current is less than or equal to 1.18 kA for ungrounded electrical systems. The label shall also indicate this section was used to determine the incident energy. FPN: As an example, the label may state: “Arc Flash Hazard. 7.5 cal/cm2 incident energy at 18” working distance based on NFPA 70E 2009 Edition Article 130.3(C)(1)(b)(iii).” (2) Hazard / Risk Categories. When the requirements of 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10), and 130.7(C)(11) are used to select protective clothing and other personal protective equipment, the incident energy shown on the label shall be: (a) 3.8 cal/cm2 for panelboards or other equipment rated 240 volts and below. (b) 7.6 cal/cm2 for panelboards or switchboards rated over 240 volts and up to 600 volts. (c) 38 cal/cm2 for 600 volt class motor control centers. (d) 38 cal/cm2 for 600 volt class switchgear. (e) 38 cal/cm2 for other 600 volt class equipment. (f) 38 cal/cm2 for NEMA E2 motor starters rated 2.3 kV through 7.2 kV. (g) 38 cal/cm2 for metal clad switchgear rated 1 kV through 38 kV. (h) 38 cal/cm2 for arc resistant switchgear Type 1 or 2. (i) 38 cal/cm2 for other equipment rated 1 kV through 38 kV. The label shall also indicate which section was used to determine the incident energy. FPN: As an example, the label may state: “Arc Flash Hazard. 3.8 cal/cm2 incident energy at 18” working distance based on NFPA 70E 2009 Edition Article 130.3(C)(2)(a).” FPN: It is strongly advised that an incident energy calculation be performed for equipment rated 1 kV and above. The inverse time characteristics of relays and fuses may result in long arcing times and incident energies in excess of 40 cal /cm2. Substantiation: (C) Equipment Labeling. Electrical equipment, such as switchboards, panelboards, industrial control panels, meter socket enclosures, and motor control centers, operating at 50 volts or more shall be field marked with a label containing the available incident energy or required level of PPE. based on one of the following methods:

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E “Equipment” was a vague description; therefore, it was expanded to be consistent with the National Electrical Code (110.16). The “required level of PPE” was deleted since it was not defined in NFPA 70E. The National Electrical Code only requires generic warning labels. It appears the intent of this section was to require labels with more specific information (in this case, the available incident energy). All equipment rated 50 volts and higher should be labeled (NO EXCEPTIONS). Unfortunately, NFPA 70E allows two exceptions to calculating the incident energy. First, Article 130.3(B)(2) allows you to use PPE shown in the tables (Tables 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10), and 130.7(C)(11)). Second, Article 130.3 Exception No. 1 does not require arc flash hazard analysis for electrical systems rated 240 volts or less, fed from one transformer, and that transformer was rated less than 125 kVA. Presently, if one of the exceptions is used to not perform an arc flash hazard analysis, it is not known what, if anything, should be shown on an equipment label. If a label is omitted, how does one know what safety precautions are required prior to exposing or working within the limited approach boundary of energized electrical conductors or circuit parts. It may be incorrectly inferred that there was no arc flash hazard since a label with the incident energy was not applied. (2) Hazard / Risk Categories. If you do not perform an analysis because you are using the tables, what incident energy do you put on the label? The incident energy values shown in the proposed text for 130.3(C)(2) were arbitrarily set at 95% of the minimum arc rating for the highest HRC shown for a particular equipment type ((a) to (i) follow the equipment designations shown in Table 130.7(C)(9)). For example, panelboards or other equipment rated 240 V and below had a maximum HRC of 1 in Table 130.7(C)(9), and HRC 1 had a required minimum arc rating of 4 cal /cm2. Therefore, the value shown in the proposed text for 130.3(C)(2)(a) was 3.8 cal /cm2 (95% or 4). By selecting the incident this way, people can use the PPE shown in the tables for tasks that have direct exposure to energized electrical conductors or circuit parts. The second fine print note recommends making an incident energy calculation instead of using the tables because there were no notes about the magnitude of fault current and protective device fault clearing time like there were for equipment rated 600 volts and below. (1)(b) When an arc flash hazard analysis is not performed based on 130.3 Exception No. 1. Similarly, if you do not perform an analysis because you are using 130.3 Exception No. 1, what incident energy do you put on the label? This exception is similar to statements in IEEE Std 1584-2002: “Equipment below 240 V need not be considered unless it involves at least one 125 kVA or larger low-impedance transformer in its immediate power supply.” and “The arc-flash hazard need only be considered for large 208 V systems: systems fed by transformers smaller than 125 kVA should not be a concern.” If the intent of this exception was to not require an arc flash hazard analysis because the severity of a potential arc flash was considered low, then it may be better to change the exception from a minimum transformer kVA rating to a minimum threephase, momentary, symmetrical fault current (separate proposal to address this). The results of several arc flash hazard calculations based on the IEEE Std 1584-2002 calculation method shows protective device operating times from 4 to 46 seconds for some 208-volt panelboards (especially those fed directly by a 480V-208Y/120V drytype transformer). Incident energies based on the estimated arcing fault current and fault clearing time could easily result in incident energy in excess of 40 cal / cm2. A recent IEEE paper (“Effect of Insulating Barriers in Arc Flash Testing”, IAS, vol. 44, no. 5, pp 1354-1359, September/October 2008) documented sustaining (for 0.1 seconds - the test station breaker was set to open after 6 cycles) a 4500A arc with a 12.7 mm gap at 208V and a 10,000A arc with a 32 mm gap at 208V. At those times, the calculated incident energy would be below 1.5 cal/cm2 for both currents (based on an IEEE Std 1584-2002 calculation); however, it is unknown how long the arc would have burned if the test set did not interrupt the fault. The incident energy values shown in the proposed text for 130.3(C)(3) were based on IEEE Std 1584-2002 calculations. The incident energy (39 cal /cm2) shown in 130.3(C)(1)(b)(i) was based on a voltage of 240-volts (line-line), a gap of 25 mm (for panelboards), a calculation factor (Cf) of 1.5 (for voltages less than or equal to 1 kV), a distance exponent (x) of 1.641 (for panelboards), a working distance of 18 inches, and an arcing time of 2 seconds (arbitrarily chosen). The incident energy (24 cal /cm2) shown in 130.3(C)(1)(b)(ii) was based on a voltage of 240-volts (line-line), a gap of 25 mm (for panelboards), a calculation factor (Cf) of 1.5 (for voltages less than or equal to 1 kV), a distance exponent (x) of 1.641 (for panelboards), a working distance of 18 inches, and an arcing time of 2 seconds (arbitrarily chosen). The incident energy (7.5 cal /cm2) shown in 130.3(C)(1)(b)(iii) was based on a voltage of 240-volts (line-line), a gap of 25 mm (for panelboards), a calculation factor (Cf) of 1.5 (for voltages less than or equal to 1 kV), a distance exponent (x) of 1.641 (for panelboards), a working distance of 18 inches, and an arcing time of 1.5 seconds (arbitrarily chosen). The incident energy (3.5 cal /cm2) shown in 130.3(C)(1)(b)(iv) was based on a voltage of 240-volts (line-line), a gap of 25 mm (for panelboards), a calculation factor (Cf) of 1.5 (for voltages less than or equal to 1 kV), a distance exponent (x) of 1.641 (for panelboards), a working distance of 18 inches, and an arcing time of 1 second (arbitrarily chosen).

The incident energy (39 cal /cm2) shown in 130.3(C)(1)(b)(v) was based on a voltage of 240-volts (line-line), a gap of 25 mm (for panelboards), a calculation factor (Cf) of 1.5 (for voltages less than or equal to 1 kV), a distance exponent (x) of 1.641 (for panelboards), a working distance of 18 inches, and an arcing time of 2 seconds (arbitrarily chosen). The incident energy (24 cal /cm2) shown in 130.3(C)(1)(b)(vi) was based on a voltage of 240-volts (line-line), a gap of 25 mm (for panelboards), a calculation factor (Cf) of 1.5 (for voltages less than or equal to 1 kV), a distance exponent (x) of 1.641 (for panelboards), a working distance of 18 inches, and an arcing time of 2 seconds (arbitrarily chosen). The incident energy (7.5 cal /cm2) shown in 130.3(C)(1)(b)(vii) was based on a voltage of 240-volts (line-line), a gap of 25 mm (for panelboards), a calculation factor (Cf) of 1.5 (for voltages less than or equal to 1 kV), a distance exponent (x) of 1.641 (for panelboards), a working distance of 18 inches, and an arcing time of 1.5 seconds (arbitrarily chosen). The incident energy (3.5 cal /cm2) shown in 130.3(C)(1)(b)(viii) was based on a voltage of 240-volts (line-line), a gap of 25 mm (for panelboards), a calculation factor (Cf) of 1.5 (for voltages less than or equal to 1 kV), a distance exponent (x) of 1.641 (for panelboards), a working distance of 18 inches, and an arcing time of 1 second (arbitrarily chosen). These values may need to be changed in the future based on other test results. Another problem with this exception is that it has been used for several years by some arc flash software vendors to offer options to “force” a result to HRC 0 or HRC 1 independent of the actual calculation results. When an incident energy calculation is made at a panelboard fed by a 480V-208Y/120V dry-type transformer rated 75 kVA or less, it is not unusual to have arcing times of 2 to 50 seconds for the upstream moldedcase circuit breaker and calculated incident energies of 12 to 100 cal/cm2. Although I do not know the rationale for providing that option, I would suspect it was based on a comment in IEEE Std 1584-2002 (“The arc-flash hazard need only be considered for large 208 V systems: systems fed by transformers smaller than 125 kVA should not be a concern.”) and the misapplication of Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) in NFPA 70E 2004 Edition (Panelboards rated 240V and below, Notes 1 and 3 (25 kA short circuit current available. 0.03 (2 cycle) fault clearing time. For < 10 kA short circuit current available, the hazard / risk category required may be reduced by one number.)) Since the maximum hazard /risk category shown in the table was one, reducing it by one would make it zero. (Similar comments appeared in Table 3-3.9.1 in NFPA 70E 2000 Edition.) Since the fault clearing time was 2 to 50 seconds, the table can not be used. Using the proposed change should eliminate the ability to force a result to HRC 0 or HRC 1 based on a vague comment (“should not be a concern”) and the misapplication of an old table. (I realize the proposal I made was based on an assumed maximum arc time of 1 to 2 seconds where protective devices may not operate for 2 to 50 seconds; however, if the arcs are difficult to sustain due to the magnitude of the voltage (240 volts or less) and the magnitude of the fault current (15 kA or less), these times may be reasonable. (In the IEEE paper (“Effect of Insulating Barriers in Arc Flash Testing”, IAS, vol. 44, no. 5, pp 1354-1359, September/October 2008), they were unable to sustain a 4500A arc with a 32 mm gap at 208V.) If further testing shows the ability to sustain an arc exceeds 1 to 2 seconds, then some additional changes to the standard may be required.) If equipment is not labeled with an incident energy based on an exception, people may assume the equipment is “safe” to work on energized (from an arc flash standpoint) due to a presumed low risk (they may think an incident energy was not shown because it is below the threshold for a second degree burn). This could present a serious risk to someone exposing or working on energized electrical conductors or circuit parts. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle in Part The committee action accepts in principle in the first paragraph of 130.3(C) and in (1)(a). The remainder of the recommendation is rejected. Committee Statement: The recommendation for detailed information on the label is beyond what the committee intends to be conveyed. See the committee action on Proposal 70E-260. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-265 Log #433 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.3(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Elihu “Hugh” Hoagland IV, ArcWear.com/e-Hazard.com Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: (C) Equipment Labeling. Equipment shall be field marked with a label containing the available incident energy or required level of PPE and the date the assessment was performed or the label was produced. Substantiation: This is a requirement in CSA Z462 and a common best practice. The standard requires arc flash assessments be updated every five years. If the energy were to rise and a label was missed in the replacement process, this could be additional hazard to the worker. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-260 meets the intent of the recommendation.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 3 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: See my explanation of negative vote on Proposal 70E-260. REGE, T.: The committee action should be reject. See my comment on 70E-260. WILMER, K.: See my comment on Proposal 70E-260. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-266 Log #445 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Part (130.3(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Steven J. Abbott, Stark Safety Consultants Recommendation: Add new text as follows: 130.3(C)(1) The method of calculating and data to support the information for the label shall be documented and kept available for verification. Substantiation: Currently 130.3(C) requires 1 of 2 choices to be included on the label. There is potential for a facility to put down the required PPE level or available incident energy and not have any supporting information as to how they reached that conclusion. This could create a situation where an outside contractor could under protect their employee by using the inaccurate label. By requiring that method and date for the information on the label to be documented and available to outside contractors, it will aid in the employer to ensure that the info that is already required to be on the label actually has some validity. This will also support 110.5(A)(1)(b) information about the employer’s installation that the contract employer needs to make the assessments required by Chapter 1. This will also support 130.3 asking to update the analysis, ensuring that the information is accurate and up to date. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Part The committee accepts “The method of calculating and data to support the information for the label shall be documented.” The committee does not accept the portion of the recommendation that reads: “and kept available for verification”. Committee Statement: The committee rejects the recommendation for keeping records for verification because it recommended text does not prescribe how and for how long the records are to be kept. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HITTEL, M.: The Committee Statement does not make sense. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-267 Log #452 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.3(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Mark Rucker, Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Equipment in which an arc flash hazard may exist shall be field marked with a label containing the available incident energy or required level of PPE. Substantiation: “Equipment” as defined in Section 100 is “a general term, including fittings, devices, appliances, luminaires,” etc. So, the requirement of 130.3(C) is too broad. It is neither reasonable nor necessary to require labeling on every element of an electrical installation. “Arc Flash Hazard” includes in its definition, in Section 100, the following FPN: “An arc flash hazard may exist when energized...parts are exposed or when they are within equipment in a guarded or enclosed condition, provided a person is interacting with the equipment in such a manner that could cause an electrical arc...”. So, this proposal is to require arc flash warning labels only in equipment that meets the definition of having an arc flash hazard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-260 meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: The action should be reject. The action taken on Proposal 70E-260 clearly points out that only when this equipment is “likely to require service, examination or adjustment while energized.” This expands the requirements beyond what is contemplated by the standard. There is equipment “in which an arc flash hazard may exist” that do not meet this threshold are not required to be labeled. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-268 Log #32 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.3(C), FPN 1 and 2 (New)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Charles Helmick, AVO Training Institute, Inc. Recommendation: Add text to read as follows: Equipment Labeling. Equipment shall be field marked with a label containing the available incident energy or the required level of PPE. FPN: No. 1 NFPA 70 110.16 Flash Protection provides assistance for warning label requirements. FPN: No. 2 ANSI Z535.4-1998 (or most current edition) Product Safety Signs and Labels provides guidelines for the design of safety signs and labels for application to products. Substantiation: There are a lot of differences of opinions concerning the label requirements for arc flash. The labeling requirement should be simple, not complex. Most of all, the qualified workers reading the label to establish safe work areas and protect themselves from the hazardous conditions should be able to read the label and get the information needed. I have seen the HRC on labels where an arc flash analysis was done and been told that was incorrect. If that is the case, this is being made way to hard. The first FPN tells where and when. The second FPN tells how. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle The committee accepts the recommendation for FPN No 2. Committee Statement: The intent of FPN 1 was included in the committee action on 70E-260. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: TIEDE, T.: This proposal should be rejected. These proposed FPN’s will generate confusion in the industry. The current requirement in NEC 110.16 is to warn of the hazard. The NEC already has an FPN pointing to ANSI Z535. This label may be separate from a label showing calculated incident energy values, dates, etc. See the NEC 2008 Handbook for an example of a label that meets the requirement of 110.16 but does not contain specific information. The information specific to the arc-flash hazard, which is subject to periodic review and update, may be imprinted on an separate label. 70E should allow users the ability to choose the method they wish to comply with both labeling requirements. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-269 Log #82 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3(C) Exception (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Robert Huddleston, Jr., RLH Engineering Recommendation: Add an exception to 130.3(C) Exception: Equipment labeling containing available incident energies or required PPE shall not be required in industrial facilities provided the following conditions are met: a. conditions of maintenance and supervision ensure that only qualified persons service the equipment; b. facilities have procedures and processes that require an Energized Work Permit as described in Section 130.1(B). Substantiation: For industrial establishments with trained, qualified electrical workers, utilizing an Energized Electrical Work Permit process that includes the required safety elements specified in Section 130.1(B) (which requires both a shock and arc flash hazard analysis) makes the labeling of equipment superfluous. Often in industrial facilities, arc flash energies are significantly reduced by adjusting relay settings, single-ending double-ended substations, adding additional temporary relaying or other techniques that are applied before work commences. If this is done, labeling of equipment with incident energies while the equipment is normally operating becomes meaningless and confusing. If an industrial establishment has required programs and processes with all the elements listed in Section 130.1(B), then labeling equipment with arc flash information serves no purpose other than to confuse those performing the work. Arc Flash Warning Labels are a good idea for commercial and small industrial establishments, as typically electrical work is performed by contractors at these facilities and these contractors often do not have the means to do an arc flash hazard analysis. An exception for industrial facilities that utilize the Energized Electrical Work Permit any time work is performed on electrical conductors or parts that are not placed in the electrically safe work condition will be a significant safety improvement by eliminating incorrect or superfluous information. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee intends to require labeling for all conditions covered within the scope of this standard. See the committee action on Proposal 70E-260. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

70E-76

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-270 Log #111 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3(C) Exception (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Charles L. Powell, Eastman Chemical Company Recommendation: Add an exception to 130.3(C) as follows: Exception: Equipment labeling with labels containing the available incident energy or required level of PPE will not be required in industrial installations with written safety procedures if both of the following are true: a. where conditions of maintenance and supervision ensure that only qualified persons service the equipment b. where such installations have a procedure and process that requires a permit for each task involving work on or near energized equipment and the permit process includes all of the following: 1. Justification for working on or near energized equipment 2. An analysis of the arc flash hazard under current system conditions 3. Documentation of the hazard including arc flash energy levels, required PPE, and work plan on the permit. Substantiation: A permit process that includes the required elements for every job results in a higher level of safety than the required equipment labeling. If an industrial installation has a program with all the required elements listed above, the labels do nothing to increase safety; but the labels may confuse persons performing work by causing them to question whether the established permitting process must be followed for every job. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee intends to require labeling for all conditions covered within the scope of this standard. See the committee action on Proposal 70E-260. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-271 Log #165 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.3(C) Exception (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Paul S. Hamer, Chevron Energy Technology Company Recommendation: Add a new Exception to read as follows: Exception: Labeling shall not be required for the terminal boxes of motors or generators that are in industrial occupancies where conditions of maintenance and supervision ensure that only qualified persons service the installation. Substantiation: The present definition of “equipment” in NFPA 70E includes “machinery”: that, in most cases, is outside the normally controlled environment of a building or electrical room. It appears that the intent was not to include machinery in the “field marking” requirement, if section 110.16 of the 2008 NEC is referenced: “110.16 Flash Protection. Electrical equipment, such as switchboards, panelboards, industrial control panels, meter socket enclosures, and motor control centers, that are in other than dwelling occupancies, and are likely to require examination, adjustment, servicing, or maintenance while energized shall be field marked to warn qualified persons of potential electric arc flash hazards. The marking shall be located so as to be clearly visible to qualified persons before examination, adjustment, servicing, or maintenance of the equipment.” To apply field-marked labels of sufficient durability would be very difficult to accomplish on motors or generators, as this section requires, and may in fact void the hazardous location listing or ingress protection integrity if applied with screws. This may result in an installation that is less safe. Normally, lockout/tagout procedures minimize the risk at electrical machinery, since the terminal boxes would only be opened after safety procedures on upstream equipment were followed. Qualified persons would still, as a normal course of action, prove that an electrically safe work condition exists prior to working on internal terminal box components. This justifies the application of an industrial exception to the equipment labeling requirement of 130.3(C) for motor and generator terminal boxes. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee does not accept the recommended exception. The action on 70E-260 lists the equipment needing labels. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: Action should have been an “Accept in Principle,” with the action on Proposal 70E-260 meeting the intent of the submitter.

Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We do not agree with the portion of the committee statement indicating that the list accepted in the action on 70E-260 identifies all of the equipment requiring labeling since the phrase “such as” is meant to offer examples rather than a definitive list. HITTEL, M.: I support the action to reject a generic exemption as stated in the proposal. However, the submitter’s substantiation proposes a scenario whereby “an electrically safe work condition exists prior to working on internal terminal box components.” If this is the case, the motor terminal box would not be subject to labeling requirements because it is not “likely to require examination, adjustment, servicing or maintenance while energized.” Therefore, the exemption that the submitter is seeking already exists. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-271a Log #CP13 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (130.4) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Electrical Safety in the Workplace, Recommendation: Revise 130.4 to read: 130.4 Test Instruments and Equipment Use Testing Only qualified persons shall perform tasks such as testing, troubleshooting, voltage measuring, etc. work within the Limited Approach Boundary of energized electrical conductors or circuit parts operating at 50 volts or more. Substantiation: The revisions are for clarity and for consistency or wording with 130.1(B)(3). Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-272 Log #434 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (Table 130.7(C)(9)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Elihu “Hugh” Hoagland IV, ArcWear.com/e-Hazard.com Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows:

Substantiation: In the 2004 standard I filed this same proposal for >1kV and 600V class switchgear. I believe it was formatted incorrectly but was agreed upon in principle. No utility I surveyed allowed racking of breakers without voltage rated gloves. As this requires HRC 4 clothing, this would indicate substantial arc flash potential. The worker is characteristically holding a metal crank and in the event of an arc flash this metal crank could see a potential drop from one hand to the other introducing a shock hazard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: The proposal should be rejected. The operation of “racking” does not expose workers to a shock hazard, but only to an arc-flash hazard, and the requirement to use insulating rubber gloves is the wrong application of the PPE. Either arc-rated gloves, or insulating rubber gloves with leather protectors could be used to afford the protection. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

Hazard/Risk

Category

Rubber Insulating

Gloves

Insulated and Insulating Hand

Tools600 V Class Switchgear (with power circuit breakers or fused switches) — Note 4Insertion or removal (racking) of CBs from cubicles, doors open or closed

4 N Y N

70E-77

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-273 Log #435 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (Table 130.7(C)(9)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Elihu “Hugh” Hoagland IV, ArcWear.com/e-Hazard.com Recommendation: Revise table as follows:

Add General Notes (applicable to the entire table) as follows: (g) Hand tools for use in battery rooms with lead acid source shall be non-sparking. (h) If lead acid exposure is possible the clothing shall be protective from acid and arc rated to the hazard. ASTM F1891 is garments are sufficient. (I) In clean rooms or other electrical installations which cannot allow leather protectors for arc flash exposure, ASTM F496 recommendations shall be followed for using rubber insulating gloves without leather protectors and the rubber gloves chosen shall be arc rated to the potential exposure level of the HRC category. Add Specific Notes (as referenced in the table) as follows: 5: Maximum arc duration of 0.25 sec and available bolted fault current of 25 kA or any combination not exceeding 6250 ampere seconds. Substantiation: There is no guide for battery rooms or DC hazards in the standard which give usable guidance. I suggest this for the time being to start the process for DC calculation and allow small companies which have limited batteries such as forktruck batteries or small stationary battery installations to use this until IEEE 1584 gives more definite results on DC arc flash calculation. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-347a (Log #CP12) meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-274 Log #146 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.4 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Drake A. Drobnick, Saline, MI Recommendation: Add Equipment Labeling as a standalone section and increment the rest of the sections (i.e., 130.5 Test Instruments and Equipment Use, etc.) Substantiation: Equipment labeling is currently listed as a sub-set of Article 130.3. In its present location it appears to be only associated with an arc flash hazard analysis and would not be required if using the task tables. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee does not agree with relocating the section. The submitter did not provide adequate substantiation to support the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-275 Log #256 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (130.4) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: David A. Pace, Olin Corporation Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 130.4 Test Instruments and Equipment Use. Only qualified persons shall perform testing work on or near live parts operating at 50 volts or more, or where an electrical hazard exists. Substantiation: Only qualified persons are allowed to work on or near conductors or circuit parts where an electrical hazard exists. Electrical hazards can exist on circuits operating at less than 50 volts. This revision also makes this text consistent with that found elsewhere in the document.

Committee Meeting Action: Accept Committee Statement: The committee notes that this action modifies Proposal 70E-271a (Log#CP13). Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: The action should be reject. The proposal does not show the existing language correctly as it appears in the standard but uses underlines that seemingly only adds “or where an electrical hazard exists.” This is not the case and the committee action is inappropriate. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-275a Log #CP14 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.5) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Electrical Safety in the Workplace, Recommendation: Revise 130.5 (A) through (D) to read: 130.5 Work Within the Limited Approach Boundary of Uninsulated Overhead Lines. (A) Uninsulated and Energized General. Uninsulated, energized overhead line(s) shall be put into an Electrically Safe Work Condition if work is to be performed within the Limited Approach Boundary unless the employer can demonstrate justification for energized work in compliance with the requirements of 130.1 and the lines are guarded. FPN: See Table 130.2 (C) Column 2 for Limited Approach Boundary Where work is performed in locations containing uninsulated energized overhead lines that are not guarded or isolated, precautions shall be taken to prevent employees from contacting such lines directly with any unguarded parts of their body or indirectly through conductive materials, tools, or equipment. (B) Deenergizing or Guarding. Employer Responsibility. The employer shall be responsible for: (1) Documenting necessary work practices to ensure that uninsulated overhead lines are placed in an Electrically Safe Work Condition and temporary protective grounding equipment is installed at or near the point of work; or items (2) through (5) are implemented. These precautions shall prevent each employee from contacting such lines directly with any part of his or her body or indirectly through conductive materials, tools, or equipment. (2) Ensuring protective measures, such as guarding, isolating, or insulation, and Alerting Techniques are employed prior to allowing any work within Limited Approach Boundary of the uninsulated energized overhead lines. (3) Providing necessary PPE for establishing Electrically Safe Work Condition or for installation of protective measures. (4) Documenting necessary procedures, and providing training to employees for arrangements required to be made with the person (s) or organization that owns, operates or controls the uninsulated overhead lines to deenergize the uninsulated overhead lines, if necessary. (5) Documenting qualifications and training of person(s) permitted to enter the Limited Approach Boundary of the uninsulated energized overhead lines. FPN: See 120.3 for requirements of Protective Equipment Grounding Equipment and 130.7 (E) for Alerting Techniques If the lines are to be deenergized, arrangements shall be made with the person or organization that operates or controls the lines to deenergize them and visibly ground them at the point of work. If arrangements are made to use protective measures, such as guarding, isolating, or insulation, these precautions shall prevent each employee from contacting such lines directly with any part of his or her body or indirectly through conductive materials, tools, or equipment. (C) Employer and Employee Responsibility. Qualified Person Responsibility. (1)Employees working within the Limited Approach Boundary of uninsulated energized overhead lines shall: (a) Be qualified for the task to be performed. (b) Comply with all established work practices and procedures. (c) Use all necessary personal protective equipment. (d) Confirm that uninsulated energized overhead lines are suitably guarded or isolated for the conditions. (e) Confirm that suitable barriers and Alerting Techniques are implemented to prevent qualified personnel from entering the Restricted Approach Boundary, and unqualified personnel from entering the Limited Approach Boundary, directly with any unguarded parts of their body or indirectly through conductive materials, tools, or equipment. FPN: Objects that are not insulated for the voltage involved should be considered to be conductive. (2) A qualified person shall determine if the overhead electrical lines are insulated for the operational voltage. The employer and employee shall be responsible for ensuring that guards or protective measures are satisfactory for the conditions. Employees shall comply with established work methods and theuse of protective equipment. (D) Approach Distances for Unqualified Persons. Unqualified person(s) shall not enter the Limited Approach Boundary when working on the ground or in an elevated position near uninsulated energized overhead lines directly with any parts of their body or indirectly through the use of any tools or equipment.

Tasks Performed on Energized Equipment

Hazard/Risk

Category

Rubber Insulating Gloves(i)

Insulated and

Insulating Hand Tools

Storage Batteries, Direct-Current Switchboards and other DC supply sources >50V<600V Note 5Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing

1h Y Yg

70E-78

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E When unqualified persons are working on the ground or in an elevated position near overhead lines, the location shall be such that the employee and the longest conductive object the employee might contact do not come closer to any unguarded, energized overhead power line than the Limited Approach Boundary in Table 130.2(C), Column 2. FPN: Objects that are not insulated for the voltage involved should be considered to be conductive. Substantiation: The recommendation reorganizes this section for clarity and delineates the responsibility for each of the affected parties in overhead line work. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee’s intent is to reorganize these sections for clarity but is concerned that the reorganization could have unintended technical changes. The committee is seeking public input on the recommended reorganization of 130.5(A) through (D). Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: The context of part (A) as currently written is focused on work performed inside the limited approach boundary that is not related to these overhead lines directly, but happens to occur in the proximity of the lines. The proposed language has a quite different context whereby even tasks such as changing a blown fuse on a cut-out or removing a dead animal from a line with a properly insulated live-line tool would not be allowed unless justified through a rigorous permitting process. These types of systems are designed to be serviced in this manner while energized with specialized tools by specially-trained individuals. Utilities do this type of work on a regular basis in a safe manner. The new language does not make the distinction clear that the requirement to shut off these systems is directed at tasks performed by unqualified persons that happen to impinge on the limited approach boundary. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: WILMER, K.: Edison Electric Institute supports the committee action. Section 130.5 is not in need of reorganization. The current structure provides employers with clear language. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-276 Log #475 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (130.5(B) (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Danny Liggett, DuPont Recommendation: Insert a new 130.5(B) and renumber the existing 130.5(B) to 130.5(C). Renumber the remaining sections as appropriate. The new 130.5(B) to read as follows. (B) A qualified person shall determine if the overhead electrical lines are insulated for the voltage the lines are operating at. Substantiation: Some overhead lines have been installed with a protective covering (weather protection) but is not rated for the voltage that the line is operating at. It would be easy for an unqualified person to assume that because there is a covering on the conductors that the conductors are insulated. If that were the case then all of 130.5 would not apply. Overhead conductors need to correctly identified so that the appropriate safe work practices can be applied. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: CARPENTER, T.: The committee action for this proposal should have been to reject. This title of this section is “130.5 Work Within the Limited Approach Boundary of Uninsulated Overhead Lines.” The requirement being added is to have a qualified person determine if the lines are insulated for the voltage the lines are operating at. This section is for uninsulated lines, so what is the qualified person checking for since there is no insulation to check? Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: Suggest “Accepting in Principle” and rewording to improve grammar: “(B) A qualified person shall determine if the overhead electrical lines are insulated for the line’s operating voltage.” HICKMAN, P.: We agree with adding the new text but note that a title was not added for the newly proposed section. In addition, we suggest that the proposed text may be better suited to go in the existing (B) where the existing title addresses the additional text. HITTEL, M.: The text accepted is not grammatically correct. It should read: “for the voltage which the lines are operating.”

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-277 Log #96 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.6(B)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas Doyle, Industrial Safety Integration Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: (B) Blind Reaching. Where inadvertent contact with electrical hazards is reasonably foreseeable, protective measures shall be implemented. Employees shall be instructed regarding inadvertently reaching into electrical equipment or into areas containing energized electrical conductors or circuit parts where an electrical hazard could exist. Employee shall be instructed not to reach blindly into areas that might contain exposed energized electrical conductors or circuit parts where an electrical hazard exists. Substantiation: What is “Blind Reaching”? This term will need to be defined as the criteria for “Blind Reaching” is not included in the clause. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation does not improve the clarity of the current provision. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-278 Log #97 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.6(C)(1)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas Doyle, Industrial Safety Integration Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: General. Employees shall not enter spaces containing electrical hazards where lack of illumination could lead to an increased level of risk unless illumination is provided that enables Illumination shall be provided such that it enables the employees to perform the work safely. Substantiation: How would a worker know how much illumination there is before they enter the space. This criterion must be established and outlined in the work instruction or work permit. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation does not improve the clarity of the current provision. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-279 Log #147 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.6(C)(3)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Michael A. Anthony, University of Michigan / Rep. APPA.ORG - Assn of Higher Education Facilities Executives Recommendation: Add new text as follows: 130.6 Other Precautions for Personnel Activities. A. Alertness. 1 When Hazardous. Employees shall be instructed to be alert at all times when they are working within the Limited Approach Boundary of energized electrical conductors or circuit parts operating at 50 volts or more and in work situations where electrical hazards might exist. 2 When Impaired. Employees shall not be permitted to work within the Limited Approach Boundary of energized electrical conductors or circuit parts operating at 50 volts or more, or where other electrical hazards exist, while their alertness is recognizably impaired due to illness, fatigue, or other reasons. 3 Changes in Scope. Employees shall be instructed to be alert for changes in the job or task that may lead the person outside of the electrically safe work condition or expose the person to additional hazards that were not part of the original plan. B Blind Reaching. Employees shall be instructed not to reach blindly into areas that might contain exposed energized electrical conductors or circuit parts where an electrical hazard exists. C Illumination. 1 General. Employees shall not enter spaces containing electrical hazards unless illumination is provided that enables the employees to perform the work safely. 2 Obstructed View of Work Area. Where lack of illumination or an obstruction precludes observation of the work to be performed, employees shall not perform any task within the Limited Approach Boundary of energized electrical conductors or circuit parts operating at 50 volts or more or where an electrical hazard exists.

70E-79

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E 3 Service Switchgear Ingress and Egress Illumination. Employees shall not perform any task on non-residential electrical service equipment greater than 200 amperes where emergency illumination of the work area around the service equipment is not present. Where the equipment is not located along the primary egress path of the building, emergency illumination shall be provided along an ingress path from the exterior of the building to the electrical service equipment. Substantiation: This proposal is one of several proposals submitted to technical committees (NFPA 70, 101 and 5000) intended to provide an illuminated egress and ingress path for: a) the electrician who is working in the service equipment area without a flashlight b) the maintenance mechanic - or general occupant -- who may neither be an electrician nor familiar with the electric service equipment to work on it in the dark. Electric service panels are not always installed along either the primary or secondary egress path required by the Life Safety Code. The cost of making this mandatory is relatively small -- on the order of $100-$250 per installation. CMP-1 and CMP-13 of the National Electrical Code have rejected proposals and comments of this nature for the 2005, 2008 and 2011 revision cycles. The basis for its rejection was that mandatory emergency illumination for electricians belongs in other documents -- not the NEC -- or that emergency illumination is matter of design “choice”. The outcome of NFPA 101 and NFPA 5000 committee consideration is not yet known. The substantiation of the original submitter, an electrical inspector from the State of Michigan, is worth repeating here: “The safety of the electrician has been overlooked in the electrical panel areas in the past. Emergency lighting needs to be installed in the areas where electrical panels are located for egress of someone that may have been injured from an electrocution. The building code has not addressed this location and the safety of those working on this type of equipment needs to be addressed by the electrical code.” Perhaps the NFPA 70E technical committee, with a slightly different scope than the other documents through which this concept has traveled, will see emergency illumination for employees as a workplace safety issue. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: There is inadequate substantiation to require additional lighting beyond what is currently required by 130.6(C)(1) and no substantiation has been provided for the 200 ampere limit. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-280 Log #98 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.6(f)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas Doyle, Industrial Safety Integration Recommendation: Revise text as follows: (F) Confined or Enclosed Work Spaces Word Spaces Which Inhibit or Restrict Movement. When a employee works in a confined or enclosed space an area where movement is inhibited or restricted and could therefore lead to an increase in risk (such as a manhole or vault)... Substantiation: The term “confined space” already brings enough confusion to the OH&S arena. Please avoid the use of this term. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation does not improve the clarity of the current provision. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: By the OSHA 1910.146 definition, “Confined space” means a space that: (1) Is large enough and so configured that an employee can bodily enter and perform assigned work; and (2) Has limited or restricted means for entry or exit (for example, tanks, vessels, silos, storage bins, hoppers, vaults, and pits are spaces that may have limited means of entry.); and (3) Is not designed for continuous employee occupancy. This is what is meant to be included in this section. If it is necessary to add the definition as a FPN, then comments are invited. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-281 Log #518 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.6(F)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Paul Dobrowsky, Holley, NY Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: (F) Confined or Enclosed Work Spaces. When an employee works in a

confined or enclosed space (such as a manhole or vault) that contains exposed energized electrical conductors or circuit parts operating at 50 volts or more or where an electrical hazard exists, the employer shall provide, and the employee shall use, protective shields, protective barriers, or insulating materials as necessary to avoid inadvertent contact with these parts and the effects of the electrical hazards. Doors, hinged panels, and the like shall be secured to prevent their swinging into an employee and causing the employee to contact exposed energized electrical conductors or circuit parts rating at 50 volts or more or where an electrical hazard exists. Insert the following as a new (G) and re-identify the remaining subdivisions. (G) Doors, hinged panels, and the like shall be secured to prevent their swinging into an employee and causing the employee to contact exposed energized electrical conductors or circuit parts rated at 50 volts or more or where an electrical hazard exists if the door closing is likely to create a hazard. Substantiation: Doors should be secured where they can create an unsafe condition even where they are not in a confined or enclosed space. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the recommendation to read: (G) Doors, hinged panels, and the like shall be secured to prevent their swinging into an employee and causing the employee to contact exposed energized electrical conductors or circuit parts rated at 50 volts or more or where an electrical hazard exists if movement of the door, hinged panel, and the like is likely to create a hazard. Committee Statement: The committee revision expands the provision to any type of movement, not just closing. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: BOWMAN, W.: Editorially remove “and the like” and just say “movement of the door or hinged panel cover”. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-282 Log #99 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (130.6(g)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas Doyle, Industrial Safety Integration Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Where energized electrical conductors or circuit parts present an electrical contact hazard, employees shall not perform housekeeping duties inside the Limited Approach Boundary where there is a possibility of contact, unless adequate safeguards (such as insulating equipment or barriers) are provided to prevent contact. Employees shall not perform housekeeping duties inside the Limited Approach Boundary where there is a possibility of contact with energized electrical conductors or circuit parts, unless adequate safeguards (such as insulating equipment or barriers) are provided to prevent contact. Substantiation: Correct grammar of run-on sentence. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Committee Statement: The committee notes that this recommendation only revises the first paragraph and does not impact the existing remaining text. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-283 Log #100 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.6(i)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas Doyle, Industrial Safety Integration Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: When there is evidence that electric equipment could fail and injury employees failure of electrical equipment would result in an increase in risk to the employee(s), the electrical equipment shall be de-energized unless the employer can demonstrate that de-energizing introduces additional increased hazards or increased risk or that it is infeasible because of equipment design or operational limitation. Employees shall be protected from hazards associated with the anticipated impending failure until the equipment is de-energized and/or repaired. Substantiation: Failure of equipment does not typically result in increased “hazards.” Failure of equipment does typically increase the risk by introducing an increase in the probability of the occurrence of hazardous events which in turn increases the likelihood of harm. Impending failures are things that are going to happen. These need to be immediately fixed. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Adequate substantiation has not been provided to justify the proposed text change. The recommended text does not improve the clarity of the existing provision. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A.

70E-80

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HITTEL, M.: The existing language contemplates evidence that suggests that the equipment could fail, such as water intrusion. The suggested language does not contemplate that probability. Properly installed, operated and maintained equipment should not include the expectation that the equipment will fail. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-284 Log #202 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Part (130.6(I)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Daleep C. Mohla, DCM Electrical Consulting Services, Inc. Recommendation: Revise text as follows: (I) Anticipating Failure. When there is evidence that electric equipment could fail and injure employees, the electric equipment shall be deenergized unless the employer can demonstrate that deenergizing introduces additional or increased hazards or is infeasible because of equipment design or operational limitation. Until the equipment is deenergized or repaired, employees shall be protected from hazards associated with the impending failure of the equipment by suitable barricades and other alterting techniques necessary for safety of the employees. Informational Note: See 130.7(E) for Alerting Techniques Substantiation: If the evidence is there that the equipment can fail and injure employees it should be deenergized and an action plan should be in place for deenergization as soon as possible. Equipment design infeasability and operational limitations should not be a factor to be considered for continued operation of such equipment when there is evidence that it could fail and injure employees. Reference to alerting techniques and emphasis on barricades has been added to convey the intent of preventing employees access since only safety signs and tags may not be adequate to protect against shrapnel during equipment operation. An Information Note is added to guide users to the Altering techniques specified in 70E-2009. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Part The committee rejects the recommendation to delete text and accepts the remainder of the recommendation. Committee Statement: The substantiation is not adequate to remove the infeasibility exemption. The committee notes that “altering” is “alerting” is the last line of the provision. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: It may not be possible to immediately deenergize equipment. Suitable barriers, introducing distance and keeping employees away for a possible hazard, is an appropriate reaction. ______________________________________________________________ 70E-285 Log #423 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.6(I) (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Michael A. Anthony, University of Michigan / Rep. APPA.ORG - Association of Education Facility Executives Recommendation: New text to read as follows: Insert permissive language in 130.6(I) for partial discharge sensing technology to give electricians an early warning of flash danger. (I) Anticipating Failure. When there is evidence that electric equipment could fail and injure employees, the electric equipment shall be deenergized unless the employer can demonstrate that deenergizing introduces additional or increased hazards or is infeasible because of equipment design or operational limitation. Until the equipment is deenergized or repaired, employees shall be protected from hazards associated with the impending failure of the equipment. Installation of partial discharge sensing technology shall be permitted. Substantiation: This is one of a series of product solution proposals from our industry intended raise the level of debate on a number of innovations that present disruptive, but possibly cost-effective, solutions to the electrical safety problem presented by flash hazard. Substantiation for this proposal is adapted from an October 2009 IEEE Industry Applications Society paper authored by David D. Shipp & David M. Wood, “Innovative Techniques for Mitigating Arc Flash Exposure” – as presented at the IEEE IAS conference in Houston, 110/09 (IEEE #IAS16P3). “…Partial Discharge (PD) sensing is another way of predicting faults way before they happen. This technology senses high frequency discharges in insulation systems at MV and HV and can give months of advance warning. It does it with sensors that are typically permanently installed (coupling capacitors, RFCTs, RTD couplers that use the RTD leads as internal antenna) and feeds an external PD relay. This gives continuous on-line monitoring and advises when a problem is occurring, all without the need to remove protective covers. If the cover is not removed, no special PPE requirements are needed. When a problem is alerted, you deenergize that one piece of equipment and correct the problem safely…. PD technology exists for switchgear, generators,

motors and transformers…” Application of this technology can meet business continuity objectives as well--particularly within the switchgear that supplies the medium voltage distribution grids common in many US colleges and universities. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The standard does not currently prohibit what has been recommended by this proposal. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-286 Log #143 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (130.6(K)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Kevin J. Lippert, Eaton Corporation Recommendation: (K) Reclosing Circuits After Protective Device Operation. After a circuit is deenergized by the automatic operation of a circuit protective device, the circuit shall not be manually reenergized until it has been determined that the equipment and circuit can be safely energized. The repetitive manual reclosing of circuit breakers or reenergizing circuits through replaced fuses shall be prohibited. When it is determined from the design of the circuit and the overcurrent devices involved that the automatic operation of a device was caused by an overload rather than a fault condition, examination of the circuit or connected equipment shall not be required before the circuit is reenergized. Substantiation: There are 2 changes included in this proposal: 1) The requirement is applicable only when the protective device is operated “automatically.” As presently worded, it is incorrectly applicable to the manual operation too. 2) Determination of an overload condition does not always require review of the design of the circuit or the overcurrent devices. Rather, if another large load is energized and is the identified problem, there is no need to review the overcurrent devices. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. However, I have the following comment on the committee statement for this action: The substantiation from the submitter did not explain how one could determine that the operation of a protective device was caused by an overload without reviewing the design of the circuit or overcurrent devices. In the specific example given, how would you even know that the second load was on the same circuit or that the circuit was designed for the load without such a review. Thus, I do not believe that the substantiation justifies the recommended deletion, and an additional committee statement is needed to justify an action of “accept”. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-287 Log #257 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.6(L) (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: David A. Pace, Olin Corporation Recommendation: Add new text to read as follows: (L) Equipment Maintenance. Electrical equipment shall be maintained in good condition to reduce or eliminate the risk of failure and the subsequent exposure of employees to electrical hazards. This requirement shall include the equipment environment, operation, components, attachments, extensions, and associated auxiliary equipment. Substantiation: All aspects of NFPA 70E, hazards analysis, determination of risk, arc flash hazards, Hazard/Risk Categories, etc. are rendered invalid and incorrect if the equipment is not properly maintained. The requirement to properly maintain equipment must be considered an equal and necessary part of compliance with 70E. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee is unsure as to what the term “equipment” is intended to cover. Safety related maintenance requirements belong in Chapter 2. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: PACE, D.: This should have been Accepted in Principal. The submitter contends that what the term “equipment” is intended to cover would be well understood by readers of the document, in disagreement with the first portion of the committee statement. The requirement should be moved to Article 205 as a new 205.1 General Requirements. All other articles in the balance of 205 should be renumbered accordingly. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

70E-81

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-288 Log #367 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.6(L) (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Rodney J. West, Square D Company/Schneider Electric Recommendation: Add new text to read as follows: 130.6(L) Routine Operation. Routine operation of 50-600 Volt enclosed equipment does not require the use of Protective Clothing. Also add a new definition in Article 100 to read as follows: Operation, Routine. Operation of enclosed electrical equipment that has not been altered and has been properly installed, rated, and maintained does not expose users to a shock or arc flash hazards. For purposes of this definition, altered equipment includes equipment with covers removed to expose bare energized conductors or circuit parts or when work is being performed on or in the equipment. Substantiation: The proposed addition adds clarity for users of the document. With the removal of “working on or near” equipment in the 2009 of edition of NFPA 70E, some users are confused by when and where protective clothing is necessary. The Technical Committee recognizes that under normal operating conditions, enclosed energized equipment that has been properly installed and maintained is not likely to pose an arc flash or shock hazard. This is clearly explained in the Article 100 Definition of Arc Flash Hazard. The Arc Flash Protection Boundary exists only when an Arc Flash Hazard exists. This point is not well understood by some users of the document. Manufacturers of enclosed equipment receive questions from users regarding routine operation of certain types of equipment. These questions come from both large and small facilities and are a good indication of confusion in the field. In the existing document, 130.7(C)9 FPN 1 explains that the consensus judgment of the full NFPA 70E Technical Committee allows the reduced PPE levels shown in the tables to be reasonable for operation. This understanding must be made clearer and located so that all users can refer to it. The standard is silent on this issue unless the Tables are used. The proposed text will clearly explain that under normal conditions, routine operation of enclosed energized equipment does not pose an arc flash hazard. There are countless examples, but a few to consider: 1) A 480 Volt panelboard with an incident energy level of 5 cal/cm^2 and is marked as Hazard/Risk Category 2. While the marking is applicable to a worker who may be performing voltage testing inside the panel, is it also necessary for the security guard who is simply operating the breakers every morning and evening to wear Category 2 PPE? 2) A 240 Volt fusible switch with an incident energy level of 2 cal/cm^2 is marked as Hazard/Risk Category 1. While the marking is applicable to the worker who may be troubleshooting the fuses, is it also necessary for a Nebraska farmer who is simply turning on the fan to his grain dryer? 3) A 600 V Switchgear with an incident energy level of 16 cal/cm^2 is marked as Hazard/Risk Category 3. While the marking is applicable to the worker who may be removing a bolted cover to expose bare bus bars, is it also necessary for the technician who is reading a panel meter while operating a meter switch? The proposed additions are consistent with 130.7(C)(9) FPN 1 and add clarity to the document. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: It is incorrect to assume that no protective clothing is required without first performing an arc flash hazard analysis. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: TIEDE, T.: This proposal should be accepted or accepted in principle. While it is already stated in the Article 100 definitions, the body of the standard should also clearly explain that the Arc Flash Boundary exists only when an Arc Flash Hazard exists. The proposed text would help clarify that under normal circumstances, where the equipment has been properly installed, rated, and maintained and has been in operation for some period of time, normal operation of circuit breakers and fusible switches does not pose an arc flash hazard. WEBER, J.: The committee’s response does not address submitter’s issue. A properly installed and maintained disconnect switch with enclosure intact should not present a hazard when being routinely operated. If it does, then there is a design problem with the switch that should be addressed in a product standard. Protective clothing cannot shield a worker from shrapnel from a breached enclosure and should not be relied upon to do so. The committee’s statement that a hazard analysis is required to determine if PPE is required assumes the very point that submitter is challenging; that a fully enclosed, properly installed and maintained switch presents a hazard. That is not sufficient justification for rejection because it effectively says the committee disagrees without offering the reason why. At the extreme, a user who pulls a disconnect on a malfunctioning piece of equipment is in violation unless he suits up first. The committee has not offered any data in support of it’s position. Submitter has a valid point that should be addressed by the committee. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: I agree with the rejection of this proposal. The proposed concept could be changed to read as an exception and be added after the FPN No.2 to 130.7(A): Exception: Enclosed and labeled equipment rated 600 volts and below that is in a normal operating condition shall not require the use of personal and other protective equipment. Informational Note: Opening and closing a switching device that is applied within its published voltage, continuous-current, and short-circuit ratings is considered a normal operating condition. An activity such as insertion or removal of a starter or a circuit breaker from its cubicle, or opening enclosure doors or removing covers that expose live parts, is not a normal operating condition. HITTEL, M.: The fine print note associated with the definition of Arc Flash Hazard currently contemplates that equipment that is “properly installed, rated, and maintained” is not likely pose an arc flash hazard. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-289 Log #246 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.7) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James T. Dollard, Jr., IBEW Local 98 Recommendation: New text to read as follows: 1. Add a Table in Article 130.7 that lists shock and arc flash PPE, citing the appropriate Article in 130.7 for each item of PPE listed and add a statement to 130.7(A) referencing the new table and stating its purpose. 2. Add a new last sentence to 130.7 to reference the new table. 130.7 Personal and Other Protective Equipment. (A) General. Employees working in areas where electrical hazards are present shall be provided with, and shall use, protective equipment that is designed and constructed for the specific part of the body to be protected and for the work to be performed. A summary of the personal protective equipment required by this standard for electrical hazards is found in Table 130.7(A).(See Table 130.7(A) on the following pages.) Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the Tables Task Group appointed by NFPA 70E Chairman Dave Dini. The task group consisted of Larry Ayer, Palmer Hickman, Jim White, Ron Widup, Vince Saporita, Daniel Roberts, Mike Doherty, Tom Neal, Paul Dobrowsky, John Luke, David Wallace, Daleep Mohla, Paul Hamer, Eric Glaude and Jim Dollard. Many users of the NFPA 70E “reverse engineer” Table 130.7(C)(10) to acquire an arc flash PPE list rather than go section by section through the document. This is inappropriate. Table 130.7(C)(10) is designed to be used only with Table 130.7(C)(9) and not as a general PPE list. As stated on-line in the NFPA Journal®, November/December 2008: “Some think they can do an incident-energy analysis, find the incident energy for the task, and use Table 130.7(C)(9) to select the PPE. If you choose to do an incident-energy analysis rather than using the tables, you cannot use Table 130.7(C)(9), Table 130.7(C)(10), or Table 130.7(C)(11).” http://www.nfpa.org/publicColumn.asp?categoryID=&itemID=40828&src=NFPAJournal&cookie%5Ftest=1 Finding information regarding the selection of PPE in the document can be difficult as not all the information is in one location, nor is the information on PPE laid out in a linear fashion in the document. This new table makes the document more user friendly by providing information for the user at a glance without having users “reverse engineer” Table 130.7(C)(10). By including the appropriate section number in the table the user is directed to the detailed information. Other than hearing protection, none of the information in the proposed table is new. All information can be found either in existing sections (as shown), or in the case of hearing protection, in all hazard/risk categories in Table 130.7(C)(10). Hearing protection should be included in the table. See Annex K.4 where it states: “The sounds associated with these [arc blast] pressures can exceed 160 dB.” Note: TC action will be required for hearing protection. A separate proposal has been submitted regarding hearing protection. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation may be better suited as reference material in an Annex. The recommendation does not provide additional clarity. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: WILMER, K.: Committee action was correct. The material is appropriate for an Annex, but not as a requirement in the 70E standard.

70E-82

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E [Attachment for New-PPE-Table-DR_R1.doc]

[Option 1 for Technical Committee consideration – a PPE list somewhat like Table 130.7(C)(10)]

Table 130.7(A) Personal and Other Protective Equipment for Electrical Hazards

Shock Hazard Personal and Other Protective Equipment Applicable Section(s)

Rubber insulating gloves; and Leather protectors (unless the requirements of ASTM F 496 are met)

130.7(C)(6)(a)

Rubber insulating sleeves (as needed) 130.7(C)(6)(a)

Class E or G hard hat (as needed) 130.7(C)(3)

Safety glasses or goggles (as needed) 130.7(C)(4)

Dielectric overshoes (as needed) 130.7(C)(7)

Arc Flash Hazard Personal and Other Protective Equipment Applicable Section(s)

Incident Energy Exposures ≤ 1.2 calories/cm2

Non-melting or untreated natural fiber long sleeve shirt and long pants or coverall 130.7(C)(5); 130.7(C)(12)(d)

Leather gloves 130.7(C)(6)(b); 130.7(C)(13)(c)

Class E or G hard hat 130.7(C)(3)

Faceshield that covers the face, neck and chin 130.7(C)(3)

Safety glasses or Safety goggles 130.7(C)(4); 130.7(C)(13)(b)

Hearing protection (TC action required)

Heavy duty leather work shoes or boots (as needed) 130.7(C)(13)(d)

Incident Energy Exposures > 1.2 calories/cm2 and ≤ 4 calories/cm2

Arc rated clothing or a multi-layered arc rated clothing system with an arc rating appropriate to the anticipated incident energy exposure

130.7(C)(1); 130.7(C)(2); 130.7(C)(5); 130.7(C)(12)(d)

Underlayers (when used): FR or non-melting or untreated natural fiber 130.7(C)(12)(c); 130.7(C)14; 130.7(C)(15)

Heavy duty leather gloves (e.g. > 12 oz/yd2); orRubber insulating gloves with their leather protectors; or Arc rated gloves

130.7(C)(6)(b); 130.7(C)(13)(c)

Class G or E hard hat 130.7(C)(1); 130.7(C)(3)

Arc rated faceshield that covers the face, neck and chin and an arc rated balaclava; orArc rated hood with arc rated faceshield

130.7(C)(1); 130.7(C)(3); 130.7(C)(13)(b)




Incident Energy Exposures > 4 calories/cm2 and ≤ 8 calories/cm2


130.7(C)(1); 130.7(C)(2); 130.7(C)(5); 130.7(C)(12)(d)



130.7(C)(6)(b); 130.7(C)(13)(c)



130.7(C)(1); 130.7(C)(3); 130.7(C)(13)(b)



Heavy duty leather work shoes or boots 130.7(C)(13)(d)

Incident Energy Exposures > 8 calories/cm2


130.7(C)(1); 130.7(C)(2); 130.7(C)(5); 130.7(C)(12)(d)


Class G or E hard hat and an arc rated hood with arc rated faceshield: 130.7(C)1; 130.7(C)3; 4.3.7.3.13(b)

Rubber insulating gloves with their leather protectors; or Arc rated gloves

130.7(C)(6)(b); 130.7(C)(13)(c)

Class G or E hard hat 130.7(C)(3)

Arc rated hood with arc rated faceshield 130.7(C)(1); 130.7(C)(3); 130.7(C)(13)(b)





70E-83


[Option 2 for Technical Committee consideration – a PPE list showing affected body part as is done in the body of the standard]


Affected Body Part Shock Hazard Personal and Other Protective Equipment Applicable Section(s)

Hands Rubber insulating gloves; and Leather protectors (unless the requirements of ASTM F 496 are met)

130.7(C)6(a)

Arms Rubber insulating sleeves (as needed) 130.7(C)6(a)

Head Class G or E hard hat (as needed) 130.7(C)3

Eyes Safety glasses or goggles (as needed) 130.7(C)4

Feet Dielectric overshoes (as needed) 130.7(C)7

Affected Body Part Arc Flash Hazard Personal and Other Protective Equipment Applicable Section(s)


Body Non-melting or untreated natural fiber long sleeve shirt and long pants or coverall

130.7(C)1; 130.7(C)12(d)

Hands Leather gloves 130.7(C)6(b); 130.7(C)13(c)

Head, face, neck and chin

Class G or E hard hat; and

Faceshield that covers the face, neck and chin

130.7(C)3

Eyes Safety glasses or goggles 130.7(C)4; 130.7(C)13(b)

Hearing Hearing protection (TC action required)

Feet Heavy duty leather work shoes or boots (as needed) 130.7(C)13(d)

Incident Energy Exposures > 1.2 calories/cm2

Body Arc rated clothing or a multi-layered arc rated clothing system with an arc rating appropriate to the anticipated incident energy exposure

130.7(C)1; 130.7(C)2; 130.7(C)5; 130.7(C)12(d)


Hands Exposures > 1.2 calories/cm and ≤ 8 calories/cm2: Heavy duty leather gloves (e.g. > 12 oz/yd2)

Exposures > 8 calories/cm2: Rubber insulating gloves with their leather protectors; or

Arc rated gloves

130.7(C)6(b); 130.7(C)13(c)


Class G or E hard hat; and

Exposures > 1.2 calories/cm and ≤ 8 calories/cm2: Arc rated faceshield that covers the face, neck and chin and an arc

rated balaclava; orArc rated hood with arc rated faceshield

Exposures > 8 calories/cm2: Arc rated hood with arc rated faceshield:

130.7(C)1; 130.7(C)3; 4.3.7.3.13(b)

Eyes Safety glasses or goggles 130.7(C)4; 130.7(C)13(b)

Hearing Hearing protection (TC action required)

Feet Exposures ≤ 4 calories/cm2:Heavy duty leather work shoes or boots (as needed)

Exposures > 4 calories/cm2:Heavy duty leather work shoes or boots

130.7(C)13(d)


70E-84


[Option 3 for Technical Committee consideration – a PPE list without showing the affected body part]


Shock Hazard Personal and Other Protective Equipment Applicable Section(s)


130.7(C)6(a)

Rubber insulating sleeves (as needed) 130.7(C)6(a)

Class G or E hard hat (as needed) 130.7(C)3

Safety glasses or goggles (as needed) 130.7(C)4

Dielectric overshoes (as needed) 130.7(C)7

Arc Flash Hazard Personal and Other Protective Equipment Applicable Section(s)


Clothing: non-melting or untreated natural fiber long sleeve shirt and long pants or coverall 130.7(C)1; 130.7(C)12(d)

Gloves: leather 130.7(C)6(b); 130.7(C)13(c)

Hard hat: class G or E 130.7(C)3

Faceshield: covers the face, neck and chin 130.7(C)3

Safety glasses or goggles 130.7(C)4; 130.7(C)13(b)


Shoes or boots: heavy duty leather (as needed) 130.7(C)13(d)

Incident Energy Exposures > 1.2 calories/cm2

Clothing: arc rated clothing system with an arc rating appropriate to the anticipated incident energy exposure

130.7(C)1; 130.7(C)2; 130.7(C)5; 130.7(C)12(d)


Gloves:

Exposures > 1.2 calories/cm and ≤ 8 calories/cm2: Heavy duty leather gloves (e.g. > 12 oz/yd2)


Arc rated gloves

130.7(C)6(b); 130.7(C)13(c)

Hard hat: class G or E; and

Exposures > 1.2 calories/cm and ≤ 8 calories/cm2: Arc rated faceshield that covers the face, neck and chin and an arc rated balaclava; or

Arc rated hood with arc rated faceshield


130.7(C)1; 130.7(C)3; 4.3.7.3.13(b)

Safety glasses or goggles 130.7(C)4; 130.7(C)13(b)


Shoes or boots:

Exposures ≤ 4 calories/cm2:Heavy duty leather work shoes or boots (as needed)


130.7(C)13(d)


70E-85

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-290 Log #389 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.7) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Mike Doherty, Infrastructure Health & Safety Association / Rep. CSA Z462 Technical Committee Recommendation: Add a Table in Article 130.7 that lists shock and arc flash PPE, citing the appropriate Article in 130.7 for each item of PPE listed and add a statement to 130.7(A) referencing the new table and stating its purpose. 130.7 Personal and Other Protective Equipment. (A) General. Employees working in areas where electrical hazards are present shall be provided with, and shall use, protective equipment that is designed and constructed for the specific part of the body to be protected and for the work to be performed. A summary of the personal protective equipment required by this standard for electrical hazards is found in Table 130.7(A). (See Tables Option 1, 2, and 3 on the following pages.) This proposal is one of three related proposals. The other two proposals are: ● Move Sections and Tables 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10) and 130.7(C)(11) into an Annex ● Create a new article requiring hearing protection for all arc flash exposures Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the CSA Z462 Workplace Electrical Safety full Technical Committee. Many users of the NFPA 70E “reverse engineer” Table 130.7(C)(10) to acquire an arc flash PPE list rather than go section by section through the document. Paragraph 130.3(B) requires that one of two methods is to be used for selection of protective clothing and equipment, i.e. either an incident energy analysis or the “Tables” method. There is no provision permitting the mixing of these two methods, i.e. calculating incident energy and then using Table 130.7(C)(10) for selection of protective clothing and equipment selection. Table 130.7(C)(10) is designed to be used only with Table 130.7(C)(9) and not as a general PPE list. As stated on-line in the NFPA Journal®, November/December 2008: “Some think they can do an incident-energy analysis, find the incident energy for the task, and use Table 130.7(C)(9) to select the PPE. If you choose to do an incident-energy analysis rather than using the tables, you cannot use Table 130.7(C)(9), Table 130.7(C)(10), or Table 130.7(C)(11).” http://www.nfpa.org/publicColumn.asp?categoryID=&itemID=40828&src=NFPAJournal Finding information regarding the selection of PPE in the document can be difficult as not all the information is in one location, nor is the information on PPE laid out in a linear fashion in the document. This new table makes the document more user friendly by providing information for the user at a glance without having users “reverse engineer” Table 130.7(C)(10). By including the appropriate section number in the table the user is directed to the detailed information. Other than hearing protection, none of the information in the proposed table is new. All information can be found either in existing sections (as shown), or in the case of hearing protection, in all hazard/risk categories in Table 130.7(C)(10). Hearing protection should be included in the table. See Annex K.4 where it states: “The sounds associated with these [arc blast] pressures can exceed 160 dB.” Note: TC action will be required for hearing protection. A separate proposal has been submitted regarding hearing protection. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: See the panel action and statement on Proposal 70E-289. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-291 Log #12 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.7(A), FPN 2) _______________________________________________________________ Note: This proposal appeared as Comment 70E-531 (Log #663) which was held from the Annual 2008 ROC on Proposal 70E-258 and 70E-259. Submitter: Palmer L. Hickman, NJATC Recommendation: Change 40 to 8 in the following: 130.7(A) FPN No. 2: When incident energy exceeds 40 8 cal/cm2 at the working distance, greater emphasis should be placed on de-energizing before working on or near the exposed electrical conductors or circuit parts. Substantiation: While alerting users of 70E that greater emphasis should be placed on de-energizing before working on or near the exposed electrical conductors or circuit parts when incident energy exceeds 40 cal/cm2 at the working distance is a step in the right direction, 8 cal/cm2 at the working distance seems to be a reasonable point to raise this concern. For example, this is the point where protection would require a face shield and go from FR pants and shirts to a flash suit when using the tables. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The substantiation does not support reducing the incident energy level to 8 cal/cm2. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-292 Log #27 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.7(B)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Charles Helmick, AVO Training Institute, Inc. Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: (B) Protective Clothing and Other Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for application with an arc flash hazard analysis. Where it has been determined that work will be performed within the arc flash boundary identified by 130.3(A), one or both of the following methods shall be used... Substantiation: The problem is some “experts” are interpreting this to mean the HRCs shall not be used in conjunction with an analysis. The title to the article clearly states the PPE application is to be used with an arc flash analysis. By stating “or both” it will make the text agree with the title and avoid some confusion (hopefully). Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: NFPA 70E does not permit mixing methods of selecting personal protective equipment. If incident energy calculations are performed, Tables 130.7(C)(9), (C)(10), and (C)(11) cannot be used for selection of personal protective equipment. Incident energy values shall be used for selection of proper PPE. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. However, I have the following comment on the committee statement for this action: The committee statement implies but does not state clearly that you cannot use the table for some tasks and calculate incident energy for other tasks. The committee statement should explicitly clarify whether or not this is the case particularly because section 130.7(C)(9) requires an incident energy calculation for task not listed in the table, which necessitates using the table for some tasks and incident energy calculations for others. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We are concerned that the committee statement is inaccurate and that it does not clearly convey the intent of the committee. We are concerned that one could take the last sentence (“Incident energy values shall be used for selection of proper PPE.”) out of context and conclude that 130.3(B)(1) is the ONLY way to determine PPE and that 130.3(B)(2) is not permitted (the use of HRCs and Tables). We suggest that the committee statement to reject read as follows: NFPA 70E does not permit mixing methods of selecting personal protective equipment. If incident energy calculations are performed, Tables 130.7(C)(9), (C)(10), and (C)(11) cannot be used for selection of personal protective equipment. Incident energy values shall be not used for selection of proper PPE in conjunction with Tables 130.7(C)(9), (C)(10), and (C)(11). Incident energy values shall be used for selection of proper PPE in conjunction with the arc rating of the arc rated garment(s).

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[Attachment for New PPE Table.doc]

[Option 1 for TC consideration – a PPE list somewhat like Table 130.7(C)(10)] Table 130.7(A) Personal Protective Equipment for Electrical HazardsShock Hazard Personal Protective Equipment Applicable Section(s)


130.7(C)(6)(a)

Rubber insulating sleeves (as needed) 130.7(C)(6)(a)

Class E or G hard hat (as needed) 130.7(C)(3)

Safety glasses or goggles (as needed) 130.7(C)(4)

Dielectric overshoes (as needed) 130.7(C)(7)

Arc Flash Hazard Personal Protective Equipment Applicable Section(s)Incident Energy Exposures ≤ 1.2 calories/cm2

Non-melting or untreated natural fiber long sleeve shirt and long pants or coverall 130.7(C)(5); 130.7(C)(12)(d)

Leather gloves 130.7(C)(6)(b); 130.7(C)(13)(c)

Class E or G hard hat 130.7(C)(3)

Faceshield that covers the face, neck and chin 130.7(C)(3)




Incident Energy Exposures > 1.2 calories/cm2 and ≤ 4 calories/cm2


130.7(C)(1); 130.7(C)(2); 130.7(C)(5); 130.7(C)(12)(d)



130.7(C)(6)(b); 130.7(C)(13)(c)



130.7(C)(1); 130.7(C)(3); 130.7(C)(13)(b)




Incident Energy Exposures > 4 calories/cm2 and ≤ 8 calories/cm2


130.7(C)(1); 130.7(C)(2); 130.7(C)(5); 130.7(C)(12)(d)



130.7(C)(6)(b); 130.7(C)(13)(c)



130.7(C)(1); 130.7(C)(3); 130.7(C)(13)(b)




Incident Energy Exposures > 8 calories/cm2


130.7(C)(1); 130.7(C)(2); 130.7(C)(5); 130.7(C)(12)(d)


Class G or E hard hat and an arc rated hood with arc rated faceshield: 130.7(C)1; 130.7(C)3; 4.3.7.3.13(b)


130.7(C)(6)(b); 130.7(C)(13)(c)

Class G or E hard hat 130.7(C)(3)

Arc rated hood with arc rated faceshield 130.7(C)(1); 130.7(C)(3); 130.7(C)(13)(b)





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[Option 2 for TC consideration – a PPE list showing affected body part as is done in the body of the standard]Table 130.7(A) Personal Protective Equipment for Electrical HazardsAffected Body Part Shock Hazard Personal Protective Equipment Applicable Section(s)Hands Rubber insulating gloves; and

Leather protectors (unless the requirements of ASTM F 496 are met)130.7(C)6(a)

Arms Rubber insulating sleeves (as needed) 130.7(C)6(a)Head Class G or E hard hat (as needed) 130.7(C)3Eyes Safety glasses or goggles (as needed) 130.7(C)4Feet Dielectric overshoes (as needed) 130.7(C)7

Affected Body Part Arc Flash Hazard Personal Protective Equipment Applicable Section(s)Incident Energy Exposures ≤ 1.2 calories/cm2

Body Non-melting or untreated natural fiber long sleeve shirt and long pants or coverall

130.7(C)1; 130.7(C)12(d)

Hands Leather gloves 130.7(C)6(b); 130.7(C)13(c)Head, face, neck and chin

Class G or E hard hat; and Faceshield that covers the face, neck and chin

130.7(C)3

Eyes Safety glasses or goggles 130.7(C)4; 130.7(C)13(b)Hearing Hearing protection (TC action required)Feet Heavy duty leather work shoes or boots (as needed) 130.7(C)13(d)Incident Energy Exposures > 1.2 calories/cm2

Body Arc rated clothing or a multi-layered arc rated clothing system with an arc rating appropriate to the anticipated incident energy exposure

130.7(C)1; 130.7(C)2; 130.7(C)5; 130.7(C)12(d)

Underlayers (when used): FR or non-melting or untreated natural fiber 130.7(C)(12)(c); 130.7(C)14; 130.7(C)(15)Hands Exposures > 1.2 calories/cm and ≤ 8 calories/cm2:

Heavy duty leather gloves (e.g. > 12 oz/yd2)Exposures > 8 calories/cm2:


130.7(C)6(b); 130.7(C)13(c)


Class G or E hard hat; andExposures > 1.2 calories/cm and ≤ 8 calories/cm2:



130.7(C)1; 130.7(C)3; 4.3.7.3.13(b)

Eyes Safety glasses or goggles 130.7(C)4; 130.7(C)13(b)Hearing Hearing protection (TC action required)


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[Option 3 for TC consideration – a PPE list without showing the affected body part]Table 130.7(A) Personal Protective Equipment for Electrical HazardsShock Hazard Personal Protective Equipment Applicable Section(s)Rubber insulating gloves; and

Leather protectors (unless the requirements of ASTM F 496 are met)130.7(C)6(a)

Rubber insulating sleeves (as needed) 130.7(C)6(a)Class G or E hard hat (as needed) 130.7(C)3Safety glasses or goggles (as needed) 130.7(C)4Dielectric overshoes (as needed) 130.7(C)7

Arc Flash Hazard Personal Protective Equipment Applicable Section(s)Incident Energy Exposures ≤ 1.2 calories/cm2

Clothing: non-melting or untreated natural fiber long sleeve shirt and long pants or coverall 130.7(C)1; 130.7(C)12(d)Gloves: leather 130.7(C)6(b); 130.7(C)13(c)Hard hat: class G or E 130.7(C)3Faceshield: covers the face, neck and chin 130.7(C)3Safety glasses or goggles 130.7(C)4; 130.7(C)13(b)Hearing protection (TC action required)Shoes or boots: heavy duty leather (as needed) 130.7(C)13(d)Incident Energy Exposures > 1.2 calories/cm2

Clothing: arc rated clothing system with an arc rating appropriate to the anticipated inci-dent energy exposure

130.7(C)1; 130.7(C)2; 130.7(C)5; 130.7(C)12(d)

Underlayers (when used): FR or non-melting or untreated natural fiber 130.7(C)(12)(c); 130.7(C)14; 130.7(C)(15)Gloves:

Exposures > 1.2 calories/cm and ≤ 8 calories/cm2: Heavy duty leather gloves (e.g. > 12 oz/yd2)


Arc rated gloves

130.7(C)6(b); 130.7(C)13(c)

Hard hat: class G or E; andExposures > 1.2 calories/cm and ≤ 8 calories/cm2:



130.7(C)1; 130.7(C)3; 4.3.7.3.13(b)

Safety glasses or goggles 130.7(C)4; 130.7(C)13(b)Hearing protection (TC action required)Shoes or boots:

Exposures ≤ 4 calories/cm2:Heavy duty leather work shoes or boots (as needed)


130.7(C)13(d)


70E-89

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-293 Log #36 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.7(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Charles Helmick, AVO Training Institute, Inc. Recommendation: Add text to read as follows: Immediately after (7) a list item should be numbered (8) and titled “Hearing Protection”. The existing (8) should be renumbered to (9). (8) Hearing Protection (ear canal inserts) shall be required when energized work is being done at any voltage level above 50 volts. (9) Standards for Personal Protective Equipment... Substantiation: The problem is; the only place at present where hearing protection is required is listed in the PPE Table 130.7(C)(10). We are told in 130.7(C)(10) to use this table after the HRC has been determined in Table 130.7(C)(9) which we are told to “use in lieu of an incident energy analysis”. 130.3(B) says to use one method or the other, the analysis (1) or the HRCs (2). The need for hearing protection has been substantiated for use by the documentation that included HRC 0 & 1 in the 2009 edition. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The panel action on Proposal 70E-294 addresses the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: The submitter has not provided substantiation that hearing protection is required for work at 50V. Just because there was documentation submitted that applied to the inclusion of the requirement in the tables for the 2009 edition, does not means it applies generically. There are several places that the committee stated that the “detailed/vigorous” approach is different than the HRC/Tables method and they cannot be mixed. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-294 Log #245 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.7(C)x. (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James T. Dollard, Jr., IBEW Local 98 Recommendation: New text to read as follows: Insert new article requiring hearing protection (ear canal inserts) for all arc flash exposures 130.7(C)X Hearing Protection. Workers shall wear protective equipment whenever there is danger of injury to the hearing resulting from electrical explosion. When worn with arc flash protective equipment, hearing protection that is not covered by arc rated apparel shall be flame resistant. FPN: The hearing protection may be either ear muffs or ear canal inserts or both. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the Tables Task Group appointed by NFPA 70E Chairman Dave Dini. The task group consisted of Larry Ayer, Palmer Hickman, Jim White, Ron Widup, Vince Saporita, Daniel Roberts, Mike Doherty, Tom Neal, Paul Dobrowsky, John Luke, David Wallace, Daleep Mohla, Paul Hamer, Eric Glaude and Jim Dollard. A requirement for hearing protection is not specifically addressed in the document. A specific requirement for hearing protection should be included in the document. See Annex K.4 where it states: “The sounds associated with these [arc blast] pressures can exceed 160 dB.” The importance of hearing protection is noted in Table 130.7(C)(10) where hearing protection is a requirement for all hazard/risk categories. Adding a section that specifically addresses hearing protection will clarify when the protection is required and the appropriate requirements for that protection. The wording in the proposed section is modelled after the wording found in 130.7(C)(4) Eye Protection. The submitters suggests that the new section is best placed as 130.7(C)(5) Hearing Protection, and the remaining sections renumbered accordingly. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the recommendation to read: 130.7(C)X Hearing Protection. Workers Employees shall wear hearing protection protective equipment whenever there is danger of injury to the hearing resulting from electrical explosion, working within the arc flash boundary. When worn with arc flash protective equipment, hearing protection that is not covered by arc rated apparel shall be flame resistant. FPN: The hearing protection may be either ear muffs or ear canal inserts or both. Committee Statement: The committee has revised the recommendation to make hearing protection mandatory when working within the arc flash protection boundary. The committee has revised the recommendation by deleting the second sentence because this type of hearing protection is not available. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 3 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A.

Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: The action should be reject. We are presenting another puzzle to the public with regards to the concussive effects of an arc blast. There is currently no method for determining the effect of arc flash explosion on hearing. The standards for assessing the need for hearing protection is based on decibel levels over time. It is inappropriate for the committee to set arbitrary levels w/o a method for validating these levels. Also, ASTM does not have a standard that addresses flame resistant hearing protection. The submitter has not provided substantiation to the requirements for hearing protection. Additionally, this protection may melt and cause a different sort of harm. REGE, T.: Committee action should be Reject. No evidence supports a one time noise exposure from an arc flash event produces any permanent hearing loss. The arc flash audio event is a very low duration. Even at high magnitudes, there is no evidence that this would cause permanent hearing loss. However, since there is no arc rated hearing protection available, mandating workers wear protection that could ignite and continue to burn, could very well result in permanent hearing loss. This requirement actually increases risk to the employees and should be rejected. WILMER, K.: Committee action should be Reject. The committee has not provided evidence that hearing protection is required for all employees any time they are within the arc flash boundary. This will result in requiring hearing protection at very low risk situations when there is, in reality, no danger of overexposure to noise. EEI understands that the Technical Committee cannot quantify the level at which hearing protection is required. That is not an excuse for requiring it at all times. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We agree with the committee action and note that no section was recommended as indicated by “X” as the assigned location. We recommend that it be placed in 130.7(C)(3) [after existing (2) Movement and Visibility, and before existing (3) Head, Face,…] and renumber the balance as a result. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-295 Log #383 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.7(C)x. (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Mike Doherty, Infrastructure Health & Safety Association / Rep. CSA Z462 Technical Committee Recommendation: Insert new article requiring hearing protection (ear canal inserts) for all arc flash exposures 130.7(C)X Hearing Protection. Workers shall wear protective equipment whenever there is danger of injury to the hearing resulting from electrical explosion. FPN: The hearing protection may be either ear muffs or ear canal inserts or both. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the CSA Z462 Workplace Electrical Safety full Technical Committee. A requirement for hearing protection is not specifically addressed in the document. A specific requirement for hearing protection should be included in the document. See Annex K.4 where it states: “The sounds associated with these [arc blast] pressures can exceed 160 dB.” The importance of hearing protection is noted in Table 130.7(C)(10) where hearing protection is a requirement for all hazard/risk categories. Adding a section that specifically addresses hearing protection will clarify when the protection is required and the appropriate requirements for that protection. The wording in the proposed section is modelled after the wording found in 130.7(C)(4) Eye Protection. The submitters suggest that the new section is best placed as 130.7(C)(5) Hearing Protection, and the remaining sections renumbered accordingly. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The panel action on Proposal 70E-294 addresses the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: See my explanation of negative vote on Proposal 70E-294. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-296 Log #15 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.7(C)(1)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Palmer L. Hickman, National Joint Apprentice & Training Committee Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: (C) Personal Protective Equipment. (1) General. When an employee is working within the Restricted Approach Boundary he or she shall wear personal protective equipment in accordance with 130.2. When an employee is working within the Arc Flash Protection

70E-90

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Boundary he or she shall wear protective clothing and other personal protective equipment in accordance with 130.3. All parts of the body inside the Arc Flash Protection Boundary shall be protected. Substantiation: 130.7(C)(1) outlines general requirements for PPE but presently only mentions arc flash PPE and what to wear once the AFPB is crossed. The proposed text is intended to clarify the PPE for shock is required as well. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the recommendation by changing “he or she” in the first sentence to “the worker”. Committee Statement: The revision is for consistency of terminology used in the standard. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We recommend that the committee action be revised by changing “the worker” to “he or she” for uniformity so that this action matches the “he or she” in the existing text in the second sentence. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-297 Log #118 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.7(C)(3)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: E. W. Buss, Mashpee, MA Recommendation: Change the second sentence as follows:.. “.nonconductive protective equipment for the entire head (face, neck, back of head and chin) whenever there is a risk of injury from exposure to electric arcs or flashes...” Substantiation: Some users do not recognize that 130.7(C)(5) includes the head (head is part of the body). This will remind those users that if the back of the head is within the flash protection boundary, it needs to be protected. The movements of a worker do not always ensure that the back of the head is facing away from the arc flash. the last sentence of 130.7(C)(1) also requires that all parts of the body be protected. Both those sections would have to change if this change is rejected. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The Committee concludes that this concern is currently addressed in 130.7 (C)(1). Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We conclude that the committee action continues to recognize that “the entire head” and the “back of the head” are included as “all parts of the body” that must be protected by FR (arc rated) when any part (all parts) of the body are within the arc flash boundary as indicated by 130.7(C)(1) and130.7(C)(5). _______________________________________________________________ 70E-298 Log #436 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part (130.7(C)(3)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Elihu “Hugh” Hoagland IV, ArcWear.com/e-Hazard.com Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: If employees use hairnets and/or beard nets, these items must be non-melting and flame resistant arc-rated meeting ASTM F1506. Substantiation: There is no standard criteria for non-melting and flame resistant. There are arc rated hairnets meeting F1506 or FR treated melting hairnets. The wording is confusing. Cite that they must meet ASTM F1506. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle in Part Reject the reference to ASTM 1506 standard, delete “non-melting and” and accept in principle the remainder of the recommendation. Committee Statement: See the committee action on Proposal 70E-55 which changes “flame resistant” to “arc-rated”. “Non-melting” is deleted because it is redundant. In addition, the Committee is not accepting the reference to ASTM 1506. The reference already appears in 130.7(C)(8). Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We conclude that the word “meeting” was not accepted in the committee action.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-299 Log #21 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (130.7(C)(5), FPN ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Palmer L. Hickman, NJATC Recommendation: Delete the Fine Print Note to 130.7(C)(5). Substantiation: The FPN is somewhat misleading in that only mentions shirts and pants while the NFPA 70E Technical Committee made it clear that this section on body protection includes all parts of the body in the following Committee Statement on Proposal 70E-271 for the 2009 edition of NFPA 70E: “Committee Statement: Removing the word “body” and replacing it with the word “torso” could mislead the user of the standard by implying that other parts of the body need not be protected. The committee concludes that this section is intended to address all parts of the body.” There were 24 members eligible to vote and 24 voted affirmative on this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: The proposal should be rejected. The FPN is intended to be informational and does provide good information for the user on “FR clothing” (should be changed to arc-rated clothing). Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: In addition to deleting the FPN, in locations including, but not limited to, 130.3(A), 130.7(C)(5) and Table 130.7(C)(11), globally delete the parallel reference to J/cm2 adjacent to cal/cm2 since the arc rating of arc rated clothing is only indicated as cal/cm2 _______________________________________________________________ 70E-300 Log #14 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.7(C)(5), FPN, M.1.1 and M.3) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: The Technical Correlating Committee directs the committee to correlate the action taken on this proposal with the actions taken on Proposals 70E-372 and 70E-373. This action will be considered as a public comment. Submitter: Mark S. Saner, Workrite Uniform Company, Inc. Recommendation: Revise text as follows: 130.7 (C) (5) FPN - Although the flammable, non-melting clothing provides additional thermal protection while covered by FR layers, it is not counted towards the system arc rating. M.1.1 - The total system of protective clothing can be selected to take credit for the protection provided of all the layers of clothing that are worn. For example, to achieve an arc rating of 40 cal/cm², an arc flash suit with an arc rating of 40 cal/cm² could be worn over a cotton shirt and cotton pants. The cotton shirt and cotton pants do not count towards the arc rating of the clothing system. M.3 – Total System Arc Rating. The total system arc rating is the arc rating obtained when all FR clothing layers worn by a worker are tested as a multilayer test sample. Substantiation: I regularly get questioned about where in the standard it’s stated that non-melting, non-FR clothing cannot be counted towards the arc rating. By adding the statement to the end of the FPN and the changes to Annex M, I believe this question gets answered. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee rejects the recommended revisions to the Fine Print Note to 130.7(C)(5). This information is available in Annex M. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We suggest that the correct action should have been accept in principle since the concerns of the submitter were addressed in the committee actions on Proposal 70E-372 and 70E-373 recognizing that a garment without an arc rating cannot count towards or increase the arc rating. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-301 Log #70 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.7(C)(6)a.) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Kenneth E. Cybart, Littlefuse, Inc. Recommendation: Delete the Exception: Where it is necessary to use rubber insulating gloves without leather protectors, the requirements of ASTM F 496, Standard Specifications for In-Service Care of Insulating Gloves and Sleeves, shall be met. Substantiation: The exception conflicts with Section 130.7(C)(13)(c)(2) which reads: “Where insulating rubber gloves are used for shock protection, leather protectors shall be worn over the rubber gloves.”

70E-91

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The Committee disagrees that 130.7 (C)(13)(c)(2) deals with arc flash while 130.7 (C)(6)(a) deals with shock protection. This exception is necessary to allow use of rubber insulated gloves without leather protectors. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-302 Log #519 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.7(C)(7)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Paul Dobrowsky, Holley, NY Recommendation: Add a new first sentence to read as follows: EH rated shoes shall be worn when individuals are working on energized electrical equipment or if a shock hazard exists. Substantiation: A proposal to require EH rated footwear was rejected for the 2009 edition with a statement indicating that they could become dirty or contaminated. Isn’t it better to have rated footwear than not if either can become wet, contaminated or dirty? EH footwear is widely available at no significant difference in cost. Requiring them to be worn by electrical workers provides a better level of safety. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: There are inherent hazards to the use of electrical hazard (EH) footwear in some environments. One example is static buildup through the use of insulated footwear resulting in an ignition hazard in hazardous (classified) environments. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HITTEL, M.: Isolating a worker from ground should be considered only after exhausting other safety measures to reduce risk of electric shock to an acceptable level. In addition the protection offered by EH shoes is compromised very quickly when worn continuously. The additional benefit is modest, at best as it does not ensure protection against electric shock. The standard currently focuses on avoiding the “bird on the wire concept. Overshoes or dielectric mats that are not used continuously can be used on a case by case basis where the risk assessment deems them necessary. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-303 Log #195 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (Table 130.7(C)(8)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Daleep C. Mohla, DCM Electrical Consulting Services, Inc. Recommendation: Rearrange table alphabetically for accessibility of subjects as shown in the following proposed table arrangment: (See Table 130.7(C)(8) on the following page.) Substantiation: Make the table more user friendly. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-305 meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-304 Log #437 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (Table 130.7(C)(8)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Elihu “Hugh” Hoagland IV, ArcWear.com/e-Hazard.com Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: (See Table 130.7(C)(8) on page.) Substantiation: The following standards are now commonly used in shock and arc flash protection. Dielectric body protection could be very useful in working on DC sources as it offers both shock and acid resistance. Blankets and Sheeting cover parts which are not being worked on but are energized and can prevent arcs and shocks. The shields and blankets are being used more and more to shunt arc flash energy away from the worker. We have several standard we list which receive attention and training after being mentioned in NFPA 70E. We define barriers but give NO guidance on when they should be used and currently don’t even cite available standards. Other standards listed above have newer editions. Seems strange to include the insulated sole test method ASTM F2412 if you mention in 130.7(C)(7) that insulated soles cannot be used for primary protection. I would include F1116 which is the dielectric shoe test for F1117.

The F2412 shoes EH have no mention in the standard though they can be useful in protection. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-305 meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-305 Log #441 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (Table 130.7(C)(8)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Marcia L. Eblen, Pacific Gas & Electric / Rep. ASTM F18 Recommendation: Revise references in Table 130.7(C)(8) as follows: (See Table 130.7(C)(8) Recommendation on page 70E-94.) Substantiation: Table 130.7(C)(8) lists ASTM standards with revision dates. These standards are constantly being revised and renewed so these dates become obsolete. References should be updated to reflect the latest changes. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle (See Table 130.7(C)(8) Committee Action on page 70E-94.) Committee Statement: The table has been updated and reformatted with subjects in alphabetical order to make it more user friendly. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-306 Log #47 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (Table 130.7(C)(8), (C)(9), (C)(10), and (C)(11) and Sections 130.7(C)(12), (C)(13), (C)(14), (C)(15), and (C)(16)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Palmer L. Hickman, NJATC Recommendation: Relocate and renumber Sections and Tables 130.7(C)(8), 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10), and 130.7(C)(11) in their entirety so that they appear as the end of 130.7(C) as Sections and Tables 130.7(C)(13), 130.7(C)(14), 130.7(C)(15), and 130.7(C)(16) and relocate and renumber Sections 130.7(C)(12), 130.7(C)(13), 130.7(C)(14), 130.7(C)(15), and 130.7(C)(16) in their entirety as 130.7(C)(8), 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10), 130.7(C)(11), and 130.7(C)(12). In addition, editorially revise all references to these sections and tables throughout the standard to reflect these changes. 130.7(C)(8) Standards for Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). 130.7(C)(13) Standards for Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). Table 130.7(C)(8) Standards on Protective Equipment Table 130.7(C)(13) Standards on Protective Equipment 130.7(C)(9) Selection of Personal Protective Equipment When Required for Various Tasks. 130.7(C)(14) Selection of Personal Protective Equipment When Required for Various Tasks. Table 130.7(C)(9) Hazard/Risk Category Classifications and Use of Rubber Insulating Gloves and Insulated and Insulating Hand Tools Table 130.7(C)(14) Hazard/Risk Category Classifications and Use of Rubber Insulating Gloves and Insulated and Insulating Hand Tools 130.7(C)(10) Protective Clothing and Personal Protective Equipment Matrix. 130.7(C)(15) Protective Clothing and Personal Protective Equipment Matrix. Table 130.7(C)(10) Protective Clothing and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) Table 130.7(C)(15) Protective Clothing and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 130.7(C)(11) Protective Clothing Characteristics. 130.7(C)(16) Protective Clothing Characteristics. Table 130.7(C)(11) Protective Clothing Characteristics Table 130.7(C)(16) Protective Clothing Characteristics 130.7(C)(12) Factors in Selection of Protective Clothing. 130.7(C)(8) Factors in Selection of Protective Clothing. 130.7(C) (13) Arc Flash Protective Equipment. 130.7(C) (9) Arc Flash Protective Equipment.

70E-92


Table 130.7 ( C) (8) Standards on Protective Equipment

Subject Number and Title

Arc Flash Protection Apparel ASTM F 1506, Standard Performance Specification for Textile Material for Wearing Apparel for Use by Electrical Workers Exposed to Momentary Electric Arc and Related Thermal Hazards, 2002a

Eye and face protection ANSI Z87.1, Practice for Occupational and Educational Eye and Face Protection, 2003

Face protective products ( Face Shields) ASTM F 2178, Standard Test Method for Determining the Arc Rating and Standard Specification for Face Protective Products, 2006

Fall protection ASTM F 887, Standard Specifications for Personal Climbing Equipment, 2005

Footwear (specifications - Dielectric) ASTM F 1117, Standard Specification for Dielectric Overshoe Footwear, 2003

Footwear (specifications) ASTM F 2413, Standard Specification for Performance Requirements for Foot Protection, 2005

Footwear (Test methods) ASTM F 2412, Standard Test Methods for Foot Protection, 2005

Gloves (specifications) ASTM D 120, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating Gloves, 2002a (R 2006)

Gloves ( In-service care) ASTM F 496, Standard Specification for In-Service Care of Insulating Gloves and Sleeves, 2006

Gloves ( Visual Inspection) ASTM F 1236, Standard Guide for Visual Inspection of Electrical Protective Rubber Products, 1996 (R 2007)

Head Protection ANSI Z89.1, Requirements for Protective Headwear for Industrial Workers, 2003

Leather protectors ASTM F 696, Standard Specification for Leather Protectors for Rubber Insulating Gloves and Mittens, 2006

Raingear ASTM F 1891, Standard Specification for Arc and Flame Resistant Rainwear, 2006

Sleeves ASTM D 1051, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating Sleeves, 2007

Sleeves ( In-service care) ASTM F 496, Standard Specification for In-Service Care of Insulating Gloves and Sleeves, 2006

Sleeves ( Visual Inspection) ASTM F 1236, Standard Guide for Visual Inspection of Electrical Protective Rubber Products, 1996 (R 2007)


70E-93


Subject Number and Title

HeadprotectionA

ANSI Z89.1, Requirements for ProtectiveHeadwear for Industrial Workers, 2003 2009

Gloves ASTM D 120, Standard Specification for RubberInsulating Gloves, 2002a (R 2006) 2009

Sleeves ASTM D 1051, Standard Specification forRubber Insulating Sleeves, 2007 2008

Gloves and Sleeves ASTM F 496, Standard Specification forIn-Service Care of Insulating Gloves andSleeves, 2006 2008

Footwear ASTM F 1117, Standard Specification forDielectric Overshoe Footwear, 2003 (R2008)ASTM F1116 - 03(2008) Standard Test Method for Determining Dielectric Strength of Dielectric FootwearASTM F 2412, Standard Test Methods for FootProtection, 2005ASTM F 2413, Standard Specification for PerformanceRequirements for Foot Protection, 20052008

Apparel

ASTM F 1506, Standard PerformanceSpecification for Textile Material for WearingApparel for Use by Electrical Workers Exposed toMomentary Electric Arc and Related ThermalHazards, 2002a 2008

Faceprotectiveproducts

ASTM F 2178, Standard Test Method forDetermining the Arc Rating and StandardSpecification for Face Protective Products, 2006 2008

Fall protection

ASTM F 887, Standard Specifications for PersonalClimbing Equipment, 2005ae1

Dielectric Body Protection ASTM F2677 Standard Specification for Electrically Insulating Aprons, 2008a

Dielectric Barriers ASTM D1048 Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating Blanket, 2005ASTM F1742 - 03e1 Standard Specification for PVC Insulating Sheeting

Arc Flash Barriers ASTM F2676 Standard Test Method for Determining the Protective Performance of an Arc Protective Blanket for Electric Arc Hazards, 2009ASTM F2522 - 05 Standard Test Method for Determining the Protective Performance of a Shield Attached on Live Line Tools or on Racking Rods for Electric Arc Hazards


70E-94


Updated ASTM Standards for Table 130.7(C)(8)ASTM Standard

Title Reference to Latest Revision

D120 Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating Gloves ASTM D120 - 09 D1051 Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating Sleeves ASTM D1051

- 08 F496 Standard Specification for In-Service Care of Insulating Gloves and Sleeves ASTM F496 - 08 F696 Standard Specification for Leather Protectors for Rubber Insulating Gloves and Mittens ASTM F696 - 06 F1117 Standard Specification for Dielectric Footwear ASTM F1117 -

03(2008) F2412 Standard Test Methods for Foot Protection ASTM F2412

- 05 F2413 Standard Specification for Performance Requirements for Foot Protection ASTM F2413

- 05 F1236 Standard Guide for Visual Inspection of Electrical Protective Rubber Products ASTM F1236 -

96(2007) F1506 Standard Performance Specification for Flame Resistant Textile Materials for Wearing

Apparel for Use by Electrical Workers Exposed to Momentary Electric Arc and Related Thermal Hazards

ASTM F1506 - 08

F1891 Standard Specification for Arc and Flame Resistant Rainwear ASTM F1891 - 06

F2178 Standard Test Method for Determining the Arc Rating and Standard Specification for Face Protective Products

ASTM F2178 - 08

F887 Standard Specifications for Personal Climbing Equipment ASTM F887 - 05e1


Proposed Table 130.7(C)(8) Subject Document Number and Title Document Number and Revision Apparel Arc-Rated Standard Performance Specification for Flame Resistant Textile

Materials for Wearing Apparel for Use by Electrical Workers Exposed to Momentary Electric Arc and Related Thermal Hazards

ASTM F1506 - 08

Aprons- Insulating Standard Specification for Electrically Insulating Aprons ASTM F2677 – 08aEye and Face Protection-General

Practice for Occupational and Educational Eye and Face Protection ANSI/ASSE Z87.1-2003

Face Arc-Rated Standard Test Method for Determining the Arc Rating and Standard Specification for Face Protective Products

ASTM F2178 - 08

Fall Protection Standard Specifications for Personal Climbing Equipment ASTM F887 - 05e1 Footwear-Dielectric Specification

Standard Specification for Dielectric Footwear ASTM F1117 - 03(2008)

Footwear-Dielectric Test Method

Standard Test Method for Determining Dielectric Strength of Dielectric Footwear

ASTM F1116 - 03(2008)

Footwear-Standard Performance Specification

Standard Specification for Performance Requirements for Foot Protection

ASTM F2413 - 05

Footwear-Standard Test Method

Standard Test Methods for Foot Protection ASTM F2412 - 05

Gloves - Leather Protectors

Standard Specification for Leather Protectors for Rubber Insulating Gloves and Mittens

ASTM F696 - 06

Gloves and Sleeves-In-Service Care

Standard Specification for In-Service Care of Insulating Gloves and Sleeves

ASTM F496 - 08

Gloves-Rubber Insulating

Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating Gloves ASTM D120 - 09

HeadProtection- Hard Hats

Requirements for Personal Protection - Protective Headwear for Industrial Workers,

ANSI/ISEA Z89.1-2009

Rainwear Arc-Rated Standard Specification for Arc and Flame Resistant Rainwear ASTM F1891 - 06 Rubber Protective Products-Visual Inspection

Standard Guide for Visual Inspection of Electrical Protective Rubber Products

ASTM F1236 - 96(2007)

Sleeves - Insulating Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating Sleeves ASTM D1051 - 08

Proposal 70E-305 (Log #441) Committee Action

70E-95

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E 130.7(C) (14) Clothing Material Characteristics. 130.7(C) (10) Clothing Material Characteristics. 130.7(C) (15) Clothing and Other Apparel Not Permitted. 130.7(C) (11) Clothing and Other Apparel Not Permitted. 130.7(C) (16) Care and Maintenance of FR Clothing and FR Arc Flash Suits. 130.7(C) (12) Care and Maintenance of FR Clothing and FR Arc Flash Suits. Substantiation: This proposal is intended to editorially increase usability. Sections and Tables 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10), and 130.7(C)(11) break the flow of the requirements of 130.7(C) since Sections and Tables 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10), and 130.7(C)(11) are not to be used where incident energy calculations are done. When incident energy calculations are performed, Sections 130.7(C)(1) through 130.7(C)(8) and 130.7(C)(12) through 130.7(C)(16) are used to select PPE based on the incident energy calculation. Relocating the tables to the end of 130.7(C) will make the standard more user friendly. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee has deleted 130.7(C)(11) by their action on Proposal 70E-363. The committee accepts relocating sections and Tables 130.7(C)(8), (9) & (10) as the last 2nd level subdivisions of this section for clarity. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-307 Log #42 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.7(C)(9)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Palmer L. Hickman, NJATC Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Delete the following three (3) categories (shown with strike through) from Table 130.7(C)(9). This recommendation is to delete all information in Table 130.7(C)(9) related to these three (3) categories (task, Hazard/Risk Category Classifications, use of Rubber Insulating Gloves, and use of Insulated and Insulating Hand Tools). NEMA #2 (fused contactor) Motor Starters, 2.3 kV Through 7.2 kV Metal Clad Switchgear, 1 kV Through 18 kV Other Equipment 1kV Through 38 kV Substantiation: It is proposed to delete the following three tasks from Table 130.7(C)(9) since there are no notes associated with these tasks to limit available short circuit current or fault clearing time: NEMA E2 (fused contactor) Motor Starters, 2.3 kV Through 7.2 kV Metal Clad Switchgear, 1 kV Through 38 kV Other Equipment 1 kV Through 38 kV Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee has added maximum available short circuit current and clearing time values. See the committee action and statement on Proposal 70E-331. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: The proposal should be rejected, but for a different reason than stated (i.e., the action on Proposal 70E-331). Industry experience is such that no notes are applicable or required for these classes of equipment. Typical engineering protection practices and experience using this equipment over time has demonstrated the requirements of the table provide adequate personal protection. The calculation methodology has not matured to the point where a basis can be justified to add notes that define the available short circuit current or fault clearing time limits. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-308 Log #68 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (Table 130.7(C)(9)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Palmer L. Hickman, National Joint Apprentice & Training Committee Recommendation: Revise the equipment category in the “Tasks Performed on Energized Equipment” column in Table 130.7(C)(9) by adding the phrase “or Other Equipment” and by deleting the phrase “(with molded case or insulated case circuit breakers)”: Panelboards, or Switchboards, or Other Equipment Rated >240 V and up to 600 V (with molded ease or insulated case circuit breakers) - Note 1. Substantiation: This recommendation is an attempt to correlate the headings of “Panelboards or Other Equipment Rated 240 V and Below” with that of “Panelboards or Switchboards Rated >240 V and up to 600 V (with molded case or insulated case circuit breakers).” The equipment phrase “or Other Equipment” was added to “Panelboards Rated 240 V and Below” for the 2009

Edition of NFPA 70E to expand the number of tasks where the table could apply. This recommendation is intended to do the same for “Panelboards or Switchboards Rated >240 V and up to 600 V (with molded case or insulated case circuit breakers).” In addition, the phrase “(with molded case or insulated case circuit breakers)” is proposed to be deleted for consistency with “Panelboards or Other Equipment Rated 240 V and Below” so that both categories of equipment apply regardless of whether the energized electrical equipment and circuit part is supplied by molded case or insulated case circuit breakers or not. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: This proposal should be “Accepted in Part.” Accept the part to add “Other Equipment,” since this may apply to equipment that is fed by branch circuits. Do not accept the deletion of “(with molded ease or insulated case circuit breakers),” since it is important to distinguish these type of devices, which tend to be current-limiting or introduce significant arc impedance during the interruption process, from other types of protective devices applied at voltages greater than 240 volts and up to 600 volts. For “Panelboards or Other Equipment Rated 240 V and Below,” it is not important to designate “molded case or insulated case circuit breakers” for that category. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-309 Log #112 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (Table 130.7(C)(9)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: E. W. Buss, Mashpee, MA Recommendation: Revise section headings as follows: NEMA E2 (fused contactor) Motor Starter, 2.3 kV through 7.2 kV-Note 5 Metal Clad Switchgear, 1 5 kV through 38 15 kV. Other Electrical Equipment 1 5 kV through 38 15 kV Add: Note 5 Maximum of 32 kA short circuit current available; maximum of.7 sec fault clearing time. Substantiation: The table should not be used without power system constraints. The voltages were changed to comply with the data in Table D.9.2 and the Note 5 data taken from that table. Use of voltages below 5 kv and above 15 kv are unusual and should require a better solution than using the tables. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-331 meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: The proposal should be rejected, and should not refer to the action on Proposal 70E-331. Annex Table D.9.2 is informative and there are other calculation techniques than IEEE Std 1584. Table 130.7(C)(9) is now used for applications 2.3 kV through 38 kV and these voltage ratings are common and valid and the tables are being used successfully for these applications. There was no evidence submitted to the contrary. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-310 Log #128 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.7(C)(9)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: E. W. Buss, Mashpee, MA Recommendation: Change each item in the table that requires” H/R Cat 0” to “H/R Cat 1” Substantiation: H/R Cat 0 exists in 70E 2009 only in the three 130.7(C) Tables. The two sections of the 2004 edition that permitted non-FR clothing [130.7(C)(5) Exception and 130.7(C)(14)(b)] were deleted from the 2009 edition. Section 130.7(C)(5) requires ALL body protection to be FR. Until that is changed, there can be no H/R Cat. 0. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The submitter has not provided adequate technical substantiation, including specific test data, to support completely eliminating all HRC 0 tasks. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We recommend changing any HRC 0 to HRC 1 in each instance where employees are exposed to energized electrical equipment or circuit parts that are not in an electrically safe work condition including, but not limited to, when covers are off, doors are open, or covers are being removed.

70E-96

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-311 Log #129 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.7(C)(9)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: E. W. Buss, Mashpee, MA Recommendation: Delete the task “Insulated cable examination, in manhole or other confined space” which is part of the Other Equipment 1 kV through 38 kV section. Substantiation: This table was intended for users with limited power system experience. This task is a bit too specific for a general “one size fits all” answer. Does “the collective experience of the task group” still feel comfortable requiring a bulky H/R Cat 4 suit to enter a manhole which may not be safely accessible by a worker with that PPE? For this type of complex assignment where manhole size and number of cables in the manhole may vary, the committee would probably prefer the qualified person seek safety expertise rather than rely on the Table. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The submitter has not provided adequate substantiation to delete this task. The Committee disagrees that this was designed for users with limited experience. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-312 Log #130 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.7(C)(9)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: E. W. Buss, Mashpee, MA Recommendation: Delete the three categories titled NEMA E2, Metal Clad Switchgear 1 kV through 38kV and Other Equipment 1 kV through 38 kV and all the tasks associated with those categories. Substantiation: There are no maximum current and clearing times associated with these three classes and it does not take a very strong power system to reach incident energy levels above 40 cal/cm**2. Time and current data does exist in Table D.9.2 that can be used if these sections are deleted. I’m sure the “collective experience of the task group” [See 130.7(C)(9) FPN 1] that developed these tables several editions ago would now agree that there should be some current and clearing time constraints for this type equipment. Until they are added as Notes, the equipment and tasks should be removed from the document and table D.9.2 (only to 15 kV, no data exists between 15 kv and 38 kV) can be used. Notice that the Arc Resistant Switchgear tasks added last edition included constraints on time and current. The last sentence of 130.7(C)(9) added last edition actually implies current and times are needed to use the table. I actually prefer that the items remain, but only with limiting notes. This was proposed last cycle with some nominal numbers but the committee felt those numbers were too low and no further work was done. If specific numbers cannot be found, the tasks should be deleted. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee has added maximum available short circuit current and clearing time values for the tasks related to this equipment. See the committee action and statement on Proposal 70E-331. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: The proposal should be rejected, but should not refer to the action on Proposal 70E-331. See my comment on Proposal 70E-309 _______________________________________________________________ 70E-313 Log #162 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.7(C)(9)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Bobby J. Gray, Hoydar/Buck, Inc. Recommendation: Where selected in lieu of the incident energy analysis of 130.3(B)(1). Table 130.7(C)(9) shall be used to determine the hazard/risk category and requirements for use of rubber insulating gloves and insulated and insulating hand tools for a task. Substantiation: Shock protection shortcuts should be removed from the text and tables in 130.7(C)(9) to ensure a shock hazard is not overlooked. Each individual task must be analyzed for shock hazards based on the conditions and configuration of the specific equipment. As an example of the potential problem, removal of bolted covers in a 240 volt panelboard is not required to be done with Rubber Insulating Gloves according to Table 130.7(c)(9), but depending on the weight, orientation, strength of worker, etc. the possibility of the removed cover contacting an energized component, thus exposing the worker to a shock hazard is high. Also, operation of a circuit breaker in a 600 volt MCC with doors open could place the worker’s uninsulated hands within the Restricted Approach Boundary but, according to to the table would not require Rubber Insulating Gloves. As currently written, the tables present the

possibility of a shock hazard by not requiring a task-based Shock Hazard Analysis. The need for a shortcut for the Shock Hazard Analysis is not the same as for the Arc Flash Hazard Analysis. The Shock Hazard Analysis required by 130.2(A) does not require the support of engineering as does the Arc Flash Hazard Analysis. All of the information needed to apply the proper protection schemes for shock is available to the qualified worker and should be done by that worker for the specific task. Additionally, this proposal will remove the contradiction between the tables and other parts of the Standard including 130.6(D) and 130.2(C). This proposal is a companion to another proposal to remove the shock protection columns from Table 130.7(C)(9). Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee does not agree that the columns for voltage rated gloves/tools represent a shortcut. The inclusion of columns for rubber insulating gloves and insulating tools provide clarity and usability. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We agree with the concept of the submitter in principle. Protection for shock and arc flash and the need for insulated tools should be relocated to Table 130.7(C)(10) with a footnote indicating that these are not required where no shock and/or arc flash hazard exists. The protective equipment identified for each Hazard/Risk Category in Table 130.7(C)(10) should additionally list “Rubber Insulating Gloves (AR)” and “Insulated and Insulating Hand Tools (AR)” with the “AR” indicating that Rubber Insulating Gloves and/or Insulated and Insulating Hand Tools are required unless there is no need for their use to protect against shock and/or arc flash. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-314 Log #163 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.7(C)(9)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Bobby J. Gray, Hoydar/Buck, Inc. Recommendation: Remove columns titled: Rubber Insulating Gloves and Insulated and Insulating Hand Tools. Substantiation: Shock protection shortcuts should be removed from the text and tables in 130.7(C)(9) to ensure a shock hazard is not overlooked. Each individual task must be analyzed for shock hazards based on the conditions and configuration of the specific equipment. As an example of the potential problem, removal of bolted covers in a 240 volt panelboard is not required to be done with Rubber Insulating Gloves according to Table 130.7(c)(9), but depending on the weight, orientation, strength of worker, etc. the possibility of the removed cover contacting an energized component, thus exposing the worker to a shock hazard is high. Also, operation of a circuit breaker in a 600 volt MCC with doors open could place the worker’s uninsulated hands within the Restricted Approach Boundary but, according to to the table would not require Rubber Insulating Gloves. As currently written, the tables present the possibility of a shock hazard by not requiring a task-based Shock Hazard Analysis. The need for a shortcut for the Shock Hazard Analysis is not the same as for the Arc Flash Hazard Analysis. The Shock Hazard Analysis required by 130.2(A) does not require the support of engineering as does the Arc Flash Hazard Analysis. All of the information needed to apply the proper protection schemes for shock is available to the qualified worker and should be done by that worker for the specific task. Additionally, this proposal will remove the contradiction between the tables and other parts of the Standard including 130.6(D) and 130.2(C). This proposal is companion to another proposal to remove the Shock Hazard Analysis shortcuts. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee does not agree that the columns for voltage rated gloves/tools represent a shortcut. The inclusion of columns for rubber insulating gloves and insulating tools provide clarity and usability. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We agree with the concept of the submitter in principle. Protection for shock and arc flash and the need for insulated tools should be relocated to Table 130.7(C)(10) with a footnote indicating that these are not required where no shock and/or arc flash hazard exists. The protective equipment identified for each Hazard/Risk Category in Table 130.7(C)(10) should additionally list “Rubber Insulating Gloves (AR)” and “Insulated and Insulating Hand Tools (AR)” with the “AR” indicating that Rubber Insulating Gloves and/or Insulated and Insulating Hand Tools are required unless there is no need for their use to protect against shock and/or arc flash.

70E-97

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-315 Log #167 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.7(C)(9)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Paul S. Hamer, Chevron Energy Technology Company Recommendation: Add a Note 5 to the heading in the table: Panelboards or Other Equipment Rated 240 V and Below - Notes 1 and 5 5. For > 10 kA short-circuit current available, the hazard/risk category may be reduced by one number. Substantiation: The proposed note existed for this category of equipment in the table for the 2000 and 2004 editions and was removed when the 130.3 Exception No. 1 was added in the 2009 edition. The removal of this note created an inconsistency that is corrected by this proposal to add a note 5. With the reduction of the Hazard/Risk Category by one number as listed on the table, low-capacity (i.e., less than 10 kA short-circuit) systems rated 240 volts and below will only be subject to the Hazard/Risk Category 0 protective clothing and PPE requirements of Table 130.7(C)(10), which is appropriate. See also my proposed submitted to revise 130.3, Exception No. 1. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee rejects a reduction in HRC where the available short circuit current is below 10kA. See FPN No. 2 to 130.7(C)(9) on page 30 in the 2009 edition of the standard. No substantiation has been provided to justify the HRC reduction where the available short circuit current is below 10 kA. The committee recognizes that the submitter intended a “less than” symbol. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: This proposal should be accepted, with correction to the proposed note of the “less than” symbol before 10 kA. See Proposal 70E-224 and my ballot comment. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-316 Log #178 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (Table 130.7(C)(9)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Michael J. Johnston, National Electrical Contractors Association Recommendation: Revise the lines in Table 130.7(C)(9) in 5 locations that read: “Application of safety grounds, after voltage test” as follows: Application of safety protective grounding equipment grounds, after voltage test Substantiation: The term “ground” is defined as “the earth” in Article 100. Literally this section would read...whether the earths shall be installed for the duration of the task...This revision is proposed to promote consistent use of terms throughout NFPA 70E to assist all users in understanding the meaning of rules using defined terms. The more appropriate term here would appear to be protective grounding equipment or safety grounding equipment. The term “protective grounding equipment” is used by OSHA in a few rules as in the following example: 1910.269(n)(4) “Protective grounding equipment.” 1910.269(n)(4)(i) Protective grounding equipment shall be capable of conducting the maximum fault current that could flow at the point of grounding for the time necessary to clear the fault. This equipment shall have an ampacity greater than or equal to that of No. 2 AWG copper. Note: Guidelines for protective grounding equipment are contained in American Society for Testing and Materials Standard Specifications for Temporary Grounding Systems to be used on De-Energized electric Power Lines and Equipment. ASTM F855-1990. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Delete the word safety in the recommendation. In addition, insert the word temporary in front of the word protective. Committee Statement: The committee action meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A.

Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: The “Accept in Principle” is the correct action, but the addition of “temporary” by the Committee Meeting Action is redundant. The following should be added to Article 100, Definitions, from ASTM F 855-04: “Protective Grounding Equipment. Devices installed temporarily on de-energized electric power circuits for the purposes of potential equalization and to conduct a short circuit current for a specified duration (time).” _______________________________________________________________ 70E-317 Log #197 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.7(C)(9)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Daleep C. Mohla, DCM Electrical Consulting Services, Inc. Recommendation: Revise Table 130.7(C)(9) as follows: (See Table 130.7(C)(9) on the following pages.) Substantiation: There is no technical justification to reduce hazard risk category when equipment is operated with doors closed. Closed doors in a non arc resistant equipment construction are not designed to mitigate arc flash hazards. Equipment tested under bolted fault conditions is not suitable to resist sudden pressure created by an arcing fault. Numerous industry experiences validate this when doors were blown open during an arcing fault. 70E-2009, 130.1 FPN No. 3 documents this with the following statement: “FPN No. 3: The occurrence of arcing fault inside an enclosure produces a variety of physical phenomena very different from a bolted fault. For example, the arc energy resulting from an arc developed in air will cause a sudden pressure increase and localized overheating. During switching operations the change of state is the most likely time to experience a fault. Also, working on control circuits less than 120 volts does not justify a reduction. During this testing, especially in NEMA E2 contactors and switchgear 1kV through 38 kV, person is right on top or next to energized electrical equipment mostly less than 36 inch working distance. Since working on the control circuit is likely interaction, occurrence of a fault can increase. Only exception may be for an arc resistant equipment where design of the equipment ensures that arc resistant integrity of switch or breaker enclose is maintained working in the control compartment. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The substantiation does not support the comprehensive changes to HRC categories for all levels of equipment recommended by the submitter. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. However, I have the following comment on the committee statement for this action: Proposals 70E-184, 70E-317, 70E-336, and 70E-338 provide technical substantiation that reducing the level of protection based on (1) lower probability of occurrence or (2) the presence of covers is inappropriate. The committee continues to use nontechnical justifications, such as “risk is a component of the task based tables.” The fact that it is a component does not justify that risk should be used to lower protection. The likelihood that an arc flash will occur is not relevant to how much protection should be provided but only to whether protection should be required at all. The committee has not explained in technical terms how an employee wearing clothing insufficient for the heat energy will be protected when a low-probability event does occur. Committee experience and opinion is insufficient justification in the face of the technical substantiation from these submitters.

70E-98


Table 130.7(C)(9) Hazard/Risk Category Classifications and Use of Rubber Insulating Gloves and Insulated and Insulating Hand Tools

Tasks Performed on Energized Equipment Hazard/Risk Category

Panelboards or Other Equipment Rated 240 V and Below — Note 1

Perform infrared thermography and other non-contact inspections outside the restricted approach boundary 0

Circuit breaker (CB) or fused switch operation with covers on 0

CB or fused switch operation with covers off 0

Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing 1

Remove/install CBs or fused switches 1

Removal of bolted covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) 1

Opening hinged covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) 0

Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts of utilization equipment fed directly by a branch circuit of the panelboard

1

Panelboards or Switchboards Rated >240 V and up to 600 V (with molded case or insulated case circuit breakers) — Note 1


CB or fused switch operation with covers on 0 1

CB or fused switch operation with covers off 1

Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing 2*

Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts of utilization equipment fed directly by a branch circuit of the panelboard or switchboard

2*

600 V Class Motor Control Centers (MCCs) — Note 2 (except as indicated)


CB or fused switch or starter operation with enclosure doors closed 0 1

Reading a panel meter while operating a meter switch 0

CB or fused switch or starter operation with enclosure doors open 1


Work on control circuits with energized electrical conductors and circuit parts 120 V or below, exposed 0 1

Work on control circuits with energized electrical conductors and circuit parts >120 V, exposed 2*

Insertion or removal of individual starter “buckets” from MCC — Note 3 4

Application of safety grounds, after voltage test 2*

Removal of bolted covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) — Note 3 4

Opening hinged covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) — Note 3 1

Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts of utilization equipment fed directly by a branch circuit of the motor control center

2*

600 V Class Switchgear (with power circuit breakers or fused switches) — Note 4

Perform infrared thermography and other non-contact inspections outside the restricted approach boundary 2 1

CB or fused switch operation with enclosure doors closed 0 1


CB or fused switch operation with enclosure doors open 1


Work on control circuits with energized electrical conductors and circuit parts 120 V or below, exposed 0 1

Work on control circuits with energized electrical conductors and circuit parts >120 V, exposed 2*

Insertion or removal (racking) of CBs from cubicles, doors open or closed 4





70E-99


Table 130.7(C)(9) Hazard/Risk Category Classifications and Use of Rubber Insulating Gloves and Insulated and Insulating Hand Tools (continued)

Tasks Performed on Energized Equipment Hazard/Risk Category

Other 600 V Class (277 V through 600 V, nominal) Equipment — Note 2 (except as indicated)

Lighting or small power transformers (600 V, maximum)

Removal of bolted covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) 2*




Revenue meters (kW-hour, at primary voltage and current) Insertion or removal 2*

Cable trough or tray cover removal or installation 1

Miscellaneous equipment cover removal or installation 1



Insertion or removal of plug-in devices into or from busways 2*

NEMA E2 (fused contactor) Motor Starters, 2.3 kV Through 7.2 kV


Contactor operation with enclosure doors closed 0 2*


Contactor operation with enclosure doors open 2*


Work on control circuits with energized electrical conductors and circuit parts 120 V or below, exposed 0 2*

Work on control circuits with energized electrical conductors and circuit parts >120 V, exposed 3

Insertion or removal (racking) of starters from cubicles, doors open or closed 4

Application of safety grounds, after voltage test 3



Insertion or removal (racking) of starters from cubicles of arc-resistant construction, tested in accordance with IEEE C37.20.7, doors closed only

0

Metal Clad Switchgear, 1 kV Through 38 kV


CB operation with enclosure doors closed 2 4


CB operation with enclosure doors open 4


Work on control circuits with energized electrical conductors and circuit parts 120 V or below, exposed 2

Work on control circuits with energized electrical conductors and circuit parts >120 V, exposed 4

Insertion or removal (racking) of CBs from cubicles, doors open or closed 4

Application of safety grounds, after voltage test 4



Opening voltage transformer or control power transformer compartments 4


70E-100


Table 130.7(C)(9) Hazard/Risk Category Classifications and Use of Rubber Insulating Gloves and Insulated and Insulating Hand Tools (continued)

Arc-Resistant Switchgear Type 1 or 2 (for clearing times of <0.5 sec with a perspective fault current not to exceed the arc resistant rating of the equipment)

CB operation with enclosure door closed 0

Insertion or removal (racking) of CBs from cubicles, doors closed 0

Insertion or removal of CBs from cubicles with door open 4

Work on control circuits with energized electrical conductors and circuit parts 120 V or below, exposed 2

Insertion or removal (racking) of ground and test device with door closed 0

Insertion or removal (racking) of voltage transformers on or off the bus door closed 0

Other Equipment 1 kV Through 38 kV

Metal-enclosed interrupter switchgear, fused or unfused

Switch operation of arc-resistant-type construction, tested in accordance with IEEE C37.20.7, doors closed only 0

Switch operation, doors closed 2 4




Outdoor disconnect switch operation (hookstick operated) 3

Outdoor disconnect switch operation (gang-operated, from grade) 2

Insulated cable examination, in manhole or other confined space 4

Insulated cable examination, in open area 2


70E-101

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-318 Log #242 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.7(C)(9)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James T. Dollard, Jr., IBEW Local 98 Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Move the maximum short circuit current, fault clearing time from the Specific Notes 1 to 4 into the appropriate section(s) of Table 130.7(C)(9).


Tasks Performed on Energized EquipmentHazard/Risk

CategoryRubber Insulating

Gloves


ToolsPanelboards or Other Equipment Rated 240 V and Below — Note 1

Parameters: maximum of 25 kA short circuit current available; maximum of 0.03 sec (2 cycle) fault clearing time

-- -- --



-- -- --

600 V Class Motor Control Centers (MCCs) — Note 2 (except as indi-cated)


[For clarity: consolidate all 600 V MCC Note 2 tasks]

-- -- --

[For clarity: New 600 V MCC table header for Note 3 tasks]

600 V Class Motor Control Centers (MCCs)

Parameters: maximum of 42 kA short circuit current available; maximum of 0.33 sec (20 cycle) fault clearing time Insertion or removal of individual starter “buckets” from MCC — Note 3 4 Y NRemoval of bolted covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) — Note 3 4 N NOpening hinged covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) — Note 3 1 N N600 V Class Switchgear (with power circuit breakers or fused switches) — Note 4

Parameters: maximum of 35 kA short circuit current available; maximum of up to 0.5 sec (30 cycle) fault clearing time; minimum 18 in. working distance

-- -- --

Other 600 V Class (277 V through 600 V, nominal) Equipment — Note 2 (except as indicated)


-- -- --

Specific Notes (as referenced in the table):

1. Maximum of 25 kA short circuit current available; maximum of 0.03 sec (2 cycle) fault clearing time.



4. Maximum of 35 kA short circuit current available; maximum of up to 0.5 sec (30 cycle) fault clearing time.

70E-102

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the Tables Task Group appointed by NFPA 70E Chairman Dave Dini. The task group consisted of Larry Ayer, Palmer Hickman, Jim White, Ron Widup, Vince Saporita, Daniel Roberts, Mike Doherty, Tom Neal, Paul Dobrowsky, John Luke, David Wallace, Daleep Mohla, Paul Hamer, Eric Glaude and Jim Dollard. A tendency of many users of the document is to overlook the parameters referred to in Section 130.7(C)(9) found in the notes at the end of Table 130.7(C)(9). The PPE selected using the hazard/risk category method may be inadequate if the characteristics of the electrical system to be worked on exceed the specified parameters. Locating the parameters to the body of the table will make it more likely that they are followed thereby enhancing the safety of the user of the document. Note that the task group has also suggested the notes be included in a task based revision of the existing table. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-331 meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: I agree in principle with moving the notes, but would solicit Public Comment if this editorial change is necessary. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-319 Log #261 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.7(C)(9)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Daryld Ray Crow, DRC Consulting, Ltd. Recommendation: Revise FPN 1 and add new FPN No. 2 as follows: FPN No. 1: …..In several cases where the risk of an arc flash incident is considered low, very low, or extremely low by the task group, the hazard/risk category number has been reduced by 1, 2, or 3 numbers, respectively. The collective experience of the task group is that …… The collective experience of the task group. FPN No. 2: The collective experience of the task group is that in most cases closed doors do not provide enough protection to eliminate the need for PPE for instances where the state of the equipment is known to readily change (e.g., doors open or closed, rack in or rack out). The premise used by the Task Group is considered to be reasonable, based on the consensus judgment of the full NFPA 70E Technical Committee. Substantiation: There are many cases where the doors blew open during an arcing fault in equipment. The only equipment that will ensure that the doors do not blow open during a fault is arc-resistant equipment. This note is important and needs to stand out better in the standard. It should not simply be

the last sentence in FPN No. 1. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Accept Fine Print Note No. 2 as recommended and revise Fine Print Note No. 1 of the recommendation to read: Informational Note No. 1: The Hazard/Risk Category, work tasks, and protective equipment identified in Table 130.7(C)(9) were identified by a task group and the Hazard/Risk Category, protective clothing and equipment selected was based on the collective experience of the task group. The protective clothing and equipment is generally based on determination of estimated exposure levels. In several cases where the risk of an arc flash incident is considered low, very low, or extremely low by the task group, the hazard/risk category number has been reduced by 1, 2, or 3 numbers, respectively. Committee Statement: The committee has made revisions to the recommendation for clarity. See the committee action on Proposal 70E-317. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: The existing FPN No. 1 describes what the task group did in originally creating the table and should not be segregated into two separate FPNs. The last sentence in the new FPN No. 2 needs to apply to both FPN No. 1 and FPN No. 2. I accept the editorial additions by the Committee Meeting Action associated with “Hazard/Risk Category.” Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We are not sure that “e.g. should be used and recommend that it be replaced with a suitable replacement. In addition, our notes indicate that “the Hazard/Risk Category” was intended to be added in a third location as follows: The Hazard/Risk Category, protective clothing, and equipment is generally based on determination of estimated exposure levels. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-320 Log #269 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (Table 130.7(C)(9)) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: It was the action of the Technical Correlating Committee that the action taken on this proposal be correlated with the action taken on Proposal 70E-331. This action will be considered as a public comment. Submitter: Daniel Doan, DuPont Engineering Recommendation: 1. Add Specific Notes for Table 130.7 (C) (9), as follows: 5. Maximum of 20 kA short circuit available, and up to 0.33 second (20 cycle) fault clearing time. 6. Maximum of 25 kA short circuit available, and up to 0.33 second (20 cycle) fault clearing time. 2. Add references to Notes and make changes at the following locations (as shown in legislative text) within the table:

Tasks Performed on Energized Equipment Hazard/ Risk Category

Rubber Insulating Gloves


ToolsNEMA E2 (fused contactor) Motor Starters, 2.3 kV Through 7.2 kV - Note 5

Perform infrared thermography and other non-contact inspections outside the restricted approach boundary

3 N N

Contactor operation with enclosure doors closed 03 N NReading a panel meter while operating a meter switch 0 N NContactor operation with enclosure doors open 2*3 N NWork on energized conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing 4 Y YWork on control circuits with energized conductors and circuit parts 120 V or below, exposed

0 Y Y

Work on control circuits with energized conductors and circuit parts >120 V, exposed

3 Y Y

Insertion or removal (racking) of starters from cubicles, doors open or closed 4 N NApplication of safety grounds, after voltage test 3 Y NRemoval of bolted covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts)

4 N N

Opening hinged covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and cir-cuit parts)

3 N N

Insertion or removal (racking) of starters from cubicles of arc-resistant construc-tion, tested in accordance with IEEE C37.20.7, doors closed only

0 N N

70E-103

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Metal Clad Switchgear, 1 kV Through 38 kV through 15kV Note 6 ... [no change to table entries] ... Other Equipment 1 kV Through 38 kV through 15kV Note 6 ... [no change to table entries] Substantiation: Notes 5 and 6 are needed to show the maximum short circuit current and fault clearing times associated with the medium voltage sections of the Table. With these limits, this table should be applicable for the majority of these types of equipment. Special cases with higher short circuit current or longer fault clearing times should be analyzed carefully for possible higher energy hazards. The title to the sections on Metal Clad Switchgear and Other Equipment, originally with a voltage limit of 1kV to 38kV, should be changed to show a different limitation of voltage. Research and testing for voltages above 15kV are not at all complete, and voltage above 15kV should be out of the scope of this table. The hazards for equipment over 15kV must be carefully analyzed. The proposed changes to the Hazard/Risk Category entries in the Table are based on the values of arcing current and fault clearing time in the Notes, using the IEEE 1584-2004 spreadsheet as shown below. This provides a published and accepted estimate, based on available research and testing. Numerous studies have been completed and documented using this methodology, and the results have proven to be useful for application to electrical equipment.

The HRC category for “Contactor operation with enclosure doors closed” should be changed from 0 to 3, because this entry implies that the worker is initiating the contactor operation from a front-panel switch. When the worker is interacting with the equipment, mishaps can occur. If the equipment is not tested to be arc-resistant per IEEE C37.20.7, the worker can be injured by arc flash. It is prudent for the code to require PPE in this case. Likewise, if the doors are open, the HRC category should be increased to 3 for proper protection of the worker. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-331 meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: The proposal should be rejected, and should not refer to the action on Proposal 70E-331. Table 130.7(C)(9) is now being used successfully for applications 2.3 kV through 38 kV and these voltage ratings are common and valid for Table 130.7(C)(9). There was no evidence submitted in the substantiation to the contrary. IEEE Std 1584 is not well developed enough even at 15 kV to designate the proposed fault-current and clearing time values, and it is not the only method for calculating incident energy. No justification by field experience for this change has been submitted. Reduction to the values of the proposed notes 5 and 6 would make the table virtually unusable for these equipment applications, where Table 130.7(C)(9) has been used safely since its introduction in prior editions of NFPA 70E. See my comment for Proposal 70E-309. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-321 Log #358 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (130.7(C)(9)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Louis A. Barrios, Shell / Rep. API (American Petroleum Institute) Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: (9) Selection of Personal Protective Equipment When Required for Various Tasks. Where selected in lieu of the incident energy analysis of 130.3(B)(1), Table 130.7(C)(9) shall be used to determine the hazard/risk category and requirements for use of rubber insulating gloves and insulated and insulating hand tools for a task. The assumed maximum short-circuit current capacities and maximum fault clearing times for various tasks are listed in the notes to Table 130.7(C)(9). For tasks not listed, or for power systems with greater than the assumed maximum short circuit current capacity or with longer than the assumed maximum fault clearing times, an arc flash hazard incident energy analysis shall be required in accordance with 130.3. Substantiation: During the 2009 NFPA 70E revision cycle action was taken to better delineate the difference between conducting an arc flash hazard analysis and an incident energy analysis. An arc flash analysis is the higher level analysis that includes determining the flash protection boundary and the level of PPE required. Per 130.3(B), the appropriate level of arc flash protection PPE may be determined either by conducting an incident energy analysis or by

using a combination of Tables 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10), and 130.7(C)(11). As a result of the clarification made in the 2009 edition, the correct term to use in 130.7(C)(9) as shown above is “incident energy analysis”. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: BOWMAN, W.: The proposal should have been accepted in principle and should have been revised as follows:Where selected in lieu of the incident energy analysis of 130.3(B)(1). Table 130.7(C)(9) shall be used to determine the arc flash boundary, the hazard/risk category, and the requirements for use of rubber insulating gloves and insulated and insulating hand tools for a task. The assumed maximum short-circuit current capacities and maximum fault clearing times for various tasks are listed in the notes to included in Table 130.7(C)(9). For tasks not listed, or for power systems with greater than the assumed maximum short circuit current capacity or with longer than the assumed maximum fault clearing times, an incident energy analysis including determination of the arc flash boundary shall be required in accordance with 130.3. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-322 Log #394 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.7(C)(9)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas E. Neal, Neal Associates Ltd. Recommendation: Add Note “g” to Table 130.7 (C)(9): Notes: g. If the task involves an arc flash hazard within an enclosure, add one number to the hazard/risk category number. The arc rating of clothing is known to decrease when the arc flash event occurs in an enclosure due to the higher proportion of convective energy created in this equipment configuration. This note applies to all tasks listed in Table 130.7(C)(9) in which the arc flash hazard is in an enclosure. Substantiation: Testing at the Ferraz Shawmut laboratory by the author in cooperation with Michael Lang, and testing at the PG&E laboratory by Marcia Eblen and Thomas Short has indicated the arc rating determined for protective clothing when subjected to arc-in-a-box, plasma rich arc flash exposures significantly decreases relative to the arc rating determined by ASTM F1959 standard test method. Consequently, it is important to alert users of the Table 130.7(C)(9) that additional protection is required for arc-in-a-box tasks, i.e. tasks involving conductors in an equipment enclosure. An IEEE paper by the author of this proposal has been attached as supporting information. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The substantiation does not support the comprehensive changes to HRC categories for all levels of equipment recommended by the submitter. Number Eligible to Vote: 25

Section of Table Volts kA Fault clearing time working distance inchesEnergy cal/

sqcmPPE

CategoryE2 MV Note 5 2300 20 0.33 24 11.2 3E2 MV Note 5 7200 20 0.33 24 12.7 3

70E-104

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: PACE, D.: This Proposal should have been Accepted. The substantiation clearly indicates there is problem. The personnel involved are considered to be experts in this field. To reject this proposal will endanger electricians. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: The submitter has provided important information that should not be overlooked simply because the TC determined that adequate substantiation had not been provided. We find the implications alarming. It is extremely important that the proposed text “The arc rating of clothing is known to decrease when the arc flash event occurs in an enclosure due to the higher proportion of convective energy created in this equipment configuration” from the submitter not be ignored. This calls into question the protection provided by the associated HRC. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-323 Log #401 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part (Table 130.7(C)(9)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas E. Neal, Neal Associates Ltd. Recommendation: 1. Move the maximum short circuit current, fault clearing time and working distance parameters from the notes into the main body of Table 130.7(C)(9). 2. Provide an estimation of incident energy and arc flash protection boundary based on the parameters. (See Tables on the following pages.) Substantiation: A tendency of many users of the document is to overlook the parameters referred to in Section 130.7(C)(9) found in the notes at the end of Table 130.7(C)(9). The PPE selected using the hazard/risk category method may be inadequate if the characteristics of the electrical system to be worked on exceed the specified parameters. Locating the parameters in the body of the table will make it more likely that they are followed thereby enhancing the safety of the users of the document. Many users of the Table 130.7(C)(9) have no means to calculate the Arc Flash Protection Boundary. These users may use the “default” Arc Flash Protection Boundary distance of 48 inches found in 130.3(A)(1), which in many cases would leave workers unprotected. Including the Incident Energy and Arc Flash Protection Boundary calculated at the maximum value listed for each task would ensure that workers within the actual boundary are using PPE, not just those within 48 inches and also would make workers more aware of the area that could be impacted by the arc flash hazard. The incident energy and arc flash protection boundary estimations were calculated using the IEEE 1584 method (spreadsheet calculations can be found in Supporting Material). Including the incident energy and arc flash protection boundary estimates in each section provides clarity and transparency to the users of the document. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle in Part The committee rejects the portion of the recommendation to provide an estimation of incident energy in Table 130.7(C)(9). Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-331 meets the intent of the recommendation with respect to the arc flash boundaries. Table 130.7(C)(9) is hazard/risk based and not exclusively based on incident energy. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: The proposal should be rejected, and should not refer to the action on Proposal 70E-331. The calculation procedures to determine the incident energy are in a constantly changing environment, and the proposal only includes IEEE Std 1584-2002 methodology, which is only one approach. The proposal adds very detailed and precise information to the table which would lead the user to the conclusion that the procedure for arc-flash incident energy calculation is proven science. It is not. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-324 Log #404 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.7(C)(9)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Lawrence S. Ayer, Biz Com Electric, Inc. / Rep. IEC Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Reclassify the first three equipment categories of Table 130.7(C)(9) as follows: Panelboards, or Other Equipment Rated 400A and less 240V and Below, Note 1 Panelboards, or Switchboards, and Other Equipment Rated > 400A >240V and up to 600V (with molded case or insulated case circuit breakers), Note 1, Note 2600V Switchboards and Motor Control Centers – Note 2 (except as indicated) Substantiation: The first two equipment categories of Table 130.7(C)(9) are inadequate in the way they determine the electrical hazard for both panels and switchboards It could be argued that 80% of the work on energized equipment takes place within the first two equipment categories so issues involving this equipment affects a significant portion of electrical workers. Proposed changes are shown below which will reclassify the first two equipment sections according to ampacity. Panelboards, or Other Equipment Rated 400A and less 240V and Below, Note 1 Panelboards, or Switchboards, and Other Equipment Rated >400A >240V and up to 600V (with molded case or insulated case circuit breakers), Note 1, Note 2 The present Task Table lumps all 240V rated panelboards and switchboards into one big Hazard Risk Category. Higher voltage rated panels and switchboards up to 600V are lumped together as well. This categorization of equipment creates a Table which misinforms the electrical industry that the hazard is the same for panelboards and switchboards in the same voltage class regardless of ampacity. For example, it would not be logical and practical to educate a field worker to wear HRC 1 clothing when replacing fuses in a 30 amp 208 volt disconnect and require similar clothing when replace 4000 amp fuses in a 208 volt switchboard. The same argument could be made for similar equipment in the 480 or 600V range. It is substantiated below that equipment in the 400A or less category is less of a hazard, compared to equipment larger than 400A. Distinguishing equipment in the first two categories by ampacity would be a more practical approach that would create more “buy-in” from the electrical community and provide for safer work practices as required by IEEE 1584 calculations. Proposed changes are shown below which will reclassify the first two equipment sections according to ampacity. 600V Switchboards and Motor Control Centers – Note 2 (except as indicated) The location of Switchboards in the Tables creates a safety issue as well. Switchboard construction is very different from panelboards. Switchboards are free standing distribution equipment that has many similar components to Motor Control Centers. Control circuits and draw-out or rack mount breakers can be a part of switchboards similar to controls circuits and removable buckets within motor control centers. Both Motor Control Centers and Switchboards can have switches on the front panel to view power measurements. Both are typically purchased at ampacities 1200 amps or above. Panelboards are typically purchased below 1200A even though some panelboards can be purchased above this figure. Switchboard construction can also be purchased with draw-out type breakers. Normally standard fixed mount breakers are not replaced energized. It would not be practical or logical to continue to lump switchboards and panelboards in the same equipment class. Therefore, this proposal combines switchboards and motor control centers into the same category as revised below. The HRC for motor control centers is based upon 65 kA and 2 cycle clearing time which is more appropriate for switchboards. 600V Switchboards and Motor Control Centers – Note 2 (except as indicated) The reasons for the proposed changes are itemized below. 1. Comparison of Overcurrent Devices 400A and below. The “first two equipment sections of the table are based on using 25,000A short circuit and 2 cycle clearing time. When these parameters are placed into the IEEE 1584 equations at the 240 volt level an incident energy of 1.2 cal/cm2 is calculated. Performing the same calculations for 600 volt systems reveals incident energy levels of 2.1 cal/cm2. While these values would appear to be low enough to warrant HRC 1 clothing for all equipment within these categories, regardless of voltage, only the 240V and below section in the table permits HRC 1 clothing when working on energized equipment. The 480 volt section requires 2*. While at first glance this may appear appropriate one must look at some technical analysis to see what is wrong with this picture. The graph below was taken from the an IEEE paper titled “Arc Flash Calculations in Systems Protected by Low-Voltage Circuit Breakers”, (July/Aug 2003 Industry Applications Transactions). This graph provides information from various circuit breaker manufacturers which shows that regardless of voltage, for fault currents up to 80kA and for 400 Amp breakers or less, the odds of an arcing event going above 4 cal/cm^2 are very low.

70E-105

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Table 130.7(C)(9) Hazard/Risk Category Classifications and Use of Rubber Insulating Gloves and Insulated and Insulating Hand Tools


CategoryRubber Insulating

Gloves


ToolsPanelboards or Other Equipment Rated 240 V and Below — Note 1 Note XParameters: maximum of 25 kA short circuit current available; maximum of 0.03 sec (2 cycle) fault clearing time; minimum 18 in. working distanceIncident energy using above parameters: solidly grounded system = 1.0 calo-ries/cm2; ungrounded system = 1.3 calories/ cm2

Arc Flash Protection Boundary using above parameters: solidly grounded sys-tem = 16 inches; ungrounded system = 19 inches

-- -- --

Panelboards or Switchboards Rated >240 V and up to 600 V (with mold-ed case or insulated case circuit breakers) — Note 1 Note XParameters: maximum of 25 kA short circuit current available; maximum of 0.03 sec (2 cycle) fault clearing time; minimum 18 in. working distance Incident energy using above parameters: solidly grounded system = 2.1 calo-ries/ cm2; ungrounded system = 2.7 calories/ cm2


-- -- --

600 V Class Motor Control Centers (MCCs) — Note 2 (except as indi-cated) Note XParameters: maximum of 65 kA short circuit current available; maximum of 0.03 sec (2 cycle) fault clearing time; minimum 18 in. working distance Incident energy using above parameters: solidly grounded system = 5.5 calo-ries/ cm2; ungrounded system = 7.1 calories/ cm2


[For clarity: consolidate all 600 V MCC Note 2 tasks]

-- -- --

[For clarity: New 600 V MCC table header for Note 3 tasks]600 V Class Motor Control Centers (MCCs) Note XParameters: maximum of 42 kA short circuit current available; maximum of 0.33 sec (20 cycle) fault clearing time; minimum 18 in. working distance Incident energy using above parameters: solidly grounded system = 35.5 calo-ries/ cm2; ungrounded system = 46.1 calories/ cm2

Arc Flash Protection Boundary using above parameters: solidly grounded sys-tem = 142 inches; ungrounded system = 165 inchesInsertion or removal of individual starter “buckets” from MCC — Note 3 4 Y NRemoval of bolted covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) — Note 3 4 N NOpening hinged covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) — Note 3 1 N N600 V Class Switchgear (with power circuit breakers or fused switches) — Note 4 Note XParameters: maximum of 35 kA short circuit current available; maximum of up to 0.5 sec (30 cycle) fault clearing time; minimum 18 in. working distanceIncident energy using above parameters: solidly grounded system = 40.5 calo-ries/ cm2; ungrounded system = 52.5 calories/ cm2


-- -- --

Other 600 V Class (277 V through 600 V, nominal) Equipment — Note 2 (except as indicated) Note XParameters: maximum of 65 kA short circuit current available; maximum of 0.03 sec (2 cycle) fault clearing time; minimum 18 in. working distance (except as indicated) Incident energy using above parameters: solidly grounded system = 5.5 calo-ries/cm2; ungrounded system = 7.1 calories/ cm2


-- -- --

General Notes (applicable to the entire table): (d) For systems rated less than 1000 volts, the fault currents and upstream protective device clearing times are based on an 18 in. working distance.(X) The incident energy and arc flash protection boundary values were calculated using the IEEE 1584 method and the parameters specified in each section for equipment rated under 1 kV. The arc flash protection boundary distance has been rounded up to the nearest one inch dimension.Specific Notes (as referenced in the table):1. Maximum of 25 kA short circuit current available; maximum of 0.03 sec (2 cycle) fault clearing time. 2. Maximum of 65 kA short circuit current available; maximum of 0.03 sec (2 cycle) fault clearing time.3. Maximum of 42 kA short circuit current available; maximum of 0.33 sec (20 cycle) fault clearing time.4. Maximum of 35 kA short circuit current available; maximum of up to 0.5 sec (30 cycle) fault clearing time.


70E-106


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70E-107


480 Volt Secondary 208 Volt Secondary

Maximum over-current protec-

tive device*. (This is the

device that must open if an arc-flash occurs.)

Applicable for this range of available

short-circuit currents (bolted) that will flow through the overcur-rent protective device if an arc-flash occurs

Approximate transformer size(s) to provide this range of available

short circuit currents (kVA)

Maximum over-current protec-

tive device*. (This is the

device that must open if an arc-flash occurs.)

Applicable for this range of available short-circuit cur-rents (bolted) that will flow through the overcurrent

protective device if an arc-flash

occurs

Approximate trans-former size to provide this range of available short circuit currents

(kVA)

100 1,569-15,036 Amps 150 200 3,621-38,913 Amps 150

200 2,353-30,071 Amps 225, 300 400 5,431-79,309 Amps225, 300, 500, 750,

1000

400 5,230-75,178 Amps 500, 750, 1000, 1500, 2000, 2500 *Fuses types are Class J and RK1 Circuit Breakers are MCCB 100-400

In addition to this graph, work performed by a Tables subtask Group prior to the ROP Technical Committee Meeting provided a proposal for Annex material. This proposal submitted a table which indicates that using the output of various transformers of all different fault current ratings, a level of 4 cal/cm^2 is achieved on the load side of overcurrent devices 400 amp and below. The table provide by the subtask group is found below.

70E-108

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E A similar calculation was completed using SKM software comparing two 400A breakers at two different voltage levels. The comparison reveals little difference between these breaker sizes. Actually, the 208 volt graph has a higher incident energy for 400A breakers between the ranges of 5kA and 15 kA.

2. Comparison of Overcurrent devices above 400A. Graphs of overcurrent devices and their associated incident energy over a wide range of fault current values were developed using SKM software. The graphs of 240V 200A, 400A, and 800A breakers were compared. The graph below shows a wide discrepancy between small 200 or 400 amp overcurrent deviecs and those that are larger. The 800A breaker shown in the graph below indicates that electricians would be exposed to much greater incident energy than the 25KA@ 2 cycle calculations would otherwise suggest. The electrician would be exposed to this hazard over much of the entire fault current range from very low levels up to 25kA. Overcurrent devices above 400A should use 65kA and 2 cycle input parameters for the IEEE equations.

70E-109


3. Switchboards. The present user of the Table may be confused when looking for what equipment category 208 or 240 volt switchboards are located. While the 600V switchboards are clearly labeled in the second equipment section, the lack of reference to the 250 volt versions must by default place them in the first grouping of equipment. The first equipment group presents worker safety issues for Switchboards as well. Switchboards are typically purchased at 1200 amps or higher and can contain rather large high ampacity bulky circuit breakers or fuses rated well above the 400A threshold. Comparing 2000A Overcurrent devices at the 2000A level in the graph below one can quickly reach the conclusion that the 25000A 2 cycle parameters are inadequate for this type of equipment. It would be disingenuous to continue to allow workers to wear HRC 1 clothing at the 208 volt level.

Comparison of incident energies of 2000A CB and fuses at 208 volt.

70E-110


Comparison of incident energies of 2000A CB and fuses at 480 volt. 4. Desire to eliminate 2*. The Tables Task Group committee has indicated a desire to eliminate 2* and require the balaclava to be used for Category 2 tasks. It may prove difficult to get buy-in from contractors or small users to use the balaclava when changing out 20 amp breakers in a 200 amp or 400A panel rated 480 volts or when working on a 30 amp 480 volt disconnect. The proposed changes will remove the voltage restriction and split panels into two ampacity categories: those 400A and below and those above the 400A threshold. This will permit electricians to use HRC 1 clothing for equipment 400A or less such as small disconnects, panel, starters and other devices. Electricians will have more buy-in with this approach since a balaclava will not be required. The proposed change will require HRC 2 clothing for panels or other equipment larger than 400 amps. This would be adequate since panels or disconnects larger than 400A are much bulkier, covers are much heavier, and the risk is much higher as well. Electricians will have less hesitation to use the balaclava for the larger equipment. This requirement will also coincide with the calculations. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The proposal sought to differentiate equipment by ampacity levels. The submitter has not provided adequate substantiation to support this revision with respect to the HRC levels within these equipment categories. Relocating switchboards into the motor control center equipment category would eliminate the category for 250 volts and below switchboards and may create confusion. See the committee action and statement on Proposal 70E-326. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: BOWMAN, W.: While we are voting Affirmative on the action to Reject proposal 70E-324 the idea to build tables for panelboards and other equipment based upon equipment protected by an upstream device 400A and below and equipment protected by greater than 400A should be reviewed further by the committee. The chart provided by the submitter indicates that the hazard is less for equipment protected by 400 amps or less overcurrent devices. Electricians who work on 30A 600V disconnects could be protected by HRC 1 rather than 2*. This information may greatly expand the use of the Tables and create greater buy-in from the electrical community.

HICKMAN, P.: We are voting Affirmative on the action to Reject proposal 70E-324. Our comments are as follows: The concept of building tables based upon the rating of the upstream overcurrent protective device has merit and deserves further consideration by the committee. Separation of tasks based upon the size of the upstream overcurrent protective device along with parameters for voltage, maximum available short circuit current and maximum clearing time will enhance the accuracy as well as the usefulness of the tables. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-325 Log #405 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (130.7(C)(9)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Lawrence S. Ayer, Biz Com Electric, Inc. / Rep. IEC Recommendation: Add the following tasks and Hazard/Risk information to the second equipment category of Table 130.7(C)(9), Panelboards, Switchboards, and other equipment rated >240 V and up to 600V. Removal of bolted covers (to exposed bare energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) 1 N N Opening hinged covers (to expose bare energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) 0 N N Remove/install CB’s or fused switches 2* Y Y (See Table 130.7(C)(9) on the following page.)

70E-111



Category

Rubber Insulating

Gloves Insulated and Insulating Hand ToolsPanelboard, or other Equipment Rated 240V and Below – Note 1

Perform Infrared thermography and other non-contact inspection outside the restricted approach boundary 0 N NCircuit breaker of fused switch operation with the covers on, 0 N NCircuit breaker or fused switch operation with covers off 0 N NRemoval of bolted covers (to exposed bare energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) 1 N NOpening hinged covers (to expose bare energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) 0 N NRemove/install CB’s or fused switches 1 Y YWork on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing 1 Y YWork on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts of utilization equipment fed directly by a branch circuit of the panelboard

1 Y Y

Panelboards or Switchboards, Rated > 240V and up to 600V (with molded case or insulated case circuit breakers) Note 1

Perform Infrared thermography and other non-contact inspection outside the restricted approach boundary 1 N N

CB of fused switch operation with the covers on 0 N N

Circuit breaker or fused switch operation with covers off 1 Y NRemoval of bolted covers (to exposed bare energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) 1 N NOpening hinged covers (to expose bare energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) 0 N N

Remove/install CB’s or fused switches 2* Y YWork on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing 2* Y YWork on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts of utilization equipment fed directly by a branch circuit of the panelboard

2* Y Y


70E-112

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Substantiation: The second equipment category of Table 130.7(C)(9) deals with “Panelboards or Switchboards, Rated >240V up to 600V”. Certain tasks are absent when comparing tasks line by line with the 240V and below equipment category. Adding the tasks will make the table match exactly the 240 volt category and add clarity. Adding tasks for removing bolted covers, opening hinged covers, and removing/installing circuit breaker or fuses to this category will provide common tasks to the Panelboard/Switchboard equipment section that are commonly performed on a daily basis. Removing or installing c/b or fused switches was given a 2* to match the other similar energized tasks within the category. Removing bolted covers was deemed a HRC 2* task to equate with the similar task “remove/install cb or fused switches”. The 240V and below category similarly equated both tasks. Opening hinged covers was given a HRC 0 rating since all tasks involving opening hinged covers in other 600V and below categories was also considered HRC 0. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HICKMAN, P.: We disagree with the part of the committee action that accepted “Remove/install CB’s or fused switches” and associated “2* Y Y” as that task is already covered by the existing text “Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing.” In addition, we recommend removal of the text “Remove/install CBs or fused switches” and associated “1 Y Y” from Table 130.7(C)(9) for “Panelboards or Other Equipment Rated 240 V and Below - Note 1” as that task is already covered by the existing text “Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing.” The submitter of this proposal recommended adding “Remove/install CB’s or fused switches” to “match exactly the 240 volt category.” We respectfully suggest that “Remove/install CB’s or fused switches” should not be specifically included in either class of equipment. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-326 Log #406 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part (130.7(C)(9)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Lawrence S. Ayer, Biz Com Electric, Inc. / Rep. IEC Recommendation: Relocate switchboards out of the first two equipment categories and combine with third equipment category, motor control centers. Panelboards, or Switchboards, and Other Equipment >240V and up to 600V (with molded case or insulated case circuit breakers), Note 1 600V Switchboards and Motor Control Centers – Note 2 (except as indicated) Add task category to new Switchboards and Motor Control Center category Insertion or removal (racking) of CBs from cubicles, doors open or closed (Note 4) 4 N N

Substantiation: The location of Switchboards in the Tables creates a safety issue for workers. Switchboard construction is very different from panelboards. Switchboards are free standing distribution equipment that has many similar components to Motor Control Centers. Control circuits and draw-out breakers are a part of switchboards similar to controls circuits and removable buckets that are a part of MCC’s. Both Motor Control Centers and Switchboards can have switches on the front panel to view power measurements. Both are typically purchased at ampacities 1200 amps or above. Panelboards are typically purchased below 1200A even though some panelboards can be purchased above this figure. Switchboard construction can also be purchased with draw-out type breakers. Normally standard fixed mount breakers are not replaced energized. It would not be practical or logical to continue to lump switchboards and panelboards in the same equipment class. The hazard to replace a 30 amp fuse in a disconnect is very different than installing wires into a 2000 amp switchboard. Therefore, this proposal combines switchboards and motor control centers into the same category. The HRC for motor control centers is based upon 65 kA SCC and 2 cycle clearing time. These input parameters used for IEEE 1584 calculations are also more appropriate for switchboards. The chart below provides a graph of a 2000A breaker vs. a 2000A Class L fuse, both rated at 480 volts. These overcurrent devices were chosen as typical devices that may protect a large switchboard. The graph below provides substantiation that 25 kA, 2 cycle clearing time input parameters is not appropriate for switchboard type construction. (See Figure below.) The task “insertion or removal (racking) of CBs from cubicles, doors open or closed” is being added to this combined category since switchboards can have draw-out or rackable circuit breakers similar to switchgear construction. HRC Category 4 is being used for this task similar to the task in the switchgear section. Note 3 is being added to match the 42kA SCC and.33 sec clearing time for a similar task to remove or insert of a MCC bucket. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle in Part The committee accepts the addition of “and Other Equipment” and rejects the remainder of the proposal. The accepted revision will read: “Panelboards, Switchboards, and Other Equipment” Committee Statement: The committee does not agree that switchboards and motor control centers can be applied in the same HRC. See the committee action on Proposal 70E-308.

70E-113

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: BOWMAN, W.: This proposal should have been accepted in principle with either the Switchboard being moved into their own equipment section or being combined with Motor Control Centers. If the equipment sections are combined then the equipment category should read as follows:600V Class, Switchboards and Motor Control Centers, 600V and Below - Note 2 (except as indicated) If the committee accepts Switchboards as being in their own Category the following changes should be made: 600V Class, Motor Control Centers, 600V and Below - Note 2 (except as indicated) Switchboards, 600V and Below – Note 2 (except as indicated) ** Add Tasks as listed below** Perform infrared thermography and other non-contact inspections outside the restricted approach boundary. 1 N N CB or fused switch operation with covers on 0 N N Reading a panel meter while operating a meter switch 0 N N CB or fused switch operation with covers off 1 N N Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing 2* Y Y Insertion or removal (racking) of CB’s from cubicles, doors open or closed 4 N N Application of temporary protective equipment grounds, after voltage test 2* Y N Removal of bolted covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) – Note 3 4 N N Opening of hinged covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) – Note 3 1 N N Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts of utilization equipment fed directly by a branch circuit of the switchboard 2* Y Y The following are reasons to relocate the switchboard equipment in the Tables. 1. A significant percentage of Panelboards are purchased in the 100A to 800A range while Switchboards typically start at 800A and extend upward to 5000A. Panelboards are normally purchased with an interrupting rating of 10K to 42K, switchboard overcurrent protection normally starts at 65K. Given these parameters it would be logical that panelboards can easily fit into a model with 25k/2 cycle clearing time but it would be difficult to lump Switchboard construction into these same parameters. Viewing the time current curves of 100 to 400 amp devices and looking at the 25,000A short circuit current it would be common to see these devices trip at or below the 2 cycle level. Viewing time current curves for devices greater than 800 amps it would be difficult to find a device that is within its instantaneous region using the same parameters. Raising switchboard equipment into the 65kA Note 2 parameter is a much more logical fit.

2. Switchboards and MCC equipment have similar features. Switchboards are purchased with rack mounted breakers and metering/amp/voltage devices, similar to an MCC. They also can have control circuits to control zone interlocking features 3. During the ROP proposal 70E-331 has been accepted to allow for the Arc Flash Boundary information to be included for each task. The Arc Flash Boundary has been calculated based upon the voltage level, the short circuit current, and clearing time parameters for each equipment section. If switchboards remain in the panelboard section they will be required to have an Arc Flash Boundary of 20 inches for the 240 volt level and 30 inches for the 600 volt level. Yet, MCC type equipment is calculated at 55 inches based upon 65kA and 2 cycle clearing time. It would not seem logical to have switchboards remain with such a low arc flash boundary compared to the actual calculated values of arc flash boundaries in the real world. 4. Whether switchboards or MCC equipment are combined the “600V Class” equipment header for MCC’s needs to be changed. When a user of the 70E standard looks for tasks that involve Motor Control Centers wired for 208 or 240v operation, they may be confused and inadvertently use the “Panelboard or Other Equipment, 240V and Below” section since they may assume that “600V Class” means only equipment rated above 250V to ground. Not everyone is aware that Motor Control Centers are manufactured only in the 600V Class designation. It would provide additional usability and clarity to replace 600V Class with “600V and below” to indicate that any Motor Control Center wired for 600 volts or less clearly falls into this category. This would also correlate with similar wording for the first two sections. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-327 Log #453 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.7(C)(9)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Mark Rucker, Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. Recommendation: Revise table to read as follows: (See Table 130.7(C)(9) below.) Substantiation: The proposal is to change Hazard Risk Category ratings for tasks which do not have an exposed hazard from Category 0 to N/A (Not Applicable). Reasoning is if a panel is closed with covers or there is generally no exposure to arc flash from within the panel. It is not reasonable nor necessary to require equipment operators who switch lighting from a panelboard, or operate a closed disconnect, or switch a 120V panel meter switch to wear Category 0 PPE (long sleeved cotton clothing, leather gloves, and hearing protection). Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Hazard risk category 0 does not require arc rated clothing. The submitter has not provided adequate technical substantiation to

Tasks Performed on Energized Equipment Hazard/Risk CategoryPanelboards or Other Equipment Rated 240V and Below …. Circuit breaker (CB) or fused switch operation with covers on

0 N/A

Panelboards or Switchboards Rated >240V and up... CB or fused switch operation with covers on

0 N/A

600V Class Motor Control Centers (MCCs) CB or fused switch or starter operation with enclosure doors closed

0 N/A

600V Class Switchgear CB or fused switch operation with enclosure doors closed

0 N/A

NEMA E2 (fused contactor) Motor Starters, 2.3 kV through 7.2 kV Contactor operation with enclosure doors closed Reading a panel meter while operating a meter switch

0 N/A

Metal Clad Switchgear, 1kV through 38 kV Reading a panel meter while operating a meter switch

0 N/A

General Notes (applicable to entire table): (g) Hazard Risk Catergory entries marked N/A (not applicable) indicate that under normal conditions of maintenance and installation that an arc flash hazard is not present and that arc flash PPE is not required.

70E-114

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E support the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: The committee statement does not address the proposal appropriately. The submitter does not mention arc rated clothing at all. The focus is on the tasks where there is no exposure whatsoever, but still require long-sleeve cotton shirt (and other Category 0 “table” requirements). In many cases, a lighting panel circuit breaker may be operated by a non-electrician, but the committee is treating them as if they are an electrician. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-328 Log #511 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.7(C)(9)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Paul Dobrowsky, Holley, NY Recommendation: In the proposed table submitted by the task group change the 1 and 2 used to identify a grounded and ungrounded system respectively to a G and U. Add a note indicating the G = Grounded System and U = Ungrounded system. Substantiation: This will help avoid possibly miss applying or misinterpreting the table. The numbers 1 and 2 are already used for other purposes and indicating a G and U is almost self explanatory. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The proposal did not include values for grounded and ungrounded systems. The task group used only the largest AFB. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-329 Log #521 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (Table 130.7(C)(9)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Paul Dobrowsky, Holley, NY Recommendation: Add a note to Table 130.7(C)(9) as follows: N indicates that rubber gloves and insulated and insulating hand tools are not required only if in accordance with 130.2 and 130.7(D) Substantiation: The existing use of the N can be misleading where it is indicated because it is expected that tools are not being used or the hands will not cross the RAB. For tasks or equipment where acidental contact can be made with live parts or where the hands cross the RAB, rubber gloves and insulated or insulating tools can be necessary. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the new general note as follows: The use of “N” does not indicate that rubber insulating gloves, insulated and insulating hand tools are not required in all cases. Rubber insulating gloves, insulated and insulating hand tools may be required by 130.2, 130.7(C)(6) and 130.7(D). Committee Statement: The committee revision clarifies the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A.

Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: The wording is very messy and does not clarify when the requirement exists. The current note associated with table identifies “N=no(not required).” If an “N” appears in the line item for a particular task, it says that it is not required for that particular task. The statement by the committee seems to suggest that they “may” be required. Which is it? Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We agree with the concept of the submitter in principle. Protection for shock and arc flash and the need for insulated tools should be relocated to Table 130.7(C)(10) with a footnote indicating that these are not required where no shock and/or arc flash hazard exists. The protective equipment identified for each Hazard/Risk Category in Table 130.7(C)(10) should additionally list “Rubber Insulating Gloves (AR)” and “Insulated and Insulating Hand Tools (AR)” with the “AR” indicating that Rubber Insulating Gloves and/or Insulated and Insulating Hand Tools are required unless there is no need for their use to protect against shock and/or arc flash. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-330 Log #524 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.7(C)(9)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: T David Mills, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC Recommendation: Delete the table. Substantiation: After several years of dealing with the confusion in the work force about why there is a different requirement for certain tasks that are also calculated to have a higher arc flash incident energy than the table allowed PPE, it has become more of a liability than aid. Simply requiring the calculation as is already part of section 130.3(B)(1) without the allowance of the table values will make the presentation of requirements more meaningful to the worker and to those who enforce the requirements. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The use of Table 130.7(C)(9) and the Hazard Risk Category method is necessary for venues in which a complete study of all incident energy values has not been completed. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We suggest that the use of Table 130.7(C)(9) and the Hazard Risk Category method may also be appropriate for venues in which a complete study of all incident energy values has been obtained (as well when they have not all been obtained). _______________________________________________________________ 70E-331 Log #535 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (Table 130.7(C)(9)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James T. Dollard, Jr., IBEW Local 98 Recommendation: Add a column to existing Table 130.7(C)(9) to include Arc Flash Protection Boundaries for each task. (shown on pages 70E-114 thru 120.)

Perform infrared Thermography and other non-contact inspections outside the restricted approach boundary

Equipment ClassificationHazard/

Risk Category

Rubber Insulating

Gloves

Insulated and Insulating

Hand Tools

Maximum avail-able short circuit

current & clearing time

Arc Flash Boundary (inches)

Panelboard, and other equipment rated 240V and below (1) 0 N N 25kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle) 20

Panelboard, Switchboard and other equipment Rated >240V and up to 600V (with molded case or insulated case break-ers) (2)

1 N N 25kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle) 30

600V Class Motor Control Centers(MCC’s) (3) 1 N N 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle) 55

600V Class Switchgear - (with power circuit breakers or fused switches) (4) 2 N N 35kA @ 0.5 sec

(30 Cycle) 235

NEMA E2 (fused contactor) Motor Starters, 2.3 kV Through 7.2 kV (6) 3 N N 35kA @ .2 sec

(12 cycle) 420

Metal Clad Switchgear, 1 kV Through 38 kV (7) 3 N N 35kA @ .2 sec (12 cycle) 420

70E-115


Removing Bolted Covers

Equipment Classification Hazard/Risk Category

Rubber Insulating

Gloves


Tools

Maximum available short circuit current

& clearing time

Arc Flash Boundary


Cable trough or tray cover removal or installation (5) 1 N N 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle) 55

Lighting or Small power transformers (600V, maximum) (5) 2* N N 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle) 55

Miscellaneous equipment cover removal or installation (5) 1 N N 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle) 55



(30 Cycle) 235


(12 cycle) 420

Metal Clad Switchgear, 1 kV Through 38 kV, including opening voltage transformer or control power transformer compartments (7)

4 N N 35kA @ .2 sec (12 cycle) 420

Metal-enclosed interrupter switchgear, fused or unfused, 1 kV through 38 kV (9) 4 N N 35kA @ .2 sec

(12 cycle) 420

Opening Hinged Covers

Panelboard, and other equipment rated 240V and below (1) 0 N N 25kA @ 0.03 sec

(2 Cycle) 20

Lighting or Small power transformers (600V, maximum) (5) 1 N N 65kA @ 0.03 sec

(2 Cycle) 55



(30 Cycle) 235


(12 cycle) 420

Metal Clad Switchgear, 1 kV Through 38 kV (7) 3 N N 35kA @ .2 sec (12 cycle) -420

Metal-enclosed interrupter switchgear, fused or unfused, 1 kV through 38 kV (9) 3 N N 35kA @ .2 sec

(12 cycle) 420

Opening voltage transformer or control power transformer compartments in Metal Clad Switchgear, 1 kV Through 38 kV (7)

4 N N 35kA @ .2 sec (12 cycle) 420

70E-116


Operation of a Meter Switch, Circuit Breaker, Switch or Contactor (Covers/Doors On)


Rubber Insulating

Gloves

Insulated and



& clearing time

Arc Flash Boundary


Panelboard, Switchboard and other equipment Rated >240V and up to 600V (with molded case or insulated case breakers) (2) 0 N N 25kA @ 0.03 sec

(2 Cycle) 0



(30 Cycle) 0

Reading a panel meter while operating a meter switch (3, 4, 6, 7) 0 N N ROP action necessary

N/A 0


(12 cycle) 420


Arc- Resistant Switchgear Type 1 or 2 (for clearing times of <.5 sec with a perspective fault current not to exceed the arc resis-tant rating of the equipment) (8)

0 N N 35kA @ .2 sec (12 cycle) 0

Metal-enclosed interrupter switchgear, fused or unfused (1 kV through 38 Kv) (9) 2 N N 35kA @ .2 sec

(12 cycle) 420

Metal-enclosed interrupter switchgear, fused or unfused (1 kV through 38 Kv) Outdoor disconnect switch (hookstick operated) (9)

3 Y Y 35kA @ .2 sec (12 cycle) 420

Metal-enclosed interrupter switchgear, fused or unfused (1 kV through 38 Kv) Outdoor disconnect switch (gang-operated, from grade) (9)

2 Y N 35kA @ .2 sec (12 cycle) 420

Arc-resistant switchgear 1kV through 38 kV (9) 0 N N 35kA @ .2 sec (12 cycle) 0

Reading a panel meter while operating a meter switch (3, 4, 6, 7) 0 N N 35kA @ .2 sec

(12 cycle) 0

Operation of Circuit Breaker, Switch or Contactor (Covers Off)


Panelboard, Switchboard and other equipment Rated >240V and up to 600V (with molded case or insulated case breakers) (2) 1 Y N 25kA @ 0.03 sec

(2 Cycle) 30


600V Class Switchgear - (with power circuit breakers or fused switches) (4) 1 Y N 35kA @ 0.5 sec

(30 Cycle) 235

NEMA E2 (fused contactor) Motor Starters, 2.3 kV Through 7.2 kV (6) 2* N N 35kA @ .2 sec (12

cycle) 420


70E-117


Specific Tasks on Energized Equipment (600V or less)


Rubber Insulating

Gloves


Tools

Maximum available short circuit current &

clearing time

Arc Flash Boundary

Panelboard, and other equipment rated 240V and below

(1) Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing 1 Y Y 25kA @ 0.03 sec

(2 Cycle) 20

(1) Remove/install CB’s or fused switches 1 Y Y 25kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle) 20

(1)Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts of utilization equipment fed directly by a branch circuit of a panelboard

1 Y Y 25kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle) 20

Panelboard, Switchboard and other equipment Rated >240V and up to 600V (with molded case or insulated case breakers)

(2) Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing 2* Y Y 25kA @ 0.03 sec

(2 Cycle) 30

(2)Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts of utilization equipment fed directly by a branch circuit of a panelboard

2* Y Y 25kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle) 30

600V Class Switchboards and Motor Control Centers(MCC’s)

(3) Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing 2* Y Y 65kA @ 0.03 sec

(2 Cycle) 55

(3) Work on control circuits with energized electrical con-ductors and circuit parts 120V or below, exposed 0 Y Y 65kA @ 0.03 sec

(2 Cycle) 15

(3) Work on control circuits with energized electrical con-ductors and circuit parts > 120V, exposed 2* Y Y 65kA @ 0.03 sec

(2 Cycle) 20

(3) Insertion or removal of individual starter “buckets” from MCC 4 Y N 42Ka @ 0.33 sec

(20 Cycle) 165

(3)Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts of utilization equipment fed directly by a branch circuit of a motor control circuit

2* Y Y 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle) 55

70E-118


Specific Tasks on Energized Equipment (600V or less) (continued)

600V Class Switchgear - (with power circuit breakers or fused switches)

(4) Work on energized electrical conductors and cir-cuit parts, including voltage testing 2* Y Y 35kA @ 0.5 sec

(30 Cycle) 235

(4)Work on control circuits with energized electri-cal conductors and circuit parts 120V or below, exposed

0 Y Y 35kA @ 0.5 sec(30 Cycle) 235

(4) Work on control circuits with energized electrical conductors and circuit parts > 120V, exposed 2* Y Y 35kA @ 0.5 sec

(30 Cycle) 235

(4) Insertion or removal (racking) of CB’s from cubicles, doors open or closed 4 N N 35kA @ 0.5 sec

(30 Cycle) 235

Lighting or Small power transformers (600V, maxi-mum)


(2 Cycle) 55

Other 600 v Class (277 V through 600 V, nominal) Equipment

(5) Revenue meters (kW, at primary voltage and cur-rent) Insertion or removal 2* Y N 65kA @ 0.03 sec

(2 Cycle) 55

(5) Insertion or removal of plug-in devices into or from busways (Other 600 V Class Equipment) 2* Y N 65kA @ 0.03 sec

(2 Cycle) 55


(2 Cycle) 55

70E-119

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Specific Tasks on Energized Equipment (> 600V )


Rubber Insulating

Gloves


Tools


clearing time

Arc Flash Boundary


(6) Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing 4 Y Y 35kA @ .2 sec

(12 cycle) 420

(6) Work on control circuits with energized electrical conductors and circuit parts 120V or below, exposed 0 Y Y 35kA @ .2 sec

(12 cycle) 420

(6) Work on control circuits with energized electrical conductors and circuit parts > 120V, exposed 3 Y Y 35kA @ .2 sec

(12 cycle) 420

(6) Insertion or removal of individual starter from cubi-cles, doors open or closed 4 N N 35kA @ .2 sec

(12 cycle) 420

(6)Insertion or removal (racking) of starters from cubi-cles of arc-resistant construction, tested in accordance with IEEE C37.20.7, doors closed only

0 N N 35kA @ .2 sec (12 cycle) 0

Metal Clad Switchgear, 1 kV Through 38 kV

(7) Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing 4 Y Y 35kA @ .2 sec

(12 cycle) 420


(12 cycle) 15

(7) Work on control circuits with energized electrical conductors and circuit parts > 120V, exposed 4 Y Y 35kA @ .2 sec

(12 cycle) 20

(7) Insertion or removal of (racking) of CB’s from cubi-cles, doors open or closed 4 N N 35kA @ .2 sec

(12 cycle) 420

Arc- Resistant Switchgear Type 1 or 2 (for clearing times of <.5 sec with a perspective fault current not to exceed the arc resistant rating of the equipment)

(8) Insertion or removal of CB’s from cubicles with door open 0 N N 35kA @ .2 sec

(12 cycle) 420

(8) Insertion or removal (racking) of CB’s from cubicles, doors closed 4 N N 35kA @ .2 sec

(12 cycle) 0


(12 cycle) 15

(8) Insertion or removal (racking) of ground and test device with door closed 0 N N 35kA @ .2 sec

(12 cycle) 420

(8) Insertion or removal (tracking) of voltage transform-ers on or off the bus door closed 0 N N 35kA @ .2 sec

(12 cycle) 420

Other Equipment 1 kV Through 38 kV

(9) Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts including voltage testing 4 N N 35kA @ .2 sec

(12 cycle) 420

(9) Insulated cable examination, in manhole or other confined space 4 Y N 35kA @ .2 sec

(12 cycle) 420

(9) Insulated cable examination, in open area 2 Y N 35kA @ .2 sec (12 cycle) 420

70E-120


Applications of Safety Grounds after voltage test


Rubber Insulating

Gloves


Hand Tools


clearing time

Arc Flash Boundary

Lighting or Small power transformers (600V, maxi-mum) (5) 2* Y N 65kA @ 0.03 sec

(2 Cycle) 55

Other 600V Class (277V through 600V, nominal) Equipment (5) 2* Y N 65kA @ 0.03 sec

(2 Cycle) 55

600V Class Motor Control Centers(MCC’s) (3) 2* Y N 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle) 55

600V Class Switchgear - (with power circuit breakers or fused switches) (4) 2* Y N 35kA @ 0.5 sec

(30 Cycle) 235

NEMA E2 (fused contactor) Motor Starters, 2.3 kV Through 7.2 kV 3 Y N 35kA @ .2 sec

(12 cycle) 420

Metal Clad Switchgear, 1 kV Through 38 kV 4 Y N 35kA @ .2 sec (12 cycle) 420

General Notes (applicable to the entire table):(a) Rubber insulating gloves are gloves rated for the maximum line-to-line voltage upon which work will be done.(b) Insulated and insulating hand tools are tools rated and tested for the maximum line-to-line voltage upon which work will be done, and are manufactured and tested in accordance with ASTM F 1505, Standard Specification for Insulated and Insulating Hand Tools.(c) Y = yes (required), N = no (not required).(d) For systems rated less than 1000 volts, the fault currents and upstream protective device clearing times are based on an 18 in. working distance.(e) For systems rated 1 kV and greater, the Hazard/Risk Categories are based on a 36 in. working distance.(f) For equipment protected by upstream current limiting fuses with arcing fault current in their current limiting range (1⁄2 cycle fault clearing time or less), the hazard/risk category required may be reduced by one number.

70E-121

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Add limitations for available short circuit current and clearing time where they are missing in the existing table. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the Tables Task Group appointed by NFPA 70E Chairman Dave Dini. The task group consisted of Larry Ayer, Palmer Hickman, Jim White, Ron Widup, Vince Saporita, Daniel Roberts, Mike Doherty, Tom Neal, Paul Dobrowsky, John Luke, David Wallace, Daleep Mohla, Paul Hamer, Eric Glaude and Jim Dollard. Many users of the Table 130.7(C)(9) have no means to calculate the Arc Flash Protection Boundary (AFPB). These users may use the “default” AFPB of 48”, which in many cases would leave workers unprotected. Including the Arc Flash Protection Boundary calculated at the maximum value listed for each task would ensure that workers within the actual boundary are protected, not just those within 48 inches and also make workers more aware of the extent of the arc flash hazard. No values for short circuit available current or operating time were given in the current NFPA 70E table notes for medium-voltage equipment, so values were used that approximate the maximum (40 cal/cm2) exposure allowed for the exposure. The following attachments have been provided as supporting material: Attachment 1 (shown in the recommendation) provides an example of how the arc flash boundaries, maximum ASCC and maximum clearing times can be added for clarity and usability. Note that this example is added to another proposal from the Tables Task Group that suggests a task based table approach. Attachment 2 provides information on how the calculations were derived as well as the reasoning behind them. Attachment 3 is the IEEE 1584 spreadsheet used for the calculation of the AFPB. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle The committee accepts: (1)The insertion of maximum available short circuit currents and clearing times into a new column in Table 130.7(C)(9). (2)The insertion of the new column with arc flash boundaries in Table 130.7(C)(9). (3)The addition of maximum ASCC and clearing times in Table 130.7(C)(9) for tasks where these qualifiers were missing. The committee also deletes the existing “specific notes” to Table 130.7(C)(9). The committee adds two notes at the end of the table to explain how the arc flash boundary was determined: Note 1. For power systems up to 600V the Arc Flash Boundary was determined by using the following information: When 0.03 second trip time was used, that indicated MCC or panelboard-equipment protected by a molded-case circuit breaker. Working distance used is (455mm) 18”, arc gap used is 32mm for switchgear and 25mm for MCC, protective device type 0 for all. When 0.33 or 0.5 second trip time was used, that indicated a LVPCB (drawout circuit breaker) in switchgear. Working distance is (610mm) 24”, arc gap used is 32mm, protective device type 0 for all. All numbers were rounded up or down depending on closest multiple of “5”. Note 2. For power systems from 1kV to 38kV the Arc Flash Boundary was determined by using the following information: No maximum values were given in the 2009 edition of the NFPA 70E for short circuit current or operating time. Two sets of equations were performed [35kA AIC and 0.2 second operating time] and [26kA AIC and 0.2 second operating time]. 0.2 seconds was used by adding the typical maximum total clearing time of the circuit breaker to an estimated value for relay operation. This coincides with the IEEE 1584 values of 0.18 second operating time and 0.08 tripping time rounded off. 35kA was used as a maximum (HRC-4 @ ~ 40 cal/cm2) and 26kA was used to compare the effects of lowering the short circuit current (HRC-4 @ ~ 30 cal/cm2). Working distance used was (909mm) 36”, arc gap was (455mm) 6”, protective device type 0 for all. Committee Statement: The revisions meet the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1

Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: The proposed additional columns should be rejected. Procedures for arc-flash incident energy calculation are not agreed, may have widely varying results and inaccuracies due to the random behavior of arcing faults and laboratory-based measurements, and a single method has not been accepted by consensus of the Technical Committee. To add the proposed new columns within Table 130.7(C)(9) would complicate the issue and give a false impression that the table Hazard / Risk Categories are based entirely on IEEE Std 1584 calculations, which is not true. The Arc Flash Protection Boundary could be determined by one of many calculation methods, including but not limited to IEEE Std 1584 or other methods in Annex D. A a possible solution is to add a sentence to the end of the present text of Section 130.7(C)(9), above the present FPN No. 1: “… It shall be permitted to determine the Arc Flash Protection Boundary by one or more calculation methods The calculation and method(s) used for the determination of the Arc Flash Protection Boundary (or boundaries) shall be documented.” Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We understand that the committee recognizes that arc rated clothing (garments) must be worn on all parts of the body that are within the arc flash boundary (AFB) as indicated by 130.7(C)(1) and130.7(C)(5) and suggest that this concept should be incorporated into the protection determined by Tables 130.7(C)(9) and 130.7(C)(10) via notes and/or other means of communicating this point such as additional text in 130.7(C)(9) and/or 130.7(C)(10). This would include, but not be limited to, changing Hazard/Risk Category (HRC) 0 to HRC 1 and requiring a balaclava for HRC 1 where the Arc Flash Boundary (AFB) is a greater distance than the associated 18” or 36” distance identified in the table notes. The following changes are recommended (changing HRC 0 to HRC 1) where the AFB is greater than 18 inches for less than 1000 volts and 36 inches for 1kV and greater (where flammable clothing is currently permitted to be inside the associated AFB). (See Table on the pages 70E-122 through 70E-124 .) REGE, T.: ACCEPT with comments-ASTM F18 supports the concept of the tables but there are number of technical issues. The tables list tasks with HRC = 0 and Arc Flash Boundary equals zero inches. HRC = 0 means there are PPE requirements for this work inside the arc flash boundary. But arc flash boundary equals zero has no meaning. These tasks should be deleted from the table. The table should include an explanation of the expectation when arc flash boundary is less than arms’ length. Does that mean you need protection for the hands but not the torso? Does that mean that hearing protection and head protection is not required since the head is outside the arc flash boundary? The table includes requirements for equipment that is above 15 kv. But the IEEE 1584 method is known not to be accurate above 15 kv. The table should include a note indicating that calculations above 15 kv may not be accurate or delete all tasks above 15 kv. TIEDE, T.: Reformatting the tables to reduce confusion and misapplication is a good idea. The zero (0) value in the “Arc Flash Boundary” column may be confusing and should be replaced with “n/a” since the Arc Flash Boundary exists only when an Arc Flash Hazard exists. WIDUP, R.: There were transcribing errors made by TG4 members when submitting the proposal to the committee. Recommend revising the two added columns as per worksheet provided to resolve those errors. P(See table on pages 125-128). WILMER, K.: EEI supports the concept of the tables but there are number of technical issues. The tables list tasks with HRC = 0 and Arc Flash Boundary equals zero inches. HRC = 0 means there are PPE requirements for this work inside the arc flash boundary. But arc flash boundary equals zero has no meaning. These tasks should be deleted from the table. The table should include an explanation of the expectation when arc flash boundary is less than arms’ length. Does that mean you need protection for the hands but not the torso? Does that mean that hearing protection and head protection is not required since the head is outside the arc flash boundary? The table includes requirements for equipment that is above 15 kv. But the IEEE 1584 method is known not to be accurate above 15 kv. The table should include a note indicating that calculations above 15 kv may not be accurate or delete all tasks above 15 kv.

70E-122


70E-331 (Log #535) Hickman Affirmative on Comment Ballot

70E-123


70E-331 (Log #535) Hickman Affirmative on Comment Ballot (continued)

70E-124


70E-331 (Log #535) Hickman Affirmative on Comment Ballot (continued

70E-125


70E-331 (Log #535) Widup Affirmative on Comment Ballot

70E-126


70E-331 (Log #535) Widup Affirmative on Comment Ballot (continued)

70E-127



70E-128



70E-129

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-332 Log #536 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.7(C)(9)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James T. Dollard, Jr., IBEW Local 98 Recommendation: Revise table toward a task driven format. Relocate tasks from under equipment headings and move into 6 main task headings as follows: 1. Thermography 2. Opening Covers 3. Engaging Switches/Breakers 4. Applications of Safety Grounds 5. Specific Energized Tasks for Equipment <600V 6. Specific Energized Tasks for Equipment >600V (See tables on the following pages.) Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the Tables Task Group appointed by NFPA 70E Chairman Dave Dini. The task group consisted of Larry Ayer, Palmer Hickman, Jim White, Ron Widup, Vince Saporita, Daniel Roberts, Mike Doherty, Tom Neal, Paul Dobrowsky, John Luke, David Wallace, Daleep Mohla, Paul Hamer, Eric Glaude and Jim Dollard. The goal of Table 130.7(C)(9) is to provide an alternative to the lengthy engineering calculation method for determining the hazard/risk when working on energized electrical equipment. While the table has been relatively successful there is a large portion of the contracting industry which does not use the table partly due to its format. This proposal rearranges the information in the existing table into a Task Driven format to reach a larger portion of the electrical industry. The three main changes brought forth in this proposal are: (1) reversing the existing table to allow the user to focus on 6 specific task driven tables, (2) moving the maximum short circuit and clearing time directly into the table, and (3) moving the arc flash boundary information associated with the short circuit and clearing time of each category of equipment directly into the table. 1. Task Driven Format. Outside of the relocation of the specific notes for ASCC and clearing time and the addition of a column to add the AFB to the table, this proposal essentially reformats the existing table editorially into a task based table. The existing table 130.7(C)(9) is separated into 9 separate pieces. This proposal identifies where each part of the existing table went into this new “task based” table format. In the first column of each part of the new “task based” table titled “Equipment Classification” there is a number (1 through 9) in parentheses added only to help you to identify where the task is located in the existing table. For example, in the first part of the proposed “task based” table for thermography, each piece of equipment is followed by a number such as (1). This part of the task based table has editorially relocated all thermography tasks. By looking at the numbers in parentheses, the reader of this proposal can see that these tasks existed previously in six of the nine sections of the existing table. Item (1) was previously located in the first part of the table on page 30, item (2) was previously located in the second part of the table on page 30, item (3) was previously located in the third part of the table on page 31, item (4) was previously located in the fourth part of the table on page 31, item (6) was previously located in the sixth part of the table on page 32 and item (7) was previously located in the seventh part of the table on page 33. Electricians and maintenance personnel need to quickly identify the severity of the electrical hazard when working on energized electrical equipment. In many cases in large scale industrial settings or large corporations the hazards are well identified in advance by a well established and well resourced safety department which has spent time and money either performing an arc flash analysis or reviewing in close detail the applicability of Table 130.7(C)(9). Small, medium and even the largest of contracting firms work in occupancies that vary on a daily basis and workers are rotated from project to project. The men and women in this portion of the electrical industry are not afforded the same resources. Additionally these installer/maintainers are constantly faced with tasks in structures that they have never been in before and must rely on the 70E HRC tables where justified energized work is to be performed. Reworking the tables into task-based headings will provide clarity and will greatly enhance usability. The user of the HRC tables in NFPA 70E is “task based.” They refer to the HRC as they are about to perform a justified energized “task.” The goal of the tables should be both for a worker to quickly find the task they are working on and determine the hazard risk category necessary to protect them from an arc flash event and to provide them with as much necessary information as possible in the location of the table they are accessing with respect to the task at hand. The present table does not satisfy both these needs. To find the information in the 2009 version, a user must get through three steps, first define the voltage, second they determine the equipment they are working on, and third they finally determine their task and hope the task is contained with the tables. This all must be done searching for the information across 4 to 5 pages. In many cases the tasks were not duplicated across each equipment section, leaving the individual to wonder why the task was included in one category but not another. For instance, if a worker were to replace fuses in a 208 volt disconnect they can find the task in the first equipment category, but if the same worker desired to replace fuses within a 600 volt disconnect,

the same task is missing. The reformatting of the table will allow workers to concentrate on one specific task while the equipment under each task will be exactly the same. In this proposed revision, the user will search first for the task across 6 specific tasks tables and then look for the specific equipment that their work applies to. This will allow individuals to focus on one or two task-driven tables that meet their needs rather than searching across the 9 separate parts of the existing table for an individual task. As an example, a thermographer would now have his/her own section in which they can quickly look down a very specific table and find the equipment they are working on. An electrical inspection company, or a firm specializing in maintenance, would possibly focus on only two of the tables such as opening/removing covers or engaging switch/breaker. An electrical contracting company would spend more time focusing on tables involving Specific Energized Tasks. If that firm specialized in electrical work on systems less than 600V, then they could focus on one table (Specific Energized Tasks on Equipment less than 600V). This “task based” approach will provide clarity and usability for all size contractors as well as large users who choose to use the table. As a side benefit the new table format will provide the user with an overall view of the task and the required PPE over different types of equipment/voltages and will inform the user of where the hazard increases dynamically. Consolidating the task in a group is user friendly and provides clarity. A thermographer looking at the proposed table will be able to quickly understand that they can use HRC 2 clothing successfully for all equipment up to and including 600V Class Switchgear (as shown below). In the previous version a thermographer who performed their job looking at various pieces of electrical equipment such as motor control centers, switchboards, and the like would have to look in 5 different sections for each specific piece of equipment. Many contractors purchase equipment using 1 or 2 HRC levels. Typically the contracting industry outfits their employees in HRC 2 Clothing for most everyday tasks and purchases a few higher level clothing sets for the more difficult/hazardous tasks. These same companies may have difficulty determining the demarcation at which the risk increases from 2 to 4. The new format would quickly help firms identify the more dangerous tasks with respect to equipment types. 2. Maximum Available Short Circuit and Clearing Time This proposal deletes the specific notes and adds them in each task as they apply. Almost all Hazard/Risk Categories were determined by IEEE 1584 calculations using certain available short circuit and clearing time parameters. This information is an essential part of accurately using the tables. These parameters were often overlooked and as a result they have been moved from footnotes at the bottom of the table into the body of the table. Certain equipment categories were never assigned maximum available short circuit and clearing time information. This missing data was provided by a subtask group led by Jim White and has been included in this proposal. A companion proposal has been submitted by the Tables Task Group detailing this work. 3. Arc Flash Boundaries The arc flash boundaries have never been a part of the tables. This proposal has incorporated arc flash boundaries associated with the specific fault and clearing time parameters into each table. Users of the 2009 version may incorrectly believe that the 4 foot arc flash boundary in 130.3(A)(1) is typically adequate when using the tables and this is not always the case. This crucial piece of information will allow the user to see how the boundary may change drastically for various pieces of equipment. This missing data was also provided by a subtask group led by Jim White and has been included in this proposal. A companion proposal has been submitted by the Tables Task Group detailing this work. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The existing “equipment based” layout of Table 130.7(C)(9) is more user friendly. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: BOWMAN, W.: A task driven format for Table 130.7(C)(9) is the most appropriate look for HRC Tables. It may not provide increased usability and clarity for the industrial users but it would create more usability, clarity and buy in from the contracting world. It would indicate to the user how the arc flash boundary increases as the different equipment is used. It would also indicate more clearly how the hazard level changes depending on the equipment being serviced. Electricians and Contractors tend to come up with their own Table to use for their company. The table they create looks more like a Task Drive approach. The committee should give more consideration to the Task Driven format. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

70E-130


Perform infrared Thermography and other non-contact inspections outside the restricted approach boundary

Equipment ClassificationHazard/Risk

Category

Rubber Insulating

Gloves


Hand Tools


& clearing time

Arc Flash Boundary (inches)

Panelboard, and other equipment rated 240V and below (1)

0 N N 25kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

20

Panelboard, Switchboard and other equipment Rated >240V and up to 600V (with molded case or insulated case breakers) (2)

1 N N 25kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

30

600V Class Motor Control Centers(MCC’s) (3) 1 N N 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

55

600V Class Switchgear - (with power circuit breakers or fused switches) (4)

2 N N 35kA @ 0.5 sec (30 Cycle)

235

NEMA E2 (fused contactor) Motor Starters, 2.3 kV Through 7.2 kV (6)

3 N N 35kA @ .2 sec (12 cycle)

420

Metal Clad Switchgear, 1 kV Through 38 kV (7) 3 N N 35kA @ .2 sec (12 cycle)

420

Removing Bolted Covers


Category

Rubber Insulating

Gloves


Tools


& clearing timeArc Flash Boundary


1 N N 25kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

20

Cable trough or tray cover removal or installation (5) 1 N N 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

55

Lighting or Small power transformers (600V, maxi-mum) (5)

2* N N 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

55

Miscellaneous equipment cover removal or installa-tion (5)

1 N N 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

55


165


4 N N 35kA @ 0.5 sec (30 Cycle)

235



420

Metal Clad Switchgear, 1 kV Through 38 kV, includ-ing opening voltage transformer or control power transformer compartments (7)


420

Metal-enclosed interrupter switchgear, fused or unfused, 1 kV through 38 kV (9)


420


70E-131


Opening Hinged Covers


0 N N 25kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

20

Lighting or Small power transformers (600V, maximum) (5)

1 N N 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

55


165


2 N N 35kA @ 0.5 sec (30 Cycle)

235



420


-420

Metal-enclosed interrupter switchgear, fused or unfused, 1 kV through 38 kV (9)


420

Opening voltage transformer or control power transformer compartments in Metal Clad Switchgear, 1 kV Through 38 kV (7)


420


70E-132


Operation of a Meter Switch, Circuit Breaker, Switch or Contactor (Covers/Doors On)


Category

Rubber Insulating

Gloves


Tools


& clearing timeArc Flash Boundary


0 N N 25kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

0

Panelboard, Switchboard and other equipment Rated >240V and up to 600V (with molded case or insu-lated case breakers) (2)

0 N N 25kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

0


0

600V Class Switchgear - (with power circuit break-ers or fused switches) (4)

0 N N 35kA @ 0.5 sec (30 Cycle)

0

Reading a panel meter while operating a meter switch (3, 4, 6, 7)

0 N N ROP action necessary N/A

0



420


420

Arc- Resistant Switchgear Type 1 or 2 (for clearing times of <.5 sec with a perspective fault current not to exceed the arc resistant rating of the equipment) (8)


0

Metal-enclosed interrupter switchgear, fused or unfused (1 kV through 38 Kv) (9)


420

Metal-enclosed interrupter switchgear, fused or unfused (1 kV through 38 Kv) Outdoor disconnect switch (hookstick operated) (9)

3 Y Y 35kA @ .2 sec (12 cycle)

420

Metal-enclosed interrupter switchgear, fused or unfused (1 kV through 38 Kv) Outdoor disconnect switch (gang-operated, from grade) (9)

2 Y N 35kA @ .2 sec (12 cycle)

420

Arc-resistant switchgear 1kV through 38 kV (9) 0 N N 35kA @ .2 sec (12 cycle)

0

Reading a panel meter while operating a meter switch (3, 4, 6, 7)


0


70E-133


Operation of Circuit Breaker, Switch or Contactor (Covers Off)


0 N N 25kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

20

Panelboard, Switchboard and other equipment Rated >240V and up to 600V (with molded case or insulated case breakers) (2)

1 Y N 25kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

30


55


1 Y N 35kA @ 0.5 sec (30 Cycle)

235


2* N N 35kA @ .2 sec (12 cycle)

420


420

Applications of Safety Grounds after voltage test


Category

Rubber Insulating

Gloves


Hand Tools


clearing timeArc Flash Boundary

Lighting or Small power transformers (600V, maximum) (5)

2* Y N 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

55

Other 600V Class (277V through 600V, nominal) Equipment (5)

2* Y N 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

55

600V Class Motor Control Centers(MCC’s) (3)

2* Y N 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

55


2* Y N 35kA @ 0.5 sec(30 Cycle)

235


3 Y N 35kA @ .2 sec (12 cycle)

420

Metal Clad Switchgear, 1 kV Through 38 kV 4 Y N 35kA @ .2 sec (12 cycle)

420

General Notes (applicable to the entire table):(a) Rubber insulating gloves are gloves rated for the maximum line-to-line voltage upon which work will be done.(b) Insulated and insulating hand tools are tools rated and tested for the maximum line-to-line voltage upon which work will be done, and are manu-factured and tested in accordance with ASTM F 1505, Standard Specification for Insulated and Insulating Hand Tools.(c) Y = yes (required), N = no (not required).(d) For systems rated less than 1000 volts, the fault currents and upstream protective device clearing times are based on an 18 in. working distance.(e) For systems rated 1 kV and greater, the Hazard/Risk Categories are based on a 36 in. working distance.(f) For equipment protected by upstream current limiting fuses with arcing fault current in their current limiting range (1⁄2 cycle fault clearing time or less), the hazard/risk category required may be reduced by one number.


70E-134




Category

Rubber Insulating

Gloves

Insulated and




Arc Flash Boundary


(1) Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing

1 Y Y 25kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

20

(1) Remove/install CB’s or fused switches 1 Y Y 25kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

20

(1) Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts of utilization equipment fed directly by a branch circuit of a panelboard

1 Y Y 25kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

20



2* Y Y 25kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

30


2* Y Y 25kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

30



2* Y Y 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

55

(3) Work on control circuits with energized electrical conduc-tors and circuit parts 120V or below, exposed

0 Y Y 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

15

(3) Work on control circuits with energized electrical conduc-tors and circuit parts > 120V, exposed

2* Y Y 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

20

(3) Insertion or removal of individual starter “buckets” from MCC

4 Y N 42Ka @ 0.33 sec(20 Cycle)

165

(3) Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts of utilization equipment fed directly by a branch circuit of a motor control circuit

2* Y Y 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

55



2* Y Y 35kA @ 0.5 sec(30 Cycle)

235

(4) Work on control circuits with energized electrical conduc-tors and circuit parts 120V or below, exposed

0 Y Y 35kA @ 0.5 sec(30 Cycle)

235

(4) Work on control circuits with energized electrical conduc-tors and circuit parts > 120V, exposed

2* Y Y 35kA @ 0.5 sec(30 Cycle)

235

(4) Insertion or removal (racking) of CB’s from cubicles, doors open or closed

4 N N 35kA @ 0.5 sec(30 Cycle)

235

Lighting or Small power transformers (600V, maximum)


2* Y Y 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

55


(5) Revenue meters (kW, at primary voltage and current) Insertion or removal

2* Y N 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

55

(5) Insertion or removal of plug-in devices into or from bus-ways (Other 600 V Class Equipment)

2* Y N 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

55


2* Y Y 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

55


70E-135




Category

Rubber Insulating

Gloves

Insulated and




Arc Flash Boundary



1 Y Y 25kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

20

(1) Remove/install CB’s or fused switches 1 Y Y 25kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

20


1 Y Y 25kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

20



2* Y Y 25kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

30


2* Y Y 25kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

30



2* Y Y 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

55

(3) Work on control circuits with energized electrical con-ductors and circuit parts 120V or below, exposed

0 Y Y 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

15

(3) Work on control circuits with energized electrical con-ductors and circuit parts > 120V, exposed

2* Y Y 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

20

(3) Insertion or removal of individual starter “buckets” from MCC

4 Y N 42Ka @ 0.33 sec(20 Cycle)

165

(3) Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts of utilization equipment fed directly by a branch circuit of a motor control circuit

2* Y Y 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

55



2* Y Y 35kA @ 0.5 sec(30 Cycle)

235

(4) Work on control circuits with energized electrical con-ductors and circuit parts 120V or below, exposed

0 Y Y 35kA @ 0.5 sec(30 Cycle)

235

(4) Work on control circuits with energized electrical con-ductors and circuit parts > 120V, exposed

2* Y Y 35kA @ 0.5 sec(30 Cycle)

235

(4) Insertion or removal (racking) of CB’s from cubicles, doors open or closed

4 N N 35kA @ 0.5 sec(30 Cycle)

235

Lighting or Small power transformers (600V, maximum)


2* Y Y 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

55


(5) Revenue meters (kW, at primary voltage and current) Insertion or removal

2* Y N 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

55

(5) Insertion or removal of plug-in devices into or from busways (Other 600 V Class Equipment)

2* Y N 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

55


2* Y Y 65kA @ 0.03 sec (2 Cycle)

55


70E-136

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-333 Log #384 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10), 130.7(C)(11), Tables 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10), and 130.7(C)(11)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Mike Doherty, Infrastructure Health & Safety Association / Rep. CSA Z462 Technical Committee Recommendation: This proposal recommends the following:

1. Revise 130.3 to require an arc flash hazard analysis without referencing a specific method.

2. Move sections 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10) and 130.7(C)(11) and Tables 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10) and 130.7(C)(11) into Annex D.X and re-title Annex D as shown in the attachment. [Note: the submitter suggests Annex D as the appropriate location, the NFPA 70E Technical Committee may deem another Annex such as H more appropriate, or the creation of a new Annex.]

3. Editorial changes made to sections referencing sections 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10) and 130.7(C)(11) and Tables 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10) and 130.7(C)(11).

This proposal is one of three related proposals. The other two proposals are:

Create a new PPE table in 130.7•Create a new article requiring hearing protection for all arc flash exposures

[Item 1 of proposal: Revise 130.3 to require an arc flash hazard analysis without referencing a specific method.]

130.3 Arc Flash Hazard Analysis. An arc flash hazard analysis shall determine the Arc Flash Protection Boundary and the personal protective equipment that people within the Arc Flash Protection Boundary shall use.

The arc flash hazard analysis shall be updated when a major modification or renovation takes place. It shall be reviewed periodically, not to exceed five years, to account for changes in the electrical distribution system that could affect the results of the arc flash hazard analysis. The arc flash hazard analysis shall take into consideration the design of the overcurrent protective device and its opening time, including its condition of maintenance.

Exception No. 1: An arc flash hazard analysis shall not be required where all of the following conditions exist:

(1) The circuit is rated 240 volts or less.

(2) The circuit is supplied by one transformer.

(3) The transformer supplying the circuit is rated less than 125 kVA.

Exception No. 2: The requirements of 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10), and 130.7(C)(11) shall be permitted to be used in lieu of a detailed incident energy analysis.

(B) Protective Clothing and Other Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for Application with an Arc Flash Hazard Analysis. Where it has been determined that work will be performed within the Arc Flash Protection Boundary identified by 130.3(A), one of the following methods shall be used for the selection of protective clothing and other personal protective equipment: arc flash protective clothing and other personal protective equipment that meets the requirements of 130.7 shall be used.

The personal protective clothing and equipment shall be based on the working distance of the employee’s face and chest areas from a prospective arc source, while performing a specific task. Additional protective clothing and equipment shall be used for parts of the employee’s body that are closer than the working distance.

FPN: For information on methods to estimate incident energy or determine appropriate PPE see Annex D and H.

(1) Incident Energy Analysis. The incident energy analysis shall determine, and the employer shall document, the incident energy exposure of the worker (in calories per square centimeter). The incident energy exposure level shall be based on the working distance of the employee’s face and chest areas from a prospective arc source for the specific task to be performed. Arc-Rated FR clothing and other personal protective equipment (PPE) shall be used by the employee based on the incident energy exposure associated with the specific task. Recognizing that incident energy increases as the distance from the arc flash decreases, additional PPE shall be used for any parts of the body that are closer than the distance at which the incident energy was determined.

FPN: For information on estimating the incident energy, see Annex D.

(2) Hazard/Risk Categories. The requirements of 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10), and 130.7(C)(11) shall be permitted to be used for the selection and use of personal and other protective equipment.

[Item 2 of proposal: Move sections 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10) and 130.7(C)(11) and Tables 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10) and 130.7(C)(11) into Annex D.X]

Annex D Incident Energy and Flash Protection Boundary Calculation and Hazard/Risk Category Methods

D.1 Introduction. Annex D summarizes calculation methods available for calculating arc flash boundary and incident energy. Annex D also includes the hazard/risk category method of selecting electrical hazard personal protective equipment. It is important to investigate the limitations of any methods to be used. The limitations of calculation methods summarized in Annex D are described in Table D.1.

[The remainder of Annex D remains unchanged]

D.X Hazard/Risk Category Method of Selecting Personal Protective Equipment for Various Tasks

FPN: Any use of mandatory language in this section only indicates that users of this method cannot selectively use parts of the method and ignore other parts, it does not impose a requirement on users of this document to use this method. The hazard/risk category method is designed to be used in whole, not in part.

(9) D.X1 Selection of Personal Protective Equipment When Required for Various Tasks

Where selected in lieu of the incident energy analysis of 130.3(B)(1), Table 130.7(C)(9) shall be When using this method, Table D.X1 is used to determine the hazard/risk category and requirements for the use of rubber insulating gloves and insulated and insulating hand tools for a task. The assumed maximum short-circuit current capacities and maximum fault clearing times for various tasks are listed in the notes to Table 130.7(C)(9) D.X1. Do not use this method for tasks not listed, or for power systems with greater than the assumed maximum short circuit current capacity or with longer than the assumed maximum fault clearing times, an arc flash hazard analysis shall be required in accordance with 130.3.

FPN No. 1: The work tasks and protective equipment identified in Table 130.7(C)(9) D.X1 were identified by a task group and the protective clothing and equipment selected was based on the collective experience of the task group. The protective clothing and equipment is generally based on determination of estimated exposure levels.

In several cases where the risk of an arc flash incident is considered low, very low, or extremely low by the task group, the hazard/risk category number has been reduced by 1, 2, or 3 numbers, respectively. The collective experience of the task group is that in most cases closed doors do not provide enough protection to eliminate the need for PPE for instances where the state of the equipment is known to readily change (e.g., doors open or closed, rack in or rack out). The premise used by the Task Group is considered to be reasonable, based on the consensus judgment of the full NFPA 70E Technical Committee.

FPN No. 2: Both larger and smaller available short-circuit currents could result in higher available arc flash energies. If the available short-circuit current increases without a decrease in the opening time of the overcurrent protective device, the arc flash energy will increase. If the available short-circuit current decreases, resulting in a longer opening time for the overcurrent protective device, arc flash energies could also increase.

FPN No. 3: Energized electrical conductors or circuit parts that operate at less than 50 volts may need to be deenergized to satisfy an “electrically safe work condition.” Consideration should be given to the capacity of the source, any overcurrent protection between the energy source and the worker, and whether the work task related to the source operating at less than 50 volts increases exposure to electrical burns or to explosion from an electric arc.

FPN No. 4: See 130.1(B)(2)(6) for requirements on documenting the available short-circuit current and fault clearing time.

Table 130.7(C)(9) Table D.X1 Hazard/Risk Category Classifications and Use of Rubber Insulating Gloves and Insulating Hand Tools

[The content of existing table 130.7(C)(9) and the associated notes remain the same]

(10) D.X2 Protective Clothing and Personal Protective Equipment Matrix.

Once the Hazard/Risk Category has been identified from Table 130.7(C)(9) (including associated notes) and the requirements of 130.7(C)(9), Table 130.7(C)(10) shall be used to determine the required PPE for the task. Table 130.7(C)(10) D.X2 lists the requirements for protective clothing and other protective equipment based on Hazard/Risk Category numbers 0 through 4. This clothing and equipment shall be used when working within the Arc Flash Protection Boundary.

Once the Hazard/Risk Category has been identified in Table D.X1 by following the method indicated in D.X1, Table D.X2 is used to determine the PPE for the task(s). The protective clothing and other protective equipment for Hazard/Risk Category numbers 0 through 4 listed in Table D.X2 is based on the

70E-137

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E requirements of this standard. This standard requires that such clothing and equipment be used when working within the Arc Flash Protection Boundary (see 130.7(C)(1)).

FPN No. 1: See Annex H for a suggested simplified approach to ensure adequate PPE for electrical workers within facilities with large and diverse electrical systems.

FPN No. 2: The PPE requirements of listed in this section are is intended to protect a person from arc flash and shock hazards. While some situations could result in burns to the skin, even with the protection described in Table 130.7(C)(10) D.X2, burn injury should be reduced and survivable. Due to the explosive effect of some arc events, physical trauma injuries could occur. The PPE requirements of listed in this section do not address protection against physical trauma other than exposure to the thermal effects of an arc flash.

Table 130.7(C)(10) Table D.X2 Protective Clothing and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

[The content of existing table 130.7(C)(10) and the associated notes remain the same except as noted]

Notes:

1. See Table 130.7(C)(11) D.X3. Arc rating for a garment or system of garments is expressed in cal/cm2.

2. If the use of rubber insulating gloves with leather protectors are required indicated by Table 130.7(C)(9) D.X1, additional leather or arc-rated gloves are not required necessary. The combination of rubber insulating gloves with leather protectors satisfies the arc flash protection requirements of 130.7 within the limits of Table D.X2 (e.g. up to 40 calories/cm2).

(11) D.X3 Protective Clothing Characteristics.

Table 130.7(C)(11) lists examples of protective clothing systems and typical characteristics, including the degree of protection, for various clothing. The protective clothing selected for the corresponding Hazard/Risk Category number determined from Table 130.7(C)(9) (including associated notes) and the requirements of 130.7(C)(9) shall have an arc rating of at least the value listed in the last column of Table 130.7(C)(11).

Table D.X3 lists examples of protective clothing systems and typical characteristics, including the degree of protection, for various clothing. In order to comply with the requirements of this document the protective clothing selected for the corresponding Hazard/Risk Category number determined from Table D.X1, by following the method indicated in D.X1, must have an arc rating of at least the value listed in the last column of Table D.X3.

FPN: The arc rating for a particular clothing system can be obtained from the FR clothing manufacturer.

Table 130.7(C)(11) Table D.X3 Protective Clothing Characteristics

[The content of existing table 130.7(C)(11) and the associated notes remain the same]

Item 3 of proposal: Editorial changes made to sections referencing sections 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10) and 130.7(C)(11) and Tables 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)

(10) and 130.7(C)(11)]

Article 100 Definitions

Arc flash hazard.

FPN No. 2: See Table 130.7(C)(9) D.X1 for examples of activities that could pose an arc flash hazard.

130.1(B)(2) Elements of work permit

(8) The necessary personal protective equipment to safely perform the assigned task [130.3(B) and 130.7(C) 130.7(C)(9), and Table 130.7(C)(9).]

130.7(C)(6) Hand and arm protection

FPN: Table 130.7(C)(9) provides further information on identifying D.X1 provides guidance to identify tasks where rubber insulating gloves are required.

130.7(C)(15) Clothing and Other Apparel Not Permitted.

Exception No. 1: Nonmelting, flammable (non-FR) materials shall be permitted to be used as underlayers to FR clothing, as described in 130.7(C)(14), and also shall be permitted to be used for Hazard/Risk Category 0 as described in Table 130.7(C)(10).

Annex H Simplified, Two-Category, Flame-Resistant (FR) Clothing System

This annex is not a part of the requirements of this NFPA document but is included for informational purposes only.

H.1 Use of Simplified Approach.

The use of Table H.1 is suggested as a simplified approach to provide minimum personal protective equipment for electrical workers within facilities with large and diverse electrical systems. The clothing listed in Table H.1 fulfills the minimum FR clothing requirements of Table 130.7(C)(9) and Table 130.7(C)(10). The clothing systems listed in this table should be used with the other PPE appropriate for the Hazard/Risk Category. [See Table 130.7(C)(10).] The notes at the bottom of Table 130.7(C)(9) must apply as shown in that table. The notes associated with the use of Table D.X1 also apply to the use of this table.

The use of Table H.1 is suggested as a simplified approach to provide minimum personal protective equipment for electrical workers within facilities with large and diverse electrical systems. The clothing listed in Table H.1 is derived from the Hazard/Risk Category method of Table D.X1 and Table D.X2. The clothing systems listed in this table should be used with the other PPE appropriate for the Hazard/Risk Category listed in Table D.X2. The notes associated with the use of Table D.X1 also apply to the use of this table.

Table H.1 Simplified two –category flame-resistant (FR) clothing systems

Applicable Tasks

All Hazard/Risk Category 1, 2 and 2* tasks listed in Table 130.7(C)(9)b

a Note other PPE required for the specific tasks listed in Tables 130.7(C)(9) D.X1 and 130.7(C)(10) D.X2, which include arc-rated face shields or arc flash suit hoods, FR hardhat liners, safety glasses or safety goggles, hard hat, hearing protection, leather gloves, voltage-rated gloves, and voltage-rated tools. Arc rating for a garment is expressed in cal/cm2.b The assumed short-circuit current capacities and fault clearing times for various tasks are listed in the text and notes to Table 130.7(C)(9) D.X1. Do not use this method for tasks not listed, or for power systems with greater than the assumed short-circuit capacity or with longer than the assumed fault clearing times, an arc flash hazard analysis shall be required in accordance with 130.3.

Index

Arc flash suit 130.7(C)(5), Table 130.7(C)(10) Table D.X2, 130.7(C)(13)(a), 130.7(C)(16)

Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the full CSA Z462 Workplace Electrical Safety Technical Committee. The standard should not permit only one of two methods to determine arc flash PPE when other methods may be equally effective or more effective. The Standard should specify the outcome of a method rather than a method. This is already currently done: “130.3 Arc Flash Hazard Analysis. An arc flash hazard analysis shall determine the Arc Flash Protection Boundary and the personal protective equipment that people within the Arc Flash Protection Boundary shall use.“ Additionally, the requirements of Section 130.7 are more than adequate to specify the outcome of any PPE selection method. Users of the document can consult Annex D (or other Annex) for methods of estimating incident energy or determining appropriate levels of PPE, or use another equally effective method. It must be noted that some users of the document understand the term “arc flash hazard analysis” to require an incident energy analysis per (130.3(B)(1). This is not correct. As currently defined, an arc flash hazard analysis is “a study investigating a worker’s potential exposure to arc-flash energy, conducted for the purpose of injury prevention and the determination of safe work practices, arc flash protection boundary, and the appropriate levels of PPE.” Both the incident energy analysis method and the hazard/risk category method involves investigating a worker’s potential exposure to arc flash energy for the purposes of determining appropriate levels of PPE. With reference to the hazard/risk category method it states in 130.7(C)(9) FPN No. 1: “The protective clothing and equipment is generally based on determination of estimated exposure levels.” The estimated exposure levels are noted in the NFPA 2003 Report on Proposals (see 70E-98-Part 2, Table 3-3.9.1 pages 236 to 244). The specific notes for Table 130.7(C)(9) reference some of these exposure levels. [http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/PDF/ROP/70E-A2003-rop.pdf] Conclusion: The hazard/risk category method is but one method of determining potential exposure levels and arc flash PPE. An incident energy analysis is another method. None of the calculation methods are found in the body of the standard, they are all in Annex D, therefore, the Hazard/Risk category method should likewise be located in the Annex. It must be recognized that there are issues with both methods:

70E-138

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E · The hazard/risk category method is not a transparently scientific method. The reduction in levels of PPE employed in the method is not based on accepted risk management principles found in ANSI Z10 or ISO Z31000. · The incident energy analysis method is not 100% accurate, but it is based on the best empirical evidence we have at this time. Other methods that would be equally effective include: · Tables of incident energy values based on maximum fault current and system voltage, such as that found in Annex D.8 · Tables that define two levels of arc flash PPE based on various voltage levels, fault clearing times and maximum available fault current, such as that found in Annex D.9. · A two tier PPE simplified approach such as that found in Annex H · Other equally effective methods such as incident energy “look-up” tables. Placing the hazard/risk category method in an Annex does not make it less important, anymore than does placing various calculation methods in an Annex make them less important. Placing both methods in the Annexes provides clarity and enhances usability of the document. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee disagrees that Tables 130.7(C)(9), (10) and (11) belong in an Annex simply because calculation methods exist in Annex D. The other methods mentioned in the substantiation are not precluded and may be developed and employed provided they meet the minimum requirements set forth in Article 130. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: PACE, D.: This Proposal should have been Accepted in Principle. The Tables should be moved to an Annex. The calculation methods are in an Annex. By having the Tables in the body of the text places more emphasis on using the Table and sends the signal that using the Tables is the preferred method. Moving the Tables to an Annex is the appropriate approach. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-334 Log #392 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10), and 130.7(C)(11)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Scott Margolin, WESTEX, Inc. Recommendation: Replace all references to Hazard/Risk Category 0 in Tables 130.7(C)(9), (C)(10), and (C)(11) with Hazard/Risk Category 1. Substantiation: HRC 0 permits, and arguably promotes the wearing of non FR clothing by workers exposed to the arc flash hazard. Based on recent research on low voltage arc flash, this can no longer be considered safe or prudent. It is also contrary to committee intent statements in the 2009 revision cycle. HRC 0 was originally predicated on ignition threshold work which indicated that non-FR cotton of sufficient weight would not be expected to ignite in arc flashes below 2 calories. However, research conducted since then has clearly demonstrated that low voltage arc flashes in real equipment pose significantly greater ignition hazards than the arcs used for the ignition threshold work. The arcs generated to examine non FR cotton were the best available at the time, but did not project plasma outward toward the fabric, did not concentrate and focus the energy, had very little molten metal and very little blast component. Recent high speed film of arcs in actual low voltage gear (480V) definitively shown both severe projection and concentration of the arc, almost always directly toward the fabric (or worker), as well as vastly more molten metal, projected by blast force onto and past the fabric. Any one of these four issues can dramatically shift ignition. When the arc focuses and projects, distance calculations become invalid; instead of being at 12 of 18 in. from the arc, the fabric is actually in the arc, which can cause ignition. Molten metal, usually copper, is at least 1900F, and cotton ignites at or below 800 F; this is why the molten metal industry are all in FR clothing. The copper alone can cause ignition of cotton regardless of arc incident energy or direction, and significant volumes of molten metal are created in arcs of any energy level, including > 1 cycle and > 1 cal. The second set of issues involve the fabric itself; as tested the cotton was new and clean. However, over time non-FR cotton fabrics lose mass to wear, due to laundering and linting. Lighter cotton will ignite at lower energies. Over time, non-FR fabrics also tend to accumulate flammable contaminants, especially fabric softener. This also has the potential to dramatically reduce ignition thresholds. Any single one of the above variables can shift non-FR cotton to ignition. Recent research has shown beyond doubt that most or all of these variables are in play in virtually every arc in the real world, and repeatedly cause non-FR garments, including 100 percent cotton, to ignite. We have learned that non-FR cotton can never be reasonable claimed to be safe in an arc flash. Non-FR cotton is not an upgrade over synthetic blends; it ignites just as easily, burns hotter, is harder to extinguish, and is typically heavier, meaning more fuel and a longer fire. 70E should not permit or endorse the intentional wearing of flammable garments by workers who have an arc flash hazard. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The submitter has not provided adequate technical substantiation, including specific test data, to support completely eliminating

all HRC 0 tasks. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We recommend changing any HRC 0 to HRC 1 in each instance where employees are exposed to energized electrical equipment or circuit parts that are not in an electrically safe work condition including, but not limited to, when covers are off, doors are open, or covers are being removed. REGE, T.: Committee action was correct. Elimination of HRC 0 would have meant that cotton clothing was never allowed for electrical work. It is well known that the use of cotton clothing in low risk situations has provided adequate protection and should be allowed to continue. WILMER, K.: Committee action was correct. Elimination of HRC 0 would have meant that cotton clothing was never allowed for electrical work. It is well known that the use of cotton clothing in low risk situations has provided adequate protection and should be allowed to continue. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-335 Log #28 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.7(C)(9) through (11)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Charles Helmick, AVO Training Institute, Inc. Recommendation: Move all of the tables and information in 130.7(C)(9)-(11) to Annex P. Renumber (12)-(16). (9) Selection of Personal Protective Equipment. When required for Various Tasks. Personal protective equipment must be selected based on results of hazard analysis for shock hazard and arc flash hazard. Where a hazard analysis has not been done such as in the case of contractors working on site or workers collecting data for the analysis, the tables and information in Annex P may be used within the parameters of the accompanying NOTES as an interim measure to provide personal protective equipment for workers. Substantiation: The problem is that some people are of the opinion that the task tables are exhaustive in their scope to perform an arc flash analysis. The shock analysis is based on known nominal voltages. The arc flash analysis is based on known fault currents and clearing times. The tables are based on assumptions of fault current and clearing times which are, at best, an interim measure until the actual fault currents and clearing times can be determined by an analysis. It should also be noted that an analysis will provide information for an arc flash boundary whereas Annex D is rarely used with the Tables to determine needed information. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Inadequate technical substantiation has been provided for moving the tables to an annex. Tables 130. 7(C)(9), (C)(10), and (C)(11) can be used within the limits of parameters included in the tables. See committee action on Proposal 70E-331 where notes were moved into the tables. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: WILMER, K.: Committee action should be Reject. The action will require use of balaclava for Hazard Risk Category 2 work. Use of hard hat and face shield alone will not be allowed. Hard hat and face shield have been known to provide adequate protection alone. Requiring the use of a balaclava under the hard hat for this work is unnecessary. HRC 2* should be retained so employees can continue to wear hard hat and face shield alone for HRC2 and hard hat/face shield/balaclava for higher risk HRC 2* work. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-336 Log #196 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.7(C)(9), FPN 1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Daleep C. Mohla, DCM Electrical Consulting Services, Inc. Recommendation: Revise FPN No. 1 as follows: FPN No. 1: The work tasks and protective equipment identified in Table 130.7(C)(9) were identified by a task group and the protective clothing and equipment selected was based on the collective experience of the task group. The protective clothing and equipment is generally based on determination of estimated exposure levels. In several cases where the risk of an arc flash incident is considered low, very low, or extremely low by the task group, the hazard/risk category number has been reduced by 1, 2, or 3 numbers, respectively. The collective experience of the task group is that in most cases closed doors do not provide enough protection to eliminate the need for PPE for instances where the state of the equipment is known to readily change (e.g., doors open or closed, rack in or rack out). The premise used by the Task Group is considered to be reasonable, based on the consensus judgment of the full NFPA 70E Technical Committee.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Substantiation: Risk of occurrence does not reduce the severity of injury. Arc flash hazard intensity will be the same whether the risk is low or extremely low. That should not reduce the level of protection needed. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The current text provides recognition of the risk assessment element that is a component of the tasks included in the tables. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. However, I have the following comment on the committee statement for this action: Proposals 70E-184, 70E-317, 70E-336, and 70E-338 provide technical substantiation that reducing the level of protection based on (1) lower probability of occurrence or (2) the presence of covers is inappropriate. The committee continues to use nontechnical justifications, such as “risk is a component of the task based tables.” The fact that it is a component does not justify that risk should be used to lower protection. The likelihood that an arc flash will occur is not relevant to how much protection should be provided but only to whether protection should be required at all. The committee has not explained in technical terms how an employee wearing clothing insufficient for the heat energy will be protected when a low-probability event does occur. Committee experience and opinion is insufficient justification in the face of the technical substantiation from these submitters. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-337 Log #399 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.7(C)(9), FPN 1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas E. Neal, Neal Associates Ltd. Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: FPN No. 1: The work tasks and protective equipment identified in Table 130.7(C)(9) were identified by a task group and the protective clothing and equipment selected was based on the collective experience of the task group. The protective clothing and equipment is generally based on determination of estimated exposure levels. In several cases where the risk of an arc flash incident is considered low, very low, or extremely low by the task group, the hazard/risk category number has been reduced by 1, 2, or 3 numbers, respectively. The collective experience of the task group is that in most cases closed doors do not provide enough protection to eliminate the need for PPE for instances where the state of the equipment is known to readily change (e.g., doors open or closed, rack in or rack out). A reduction in the hazard/risk category number is based on the assumption that the equipment is properly installed and maintained (see Arc Flash Hazard definition FPN No. 1). The premise used by the Task Group is considered to be reasonable, based on the consensus judgment of the full NFPA 70E Technical Committee. Substantiation: Implicit in the reduction in hazard/risk category numbers in Table 130.7(C)(9) is that the equipment be properly installed and maintained, however, nowhere is that stated. Issue # 1: When equipment is not properly installed, and particularly when it is not properly maintained, then the expected fault clearing times may significantly exceed what is expected resulting in an exposure level in excess of the “estimated exposure levels” noted in paragraph 1 of FPN under 130.7(C)(9). Issue # 2: As explained in 130.7(C)(9) FPN No. 1 paragraph two, the hazard/risk category number has been reduced “where the risk of an arc flash incident is considered low, very low, or extremely low by the task group.” The risk, or probability, of an arc flash event occurring will change when equipment is not in proper operating condition due to lack of or improper maintenance. This needs to be articulated for the protection of the worker using the hazard/risk category method. According to the Heid, Widup paper presented at the 2008 IEEE IAS Electrical safety Workshop, a survey was conducted of field testing results for low- and medium-voltage circuit breakers and related components. The results were obtained from InterNational Electrical Testing Association (NETA) accredited companies in the United States and Canada. The results yielded data of approximately 340,000 electrical protective devices under field test. Based on the results of the survey, approximately 22% of the circuit breakers tested (Question No. 3) had an issue affecting the protective device operation. On average, 10.5% of the devices did not function at all when tested. A statement indicating the relationship of proper maintenance and installation to the reduction hazard/risk category numbers provides clarity and transparency to users of the document. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: There are multiple factors that are included in performing the risk assessment and it is not possible to enumerate all of the factors in this fine print note. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A.

Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We agree that the protection needs to be based on properly maintained equipment. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-338 Log #490 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.7(C)(9) and Table 130.7(C)(9), FPN 1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas E. Neal, Neal Associates Ltd. Recommendation: 130.7(C)(9) FPN No. 1: The work tasks and protective equipment identified in Table 130.7(C)(9) were identified by a task group and the protective clothing and equipment selected was based on the collective experience of the task group. The protective clothing and equipment is generally based on determination of estimated exposure levels. In several cases where the risk of an arc flash incident is considered low, very low, or extremely low by the task group, the hazard/risk category number has been reduced by 1 or 2, 2, or 3 numbers, respectively. The collective experience of the task group is that in most cases closed doors do not provide enough protection to eliminate the need for PPE for instances where the state of the equipment is known to readily change (e.g., doors open or closed, rack in or rack out). The premise used by the Task Group is considered to be reasonable, based on the consensus judgment of the full NFPA 70E Technical Committee. (See table on the following pages.)

Substantiation: As noted in FPN No. 1 of 130.7(C)(9), based on low, very low and extremely low levels of risk that an arc flash incident will occur, the H/RC number can be reduced by up to 3 numbers which means that an H/RC4 incident energy exposure of up to 40 cal/cm2 could show up in Table 130.7(C)(9) as an H/RC1 which would indicate protective clothing and equipment have an arc rating of at least 4 (cal/cm2). The intent of this proposal is to modify the practice of reducing the H/RC number so that the maximum reduction is 2 numbers instead of 3 numbers. A recent study of the performance of arc rated clothing and equipment in real arc flash accidents indicates that in several cases, worker have been injured because they selected arc rated clothing and equipment based on the Tables method which directed them to select a lower level of protection due to this practice of reducing the H/RC number based on low risk of occurrence of an arc flash incident. A copy of this paper has been provided in support of this proposal. Note: Supporting Material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The substantiation provided does not bear out that injured workers were using the HRC tables or that PPE was chosen with any acceptable method. The available short circuit current and clearing times are not provided. Throughout the data provided, workers in many cases had no protection at all on given parts of the body and received burns as a result. Proper application of the tables requires that the maximum available short circuit current and clearing time are known and the proper HRC and PPE are chosen. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. However, I have the following comment on the committee statement for this action: Proposals 70E-184, 70E-317, 70E-336, and 70E-338 provide technical substantiation that reducing the level of protection based on (1) lower probability of occurrence or (2) the presence of covers is inappropriate. The committee continues to use nontechnical justifications, such as “risk is a component of the task based tables.” The fact that it is a component does not justify that risk should be used to lower protection. The likelihood that an arc flash will occur is not relevant to how much protection should be provided but only to whether protection should be required at all. The committee has not explained in technical terms how an employee wearing clothing insufficient for the heat energy will be protected when a low-probability event does occur. Committee experience and opinion is insufficient justification in the face of the technical substantiation from these submitters. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We look forward to additional substantiation from the submitter in a Comment to this Proposal that will address the concerns of the committee expressed in the committee statement.

70E-140




Hazard/ Risk Category

Rubber Insulating Gloves

Insulated and Insulating Hand Tools

Panelboards or Other Equipment Rated 240 V and Below — Note 1


1 N N

Circuit breaker (CB) or fused switch operation with covers on 1 N N

CB or fused switch operation with covers off 1 N N

Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing 1 Y Y

Remove/install CBs or fused switches 1 Y Y

Removal of bolted covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts)

1 N N

Opening hinged covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) 1 N N


1 Y Y



1 N N

CB or fused switch operation with covers on 1 N N

CB or fused switch operation with covers off 2 Y N

Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing 2* Y Y


2* Y Y

Proposal 70E-338 (Log #490)

70E-141


600 V Class Motor Control Centers (MCCs) — Note 2 (except as indicated)


2 N N

CB or fused switch or starter operation with enclosure doors closed 1 N N

Reading a panel meter while operating a meter switch 1 N N

CB or fused switch or starter operation with enclosure doors open 2 N N

Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing 2* Y Y

Work on control circuits with energized electrical conductors and circuit parts 120 V or below, exposed

0 Y Y

Work on control circuits with energized electrical conductors and circuit parts >120 V, exposed

2* Y Y

Insertion or removal of individual starter “buckets” from MCC — Note 4

4 Y N

Application of safety grounds, after voltage test 3 Y N

Removal of bolted covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) — Note 4

4* N N

Opening hinged covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) — Note 4

2 N N


2* Y Y

600 V Class Switchgear (with power circuit breakers or fused switches) — Notes 5


3 N N

CB or fused switch operation with enclosure doors closed 2 N N

Reading a panel meter while operating a meter switch 0 N N

CB or fused switch operation with enclosure doors open 2 N N

Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing 3 Y Y


0 Y Y


3 Y Y

Insertion or removal (racking) of CBs from cubicles, doors open or closed]

4 N N

Application of safety grounds, after voltage test 3 Y N

Removal of bolted covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts)

4 N N

Opening hinged covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) 3 N N


70E-142


Other 600 V Class (277 V through 600 V, nominal) Equipment — Note 2 (except as indicated)Lighting or small power transformers (600 V, maximum) — — — Removal of bolted covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts)

2* N N

Opening hinged covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts)

2 N N

Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing

2* Y Y

Application of safety grounds, after voltage test 2* Y NRevenue meters (kW-hour, at primary voltage and current) — — — Insertion or removal 2* Y NCable trough or tray cover removal or installation 2 N NMiscellaneous equipment cover removal or installation 2 N NWork on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing

2* Y Y

Application of safety grounds, after voltage test 2* Y NInsertion or removal of plug-in devices into or from busways 2* Y NNEMA E2 (fused contactor) Motor Starters, 2.3 kV Through 7.2 kVPerform infrared thermography and other non-contact inspections outside the restricted approach boundary

4 N N

Contactor operation with enclosure doors closed 1 N NReading a panel meter while operating a meter switch 0 N NContactor operation with enclosure doors open 3 N NWork on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing

4 Y Y


0 Y Y


4 Y Y

Insertion or removal (racking) of starters from cubicles, doors open or closed

4 N N

Application of safety grounds, after voltage test 4 Y NRemoval of bolted covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conduc-tors and circuit parts)

4 N N

Opening hinged covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts)

4 N N

Insertion or removal (racking) of starters from cubicles of arc-resistant construction, tested in accordance with IEEE C37.20.7, doors closed only

1 N N


70E-143

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-339 Log #72 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (130.7(C)(9), FPN 2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Palmer L. Hickman, NJATC Recommendation: Relocate 130.7(C)(9) FPN No. 2 as 130.3 FPN No. 2 and renumber existing 130.3 FPN No. 2 as 130.3 FPN No. 3. Substantiation: The information presently located in 130.7(C)(9) FPN No. 2 applies generally to arc flash hazard analysis and not only to Table 130.7(C)(9). Accordingly, this important information should be relocated in 70E as a fine print note to 130.3. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-340 Log #357 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (130.7(C)(9), FPN 3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Louis A. Barrios, Shell / Rep. API (American Petroleum Institute) Recommendation: Delete FPN No. 3 in 130.7(C)(9). Substantiation: FPN No. 3 in 130.7(C)(9) suggests that energized electrical conductors or circuit parts that operate less than 50V may need to be deenergized in order to satisfy an “electrically safe work condition” depending on the short circuit capacity of the source, location of protective devices and whether there is increased exposure to electrical burns or to explosion from an electric arc. This FPN is more appropriately located in 130.1(A) where the “Less than 50V” exception for deenergization is located and not in the section addressing arc flash protection. However, when placed under 130.1(A)(3), which addresses electrical conductors and circuit parts that operate less than 50V, you’ll notice that the provisions in the FPN are already addressed in this section as a result of modifications made during the NFPA 70E 2009 revision cycle. Therefore, FPN No. 3 in 130.7(C)(9) is no longer needed and should be deleted. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-341 Log #135 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (130.7(C)(9), FPN 4) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Dale Edwin Scherry, Scherry Engineering and Consulting, Inc. Recommendation: FPN No.4 See 130.1(B)(2)(6) for requirements on documenting the available short-circuit current and fault clearing time. OR (Include the appropriate reference.) Substantiation: The reference to 130.1(B)(2)(6) refers to “Results of the arc flash hazard analysis (130.3)” This reference is not correct for short circuit or fault clearing time. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Committee Statement: The committee has deleted the text as shown in the submitter’s first recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We suggest that the correct action is accept in principle since the submitter gave two choices and the committee selected on of the in their action on proposal 70E-201. In addition, the committee should have added a note indicating that they did not necessarily agree with all of the substantiation of the submitter.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-342 Log #489 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.7(C)(9) Note, Note h (New)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas E. Neal, Neal Associates Ltd. Recommendation: Add Note “h” to Table 130.7 (C)(9) to read as follows: h. If the task involves an arc hazard within an enclosure and the conductors are vertical and terminate into a resistive element, or the conductors are horizontal and are configured to point out of the enclosure opening, add one number to the H/RC number. These conductor configurations are known to create higher than expected incident energy. This note applies to all tasks listed in Table 130.7(C)(9) for which the arc flash hazard is within an enclosure and the equipment meets the above conductor configuration description. Substantiation: Statement/Substantiation: Testing conducted at the Ferraz Shawmut Laboratory by Michael Lang et. al. has been reported which indicate that the plasma rich exposures from the two conductor configurations cited in the proposal exceed the incident energy values that would be determined by available hazard analysis equations or software. Three papers are attached which describe research conducted on these conductor configurations. Note: Supporting Material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The substantiation does not support the comprehensive changes to HRC categories for all levels of equipment recommended by the submitter. The HRC tables are not based exclusively on incident energy calculations. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: I support the action to Reject this proposal. The requirements would vary widely, based on the actual conductor configuration within the equipment. No recommendation was proposed for situations where the existing Hazard/Risk Category listing is “4” and would be increased by one number to “5,” which does not exist. Adding the proposed note would decrease the usability and practicality of the table. HICKMAN, P.: We look forward to additional substantiation from the submitter in a Comment to this Proposal that will address the concerns of the committee expressed in the committee statement. The submitter has provided important information that should not be overlooked because the Technical Committee determined that adequate substantiation had not been provided. We find the substantiation persuasive and the implications worthy of note. It is extremely important that the proposed text “If the task involves an arc hazard within an enclosure and the conductors are vertical and terminate into a resistive element, or the conductors are horizontal and are configured to point out of the enclosure opening…” and that “These conductor configurations are known to create higher than expected incident energy” from the submitter not be ignored as this calls into question the protection provided by the associated HRC. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-343 Log #136 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.7(C)(9) Note 1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Dale Edwin Scherry, Scherry Engineering and Consulting, Inc. Recommendation: (1) Revise Note 1 to Note 1A. Maximum of 25kA 50kA short circuit current available; maximum of 0.03 sec (2 cycles) 0.16 sec (10 cycles) fault clearing time. (2) Revise a portion of Table 130.7(C(9) as shown on the following page.: Substantiation: The 2-cycle constraint is too restrictive for system coordination. To permit coordination, the protective device protecting the bus and the feeder protective devices, should be set above the instantaneous settings portion of the feeder protective devices, fuses or breakers. See the “208V Pnl Spreadsheet” submitted which provides the Incident Energy for 208V panels derived from 1584 calculation method. (Detailed 1584 calculations are available upon request.) Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The “table method” is intended for use on systems where an incident energy analysis has not been performed. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

70E-144


_______________________________________________________________ 70E-344 Log #137 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.7(C)(9) Note 1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Dale Edwin Scherry, Scherry Engineering and Consulting, Inc. Recommendation: (1) Change Note 1 to Note 1B. Maximum of 25kA 50kA short circuit current available; maximum of 0.03 sec (2 cycles) 0.25 sec (15 cycles) fault clearing time. (2) Revise a portion of Table 130.7(C(9) as follows:

Substantiation: The 2-cycle constraint is too restrictive for system coordination. To permit coordination, the protective device protecting the bus and feeder protective devices, should be set above the instantaneous settings portion of the feeder protective devices, fuses or breakers. See the “Swbd Spreadsheet” submitted which provides the incident energy for 480V Switchboards derived from 1584 calculation method. (Detailed 1584 calculations are available upon request.) Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The “table method” is intended for use on systems where an incident energy analysis has not been performed. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

Table 130.7(C)(9) Hazard/Risk Category Classifications and Use of Rubber Insulating Gloves and Insulated and Insulating Hand ToolsTasks Performed on Energized Equipment Hazard/Risk Category

Panelboards or Other Equipment Rated 240V and Below - Note 1 1A


0 1

Circuit breaker (CB) or fused switch operation with covers on 0

CB or fused switch operation with covers off 0 2

Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing 1 2*

Remove/install CBs or fused switches

1 2*

Removal of bolted covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) 1 2

Opening hinged covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) 0 1


1


Tasks Performed on Energized Equipment Hazard/Risk CategoryPanelboards or Switchboards Rated >240V and up to 600V (with molded case or insulated case circuit breakers) – Note 1-1BPerform infrared thermography and other non-contact inspections outside the restricted approach boundary

1 2

CB or fused switch operation with covers on 0

CB or fused switch operation with covers off 1 3

Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing 2 3


2*

70E-145

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-345 Log #140 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.7(C)(9) Note 2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Dale Edwin Scherry, Scherry Engineering and Consulting, Inc. Recommendation: (1) Revise Note 2 as follows: Note 2. Maximum of 65kA 50kA short circuit current available; maximum of 0.03 sec (2 cycles) 0.25 sec (15 cycles) fault clearing time. (2) Revise a portion of Table 130.7(C(9) as follows:

Substantiation: The 2-cycle constraint is too restrictive for system coordination. To permit coordination, the protective device protecting the bus and feeder protective devices, should be set above the instantaneous settings portion of the feeder protective devices, fuses or breakers. See the “Other 600V Spreadsheet” submitted which provides the incident energy for 600V Equipment derived from 1584 calculation method. (Detailed 1584 calculations are available upon request.) Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The “table method” is intended for use on systems where an incident energy analysis has not been performed. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

Table 130.7(C)(9) Hazard/Risk Category Classifications and Use of Rubber Insulating Gloves and Insulated and Insulating Hand ToolsTasks Performed on Energized Equipment Hazard/Risk Category

Other 600 V Class (277 V through 600 V, nominal Equipment – Note 2 (except as indicated)

Lighting or small power transformers (600 V, Maximum)

Removal of bolted covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) 2* 3

Opening hinged covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) 1 2*

Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts including voltage testing 2* 3

Application of safety grounds, after voltage test 2* 3

Revenue meters (kW-hour, at primary voltage and current) Insertion or removal 2* 3

Cable trough or tray cover removal or installation 1

Miscellaneous equipment cover removal or installation 1

Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing 2* 3


Insertion or removal of plug-in devices into or from busways 2* 3

70E-146

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-346 Log #138 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.7(C)(9) Note 2 and 3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Dale Edwin Scherry, Scherry Engineering and Consulting, Inc. Recommendation: (1) Revise Note 2 as follows: Note 2. Maximum of 65kA 50kA short circuit current available; maximum of 0.03 sec (2 cycles) 0.25 sec (15 cycles) fault clearing time. (2) Revise Note 3 as follows: Note 3. Maximum of 42kA 50kA short circuit current available; maximum of 0.33 sec (20 cycles) fault clearing time. (3) Revise a portion of Table 130.7(C(9) as follows:

Substantiation: The 2-cycle constraint is too restrictive for system coordination. To permit coordination, the protective device protecting the bus and feeder protective devices should be set above the instantaneous settings portion of the feeder protective devices, fuses or breakers. See the “MCC Spreadsheet” submitted which provides the incident energy for 480V MCC’s derived from 1584 calculation method. (Detailed 1584 calculations are available upon request.) Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The “table method” is intended for use on systems where an incident energy analysis has not been performed. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.


Tasks Performed on Energized Equipment Hazard/Risk Category600V Class Motor Control Centers (MCCs) – Note 2 (except as indicated)

Perform infrared thermography and other non-contact inspections outside the restrict-ed approach boundary

1 2

CB or fused switch or starter operation with enclosure doors closed 0


CB or fused switch or starter operation with enclosure doors open 1 3

Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including a voltage testing 2* 3

Work on control circuits with energized electrical conductors and circuit parts 120V or below, exposed

0 1

Work on control circuits with energized electrical conductors and circuit parts > 120V, exposed

2* 3

Insertion or removal of individual starter “buckets” from MCC- Note 3 4


Removal of bolted covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) – Note 3

4

Opening hinged covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) – Note 3

1 2*


2*

70E-147

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-347 Log #139 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.7(C)(9) Note 4) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Dale Edwin Scherry, Scherry Engineering and Consulting, Inc. Recommendation: (1) Revise Note 4 as follows: Note 4. Maximum of 35kA 50kA short circuit current available; maximum of 0.5 sec (30 cycles) 0.33 sec (20 cycles) fault clearing time. (2) Revise a portion of Table 130.7(C(9) as follows:

Substantiation: To be more consistent with other recommended changes to 600V equipment. To permit coordination, the protective device protecting the bus and feeder protective devices should be set above the instantaneous settings portion of the feeder protective devices, fuses or breakers. See the “480V Swgr Spreadsheet” submitted which provides the incident energy for 480V Swgr derived from 1584 calculation method. (Detailed 1584 calculations are available upon request.) Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The “table method” is intended for use on systems where an incident energy analysis has not been performed. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.


Tasks Performed on Energized Equipment Hazard/Risk Category600 V Class Switchgear (with power circuit breakers or fused switches) - Note 4


2

CB or fused switch operation with enclosure doors closed 0


CB or fused switch operation with enclosure doors open 1 3

Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing 2* 3


0

Work on control circuit with energized electrical conductors and circuit parts > 120 V, exposed

2* 3

Insertion or removal (racking) of CBs from cubicles, doors open or closed 4 3

Application of Safety grounds, after voltage test 2*

Removal of bolted covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) 4* 3


70E-148

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-347a Log #CP12 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (Table 130.7(C)(9)(2) New) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Electrical Safety in the Workplace, Recommendation: Renumber existing Table 130.7(C)(9) as Table 130.7(C)(9)(1) and add a new Table 130.7(C)(9)(2)

Substantiation: This proposal is the work of NFPA 70E 2012 DC Hazards Task Group whose members include: Tom Carpenter, Jim Coady, Gary Dreifuerst, Dan Doan, Lloyd Gordon, Bobby Gray, Mike Hittel, Hugh Hoagland, Greg Leask, Mark Ode, and PK Sen. There is no information for dc hazards in the standard which gives usable guidance. This proposal provides tasks associated with dc hazards using the best available technical information as shown in referenced documents. This following technical papers were used in developing this table: 1. DC Arc Models and Incident Energy Calucations Copyright Material IEEE Paper No. PCIC-2009-7 2. Arc Flash Calculations for Exposures to DC Systems Copyright Material IEEE Paper No. ESW2007-19 3. DC Arc Hazard Assessment Phase II Copyright Material Kinectrics Inc. Report No. K-012623-RA-0002-R00 Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Negative: 1

Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HICKMAN, P.: We are concerned that adequate technical substantiation has not been provided to accept this recommended table. Comment on Affirmative: BOWMAN, W.: The proposed table should be added into the existing Table 130.7(C)(9). They should not be relabeled (C)(9)(1) and (C)(9)(2). Arc Flash information needs to be added into this Table to correspond with similar action taken on previous proposals. GRAY, B.: To correlate with the actions taken in 70E-331 and other proposals, another column must be added to the new table implemented by this committee action. The added column should be Titled: “Arc Flash Boundary” and should contain the following values corresponding to each of the seven identified tasks beginning at the top of the Table: 915 mm (36”); 1.2 m (48”); 1.8 m (72”); 915 mm (36”); 1.2 m (48”); 1.8 m (72”); 2.5 m (96”).


Hazard/RiskCategory

Rubber InsulatingGloves(h)

Insulated andInsulating Hand Tools

Storage Batteries, Direct-Current Switchboards and other DC supply sources >100V <250V Notes 5, 6Work on energized electrical con-ductors and circuit parts,including voltage testing where arcing current is >=1kA and <4kA

1g Y Y

Work on energized electrical con-ductors and circuit parts,including voltage testing where arcing current is >=4kA and <9kA

2g Y Y

Work on energized electrical con-ductors and circuit parts,including voltage testing where arcing current is >=9kA and <15kA.

3g Y Y

Storage Batteries, Direct-Current Switchboards and other DC supply sources >=250V <=600V Notes 5, 6Work on energized electrical con-ductors and circuit parts,including voltage testing where arcing current is >= 1kA and <1.5 kA.

1g Y Y

Work on energized electrical con-ductors and circuit parts,including voltage testing where arcing current is >=1.5 kA and <3 kA.

2g Y Y

Work on energized electrical con-ductors and circuit parts,including voltage testing where arcing current is >=3 kA and <7 kA.

3g Y Y

Work on energized electrical con-ductors and circuit parts,including voltage testing where arcing current is >=7 kA and <10 kA.

4g Y Y

General Notes (applicable to the entire table):

(g) If acid exposure is possible, the clothing shall be protective from acid and arc rated to the hazard according to ASTM F1891 or equivalent and evaluated by ASTM F1296 for acid protection.

(h) In clean rooms or other electrical installations, which cannot allow leather protectors for arc flash exposure, ASTM F496 shall be followed for using rubber insulating gloves without leather protectors and the rubber gloves chosen shall be arc rated to the potential exposure level of the HRC category.

70E-149

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-348 Log #44 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part (Table 130.7(C)(10)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Palmer L. Hickman, NJATC Recommendation: Add “and balaclava (sock hood)” to the list of FR Clothing list for HRC 1 and 2 in Table 130.7(C)(10). Only the text shown as underlined text is the recommendation of this proposal. Hazard/Risk Category 1 FR clothing, Minimum Arc Rating of 4 (Note 1) Arc-rated long-sleeve shirt (Note 3) Arc-rated pants (Note 3) Arc-rated coverall (Note 4) Arc-rated face shield and balaclava (sock hood) or arc flash suit hood (Note 7) Arc-rated jacket, parka, or rainwear (AN) Hazard/Risk Category 2 FR Clothing, minimum Arc Rating of 8 (Note 1) Arc-rated long-sleeve shirt (Note 5) Arc-rated pants (Note 5) Arc-rated coverall (Note 6) Arc-rated face shield and balaclava (sock hood) or arc flash suit hood (Note 7) Arc-rated jacket, parka, or rainwear (AN) Substantiation: This proposal is an attempt to correlate the PPE required in Table 130.7(C)(10) with the requirements in Section 130.7(C)(5) where it is required that all parts of the body be protected by FR if the incident energy is above 1.2 calories per square centimeter. The PPE required for HRC 1 and HRC 2 appears to be less protective than that required by Section 130.7(C)(5) since HRC 1 requires an arc rating of at least 4 and HRC 2 requires an arc rating of at least 8. One could conclude that the back of the head is part of the body, for example, and that the back of the head would not be protected when inside the arc flash protection boundary when PPE is selected from Table 130.7(C)(10) as outlined in the 2009 Edition of NFPA 70E. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle in Part The committee accepts in principles the recommendation for the inclusion of balaclava in HRC 2. and rejects the inclusion of balaclava in HRC 1. Committee Statement: The substantiation does not support the expansion of balaclavas in HRC 1. The committee action on Proposal 70E-355 meets the intent of the recommendation relative to inclusion of balaclavas in HRC 2. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 3 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: This proposal should be rejected. See my comment on Proposal 70E-355. REGE, T.: REJECT- See my comment on 70E-355. WILMER, K.: See my comment on Proposal 70E-355. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We understand that the committee recognizes that arc rated clothing (garments) must be worn on all parts of the body that are within the arc flash boundary (AFB) as required by 130.7(C)(1) and 130.7(C)(5) and suggest that this concept should be incorporated into Tables 130.7(C)(9) and/or 130.7(C)(10) via notes and/or another effective means of communicating this point such as additional text in 130.7(C)(9) and/or 130.7(C)(10). This would include, but not be limited to, the need for a balaclava for HRC 1 when the AFB is greater than the working distance. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-349 Log #45 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (Table 130.7(C)(10)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Palmer L. Hickman, NJATC Recommendation: Delete “FR” from “FR Protective Equipment” in all HRCs in Table 130.7(C)(10). Only the text shown as strikethrough text is the recommendation of this proposal. Hazard/Risk Category 0 FR Protective Equipment Hazard/Risk Category 1 FR Protective Equipment Hazard/Risk Category 2 FR Protective Equipment Hazard/Risk Category 2* FR Protective Equipment Hazard/Risk Category 3 FR Protective Equipment Hazard/Risk Category 4 FR Protective Equipment Substantiation: This proposal is an attempt to make this portion of the table technically correct. While the equipment listed here is protective equipment, it does not seem technically correct that hard hats, safety glasses or safety

goggles, hearing protection (ear canal inserts), leather gloves, and leather work shoes are FR protective equipment. A companion proposal will be submitted to relocate “FR hard hat liner” for HRC 3 and HRC 4 from this protective equipment list up into the FR clothing list where it seems better suited. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: The proposal should be rejected. See my comment on Proposal 70E-355 Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-350 Log #46 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (Table 130.7(C)(10)) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: It was the action of the Technical Correlating Committee that this proposal be reconsidered and correlated with the action taken on Proposal 70E-358. This action will be considered as a public comment. Submitter: Palmer L. Hickman, NJATC Recommendation: Relocate “FR hard hat liner” for HRC 3 and HRC 4 from the “FR protective equipment” list up into the “FR clothing” list in Table 130.7(C)(10). Only the text shown as strikethrough and underlined text is the recommendation of this proposal. Hazard/Risk Category 3 FR Protective Equipment Hard hat FR hard hat liner (AR) Safety glasses or safety goggles (SR) Hearing protection (ear canal inserts) Arc-rated gloves (Note 2) Leather work shoes Hazard/Risk Category 3 FR Clothing, Minimum Arc rating of 25 (Note 1) Arc-rated long-sleeve shirt (AR) (Note 8) Arc-rated pants (AR) (Note 8) Arc-rated coverall (AR) (Note 8) Arc-rated arc flash suit jacket (AR) (Note 8) Arc-rated arc flash suit pants (AR) (Note 8) Arc-rated arc flash suit hood (Note 8) Arc-rated jacket, parka, or rainwear (AN) FR hard hat liner (AR) Hazard/Risk Category 4 FR Protective Equipment Hard hat FR hard hat liner (AR) Safety glasses or safety goggles (SR) Hearing protection (ear canal inserts) Arc-rated gloves (Note 2) Leather work shoes Hazard/Risk Category 4 FR Clothing, Minimum Arc Rating of 40 (Note 1) Arc-rated long-sleeve shirt (AR) (Note 9) Arc-rated pants (AR) (Note 9) Arc-rated coverall (AR) (Note 9) Arc-rated arc flash suit jacket (AR) (Note 9) Arc-rated arc flash suit pants (AR) (Note 9) Arc-rated arc flash suit hood (Note 9) Arc-rated jacket, parka, or rainwear (AN) FR hard hat liner (AR) Substantiation: This proposal is an attempt to make this portion of the table technically correct. Other than the FR hard hat liner, the equipment listed in the protective equipment section, such as hard hat, safety glasses or safety goggles, hearing protection (ear canal inserts), leather gloves, and leather works shoes, does not seem to be FR protective equipment. A companion proposal will be submitted recommending deletion of “FR” from “FR Protective Equipment” in Table 130.7(C)(10) to correlate the action of this recommendation if it is accepted. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

70E-150

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: The action should be an “Accept in Principle.” Change to: “Arc-rated hard hat liner (AR)” instead of FR. HICKMAN, P.: We believe this action was modified by the committee action on 70E-358 and therefore this action should have been an accept in principle. “Hard hat liner was added to the list including arc-rated jacket, parka, or rainwear. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-351 Log #81 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.7(C)(10)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James Durnan, Brookhaven National Laboratory Recommendation: Add new text to read as follows:

Substantiation: Operating 120 volt, 20 Amp circuit breakers in quiet office areas requires hazard/risk category 0 PPE per table 130.7(C)(9). Since arc blast noise is mitigated by 120/240 volt panel cover there is no requirement for ear protection. Adding “As Needed” allows for work place planning to evaluate if hearing protection is needed. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The substantiation does not support the deletion of hearing protection in HRC 0. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: The proposal makes sense for HRC 0 tasks. The 2004 Edition only required hearing protection at HRC 2 and above. I think the change made in 2009 was an over-specification of PPE. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-352 Log #125 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Part (Table 130.7(C)(10)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: E. W. Buss, Mashpee, MA Recommendation: Four Changes as follows: In H/R Cat 1 change as follows: Arc-rated face shield and arc rated balaclava or an arc flash suit hood (Note 7) In H/R Cat 2 change as follows: Arc-rated face shield and arc rated balaclava or an arc flash suit hood (Note 7) Delete H/R Cat 2* Change note 7 as follows: A face shield with arc rating of 4 for H/R1 or 8 for H/R2 with a wrap around guarding to protect not only the face, but also the forehead, ears and neck AND a arc rated balaclava rated 4 or 8 cal/cm**2 (or alternatively, an arc rated arc flash suit hood) is required Substantiation: Some users do not recognize that 130.7(C)(5) includes the head (head is part of the body). This will remind those users that if the back of the head is within the flash protection boundary, it needs to be protected. The movements of a worker do not always insure that the back of the head is facing away from the arc flash. Unless changed, this table is in conflict with 130.7(C)(5) which requires all body parts within the FPB to have FR protection. Since H/R Cat 2 will now include protection for the entire head, H/R Cat 2* can be deleted. This will eliminate the 2* designation confusion. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Part The committee accepts the recommendation for adding “and arc-rated balaclava” for HRC 2 and for deleting HRC 2*. The committee rejects the remainder of the recommendation. Committee Statement: The substantiation does not support the expansion of arc-rated balaclavas in HRC 1. The recommendation for Note 7 does not improve clarity. See the committee action on 70E-355 relative to inclusion of balaclavas in HRC 2 and the deletion of HRC 2*. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: The proposal should be rejected. See my comment on Proposal 70E-355 Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative:

HICKMAN, P.: We recommend changing any HRC 0 to HRC 1 in each instance where employees are exposed to energized electrical equipment or circuit parts that are not in an electrically safe work condition including, but not limited to, when covers are off, doors are open, or covers are being removed. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-353 Log #126 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.7(C)(10)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: E. W. Buss, Mashpee, MA Recommendation: Delete the entire Hazard/Risk Category 0 section of the table Substantiation: H/R Cat 0 exists in 70E 2009 only in the three 130.7(C) Tables. The two sections of the 2004 edition that permitted non-FR clothing [130.7(C)(5) Exception and 130.7(C)(14)(b)] were deleted from the 2009 edition. Section 130.7(C)(5) requires ALL body protection to be FR. Until that is changed, there can be no H/R Cat. 0. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The submitter has not provided adequate technical substantiation, including specific test data, to support completely eliminating all HRC 0 tasks. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We recommend changing any HRC 0 to HRC 1 in each instance where employees are exposed to energized electrical equipment or circuit parts that are not in an electrically safe work condition including, but not limited to, when covers are off, doors are open, or covers are being removed. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-354 Log #131 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (Table 130.7(C)(10)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: E. W. Buss, Mashpee, MA Recommendation: Revise each instance of FR Protective Equipment in the left column as follows: FR Protective Equipment Substantiation: Many users wonder where they can get FR safety glasses, and FR leather work shoes, etc. There are no arc flash testing standards these items of PPE including FR ear canal inserts so they are also not available. If a balaclava is always required for back of head protection, the balaclava may prevent the melting of the ear canal inserts that many users fear. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-355 Log #248 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (Table 130.7(C)(10)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James T. Dollard, Jr., IBEW Local 98 Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 1. Include the requirement for a balaclava in hazard/risk category 2 2. Delete hazard/risk category 2* and note 10. 3. Revise all tasks currently listed as hazard/risk category 2* in Table 130.7(C)9 to hazard/risk category 2. (See Table 130.7(C)(10) on the following page. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the Tables Task Group appointed by NFPA 70E Chairman Dave Dini. The task group consisted of Larry Ayer, Palmer Hickman, Jim White, Ron Widup, Vince Saporita, Daniel Roberts, Mike Doherty, Tom Neal, Paul Dobrowsky, John Luke, David Wallace, Daleep Mohla, Paul Hamer, Eric Glaude and Jim Dollard. The back of the head may not be protected during tasks performed with PPE as listed as hazard/risk category 2. Hazard/risk category 2 should require the use of a balaclava or an arc flash suit hood in order to achieve consistency with the last sentence in 130.3(C)1: “All parts of the body inside the Arc Flash Protection Boundary shall be protected.” Including a balaclava in hazard/risk category 2 makes hazard/risk category 2* redundant. The proposed changes will provide consistency and clarity for users of the document.

Hazard Risk Category 0Protective Clothing, Nonmelting (according to ASTM F 1506-00) or Untreated Natural Fiber FR Protective Equipment

Shirt (long sleeve)Pants (long)Safety Glasses or Safety Goggles (SR)Hearing Protection (ear canal inserts) (AN)Leather Gloves (AN) (Note 2)

70E-151


Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 20 Negative: 3 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: This proposal should be rejected. Substantiation for the change was not provided. Look at the present tasks of Table 130.7(C)(9) associated with “HRC 2.” Do these tasks realistically require a sock hood in addition to an arc-rated face shield? Adding this requirement may lead to blatant non-compliance due to the worker’s perception of excessive PPE for the task. Keep in mind FPN No. 1 of 130.7(A): “FPN No. 1: The PPE requirements of 130.7 are intended to protect a person from arc flash and shock hazards. While some situations could result in burns to the skin, even with the protection selected, burn injury should be reduced and survivable....” REGE, T.: Committee action should be Reject. The action will require use of balaclava for Hazard Risk Category 2 work. Use of hard hat and face shield alone will not be allowed. Hard hat and face shield have been known to provide adequate protection alone. Requiring the use of a balaclava under the hard hat for this work is unnecessary. HRC 2* should be retained so employees can continue to wear hard hat and face shield alone for HRC2 and hard hat/face shield/balaclava for higher risk HRC 2* work. WILMER, K.: Committee action should be Reject. The action will require use of balaclava for Hazard Risk Category 2 work. Use of hard hat and face shield alone will not be allowed. Hard hat and face shield have been known to provide adequate protection alone. Requiring the use of a balaclava under the hard hat for this work is unnecessary. HRC 2* should be retained so employees can continue to wear hard hat and face shield alone for HRC2 and hard hat/face shield/balaclava for higher risk HRC 2* work. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-356 Log #253 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part (Table 130.7(C)(10)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: David A. Pace, Olin Corporation Recommendation: Delete the words “Protective Clothing and PPE” from the title of the second column of the table. Revise the text in the first column for Hazard/Risk Category 0 to read as follows: Protective Clothing, Nonmelting (according to ASTM 1506-00) or Untreated Natural Fiber FR Protective Equipment. Substantiation: Although tests have shown that “Nonmelting (according to ASTM 1506-00) or Untreated Natural Fiber” clothing provides some level of protection in low level events and if worn under FR clothing, the fact remains that it has no arc flash rating and therefore cannot be considered “Protective Clothing”. The existing text implies clothing made from these materials provides protection and is required to be worn to provide this protection. They are listed not because they are required, but rather because clothing from other materials is prohibited from being worn. This text has been interpreted to mean untreated cotton clothing is required and the next question as to how much

protection it provides cannot be answered. Articles such as safety glasses, safety goggles, hearing protection have no arc flash rating and therefore cannot be considered “FR Protective Equipment”. The existing text is also inconsistent with table 130.7(C)(11), for Hazard/Risk Category 0, second column. The title of this column is “Clothing Description” and there is no mention of “Protective” or “FR” in the text. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle in Part The committee action is as follows: 1. The committee accepts the deletion of “FR” in HRC 0. 2. The committee reformats the table by relocating the information in column 1 to column 2. Column 1 will only contain the number of the HRC as seen in the present format of Table 130.7(C)(11). The term “Hazard/Risk Category” is deleted in each row. 3. The committee rejects the deletion of the title to the second column and the deletion of the term Protective in HRC 0. Committee Statement: The committee recognizes that the present table format needs clarification. The committee considers all clothing requirements in 130.7(C)(10) to be protective. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: PACE, D.: This Committee should have been Accepted the deletion of the word “Protective” from the title. The submitter is correct in stating that if clothing does not have an arc flash rating then it cannot be considered as “protective” clothing. The committee statement includes “The committee considers all clothing requirements in 130.7(C)(10) to be protective”. If this is the case, what does the “Nonmelting (according to ASTM 1506-00) or Untreated Natural Fiber Protective Equipment” under the “Protective Clothing” header protect someone from, and to what level of hazard does it protect? Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We understand that the phrase “Hazard/Risk Category” is being deleted everywhere except as the heading of the left hand column and that that phrase will not be relocated from the left column to the right column. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-357 Log #374 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.7(C)(10)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Mike Doherty, Infrastructure Health & Safety Association / Rep. CSA Z462 Technical Committee Recommendation: Delete (AN) for leather gloves in Hazard/Risk Category 0 of Table 130.7(C)(10). Hazard/Risk Category 0 Leather gloves (AN) (Note 2) Substantiation: Although the exposure level for Hazard/Risk Category 0 is intended to be a maximum of 1.2 cal/cm2, this exposure is determined for the worker’s upper torso at a distance of 18 inches from the arc flash hazard. The

Hazard/risk category 2FR Clothing, Minimum Arc Rating of 8 (Note 1) Arc-rated long-sleeve shirt (Note 5)

Arc-rated pants (Note 5)Arc-rated coverall (Note 6)Arc-rated arc flash suit hood; orArc rated faceshield (Note 7) and arc rated balaclavaArc-rated face shield and balaclava or arc flash suit hood (Note 7)Arc rated jacket, parka, or rainwear (AN)

FR protective equipment Hard hatSafety glasses or safety goggles (SR)Hearing protection (ear canal inserts)Leather gloves (Note 2)Leather work shoes

Hazard/Risk Category 2*FR Clothing, Minimum Arc Rating of 8 (Note 1) Arc-rated long-sleeve shirt (Note 5)

Arc-rated pants (Note 5)Arc-rated coverall (Note 6)Arc-rated arc flash suit hood (Note 10)Arc-rated jacket, parka, or rainwear (AN)


Notes:10. Alternate is to use a face shield with a minimum arc rating of 8 and a balaclava (sock hood) with a minimum arc rating of 8 and which covers the face, head and neck except for the eye and nose areas.

70E-152

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E hands of a worker involved in an electrical task will generally be closer than his upper torso so the exposures to his hands will frequently exceed 1.2 cal/cm2. Since the arc flash exposure level increases with the inverse square of the distance, the exposure to the hands at a distance of 9 inches would increase to a maximum of 1.4 cal/cm2. At a distance of 4.5 inches the maximum exposure would increase to over 2 cal/cm2, and at 2.25 inches the maximum exposure would increase to 4.3 cal/cm2. A second or third degree burn to the hands would be expected at any of these closer distances. Hand burns can result in a greater loss of quality of life for a burn victim than burns on many other parts of the body so it is particularly important to protect a worker’s hands. Also, in many cases in Table 130.7(C)(9), Hazard/Risk Category 0 is listed, but the H/RC level has been downgraded by 1, 2 or 3 numbers based on the low risk of an arc flash occurrence so the actual exposures could be up to 25 cal/cm2 or even higher if the hands are closer to the prospective arc flash source than the torso. In addition, NFPA 70E-2009 Article 130.3 (B)(1) shown below recognizes the need for additional PPE for parts of the body that are closer to the arc flash hazard than the distance at which incident energy was determined. The Table should utilize this protection principle relating to closer body parts when assigning PPE. “(1) Incident Energy Analysis. …Recognizing that incident energy increases as the distance from the arc flash decreases, additional PPE shall be used for any parts of the body that are closer than the distance at which the incident energy was determined.” Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The submitter has not substantiated the need for leather gloves for all HRC 0 tasks. There are certain HRC 0 tasks in Table 130.7(C)(9) such as operating a circuit breaker with the covers on, where leather gloves are not deemed necessary. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HALE, L.: The submitters substantiation that in essence the hands are closer and the incident energy will be higher is correct, the committee statement is also correct as this situation does not apply to all level 0 tasks. This should have been accept in principle to acknowledge that higher energy could be available to the hands in some instances but not all instances. PACE, D.: This Proposal should have been Accepted. The submitter is correct. The hands are closer than the body where the arc flash incident energy is calculated. This subjects the hands to greater energy. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: WIDUP, R.: There is no doubt that additional protection in provided by the use of leather gloves, however not all instances may require their use, and in fact may introduce additional hazards. Keeping the requirement “AN” (As Needed) allows for the employee/employer to determine the need. WILMER, K.: Committee action was appropriate. Requiring leather gloves for HRC 0 work is not necessary. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-358 Log #375 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (Table 130.7(C)(10)) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: It was the action of the Technical Correlating Committee that this proposal be reconsidered and correlated with the action taken on Proposal 70E-350. This action will be considered as a public comment. Submitter: Mike Doherty, Infrastructure Health & Safety Association / Rep. CSA Z462 Technical Committee Recommendation: The intent of this proposal is to add FR rated hard hat liners to Hazard/Risk Categories 1, 2 and 2* in Table 130.7(C)(10).

(See Table 130.7(C)(10) on the following page. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the CSA Z462 Workplace Electrical Safety full Technical Committee. Electrical workers should not wear or use materials that create additional risk of injury. When an electrical worker needs to wear a hard hat liner, either for cold weather or for additional protection from the effects of an arc flash, the hard hat liner should be made of material that will not ignite if exposed to an arc flash. The use of FR hard hat liners will reduce the potential for burn injury in the event of an arc flash exposure. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the recommendation as follows: 1. Add the recommended text to the “Clothing” requirements. 2. Add “hard hat liner” between “rainwear” and “(AN)” Committee Statement: The committee action meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HITTEL, M.: In substantiation, the proposer poses that the FR hard hat liner would not ignite. I believe that this is not entirely accurate. Arc rated materials may still ignite, but will self extinguish when the ignition source is removed. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-359 Log #438 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.7(C)(10)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Elihu “Hugh” Hoagland IV, ArcWear.com/e-Hazard.com Recommendation: New text to read as follows: HRC 1 Leather work shoes (AN) 11 HRC 2 Leather work shoes11 HRC 3 Leather work shoes11 HRC 4 Leather work shoes11 *EH (Electrical Hazard) shoes meeting ASTM F2413 provide extra protection since they have insulated soles but they may not be used for primary protection. DI (Dielectric Shoes)shoes meeting ASTM F1117 shall be used when the work location or task may introduce step potential hazards. EH leather shoes may be worn under DI overshoes. Substantiation: This wording clarifies the mention of both the EH F2413 shoes AND the DI F2413 shoes. DI shoes are mentioned in F2413 as shoes which meet ASTM F1117. EH shoes meet the sole test in F2413. In 130.7(C)(7) the standard points out that Insulated soles may not be used for primary protection but doesn’t clarify that the standard is speaking of DI shoes vs. EH shoes. Using the standard terms, EH and DI and citing the proper ASTM Standards F2413 for EH and F1117 for DI shoes will make things clearer. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The suggested note does not provide clarity or usability. Table 130.7(C)(9) does not address EH or DI footwear. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-360 Log #439 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (Table 130.7(C)(10)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Marcia L. Eblen, Pacific Gas & Electric / Rep. ASTM F18 Recommendation: Delete text as shown: Protective Clothing, Nonmelting (according to ASTM 1506-00) or Untreated Natural Fiber. Substantiation: ASTM 1506-00 is not the current version of the standard and in ASTM 1506-08 Nonmelting is not defined. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

70E-153


Table 130.7(C)(10) Protective Clothing and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) Hazard/Risk Category 0Protective clothing, non-melting (as specified in ASTM F 1506) or untreated natural fibre

Shirt (long sleeve)

Pants (long)Other Protective Equipment Safety glasses or safety goggles (SR)

Hearing protection (ear canal inserts)

Leather gloves (AN) (Note 2)Hazard/Risk Category 1FR Clothing, Minimum Arc Rating of 4 (Note 1) Arc-rated long-sleeve shirt (Note 3)

Arc-rated pants (Note 3)

Arc-rated coverall (Note 4)

Arc-rated faceshield or arc flash suit hood (Note 7)

Arc-rated jacket, parka, or rainwear (AN)FR Protective Equipment Hard hat

FR hard hat liner (AR)

Safety glasses or safety goggles (SR)


Leather gloves (Note 2)

Leather work shoes (AN)Hazard/Risk Category 2FR Clothing, Minimum Arc Rating of 8 (Note 1) Arc-rated long-sleeve shirt (Note 5)



Arc-rated faceshield or arc flash suit hood (Note 7)






Leather work shoesHazard/Risk Category 2*FR Clothing, Minimum Arc Rating of 8 (Note 1) Arc-rated long-sleeve shirt (Note 5)



Arc-rated arc flash suit hood (Note 10)






Leather work shoes


70E-154

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-361 Log #454 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.7(C)(10)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Mark Rucker, Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. Recommendation: Revise as follows:

Substantiation: Proposal is to eliminate requirement for ear protection for Category 0. OSHA regulations in CFR 1910.95(b)(2) Table G-16 Footnote (1) states, “Exposure to impulsive or impact noise should not exceed 140 dB peak sound pressure level.” This is quite high and not achievable in a Category 0 level arc flash in most cases. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The substantiation does not support the deletion of hearing protection in HRC 0. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: See my comment on Proposal 70E-351. HITTEL, M.: The action should be accept. Where is the data that proves that an HRC 0 task meets this decibel threshold. Also, see my explanation of negative vote on proposal 70E-294. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-362 Log #478 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Part (130.7(C)(10)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Roger F. Parry, The DuPont Company Recommendation: Revise all occurrences of “...Hazard/Risk Category...” Revise all occurrences of “...FR Protective Clothing System...” Revise Note 1: “See Table 130.7(C)(11) for typical clothing characteristics and 130.7(C)(12)(a) for layering information. Arc rating for a garment or system of garments is expressed in cal/cm2.” Revise Note 5: “A multilayer protective clothing system based on FR shirt and FR pants over flammable underlayers used for Hazard/Risk Category 2 is allowed and shall have a minimum arc rating of 8. Flammable underlayers that are not part of a multilayer protective clothing system shall be completely covered by a suitably rated protective clothing system.” Revise Note 6: “An alternate is to sue FR coveralls (minimum ar rating of 8) instead of FR shirt and FR pants. The resulting system shall have a minimum arc rating of 8.”

Substantiation: The table information/solution that provides Hazard/Risk Category Classifications [Table 130.7(C)(9)] currently approximates the exposure level that a person could be expected to encounter based on the listed task (through calculations and an inappropriate risk assessment). The NFPA 70E Technical committee has modified/reduced the H/RC numbers for tasks that are perceived as low risk (Expert Opinion information only - no other job/site/company specific information is included or used.) Because of this, the committee has noted that it may still be possible that a person could be exposed to energy levels that could exceed the arc rating of the clothing system (130.7(C)(10) FPN No. 2, basically from higher risk situations). A NFPA 70E-2009 revision cycle proposal (70E-389, Log #320) was submitted that asserted (without data) and was accepted with modifications, that there may be situations in which PPE exposure to much higher energies than that specified in the Tables (limits not specified) could result in all FR layers exhibiting breakopen thus permitting direct exposure and ignition of the flammable natural fiber underlayers that were previously allowed in Table 130.7(C)(9) based multilayer protective systems in the 2004 edition of the standard. It is noted that ignition of the flammable underlayer has the potential to significantly increase the burn injury one might receive (no other information was provided).

The 2009 revision cycle NFPA 70E technical committee responded to this assertion by removing the option of using layered systems that do not comprise all FR materials for the minimum PPE clothing characteristics (in other words, a non-FR underlayer does not apply to the arc rating performance requirement). The technical committee has also asserted in the response to the 2009 cycle ROC 70E-589, Log #550 (that essentially proposes to re-instituted layering) the following (without data and is technically incorrect): “Non-FR flammable underlayers do not add protection from 2nd degree burns in such an exposure because the FR outerlayer(s) alone protect the wearer from 2nd degree burn at energies at or below its arc rating. While non-FR underlayers can add protection in exposures above the arc rating of the FR garment layer(s), exposures above the arc rating of the FR garment can result in breakopen of the FR outerlayer(s) and ignition of the non-FR flammable underlayers as described in Annex N (N.2 and N.2.1). The committee concludes that it is important to avoid the hazard of ignited flammable underlayers and that it’s position on not including non-FR flammable underlayers in the determination of the system arc rating helps to avoid the hazard of ignited flammable underlayers.” In actuality, non-FR flammable underlayers add significant protection from the thermal burns and have been documented in ASTM Special Publications - ASTM Research Report No. F18-1001/ASTM F18-1036-CPMS (Category 2 systems only) to significantly extend the protection offered in this type of multilayer system (FR over flammable underlayers) well beyond FR outerlayer breakopen with ignition at ~3X the Cat 2 rating. The table below highlights pertinent findings of the ASTM study:

Hazard/Risk Category Protective Clothing and PPE

Hazard Risk Category 0FR Protective Equipment Safety glasses or safety goggles (SR)

Hearing protection (ear canal inserts)Leather gloves (AN) (Note 2)

Values in cal/cm2 Values in cal/cm2 Values in cal/cm2 Values in cal/cm2

Clothing System 70E-2009Category

Arc Rating Arc ThermalProtection Value

(ATPV)

Energy toBreakopen (Est)

Energy toIgnition

(Ignition50)

7.5 oz.yd2 FRT Cotton Single Layer 2 ~ 8 ~8 ~11 -

7.5 oz/yd2 FRT Cotton +4.5 oz/yd2 Cotton T-shirt

2 ~13.5 ~22.8 ~13.5 ~25.9

4.5 oz/yd2 Aramid+ 5.9 oz/yd2 Cotton T-shirt

1 ~8.7 ~23 ~8.7 ~25

4.5 oz/yd2 Aramid Blend+ 4.5 oz/yd2 Cotton T-Shirt

1 ~15.6 ~23.2 ~15.6 ~24.3

70E-155

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E The table clearly shows that the use of layered systems with non-FR underlayers does not pose an ignition hazard (where ignition is measured to occur at ~3X the Cat 2 arc rating for the lightest systems available) and adds significant thermal protection to the wearer (also ~3-2X the arc rating value). It can also be noted in this data that the lightest layered systems (FR + non-FR) far outperforms a single layer solution in all respects. If the values in Table 130.7(C)(9) are off by a factor of ~3X (at least in regards to Cat 2) then the problem lies with the tables, not with the prescrived PPE solution and there are far more serious issues with this standard (introduction of a “risk” assessment to reduce category levels). Essentially, the changes adopted for the 2009 revision to Tables 130.7(C)(10) and 130.7(C)(11) (removal of cotton/non-FR underlayers use) have resulted in a reduction of the thermal hazard protection that was previously available in the NFPA 70E-2004 Edition (allowing the use of layered systems solutions). In addition, it does nothing to address the ignition of flammable underlayers for Category 2 solutions. One will note from the data above (single layer FRT cotton compared to the multilayer FRT cotton/cotton T-shirt) the ignition potential for a user who is wearing non-FR flammable underlayers with the 2009 edition prescribed solution gets underlayer ignition essentially at the same energy exposure as the NFPA 70E-2009 “table prohibited” combinations. Also, note that any exposure above 8 cal/cm2 (above 50% probability level) with the single layer system results in a predicted burn injury with significantly higher levels of burn injury to unprotected skin as a result of breakopen above this energy. Obviously, there’s no ignition hazard (no flammable underlayers), but the user of this system is only protected to 8 cal/cm 2 with this solution. If there are problems with the 70E table values (higher risk), there is no added protection. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Part The committee accepts the recommendation to delete “FR” and rejects the remainder of the recommendation. Committee Statement: Table 130.7(C)(9) is based upon both hazard and risk. The proposed revisions do not improve clarity or usability. See the committee action and statement on Proposal 70E-55 relative to the deletion of “FR”. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-363 Log #247 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (Table 130.7(C)(10) and (11)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James T. Dollard, Jr., IBEW Local 98 Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 1. Combine the information found in 130.7(C)10 and Table 130.7(C)10 and 130.7(C)11 and Table 130.7(C)11 into a single section and table. 2. Delete redundant information from Table 130.7(C)10 and the table notes. 130.7(C)(10) Protective Clothing and Personal Protective Equipment Matrix. Once the Hazard/Risk Category has been identified from Table 130.7(C)(9) (including associated notes) and the requirements of 130.7(C)(9), Table 130.7(C)(10) shall be used to determine the required PPE for the task. Table 130.7(C)(10) lists the requirements for protective clothing and other protective equipment based on Hazard/Risk Category numbers 0 through 4. This clothing and equipment shall be used when working within the Arc Flash Protection Boundary. FPN No. 1: See Annex H for a suggested simplified approach to ensure adequate PPE for electrical workers within facilities with large and diverse electrical systems. FPN No. 2: The PPE requirements of this section are intended to protect a person from arc flash and shock hazards. While some situations could result in burns to the skin, even with the protection described in Table 130.7(C)(10), burn injury should be reduced and survivable. Due to the explosive effect of some arc events, physical trauma injuries could occur. The PPE requirements of this section do not address protection against physical trauma other than exposure to the thermal effects of an arc flash. (11) Protective Clothing Characteristics. Table 130.7(C)(11) lists examples of protective clothing systems and typical characteristics, including the degree of protection, for various clothing. The protective clothing selected for the corresponding Hazard/Risk Category number determined from Table 130.7(C)(9) (including associated notes) and the requirements of 130.7(C)(9) shall have an arc rating of at least the value listed in the last column of Table 130.7(C)(11). FPN No. 3: The arc rating for a particular clothing system can be obtained from the FR arc rated clothing manufacturer. (See talbes 130.7(C)(10) and 130.7(C)(11) on the following pages.)Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the Tables Task Group appointed by NFPA 70E Chairman Dave Dini. The task group consisted of Larry Ayer, Palmer Hickman, Jim White, Ron Widup, Vince Saporita, Daniel Roberts, Mike Doherty, Tom Neal, Paul Dobrowsky, John Luke, David Wallace, Daleep Mohla, Paul Hamer, Eric Glaude and Jim Dollard. The majority of the information found in Table 130.7(C)11is redundant and several of the notes found in Table130.7(C)10 are also redundant. Combining the two tables and deleting the redundant information will provide clarity and improve usability of the document.

Committee Meeting Action: Accept Committee Statement: The committee understands that the actions on Proposals 70E-349, 70E-354 and 70E-356 modify this action. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We understand that combining the information in Table 130.7(C)(10) and Table 130.7(C)(11) will not place J/cm2 adjacent to cal/cm2 In addition, in locations including, but not limited to, 130.3(A), 130.7(C)(5) and Table 130.7(C)(11), globally delete the parallel reference to J/cm2 adjacent to cal/cm2 since the arc rating of arc rated clothing is only indicated as cal/cm2. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-364 Log #402 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.7(C)(10) and Table 130.7(C)(10) Notes) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas E. Neal, Neal Associates Ltd. Recommendation: Delete (AN) for leather gloves in Hazard/Risk Category 0 of Table 130.7(C)(10) and add a new Note 11 under the Table: Hazard/Risk Category 0 Leather gloves (AN) (Notes 2 and 11) Notes: 11. For tasks that do not require rubber gloves with leather protectors, Class 00 rubber gloves (black only) without leather protectors can be used instead of leather gloves for Hazard/Risk Category 0 for protection against the arc flash hazard. Class 00 gloves without leather protectors do not provide shock protection. Substantiation: Although the exposure level for Hazard/Risk Category 0 is intended to be a maximum of 1.2 cal/cm2, this exposure is determined for the worker’s upper torso at a distance of 18 inches from the arc flash hazard. The hands of a worker involved in an electrical task will generally be closer than his upper torso so the exposures to his hands will frequently exceed 1.2 cal/cm2. Since the arc flash exposure level increases with the inverse square of the distance, the exposure to the hands at a distance of 9 inches would increase to a maximum of 1.4 cal/cm2. At a distance of 4.5 inches the maximum exposure would increase to over 2 cal/cm2, and at 2.25 inches the maximum exposure would increase to 4.3 cal/cm2. A second or third degree burn to the hands would be expected at any of these closer distances. Hand burns can result in a greater loss of quality of life for a burn victim than burns on many other parts of the body so it is particularly important to protect a worker’s hands. Also, in many cases in Table 130.7(C)(9), Hazard/Risk Category 0 is listed, but the H/RC level has been downgraded by 1, 2 or 3 numbers based on the low risk of an arc flash occurrence so the actual exposures could be up to 25 cal/cm2 or even higher if the hands are closer to the prospective arc flash source than the torso. In addition, NFPA 70E-2009 Article 130.3 (B)(1) shown below recognizes the need for additional PPE for parts of the body that are closer to the arc flash hazard than the distance at which incident energy was determined. The Table should utilize this protection principle relating to closer body parts when assigning PPE. “(1) Incident Energy Analysis. …Recognizing that incident energy increases as the distance from the arc flash decreases, additional PPE shall be used for any parts of the body that are closer than the distance at which the incident energy was determined.” A new Note 11 is added to provide the option of wearing black Class 00 gloves without leather protectors for H/R C0 tasks in order to increase dexterity. See page 8 of the related attachment showing the “arc rating” of Class 00 black gloves based on the proposed but not yet approved ASTM F18 test method for determining the arc rating of gloves. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The submitter has not substantiated the need for leather gloves or insulating rubber gloves for all HRC 0 tasks. There are certain HRC 0 tasks in Table 130.7(C)(9) such as operating a circuit breaker with the covers on, where leather gloves or rubber gloves are not deemed necessary. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HITTEL, M.: I do not agree with the statement that “Class 00 gloves w/o leather protectors do not provide shock protection”

70E-156


Table 130.7(C)(10) Protective Clothing and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Hazard/risk category 0

Protective Clothing, Nonmelting (according to ASTM F 1506-00) or Untreated Natural Fiber (i.e., untreated cotton, wool, rayon, or silk, or blends of these materials) with a fabric weight at least 4.5 oz/yd2

Shirt (long sleeve) Pants (long);

FR Protective Equipment Safety glasses or safety goggles (SR)Hearing protection (ear canal inserts)Leather gloves (AN) (Note 2)


Arc rated FR clothing, minimum arc rating of 4 cal/cm2 (16.74 J/cm2) (Note 1)

Arc rated long-sleeve shirt and pants (Note 3) or arc rated cov-erall (Note 4)Arc rated faceshield or arc flash suit hood (Note 7)Arc rated jacket, parka, or rainwear (AN)

FR protective equipment Hard hatSafety glasses or safety goggles (SR)Hearing protection (ear canal inserts)Leather gloves (Note 2)Leather work shoes (AN)



Arc rated long-sleeve shirt and pants (Note 5) or arc rated cov-erall (Note 6)Arc rated faceshield or arc flash suit hood (Note 7)Arc rated jacket, parka, or rainwear (AN)


Hazard/risk category 2*


Arc rated long-sleeve shirt and pants (Note 5) orarc rated coverall (Note 6)Arc rated arc flash suit hood (Note 10)Arc rated jacket, parka, or rainwear (AN)



Arc rated FR clothing, selected so that the system arc rating meets the required minimum arc rating of 25 cal/cm2 (104.6 J/cm2) (Note 1)

Arc rated long-sleeve shirt (AR) (Note 8)Arc rated pants (AR) (Note 8)Arc rated coverall (AR) (Note 8)Arc rated jacket, parka, or rainwear (AN)Arc rated arc flash suit jacket (AR) (Note 8)Arc rated arc flash suit pants (AR) (Note 8)Arc rated arc flash suit hoodArc rated gloves (Note 2)

FR protective equipment Hard hatFR hard hat liner (AR)Safety glasses or safety goggles (SR)Hearing protection (ear canal inserts)Leather work shoes


Arc rated FR clothing, selected so that the system arc rating meets the required minimum arc rating of 40 cal/cm2 (167.36 J/cm2) (Note 1)



70E-157


AN = as needed (optional)AR = as requiredSR = selection requiredNotes:(1) See Table 130.7(C11). Arc rating for a garment or system of garments is expressed in cal/cm2.(2) If rubber insulating gloves with leather protectors are required by Table 130.7(C)9, additional leather or arc rated gloves shall not be

required. The combination of rubber insulating gloves with leather protectors satisfies the arc flash protection requirement.(3) The FR shirt and pants used for hazard/risk category 1 shall have a minimum arc rating of 4 cal/cm2.(4) An alternative is to use FR coveralls (minimum arc rating of 4 cal/cm2) instead of an FR shirt and FR pants.(5) The FR shirt and FR pants used for hazard/risk category 2 shall have a minimum arc rating of 8 cal/cm2.(6) An alternative is to use FR coveralls (minimum arc rating of 8 cal/cm2) instead of an FR shirt and FR pants.(7) A faceshield with a minimum arc rating of 4 cal/cm2 for hazard/risk category 1 or a minimum arc rating of 8 cal/cm2 for hazard/risk

category 2, with Faceshields shall have wrap-around guarding to protect not only the face but also the forehead, ears, and neck (or, alternatively, an arc rated arc flash suit hood) shall be worn.

(8) An alternative is to use a total FR clothing system and hood, which shall have a minimum arc rating of 25 cal/cm2 for hazard/risk cat-egory 3.

(9) The total clothing system, consisting of FR shirt and pants and/or FR coveralls and/or arc flash coat and pants and hood, shall have a minimum arc rating of 40 cal/cm2 for hazard/risk category 4.

(10) An alternative is to use a faceshield with a minimum arc rating of 8 cal/cm2 and a balaclava (sock hood) with a minimum arc rating of 8 cal/cm2 that covers the face, head, and neck except for the eye and nose areas.

(11) Arc rating is defined in Article 100 and can be either ATPV or EBT. ATPV is defined in ASTM F 1959, Standard Test Method for Determining the Arc Thermal Performance Value of Materials for Clothing, as the incident energy on a material or a multilayer system of materials that results in a 50% probability that sufficient heat transfer through the tested specimen is predicted to cause the onset of a second-degree skin burn injury based on the Stoll curve, cal/cm2. EBT is defined in ASTM F 1959 as the incident energy on a material or material system that results in a 50% probability of breakopen. Arc rating is reported as either ATPV or EBT, whichever is the lower value.

Table 130.7(C)(10) (continued)

Table 130.7(C)(11) Protective Clothing Characteristics

Hazard/risk Category Description of clothing

Arc rating (mini-mum), J/cm2 (cal/cm2)

0Non-melting flammable materials (i.e., untreated cotton, wool, rayon, or silk, or blends of these materials) with a fabric weight at least 4.5 oz/yd2 N/A

1 Arc rated FR shirt and FR pants or FR coverall 16.74 (4)


3Arc rated FR shirt and FR pants or FR coverall, and arc flash suit selected so that the system arc rating meets the required minimum 104.6 (25)


Note: Arc rating is defined in Article 100 and can be either ATPV or EBT. ATPV is defined in ASTM F 1959, Standard Test Method for Determining the Arc Thermal Performance Value of Materials for Clothing, as the incident energy on a material or a multilayer system of materials that results in a 50% probability that sufficient heat transfer through the tested specimen is predicted to cause the onset of a second-degree skin burn injury based on the Stoll curve, cal/cm2. EBT is defined in ASTM F 1959 as the incident energy on a material or material system that results in a 50% probability of breakopen. Arc rating is reported as either ATPV or EBT, whichever is the lower value.

Proposal 70E-363 (Log #247 Recommendation

70E-158

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-365 Log #382 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.7(C)(10), Table 130.7(C)(10), 130.7(C)(11), and Table 130.7(C)(11)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Mike Doherty, Infrastructure Health & Safety Association / Rep. CSA Z462 Technical Committee Recommendation: 1. Combine the information found in 130.7(C)10 and Table 130.7(C)10 and 130.7(C)11 and Table 130.7(C)11 into a single section and table. 2. Delete redundant information from Table 130.7(C)10 and the table notes. 130.7(C)(10) Protective Clothing and Personal Protective Equipment Matrix. Once the Hazard/Risk Category has been identified from Table 130.7(C)(9) (including associated notes) and the requirements of 130.7(C)(9), Table 130.7(C)(10) shall be used to determine the required PPE for the task. Table 130.7(C)(10) lists the requirements for protective clothing and other protective equipment based on Hazard/Risk Category numbers 0 through 4. This clothing and equipment shall be used when working within the Arc Flash Protection Boundary. FPN No. 1: See Annex H for a suggested simplified approach to ensure adequate PPE for electrical workers within facilities with large and diverse electrical systems. FPN No. 2: The PPE requirements of this section are intended to protect a person from arc flash and shock hazards. While some situations could result in burns to the skin, even with the protection described in Table 130.7(C)(10), burn injury should be reduced and survivable. Due to the explosive effect of some arc events, physical trauma injuries could occur. The PPE requirements of this section do not address protection against physical trauma other than exposure to the thermal effects of an arc flash. (11) Protective Clothing Characteristics. Table 130.7(C)(11) lists examples of protective clothing systems and typical characteristics, including the degree of protection, for various clothing. The protective clothing selected for the corresponding Hazard/Risk Category number determined from Table 130.7(C)(9) (including associated notes) and the requirements of 130.7(C)(9) shall have an arc rating of at least the value listed in the last column of Table 130.7(C)(11). FPN No. 3: The arc rating for a particular clothing system can be obtained from the FR arc rated clothing manufacturer. (See Table 130.7(C)(10) on the following pages.) Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by CSA Z462 Workplace Electrical Safety full Technical Committee. The majority of the information found in Table 130.7(C)11is redundant and several of the notes found in Table130.7(C)10 are also redundant. Combining the two tables and deleting the redundant information will provide clarity and improve usability of the document. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The panel action on Proposal 70E-363 meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-366 Log #43 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.7(C)(11)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Palmer L. Hickman, NJATC Recommendation: Delete HRC 0 and all information in all 3 columns related to HRC 0 from Table 130.7(C)(11). Substantiation: Hazard/Risk category (HRC) 0 should be removed from Table 130.7(C)(11) to increase usability since none of the clothing that comprises HRC 0 protection has an arc rating. The protective clothing required for HRC 0 is clearly spelled out in Table 130.7(C)(10) and it is misleading to have clothing without an arc rating commingled in a table that is used essentially to determine the arc rating associated with a given HRC. Having a HRC in this table that does not have an arc rating creates confusion in that users try to assign as arc rating to it that is somewhere between no arc rating and 4 calories (where HRC 1 begins). The FPN to Table 130.7(C)(11) indicates that the clothing system arc rating can be obtained from the manufacturer implying that non-FR has an arc rating. Non-FR clothing has no arc rating and cannot be added to an arc rating to get a higher arc rating. Likewise, Note 1 to Table 130.7(C)(10) points to Table 130.7(C)(11) for an arc rating. Again, non-FR clothing has no arc rating and cannot be added to an arc rating to get a higher arc rating. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Table 130.7(10) contains requirements for arc rated as well as other equipment. The committee has deleted Table 130.7(C)(11). In addition see the committee action and statement on Proposal 70E-334. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-367 Log #127 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.7(C)(11)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: E. W. Buss, Mashpee, MA Recommendation: Delete entire section for H/R Cat 0 Substantiation: H/R Cat 0 exists in 70E 2009 only in the three 130.7(C) Tables. The two sections of the 2004 edition that permitted non-FR clothing [130.7(C)(5) Exception and 130.7(C)(14)(b)] were deleted from the 2009 edition. Section 130.7(C)(5) requires ALL body protection to be FR. Until that is changed, there can be no H/R Cat. 0. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The technical committee has deleted Table 130.7(C)(11). The submitter has not provided adequate technical substantiation, including specific test data, to support completely eliminating all HRC 0 tasks. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We recommend changing any HRC 0 to HRC 1 in each instance where employees are exposed to energized electrical equipment or circuit parts that are not in an electrically safe work condition including, but not limited to, when covers are off, doors are open, or covers are being removed. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-368 Log #251 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.7(C)(11)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: David A. Pace, Olin Corporation Recommendation: Revise the title of the third column of Table 130.7(C)(11) to read as follows: Required Minimum Arc Rating of PPE Maximum Arc Flash Energy Exposure {J/cm2 (cal/cm2)} Revise the text in the third column of Table 130.7(C)(11) to read as follows: N/A 5.02 (1.2) Substantiation: The existing text does not adequately clarify that protection is not required for exposures below 1.2 cal/cm2, but is above 1.2 cal/cm2. The existing text has been interpreted to mean no protection is required below 4 cal/cm2. The revised text is needed to place a maximum protective value on the Category 0 case and to make the reader understand that protection is required anytime the energy exposure is above 1.2 cal/cm2. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee has removed the Table 130.7(C)(11). See the committee action on Proposal 70E-363. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We agree that the recommendation is no longer necessary as the Table has been deleted. In addition, in locations including, but not limited to, 130.3(A), 130.7(C)(5) and Table 130.7(C)(11), globally delete the parallel reference to J/cm2 adjacent to cal/cm2 since the arc rating of arc rated clothing is only indicated as cal/cm2. Note that Table 130.7(C)(10) presently (2009 edition) only reflects the arc rating in cal/cm2. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-369 Log #455 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Table 130.7(C)(11)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Mark Rucker, Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. Recommendation: Revise text as follows: Hazard Risk Category Clothing Description 4 Arc FR shirt and pants or and/or FR coverall and and/or arc flash suit selected so that the system arc rating meets the required minimum Substantiation: The proposal is to change Table 130.7(C)(11) to agree with the statements in Table 130.7(C)(10) (Note 9) which says, “The total clothing system consisting of FR shirt and pants and/or FR coveralls and/or arc flash coat and pants and hood...”. As written, users may interpret that FR undergarments are required underneath a blast suit regardless of the blast suit’s ATPV. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-363 has removed the Table 130.7(C)(110. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

70E-159

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Table 130.7(C)(10) Protective Clothing and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)


Protective Clothing, Nonmelting (according to ASTM F 1506-00) or Untreated Natural Fiber (i.e., untreated cotton, wool, rayon, or silk, or blends of these materials) with a fabric weight at least 4.5 oz/yd2

Shirt (long sleeve) Pants (long);

FR Protective Equipment Safety glasses or safety goggles (SR)Hearing protection (ear canal inserts)Leather gloves (AN) (Note 2)


Arc rated apparel FR clothing, minimum arc rating of 4 cal/cm2 (16.74 J/cm2) (Note 1) Arc rated long-sleeve shirt and pants (Note 3) or arc rated coverall (Note 4)Arc rated faceshield or arc flash suit hood (Note 7)Arc rated jacket, parka, or rainwear (AN)

FR protective equipment Hard hatSafety glasses or safety goggles (SR)Hearing protection (ear canal inserts)Leather gloves (Note 2)Leather work shoes (AN)


Arc rated apparel FR clothing, minimum arc rating of 8 cal/cm2 (33.47 J/cm2) (Note 1) Arc rated long-sleeve shirt and pants (Note 5) or arc rated coverall (Note 6)Arc rated faceshield or arc flash suit hood (Note 7)Arc rated jacket, parka, or rainwear (AN)


Hazard/risk category 2*

Arc rated apparel FR clothing, minimum arc rating of 8 cal/cm2 (33.47 J/cm2) (Note 1) Arc rated long-sleeve shirt and pants (Note 5) orarc rated coverall (Note 6)Arc rated arc flash suit hood (Notes 7 and 10)Arc rated jacket, parka, or rainwear (AN)



Arc rated apparel FR clothing, selected so that the system arc rating meets the required mini-mum arc rating of 25 cal/cm2 (104.6 J/cm2) (Note 1)




Arc rated apparel FR clothing, selected so that the system arc rating meets the required mini-mum arc rating of 40 cal/cm2 (167.36 J/cm2) (Note 1)



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AN = as needed (optional)AR = as requiredSR = selection requiredNotes:(1) See Table 130.7(C11). Arc rating for a garment or system of garments is expressed in cal/cm2.(2) If rubber insulating gloves with leather protectors are required by Table 130.7(C)(9), additional leather or arc rated gloves shall not

be required. The combination of rubber insulating gloves with leather protectors satisfies the arc flash protection requirement.(3) The FR shirt and pants used for hazard/risk category 1 shall have a minimum arc rating of 4 cal/cm2.(4) An alternative is to use FR coveralls (minimum arc rating of 4 cal/cm2) instead of an FR shirt and FR pants.(5) The FR shirt and FR pants used for hazard/risk category 2 shall have a minimum arc rating of 8 cal/cm2.(6) An alternative is to use FR coveralls (minimum arc rating of 8 cal/cm2) instead of an FR shirt and FR pants.(7) A faceshield with a minimum arc rating of 4 cal/cm2 for hazard/risk category 1 or a minimum arc rating of 8 cal/cm2 for hazard/risk

category 2, with Faceshields shall have wrap-around guarding to protect not only the face but also the forehead, ears, and neck (or, alternatively, an arc rated arc flash suit hood) shall be worn.

(8) An alternative is to use a total FR clothing system and hood, which shall have a minimum arc rating of 25 cal/cm2 for hazard/risk category 3.

(9) The total clothing system, consisting of FR shirt and pants and/or FR coveralls and/or arc flash coat and pants and hood, shall have a minimum arc rating of 40 cal/cm2 for hazard/risk category 4.

(10) An alternative is to use a faceshield with a minimum arc rating of 8 cal/cm2 and a balaclava (sock hood) with a minimum arc rating of 8 cal/cm2 that covers the face, head, and neck except for the eye and nose areas.

(11) Arc rating is defined in Article 100 and can be either ATPV or EBT. ATPV is defined in ASTM F 1959, Standard Test Method for Determining the Arc Thermal Performance Value of Materials for Clothing, as the incident energy on a material or a multilayer system of materials that results in a 50% probability that sufficient heat transfer through the tested specimen is predicted to cause the onset of a second-degree skin burn injury based on the Stoll curve, cal/cm2. EBT is defined in ASTM F 1959 as the incident energy on a material or material system that results in a 50% probability of breakopen. Arc rating is reported as either ATPV or EBT, whichever is the lower value.

Table 130.7(C)(10) continued

Table 130.7(C)(11) Protective Clothing Characteristics

Hazard/risk Category Description of clothing

Arc rating (mini-mum), J/cm2 (cal/cm2)

0Non-melting flammable materials (i.e., untreated cotton, wool, rayon, or silk, or blends of these materials) with a fabric weight at least 4.5 oz/yd2 N/A





Note: Arc rating is defined in Article 100 and can be either ATPV or EBT. ATPV is defined in ASTM F 1959, Standard Test Method for Determining the Arc Thermal Performance Value of Materials for Clothing, as the incident energy on a material or a multilayer system of materials that results in a 50% probability that sufficient heat transfer through the tested specimen is predicted to cause the onset of a second-degree skin burn injury based on the Stoll curve, cal/cm2. EBT is defined in ASTM F 1959 as the incident energy on a material or material system that results in a 50% probability of breakopen. Arc rating is reported as either ATPV or EBT, whichever is the lower value.


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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-370 Log #198 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (Table 130.7(C)(11) Note) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Daleep C. Mohla, DCM Electrical Consulting Services, Inc. Recommendation: Delete the note under the table and relocate as new Informational Note to the Article 100 Definition of Arc Rating. Note: Arc rating is defined in Article 100 and can be either ATPV or EBT. ATPV is defined in ASTM F 1959, Standard Test Method for Determining the Arc Thermal Performance Value of Materials for Clothing, as the incident energy on a material or a multilayer system of materials that results in a 50% probability that sufficient heat transfer through the tested specimen is predicted to cause the onset of a second-degree skin burn injury based on the Stoll curve, cal/cm2. EBT is defined in ASTM F 1959 as the incident energy on a material or material system that results in a 50% probability of breakopen. Arc rating is reported as either ATPV or EBT, whichever is the lower value. Substantiation: This information is applicable to arc rating of PPE and not limited to Table 130.7(C)(11) and should be relocated under the ARC Rating definition in Article 100. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-371 Log #526 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (Table 130.7(C)(11) Note) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Noel Williams, Herriman, UT Recommendation: Relocate the entire note from Table 130.7(C)(11) to become a Fine Print Note (or Informational Note) following the definition of Arc Rating in Article 100. Make this FPN No 1 and renumber the existing FPN to No 2. Alternatively, add the text of the existing FPN to the end of the relocated note. Substantiation: First, the Note to Table 130.7(C)(11) contains no requirement that in any way modifies the requirements of the Table. Second, the information is applicable to arc ratings generally, but is not usable by someone doing “detailed analysis” since the table applies only to Hazard Risk Categories. This is valuable information for anyone selecting Arc-Rated PPE whether they do it based on calculated incident energy or using Hazard Risk Categories from the Tables. Since the revision in 2009 allows only one method or the other [see both 130.3(B)(1)&(2) and 130.7(C)(11)] and not a mix of the two methods, this information should be more generally accessible. Also, since it contains no rule, it should be provided as information, not as a note to a table where the implication is that it does contain some rule. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-370 meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: Accept the proposed action, but not the entire substantiation of the proposal. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-372 Log #63 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.7(C)(12)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Palmer L. Hickman, NJATC Recommendation: Revise text as follows: 130.7(C)(12) Factors in Selection of Protective Clothing. Clothing and equipment that provide worker protection from shock and arc flash hazards shall be utilized. If FR clothing is required, it shall cover associated parts of the body as well as all flammable apparel while allowing movement and visibility. Clothing and equipment required for the degree of exposure shall be permitted to be worn alone or integrated with flammable, nonmelting apparel. Non-FR garments do not have an arc rating and shall not be permitted to increase or count towards the arc rating of the clothing system. All personal protective equipment shall be maintained in a sanitary and functionally effective condition. Personal protective equipment items will normally be used in conjunction with one another as a system to provide the appropriate level of protection. Substantiation: The first sentence is recommended to be deleted as it deals with maintenance of clothing and not “factors of selection” (the content of 130.7(C)(12) per its title). In addition, FR clothing maintenance is covered in 130.7(C)(16) and therefore the proposed deleted text seems redundant here. The second sentence is recommended to be deleted as it appears to be already addressed by the sentence in this section that indicates that “clothing and

equipment required for the degree of exposure shall be permitted to be worn alone or integrated with flammable, nonmelting apparel.” In addition, while layered systems are permitted and may be used on occasion, it seems somewhat misleading to indicate that layering is “normally” done. There are many cases where FR clothing is worn where it is not layered such as in an everyday FR program where HRC1 or HRC2 clothing is worn all day every day and layering is not “normally” done until a HRC3, HRC4 or higher task is performed. Hopefully, the are not “normal” situations. The proposed new sentence (indicated by undelined text) is necessary to make it clear that, while clothing and equipment required for the degree of exposure shall be permitted to be worn alone or integrated with flammable, nonmelting apparel, non-FR garments do not have an arc rating and do count towards the arc rating of the clothing system. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the recommendation for the new sentence to read: Garments that are not arc-rated shall not be permitted to be used to increase the arc rating of a clothing system. Committee Statement: The committee has revised the recommendation for clarity and consistency with terminology changes resulting from the committee action on Proposal 70E-55. The committee notes that the reordering of the 2nd and 3rd sentences is intended by this proposal. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We recommend that the committee action be revised as follows: Garments that are not arc-rated shall not be permitted to be used to increase the arc rating of a garment or of a clothing system. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-373 Log #64 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.7(C)(12)a.) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Palmer L. Hickman, NJATC Recommendation: Add new text to read as follows: 130.7(C)(12)(a) Layering. Nonmelting, flammable fiber garments shall be permitted to be used as underlayers in conjunction with FR garments in a layered system for added protection. If nonmelting, flammable fiber garments are used as underlayers, the system arc rating shall be sufficient to prevent breakopen of the innermost FR layer at the expected arc exposure incident energy level to prevent ignition of flammable underlayers. Non-FR garments do not have an arc rating and shall not be permitted to increase or count towards the arc rating of a layered system. Substantiation: The proposed new sentence is necessary to make it clear that, while nonmelting, flammable fiber garments are permitted to be used as underlayers in conjunction with FR garments in a layered system for added protection, non-FR garments do not have an arc rating and do count towards the arc rating of the clothing system. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the recommendation to read: Garments that are not arc-rated shall not be permitted to be used to increase the arc rating of a clothing system. Committee Statement: The committee action correlates with their action on Proposal 70E-372. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We recommend that the committee action be revised as follows: Garments that are not arc-rated shall not be permitted to be used to increase the arc rating of a garment or of a clothing system. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-374 Log #446 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.7(C)(12)d.) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Steven J. Abbott, Stark Safety Consultants Recommendation: Add text as follows: 130.7(C)(12)(d) Coverage. Clothing shall cover potentially exposed areas as completely as possible. Shirt sleeves shall be fastened at the wrists, and shirts and jackets shall be closed at the neck unless a FR garment of equal or greater cal/cm2 value is worn over the exposed area.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Substantiation: Quite often FR shirts (specifically industrial laundered uniform FR shirts) end up that a majority of wearers have difficulty buttoning the collar. By allowing the individual to wear a hood that has equal or greater ATPV value over the exposed collar would allow for covering the exposed area and giving the individual the needed protection. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee is concerned that acceptance of this recommendation could encourage employees to unbutton shirts. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-375 Log #265 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.7(C)(13)2., FPN ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Daleep C. Mohla, DCM Electrical Consulting Services, Inc. Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: FPN: Insulating rubber gloves, AR rated gloves and Leather protectors made from layers of flame-resistant material provide hand protection against arc flash hazard. Heavy duty leather (e.g., greater than 12 oz/yd2) gloves Leather protectors Class 00-provide protection suitable up to Hazard/Risk category 2 8 cal/cm2. During high arc flash exposures leather can shrink and cause a decrease in protection. The leather protectors worn over insulating rubber gloves provide additional arc flash protection for the hands for arc flash protection exposure over 8 cal/cm2. During high arc flash exposure leather can shrink and cause a decrease in protection. Substantiation: FPN has been rewritten for clarity. The phrase “gloves made from layers of flame resistant materials” has been replaced with AR rated gloves and Leather protectors. Term “heavy duty leather (e.g. greater than 12 oz/yd2) is deleted as it is not easily understood and replaced by Leather Protectors Class 00. Hazard/Risk category 2 has been replaced by 8 cal/cm2 for quantification. Table 130.7(C)(9) provides guidance where gloves are required. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the recommendation to read: FPN: Rubber insulating gloves, AR arc rated gloves, and or leather protectors made from layers of flame-resistant material provide hand protection against arc flash hazard. Heavy duty leather (e.g., greater than 12 oz/yd2) gloves Leather protectors for Class 00 rubber insulating gloves provide protection suitable up to Hazard/Risk category 2 8 cal/cm2. During high arc flash exposures leather can shrink and cause a decrease in protection. The leather protectors worn over rubber insulating gloves provide additional arc flash protection for the hands for arc flash protection exposure over 8 cal/cm2. During high arc flash exposure leather can shrink and cause a decrease in protection. Committee Statement: The revisions are for correct grammar and for consistency with terminology used in the standard. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HICKMAN, P.: We do not agree with the committee action changing ‘heavy duty leather gloves” to “leather protectors” as it has not been adequately substantiated. We do not believe that the change is editorial. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-376 Log #250 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (130.7(C)(13)a. and 130.7(C)(13)(b)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James T. Dollard, Jr., IBEW Local 98 Recommendation: New text to read as follows: 130.7(C)(13) Arc Flash Protective Equipment (a) Arc Flash Suits. Arc flash suit design shall permit easy and rapid removal by the wearer. The entire arc flash suit, including the hood’s face shield, shall have an arc rating that is suitable for the arc flash exposure. When the incident energy exposure is greater than 12 cal/cm2 a suitably rated arc flash suit hood shall be used. When exterior air is supplied into the hood, the air hoses and pump housing shall be either covered by FR materials or constructed of nonmelting and nonflammable materials. (b) Face Protection. Face shields shall have an arc rating suitable for the arc flash exposure. Face shields with a wrap-around guarding to protect the face, chin, forehead, ears, neck area shall be used. Face shields without an arc rating shall not be used. Eye protection (safety glasses or goggles) shall always be worn under face shields or hoods. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the Tables Task Group appointed by NFPA 70E Chairman Dave Dini. The task group consisted of Larry Ayer, Palmer Hickman, Jim White, Ron Widup, Vince Saporita, Daniel Roberts, Mike Doherty, Tom Neal, Paul Dobrowsky, John Luke, David Wallace, Daleep Mohla, Paul Hamer, Eric Glaude and Jim Dollard. The back of the head may not be protected during tasks performed with PPE as listed as hazard/risk category 2.

This added text is needed for consistency with and support of two other related proposals, i.e. a modified FPN after 130.3(B)(1) and a modified Annex H title, a new H.2 and a new Table H.2. The existing guidance offered by the NFPA 70E-09 is inadequate for users selecting protective clothing and equipment when using the selection method based on incident energy determined in a hazard analysis. This is particularly the case for face/head protection. At present, the guidance provided by the NFPA 70E-09 for the selection of face/head protection while using this method is that the PPE must be selected based on the incident energy exposure associated with the specific task. Using both PPE selection methods (Method (1) Incident Energy Analysis, and Method (2) Hazard/Risk Categories, results in the reverse engineering of Table 130.7(C)(10). Users currently have no other alternative because aside from the information contained in Table 130.7(C)(10) there is limited clarification provided for the type of face protection and body protection is required. For instance, the potential exists for users to select arc rated goggles & ski mask type balaclava or faceshield & balaclava to meet the requirements of 130.7(C)(3) and 130.7(C)(4). This creates protection issues since the use of goggles and a balaclava does not provide protection against projectiles, and modified arc testing of face and head PPE from a range of orientations has shown that the use of a faceshield with a balaclava for exposures above 12 cal/cm2 can lead to convective heat exposures to the eyes, nose and mouth areas when the arc exposure is coming from behind or from side angles. In these exposures from behind or from side angles, the back edges of the faceshield tend to direct the convective portion of the arc incident energy into the facial areas that are not fully covered by the balaclava. Those who use the Hazard/Rick Category method of hazard analysis are required to use arc rated arc flash suit hoods for HRC3 and higher as indicated in Table 130.7(C)(10). Similar guidance is needed for users deciding to determine incident energy exposure with a hazard analysis. The need for increased guidance in PPE selection also applies to protective clothing and other protective equipment for the body, hands and feet for users who determine incident energy exposure with a hazard analysis. This added text supports the proposed Annex H table which provides the needed guidance for protective clothing and equipment selection for users who determine incident energy exposure with a hazard analysis. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Committee Statement: The committee action is consistent with the committee action on Proposal 70E-380. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HICKMAN, P.: We believe that this should be rejected. We believe that an arc flash suit requires a beekeeper-type hood. The PPE associated with HRCs 3 and 4 in Table 130.7(C)(10) (where arc flash suits are required) and notes Notes 8 and 9 to Table 130.7(C)(10) in the 2009 edition both require a hood. To further clarify this point we suggest that the reference to “hood” in notes Notes 8 and 9 to Table 130.7(C)(10) be modified to read “beekeeper-type hood.” Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: REGE, T.: Accept with comments see 70E-380 _______________________________________________________________ 70E-377 Log #376 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (130.7(C)(13)a. and 130.7(C)(13)(b)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Mike Doherty, Infrastructure Health & Safety Association / Rep. CSA Z462 Technical Committee Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 130.7(C)(13) Arc Flash Protective Equipment (a) Arc Flash Suits. Arc flash suit design shall permit easy and rapid removal by the wearer. The entire arc flash suit, including the hood’s face shield, shall have an arc rating that is suitable for the arc flash exposure. When the incident energy exposure is greater than 12 cal/cm2 a suitably rated arc flash suit hood shall be used. When exterior air is supplied into the hood, the air hoses and pump housing shall be either covered by FR materials or constructed of nonmelting and nonflammable materials. (b) Face Protection. Face shields shall have an arc rating suitable for the arc flash exposure. Face shields with a wrap-around guarding to protect the face, chin, forehead, ears, neck area shall be used. Face shields without an arc rating shall not be used. Eye protection (safety glasses or goggles) shall always be worn under face shields or hoods. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the CSA Z462 Workplace Electrical Safety full Technical Committee. This added text is needed for consistency with and support of two other related proposals, i.e. a modified FPN after 130.3(B)(1) and a modified Annex H title, a new H.2 and a new Table H.2. The existing guidance offered by the NFPA 70E-09 is inadequate for users selecting protective clothing and equipment when using the selection method based on incident energy determined in a hazard analysis. This is particularly the case for face/head protection. At present, the guidance provided by the NFPA 70E-09 for the selection of face/head protection while using this method is that the PPE must be selected based

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E on the incident energy exposure associated with the specific task. Using both PPE selection methods (Method (1) Incident Energy Analysis, and Method (2) Hazard/Risk Categories, results in the reverse engineering of Table 130.7(C)(10). Users currently have no other alternative because aside from the information contained in Table 130.7(C)(10) there is limited clarification provided for the type of face protection and body protection is required. For instance, the potential exists for users to select arc rated goggles & ski mask type balaclava or faceshield & balaclava to meet the requirements of 130.7(C)(3) and 130.7(C)(4). This creates protection issues since the use of goggles and a balaclava does not provide protection against projectiles, and modified arc testing of face and head PPE from a range of orientations has shown that the use of a faceshield with a balaclava for exposures above 12 cal/cm2 can lead to convective heat exposures to the eyes, nose and mouth areas when the arc exposure is coming from behind or from side angles. In these exposures from behind or from side angles, the back edges of the faceshield tend to direct the convective portion of the arc incident energy into the facial areas that are not fully covered by the balaclava. Those who use the Hazard/Rick Category method of hazard analysis are required to use arc rated arc flash suit hoods for HRC3 and higher as indicated in Table 130.7(C)(10). Similar guidance is needed for users deciding to determine incident energy exposure with a hazard analysis. The need for increased guidance in PPE selection also applies to protective clothing and other protective equipment for the body, hands and feet for users who determine incident energy exposure with a hazard analysis. This added text supports the proposed Annex H table which provides the needed guidance for protective clothing and equipment selection for users who determine incident energy exposure with a hazard analysis. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Committee Statement: The committee action is consistent with the committee action on Proposal 70E-380. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: WILMER, K.: See my comment on Proposal 70E-380 _______________________________________________________________ 70E-378 Log #266 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (130.7(C)(13)c..1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Daleep C. Mohla, DCM Electrical Consulting Services, Inc. Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Leather Protectors or FR Arc rated Gloves shall be worn where required for arc flash protection. Substantiation: There is no ASTM or other nationally accepted standards that specify performance or specification of Leather gloves. Performance of leather gloves cannot be assured to provide needed protection. Leather Protectors are manufactured and tested as per ASTM F696 “Standard Specifications for Leather Protectors for Rubber Insulating Gloves and Mittens.” FR gloves have been changed to Arc rated gloves since the stated intent of this section is to provide arc flash protection. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: The action should be to “Accept in Part.” Do not accept the addition “protectors.” The “leather protectors” are meant to be used in conjunction with insulating gloves, and not separately. There is no reason that just leather gloves cannot be used. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-379 Log #233 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (130.7(C)(13)d.) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Jim Phillips, T2G / Brainfiller.com Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Heavy-duty leather work shoes provide some arc flash protection to the feet and shall be used in all tasks in Hazard/Risk Category 2 1 and higher and in all exposures greater than 4 cal/cm2. Substantiation: According to Table 130.7(C)(11), HR Category 2 has a minimum Arc Rating of 8 cal/cm2 and HR Category 1 has a minimum Arc Rating of 4 cal/cm2. Changing HR Category 2 to HR Category 1 will eliminate the contradiction between the use of Category 2 and 4 cal/cm2 in the existing text. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the recommendation as follows: Heavy-duty leather work shoes provide some arc flash protection to the feet and shall be used in all tasks in Hazard/Risk Category 2 1 and higher and in all exposures greater than 4 cal/cm2. Committee Statement: The committee action meets the intent of the recommendation.

Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-380 Log #244 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (130.7(C)(13)x. (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James T. Dollard, Jr., IBEW Local 98 Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 130.7(C)(13)(X) Head Protection. 1. An arc rated balaclava shall be used with an arc rated faceshield whenthe back of the head is within the Arc Flash Protection Boundary. Arc rated balaclavas shall cover the neck and head other than the eyes, nose and mouth area. An arc rated hood shall be permitted to be used instead of an arc rated faceshield and balaclava. 2. An arc rated hood shall be used when the anticipated incident energy exposure exceeds 12 calories/cm2. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the Tables Task Group appointed by NFPA 70E Chairman Dave Dini. The task group consisted of Larry Ayer, Palmer Hickman, Jim White, Ron Widup, Vince Saporita, Daniel Roberts, Mike Doherty, Tom Neal, Paul Dobrowsky, John Luke, David Wallace, Daleep Mohla, Paul Hamer, Eric Glaude and Jim Dollard. 130.7(C)(1) requires that “All parts of the body inside the Arc Flash Protection Boundary shall be protected,” however, the document does not specify the type of head protection. 130.7(C)13 addresses specific requirements for arc flash PPE for face, hands and feet but not the head. This leaves users of the document that perform an incident energy analysis without guidance in the selection of appropriate arc flash head protection. While a specific test method has not been approved for back of the head exposures with a faceshield, modified arc testing done by Dr. Tom Neal and others of face and head PPE from a range of orientations has shown that the use of a faceshield with a balaclava for exposures above 12 cal/cm2 can lead to convective heat exposures to the eyes, nose and mouth areas when the arc exposure is coming from behind or from side angles. In these exposures from behind or from side angles, the back edges of the faceshield tend to direct the convective portion of the arc incident energy into the facial areas that are not fully covered by the balaclava. Those who use the Hazard/Rick Category method of hazard analysis are required to use arc rated flash suit hoods for HRC3 and higher as indicated in Table 130.7(C)(10). The proposed section provides clarity and guidance based on current knowledge and best practice in selecting appropriate head protection for arc flash exposures. The submitters suggests that the new section is best placed as 130.7(C)(13)(b) Head Protection, and the remaining sections renumbered accordingly. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: See my comment on Proposal 70E-355. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: REGE, T.: Accept with comments. The action will mean that employers who do calculations must require flash hoods for exposures over 12 cal/cm2. But employers who use tables C9 and C10 will be able to use balaclava under a hard hat for HRC 2 exposures. Table C10 indicates that HRC 2 protective equipment must have minimum arc rating of 8 cal/cm2 and HRC 3 must have minimum arc rating of 25 cal/cm2. So, for the same task, a table user will be allowed to wear a hard hat and balaclava while someone who does calculations will be required to wear a flash hood. The committee should clarify if this is the intent. WILMER, K.: The action will mean that employers who do calculations must require flash hoods for exposures over 12 cal/cm2. But employers who use tables C9 and C10 will be able to use balaclava under a hard hat for HRC 2 exposures. Table C10 indicates that HRC 2 protective equipment must have minimum arc rating of 8 cal/cm2 and HRC 3 must have minimum arc rating of 25 cal/cm2. So, for the same task, a table user will be allowed to wear a hard hat and balaclava while someone who does calculations will be required to wear a flash hood. The committee should clarify if this is the intent. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-381 Log #393 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (130.7(C)(14)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas E. Neal, Neal Associates Ltd. Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 130.7(C)(14) Clothing Material Characteristics. FR clothing shall meet the requirements described in 130.7(C)(14) and 130.7(C)(15). FPN No. 1: FR materials, such as flame-retardant treated cotton, meta-aramid, para-aramid, and poly-benzimidazole (PBI) fibers, provide thermal

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E protection. These materials can ignite but will not continue to burn after the ignition source is removed. FR fabrics can reduce burn injuries during an arc flash exposure by providing a thermal barrier between the arc flash and the wearer. FPN No. 2: Non-FR cotton, polyester-cotton blends, nylon, nylon-cotton blends, silk, rayon, and wool fabrics are flammable. These Fabrics, zipper tapes and findings made of these materials could can ignite and continue to burn on the body, resulting in serious burn injuries. FPN No. 3: Rayon is a cellulose-based (wood pulp) synthetic fiber that is a flammable but nonmelting material. Clothing consisting of fabrics, zipper tapes and findings made from flammable synthetic materials that melt at temperatures below 315°C (600°F), such as acetate, acrylic, nylon, polyester, polyethylene, polypropylene, and spandex, either alone or in blends, shall not be used. FPN: These materials melt as a result of arc flash exposure conditions, form intimate contact with the skin, and aggravate the burn injury. Substantiation: Commercially available arc rated clothing with flammable and meltable zipper tapes and findings that are labeled as meeting NFPA 70E are being sold and used in the protective clothing industry. Flammable and meltable zipper tapes, stiffeners can ignite and/or melt on the workers body and cause increased burn injury. Flame resistant zipper tapes and findings are readily available and can eliminate the risk of burns from the use zipper tapes and findings constructed from these flammable and meltable materials. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We are voting Affirmative on the action to Accept proposal 70E-381. Our comments are as follows: The action taken by the committee to further clarify the information in the existing Fine Print/Informational Notes is prudent. The submitter of this proposal has pointed out that there are significant issues worth of additional consideration with the manufacturing of protective clothing. This fact has been recognized by the committee in their action to accept this proposal. The requirement for materials to meet an ASTM standard is prudent. However, the ASTM standard addresses the material only and does not provide a mechanism to ensure that each piece of arc rated clothing manufactured/assembled will perform as anticipated with only an assurance that the fabric performance has been evaluated. It is imperative to require listing of all arc rated clothing. The action on this proposal should be modified in the comment stage to read as follows: 130.(C)(14) Clothing Material Characteristics. Arc rated clothing shall be listed and shall meet the requirements described in 130.7(C)(14) and 130.7(C)(15).

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-382 Log #37 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (130.7(D)(1)i.) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: R. Dee Jones, AVO Training Institute Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 130.7(D)(i) Physical or Mechanical Barriers. Physical or mechanical (field-fabricated) barriers shall be installed to alert persons of shock and burn hazards. They shall be installed at the limited approach boundary or the flash protection boundary, whichever is greater in distance. If the space available does not allow barriers at this distance, they shall not be installed any No closer than the restricted approach boundary distance given in Table 130.2(C). While the barrier is installed, the restricted approach boundary distance specified in Table 130.2(C) shall be maintained, or the energized conductors or circuit parts shall be placed in an electrically safe work condition. Substantiation: The present requirement does not provide sufficient warning against shock and burn hazards for unqualified persons. The primary intent of barriers is to alert unqualified persons to the hazards that exist and to stay out. Normally, only qualified persons would be near the restricted approach boundary and should have all of the proper PPE in place to protect against shock and burn hazards. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation does not add clarity to the current provision. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-383 Log #440 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (Table 130.7(F)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Marcia L. Eblen, Pacific Gas & Electric / Rep. ASTM F18 Recommendation: Revise references in Table 130.7(F) as shown below. Substantiation: Table 130.7(F) lists ASTM standards with revision dates. These standards are constantly being revised and renewed so these dates become obsolete. References should be updated to reflect the latest changes. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle

Updated ASTM Standards for Table 130.7(F)ASTM Standard Title Reference to Latest RevisionD1048 Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating Blankets ASTM D1048 - 05D1049 Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating Covers ASTM D1049 - 98(2002)e1D1050 Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating Line Hose ASTM D1050 - 05e1F478 Standard Specification for In-Service Care of Insulating Line

Hose and CoversASTM F478 - 09

F479 Standard Specification for In-Service Care of Insulating Blankets

ASTM F479 - 06

F711 Standard Specification for Fiberglass-Reinforced Plastic (FRP) Rod and Tube Used in Live Line Tools

ASTM F711 - 02(2007)

F712 Standard Test Methods and Specifications for Electrically Insulating Plastic Guard Equipment for Protection of Workers

ASTM F712 - 06

F855 Standard Specifications for Temporary Protective Grounds to Be Used on De-energized Electric Power Lines and Equipment

ASTM F855 - 09

F1505 Standard Specification for Insulated and Insulating Hand Tools ASTM F1505 - 07

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Committee Statement: The table has been updated and reformatted with subjects in alphabetical order to make it more user friendly. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-384 Log #50 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Chapter 2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas A. Carpenter, Aerospace Testing Alliance Recommendation: Completely remove Chapter 2, Safety-Related Maintenance Requirements, from this document. Substantiation: This chapter is not needed as NFPA 70B, Recommended Practice for Electrical Equipment Maintenance, is the document that should cover these requirements. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The requirements within Chapter 2 are specific to safety-related maintenance requirements to ensure employee safety while on the job. Removal of this chapter would eliminate safety-related requirements and maintenance work practices that can only be found in Chapter 2 of the 70E, which would in turn put employees at greater risk for injury in the workplace. NFPA 70B is a recommended practice for all aspects of electrical equipment maintenance and does not have the specific focus on safety-related items that are contained within the 70E. Number Eligible to Vote: 25

Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-385 Log #16 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (200.1(3)) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: The Technical Correlating Committee understands that the recommended change is only for the revision of the first sentence, and does not affect the existing second sentence or the FPN. Submitter: Palmer L. Hickman, NJATC Recommendation: Revise text as follows: For the purpose of Chapter 2, maintenance shall be defined as preserving or restoring the condition of electrical equipment and installations, or parts of either, for the safety of employees who work where exposed to electrical hazards on, near, or with such equipment. Substantiation: This editorial proposal is an attempt to continue correlating the 70E standard by removing the phrase “on or near” from NFPA 70E that began in the 2009 edition where “working near” was removed from the definitions and replaced with the hazard(s) intended. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A.

ProposedTable 130.7(F) Subject Document Number and Title Document Number and RevisionArc Protective Blankets Standard Test Method for Determining the Protective

Performance of an Arc Protective Blanket for Electric Arc Hazards,

ASTM F2676 2009

Blankets Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating Blankets ASTM D1048 - 05Blankets – In-service Care

Standard Specification for In-Service Care of Insulating Blankets

ASTM F479 - 06

Covers Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating Covers ASTM D1049 - 98(2002)e1Fiberglass Rods -Live Line Tools Tools/Ladders

Standard Specification for Fiberglass-Reinforced Plastic (FRP) Rod and Tube Used in Live Line Tools

ASTM F711 - 02(2007)

Insulated Hand Tools Standard Specification for Insulated and Insulating Hand Tools ASTM F1505 - 07

Ladders American National Standard for Ladders - Wood Safety Requirements

ANSI A14.1-2007

American National Standard for Ladders - Fixed - Safety Requirements

ANSI A14.3-2008

American National Standard Safety Requirements for Job Made Wooden Ladders

ANSI A14.4-2009

American National Standard for Ladders - Portable Reinforced Plastic - Safety Requirements

ANSI A14.5-2007

Line Hose Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating Line Hose ASTM D1050 - 05e1Line Hose and Covers – In-service Care

Standard Specification for In-Service Care of Insulating Line Hose and Covers

ASTM F478 - 09

Plastic Guard Standard Test Methods and Specifications for Electrically Insulating Plastic Guard Equipment for Protection of Workers

ASTM F712 - 06

PVC Sheeting Standard Specification for PVC Insulating Sheeting ASTM F1742 - 03e1Safety Signs and Tags Series of Standards for Safety Signs and Tags ANSI Z535 SERIESShield Performance on Live Line Tools

Standard Test Method for Determining the Protective Performance of a Shield Attached on Live Line Tools or on Racking Rods for Electric Arc Hazards

ASTM F2522 - 05

Temporary Protective Grounds – In-service testing

Standard Specification for In-Service Test Methods for Temporary Grounding Jumper Assemblies Used on De-Energized Electric Power Lines and Equipment

ASTM F2249 - 03(2009)

Temporary Protective Grounds-Test Specification grounding

Standard Specifications for Temporary Protective Grounds to Be Used on De-energized Electric Power Lines and Equipment

ASTM F855 - 09

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Explanation of Negative: BOWMAN, W.: Maintenance should be performed for the safety of employees regardless of whether the hazard are exposed or covered. Acceptance of the revised text would limit why maintenance is performed. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-386 Log #369 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (200.1(3), FPN ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Ron Widup, Shermco Industries, Inc. / Rep. InterNational Electrical Testing Association (NETA) Recommendation: Revise FPN in 200.1(3) as follows: FPN: Refer to NFPA 70B, Recommended Practice for Electrical Equipment Maintenance, and ANSI/NETA MTS-2007, Standard for Maintenance Testing Specifications for Electrical Power Distribution Equipment and Systems Specification for guidance on maintenance frequency, methods, and tests. Substantiation: The revision is editorial only. It corrects the reference to the correct document title. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-387 Log #411 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (205.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Mark McNellis, Sandia National Laboratories Recommendation: Add new text to read as follows: 205.1 Scope. Chapter 2 addresses the following requirements: (1) Chapter 2 covers practical safety-related maintenance requirements for electrical equipment and installations in workplaces as included in 90.2. These requirements identify only that maintenance directly associated with employee safety. (2) Chapter 2 does not prescribe specific maintenance methods or testing procedures. It is left to the employer to choose from the various maintenance methods available to satisfy the requirements of Chapter 2. (3) For the purpose of Chapter 2, maintenance shall be defined as preserving or restoring the condition of electrical equipment and installations. or parts of either, for the safety of employees who work on. near, or with such equipment. Repair or replacement of individual portions or parts of equipment shall be permitted without requiring modification or replacement of other portions or parts that are in a safe condition. FPN: Refer to NFPA 70B, Recommended Practice fiJr Electrical Equipment Maintenance, and ANSI/NET A MTS-2007, Standard for Maintenance Testing Specification, for guidance on maintenance frequency, methods, and tests Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the Article 110 task group after discussion with liason Jeff Sargent and Chair David Dini. The the first four sections of Article 110 pertain to chapter one- not specifically Article 110. Additionally the introduction and format of Article 110 is not consistent with the introduction of chapters two, and three. Other proposals have been submitted to rectify Chapter 1- the submission of this proposal is an attempt to better align the three chapters of the standard. This proposal and three others submitted by the task group are submitted to rectify these inconsistencies. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee recognizes that parallel numbering has merits, but in this case is not essential to the use and understanding of the standard. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-388 Log #400 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (205.2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas E. Neal, Neal Associates Ltd. Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 205.2 Single Line Diagram. A single line diagram, where provided for the electrical system, shall be maintained in a legible condition and shall be kept current. Substantiation: Stating that single line diagrams are required to be maintained is ambiguous without specifying the desired of state maintenance. Since single line diagrams are critical to the process of establishing an electrically safe working condition it is imperative that they be legible and current. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1

Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: GRAY, B.: This action should have been Accept In Principle adding the words “as practicable” to the new wording. As written, strict compliance is impossible. During field modifications the one-line drawings will be in continuous revision so at some point will not be current. The intent of the requirement is valuable, but the wording must be revised to ensure compliance is possible. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-389 Log #480 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (205.2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Ron Widup, Shermco Industries, Inc. / Rep. InterNational Electrical Testing Association (NETA) Recommendation: Modify text in article 205.2 205.2 Single-Line Diagram. A single line diagram, where provided for the electrical system, shall be maintained and shall show a working distance and the calculated incident energy values at each node of the single line diagram. Substantiation: Single line diagrams are very important for worker safety and hazard analysis. Maintaining the single line diagram is also very important for proper hazard analysis. Without incident energy values and the subsequent working distances for which the value is based upon, the task of identifying hazards and properly applying safe work practices and procedures is more complicated. Experience has shown that accurate and properly maintained single line diagrams with arc flash [incident energy] safety data on the single line at key nodes within the single line simplifies the hazard analysis process and avoids potential confusion as to the available fault energy at a given point in the power system. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The proposed text is too restrictive and reflects a requirement for data that is not typically found on one-line diagrams. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-390 Log #377 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Part (205.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Mike Doherty, Infrastructure Health & Safety Association / Rep. CSA Z462 Technical Committee Recommendation: Add text to read as follows: 205.3 General Maintenance Requirements. Electrical switching devices and overcurrent protective devices shall be maintained in accordance with the manufacturers’ instructions or industry consensus standards. (1) Electrical switching devices such as circuit breakers or contactors (fixed or draw out), disconnect switches, Motor Control Centers (MCC) or other devices used in establishing an electrically safe working condition shall be maintained and tested in accordance with the manufacturers’ instructions or industry consensus standards. (2) The frequency of the testing shall be in accordance with the manufacturers’ instructions or industry consensus standards. (3) Maintenance, tests and inspections shall be documented.

Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the CSA Z462 Workplace Electrical Safety full Technical Committee. Regularly scheduled electrical maintenance is a critical part of any electrical safety program. Improper equipment operation can drastically increase the risk of worker exposure to electrical hazards. Increased operating time of protective systems due to maintenance issues will increase incident energy levels, often times unbeknownst to the worker. Workers establishing an electrically safe work condition are normally switching a number of isolation devices such as circuit breakers or disconnect switches. This act in itself can be hazardous when equipment is not functioning properly. Requiring that regular maintenance be preformed and documented enhances worker safety. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Part The committee accepts only Item (3) and rejects the remainder of the recommendation. The accepted portion will be a new last sentence in the current requirement. Committee Statement: The rejected portion of the recommendation is presently covered by the existing general maintenance requirements in 205.3. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-391 Log #481 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part (205.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Ron Widup, Shermco Industries, Inc. / Rep. InterNational Electrical Testing Association (NETA) Recommendation: Add additional text to 205.3 as follows: 205.3 General Maintenance Requirements. Overcurrent protective devices shall be maintained in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions or industry consensus standards. Records indicating date of maintenance and prescribed manufacturer and/or industry consensus test results of overcurrent protective devices shall be archived for a period of five years from the time of test. Substantiation: Proper maintenance of overcurrent protective devices is critical to worker safety. A key component of maintenance operations are the field test data/records and subsequent analysis of the results, for both immediate performance analysis and time-affected [declining] trends in performance. This cannot be done without securing and recording the data and having it available for inspection. Without the records, an AHJ or affected worker will not be able to discern if the device has been properly maintained to assure critical safety performance of the overcurrent protective device. NFPA 70B and NETA MTS-2007 prescribe maintenance test intervals for overcurrent protective devices, and generally do not have longer than five years as a maximum allowable maintenance interval, which is the basis for the five-year record retention requirement. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle in Part The committee accepts in principle the requirement to retain documentation/records and rejects the recommendation to assign a specific time frame for retention. Committee Statement: The committee does not concur that this standard should specify a time frame for document retention. The committee action on Proposal 70E-390 meets the intent of the accepted portion of this recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-392 Log #525 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (205.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: T David Mills, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC Recommendation: Add text as follows: 205.3 General Maintenance Requirements. Overcurrent protective devices shall be maintained in accordance with the manufacturers’ instructions or industry consensus standards. By special permission, the AHJ may allow an existing proven maintenance program to be continued where it is assured that equivalent objectives can be achieved by establishing and maintaining effective safety. Substantiation: Many facilities already have a proven overcurrent protective device maintenance program with few devices requiring any additional adjustment to remain compliant with the manufacturers’ coordination curves. The establishment of the new 205.3 requirement without regard to existing programs becomes an unnecessary expense with no appreciable increase in safety for those facilities. Allowing the AHJ to make the specific case calls will not create an unsafe condition, but allow the facilities to continue to exercise their good engineering practices to assure proper operation of overcurrent devices. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The authority having jurisdiction is typically not in a position to make performance-based decisions on a manufacturer’s product. Allowing an AHJ to override manufacturer’s guidance and industry consensus standards may put maintenance personnel at risk. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: The action should be accept in principle. The use of the term AHJ may be confusing this issue. It is very debatable whether the AHJ (typically the resource responsible for installation code compliance determination) has the skills and knowledge to make this particular determination. The recommendation should be modified to eliminate this term and replace it with the a term like the subject matter expert that is more applicable or definitive with regards to the proper application of the intervals. Also, the proposal should be modified to require that the program is documented to prove that the methods employed meet or exceed the intent of the requirement. I agree that the intervals may be adjusted by conditions of service, maintenance and environment. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-393 Log #421 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (205.14 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Michael A. Anthony, University of Michigan / Rep. APPA.ORG - Association of Education Facility Executives Recommendation: New text to read as follows: 205.4 (NEW) Impedance Meters. In lieu of fault current calculations required to conform to Section 130.3, it shall be permitted to install impedance measuring instruments that provide real-time measurement of utility impedance from which incident energy may be derived. The instrumentation shall be applied at the point where all fault current contributions may be measured. Substantiation: Friends of the NFPA 70-series of documents have participated in a significant amount of discussion about electrical safety and arc flash analysis for over 10 years. Some of the resistance to broader flash hazard language in the NEC has been based upon concern about dynamic utility fault contribution because of changes in the impedance of the last mile of power distribution that is the point of common coupling for building services. Changing fault current complicates incident energy calculations. This is one of a series of product solution proposals from our industry intended raise the level of debate on a number of innovations that present disruptive, but possibly cost-effective, solutions to the electrical safety problem presented by flash hazard. Please refer to the attachment, and IEEE paper, authored by Thomas L. Baldwin, Michael J. Hittel, Lynn F. Saunders and Frank Renovich Jr. titled, “Using a Microprocessor-Based Instrument to Predict the Incident Energy From Arc-Flash Hazards”. Different industries respond to innovation differently. This proposal may be too far ahead of the 2012 edition of 70E but getting the pro’s and con’s vetted now may hasten a product to market in time for the 2015 edition of this document. For the convenience of the committee, the abstract of the paper is duplicated here: “To assess the potential arc hazards of a workspace, workers must rely on engineering fault studies to provide vital fault-current data. An instrument, based on a network impedance analyzer, determines the maximum flash-arc incident-energy exposure at a worksite within a few seconds. The digital analyzer measures the power system source impedance, ratio, and the system voltage to predict the bolted fault current and incident energy, while the power distribution system is energized and in normal operation. The instrument computes the incident energy for standard electrical workspaces of an open-air arc and an enclosed box with one open side. Experiments have been conducted to verify the accuracy of the impedance and ratio measurements.” Instrumentation like this, permanently installed at services where fault current varies widely, can be used as the basis for electrical professionals to determine hazard risk categories. Consideration of the protection regime also figures into the equations. There are difficulties, however -- not the least of which is the matter of scale: How many of these instruments do we need to build before they become economical enough to include in a standard metering package? Related to the matter or scale is whether an impedance measuring instrument, applied where fault current varies widely, is more cost effective than IEEE 1584 calculation methods. As Jim Pauley, a respected voice in our industry, writes in NFPA 70 - 2011 Comment 119 on Proposal 1-183 regarding the practicality of a label for fault current that varies widely: “…The single group of users that might actually be able to have a full understanding of system changes over time is the large industrial users – yet, the panel has exempted them from the requirement. They are actually the ONLY group that could benefit from a label…” This is an accurate observation, one that applies to many of 100+ small and medium sized district energy cogeneration systems run by the education and health care facilities industry. In other words, where dynamic impedance measuring instrumentation would be most likely to be applied is where it may least be needed because of the knowledgeable staffs that run low and medium voltage installations of about 1-100 megawatts. The relevance of NFPA 70E as an asset to our industry can be no greater than the new ideas we try to drive through it every three years. The innovation itself seems credible enough for a broader industry discussion. We have seen solutions-looking-for-problems in the past. Zone-selective interlocking (ZSI), for example. ZSI’s first applications were intended to reduce fault current stress on a bus. Applications were generally sparse. In retrospect, it seems that ZSI-variants have been more widely adapted to solve the electrician safety problem. In prospect, the NFPA 70-series of documents are on the verge of needing to adapt to greater public focus on the last mile of power distribution, so-called smart grid technology, a re-scaling of the normal and backup power system availability on either side of what, for the moment, is agreed as the demarcation point between serving utility and building premises wiring. The electrical industry needs to roll in these innovations at greater pace and a non-mandatory statement is a good start. NFPA 70E may be a better place to start since its enforcement structure may permit adoption of newer technologies faster than the enforcement structure of NFPA 70. Since 80% of a building’s total owning cost is driven by operations and maintenance expenses (rather than first cost), we may find that innovations are given greater impetus from workplace safety documents such as NFPA 70E.

70E-168

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Parts of this proposal have been derived from the following source: “Using a Microprocessor-Based Instrument to Predict the Incident Energy From Arc-Flash Hazards” by Thomas L. Baldwin, Michael J. Hittel, Lynn F. Saunders and Frank Renovich Jr., IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRY APPLICATIONS, VOL. 40, NO. 3, MAY/JUNE 2004 This IEEE documents has been submitted to the NFPA 70E staff as part of this proposal and are available for public review. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Section 130.3 states that an arc flash hazard analysis shall determine the Arc Flash Boundary and the personal protective equipment that employees shall use within the Arc Flash Boundary. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-394 Log #482 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (209 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Ron Widup, Shermco Industries, Inc. / Rep. InterNational Electrical Testing Association (NETA) Recommendation: Add new article 209 as follows: Article 209 Transformers 209.1 Large Power Transformers. Large power transformers shall be maintained in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions or industry consensus standards. Records indicating date of maintenance and prescribed manufacturer and/or industry consensus test results of large power transformers shall be archived for a period of five years from the time of test. FPN: Large power transformers are defined as any transformer with windings rated higher than 600 volts and low-voltage transformers larger than 167 kVA single phase or 500 kVA three-phase. 209.2 Small Power Transformers. Small power transformers shall be maintained in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions or industry consensus standards. Records indicating date of maintenance and prescribed manufacturer and/or industry consensus test results of small power transformers shall be archived for a period of five years from the time of test. FPN: Small power transformers are defined as transformers with windings rated 600 volts or less and sizes equal to or less than 167 kVA single phase or 500 kVA three-phase. Substantiation: The 70E currently does not address the safety-related maintenance of transformers, and the addition of a new article is warranted. It is suggested as Article 209 since a [power] transformer typically would be in front of a substation, switchgear assembly, switchboard, etc. (covered in Article 210). Proper maintenance of transformers, both large and small, is critical to worker safety. Insulation condition, enclosure integrity, oil condition, bus supports and bracing, etc. all affect worker safety and system performance. The only viable means of assuring continued safe operation of power transformers is to perform prescribed manufacturer/industry consensus standard maintenance tests on the device. While a function of overall condition and operating atmosphere, NETA Accredited Companies and other testing entities have all reported and recorded varying degrees of transformer safety-related performance failures uncovered during maintenance testing procedures, which validates the need for [safety-related] maintenance. Additionally, a key component of maintenance operations are the field test data/records and subsequent analysis of the results, for both immediate performance analysis and time-affected [declining] trends in performance. This cannot be done without securing and recording the data and having it available for inspection. Without the records, an AHJ or affected worker will not be able to discern if the transformers have been properly maintained to assure critical safety performance of the device. NFPA 70B and NETA MTS-2007 prescribe maintenance test intervals for transformers, and generally do not have longer than five years as a maximum allowable maintenance interval, which is the basis for the five-year record retention requirement. The Fine Print Notes have been added to clarify and define the difference between a “large” power transformer and a “small” power transformer. The basis for the definition is taken from the national consensus standard ANSI/NETA MTS-2007, as there is not a clear definition from the IEEE between “large” and small” power transformers. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation is currently covered by industry consensus standards on equipment maintenance. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-395 Log #483 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (210.4) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Ron Widup, Shermco Industries, Inc. / Rep. InterNational Electrical Testing Association (NETA) Recommendation: Modify text in 210.4 as follows: 210.4 Electrical Insulation Integrity. Electrical insulation Insulation integrity shall be maintained to support the voltage impressed. in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions or industry consensus standards. Records indicating date of maintenance and prescribed manufacturer and/or industry consensus test results of electrical insulation shall be archived for a period of five years from the time of test. Substantiation: The proposed revised text is to add clarity as to the intent. Just the word “insulation” can be applied to a non-electrical device. “Electrical insulation” clarifies that it is an electrical insulation component, not a thermal insulation component. The addition of “in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions or industry consensus standards” clarifies the safety-related process that should be performed. Additionally, a key component of maintenance operations are the field test data/records and subsequent analysis of the results, for both immediate performance analysis and time-affected [declining] trends in performance. This cannot be done without securing and recording the data and having it available for inspection. Without the records, an AHJ or affected worker will not be able to discern if the insulation has been properly maintained to assure critical safety performance of the device. NFPA 70B and NETA MTS-2007 prescribe maintenance test intervals for substations, switchgear assemblies, switchboards, panelboards, motor control centers, and disconnect switches, and generally do not have longer than two-three years as a maximum allowable maintenance interval, however a five-year record retention requirement is listed to correlate with other proposals within this code cycle. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation is currently covered by industry consensus standards on equipment maintenance. The existing title is adequate. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HITTEL, M.: It is not appropriate for the standard to set records retention policy. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-396 Log #378 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (210.5) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Mike Doherty, Infrastructure Health & Safety Association / Rep. CSA Z462 Technical Committee Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 210.5 Protective Devices. Protective devices shall be maintained to adequately withstand or interrupt available fault current and to function in accordance with their designed operating times. Where applicable, protective devices shall be tested to operate in accordance with their designed operating times. Maintenance, tests and inspections shall be documented. FPN: Failure to properly maintain protective devices can have an adverse effect on the arc flash hazard analysis incident energy values. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the CSA Z462 Workplace Electrical Safety full Technical Committee. Regularly scheduled electrical maintenance is a critical part in any electrical safety program. Recent studies indicate that 66% of safety incidents can be attributed to maintenance in one way or another. Another recent survey performed by the International Electrical Testing Association (NETA) showed that 22% of service aged circuit breakers had some type of malfunction and 10.5% would not operate at all when maintenance testing was performed. Improper equipment operation can drastically increase the risk of exposure to electrical workers. Incident energy calculations are based on operating times of relaying protection as well as the isolation device. Poorly maintained isolation devices that are designed to operate in milliseconds often taken significantly more time to operate including not operating at all. Requiring that regular maintenance be preformed and documented enhances worker safety. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation is currently covered by industry consensus standards on equipment maintenance. Overcurrent protective devices are currently covered by 205.3. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

70E-169

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-397 Log #484 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (210.5) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Ron Widup, Shermco Industries, Inc. / Rep. InterNational Electrical Testing Association (NETA) Recommendation: Modify text in 210.5 as follows: 210.5 Electrical Protective Devices Electrical protective Protective devices shall be maintained to adequately withstand or interrupt available fault current. in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions or industry consensus standards. Records indicating date of maintenance and prescribed manufacturer and/or industry consensus test results of electrical protective devices shall be archived for a period of five years from the time of test. Substantiation: The proposed revised text is to add clarity as to the intent. Just the word “protective device” can be applied to a non-electrical device or component, which based on the Fine Print Note is not the intent of the wording. “Electrical protective device” clarifies that it is an electrical device or component, not a mechanical or non-electrical device, and it can have an adverse affect on arc flash hazard analysis if not properly maintained. The addition of “in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions or industry consensus standards” clarifies the safety-related process that should be performed. Additionally, a key component of maintenance operations are the field test data/records and subsequent analysis of the results, for both immediate performance analysis and time-affected [declining] trends in performance. This cannot be done without securing and recording the data and having it available for inspection. Without the records, an AHJ or affected worker will not be able to discern if the electrical protective device has been properly maintained to assure critical safety performance of the device. NFPA 70B and NETA MTS-2007 prescribe maintenance test intervals for protective devices, and generally do not have longer than three years as a maximum allowable maintenance interval, however a five-year record retention requirement is listed to correlate with other proposals within this code cycle. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation is currently covered by industry consensus standards on equipment maintenance. Overcurrent protective devices are currently covered by 205.3. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HITTEL, M.: It is not appropriate for the standard to set records retention policy. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-398 Log #379 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (210.6 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Mike Doherty, Infrastructure Health & Safety Association / Rep. CSA Z462 Technical Committee Recommendation: Add text to read as follows: 210.6 Switching Devices. Electrical switching devices such as circuit breakers or contactors (fixed or draw out), disconnect switches, Motor Control Centers (MCC) or other devices used in establishing an electrically safe working condition shall be maintained and tested in accordance with the manufacturers’ instructions or industry consensus standards. Maintenance, tests and inspections shall be documented. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the CSA Z462 Workplace Electrical Safety full Technical Committee. Regularly scheduled electrical maintenance is a critical part of any electrical safety program. Improper equipment operation can drastically increase the risk of worker exposure to electrical hazards. Increased operating time of protective systems due to maintenance issues will increase incident energy levels, often times unbeknownst to the worker. Workers establishing an electrically safe work condition are normally switching a number of isolation devices such as circuit breakers or disconnect switches. This act in itself can be hazardous when equipment is not functioning properly. By requiring that switching devices are in good working order Requiring that regular maintenance be preformed and documented enhances worker safety. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation is currently covered by industry consensus standards on equipment maintenance. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-399 Log #488 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (215.4 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Ron Widup, Shermco Industries, Inc. / Rep. InterNational Electrical Testing Association (NETA) Recommendation: Add new 215.4 to read as follows: 215.4 Premise Wiring (System), Power. Premise power wiring shall be maintained in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions or industry consensus standards. Records indicating date of maintenance and prescribed manufacturer and/or industry consensus test results of premise power wiring shall be archived for a period of five years from the time of test. Substantiation: Proper maintenance of medium-voltage power circuit breakers is critical to worker safety. Clearing times, fault interruption, racking condition, target indicators, etc. all affect worker safety and system performance. The only viable means of assuring continued safe operation of medium-voltage power circuit breakers is to perform prescribed manufacturer/industry consensus standard maintenance tests on the device. While a function of overall condition and operating atmosphere, NETA Accredited Companies and other testing entities have all reported and recorded varying degrees of circuit breaker safety-related performance failures uncovered during maintenance testing procedures, which validates the need for [safety-related] maintenance. Additionally, a key component of maintenance operations are the field test data/records and subsequent analysis of the results, for both immediate performance analysis and time-affected [declining] trends in performance. This cannot be done without securing and recording the data and having it available for inspection. Without the records, an AHJ or affected worker will not be able to discern if the medium-voltage power circuit breaker has been properly maintained to assure critical safety performance of the device. NFPA 70B and NETA MTS-2007 prescribe maintenance test intervals for medium-voltage power circuit breakers, and generally do not have longer than three years as a maximum allowable maintenance interval; however a five-year record retention requirement is listed to correlate with other proposals within this code cycle. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation is overly restrictive and industry consensus standards adequately cover this activity. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-400 Log #485 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (225.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Ron Widup, Shermco Industries, Inc. / Rep. InterNational Electrical Testing Association (NETA) Recommendation: Modify header to article 225.3 225.3 Circuit Breaker Testing After Electrical Faults. Substantiation: The existing article header is confusing when placed within a safety-related maintenance section of the 70E. Circuit breaker testing after a fault is very important to assure continued serviceability and overall performance of the [faulted] device; however it does not currently say that in the title. As such, it can lead the reader to believe this is the only testing required for safety-related maintenance of a circuit breaker. Manufacturer and industry consensus standards have many additional “normal” safety-related maintenance tasks that should be performed on circuit breakers, and not just when the device has sustained a fault that approached it’s interrupting rating. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: SAPORITA, V.: NEMA disagrees with the proposed title change to 225.3. It will incorrectly lead users to believe that circuit breakers always require testing, even after a low level ground fault condition. Rather, the present words cover the intended requirement to only require testing for faults approaching the breaker’s interrupting rating. This aligns with the manufacturer’s recommendations as stated in NEMA AB-4, Guidelines For Inspection And Preventive Maintenance Of Molded Case Circuit Breakers. TIEDE, T.: This proposal should be rejected. It is not true that circuit breakers always require testing after a fault condition, such as in the case of a low level ground fault. The current language is clear and aligns with guidelines such as NEMA AB-4. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

70E-170

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-401 Log #486 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (225.4 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Ron Widup, Shermco Industries, Inc. / Rep. InterNational Electrical Testing Association (NETA) Recommendation: Add new 225.4 to read as follows: 225.4 Circuit Breakers, Low-Voltage Power. Low-voltage power circuit breakers shall be maintained in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions or industry consensus standards. Records indicating date of maintenance and prescribed manufacturer and/or industry consensus test results of low-voltage power circuit breakers shall be archived for a period of five years from the time of test. Substantiation: Proper maintenance of circuit breakers is critical to worker safety. Clearing times, fault interruption, racking condition, target indicators, etc. all affect worker safety and system performance. The only viable means of assuring continued safe operation of power circuit breakers is to perform prescribed manufacturer/industry consensus standard maintenance tests on the device. While a function of overall condition and operating atmosphere, NETA Accredited Companies and other testing entities have all reported and recorded varying degrees of circuit breaker safety-related performance failures uncovered during maintenance testing procedures, which validates the need for [safety-related] maintenance. Additionally, a key component of maintenance operations are the field test data/records and subsequent analysis of the results, for both immediate performance analysis and time-affected [declining] trends in performance. This cannot be done without securing and recording the data and having it available for inspection. Without the records, an AHJ or affected worker will not be able to discern if the power circuit breaker has been properly maintained to assure critical safety performance of the device. NFPA 70B and NETA MTS-2007 prescribe maintenance test intervals for power circuit breakers, and generally do not have longer than three years as a maximum allowable maintenance interval; however a five-year record retention requirement is listed to correlate with other proposals within this code cycle. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation is covered by the current requirements in 205.3 as modified by the committee action on Proposal 70E-390. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HITTEL, M.: It is not appropriate for the standard to set records retention policy. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-402 Log #479 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (225.5 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Ron Widup, Shermco Industries, Inc. / Rep. InterNational Electrical Testing Association (NETA) Recommendation: Add new 225.4 to read as follows: 225.5 Circuit Breakers, Medium-Voltage Power. Medium-voltage power circuit breakers shall be maintained in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions or industry consensus standards. Records indicating date of maintenance and prescribed manufacturer and/or industry consensus test results of medium-voltage power circuit breakers shall be archived for a period of five years from the time of test. Substantiation: Proper maintenance of medium-voltage power circuit breakers is critical to worker safety. Clearing times, fault interruption, racking condition, target indicators, etc. all affect worker safety and system performance. The only viable means of assuring continued safe operation of medium-voltage power circuit breakers is to perform prescribed manufacturer/industry consensus standard maintenance tests on the device. While a function of overall condition and operating atmosphere, NETA Accredited Companies and other testing entities have all reported and recorded varying degrees of circuit breaker safety-related performance failures uncovered during maintenance testing procedures, which validates the need for [safety-related] maintenance. Additionally, a key component of maintenance operations are the field test data/records and subsequent analysis of the results, for both immediate performance analysis and time-affected [declining] trends in performance. This cannot be done without securing and recording the data and having it available for inspection. Without the records, an AHJ or affected worker will not be able to discern if the medium-voltage power circuit breaker has been properly maintained to assure critical safety performance of the device. NFPA 70B and NETA MTS-2007 prescribe maintenance test intervals for medium-voltage power circuit breakers, and generally do not have longer than five years as a maximum allowable maintenance interval; which is the basis for the five-year record retention requirement. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation is covered by the current requirements in 205.3 as modified by the committee action on Proposal 70E-390.

Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-403 Log #487 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (225.5 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Ron Widup, Shermco Industries, Inc. / Rep. InterNational Electrical Testing Association (NETA) Recommendation: Add new 225.4 as follows: 225.5 Circuit Breakers, Medium-Voltage Power. Medium-voltage power circuit breakers shall be maintained in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions or industry consensus standards. Records indicating date of maintenance and prescribed manufacturer and/or industry consensus test results of medium-voltage power circuit breakers shall be archived for a period of five years from the time of test. Substantiation: Proper maintenance of medium-voltage power circuit breakers is critical to worker safety. Clearing times, fault interruption, racking condition, target indicators, etc. all affect worker safety and system performance. The only viable means of assuring continued safe operation of medium-voltage power circuit breakers is to perform prescribed manufacturer/industry consensus standard maintenance tests on the device. While a function of overall condition and operating atmosphere, NETA Accredited Companies and other testing entities have all reported and recorded varying degrees of circuit breaker safety-related performance failures uncovered during maintenance testing procedures, which validates the need for [safety-related] maintenance. Additionally, a key component of maintenance operations are the field test data/records and subsequent analysis of the results, for both immediate performance analysis and time-affected [declining] trends in performance. This cannot be done without securing and recording the data and having it available for inspection. Without the records, an AHJ or affected worker will not be able to discern if the medium-voltage power circuit breaker has been properly maintained to assure critical safety performance of the device. NFPA 70B and NETA MTS-2007 prescribe maintenance test intervals for medium-voltage power circuit breakers, and generally do not have longer than three years as a maximum allowable maintenance interval; however a five-year record retention requirement is listed to correlate with other proposals within this code cycle. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation is covered by the current requirements in 205.3 as modified by the committee action on Proposal 70E-390. The committee notes that the recommendation is not correct and should be the recommendation that covered molded-case circuit breakers. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HITTEL, M.: It is not appropriate for the standard to set records retention policy. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-404 Log #284 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (240.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab / Rep. NFPA 70E Battery Task Group Recommendation: Delete Article 240.1 and relocate revised text to new section in Article 320.3 () Article 240 Batteries and Battery Rooms 240.1 Ventilation. Ventilation systems, forced or natural, shall be maintained to prevent buildup of explosive mixtures. This maintenance shall include a functional test of any associated detection and alarm systems. Add text to read as follows: 320.3() Ventilation: If applicable Ventilation systems, forced or natural, shall be maintained to prevent buildup of explosive mixtures. This maintenance shall include a functional test of any associated detection and alarm systems. Substantiation: The requirements for systems ventilation are already addressed in NFPA-1 Chapter 52.3.5 and OSHA 1926.441. Ventilation is a design and construction and should not be addressed in Article 240. Note: The battery task group has submitted a separate proposal to change the title of article 320.3 to Battery Testing, Maintenance, and Operation It is the task groups intent that all battery requirements be in Article 320. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The current location for this provision is appropriate. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A.

70E-171

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-405 Log #283 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (240.2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete Article 240.2 240.2 Eye and body wash apparatus. Eye and body wash apparatus shall be maintained in operable condition. Substantiation: Eye and body wash apparatus requirements are already addressed in NFPA 70E 320.8. They do not need to be repeated in Article 240. Although OSHA 1910.151(c) and OSHA1926.441(a)(7) also specify the needs for eye and body wash the task group believes it is still important to mention them in NFPA 70E. The intent of the battery task group is to have all requirements for batteries located in Article 320 of 70E. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The current location for this requirement is necessary for other locations or processes where eye and body wash stations are necessary. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-406 Log #179 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (250.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Michael J. Johnston, National Electrical Contractors Association Recommendation: Revise Section 250.3 as follows: (B) Testing. Prior to being returned to service, safety protective grounding equipment grounds that have has been repaired or modified shall be tested. Substantiation: The term “ground” is defined as “the earth” in Article 100. Literally this section would read...whether the earths shall be installed for the duration of the task...This revision is proposed to promote consistent use of terms throughout NFPA 70E to assist all users in understanding the meaning or rules using defined terms. The more appropriate term here would appear to be protective grounding equipment of safety grounding equipment. The term “protective grounding equipment” is used by OSHA in a few rules as in the following example: 1910.269(n)(4) “Protective grounding equipment.” 1910.269(n)(4)(i) Protective grounding equipment shall be capable of conducting the maximum fault current that could flow at the point of grounding for the time necessary to clear the fault. This equipment shall have an ampacity greater than or equal to that of No. 2 AWG copper. Note: Guidelines for protective grounding equipment are contained in American Society of Testing and Materials Standard Specifications for Temporary Grounding Systems to be used on De-Energized Electric Power Lines and Equipment, ASTM F855-1990. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the recommendation by replacing “safety” with “temporary”. Committee Statement: The committee action is for consistency with terminology used in this standard to describe this type of equipment. The committee notes that the standard referenced in the substantiation should be ASTM F 2249-03 (2009). Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: REGE, T.: Accept with comments-Committee action was correct. It should be noted that the referenced standard in the substantiation ASTM F855 is a destructive design test. If grounds are repaired and tested before returning them to service, the only appropriate test would be ASTM 2249 Standard Specification for In-Service Test Methods for Temporary Grounding Jumper Assemblies Used on De-Energized Electric Power Lines and Equipment. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-407 Log #58 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (300.x (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas A. Carpenter, Aerospace Testing Alliance Recommendation: Add a new section as follows: 300.XX Existing Installations. Existing electrical installations that do not comply with the provisions of this Standard shall be permitted to be continued in use unless the authority having jurisdiction determines that the lack of conformity with this Standard presents an imminent danger to occupants. Where changes are required for correction of hazards, a reasonable amount of time shall be given for compliance, depending on the degree of the hazard.

Substantiation: Many parts of Article 300 include installation requirements. If we are going to specify these, we need to provide clarification that existing installations do not have to be brought up to present code unless a safety hazard exists. The suggested verbiage to be added is a direct quote from the NEC Annex H except that Code was changed to Standard. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation relates to electrical installations and is the responsibility of the authority having jurisdiction for electrical installations. This language is not appropriate for inclusion in a standard covering safe work practices. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-408 Log #174 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (300.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Michael J. Johnston, National Electrical Contractors Association Recommendation: Revise as follows: Change the term “(R&D)” to the term “Research and Development (R&D).” No other changes in the section. Substantiation: This appears to be the first time the term appears in NFPA 70E. It should be spelled out and the acronym should follow in the first instance of use. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-409 Log #410 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (305 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Mark McNellis, Sandia National Laboratories Recommendation: Add new Article 305 to better align with new Chapters 105 and 205. All content is moved from Article 300 with no change in text. The remainder of Chapter 3 will be re-numbered by NFPA staff. 305.1 Scope. Chapter 3 covers special electrical equipment in the workplace and modifies the general requirements of Chapter 1. 305.2 Responsibility. The employer shall provide safety related work practices and employee training. The employee shall follow those work practices. 305.3 Organization. Chapter 3 of this standard is divided into articles. Article 300 applies generally_ Article 310 applies to electrolytic cells_ Article 320 applies to batteries and battery rooms. Article 330 applies to lasers. Article 340 applies to power electronic equipment. Article 350 applies to R&D laboratories. FPN: The NFPA 70E Technical Committee might develop additional chapters for other types of special equipment in the future. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the Article 110 task group after discussion with liason Jeff Sargent and Chair David Dini, the first four sections in Article 110 pertain to chapter one- not specifically Article 110. Additionally the introduction and format of Article 110 is not consistent with the introduction of chapters two, and three. This proposal and three others submitted by the task group are submitted to rectify these inconsistencies. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee recognizes that parallel numbering has merits, but in this case is not essential to the use and understanding of the standard. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We recommend the deletion of the existing FPN that appears after 300.3: FPN: The NFPA 70E Technical Committee might develop additional chapters for other types of special equipment in the future. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-410 Log #267 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (310.4(A)(1).1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Michael J. Johnston, National Electrical Contractors Association Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: (1) The skills and techniques to avoid dangerous contact with hazardous voltages between energized surfaces and between energized surfaces and ground grounded equipment, other grounded objects or the earth itself. Skills

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E and techniques might include temporarily insulating or guarding parts to permit the employee to work on energized parts. Substantiation: This proposal seeks to editorially clarify the requirements of this section by including grounded equipment or other grounded objects or parts in addition to just ground (the earth). The term “ground” is defined in Article 100 as “the earth.” This revision clarifies that the dangerous contact to be avoided is between energized surfaces and more than just the earth as this section is currently written. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-411 Log #101 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (310.5(1)(2)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas Doyle, Industrial Safety Integration Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: (2) Alter work procedures to eliminate the possibility reduce the probability and/or severity of harm due to of the arc flash hazard(s) Substantiation: Given that people are prone to make mistakes it is inappropriate to place the responsibility of “eliminating” arc flash hazards on the shoulders of the worker by telling them how to do the work. Risk can be reduced by using proper work procedures but hazards can only be eliminated through inherently or intrinsically safe design techniques. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation creates an indefinite quantification and reduces the current level of safety. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: I support the proposal. In reality, we can not eliminate the possibility of the arc flash and the proposal is accurate. NOTE: There is a problem with the ROP document with actions where it shows the action of the TC is to revise the section to reflect the proposal. I need to understand the action for this proposal. At this time, it is not clear. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-412 Log #102 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (310.5(2)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas Doyle, Industrial Safety Integration Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Arc flash hazard risk analysis shall be done for all routine tasks performed in the cell line work zone. The results of the arc flash hazard analysis shall be used in training employees in job procedures that minimize the possibility probability of arc flash hazards. The training shall be included in the requirements of 310.3. Substantiation: Please use the term “probability” rather than “possibility”. The possibility will always exist although the probability could be very low due to the training that has been provided. Minimizing the possibility of arc flash hazards can be achieved through intrinsically safe design measures. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation does not improve the level of safety that is currently specified. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: I support the proposal. The terminology proposed is accurate. Possibility is a term that is “digital” in nature. Either something is possible or it is not possible. Probability is more accurate in the context of the language because it is an analog value ranging from 0 to 1. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-413 Log #103 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (310.5(3)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas Doyle, Industrial Safety Integration Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: If an arc flash hazardous event is a possibility probable during nonroutine work, appropriate instructions shall be given to employees involved on how to minimize the possibility probability of a hazardous arc flash. Substantiation: Please use the term “probability” rather than “possibility”. Without the use of intrinsically safe design measures the possibility of an arc flash event will always exist although probability could be very low due in part to the instructions.

Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation does not improve the level of safety that is currently specified. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: See my explanation of negative vote on Proposal 70E-412. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-414 Log #104 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (310.5(C)(4)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas Doyle, Industrial Safety Integration Recommendation: Revise text as follows: (4) Arc Flash Hazard. If the possibility of an arc flash hard exists for either routine or nonroutine tasks, employees shall use appropriate safeguards. Regardless of the task under consideration, unless the probability of an arc flash hazard is eliminated, workers shall use appropriate arc flash protective measures. Substantiation: Please use the term “probability” rather than “possibility.” Without the use of intrinsically safe design measures the possibility of an arc flash event will always exist although the probability could be very low due in part to the instructions. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation does not improve the level of safety that is currently specified. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: See my explanation of negative vote on Proposal 70E-412. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-415 Log #105 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (310.5(D)(6)(b)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas Doyle, Industrial Safety Integration Recommendation: Revise 310.5(D)(6)(b) as follows: (b) Reducing the Effectiveness of Safeguards Bypassing of Safety Equipment. Safe work practice training shall include techniques to prevent any reduction in the effectiveness or the degree of protection that is intended to be provided by the protective measures prevent bypassing the protection of safety equipment. Clothing may increase the risk to which personnel are exposed bypass protective equipment if the clothing is wet. Trouser legs should be kept at appropriate length, and shirt sleeves should be a good fit so as not to drape while reaching. Jewellery and other electrically conductive metal accessories that could lead to an increase in risk may bypass protective equipment shall not be worn while working in the cell line working zone. Substantiation: It would seem in this clause the standard is speaking to “reducing the effectiveness of safeguards” rather than “Bypassing of Safety Equipment” If this is the intent the language should be reflective of that intent. There are other materials besides metal that could lead to an increase in risk. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation adds unnecessary complexity. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-416 Log #380 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (310.7 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Mike Doherty, Infrastructure Health & Safety Association / Rep. CSA Z462 Technical Committee Recommendation: Add text to read as follows: 310.7 Maintenance of Electrolytic Cells (1) Electrolytic cells and their electrical components and accessory equipment shall be kept in a safe and proper working condition. (2) A ground fault shall be investigated and removed without delay. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the CSA Z462 Workplace Electrical Safety full Technical Committee. Safety of persons within the cell line working zone depends on the isolation of the line from ground. Proper maintenance and the prompt removal of ground faults in conjunction with testing as required in 310.5(D)(12), will reduce the potential for injury.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Item (1) of the recommendation has merit and is better suited as a general requirement in Chapter 1. Item 2 introduces a vague term (“without delay”). Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-417 Log #237 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part (320) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: The Technical Correlating Committee advises that Article Scope statements are the responsibility of the Technical Correlating Committee and the Technical Correlating Committee “Accepts” the committee action. Submitter: Stephen McCluer, APC by Schneider Electric Recommendation: Deleted existing Article 320 and replace with new article as follows: ADD A NEW ARTICLE (Tentatively Numbered Article 325) Article 325 Safety Requirements Related to Batteries and Battery Rooms 325.1 Scope The requirements of this article cover the electrical work safety requirements necessary for the practical safeguarding of employees while working with exposed stationary storage batteries where the nominal voltage exceeds 50 volts. Informational note For additional information on safety best practices while working on stationary batteries, see the following documents (1) NFPA 1, Fire Code, 2009, Chapter 52, Stationary Storage Battery Systems (2) NFPA 70, National Electrical Code, 2011, Article 480, Storage Batteries, (3) IEEE Std. 450 , IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing and Replacement of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications, 2002 (4) IEEE Std. 937, Recommended Practice for Installation and Maintenance of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Photovoltaic Systems, 2007 (5) IEEE 1106 , IEEE Recommended Practice for Installation, Maintenance, Testing and Replacement of Vented Nickel-Cadmium Batteries for Stationary Applications, 2002 (6) IEEE 1184, IEEE Guide for Batteries for Uninterruptible Power Supply Systems, 2006 (7) IEEE 1188, IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing and Replacement of Valve-Regulated Lead-Acid (VRLA) Batteries for Stationary Applications, 2005 (8) IEEE Standard 1657, Recommended Practice for Personnel Qualifications for Installation and Maintenance of Stationary Batteries, 2009. (9) OSHA 29 CFR 1926.441, “Batteries and battery charging,” (10) OSHA 29 CFR 1910.305(j)(7), “Storage batteries” (11) DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 94-110, Applications Manual for the Revised NIOSH Lifting Equation, 1994 325.2 Definitions. For the purpose of this chapter, the following definitions shall apply Authorized personnel. The person in charge of the premises, or other persons appointed or selected by the person in charge of the premises, to perform certain duties associated with stationary batteries. Battery. A system consisting of two or more electrochemical cells connected in series or parallel and capable of storing the electrical energy received and which can give it back by reconversion. Battery room. A room specifically intended for the installation of batteries that have no other protective enclosure. Cell. The basic electrochemical unit, characterized by an anode and a cathode used to receive, store, and deliver electrical energy Electrolyte A solid, liquid, or immobilized liquid medium that provides the ion transport mechanism between the positive and negative electrodes of a cell. Nominal voltage. The value assigned to a cell or battery of a given voltage class for the purpose of convenient designation; the operating voltage of the cell or system may vary above or below this value Pilot cell. One or more cells chosen to represent the operating parameters of the entire battery (sometimes called “temperature reference cell). Prospective Fault Current. The highest level of fault current that can occur at a point on a circuit. This is the fault current that can flow in the event of a zero impedance short-circuit and if no protection devices operate. Valve-regulated lead-acid (VRLA) cell - A lead-acid cell that is sealed with the exception of a valve that opens to the atmosphere when the internal pressure in the cell exceeds atmospheric pressure by a pre-selected amount, and which provide a means for recombination of internally generated oxygen and the suppression of hydrogen gas evolution to limit water consumption. Vented cell - A type of cell in which the products of electrolysis and evaporation are allowed to escape freely into the atmosphere as they are generated (also called a “flooded cell”) 325.3 Qualified personnel Informative Note: For descriptions of the training recommended for various levels of battery technician certification, see IEEE Standard 1657,

Recommended Practice for Personnel Qualifications for Installation and Maintenance of Stationary Batteries (A) Qualification Only qualified personnel shall work on battery systems. (B) Documentation Personnel shall be trained, and records shall be maintained documenting such qualification, for service on the specific battery technology being serviced. (C) Education Training shall include demonstrated knowledge and skill levels on: (1) proper work environment (2) personal protective equipment (PPE) (3) electrical shock hazards (4) insulation (5) lockout/tagout procedures (6) electrostatic discharge (ESD) precautions (7) ventilation precautions (8) working clearances, egress paths, and task lighting (9) battery lifting and handling considerations (10) battery fire hazards and response (11) First aid 325.4 Safety procedures (A) General safety hazards (1) Battery Room or Enclosure Requirements (a) Personnel access to energized batteries Each battery room or battery enclosure shall be accessible only to authorized personnel (b) Illumination. Work on battery systems shall only be performed when lighting is sufficient for the technician to read necessary documents and to safely perform the work. (2) Apparel Personnel shall not wear electrically conductive objects such as jewelry while working on a battery system. (3) Alarms Where installed, alarms for early warning of abnormal conditions of battery operation shall be tested a minimum of once yearly. The alarm system shall be tested for an audible alarm and visual indication at the battery location, and where applicable, at a remote manned control point. Informational Note: Battery Conditions monitored for early warning typically include: (a) For vented cells (i) Overvoltage (ii) Undervoltage (iii) Overcurrent (iv) Ground fault (v) Ventilation systems in accordance with 320.5(C) (b) For VRLA cells (i) Overvoltage (ii) Undervoltage (iii) Overcurrent (iv) Ground fault (v) Over-temperature, as measured at the pilot cell (vi) Ventilation systems in accordance with 320.5© (4) Hazard Warnings The following warnings shall be posted at the entrance to the battery room or enclosure: (a) Electrical hazard warning signs indicating the shock hazard due to the battery voltage and the arc hazard due to the prospective short-circuit current Informational Note: Because internal resistance and/or prospective short-circuit are not always provided on battery container labels or data sheets, and because many variables can be introduced into a battery layout, the battery manufacturer should be consulted for accurate data. Variables can include, but are not limited to; - series connections - parallel connections - charging methodology - temperature - charge status - dc distribution cable size and length (b) Chemical hazard warning signs: (i) indicating the potential presence of explosive gas (when applicable to the battery type); (ii) prohibiting open flame and smoking; (iii) warning of the danger of chemical burns from the electrolyte (when applicable to the battery type); and (iv) applicable to the worst case when multiple battery types are installed in the same space (c) Notice requiring personnel to use and wear protective equipment and apparel appropriate to the approach boundary for the battery. (d) Notice prohibiting access to unauthorized personnel (B) Electrolyte hazards (1) Batteries with liquid electrolyte. The following protective equipment shall be available to employees performing any type of service on a battery with liquid electrolyte: (a) Goggles or face shield appropriate for the electrical hazard and the chemical hazard (b) Gloves appropriate for the chemical and electrical hazards (c) Protective aprons appropriate for the chemical hazard and electrical hazards (d) Portable or stationary water facilities for rinsing eyes and skin in case of contact with electrolyte

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E (e) Sufficient neutralizing agent to neutralize a spill from the largest battery container to: (i) a Ph between 7.0 and 9.0 for lead-acid batteries; or (ii) a Ph between 5.0 and 7.0 for alkaline batteries (6) Electrolyte spill clean-up and disposal tools (2) Batteries with solid or immobilized electrolyte. The following protective equipment shall be available to employees performing any type of service on a battery with solid or immobilized electrolyte: (a) Goggles or face shield appropriate for the electrical hazard (b) Gloves appropriate for the chemical and electrical hazards (c) Protective clothing appropriate for electrical hazard (d) Lifting devices of adequate capacity for units greater than 45 lbs (21.5 kg) (C) Electrical hazards (1) Arc Flash. When performing maintenance on or within reach of batteries, the minimum personnel protective equipment shall be in accordance with the recommendations of Table 325-1. (2) Battery Short-Circuit Current. The battery manufacturer shall be consulted regarding the sizing of the battery short-circuit protection and for battery short circuit current values. (3) DC Ground-Fault Detection. Ground-fault detection shall be based on the type of dc grounding systems utilized. Informational Note A dc grounding system can be one of four types: Type 1 – ungrounded. An ungrounded dc system is one in which neither pole of the battery is connected to ground. Work on such a system is normally carried out with the battery isolated from the battery charger. If an intentional ground is placed at one end of the battery, an increased shock hazard would exist between the opposite end of the battery and ground. Also, if another ground develops within the system (e.g., dirt and acid touching the battery rack), it can create a short circuit that could cause a fire. An ungrounded dc system is typically equipped with an alarm to indicate the presence of a ground fault. Type 2 – solid ground. A solidly grounded dc system is one in which either the positive or negative pole of the battery is connected directly to ground. No ground detection circuitry is required on this type of grounded system. Type 3 – resistance ground. A resistance grounded dc system is a variation of a Type 1 system in which the midpoint of the battery is connected to ground through a resistance. The resistance is typically used to enable operation of a ground fault alarm system. Type 4 – tapped ground. A tapped solid ground is one in which ground is connected either at the center point or at another point to suit the load system. No ground detection circuitry is required on this type of grounded system. (4) Tools and Equipment. (a) Tools and equipment for work on batteries shall be equipped with handles listed as insulated for the maximum working voltage (b) Battery terminals and all electrical conductors shall be kept clear of unintended contact with tools, test equipment, liquid containers, and other foreign objects. (D) Fire hazards (a) Portable or fixed Class C fire extinguisher shall be in battery rooms where suitable for the battery technology Informational note: (CO2

extinguishers are not recommended for most battery types because they have the potential to cause thermal shock to batteries, thereby increasing the possibility of damage). (b) Battery cell flame arresters shall be inspected for proper installation and unobstructed ventilation (E) Handling hazards (1) When handling battery containers, personnel shall not be exposed to a NIOSH lifting index greater than 3.0 (2) Lifting devices of adequate capacity shall be used for loads greater than 45 lbs (21.5kg) (3) Lifting harnesses or devices shall be used when designed by the battery manufacturer for specific battery types. Substantiation: This proposal deletes all of the requirements from the 2009 edition related to installation and/or design. Such requirements are beyond the scope of NFPA 70E (and most belong in NFPA 70). We also propose revisions to technical items and we propose new text to address best safety practices as found in battery standards. This proposal recommends to delete the existing Article 320 and create a new Article (arbitrarily numbered here as Article 325, subject to NFPA Editors to select the appropriate renumbering). We propose a totally new Article because of the extent of proposed changes. Reorganization and renumbering could cause confusion between new and older editions that have the same paragraph numbers but different text. 1. (325.1) Scope: We recognize that Scope is the jurisdiction of the Technical Correlating Committee. (a) The existing scope implies that Article 320 applies to the installation of battery systems. Installation requirements are beyond the scope of NFPA 70E. Design and installation features should be the responsibility of NFPA 70 (NEC). The Scope should correctly show that it applies to work safety practices associated with working on and handling of battery systems during stages of battery installation, operation, maintenance, and removal in order to be consistent with the Scope of NFPA 70E that is defined in 90.2. (b) The existing scope is so broad that it applies even to extremely small batteries that would not normally be in the purview of codes such as the Uniform Fire Code or the NEC.

(c) An upper limit is not put on the voltage rating. Although the great majority of battery systems are below 600 Vdc, higher voltages do exist in some industrial applications. Submitters believe that the safety guidelines enumerated here apply equally to all voltages likely to be encountered. (d) A table of recommended PPE is proposed in new annex (see separate proposal); it addresses voltages up to and beyond 600 Vdc. 2. (325.1 FPN) References are included in a non-mandatory informational note below the Scope. Because NFPA has no standards for battery systems, the documents listed are those with safety requirements specifically for battery systems. The references in most cases are technology-specific (e.g., battery chemistry) and activity-specific (e.g., installation, testing, and maintenance). Versions shown are current as of the date of this submission. 3. (325.2) Definitions are included here as they apply specifically to this section on battery systems. All of the defined terms are used elsewhere in the Article. The definitions are extracted from referenced battery standards to avoid conflicts in terminology. Where variations occur, the definitions proposed here would have precedence for purposes of applying this Standard. 4. (325.3) Qualification and certification. Prior to December 2009 no standard existed for battery certification. Anybody could “certify” anybody else. We have referenced a standard created by IEEE that identifies the minimum skills that any technician should have before being exposed to the hazards of a battery system. By definition, all work on battery systems should be considered “hot work.” The standard referenced in the informational note gives recommendations for curriculum at different competency levels. The skills identified in 325.3C should be the minimum for a technician to be identified as a “qualified person.” Ignorance in any of these areas could result in severe injury and/or property damage. This proposal requires that training be documented. 5. (325.4) Safety procedures - This proposal organizes the safety issues into categories appropriate to battery systems: (A) general safety; (B) electrolyte safety; (C) electrical safety; (D) fire hazards; and (E) handling hazards. These are the safety areas identified in several battery standards. 6. (A) The general safety section prohibits access to battery rooms by anyone who is not qualified to be there. It requires sufficient lighting to perform work safely, but it does not prescribe the installation details. It prohibits the wearing of jewelry or clothing that could be a hazard in contact with energized dc bus. It requires periodic verification of alarms systems (when they exist) to ensure that they can alert technicians to abnormal and/or unsafe conditions. It does not require alarm systems to be installed because that would be an installation requirement that can be found in the NEC, Mechanical Code, or other Codes. It requires that warnings be posted identifying the electrical and chemical hazards that may be present, recognizing that not all battery technologies have the same hazards. 7. (B) The electrolyte safety section identifies appropriate PPE and tools for use with chemical battery systems. Exposure to electrolyte is not technically an electrical safety issue, but it can be inherent in any battery handling activity. Not all battery systems potentially expose technicians to electrolyte. Depending upon the battery chemistry, electrolyte may be acidic or alkaline, so PPE is listed for each type. 8. (C) The electrical safety section refers the reader to the table (arbitrarily identified as Table 325-1) in a new Annex xx (submitted as a separate proposal) for PPE clothing, gloves, and insulated tools. (Note to TCC: These two proposals can be treated separately; one is not contingent upon the other. If this proposal is accepted and the other is rejected, this proposal should be accepted in principle and in part and the reference to the Annex should be deleted. The referenced Table will have to be renumbered as needed.) This proposal directs the user to the battery manufacturer as the only source for accurate short circuit values for any given battery cell. It deletes reference to rules of thumb for short circuit values because there are too many variables; a miscalculation could possibly result in an exploding circuit breaker and personnel injury. An Informational Note identifies four different battery grounding methods and the corresponding ground fault detection methods that a technician should understand before servicing a battery. 9. (D) Fire hazards are normally the jurisdiction of the Fire Code (NFPA 1). This proposal requires potable fire extinguishers when no fixed fire suppression system is in place. It also requires inspection of the flame arresters that are required by the Fire Code. 10. (E) Handling hazards are technically not electrical. However, they are part of the safety requirements associated with handling electrical storage batteries. This section requires NIOSH compliance. It also requires lifting devices that are suitable for the type of battery. Inappropriate battery handling is a major cause of injury, damage, and electrolyte spills. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle in Part The committee accepts the recommendation in principle in part as follows: 1. Accept the recommendation in principle as modified by the committee actions on Proposals 418 through 487. 2. Revise the committee action on Proposal 70E-460 by adding a new 320.5(C) to read: (C) Personnel shall not wear electrically conductive objects such as jewelry while working on a battery system. 3. Revise the committee action on Proposal 70E-485 by adding a new Informational Note following 320.7(B) Warning Signs, list item (1) to read: Informational Note: Because internal resistance and/or prospective short-circuit are not always provided on battery container labels or data sheets, and because

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E many variables can be introduced into a battery layout, the battery manufacturer should be consulted for accurate data. Variables can include, but are not limited to; - series connections - parallel connections - charging methodology - temperature - charge status - dc distribution cable size and length 4. Reject the following portions of the recommendation: (a) All of 325.3. Qualified personnel (b) 325.4(B)(1)(e) and 325.4(B)(1)(6) (the committee notes that the 6 should probably be a (f)). (c) 325.4(B)(2)(d) (d) 325.4 (C)(1) (e) 325.4(D) (a) and Informational Note Committee Statement: 1. The accept in principle action on this recommendation is based on the committee’s accept, accept in principle, and accept in principle in part actions on Proposals 418 through 487. 2. The accepted revision modifying the committee action on Proposal 70E-460 is deemed necessary for employee safety and are appropriate for inclusion in this standard. 3. The accepted revision modifying the committee action on Proposal 70E-485 is deemed necessary for employee safety and are appropriate for inclusion in this standard. 4. The rejected portions of the recommendation are installation requirements that are outside the scope of this standard or are covered elsewhere in the standard. The following correspond to the rejected portions of the recommendation identified in the committee meeting action. (a) Training requirements for persons that work on specialized equipment are presently addressed in 110.6 (D). (b) Environmental requirements not electrical safety issues. Such requirements are within, the purview of NFPA 1, Fire Code, Chapter 52 Stationary Storage Battery Systems, Sections 52.3.4 Spill Control and 52.3.5 Neutralization. (c) Lifting and rigging requirements are outside the scope of this document. Lifting devices may not exist that for all types of units. (d) The concept of keeping clear of unintended contact is vague. Measures can be implemented to protect against unintended contact. Equipment that is accessible for testing presents the risk of unintended contact. (e) Specific fire suppression equipment requirements are outside the scope of NFPA 70E. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: WILMER, K.: Committee action should indicate that 325.4.(E) Handling Hazards is not accepted. Requiring employers to comply with NIOSH lifting index is not appropriate. Ergonomic lifting hazards is outside the scope of NFPA 70E. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-418 Log #285 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (320.1) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: The Technical Correlating Committee advises that Article Scope statements are the responsibility of the Technical Correlating Committee and the Technical Correlating Committee “Accepts” the committee action. The Technical Correlating Committee understands that the recommended change in this proposal modifies the text in Proposal 70E-417. Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: 320.1 Scope The requirements of t This article shall apply to the covers electrical work-safety requirements related to installations of for the practical safeguarding of employees while working with exposed stationary storage batteries and battery rooms with a stored capacity exceeding 1 kWh or a nominal voltage that exceeds 50 volts, nominal. but does not exceed 650 volts Substantiation: The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. The NFPA 70E battery task group recognizes that Scope is the jurisdiction of the Technical Correlating Committee and proposes the change for the following reasons. 1. The phrase “The requirements of this article shall apply to…” is replaced with “This article covers…” This is an editorial change only to be consistent with NEC style. 2. The existing scope implies that Article 320 applies to the installation of battery systems. Installation requirements are actually the responsibility of NFPA 70 (NEC). The scope should correctly show that it applies to work-safety practices associated with working on battery systems during stages of battery installation, operation, maintenance, and removal in order to be consistent with the Scope of NFPA 70E as defined in 90.2. 3. The existing scope is so broad that it applies even to extremely small batteries that would not normally be in the purview of codes such as the

Uniform Fire Code. 4. The scope should cover battery systems that exceed 650 volts because higher voltage battery systems are used in some industrial applications. There should be a minimum voltage requirement but not a maximum voltage requirement for battery systems within the scope of NFPA-70E section 90.2. 5. The term “exposed” is inserted to clarify that it is not the intent to regulate battery systems in which a worker would not normally have direct contact with a battery, such as integrated batteries or battery cartridges that do not expose a worker to electrical or chemical hazards. 6. The term battery room is deleted because worker safety applies to batteries no matter where they are located (e.g., in enclosures or battery cabinets). 7. The reference to kWh is deleted because the term is both unnecessary and inappropriate for battery systems. See attached data sheets for examples. Batteries are rated in ampere-hours (for long duration batteries) or watts per cell (for high-rate discharge batteries). Any rating must include the discharge rate, the end voltage, and the duration of discharge, and whether battery strings are connected in parallel. Note: Supporting Material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle 320.1 Scope The requirements of t This article shall apply to the covers electrical work- safety requirements related to installations of for the practical safeguarding of employees while working with exposed stationary storage batteries and battery rooms with a stored capacity exceeding 1 kWh or a nominal with voltage that exceeds 50 volts, nominal. but does not exceed 650 volts Committee Statement: The committee action makes editorial revisions for clarity. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-419 Log #286 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.1, FPN 1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Update FPN to include the chapter of referenced material. (1) NFPA 1, Fire Code, Chapter 52, 2009, Substantiation: This addition is required by the NEC style manual. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-420 Log #287 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.1, FPN 2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: (2) NFPA 70, National Electrical Code, Article 480, Storage Batteries, 2008 2011 Substantiation: The fine print note should be updated to the latest version of the NEC Code. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-421 Log #288 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.1, FPN 4) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete FPN 4. (4) IEEE Std. 484, Recommended Practice for Installation Design and Installation of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications, 2002 Substantiation: The safety issues referenced by this FPN are adequately addressed in IEEE 450 which is referenced in FPN 3. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

70E-176

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-422 Log #289 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.1, FPN 5) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete the FPN reference in Article 320 and renumber remaining FPNs. (5) IEEE 485, Recommended Practice for Sizing Vented Lead-Acid Storage Batteries for Stationary Applications, 1997 Substantiation: The reference applies to the sizing of batteries which is an engineering design requirement and outside the scope of Article 320. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-423 Log #290 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.1, FPN 8) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete the FPN reference in Article 320 and renumber remaining FPNs. (8) IEEE Std 1187, Recommended Practice for Installation Design and Installation of Valve-Regulated Lead-Acid Storage Batteries for Stationary Applications, 2002, Substantiation: The information referenced is duplicated in IEEE 1188 The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Committee Statement: The committee notes that this recommendation should have been numbered as FPN item (9). The title is corrrect but the number from the current standard is incorrect. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-424 Log #291 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.1, FPN 11) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete the FPN reference in Article 320 and renumber remaining FPNs. (11) IEEE 1189, IEEE Guide for Selection of Valve-Regulated Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications, 1996 Substantiation: The reference applies to the selection of batteries which is beyond the scope of this article. It is an engineering design issue rather than a safe work practice. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-425 Log #292 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.1, FPN 12) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete the FPN reference in Article 320 and renumber remaining FPNs. (12) IEEE 1375, IEEE Guide for the Protection of Stationary Battery Systems, 1996 (R2003) Substantiation: Work safety practices in this document duplicate what is in IEEE 1184 which was previously referenced as FPN #8. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-426 Log #293 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.2.Accessories) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete the definition of accessories. Accessories. Items supplied with the battery to facilitate the continued operation of the battery. Substantiation: This term is not used in the current standard other than in the definitions. The definition is not used in the 2009 edition of NFPA 70-E. The term is not used in companion proposals by the NFPA 70E battery task group. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-427 Log #294 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.2.Authorized Person) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Revise the definition of Authorized Person to read. Authorized person Personnel. The person in charge of the premises, or other persons appointed or selected by the person in charge of the premises, to perform certain duties associated with stationary storage batteries the battery installation on the premises. Substantiation: The term authorized person is not used in the 2009 edition of NFPA 70E. . The term “authorized personnel” is used in companion proposals by the NFPA 70E battery task group and the revised text more accurately reflects this. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-428 Log #295 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.2.Battery) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Revise the definition of Battery to read. Battery. An electrochemical A system consisting of two or more electrochemical cells connected in series or parallel and capable of storing under chemical form the electrical energy received and which can give it back by reconversion. Substantiation: It is important to clarify the difference between a “cell” and a ”battery,” which tend to incorrectly be used interchangeably. Also, a “battery system” under NFPA terms includes other elements that are not included in this definition. This revised definition is consistent with the definitions used in IEEE stationary battery standards. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-429 Log #296 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.2.Battery Room) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Revise the definition of Battery room to read. Battery Room. A Rroom specifically intended for the installation of batteries that have no other protective enclosure. Substantiation: Revision corrects grammatical error. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

70E-177

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-430 Log #297 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.2.Cell) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Revise the definition of Cell to read. Cell. The basic electrochemical unit, characterized by an anode and a cathode used to receive, store, and deliver electrical energy An assembly of electrodes and electrolyte that constitutes the basic unit of the battery. Substantiation: It is important to clarify the difference between a “cell” and a “battery,” which tend to incorrectly be used interchangeably. Also, a “battery system” under NFPA terms includes other elements that are not included in this definition. This revised definition is consistent with the definitions used in IEEE stationary battery standards. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-431 Log #298 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.2.Charging, Constant Current Charge, Constant Voltage Charge, Container, Discharging) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete the following definitions. Charging. An operation during which a battery receives electric energy from an electrical circuit. The quantity of electricity that is known as the charge and is usually measured in ampere-hour. Constant Current Charge. A charge during with the current is maintained at a constant value. Constant Voltage Charge. A charge during with the voltage across the battery terminals is maintained at a constant value Container. A container for the plate pack and the electrolyte of a cell of a material impervious to attack by the electrolyte. Discharging. An operation during which a battery delivers electric current to an external circuit by the conversion of chemical energy into electrical energy. Substantiation: The terms Constant Voltage Charge, Discharging are not used in the body of the standard they only appear in the definitions. The new 2013 version of Article 320 proposed by the battery task group will not contain the words charging, Constant Current Charge, Constant Voltage Charge, Container or Discharging. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-432 Log #299 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.2.Definitions) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete text as follows: 320.2 Definitions. For the purpose of this chapter, the following definitions shall apply Substantiation: This is an editorial change. The lead sentence is not necessary. Deleting it would be consistent with NEC style. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-433 Log #300 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.2.Electrolyte) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Revise the definition of Electrolyte to read. Electrolyte. A solid, liquid, or aqueous immobilized liquid medium that provides the ion transport mechanism that permits ionic conduction between the positive and negative electrodes of a cell. Substantiation: Electrolyte can be in the form of free-flowing liquid (a term used in NFPA 1 Article 52), solid (such as lithium polymer or gelled VRLA batteries), or immobilized (such as absorbed glass mat [AGM] VRLA batteries. This revised definition is consistent with the definitions used in IEEE

stationary battery standards The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-434 Log #301 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.2.Electrolyte Density) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete the following definition and FNP. Electrolyte density. Density of the electrolyte, measured in kilograms per cubic meter at a specific temperature (density of pure water = 1000 kilograms per cubic meter at 4 ?Celsius). FPN: The density of an electrolyte was formerly indicated by its specific gravity. Specific gravity is the ratio of the density of the electrolyte to the density of pure water. S.G. = electrolyte density in kilkograms per cubic meter/1000. Substantiation: This term is not used in the current standard other than in the definitions. The new 2013 version of Article 320 proposed by the battery task group will not contain the words electrolyte density. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-435 Log #302 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.2.Flame Arrested Vent Plug) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete the following definition. Flame-Arrested Vent Plug. A vent plug design that provides protection against internal explosion when the cell or battery is exposed to a naked flame or external spark. Substantiation: This term is not used in the current standard other than in the definitions. The new 2013 version of Article 320 proposed by the battery task group will not contain the term Flame-Arrested Vent Plug. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-436 Log #303 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.2.Gassing) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete the following definition. Gassing. The formation of gas produced by electrolyte Substantiation: This term is not used in the current standard other than in the definitions. The new 2013 version of Article 320 proposed by the battery task group will not contain the term Gassing. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-437 Log #304 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.2.Intercell and Interrow Connection) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete the following definition. Intercell and Interrow Connection. Connections made between rows of cells or at the positive and negative terminals of the battery that might include lead-plated terminal plates, cables with lead, plated lugs, and lead-plated rigid copper components and for nickel-cadmium cells, nickel-plated copper intercell connections.

70E-178

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Substantiation: This term is not used in the current standard other than in the definitions. The new 2012 version of Article 320 proposed by the battery task group will not contain the term Intercell and Interrow Connection. The term relates to specific installation requirements rather than the safeguarding the employee. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-438 Log #305 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.2.Intercell Connector Safety Cover) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete the following definition. Intercell Connector Safety Cover. Insulated cover to shroud the terminals and intercell connectors from inadvertent contact by personnel or accidental short circuiting. Substantiation: This term is not used in the current standard other than in the definitions. The new 2013 version of Article 320 proposed by the battery task group will not contain the term Intercell Connector Safety Cover. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-439 Log #306 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.2.Nominal Voltage) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Revise text for the following definition. Nominal Voltage. An approximate value of voltage used to identify a type of battery. The value assigned to a cell or battery of a given voltage class for the purpose of convenient designation; the operating voltage of the cell or system may vary above or below this value Substantiation: Due to the introduction of new battery types, such as Li-Ion, NMH, etc., the definition currently used in the NEC is not complete and technology-specific. The proposed definition is a non-technology-specific definition. This revised definition is consistent with the definitions used in IEEE stationary battery standards. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-440 Log #307 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.2.Pilot Cell) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Revise text for the following definition. Pilot Cell. One or more cells chosen to represent the operating parameters of the entire battery (sometimes called “temperature reference” cell).A selected cell of a battery that is considered to be representative of the average state of the battery or part thereof. Substantiation: Stating that the cell represents the operating parameters used for reference more clearly describes its purpose. This revised definition is consistent with the definitions used in IEEE stationary battery standards. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-441 Log #308 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.2.Secondary Battery, Secondary Cell, Stepped Stand, Terminal Post, Tiered Stand) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete the following definitions. Secondary Battery. Two or more rechargeable cells electrically connected and used as a source of energy. Secondary Cell. A rechargeable assembly of electrodes and electrolytes that constitute the basic unit of a battery. Stepped Stand. Containers placed in rows and these rows are placed at different levels to form a stepped arrangement. Terminal Post. A part provided for the connection of a cell or a battery to external conductors. Tiered Stand. Where rows of containers are placed above containers of the same or another battery. Substantiation: The terms, secondary battery, secondary cell are not used anywhere in the 2009 edition except in definitions. Stepped stand, terminal post and tired stand, secondary battery, and secondary cell will not be used in the 2013 edition if battery task groups proposals are accepted. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-442 Log #310 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.2.Valve-Regulated Lead-Acid (VRLA)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Revise text of the following definition. Valve-regulated Lead-acid (VRLA) battery Cell - A lead-acid cell that is sealed with the exception of a valve that opens to the atmosphere when the internal pressure in the cell exceeds atmospheric pressure by a pre-selected amount, and which provides VRLA cells provide a means for recombination of internally generated oxygen and the suppression of hydrogen gas evolution to limit water consumption. A battery that has no provisions for the addition of water or electrolyte or for external measurement of electrolyte specific gravity. Substantiation: The existing 2009 definition is focused on whether water replenishment is required; the existing 2009 definition could be applied to several types of batteries that are not VRLA. The primary features of a VRLA cell are: 1- the valve that opens to allow escape of gas under pressures and then close to prevent ingress of air; and 2 - the internal recombination of hydrogen and oxygen rather than allowing these gases to escape into the atmosphere. It also clarifies that the basic unit is a cell, not a battery. The latter is a group of cells. This revised definition is consistent with the definitions used in IEEE stationary battery standards. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-443 Log #311 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.2.Vent Plug) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete the following definitions. Vent Plug. A part closing the filling hole that is also employed to permit the escape of gas. Substantiation: This term is not used in the current standard other than in the definitions. The new 2013 version of Article 320 proposed by the battery task group will not contain the words vent plug. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

70E-179

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-444 Log #312 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.2.Vented Battery) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Revise text of the following definition. Vented battery cell - A battery type of cell in which the products of electrolysis and evaporation are allowed to escape freely into the atmosphere as they are generated. (Also called “flooded cell”) Substantiation: A distinction is made that the gasses leave the battery “freely” as they are generated rather than after they have built up under pressure (such as in a VRLA cell). The terms “flooded cell” (which refers to the physical state of the electrolyte) and “vented cell” (which refers to the nature of the gas that is created from electrolysis) are often incorrectly used interchangeably. It also clarifies that the basic unit is a cell, not a battery. The latter is a group of cells. This revised definition is consistent with the definitions used in IEEE stationary battery standards. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-445 Log #309 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.2.VRLA) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete the following definitions. VRLA. Valve-regulated lead acid storage battery. Substantiation: Delete this definition. This term is already defined in Article 320 as valve-regulated lead-acid cell. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-446 Log #313 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Add new text to Article 320.3 by relocating 240.3 and delete text from 240. 3 320.3 (D) Cell Flame Arresters and Cell Ventilation. Battery cell ventilation openings shall be unobstructed, and cell flame arresters shall be maintained. 240.3 Cell Flame Arresters and Cell Ventilation. Battery cell ventilation openings shall be unobstructed, and cell flame arresters shall be maintained. Substantiation: Moving this requirement would bring battery related maintenance into the area of the standard (Article 320) that is specifically intended to address safety requirements related to batteries. Having battery safety requirements in two different Articles make finding and locating all necessary requirements cumbersome. Note: This proposal intends to unite all battery requirements into one section of the standard. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-447 Log #314 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.3, Title) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Revise the title of Section 320.3 Battery Connection Testing, Maintenance, and Operation Substantiation: The term “Battery connection” is an installation requirement for the NEC. The section should address workplace safety issues associated with testing, maintenance and operation of battery systems not installation. The battery task group has submitted additional proposals regarding Article 320.3 to remove installation requirements. The new title better describes the content that the task group intends this article to have. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept

Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-448 Log #315 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.3(A)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete all of Article 320.3 (A) (A) Method of Connection FPN No. 1: Batteries usually consist of a number of identical cells connected in series. The voltage of a series connection of cells is the voltage of a single cell multiplied by the number of cells. If cells of sufficiently large capacity are available, then two or more series-connected strings of equal numbers of cells could be connected in parallel to achieve the desired rated capacity. The rated capacity of such a battery is the sum of the capacities of a group of cells comprising a single cell from each of the parallel branches. FPN No. 2: Cells of unequal capacity should not be connected in series. FPN No. 3: Parallel connections of batteries are not recommended for constant current-charging applications. FPN No. 4: Cells connected in series have high voltages that could produce a shock hazard. Substantiation: Delete all of Section 320.3 (A). It has no text. It consists only of fine print notes that are tutorial only having to do with installation and design of battery systems. While it may be useful information, it has no guidance for employee behavior or methods and should be deleted. Note: If accepted, then the definition of Constant Current Charge will no longer be needed. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-449 Log #316 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.3(B)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Revise Article 320.3 (B) to read: (B) (A) Battery Short-Circuit Current. The battery manufacturer shall be consulted regarding the sizing of the battery short-circuit protection and for battery short circuit current values Exception If information regarding the short-circuit protection of a battery is not available from the manufacturer, the prospective fault level at the battery terminals shall be considered to be twenty times the nominal battery capacity at the 3-hour rate. FPN: Battery short-circuit current = (battery voltage) / (internal resistance) Substantiation: Battery short-circuit current calculation is technically a installation requirement that should be stipulated in NFPA 70 (NEC). However, as part of good workplace safety practice the fault current should be calculated by a qualified person and posted as required by paragraph 320.7(A). We are attaching examples of data sheets for various types of batteries on which no short circuit values are given. Because the values of a “system” can vary depending on how cells and strings are configured, the calculations should be performed by an engineer or other qualified person. The exception should be deleted. The rules of thumb for estimating battery short circuit current vary significantly by battery technology, size, and many other factors. It is much better to get a short circuit value from the manufacturer who has obtained it through testing. The existing FPN in the 2009 edition should be deleted. Batteries have internal impedance, not just resistance. Therefore modeling can be very complex. It is much better to get a short circuit value from the manufacturer who has obtained it through testing. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-450 Log #317 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.3(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete all of Article 320.3 (C) (C) Connection Between Battery and DC Switching Equipment (1) General. Any cable, busbar, or busway forming the connection between the

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E battery terminal and the dc switching equipment shall be rated to withstand the prospective short-circuit current. FPN: The available short-circuit current should be assumed for a time period of at least 1 second. Outside busbars and cables should be both of the following: 1) Insulated from the battery terminals to a height of 3.75 m (12 ft 4 in) or to the battery room ceiling, whichever is lower. 2) Clearly identified and segregated from any other supply circuits. 2) Cable. Cables shall be effectively clamped and sufficient support shall be provided throughout the length of cables to minimize sag and prevent undue strain from being imposed on the cable. (3) Busbars. FPN: Busbars should be insulated throughout their length by an isulating material not affected by the acid fumes that are present in a battery room. The steelwork supporting the busbar system should be installed so as not to restrict access to the battery for the purpose of maintenance. (4) Busways. FPN: Busways should be fully enclosed and able to withstand high levels of fault current without danger. Substantiation: These are not work safety practices; they are installation requirements These specifications for electrical connection installation requirements should be addressed in NFPA 70 (NEC) not NFPA 70E. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-451 Log #318 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.3(D)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete Article 320.3 (D) (D) DC Switching Equipment. Switching equipment shall comply with applicable installation requirements.FPN: For further information concerning electrical installation requirements, refer to NFPA 70, National Electrical Code. Substantiation: These are not work safety practices; they are installation requirements These specifications for installation of DC Switching Equipment are requirements that should be addressed in NFPA 70 (NEC) not NFPA 70E. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-452 Log #319 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.3(E)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete text of 320.3(E) Terminals and Connectors. Intercell and battery terminal connections shall be constructed of materials, either intrinsically resistant to corrosion or suitably protected by surface finish against corrosion. The joining of materials that are incompatible in a corrosive atmoshpere shall be avoided. FPN No.1: To prevent mechanical stress on the battery terminal posts, the connection between the battery and any busbar system or large cable should be insulated flexible cable of suitable rating. FPN No. 2: The takeoff battery terminals and busbar connections should be shrouded or protected by physical barriers to prevent accidental contact. Substantiation: Delete this requirement. Specifications for terminals and connectors are design / installation requirements that should be addressed in design documents, or installation documents such as NFPA 70 (NEC). They are not electrical work safety practices Note: If accepted, then the term Terminal Post can be removed from the definitions. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-453 Log #320 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (320.3(F)) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: The Technical Correlating Committee directs that the committee clarify the committee action taken on this proposal. The Technical Correlating Committee understands that the committee action on this proposal accepts the recommended text in (B) and also modifies the Fine Print Note. This action will be considered as a public comment. Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Renumber, Change title and revise text of Article 320.3 (F) and move itemized text to FPN (F) (B) DC Systems Grounding and Ground-Fault Detection. Ground-fault detection shall be based on the type of dc grounding systems utilized. DC System Grounding and Ground-Fault Detection. One of the four types of available dc grounding systems, described as Type 1 through Type 4 shall be used. FPN: Operators must understand the grounding system to safely use the appropriate ground fault detection system. A dc grounding system can be one of four types: (1) Type 1. The An ungrounded dc system, in which neither pole of the battery is connected to ground. FPN: Work on such a system is normally carried out with the battery isolated from the battery charger. If an intentional ground is placed at one end of the battery, an increased shock hazard would exist between the opposite end of the battery and ground. Also, if another ground develops within the system (e.g., dirt and acid touching the battery rack), it creates a short circuit that could cause a fire. An ungrounded dc system should be is typically equipped with an alarm to indicate the presence of a ground fault. (2) Type 2. The A solidly grounded dc system, where in which either the positive or negative pole of the battery is connected directly to ground. No ground detection circuitry is required on this type of grounded system. (3) Type 3. The A resistance grounded dc system is a variation of a Type 1 system where in which the midpoint of the battery is connected to ground through a resistance. FPN: The resistance is typically used to permit enable operation of a current relay, which in turn operates an alarm ground fault alarm system (4) Type 4. The A tapped solid ground, either at the center point or at another point to suit the load system. No ground detection circuitry is required on this type of grounded system. Substantiation: Items 320.3(F) (1) through (4) are all tutorial in nature. They are neither requirements nor recommendations. They properly belong in a Informational Note (as proposed here) or in an informative Annex. Most of the text that was originally in mandatory paragraphs is retained but is now moved to an informative note (FPN) with some edits. Because ground fault detection is an operational issue it deserves to stay in NFPA 70E, even though the specification of a particular DC grounding system is a design/installation issue. Operators must understand the grounding system to safely use the appropriate ground fault detection system. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the recommended fine print note to read: FPN: Operators must understand the grounding system to safely use the appropriate ground fault detection system. A dc grounding system can be one of four types: (1) Type 1. The An ungrounded dc system, in which neither pole of the battery is connected to ground. FPN: Work on such a system is normally carried out with the battery isolated from the battery charger. If an intentional ground is placed at one end of the battery, an increased shock hazard would exist between the opposite end of the battery and ground. Also, if another ground develops within the system (e.g., dirt and acid touching the battery rack), it creates a short circuit that could cause a fire. An ungrounded dc system should be is typically equipped with an alarm to indicate the presence of a ground fault. (2) Type 2. The A solidly grounded dc system, where in which either the positive or negative pole of the battery is connected directly to ground. No ground detection circuitry is required on this type of grounded system. (3) Type 3. The A resistance grounded dc system is a variation of a Type 1 system where in which the midpoint of the battery is connected to ground through a resistance. FPN: The resistance is typically used to permit enable operation of a current relay, which in turn operates an alarm ground fault alarm system (4) Type 4. The A tapped solid ground, either at the center point or at another point to suit the load system. No ground detection circuitry is required on this type of grounded system. Committee Statement: The committee action removes mandatory language for Style Manual compliance. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-454 Log #321 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.3(G)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete Article 320.3 (G): Protection of DC Circuits. DC circuits shall be protected in accordance with the NEC Substantiation: This statement is unnecessary because circuit protection is automatically regulated by the NEC as stated. Specifications for circuit protection are installation requirements that should be addressed in NFPA 70 (NEC). They are not electrical work safety practices. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-455 Log #322 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part (320.3(H)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Revise text of 320.3(H) as follows: (H) (C) Alarms (1) Abnormal Battery Conditions. Alarms shall be provided for early warning of the following abnormal conditions of battery operation, when present, shall be tested yearly. (1) For vented batteries cells: a. Overvoltage b. Undervoltage c. Overcurrent d. Ground fault e. ventilation systems in accordance with 320.5 (C) (2) For VRLA cells batteries, Items (1)(a) through (1)(d) plus over-temperature, as measured at the pilot cell. a. Overvoltage b. Undervoltage c. Overcurrent d. Ground fault e. Over-temperature, as measured at the pilot cell. f. ventilation systems in accordance with 320.5 (C) (2) Warning Signal. The alarm system shall provide be tested for an audible alarm and visual indication at the battery location, and where applicable, at a remote manned control point. Substantiation: This rewording changes the requirements from an installation requirement to a maintenance requirement. It is important to clarify the difference between a “cell” and a battery, which tend to incorrectly be used interchangeably. This revised definition is consistent with the definitions used in IEEE stationary battery standards. Specifications for circuit protection are installation requirements that should be addressed in NFPA 70 (NEC). They are not work safety practices. However, routine testing of the circuits should be conducted to ensure safety. Testing of ventilation systems refers to 320.5(C) which is addressed in a separate proposal. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle in Part Revise the recommendation as follows: 1. Delete (1)(e) and (2)(f) 2. (1) Abnormal Battery Conditions. Alarms shall be provided for early warning of the following abnormal conditions of battery operation, when present, shall be tested yearly for the following: Committee Statement: The committee action deletes text because 320.5(C) no longer exists and makes editorial revisions for Style Manual compliance. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: The Committee Action may be appropriate, but the yearly test frequency has not been substantiated. The establishment of a test interval seems more appropriate to be included in NFPA 70B. Suggest the Technical Committee consider changing the test frequency to every 3 or 5 years based on comments received during the comment period.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-456 Log #225 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.4) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John McAlhaney, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions Recommendation: Delete 320.4, Installations of Batteries. Substantiation: The requirements in Article 320.4 are installation requirements that should not be included in NFPA 70E. Article 320 should only address safety related work practices consistent with the philosophy of Article 310, Safety Related Work Practices for Electrolytic Cells. Installation requirements are more appropriately written for NFPA 70, National Electric Code. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-457 Log #323 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.4) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete all text of 320.4. Substantiation: Specifications for battery installation, arrangement of cells, room layout, ventilation & room features are installation requirements that should be addressed in NFPA 70 (NEC) or building codes. They are not work safety related work practices. NFPA 1 Chapter 52.3.6 already contains requirements for the ventilation needed in battery rooms. Note: If accepted the definition of Charging and Container will not be needed. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-458 Log #226 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (320.5) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John McAlhaney, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions Recommendation: Delete 320.5, Battery Room Requirements. Substantiation: The requirements in Article 320.5 are installation requirements that should not be included in NFPA 70E. Article 320 should only address safety related work practices consistent with the philosophy of Article 310, Safety Related Work Practices for Electrolytic Cells. Installation requirements are more appropriately written for NFPA 70, National Electric Code. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee actions on Proposals 70E-459 through 70E-475 delete the installation requirements and retained the parts of 320.5 deemed to be safe work provisions. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-459 Log #324 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.5) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Revise title of Article 320.5: 320.5 Battery Room or Enclosure Requirements Substantiation: The present wording applies only to battery systems in dedicated battery rooms. Not all battery systems are located in dedicated battery rooms. Some are in enclosures located in computer rooms or other general purpose rooms. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

70E-182

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-460 Log #325 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.5(A) and 320.5(A)(1)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Revise Article 320.5 (A) and 320.5 (A)(1) (A) General. Personnel access to energized batteries The Each battery room or battery enclosure shall be accessible only to authorized personnel and shall be locked when unoccupied. (1) Battery Rooms or Areas Restricted to Authorized Personnel. Substantiation: Room access is a physical/installation requirement. However, limiting access to exposed energy is a workplace safety issue. Vented (flooded) batteries should be in dedicated battery rooms. In such spaces contact with energized bus could be possible. Locked doors could impede the ability to get to the battery plant in an emergency if keys are lost (or the person with the keys is not there). A lot of existing battery rooms are not locked for this reason. Combination keypads, badge swipes, fingerprint ID or other technologies are physical means to meet the intent of restricted access. Workplace operating procedures should identify what personnel are qualified and authorized to enter such spaces. The text “(1)Battery Rooms or Areas Restricted to Authorized Personnel” is no longer needed because it has been incorporated into the proposed 320.5 (A). The requirement “shall be locked when unoccupied” is not needed because it is redundant. “Accessible only to authorized personnel” implies that the cabinet or enclosure will be inaccessible (ie., locked) to unauthorized personnel when not being serviced by authorized personnel. Batteries such as VRLA and lithium ion that do not need to be in dedicated battery rooms should be in lockable enclosures. Examples include batteries in emergency lighting systems or UPS systems located in general use areas or IT spaces. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-461 Log #326 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.5(A)(1)a.) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete Article 320.5 (A)(1)(a) (a) Doors. The battery room and enclosure doors shall open outward. The doors shall be equipped with quickrelease, quick-opening hardware. Substantiation: Delete this requirement. It is a design and/or installation requirement that should be covered in NFPA 70 (NEC) and the means of egress is in NFPA 101 (Life Safety Code). It is not an electrical work safety practice. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-462 Log #327 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.5(A)(1)b.) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete of Article 320.5 (A)(1)(b) (b) Foreign Piping. Foreign piping that is not protected against corrosion shall not pass through the battery room. Substantiation: Delete this requirement. Specifications for battery room piping are an installation requirement that should be addressed in NFPA 70 (NEC). It is not an electrical work safety practices. Avoidance of water in any electrical room (except where required/necessary) is a good idea from a reliability perspective. However, there is no good reason to preclude other piping passing through the room (Batteries do not emit toxic or explosive gasses in enough quantity to matter if it ingresses into piping). Pipes should not be run directly over the tops of batteries if it can be avoided. Pipe joints/fittings should be prohibited above batteries. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-463 Log #329 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.5(A)(1)c. and (d)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete of Article 320.5 (A)(1)(c) and (d) (c) Passageways. Passageways shall be of sufficient width to allow the replacement of all battery room equipment. (d) Emergency Exits. Emergency exits shall be provided as required. Substantiation: Specifications for passageways to allow adequate working space are installation requirements that should be addressed in NFPA 70 (NEC). They are not electrical work safety practices. The emergency exit requirement is unnecessary because it is already covered in NFPA 101 (Life Safety Code). The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-464 Log #328 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.5(A)(1)e.) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete of Article 320.5 (A)(1)(e) and FPN (e) Access. Access and entrance to working space about the battery shall be provided as required by 110.26 of NFPA 70, National Electric Code.. FPN: Provision to include emergency services personnel and their equipment should be made. Substantiation: These specifications for working space around equipment are installation requirements that are addressed in NFPA 70 (NEC) and do not need to be repeated. They are not electrical work safety practices. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-465 Log #330 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.5(A)(2)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete of Article 320.5 (A)(2) (2) Battery Enclosures. All cells shall be readily accessible for inspection cleaning, and removal. Substantiation: Delete this requirement. Specifications for accessibility to equipment are installation requirements that should be addressed in NFPA 70 (NEC). They are not electrical work safety practices. Note that procedures such as inspection of electrolyte levels and refilling electrolyte are specific to vented (flooded) batteries. The latter are rarely put into enclosures. The enclosure requirement would apply to batteries such as VRLA or Li-Ion. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-466 Log #331 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.5(A)(3)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete of Article 320.5 (A)(3) (3) Battery Room Floor Loading. Floor loading shall take into account the seismic activity. Substantiation: Delete this requirement. Specifications for floor loading are installation requirements that should be addressed in NFPA 70 (NEC). They are not electrical work safety practices. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

70E-183

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-467 Log #332 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.5(A)(4) and FPN 2, FPN 1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete of Article 320.5 (A)(4) and FPN No.1 & FPN No. 2 (4) Battery Room Floor Construction and Finish.Battery systems containing free-flowing liquid electrolyte shall be provided with spill containment systems in accordance with the fire code.. FPN No. 1: The battery room floor should be of concrete construction. The floor should be graded so any spillage of electrolyte will drain to an area where the electrolyte could be neutralized before disposal. (The battery manufacturer should be consulted on the appropriate floor grading so as to reduce connection alignment problems.) FPN No. 2: The floor should be covered with an electrolyte-resistant, durable, antistatic, and slip-resistant surface overall, to a height 100 mm (4 in.) on each wall. Where batteries are mounted against a wall, the wall behind and at each end of the battery should be coated to a distance of 500 mm (20 in.) around the battery with an electrolyte resistant paint. Substantiation: NFPA 1 and the other Fire Codes offer much more and better detail on spill containment (“drip trays”, sealing of the floor, berms, etc.). They also limit it to larger battery installations with batteries that can spill (it is unnecessary for small battery installations and for VRLA and sealed battery technologies). Grading of the floors and sumps should be avoided in most facilities due to their inability to handle hazardous waste. Detailed guidelines for various types of spill containment, spill management, neutralization of various types of electrolytes, and contingency planning are all addressed in IEEE 1578. Note that the 4” requirement is a proscriptive spill containment requirement derived from older Fire Codes. The present NFPA 1 and other modern performance-based Fire Codes allow a variety of spill containment methods. Specifications for floor construction are design/installation requirements that should be addressed in NFPA 70 (NEC). They are not electrical work safety practices. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-468 Log #333 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.5(B)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete entire text of Article 320.5 (B) (B) Battery Layout and Floor Area. The battery layout and floor area shall meet the following requirement: (1) Battery Layout. The installation shall be so designed that, unless there is a physical barrier, potential differences exceeding 120 volts shall be separated by a distance of not less than 900 mm (36 in.) measured in a straight line in any direction. (2) Floor Area. The floor area shall allow for the following clearances. (a) Aisle Width. The minimum aisle width shall be 900 mm (36 in.). (b) Single Row Batteries. In addition to the minimum aisle width, there shall be a minimum clearance of 25 mm (1 in.) between a cell and any wall or structure on the side not requiring access for maintenance. This required clearance does not preclude battery stands touching adjacent walls or structures, provided that the battery shelf has a free air space for no less than 90 percent of its length. c) Double-Row Batteries. The minimum aisle width shall be maintained on one end and both sides of the battery. The remaining end shall have a minimum clearance of 100 mm (4 in.) between any wall or structure and a cell. (d) Tiered Batteries. Tiered batteries shall meet the requirements of 320.5(B)(2)(a), 320.5(B)(2)(b), and 320.5(B)(2)(c). In addition, there shall be a minimum clearance of 300 mm (12 in.) between the highest point of the battery located on the bottom tier and the lowest point of the underside of the upper runner bearers. e) Where a charger, or other associated electrical equipment, is located in a battery room, the aisle width between any battery and any part of the battery-charging equipment (including the doors when fully open) shall be at least 900 mm (36 in.). Substantiation: Delete this requirement. Specifications for battery layout and floor area are installation requirements that should be addressed in NFPA 70 (NEC). They are not electrical work safety practices. In earthquake-prone areas, additional clearance and rack bracing may be required to comply with the NFPA 5000 Building and Construction Code. Vibration and seismic considerations mean that minimum clearance should always be maintained to avoid damage to cells during even normal operation. For example, buildings can be subject to vibration from passing vehicles, from wind, manufacturing processes, etc. Building seismic requirements are addressed in the Building Code and ASCE/SEI 7-05 Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures.

The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-469 Log #334 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.5(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete entire text of of Article 320.5 (C) (C)Takeoff Battery Terminals and Outgoing Busbars and Cables. (1) Takeoff Battery Terminals. Outgoing busbars and cables shall meet the following requirements: (1) Be insulated from the battery terminals to a height of 3.75 m (12 ft 4 in.) or the battery room ceiling whichever is lower 2) Be clearly identified and segregated from any other supply circuits 3) Prevent mechanical stress on the battery post (2) Outgoing Busbars and Cables. The takeoff battery terminals and busbar connections shall comply with either of the following: (1) Be shrouded (2) Be protected by physical barriers to prevent accidental contact Substantiation: Delete this requirement. Specifications for battery terminals and busbars are installation requirements that should be addressed in NFPA 70 (NEC). They are not work safety practices Few nominal 48 VDC systems and smaller in North America today are insulated due to the relative safety of these lower voltages (NEC Article 110.27A does not require Guarding of Live parts below 50 VDC). Requiring insulation at these lower voltages only increases costs, makes maintenance much more difficult, and does very little to increase safety. It may increase reliability, but NFPA 70E is a personnel safety Code, not an equipment reliability standard. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: The proposal should be rejected. The scope of Article 320 does not apply to a nominal voltage below 50 volts, and the requirements of this section are important to worker safety. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-470 Log #335 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.5(D), 320.5(D)(1), and 320.5(D)(2)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: DELETE 320.5(D), 320.5(D)(1),and 320.5(D)(2) Intertier and Interrow Connections. The battery terminals and busbar and cable interconnections between rows shall comply with either of the following: (1) Be shrouded (2) Be protected by insulating barriers to prevent accidental contact Substantiation: Delete this requirement. Intertier and interrrow connections are equipment installation requirements that should be covered by NFPA 70 (NEC). The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: The proposal should be rejected. The requirements of this section are important to worker safety. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-471 Log #336 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.5(E), 320.5(E)(1), and 320.5(E)(2)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: DELETE 320.5(E), 320.5(E)(1),and 320.5(E)(2)Barriers. To avoid accidental contact with intercell connections, the following insulating barriers shall be installed. (1) Double-Row Batteries. Insulating barriers between double-row batteries shall be installed for the entire length of the battery extending 100 mm (4 in.) past the end terminal unless those terminals are shrouded. The barrier shall extend vertically a minimum of 400 mm (16 in.) above the exposed portion of the intercell connections and a minimum of 25 mm (1 in.) below the top of the battery container.

70E-184

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E 2) Batteries Above 120 Volts. Where the nominal voltage of the battery exceeds 120 volts, interblock barriers shall be installed to sectionalize the battery into voltage blocks not exceeding 120 volts. Barriers shall extend a minimum of 50 mm (2 in.) out from the exposed side of the battery and a minimum of 400 mm (16 in.) above the top of the container. Substantiation: Delete this requirement. Requirements for barriers are equipment installation requirements that should be covered by NFPA 70 (NEC). This is not a work safety practice NEC article 480 already addresses grouping of cells within a battery not to exceed 250 volts per group. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-472 Log #337 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (320.5(F), 320.5(F)(1), and 320.5(F)(2)) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: The Technical Correlating Committee directs that further consideration be given to the comments expressed in the voting. This action will be considered as a public comment. Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Revise and renumber text of 320.5 (F) AND DELETE 320.5(F)(1) and 320.5(F)(2) [B] Illumination. Work on battery systems shall only be performed when lighting is sufficient for the technician to read necessary documents and to safely perform the work. (1) Battery Room Lighting. Battery room lighting shall be installed to provide a minimum level of illumination of 300 lux (30 ft-candles). (2)\) Emergency Lighting. Emergency illumination shall be provided for safe egress from the battery room. Substantiation: The revised text clearly requires that a worker have enough light to do the work safely rather the setting a minimum lever. Providing a room lighting level is 300 lux (30 ft. candles) may not provide enough light at the point of work. Emergency Lighting is a design/installation requirement that is covered in Chapter 7.9 of NFPA 101 ‘Life Safety Code’. It is not a work safety practices that should be included in NFPA 70-E. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the recommendation to read: [B] Illumination. Work on battery systems shall only be performed when if lighting is sufficient for the technician employee to read necessary documents and to safely perform the work. Committee Statement: The committee revisions are editorial for clarity and for consistency with the use of employee throughout the standard. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: GRAY, B.: The submitter’s proposed requirement does not add clarity and may actually introduce confusion by the use of the word sufficient, which is also contrary to the NEC Style Manual. This section needs to reference a specific standard or requirement such as the Illuminating Engineering Society of North America (IESNA) Lighting Handbook. The Committee action should be to reject this proposal. HITTEL, M.: This information is redundant as it is already covered in 130.6(C)(1). This information should be deleted. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-473 Log #338 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.5(G)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: DELETE 320.5(G) Location of Luminaires (Lighting Fixtures) and Switches. Luminaires shall not be installed directly over cells or exposed energized conductors and circuit parts. Switches for the control of the luminaires shall be readily accessible. Substantiation: The location for luminaries and switches are equipment room installation requirements that should be covered by NFPA 70 (NEC), NFPA 101 (Life Safety Code), or NFPA 5000 (Building Code). These are not work safety practices that should be included in NFPA 70-E. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-474 Log #339 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.5(H)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: DELETE 320.5(H) Power. General-purpose outlets shall be installed for the maintenance of the battery. Substantiation: Specifications for power outlets are an equipment room installation requirement that should be covered by NFPA 70 (NEC). These are not work safety practices that should be included in NFPA 70-E. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-475 Log #340 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.5(I)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: DELETE 320.5(I) Location of General-Purpose Outlets. General purpose outlets shall be installed at least 1800 mm (6 ft) from the battery and a minimum of 100 mm (4 in.) below the lowest point of the highest ventilation opening. Substantiation: Specification for the location of power outlets is an equipment room installation requirement that should be covered by NFPA 70 (NEC). These are not work safety practices that should be included in NFPA 70-E. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-476 Log #228 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.6) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John McAlhaney, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions Recommendation: Delete 320.6, Battery Enclosure Requirements. Substantiation: The requirements in Article 320.6 are installation requirements that should not be included in NFPA 70E. Article 320 should only address safety related work practices consistent with the philosophy of Article 310, Safety Related Work Practices for Electrolytic Cells. Installation requirements are more appropriately written for NFPA 70, National Electric Code. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-477 Log #341 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.6 through 320.6(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete text of 320.6 and sub-paragraphs Battery Enclosure Requirements. (A)Enclosure Construction (1) General. Where enclosures are designed to accommodate the battery, the battery charger, and other equipment, separate compartments shall be provided for each. (2) Ventilation. The ventilation openings for the compartment shall: (a) Prevent the exchange of air within compartments containing electrical equipment (b) Prevent accumulation of flammable gas in pockets exceeding 1 percent concentration. (B) Battery Takeoff Terminals and Outgoing Busbars and Cables. Outgoing busbars and cables shall be fully insulated, and the battery takeoff terminals shall comply with the following: (1) Takeoff terminals shall prevent excessive mechanical stress on the battery terminal (2) Takeoff terminals shall comply with either of the following: (1) Be fully shrouded (2) Have physical barriers installed between them (C) Battery Compartment Circuits. Only circuits associated with the battery shall be installed within a battery compartment of the enclosure Substantiation: Specifications for battery enclosure construction and ventilation openings are design issues and should not be addressed in 70E.

70E-185

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Terminal, busbar, cable protection and location of compartment circuitry are all installation requirements that should be covered by NFPA 70 (NEC). These are not work safety practices that should be included in NFPA 70-E. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-478 Log #229 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (320.7) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John McAlhaney, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions Recommendation: Delete 320.7, Protection. Substantiation: The requirements in Article 320.6 are installation requirements that should not be included in NFPA 70E. Article 320 should only address safety related work practices consistent with the philosophy of Article 310, Safety Related Work Practices for Electrolytic Cells. Installation requirements are more appropriately written for NFPA 70, National Electric Code. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee actions on Proposals 70E-479 through 70E-485 delete the installation requirements and retained the parts of 320.7 deemed to be safe work provisions. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-479 Log #342 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.7 and 320.7(A)(1)) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: It was the action of the Technical Correlating Committee that this proposal be correlated with the action taken on Proposal 70E-485. This proposal contains a general statement for hazard warning with (A) struck through; however, Proposal 70E-485 established a (B). This action will be considered as a public comment. Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Revise text: 320.7 Protection. Hazard Warning A) General (1) Marking. When the battery capacity exceeds 100 ampere-hours or where the nominal battery voltage is in excess of 50 volts, Warning notices indicating the battery voltage and the prospective short-circuit current of the installation shall be displayed. Substantiation: The battery task group recommends renaming this article. The task group has submitted several other proposals that would delete sub paragraphs (B) through (E). Those paragraphs relate to design and installation requirements which should be addressed in different standards. The current wording “in excess of 50 volts” conflicts with the intent of OSHA1910.333(a)(1). OSHA requires safety precautions for systems below 50 volts if there will be an exposure to electrical burns or explosion due to electrical arcs. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-480 Log #343 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.7(A)(2) and 320.7(A)(3)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete text: (2) Overcurrent Protection. Each output conductor shall be individually protected by a fuse or circuit breaker positioned as close as practicable to the battery terminals. (3) Protective Equipment. Protective equipment shall not be located in the battery compartment of the enclosure unless provided as part of a listed assembly. Substantiation: Delete these requirements. Specification for the location of battery OCPD is an installation requirement that is already be covered by NFPA 70 (NEC) 480.5 and 240.21(H). These are not work safety practices that should be included in NFPA 70-E. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-481 Log #344 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.7(B)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete text: (B) Switching and Control Equipment. Switching and control equipment shall comply with NFPA 70, National Electrical Code, and shall be listed for the application. Substantiation: Specification for equipment listing is an installation requirements already covered by NFPA 70 (NEC) as stated. These are not work safety practices that should be included in NFPA 70-E. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-482 Log #345 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.7(C)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete text: (C) Ground-Fault Protection. For an ungrounded battery of nominal voltage in excess of 120 volts, a ground-fault detector shall be provided to initiate a ground-fault alarm. Substantiation: Specifications for ground fault equipment are installation requirements that should be covered by NFPA 70 (NEC). Work place electrical safety requirements for ground fault detection have been proposed separately in 320.3 (A) & (B) and in footnotes to 320.3(B) These are not work safety practices that should be included in NFPA 70-E. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-483 Log #346 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.7(D)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete text: (D) Main Isolating Switch. The battery installation shall have an isolating switch installed as close as practicable to the main terminals of the battery. Where a busway system is installed, the isolating switch may be incorporated into the end of the busway. Substantiation: Delete this requirement. Specifications for the location of main battery isolation switch is an installation requirement that is already be covered by NFPA 70 (NEC) 480.5. These are not work safety practices; that should be included in NFPA 70-E. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-484 Log #347 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.7(E)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Delete text: (E) Section Isolating Equipment. Where the battery section exceeds 250 volts, the installation shall include an isolating switch, plugs, or links, as required, to isolate sections of the battery, or part of the battery, for maintenance Substantiation: Delete this requirement. The requirement for, and location of, isolating equipment is an installation requirement that should be covered by NFPA 70 (NEC). These are not work safety practices that should be included in NFPA 70-E. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-485 Log #348 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.7(F)) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: It was the action of the Technical Correlating Committee that this proposal be reconsidered and correlated with the action taken on Proposal 70E-479. This action will be considered as a public comment. Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Revise text and renumber paragraph: (B) (F) Warning Signs.. The following signs warnings shall be posted in appropriate locations: (1) Electrical hazard warning signs indicating the shock hazard due to the battery voltage and the arc hazard due to the prospective short-circuit current. (2) Chemical hazard warning signs: (a) indicating the potential presence of explosive gas (when applicable to the battery type); (b) danger of hydrogen explosion from prohibiting open flame and smoking; and (c) warning of the danger of chemical burns from the electrolyte (when applicable to the battery type); and (d) applicable to the worst case when multiple battery types are installed in the same space (3) Notice for personnel to use and wear protective equipment and apparel appropriate to the approach boundary for the battery. (4) Notice prohibiting access to unauthorized personnel Substantiation: Promote this requirement from subparagraph “F” under “General” to (B) under “Hazard Warning” In (2). There are actually three separate requirements. Per the NEC Style Manual they should be enumerated separately as proposed. Because some batteries (such as lithium ion) do not have liquid electrolyte that could be hazardous to technicians and/or do not have potential for venting explosive gas, signage should be appropriate to the chemical nature of the battery being used. If multiple battery types are used in the same space, signage should be appropriate for the worst case. In (3) PPE may not be required for a casual walk-through. The PPE should be appropriate for the activity. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-486 Log #349 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (320.8) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Create Separate sub-paragraphs for liquid electrolyte and solid electrolyte. 320.8 Personnel Protective Equipment. The following protective equipment shall be available to employees performing battery maintenance: (A) Batteries with Liquid Electrolyte. The following protective equipment shall be provided and used by employees performing any type of service on a battery with liquid electrolyte: (1) Goggles and face shield appropriate for the electrical hazard and the chemical hazard. (2) Gloves and aprons appropriate for the chemical and electrical hazards. (3) Portable or stationary water facilities for quick drenching or flushing of the eyes and body within the work area. (B) Solid or Immobilized Electrolyte. The following protective equipment shall be available to employees performing any type of service on a non-spillable battery with solid or immobilized electrolyte: (1) Goggles or face shield appropriate for the electrical hazard. (2) Gloves appropriate for the electrical and chemical hazards. (3) Protective clothing appropriate for electrical hazard. (1) Goggle and face shields (2) Chemical resistant gloves (3) Protective aprons (4) Protective overshoes (5) Portable or stationary water facilities for rinsing eyes and skin in case of electrolyte spillage. Substantiation: Not all batteries have liquid electrolyte. Under conditions of normal use (i.e., excluding incineration due to fire), non-spillable batteries that are totally sealed and batteries that have solid or immobilized electrolyte should not require electrolyte-resistant PPE. In such cases, the main hazard is

electrical. The present document addresses only the chemical hazard. For batteries with liquid electrolyte, the PPE needs to address both electrical and chemical hazard. This proposal creates sub-paragraphs for liquid and solid electrolyte batteries respectively. The chemical hazard is greater for batteries with liquid electrolyte. However, traces of electrolyte, either wet or dry reside, can sometimes be present on immobilized-electrolyte batteries due to factory over-fill or to abnormal operating conditions. Therefore, chemical-resistant gloves are recommended. Examples of batteries with liquid electrolyte include vented (or so-called “flooded”) lead-acid and nickel-cadmium cells. Examples of batteries with solid electrolyte include lithium polymer cells. Examples of batteries with immobilized electrolyte include Valve-regulated Lead-Acid (VRLA) cells with absorbed glass mat (AGM) separators or with gelled electrolyte. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the recommendation to read: (A) Batteries with Liquid Electrolyte. The following protective equipment shall be available to employees provided and used by employees performing any type of service on a battery with liquid electrolyte: Committee Statement: The committee revision is to parallel the text in (B). Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-487 Log #350 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (320.9) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Keith W. Schuh, Fermilab Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 320.9 Tools and Equipment. Tools and equipment for work on batteries shall comply with the following: be equipped with handles listed as insulated for the maximum working voltage (1) Be of the nonsparking type (2) Be equipped with handles listed as insulated for the maximum working voltage Substantiation: Delete subparagraph (1) and combine subparagraph (2). The amount of hydrogen in code-compliant battery installations is well below the LFL and LEL; therefore, sparking caused by insulated tools cannot ignite hydrogen. Non-sparking tools are not necessary and should not be mandated; however, they should be insulated. The members of the NFPA 70-E battery task group are making this proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-488 Log #227 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (340.5) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John McAlhaney, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions Recommendation: Revise Article 340.5 as shown below to indicate that the perception threshold for shock is.5 mA rather than 5 mA: 340.5 Hazardous Effects of Electricity on the Human Body. Employer and employees shall be aware of the following hazards associated with power electronic equipment. (1) Results of Power Frequency Current. a. At 0.5 5 mA, shock is perceptible. b. At 10 mA, a person may not be able to voluntarily let go of the hazard. c. At about 40 mA, the shock, if lasting for 1 second or longer, may be fatal due to ventricular fibrillation. d. Further increasing current leads to burns and cardiac arrest Substantiation: The threshold for AC perception begins at 0.5 mA rather than 5 mA as currently stated in Article 340.5. According to IEEE Paper No. ESW-23, “A Complete Electrical Hazard Classification System and Its Application” presented at the 2009 Electrical Safety Workshop, “The thresholds for AC (15 to 100 Hz) perception, reaction, let-go, and fibrillation are quite conservative, in general lower than those established by Dalziel. The threshold for perception and reaction generally begin about 0.5 mA. The threshold for no-let for 0.05 % of the population (that is 99.95 % can let go at this number) range from 5 mA for children to 9 mA for men….” Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: The reference source for perception of current, let-go threshold, and fibrillation should be IEC Technical Specification TS 60479-1, “Effects of current on human beings and livestock – Part 1: General aspects.” _______________________________________________________________ 70E-489 Log #106 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (340.7(A)(1)(b) and (c)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas Doyle, Industrial Safety Integration Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: b. Strategies to minimize the hazard c. Methods of avoiding or protecting against the hazard b. Strategies to minimize the probability of hazardous events (i.e., arc flash) c. Methods of reducing risk associated with the hazard Substantiation: The hazard is what it is (i.e. contact with live parts is contact with live parts). How can this hazard be minimized? The employer can either eliminate the hazard or control risk. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee concludes that the current text does not result in misapplication of work practices to minimize and avoid hazards. There are design strategies by which the exposure to hazards can be minimized. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: I think that the correct action should be to AP to add the two terms described by the submitter and leave the existing ones.. I favor getting these terms used in risk assessment. A hazard is a source of harm. The level of the hazard may be impacted by engineering controls (i.e. use of current-limiting OPD may reduce the level of the hazard). The probability of occurrence deals with how likely the arc flash may occur. These are separate issues and are dealt with separately. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-490 Log #107 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Part (340.7(b)(1)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas Doyle, Industrial Safety Integration Recommendation: Reivse text as follows: Being continuously alert and aware of the possible hazards Understanding the hazards associated with the work Substantiation: In a standard how can one prescribe being “continuously alert?” I think it is more appropriate to prescribe the understanding of the hazards as the primary responsibility of the worker. After all, if they do no understand the hazards, they should not be involved with the work. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Part The committee accepts the recommended text and rejects the deletion of the current text. The recommend text is to be numbered as (1) in the list and the current items are to be renumbered accordingly. Committee Statement: The committee concludes that the recommended text has value but also that the current text is needed. Understanding the possibility of hazard is different from being alert to their presence. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-491 Log #108 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (340.7(B)(2)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas Doyle, Industrial Safety Integration Recommendation: Add text to read as follows: (2) The use, and where appropriate maintenance, of the personal protective equipment needed to perform the work safely. Substantiation: There is no mention of the proper us of PPE as a worker responsibility. For live electrical work the PPE is the primary means of protection, therefore, it should rank very high in the list of responsibilities. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Committee Statement: The committee notes that this is to be added as the last item in the list. Based on the action on Proposal 70E-490, it will be number (8). Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HAMER, P.: This should be an “Accept in Principle.” Reword: “The use and appropriate maintenance of the personal protective equipment and tools required to perform the work safely.”

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-492 Log #109 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (340.7(B)(3)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas Doyle, Industrial Safety Integration Recommendation: Revise text as follows: Informing the employer of the malfunctioning protective measures, such as faulty or inoperable enclosures and locking schemes, torn arc flash apparel, damaged meter, etc. Substantiation: An example of damaged apparel and/or tools would be useful. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The words “such as” implies that the list is not all inclusive. The submitter has not provided sufficient technical substantiation to support the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-493 Log #534 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (350.2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Bobby J. Gray, Hoydar/Buck, Inc. Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: 350.2 Definitions; Field Evaluated. A thorough evaluation of nonlisted or modified equipment in the field that is performed by persons or parties acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction. The evaluation approval ensures will enforce that the equipment meets appropriate codes and standards, or is similarly found suitable for a specified purpose. Substantiation: In Article 100 definitions under Authority Having Jurisdiction (JHA) use the term enforcing which would make this definition in Article 350 in alignment with definitions in Article 100. This would also clarify that Field Evaluated will include the need to enforce all existing appropriate codes and standards before the equipment can be found suitable. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation is unclear as to what is to be enforced. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-494 Log #80 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (350.6) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James Durnan, Brookhaven National Laboratory / Rep. EFCOG Recommendation: Add new text to read as follows: Insert FPN 2: Field evaluation to include (1) Suitability for installation and use in conformity with the provisions of the National Electrical Code, (2) Mechanical strength and durability, including, for parts designed to enclose and protect other equipment the adequacy of the protection thus provided. (3) Wire-bending and connection space, (4) Electrical insulation, (5) Heating effects under normal conditions of use and also under abnormal conditions likely to arise in service (6) Arcing effects. (7) Classification by type, size, voltage, current capacity, and specific use, (8) Other factors that contribute to the practical safeguarding of persons using or likely to come in contact with the equipment. Substantiation: The problem that the “field evaluation” is not defined in 70E would be resolved by this addition. This proposal is the requirements for “Examination” as listed in NFPA 70 National Electrical Code, section 110.3. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommendation adds installation considerations that are outside the scope of this standard. Field evaluation parameters are within the scope of a new field evaluation standard, NFPA 791. In addition, the recommendation is for advisory text and it contains mandatory language. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-495 Log #77 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (B.1.6) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Bob Eugene, Underwriters Laboratories Inc. Recommendation: Revise text as follows: B.1.6 UL Publications. Underwriters Laboratories Inc., 333 Pfingsten Road, Northbrook, IL 60062-2096. ANSI/UL 943, Standard for Ground-Fault Circuit Interrupters, 2006, Revised 2008. ANSI/UL 1203, Explosion-Proof and Dust-Ignition-Proof Electrical Equipment for Use in Hazardous (Classified) Locations, 2006, Revised 2009. Substantiation: Update referenced standards to most recent revisions. Add ANSI approval designation where appropriate. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-496 Log #13 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Annex D) _______________________________________________________________ Note: This proposal appeared as Comment 70E-768 (Log #585) which was held from the Annual 2008 ROC on Proposal 70E-546. Submitter: John McQuilkin, GE Recommendation: Add text after the limitations of methods summary table as follows: An overriding limitation of all calculation methods available for calculating incident energy and arc-flash boundary is that the equations are invalid when the protective device is overdutied—a NEC violation. In calculating incident energy, one important factor is that an overcurrent device operates reliably; i.e. the amount of let-through current and the operating time are predictable. If the available fault current exceeds the rating of the overcurrent device, both the let-through current and the operating time are not predictable. Arc-flash calculations and field marking of equipment should not be performed for that system location and for downstream locations that cause the upstream equipment to remain overdutied. The overriding safety concern is that of the overdutied equipment killing someone when the equipment tries to open during a fault–not the arc-flash burn injuries. This hazardous incident could occur even without having exposed live parts and is a limitation of Table 130.7(C)(9)(A) as well. Substantiation: D.8.7 directs that for low-voltage circuit breakers with the bolted fault current within the range as described, the IEEE 1584 equations are valid. The top end of the range as described is “less than the circuit breaker’s interrupting rating.” This top end range definition can be extrapolated to include all devices at all voltage levels. Once overdutied equipment has been discovered, the hazard should be remedied, not have arc-flash results calculated and the equipment field-marked, somewhat legitimizing equipment that should not be applied in that circuit. Downstream faults whose arc-flash calculations depend on the overdutied equipment’s opening time, should also not have results calculated or equipment field-marked as the operating parameters are not predictable. Calculating incident energy and arc-flash boundaries for overdutied equipment is misguided and perhaps shows negligence by providing work permit values where work could be authorized on these live parts without regard to the greater hazard. The greater hazard is that the device is likely to explode, if a fault should occur while work was being performed. This hazard is not communicated on the arc-flash label and actually makes it appear similar to all the other properly field-marked equipment. Instead, the proper procedure to follow once overdutied equipment has been discovered in the course of a ANSI short-circuit study’s device evaluation, would be to inform the owner of the severity of the hazard and not provide arc-flash results or labels for the affected equipment, so that no energized work would be performed until the hazard can be eliminated. This even includes closed-door activities such as meter reading. Once the circuit has been modified, or new equipment has been installed, new arc-flash calculations will be needed along with new protective device settings. This limitation needs to be stated so that arc-flash hazard studies are not being performed for the sake of compliance, but recognition should be made that a more severe hazard, one that does not comply with NEC 110.9, and NFPA 70E 400.5, precludes completion of the arc-flash hazard calculations and field-marking requirements. In summary, the overdutied equipment itself, the downstream equipment which still causes the upstream equipment to remain overdutied should not have arc-flash calculations performed or labels provided, as no safety label can be supplied to indicate this greater hazard—for a variety of reasons. For equipment downstream, which does not cause the upstream equipment to remain overdutied, calculations and labels may be provided as the circuit elements operate as expected and are predictable. From a practical standpoint, each system study must stop at some point. Typically, during the data collection process, the end use load has only its largest protective device’s information collected, i.e. the main, if present, and largest feeder. As long as each is applied

within its interrupting rating(s), it may be assumed that the remaining devices are properly applied within their ratings and arc-flash calculations and labels may be provided. This would be for studies, which end at a MCC, panelboard, OEM equipment, etc. It requires that an ANSI short-circuit study device evaluation be performed on all of the system’s protective devices whose opening time is used to calculate downstream arc-flash results. The end use load device’s time is not used in any arc-flash calculations. Note: One reason not to supply arc-flash hazard labels for any overdutied equipment and, at times, the equipment downstream is that Energized Electrical Work Permits may be generated using the results found on the labels. Field marking may consist of detailed arc-flash hazard labels that include the calculated incident energy, arc-flash boundary, HRC, voltage, shock boundaries, and the required combined arc-flash and shock hazards PPE spelled out. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Engineering judgement is an important part of performing an incident energy analysis. It is not the intent of the committee to address work practices associated with installations that do not comply with NEC requirements. Applying overcurrent protective devices outside of their listing is contrary to 110.3(B) of the NEC. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-497 Log #363 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Annex D) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John McQuilkin, GE Recommendation: Add new text after Table D.1 Limitation of Calculation Methods table to read as follows: An overriding limitation of ALL calculation methods for incident energy and arc flash boundary is the equations are invalid when the protective device is overdutied (a NEC violation). In calculating incident energy, one important factor is that an overcurrent device operates reliably; i.e. the amount of let-through current and the operating time are predictable. If the available fault duty exceeds the rating of the overcurrent device, both the let-through current and the operating time are not predictable. Arc flash calculations and field marking of equipment should not be performed for that system location (i.e. switchgear, panel MCC, etc.) and for any downstream location that when faulted, still causes the upstream equipment to remain overdutied. The overriding safety concern is the overdutied equipment could possibly seriously injure or kill someone when it tries to open during a fault—not the arc flash burn injuries. This hazardous condition could occur even without having exposed energized electrical conductor and circuit parts and is a limitation of Table 130.7(C)(9) as well. Substantiation: Annex D Section D.7.7 correctly limits the application of IEEE Std. 1584 incident energy and Arc Flash Protection Boundary equations for low-voltage circuit breakers. The range of current for the equations to be valid is I1< Ibf< I2 where the top end of the range is described as “the interrupting rating of the CB at the voltage of interest.” If the available three-phase bolted fault is between 700 A - 106.000 A and the breaker is applied within it maximum duty rating, the equations can be used. This methodology needs to be extrapolated to include all protective devices at all voltage levels, so that every protective device is examined to determine if it is applied within its interrupting rating(s). Manufacturers do not test-current curve points higher than the interrupting rating(s) of devices so far overdutied equipment, the operating times are unknown, and an opening time can not be extrapolated for arc flash analysis. The correct remedy for a NEC overdutied equipment violation is to eliminate the violation, not calculate arc flash results and label the equipment (somewhat legitimizing equipment that should not exist in the system). The overdutied equipment should be excluded from the arc flash analysis and field marking as well as any downstream faults whose arc flash calculations depend on the overdutied equipment’s opening time, as the operating parameters are not predictable. Calculating incident energy and arc flash boundaries for overdutied equipment is misguided and perhaps shows negligence by providing work permit values where work could be authorized on these energized electrical conductor and circuit parts without regard to the greater hazard. The device is likely to explode if a fault should occur while work was being performed. The hazard is not communicated on the arc flash label and actually makes it appear similar to all the other properly marked equipment. Instead, the proper procedure to follow once overdutied equipment has been discovered in the course of an ANSI short-circuit study’s device evaluation would be to inform the owner of the severity of the hazard and not provide any arc flash results results or labels for the affected equipment, so that no energized work would be performed until the hazard is eliminated. This even includes closed-door activities such as meter reading. Once the circuit has been modified or new equipment has been installed, new arc flash calculations will be needed along with new protective device settings. This Limitation of Calculation Methods addition needs to be specifically stated so that arc flash hazard studies are not being performed for the sake of compliance; but recognition should be made that a more severe hazard, one

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E that does not comply with NEC 110.9, precludes completion of the arc flash hazard calculations and field marking requirements. In summary, the overdutied equipment itself, the downstream equipment whose fault still causes the upstream equipment to remain overdutied, should not have arc flash calculations performed or labels provided until the overdutied hazard is eliminated. No safety label can be supplied to indicate the greater hazard, for a variety of reasons. ANSI Z535 Safety Sign Standards require a message panel that indicates how to avoid the hazard and allow reaction time to do so. If someone is reading the label, they are too close and could not react to avoid a hazard such as this. Just how far away one should be to read a label warning of flying doors and 700 mph shrapnel is not determinable with regard to this misapplied equipment. For equipment downstream of the overdutied device where a fault would not cause the upstream device to be overdutied, calculations and labels may be provided as the circuit elements operate as expected and are predictable. From a practical standpoint, each system study must stop at some point. Typically during the data collection process, the end use load has only its largest protective device’s information collected, i.e. the main, if present, and largest feeder. As long as each is applied within its interrupting rating(s), it may be assumed that the remaining devices are properly applied within their ratings and arc flash calculations and labels may be provided. This would be for studies, which end at a MCC, panel, OEM equipment, etc. It requires that an ANSI short-circuit device evaluation be performed on all the system’s protective devices whose opening time is used to calculate downstream arc flash results. The end use load device’s time is not used in any arc flash calculations. Note: One reason to not supply arc flash hazard labels for any overdutied equipment and for certain downstream equipment is the Energized Electrical Work Permits may use the results found on the labels. Field marking may consist of detailed arc flash hazard labels that include the calculated incident energy, arc flash boundary, HRC, voltage, shock boundaries, and the required combined arc flash and shock PPE spelled out. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: See the committee action and statement on Proposal 70E-496. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-498 Log #368 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Annex D) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Ravel F. Ammerman, Colorado School of Mines Recommendation: D.10 Conservative Method for Estimating Arc Flash Incident Energy Exposures. This section presents a method that is based on an extensive sensitivity analysis of IEEE 1584, Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations. The approach developed allows for the quick estimate of the thermal incident energy available if an arc flash were to occur. Referred to as the “3-4-5” method, the calculations are designed to give a conservative estimate of the incident energy levels possible by focusing on the most severe cases, i.e., arcs initiated within an enclosure and working distances of 18 inches (457 mm). The “3-4-5” equations are listed below. Arc in a Box, 480 V and Below*: E = 3×Ibf×t Arc in a Box, 600 V: E = 4×Ibf×t Medium Voltage Arc, 1 – 15 kV: E = 5×Ibf×t where, E incident energy (cal/cm2) Ibf bolted fault current (kA) t time (sec) * Using 3 for 208 and 240 volt systems will generally result in very conservative estimates. Reference: The equations for this section were derived in the IEEE Paper by R.F. Ammerman, P.K. Sen, and J.P. Nelson, “Electrical Arcing Phenomena a Historical Perspective and Comparative Study of the Standards IEEE 1584 & NFPA 70E”, IEEE Industry Applications Magazine, Vol. 15, No. 3, May/June 2009, pp. 42-52. Substantiation: An individual using the “3-4-5” method may find this analytical tool to be more intuitive and user friendly than some of the other methods currently available. As documented in NFPA 70E: “The two variables that have the greatest impact on the energy released during an arcing fault are the available bolted fault current, and the time it takes the overcurrent protective device to clear the fault”. One of the features of this simplified approach is that the critical factors influencing the incident energy available are clearly evident. As a result, this method may help individuals better understand the hazards associated with an arc flash. Some of the other methods used to predict arc flash incident energy levels include calculations that address the potential variability of the arc current and the possible change in response time of the overcurrent protection device. The “3-4-5” method is not intended to replace detailed arc flash studies; rather it provides a quick “first-cut” approach for estimating incident energy levels without the need of complicated and potentially confusing calculations. A detailed description of the development of the “3-4-5” method equations is provided in an IEEE publication by R.F. Ammerman, P.K. Sen, and J.P. Nelson, “Electrical Arcing Phenomena a Historical Perspective and Comparative Study

of the Standards IEEE 1584 & NFPA 70E”, IEEE Industry Applications Magazine, Vol. 15, No. 3, May/June 2009, pp. 42-52. A copy of this paper has been provided. Note: Supporting Material is available for review at NFPA headquarters. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The submitter has not been provided sufficient substantiation to place this calculation method in Annex D. There are many published short cut methods of estimating incident energy derived from the IEEE 1584 equations. Each technique has limitations and should be researched in its entirety. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-499 Log #234 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (Annex D, Title) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Jim Phillips, T2G / Brainfiller.com Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Incident Energy and Arc Flash Protection Boundary Calculation Methods Substantiation: Insert the word “Arc” in the title to be consistent with terminology. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the title of Annex D to read: Incident Energy and Arc Flash Boundary Calculation Methods Committee Statement: The committee accepts the addition of “Arc” and deletes the term “protection” to correlate with the action taken on Proposal 70E-30. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-500 Log #415 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Annex D.1 and Table D.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Lawrence S. Ayer, Biz Com Electric, Inc. / Rep. IEC Recommendation: Revise Annex D Part D.1 as follows and delete the remaining Annex D material from D.2 till end. This annex is not a part of the requirements of this NFPA document but is included for informational purposes only. D.1 Introduction. Annex D summarizes calculation methods available for calculating arc flash boundary and incident energy. It is important to investigate the limitations of any methods to be used. The source material and limitations of for each methods summarized in Annex D are described in Table D.1. (See Table D.1 Limitation of Calculation Methods on the following page.) Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the Annex Task Group appointed by NFPA 70E Chairman Dave Dini. The task group consisted of Larry Ayer, Bruce Bowman, Daleep Mohla, Kerry Heid, Terry Becker, and Drake Drobnick. While IEEE 1584 has become the standard for 70E incident energy calculations, including only certain sections of the 1584 standard does not seem appropriate. There are other sections of the 1584 standard which the user could benefit from. In addition, there are other calculation methods which may be useful when the parameters of 1584 are exceeded or if the 70E user was looking for another opinion. The present layout of Annex D slants the user of the document to one standard which again would not be appropriate. Providing sample calculations for an industrial site for just flash protection boundary requirements does not fully explain to the user the full extent of a flash/hazard analysis. A more complete example should be included or if this is not possible the example should be deleted. A better understanding of all calculation methods and their limitations would be achieved by obtaining the complete source material. Some users of 70E prefer using the table methods. Use of NFPA 70E 130.7(C)(9), (10), and (11) make it clear that incident energy calculations are not permitted if the table method is chosen. Reference to HRC 1, 2, 3 or 4, should not be mixed into Annex D. Table D.9.1 refers to HRC 2 and HRC 4 and this table should be relocated elsewhere. Deletion of the Annex material as recommended will greatly simply the document. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee does not accept deletion of the Annex D material. The various incident energy and arc flash boundary calculation methods presented in Annex D provide guidance for the user of the document to understand the basic concepts. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

70E-190


_______________________________________________________________ 70E-501 Log #281 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (Annex D.5.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Louis A. Barrios, Shell / Rep. API (American Petroleum Institute) Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Prior to the sentence shown below in D.5.1 Arc in Open Air, add in italics “Sample Calculation:” as shown. The remainder of this section remains unchanged. Sample Calculation: Using Equation D.5.1(a), calculate the maximum open arc incident energy, cal/cm2, where DA = 18 in., tA = 0.2 second, and F = 20 kA. Substantiation: This proposed change is editorial in nature intended to simplify the standard. Adding the phrase “Sample Calculation” helps the user of the Standard understand that a sample calculation follows. Note that “Sample Calculation:” already appears in D.5.2 Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-502 Log #282 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (Annex D.5.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Louis A. Barrios, Shell / Rep. API (American Petroleum Institute) Recommendation: Delete the typical working distances in D.5.3. D.5.3 Reference. The equations for this section were derived in the IEEE paper by R. L. Doughty, T. E. Neal, and H. L. Floyd, II, “Predicting Incident Energy to Better Manage the Electric Arc Hazard on 600 V Power Distribution Systems,” Record of Conference Papers IEEE IAS 45th Annual Petroleum and Chemical Industry Conference, September 28–30, 1998. Typical working distances used for incident energy calculations are given below: (1) Low voltage (600 V and below) MCC and panelboards— 455 mm (18 in.) (2) Low voltage (600 V and below) switchgear — 610 mm (24 in.) (3) Medium voltage (above 600 V) switchgear — 910 mm (36 in.) Substantiation: This proposed change is editorial in nature intended to correct an error from the 2009 edition. Section D.5.3 identifies the reference used for the calculations in Section D.5. The addition of the typical working distances do not belong here. They were added correctly in D.5.3. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25

Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-503 Log #4 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (Annex D.6(2)) _______________________________________________________________ Note: TCC Hold from A2008 ROC Comment #70E-780 (Log #575) on Proposal 70E-554. Submitter: Louis A. Barrios, Shell Global Solutions Recommendation: The committee action should have been Accept in Principle with the following sentence added to the end of the proposed text. “Sound engineering judgment must be used in applying the 2 second maximum clearing time, because there may be circumstances where an employee’s egress is inhibited. A person in a bucket truck or a person who has crawled into equipment will need more time to move away.” Substantiation: The additional text, including the second sentence extracted from D.6(2) of IEEE Std 1584-2004, is added to satisfy the committee’s concerns that 2 seconds may not be appropriate if the worker is inhibited in any way from leaving the location. It is not unusual when performing incident energy calculations to encounter installations that have long clearing times (>10 seconds) resulting in unrealistic incident energies. IEEE Std 1584-2004 suggests a 2 second maximum for cases where there is adequate working space and clear egress from the area. Commonly used software tools for estimating incident energy have incorporated the 2 second maximum clearing time as a user selectable function. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Insert new text at end of D.6(2) as a separate paragraph to read: If the total protective device clearing time is longer than two seconds, consider how long a person is likely to remain in the location of the arc flash. It is likely that a person exposed to an arc flash will move away quickly if it is physically possible and two seconds is a reasonable maximum time for calculations. A person in a bucket truck or a person who has crawled into equipment will need more time to move away. Sound engineering judgment must be used in applying the 2 second maximum clearing time, since there may be circumstances where an employee’s egress is inhibited. Committee Statement: See the committee action on Proposal 70E-508. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A.

Table D.1 Limitation of Calculation Methods

SectionSource Calculation Method

Limitations/Parameters Reference Material/Source

D.2, D.3, D.4 Ralph Lee Paper

Calculates Arc Flash Protection Boundary for arc in open air, conservative over 600V and becomes more conservative as voltage increases

“The Other Electrical Hazard: Electrical Arc Blast Burns”, IEEE Transactions for Industrial Applications, Vol. 1A-18 No. 3, Page 246, May/June 1984

D.5 Doughty/Neal paper

Calculates incident energy for 3-phase arc on sys-tems rated 600V and below; applies to short-circuit currents between 16 kA and 50 KA

“Predicting Incident Energy to Better Manage the Electric Arc Hazard on 600V Power Distribution Systems”, Record of Conference papers IEEE IAS 45th Annual Petroleum and Chemical Industry Conference, September 28-30, 1998.

D.6 Ralph Lee PaperCalculates incident energy for 3 – phase arc in open air on systems rated above 600V becomes more conservative as voltage increases.

“The Other Electrical Hazard: Electrical Arc Blast Burns”, IEEE Transactions for Industrial Applications, Vol. 1A-18 No. 3, Page 246, May/June 1984

D.7 IEEE Std. 1584

Calculates incident energy and Arc Flash Protection Boundary for: 208V to 15 kV; 3-Phase; 50 Hz to 60Hz; 700 A to 106,000 A short-circuit current; and 13 mm to 152 mm conductor gaps

IEEE 1584, Guide for Performing Arc Flash Hazard Calculations. It can be ordered from the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers. 445 Hoes Lane P.O. Box 1331 Piscataway, NJ 08855-1331.

D.8

ANSI/IEEE C2 NESC – Section 410 Tables 410-1 and Table 410-2

Calculates incident energy for open air phase-to-ground arc 1 kV to 500 kV for live-line work.

ANSI/IEEE C2, National Electrical Safety Code. It can be ordered from the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers. 445 Hoes Lane P.O. Box 1331 Piscataway, NJ 08855-1331.


70E-191

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Explanation of Negative: HICKMAN, P.: See our negative ballot comment on Proposal 70E-512 Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-504 Log #6 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (Annex D.6(2)) _______________________________________________________________ Note: TCC Hold from A2008 ROC Comment #70E-781 (Log #697) on Proposal 70E-554. Submitter: J. F. Doering, J. F. Doering Associates Recommendation: Change committee action to accept. Substantiation: Recently, I was working on a procedure for calculating incident energy caused by cable faults in three phase 120/208 and 277/480 volt networks and also spot networks. There are many case histories where arcing cable faults have lasted for as short as minutes to over an hour, with 10 to 20 minutes being common. I came to the conclusion that the only way to calculate the incident energy was to use a “clearing time” based on the reaction of the worker. I elected to perform four calculations to give a profile of the incident energy on the worker. I used 2 feet for 1 second, 2 feet for 2 seconds, 4 feet for 1 second and 4 feet for 2 seconds. Needless to say I found Mr. Barrios proposal right on target. Using the workers reaction time rather than some form of circuit protection is appropriate for persistent arcing faults. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: See the committee action on Proposal 70E-508. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-505 Log #69 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Annex D.7) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Palmer L. Hickman, National Joint Apprentice & Training Committee Recommendation: Delete D.7 in its entirety. This includes D.7 through D.7.8 including all Tables. Substantiation: While IEEE 1584 has certainly become the de facto calculation method for incident energy and Arc Flash Protection Boundary calculations, having an abbreviated version of this Guide does not seem well suited in NFPA 70E (even in an Annex). As noted in D.7, the complete data... can be found in IEEE 1584. It is important that users of NFPA 70E have the complete data. In addition, the NFPA 70E Standard has changed significantly while Annex D.7 has not been revised to correlate with those changes. For example, NFPA 70E 130.7(C)(9), (10) and (11) now make it clear that incident energy calculations are not permitted to be used in conjunction with hazard risk categories/PPE levels while Annex D.7 references PPE levels; 1.2, 8, 25 and 40 cal/cm2. Furthermore, D.7 indicates that these PPE levels are estimated to be adequate to protect from second-degree burns in 95% of the cases. It is not clear what is to be done with an IEEE 1584 calculation of 9 cal/cm2, for example. Should one select protection 25 cal/cm2 as suggested in D.7 to get 95% assurance of protection from second-degree burn? What percentage of assurance is there that a second-degree burn will not occur if 9 cal/cm2 PPE is selected for a 9 cal/cm2 incident energy calculation? It appears that it will be significantly less than 95% based on the information provided in D.7. In summary, this recommendation to delete all of D.7 (D.7 through D.7.8 including all tables) is not calling into question the validity of the IEEE 1584 Guide. Rather, it is recommending that the IEEE 1584 Guide be used in its entirety with, as indicated in D.7, the complete data found in IEEE 1584. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: It is not appropriate to delete Annex D.7. Many users of the document look to Annex D for information regarding the various calculations methods. Deleting the information on IEEE 1584 would indicate that the committee favors certain methods of incident energy calculations when all methods are important to the process. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HICKMAN, P.: This proposal should have been accepted. Our notes that the IEEE representatives no longer support the inclusion of this information in NFPA 70E, even as Annex information. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-506 Log #263 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part (Annex D.7) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Daleep C. Mohla, DCM Electrical Consulting Services, Inc. Recommendation: Delete text to read as follows: D.7 Basic Equations for Claculating Incident Energy and Arc Flash

Protection Boundary. This section offers equations information document available for estimating incident energy and Flash Protection Boundaries based on statistical analysis and curve fitting of available test data. An IEEE working group produced the data from tests it performed to produce models of incident energy. Based on the selection of standard personal protective equipment (PPE) levels (1.2, 8, 25, and 40 cal/cm2), it is estimated that the PPE is adequate or more than adequate to protect employees from second degree burns in 95 percent of the cases. FPN: When incident energy exceeds 40 cal/cm2 at the working distance, greater emphasis than normal should be placed on de-energizing before working on or near the exposed electrical conductors or circuit parts. The complete data, including a spreadsheet calculator to solve the equations, can be found in the IEEE 1584, Guide for Performing Arc Flash Hazard Calculations. It can be ordered from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc., 445 Hoes Lane, P.O. Box 1331, Piscataway, NJ 08855-1331. Substantiation: Selection of PPE based in incident energy calculations is now provided in NFPA 70E. IEEE model based on testing was developed to calculate incident energy not provide guidance for PPE. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle in Part The committee takes the following actions: 1.The committee rejects the recommendation to delete the fine print note, 2.Revise the first sentence to read: This section details information available for estimating incident energy and Flash Protection Boundaries based on statistical analysis and curve fitting of available test data. 3.Revise the third sentence of the current text to read: Based on the selection of standard personnel protective equipment (PPE) levels (1.2, 8, 25 and 40 cal/cm2) it is estimated that the PPE arc rating will be equal to or greater than actual measured test values of incident energy in 95% of the cases. 4.Remove the term “Protection” in the title of D.7. Committee Statement: The committee does not accept the recommendation to delete the fine print note because it does provide useful guidance for the user of the standard. The committee has revised the third sentence to clarify the 95% reference. The editorial revision in the first sentence was made for proper sentence structure. The committee changes the title of D.7 to correlate with the committee action on Proposal 70E-30. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-507 Log #262 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Annex D.7.1 through D.7.7) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Daleep C. Mohla, DCM Electrical Consulting Services, Inc. Recommendation: Delete Annexes D, D.7.1, D.7.2, D.7.3, D.7.4, D.7.5, D.7.6 and D.7.7. Substantiation: This excerpted information is part of IEEE 1584-2002. Reproducing partial information here is not helpful and, in certain cases, can be misleading. To understand and correctly apply this information for calculating incident energy, user should read the backup information available in IEEE 1584 or use a commercially available software. All these equations have been incorporated in commercially available software from multiple suppliers. Moreover, IEEE 1584-2003 is being revised and retaining this information here can cause confusion due to conflicting or incompatible information in IEEE 1584 and 70E. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: See the committee action and statement on Proposal 70E-505. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-508 Log #272 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (Annex D.7.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Louis A. Barrios, Shell / Rep. API (American Petroleum Institute) Recommendation: Add the following at the end of section D.7.3 (following the explanation of the variables used in equation [D.7.3(c )]. If the arcing time, t, in equation D.7.3(c ), is longer than two seconds, consider how long a person is likely to remain in the location of the arc flash. It is likely that a person exposed to an arc flash will move away quickly if it is physically possible and two seconds is a reasonable maximum time for calculations. Sound engineering judgment should be used in applying the 2 second maximum clearing time, because there may be circumstances where an employee’s egress is inhibited. For example, a person in a bucket truck or a person who has crawled into equipment will need more time to move away. Substantiation: In large complex facilities, it is not unusual when performing incident energy calculations to encounter installations that have long clearing times (>10 seconds) due to the necessity to provide selective protective device

70E-192

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E coordination, resulting in unrealistically high incident energies. IEEE Std 1584-2004 suggests a 2 second maximum for cases where there is adequate working space and clear egress from the area. Commonly used software tools for estimating incident energy have incorporated the 2 second maximum clearing time as a user selectable function. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-509 Log #235 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Annex D.7.3(a)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Jim Phillips, T2G / Brainfiller.com Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Where: En = incident energy (J/cm2) normalized for time and distance. Substantiation: Delete (J/cm2). The equations of this section were obtained from IEEE 1584 page 11. Footnote 13 at the bottom of page 11 of IEEE 1584 states “Measurement utilized in test laboratories was in cal/cm2.” Using the units J/cm2 is incorrect. Since the units for NFPA standards must be shown as metric, deleting J/cm2 and not replacing it with cal/cm2 will make this more consistent with equation D.7.3(c) which has En listed as “incident energy normalized” with no units. Equation 5 of IEEE 1584 (also shown as equation D.7.3(b) in NFPA 70E) is based on the units cal/cm2 and equation 6 of IEEE 1584 (also shown as equation D.7.3(c) in NFPA 70E) then converts from cal/cm2 to J/cm2 by using the multiplier 4.184. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The units used are necessary for accuracy of calculation and alerts the user that the final answer must be converted. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-510 Log #142 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Annex D.7.7) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Kevin J. Lippert, Eaton Corporation Recommendation: D.7.7. Low-Voltage Circuit Breakers. A calculation of arc energy with low voltage circuit breakers is more accurate when manufacturer’s specific equations are used, or information from the manufacturer’s time current curves is used with the equations in D.7.2 through D.7.3. However, when neither of those is available, a simple method is to use Tthe equations in Table D.7.7 can be used for systems with low voltage circuit breakers. The results of these equations will determine conservative values for the incident energy and Arc Flash Protection Boundary when Ibf is within the range as described. Time-current curves for the circuit breaker are not necessary when these equations are used within the appropriate range. When bolted -fault current is below the range indicated, calculate the arcing current per Equation D.7.2(a), and use time-current curves to determine the incident energy using Equations D.7.3(a), D.7.3(b), and D.7.3(c). (Remainder is unchanged). Substantiation: This proposal is intended to clarify that the preferred method for calculating circuit breaker arc flash energy is by using information supplied by the circuit breaker manufacturer (either specific equations, or by use of time/current curves). The equations from Table D.7.7 are “generic” applications which will lead to very conservative results, but is useful when manufacturer specific information is unavailable. Similar wording is presently being processed in the update to IEEE 1584. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The current version of IEEE 1584 does not contain the suggested text. It would not be technically accurate to include the text into the 70E standard until the IEEE committee completes their work. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 21 Negative: 2 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: SAPORITA, V.: NEMA supports the proposal which would clarify the method of calculating incident arc energy with molded case circuit breakers. It should be noted that the proposed wording aligns with the balloted changes to IEEE 1584. TIEDE, T.: This proposal should be accepted. There is no reason not to use the most accurate information available when performing an arc flash hazard analysis. Such data, whether based on actual trip curves and calculated fault current levels or equipment-specific equations based on product testing is more accurate than what is provided in the IEEE 1584 equations which are developed based on the “worst-case” performance of circuit breakers within a given class.

Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-511 Log #76 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (Annex D.8) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Kathleen Wilmer, Duke Energy / Rep. Edison Electric Institute Recommendation: Delete Annex D.8 in its entirety. D.8 Estimated Incident Energy Exposures for Live Line Work on Overhead Open Air Systems 1 kV to 800 kV. Table D.8(1) and Table D.8(2) list the heat flux rate in cal/cm2/see derived from the ANSI/IEEE C2 Tables 410.1 and 410.2. To estimate the incident energy, multiply the heat flux rate in the tables by the maximum clearing time (in seconds). Table D.8(1) Table D.8(2) Substantiation: Annex D.8 relies on the content of ANSI/IEEE C2, National Electrical Safety Code, which is revised on a regular basis. The IEEE C2 standard should be used in its entirety and not paraphrased in NFPA 70E. It is important that users of IEEE C2 have the complete and current reference. The numbers in Tables D.8(1) and (2) can change as IEEE C2 is revised. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-512 Log #8 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (Annex D.8.2) _______________________________________________________________ Note: TCC Hold from A2008 ROC Comment #70E-782 (Log #576) on Proposal 70E-559. Submitter: Louis A. Barrios, Shell Global Solutions Recommendation: The committee action should have been Accept in Principle with the following sentence added before the last sentence of the proposed text. “Sound engineering judgment must be used in applying the 2 second maximum clearing time, because there may be circumstances where an employee’s egress is inhibited.” Substantiation: The additional text is added to satisfy the committee’s concerns that 2 seconds may not be appropriate if the worker is inhibited in any way from leaving the location. It is not unusual when performing incident energy calculations to encounter installations that have long clearing times (>10 seconds) resulting in unrealistic incident energies. IEEE Std 1584-2004 suggests a 2 second maximum for cases where there is adequate working space and clear egress from the area. Commonly used software tools for estimating incident energy have incorporated the 2 second maximum clearing time as a user selectable function. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-508 meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HICKMAN, P.: The recommended text in this recommendation should have been accepted as it provides additional information that needs to be considered to help reduce exposure and protect workers. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-513 Log #10 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (Annex D.8.2) _______________________________________________________________ Note: TCC Hold from A2008 ROC Comment #70E-783 (Log #698) on Proposal 70E-559. Submitter: J. F. Doering, J. F. Doering Associates Recommendation: Change committee action to accept. Substantiation: Recently, I was working on a procedure for calculating incident energy caused by cable faults in three phase 120/208 and 277/480 volt networks and also spot networks. There are many case histories where arcing cable faults have lasted for as short as minutes to over an hour, with 10 to 20 minutes being common. I came to the conclusion that the only way to calculate the incident energy was to use a “clearing time” based on the reaction of the worker. I elected to perform four calculations to give a profile of the incident energy on the worker. I used 2 feet for 1 second, 2 feet for 2 seconds, 4 feet for 1 second and 4 feet for 2 seconds. Needless to say I found Mr. Barrios proposal right on target. Using the workers reaction time rather than some form of circuit protection is appropriate for persistent arcing faults. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-508 meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1

70E-193

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-514 Log #427 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Annex D.9) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Ilanchezhian Balasubramanian, Eaton Corp. Recommendation: New text to read as follows: Two Scenario Approach: As per IEEE 1584, arc flash study needs to be performed based on maximum and minimum available fault current from the utility. When available fault current information could not be obtained from the utility, “Two scenario approach” should be considered. Scenario 1: Calculate incident energy as per IEEE 1584 based on maximum let-through current of the utility transformer. Scenario 2: Calculate incident energy as per IEEE 1584 based on 50% of the maximum let-through current of the utility transformer. Use the worst-case values between the two scenarios to select PPE. Substantiation: This proposal is based on the white paper “Impact of available fault current variations on arc-flash calculations” presented during PCIC 2009 conference in Anaheim, CA. More than half of the surveyed study engineers (57%) have used infinite bus assumption to complete arc flash study in the last 12 months because they could not obtain actual fault current information from the utility. The survey also found that it has become more difficult to obtain actual fault current information from the utility to perform arc flash study as per IEEE 1584 requirement. This forces the study engineers to use the maximum let through current of the utility transformer (i.e. infinite source from the utility) to complete arc flash study. The white paper proves that this assumption does not yield “conservative” PPE requirements. If more studies are done this way, the purpose of doing arc flash study is defeated. “Two scenario approach” will help calculate conservative PPE requirement when utility fault current information is not available. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The submitter has not provided sufficient substantiation that the “two-scenario” approach should be included in Annex D. There are many published methods to estimate incident energy derived from the IEEE 1584 equations. Each method or approach has limitations and the user should review the entire publication prior to its use. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-515 Log #199 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (Annex D.9.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Daleep C. Mohla, DCM Electrical Consulting Services, Inc. Recommendation: Delete reference to Hazard Risk Categories (HRC) in the text in Annex D, section D.9.1 and replace with applicable cal/cm2. D.9 Guideline for the use of Hazard/Risk Category (HRC) 2 and HRC 4 Personal Protective Equipment. The following tables can be used to determine the suitability of Hazard/Risk Category (HRC) 2 and HRC 4 8 cal/cm2 and 40 cal/cm2 personal protective equipment on systems rated up to 15 kV, line-to-line. See Table D.9.1 and Table D.9.2 for the recommended limitations based on bolted 3-phase short-circuit currents at the listed fault-clearing times. The limitations listed below are based on IEEE 1584 calculation methods. Substantiation: 103.3(B) requires PPE be selected either based on calculations or based on Tables 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10) and 130.7(C)(11). Hazard Risk categories are task based terms and should not be used when calculations are performed for selection of PPE. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-516 Log #200 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (Table D.9.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Daleep C. Mohla, DCM Electrical Consulting Services, Inc. Recommendation: Delete reference to Hazard Risk categories (HRC) in the text in Annex D, Table D.9.1 and replace with applicable cal/cm2 and correct notes 5 & 6 as follows:(See Table D.9.1 on the following page.) Substantiation: 103.3(B) requires PPE be selected either based on calculations or based on Tables 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10) and 130.7(C)(11). Hazard Risk categories are task based terms and should not be used when calculations are performed for selection of PPE. “properly installed, operated and maintained” has been added. “will clear” has been changed to “should clear”. Based on the manufacturer’s data, a properly installed and maintained circuit breaker should clear the fault within 0.050 sec of initiation. Nobody can be certain that it will clear the fault. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-517 Log #201 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (Table D.9.2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Daleep C. Mohla, DCM Electrical Consulting Services, Inc. Recommendation: Delete reference to Hazard Risk categories (HRC) in the text in Annex D, Table D.9.2 and replace with applicable cal/cm2 as follows:

Table D.9.2 High-Voltage Systems – Maximum Three-Phase Bolted-Fault Current Limits at Various System Voltages and Fault-Clearing Times of Circuit Breakers, for the Recommended Use Hazard/Risk Category (HRC) 2 and HRC 4 of 8 cal/cm2 and 40 cal/cm2 Personal Protective Equipment in an “Arc in a Box” Situation

System Voltage (volts, phase-to-phase)

Upstream Protection Fault-

Clearing Time (sec)

Maximum 3-Phase Bolted-Fault Current for Use of HRC 2 PPE

(8 cal/cm2)


(40 cal/cm2)

15 kV Class and 12 kV Class 0.10 0.35 0.70 1.0

45 kA 13 kA 7 kA 5 kA

63 kA*(11.4 cal/cm2) 63 kA 32 kA 23 kA

5 kV Class 0.10 0.35 0.70 1.0

50 kA 15 kA 8 kA 5 kA

63 kA* (10 cal/cm2) 63 kA*(35 cal/cm2) 37 kA 26 kA

Notes:(1) “Upstream Protection Fault-Clearing Time” is the protective relaying operating time at 90% of the actual available 3-phase bolted fault current at the specific work location (the time for the output contact operating the trip coil of the circuit breaker to be closed), plus the circuit breaker operating time (upstream of the equipment on which work is to be done).(2) Working distance for the above arc-flash exposures is assumed to be 0.92 m (3 ft).(3) Systems are assumed to be resistance grounded. This assumption results in conservative application if the table is used on a solidly grounded system, since the incident energy on a solidly grounded system is lower.(4) The cal/cm2 in parentheses in the last column are calculated at the maximum equipment short-circuit current rat-ings available.* Maximum equipment short-circuit current rating available.

70E-194


Table D.9.1 Low Voltage Systems – Maximum Three-Phase Bolted-Fault Current Limits at Various System Voltages and Fault-Clearing Times of Circuit Breakers, for the Recommended Use of 8 cal/cm2 and 40 cal/cm2 Hazard/Risk Category (HRC) 2 and HRC 4 Personal Protective

Equipment in an “Arc in a Box” SituationSystem Voltage

(volts, phase-to-phase)Upstream Protection

Fault-Clearing Time (sec)Maximum 3-Phase Bolted-Fault Current

for Use of HRC 2 PPE of (8 cal/cm2)


(40 cal/cm2)690 0.05

0.10 0.20 0.33 0.50

39 kA 20 kA 10 kA

Not Recommended Not Recommended

180 kA 93 kA 48 kA 29 kA 20 kA

600 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.50

48 kA 24 kA 12 kA

Not Recommended Not Recommended

200 kA* 122 kA 60 kA 36 kA 24 kA

480 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.50

68 kA 32 kA 15 kA 8 kA

Not Recommended

200 kA* 183 kA 86 kA 50 kA 32 kA

400 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.50

87 kA 39 kA 18 kA 10 kA

Not Recommended

200 kA* 200 kA* 113 kA 64 kA 39 kA

208 0.05 0.10

200 kA* 104 kA

Not applicable 200 kA*

Notes:(1) Three-phase “bolted fault” value is at the terminals of the equipment on which work is to be done.(2) “Upstream Protection Fault-Clearing Time” is normally the “short-time delay” setting on the trip unit of the low-voltage power circuit breaker upstream of the equipment on which work is to be done.(3) For application of this table, the recommended maximum setting (pick-up) of either the instantaneous or short-delay protection of the cir-cuit breaker’s trip unit is 30% of the actual available 3-phase bolted fault current at the specific work location.(4) Working distance for the arc-flash exposures is assumed to be 455 mm (18 in.).(5) Flash Protection Boundary (threshold distance for a second-degree skin burn) is 1.7 m (6 ft) for 8 cal/cm2 HRC 2 and 4.9 m (16 ft) for 40 cal/cm2 HRC 4. PPE is required for all personnel working within the Flash Protection Boundary.(6) Instantaneous circuit breaker trip unit(s) have no intentional time delay, and the a properly installed, operated and maintained circuit breaker should will clear the fault within 0.050 sec of initiation. Application of circuit breakers with faster clearing times or the use of current-limiting circuit breakers or fuses should permit the use of HRC 2 8 cal/cm2 and HRC 4 40 cal/cm2 PPE at greater fault currents than listed.(7) Systems are assumed to be resistance grounded, except for 208 V (solidly grounded system). This assumption results in conservative appli-cation if the table is used on a solidly grounded system, since the incident energy on a solidly grounded system is lower for the same bolted fault current availability.*Maximum equipment short-circuit current rating available.


70E-195

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Substantiation: 103.3(B) requires PPE be selected either based on calculations or based on Tables 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10) and 130.7(C)(11). Hazard Risk categories are task based terms and should not be used when calculations are performed for selection of PPE. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-517a Log #CP16 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (Annex D.10 New) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Electrical Safety in the Workplace, Recommendation: Add a new Annex D.10: DC Incident Energy Calculations Annex D.X.X: DC Arc Flash Calculations

A. Maximum power method:

The following method of estimating DC arc flash incident energy was presented at the 2007 IEEE Electrical Safety Workshop (see reference 2 below). This method is based on the concept that the maximum power possible in a DC arc will occur when the arcing voltage is one half of the system voltage. Testing completed for Bruce Power (reference 3 below) has shown that this calculation is conservatively high in estimating the arc flash value. This method applies to DC systems rated up to 1000 VDC.

Iarc = 0.5 * Ibf

IEm = 0.01 * Vsys * Iarc * Tarc / D2

Where:

Vsys is the system voltage, in volts

Ibf is the system bolted fault current, in amperes

Iarc is the arcing current, in amperes

Tarc is the arcing time in seconds

D is the working distance, in centimeters

IEm is the estimated DC arc flash incident energy at the maximum power point, in cal/cm2.

For exposures where the arc is in a box or enclosure, it would be prudent to use a 3x multiplying factor for the resulting incident energy value.

B. Detailed Arcing Current and Energy Calculations Method:

A thorough theoretical review of DC arcing current and energy was presented at the 2009 IEEE PCIC Conference. Readers are recommended to refer to that paper (reference 1 below) for those detailed calculations.

References:

1. “DC arc models and incident energy calculations”, Ammerman, R.F.; Gammon, T.; Sen, P.K.; Nelson, J.P.; Petroleum and Chemical Industry Conference, 2009, Record of Conference Papers,14-16 Sept. 2009

2. “Arc Flash Calculations for Exposures to DC Systems”, Doan, D.R., IEEE IAS Electrical Safety Workshop, 2007, Record of Conference Papers, March 2007. 3. DC Arc Hazard Assessment Phase II Copyright Material Kinectrics Inc. Report No. K-012623-RA-0002-R00Substantiation: This proposal is the work of NFPA 70E 2012 DC Hazards Task Group whose members include: Tom Carpenter, Jim Coady, Gary Dreifuerst, Dan Doan, Lloyd Gordon, Bobby Gray, Mike Hittel, Hugh Hoagland, Greg Leask, Mark Ode, and PK Sen. There is no information for dc hazards in the standard which gives usable guidance. This proposal provides tasks associated with dc hazards using the best available technical information as shown in referenced documents. This following technical papers were used in developing this table: 1. DC Arc Models and Incident Energy Calucations Copyright Material IEEE Paper No. PCIC-2009-7 2. Arc Flash Calculations for Exposures to DC Systems Copyright Material IEEE Paper No. ESW2007-19 3. DC Arc Hazard Assessment Phase II Copyright Material Kinectrics Inc. Report No. K-012623-RA-0002-R00 Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

Comment on Affirmative: BOWMAN, W.: Annex D.10 must be labeled D.8. Text must be added to Table D.1 to correlate the addition of the DC Calculation Methods. The information in Section D.8 in Table D.1 will be replaced with the following: Source Ammerman/Gammon/Nelson paper Limitations/Parameters Calculates incident energy for open air DC arcs for voltages up to 1 kV. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-518 Log #19 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (Annex E.2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Charles Mecham, General Physics Corp. Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: (2) No bare-hand contact is to be made with exposed energized electrical conductors or circuit parts operating at 50 volts or more, above 50 volts to ground, unless the “bare-hand method” is properly used. Substantiation: Other locations in 70E-2009, for example, section 110.6(D)(1)(b), use the term “50 volts or more”, with no reference “to ground”; and, in fact, the other references are correct. Adding the words “to ground” has caused some confusion with our engineering staff. The proposed correction should bring NFPA 70E into consistent use of the term “50 volts”. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: I appose this action as this change is not editorial and no substantiation to justify this change was given other than references to other articles in the standard where it appears differently. This change would impose the same requirements on “floating systems” as those that are referenced to a “common” bus in which a worker is assumed to be normally referenced to as well. An overall risk assessment would identify these situations in as drastically different. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-519 Log #110 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (Annex F) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas Doyle, Industrial Safety Integration Recommendation: Replace Existing Annex F with new text as follows:

Annex F

Hazard Analysis, Risk Estimation, and Risk Evaluation Procedure

Note: This Annex is not a mandatory part of this Standard.

F.1 Risk assessment (General)

This informative Annex provides guidance regarding a qualitative approach for risk assessment, including risk estimation and risk evaluation, which may be helpful in determining the protective measures that are required to reduce the probability of harm occurring in the circumstances under consideration. In order to receive the full benefit of completing the risk assessment process the relationships between the source or cause of risk and the effects of the hierarchy of controls on those causes must be understood. This annex is included in order to provide guidance. Hazard identification and Risk assessment are an analytical processes consisting of a number of discrete steps intended to ensure that hazards are properly identified and analysed with regard to their severity and the probability of their occurrence. Once hazards have been identified and analysed, the risk associated with those hazards can be estimated using the parameters outlined in Figure F.2. Appropriate protective measures then be implemented and evaluated in order to determine if adequate risk reduction has been achieved.

This procedure includes a comprehensive review of the hazards, associated foreseeable tasks and the protective measures that are required in order to maintain a tolerable level of risk.

This procedure includes:

(1) Identifying and analyzing electrical hazards

(2) Identifying tasks to be performed

(2) Documenting hazards associated with each task.

(3) Estimating the risk for each hazard/task pair.

(4) Determine appropriate protective measures to adequately reduce the level of risk.

70E-196

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Figure F.1 is intended to illustrate the steps to be taken and the decisions to be considered when performing an electrical work risk assessment. See Article 110.7, for a Hazard and Risk Evaluation Procedure. Figure F.4 illustrates in more detail the steps of risk analysis, assessment, and evaluation process

F.1.1 Responsibility

Electrical system designers, constructors, and users have responsibilities for defining and achieving tolerable risk. The supplier and the user either separately or jointly shall identify hazards, estimate risks and reduce risks to a tolerable level within the scope of their respective work activities. Although the responsibilities of the supplier and the user differ over the life cycle of the electrical equipment, each entity should use the risk assessment process.

In general, the electrical system supplier is responsible for the design, construction and information for operation and maintenance of the electrical system, while the user is responsible for the operation and maintenance of the electrical system.

Suppliers and users should involve qualified personnel in meeting their respective responsibilities. The supplier and user should ensure compliance with the related regulations and standards applicable to their work activity. This may include regulations and standards for a specific location and/or for a specific application.

Safetymanagement

Hazard identification

Initial estimated riskIteration

Design control

Designengineering

No

No

Organization(administrative

andbehavioralcontrols)

Estimated residual risk



Evaluation

Evaluation

Yes

Yes

Desired risk reduction achieved?

Desired risk reduction achieved?

Training/Procedures

Inherently safe design(elimination or substitution)

Personal protectiveequipment

Work organizationand instruction

Systems that increaseawareness

Communication

Action step

Verification, validationand documentation

Safety management

Protective devices

Information for use

Articles 100,–110.7(F), 130.3

Articles 110.8 (B) (1)

NFPA 70, NationalElectrical Code Table 130.7(C) (9) notes

Annex F

Annex F

Articles 120.1

Articles 130.3 (B),130.7

Articles 130.5 (B),130.6 (A), 205.9,250.2, 310.5

Annex F

Articles 130.7 (D) (1)(f) (a) (h) (i)

Articles 130.7 (E)(1) (2) (3)Articles 110.6 (A)(B) (C) (D) (E)

Articles 120.2 (F) (1)(a), 205.3 225.3, 340.7 (6)

F.2 Risk assessment F.2.1 Initial Risk estimation An initial estimation of risk should be carried out for each hazard. Risk related to the identified hazard should be derived by using the risk parameters that are shown in Figure F.2 including the following: – severity of harm, Se; and – probability of occurrence of that harm, which is a function of:

· frequency and duration of the exposure of persons to the hazard, Fr; · probability of occurrence of a hazardous event, Pr; and · possibilities to avoid or limit the harm, Av.

Risk relatedto theidentifiedhazard

andSeverity ofthe possibleharm

Se

=

Frequency and durationof exposure

Probability of occurrenceof a hazardous event

Probability of avoidingor limiting harm Av

Pr

FrProbability ofoccurrenceof that harm

F.2.2 Parameters used in risk estimation In preparation for the risk assessment parameter estimates can be entered into Table F.5. These parameters should be based on worst-case considerations for the electrical system. It may be the case that different risk reduction strategies are implemented for each hazard. The risk estimation stage is the only one at which hazards can be eliminated, thus avoiding the need for additional protective measures such as safeguarding or complementary protective measures. F.2.3 Severity (Se)

Severity of injuries or damage to health can be estimated by taking into account reversible injuries, irreversible injuries and death. Typically the types of hazards to be considered include but are not limited to shock and electrocution, burns, and impact. Choose the appropriate value of severity from Table F.1 based on the consequences of an injury, where:

4 means a fatal or a significant irreversible injury such that it will be very difficult to continue the same work after healing, if at all;

3 means a major or irreversible injury in such a way that it can be possible to continue the same work after healing. It can also include a severe major but reversible injury such as broken limbs;

2 means a reversible injury, including severe lacerations, stabbing, and severe bruises that requires attention from a medical practitioner;

1 means a minor injury including scratches and minor bruises that require attention by first aid.

Select the appropriate row for consequences (Se) of Table F.1. Insert the appropriate number under the Se column in Table F.5.

Severity (Se)

Irreversible - trauma, death 8

Permanent - skeletal damage, blindness, hearing loss, third degree burns 6Reversible - minor impact, hearing damage, second degree burns 3Reversible – minor laceration, bruises, first degree burns 1

Table F.1 – Severity (Se) classification

F.2.4 Probability of occurrence of harm Each of the three parameters of probability of occurrence of harm (i.e. Fr, Pr and Av) should be estimated independently of each other. A worst-case assumption needs to be used for each parameter to ensure that the protective measures, determined during risk evaluation, will provide adequate risk reduction. Generally, the use of a form of hazard/task-based evaluation is strongly recommended to ensure that proper consideration is given to the estimation of the probability of occurrence of harm.

F.2.4.1 Frequency and duration of exposure Consider the following aspects to determine the level of exposure:

· need for access to the hazard zone based on all modes of use, for example normal operation, maintenance; and · nature of access, for example examination, repair, trouble shooting.

It should then be possible to estimate the average interval between exposures and therefore the average frequency of access.

This factor does not include consideration of the failure of the short circuit interruption device(s) or the failure to use the appropriate personal protective equipment.

Figure F.2 Elements of risk

Figure F.1 Risk Assessment Process

70E-197

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Select the appropriate row for frequency and duration of exposure (Fr) of Table F.2. Insert the appropriate number under the Fr column in Table F.5.

Frequency and duration of exposure (Fr)

Frequency of exposure Duration > 10 min

≤ 1 per hr 5

> 1per hr ≤ 1 per day 5> 1 per day ≤ 1 per 2

weeks 4

> 1 per 2 weeks ≤ 1 year 3

> 1per year 2Table F.2– Frequency and duration of exposure (Fr) clas-

sification

F.2.4.2 Probability of occurrence of a hazardous event The occurrence of a hazardous event influences the probability of the occurrence of harm. The probability of the hazardous event occurring should describe the likelihood of the event materializing during the use and/or foreseeable misuse of the electrical system, or process. Subjectivity may have a substantial impact on the result of the risk assessment. The use of subjective information should be minimized as far as reasonably practicable.

The probability of occurrence of the hazardous event should be estimated independently of other related parameters (Fr and Av) and will typically be based on the results of the completed study of the arc-flash potential. The worst-case scenario should be used for this parameter to ensure that short circuit interruption device(s) have, where practicable, been properly selected and installed, and will provide adequate protection.

Elements of the electrical system, which are intended to ensure an intrinsically safe design, shall be taken into consideration in the determination of the probability of the hazardous event(s) These may include but are not limited to the mechanical structure, electrical devices, and electronic controls, integral to the system, and/or process at the time of the analysis. Types of components which could contribute to an inherently safe design could include, but are not limited to, current limiting devices, ground fault circuit interrupters, etc..

This parameter can be estimated by taking into account: a) Predictability of the performance of component parts of the electrical system relevant to the hazard in different modes of use (e.g. normal operation, maintenance, fault finding). At this point in the risk assessment process the protective effect of any personal protective equipment and other protective measure should not be taken into account. This is necessary in order to estimate the amount of risk that will be present if the personal protective equipment and other protective measures are not in place at the time of the exposure. In general terms, it must be considered whether the electrical system being assessed has the propensity to act in an unexpected manner. The electrical system performance will vary from very predictable to not predictable. Unexpected events cannot be discounted until it can be clearly demonstrated that the electrical system will perform as expected.

NOTE 1 Predictability is often linked to the complexity of the electrical system and the characteristics of the energy supply.

b) The specified or foreseeable characteristics of human behavior with regard to interaction with the component parts of the machine relevant to the hazard. This can be characterized by: · stress (e.g. due to time constraints, work task, perceived damage limitation); and/or · lack of awareness of information relevant to the hazard. This will be influenced by factors such as skills, training, experience, and complexity of machine/process. These attributes are not usually directly under the influence of the electrical system designer, but a task analysis will reveal activities where total awareness of all issues, including unexpected outcomes, cannot be reasonably assumed. “Very high” probability of occurrence of a hazardous event should be selected to reflect normal workplace constraints and worst case considerations. Positive reasons (e.g. well defined application and knowledge of high level of user competences) are required for any lower values to be used.

NOTE 2 Any required or assumed skills, knowledge, etc. should be stated in the information for use.

Select the appropriate row for probability of occurrence of hazardous event (Pr) of Table F.3. Indicate the appropriate number under the Pr column in Table F.5.

Probability of the occur-rence of the hazardous

event

Probability (Pr)

Very high 5

Likely 4

Possible 3

Rarely 2

Negligible 1

Table F.3– Probability (Pr) classification

F.2.4.3 Probability of avoiding or limiting harm (Av) This parameter can be estimated by taking into account aspects of the electrical system design and its intended application that can help to avoid or limit the harm from a hazard. These aspects include, for example

· sudden, fast or slow speed of appearance of the hazardous event, for example an explosion caused by high fault values under short circuit conditions; · spatial possibility to withdraw from the hazard; · the nature of the component or system, for example the use of touch safe components can reduce the probability of contact with energized parts; working in close proximity to high voltage can increase the probability of personnel being exposed to hazards due to approach to live parts; and · possibility of recognition of a hazard, for example electrical hazard: a copper bar does not change its appearance whether it is under voltage or not. To recognize the presence of the hazard one needs an instrument to establish whether electrical equipment is energized or not thus both inadvertent and advertent contact need to be considered.

Select the appropriate row for probability of avoidance or limiting harm (Av) of Table F.4. Insert the appropriate number under the Av column in Table F.5.

Probability of avoiding or limiting harm (Av)

Impossible 5

Rarely 3

Probable 1Table F.4– Parameters used to determine

class of Probability of avoiding or limiting harm (Av)

F.2.5 Risk level and probability of harm Once the parameters for each hazard under consideration have been entered in Table F.5 the information can be used in the first step of the risk assessment process as outlined in Figure F.1.

Zone No. Hazard Se Fr Pr Av

Table F.5– Parameters used to determine risk levels and probability of harm (See Figure F.2)

70E-198

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E F.3 Risk Reduction

F.3.1 Protective Measures

Once the risk prior to the application of protective measures has been estimated, all practicable efforts must be made to reduce the risk of harm. Careful consideration of failure modes is an important part of risk reduction. Care should be taken to ensure that both technical and behavioural failures, which could result in ineffective risk reduction, are taken into account during the risk reduction stage of the risk assessment. Situations where hazard elimination could not be attained typically require a balanced approach in order to reduce the probability of harm. For example in order to effectively control access to an electrical system, requires the use of barriers, awareness placards, safe operating instructions, qualification and training, and personnel protective equipment as required by this standard, and initial as well as refresher or periodic training for all affected personnel in the area. Engineering controls alone are not sufficient in reducing the remaining risk to a tolerable level. Typically all five areas must be implemented in order to achieve the desired result.Consideration of all five of the items listed below is required to establish an adequate risk reduction strategy.

F.3.1.1 Engineering controls - Engineering controls have the potential to have a substantial impact on risk. They should where practicable be considered and analyzed. Typically engineering controls take the form of barriers and other safeguarding devices as described in the National Electrical Code, IEC 60204-1 and/or ANSI/NFPA 79. F.3.1.2 Awareness devices - Awareness means can be used to compliment the effects of engineering controls with regard to risk reduction. They should be chosen based on the design configuration for each specific application and their potential effectiveness during foreseen interaction. Each design and configuration may require unique awareness devices in order to have the desired impact on risk. Typically awareness means take the form of signs, visual alarms, audible alarms etc. F.3.1.3 Procedures - Identify procedures and instructions that are required for the individual(s) to safely interact with the electrical system. The procedures and instructions should include descriptions of the hazards, the possible hazardous events, hazardous situations, and the protective measures that need to be implemented. The procedures and instructions should also be used to communicate any foreseeable misuse of the system that could contribute to an increased level of risk. Typically formal procedures should be provided in written form however in some cases verbal instruction may be provided. Care should be taken in the later case to ensure that the verbal instructions will have the desired impact on risk. F.3.1.4 Training – Training, with regard to the proper interaction and for foreseeable inappropriate interaction with the electrical system, must be completed. The intent of the training is to ensure that all affected personnel are able to understand when and how hazardous situations could arise and how to best reduce the risk associated with those situations. Typically training for those interacting with electrical systems will include technical information regarding hazards and/or hazardous situations as well as information related to potential failure modes that could impact risk. This type of training generally will be provided by a trainer who has an in depth understanding of electrical system design as well as experience in the field of adult education. Less technical training content could be appropriate in situations where only awareness of electrical hazards is needed in order to ensure that unqualified personnel do not interact with the electrical system. F.3.1.5 PPE - The electrical system must be analyzed in order to determine appropriate category of personal protective equipment (PPE). Once the appropriate PPE has been determined, personnel are required to maintain and use it as required in order to ensure that residual risk remains at the desired level. F.4 Risk Evaluation

F.4.1 Risk Evaluation

Once the appropriate protective measures described in clause F.3.1 have been applied the impact of those measures on the elements of risk (Figure F.2) should be taken into account. Each type of protective measure could impact one or more of the elements that contribute to risk. The effects on risk, or the impacts on the individual elements of risk, should be considered in the final risk estimation. The cumulative affect of the final combination of protective measures can then be used to estimate the residual risk. Listed below is a general non-exhaustive outline that can be used as a guide to the final estimation of risk.

F.4.1.1 Design - Eliminate or substitution by design

· Elimination of the hazard - Impacts both severity of harm and likelihood of harm

· Failure mode(s) examples · Component(s) failure

· Application of an incorrect construction or manufacturing specification · Incorrect calculation (i.e. potential energy, toxicity, strength, durability) · Inadequate procurement control

· Incorrect and/or insufficient maintenance · Substitution – May affect severity of harm, frequency of exposure to the hazard under consideration, and/or the possibility of avoiding or limiting harm depending on which method of substitution is applied.

· Failure mode(s) examples · Unexpected or unanticipated interaction · Excessive production pressure · Inadequate procurement control

F.4.1.2 Design - Use of engineering controls · Greatest impact on the probability of a hazardous event(s) under certain circumstances · No impact on severity of harm

· Failure mode(s) examples · Incorrect application of construction or manufacturing specification · Unanticipated tasks · Incentive to circumvent or reduce effectiveness · Excessive production pressure · Protective system failure

F.4.1.3 Use of systems that increase awareness of potential hazards

· Potential impact on avoiding or limiting harm · Potential impact on inadvertent exposure · Minimal or no impact on severity of harm

· Failure mode(s) examples · Too many warning signs · Depreciation of effect over time · Lack of understanding

F.4.1.4 Organization and the application of a safe system of work F.4.1.4.1 Personnel training

· Greatest impact on avoiding or limiting harm · Minimal if any impact on severity of harm · Possible impact on the probability of a hazardous event(s) under certain circumstances

· Failure mode(s) examples · Training not understood · Identified hazards not clearly communicated · Depreciating in effect over time · Training material not current · Training is not consistent with instructions · Training material does not include detail regarding how to perform the work

F.4.1.4.2 Access restrictions · Greatest impact on exposure · No impact on severity of harm

· Failure mode(s) examples · Work permit system does not exist · Competency complacency · Insufficient monitoring, control and/or corrective actions

F.4.1.4.3 Safe work procedures · Greatest impact on avoiding or limiting harm · Minimal if any impact on severity of harm · Possible impact on the probability of a hazardous event(s) under certain circumstances

· Failure mode(s) examples · Inconsistent with the current culture · Procedures not current, or accessible · Does not consider all task, hazards and/or hazardous situations · Insufficient monitoring, control and/or corrective actions · Instructions are not consistent with training content · Content is too general (i.e. Don’t touch the live parts, be careful)

F.4.1.4.4 Policies and instructions · Greatest impact on exposure · Possible impact on the probability of a hazardous event(s) under certain circumstances · Minimal or no impact on severity of harm

· Failure mode(s) examples · Policies and instructions are inconsistent · Instructions not clearly communicated or accessible · Insufficient monitoring, control and/or corrective actions

70E-199

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E · Allows personnel to make the decision to work live without adequate justification

F.4.1.5 Personal protective equipment (PPE) · Greatest impact on avoiding or limiting harm · Potential impact on inadvertent exposure · Minimal impact on severity of harm · No impact on the probability of a hazardous event(s)

· Failure mode(s) examples · Reason for use not understood · Creates barriers to effective completion of the work · PPE specification inappropriate for the considered hazards · Production pressure does not afford time to use or maintain · Worker forgets to use when needed · Excessive discomfort · Perceived invulnerability · Insufficient monitoring, control and/or corrective actions

F.5 Risk reduction verification

F.5.1 Verification

Once the assessment has been completed and protective measures have been determined, it is imperative to ensure that the protective measures are implemented prior to initiating the electrical work. While this procedure may not result in a reduction of PPE required, it may improve the understanding of the properties of the hazards associated with a task to a greater extent and thus allow for improvement in the implementation of the protective measures that have been selected.

F.5.2 Auditing

For each activity that has been assessed in could be necessary to audit the risk reduction strategy that is applicable. If an audit is required, the auditing process should take place prior to commencing work on electrical systems. An example non-exhaustive audit is shown in Figure F.3. Each audit process may need to be specific to the properties of the electrical system and/or the task to be performed.

Human factors (mistakes)

Human factors (willful disregard)

Unqualified person performing electrical work

Inappropriate overcurrent protection

Short circuits between test leads

Meter malfunctions

Meter misapplication

Qualified person performing electrical work that exceeds their qualification

Training and instructions include details regarding hazardous situations that could arise

Policies and supervision are in place in order to ensure that instructions are followed.

Work permit system is in place to control personnel activities.

Instructions include details regarding the selection or replacement of fuses and/or circuit breakers.

Training and instructions include details regarding care and inspection of testing equipment.

Training and instructions include details regarding care and inspection of testing equipment.

Training and instructions include details regarding use of testing equipment.

Work permit system is in place to control personnel activities.

Hazard (situation) Risk Reduction Strategy

Confirmation (in place)Yes / No

Figure F.3 Auditing

70E-200


Risk Assessment

Note: Italicized text represents information used during the risk assessment process.

Risk Assessment Process

Risk Estimation Hazard

AnalysisHazardStep 1

Assessment Version

Electrical System ID, Notes Related Documents: Technical File, Single Line Diagram, Coordination Study, Training Documents, Work Instructions, Policies and Procedures, Team Members, Assessment Date, Assumptions, etc.

General Information for Each Hazard Zone • Description of hazard zone • Foreseen activities • Hazardous event(s) • Hazardous situation(s)

Assessment Version Details

Uncertainties, Notes

Pictures

Probability of Hazard Occurrence

Severity of Potential Injury

Frequency of Exposure

Possibility of Avoidance

Risk Level — Likelihood of Harm

Risk Reduction Measures

Additional Safety Element

Evaluation

Risk Level — Likelihood of Harm

Risk Reduction Supplier

Engineering Controls Step 2

Referenced Standard(s)

Exposed Person(s)

Qualifications of Exposed Person(s)

Workplace Safety Policies, Procedures, and Instruction

Personal Protective Equipment

Residual Risk Level Not Tolerable

Residual Risk Level TolerableComplete

Task / Hazard Analysis

Area of Potential Injury

Personal Protective Equipment

Nature of Injury

Cause of Injury

Residual Risk Level — Likelihood of Harm

Risk Reduction User

Behavioral Controls Step 3

Evaluation

Risk Reduction Not Achieved

Risk Reduction AchievedRisk Level Tolerability

Figure F.4 Risk Assessment Process

70E-201


F.5 Risk assessment example

Detailed Assessment Report Risk Assessment & Risk Reduction Methods for Identified Hazards

Assessment: RA 0001 Version: 3 Date: 11/10/2009 9:09:51 AM Assessment Name: RA 0001 Version: 3

Assessment Created: 11/10/2009 Provided By: Electrical Safety Integration Performed By: Risk Manager, Bill Smith, John Doe Approved By: Plant Manager Assessment Notes: Sample Electrical Assessment 1 Resource Administrator: ABC Company System ID: Robot 1 Version Remarks: Sample Assessment This assessment is not to be used as an official

evaluation for an electrical control enclosure. It has been created as a sample and is not to be used as an estimation of risk for an actual industrial installation.

Protective measures outlined in the detailed report represent the recommendations which should be implemented by ABC Company.

WARNING: NOT ALL HAZARDS AND/OR HAZARDOUS SITUATIONS HAVE BEEN EVALUATED!

The following interaction points are to be included b) Electrical i) Shock and burn hazards Further evaluation is required by the supplier and user in order to ensure that the risk associated with the use and maintenance of this machine is sufficiently low.

Resource Administration

Name: ABC Company Street: 123 ABC St City: King City State\Prov: Any state Country: USA ZIP\Postal Code: 12345 Contact: John Smith Phone: 111-222-3333 Fax: 111-222-4444 E-mail: [email protected] System Resource

System ID: Robot 1 Date Purchased: 3/18/2005 Manufacturer / Developer: Robot Manufacturer Function of System Part handling

Figure F.5 Risk assessment example

70E-202


Hazard Zone: 1.3 Robot 1 electrical cabinet

Hazard Zone Details

Activity: Trouble shooting control system. Hazardous Event: Accidental contact with energized conductors and/or

circuit parts (electrocution). Hazardous Situation(s): While working in close proximity to energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing, personnel could come in contact with unguarded live electrical parts.

Notes: All components used in this enclosure have been selected such that accidental contact with the energized circuit parts has reduced through the use of barriers.

Risk Estimation Hazard Zone Picture: Severity of potential injury caused by hazard: Fatal - Immediate or subsequent death Frequency of exposure to the hazard: Infrequent - Weekly or less Possibility of hazard avoidance: Possible - Potentially able to avoid Probability of the occurrence to the hazard event: Unlikely to occur Supporting Documents: Incident history

Assessed risk if protective measures are not employed: High risk / Possible - injury is likely

Engineering Control Risk Reduction Method Primary safety device used to reduce risk of injury (Mechanical Guarding): None Awareness Means: None Administrative Risk Controls Nature of person exposed to hazardous area: Local maintenance / set-up Qualification / Education level of the person exposed to hazardous area: Previous formal training provided by professional trainer Personal Protective Equipment (Based on task hazard assessment(s)): Task Hazard Document Activity See Elec01 <601 VAC Trouble-shooting in panelboards or switchboards rated >240 V and up to 600 V Work place safety policies, procedures, and instructions: Corporate / Company Guidelines for all activities / written instruction Residual Risk Assumed by Facility

Low risk / Minimal - injury is highly unlikely Additional protective measures may be disproportionate to the benefit gained.

Figure F.5 Risk assessment example (continued)

70E-203

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Hazard Zone: 1.4 Robot 1 electrical cabinet

Hazard Zone Details

Activity: Trouble shooting control system. Hazardous Event: Arc flash event with incident energy less than 8cal/cm2. Hazardous Situation(s): While working in close proximity to energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing, personnel could be exposed to extremely high temperatures.

Notes: All components used in this enclosure have been selected such that incident energy will be limited to < 8cal/cm2 when installed such that the available fault current is limited to 5000 amps at the supply termination. The user of this equipment shall ensure that appropriate short circuit protective systems are installed and maintained.

Hazard Zone Picture:

Risk Estimation Severity of potential injury caused by hazard: Major - Normally irreversible injury Frequency of exposure to the hazard: Infrequent - Weekly or less Possibility of hazard avoidance: Impossible - injury is unavoidable Probability of the occurrence to the hazard event: Remote possibility Supporting Documents: Engineered calculation(s) Incident history

Assessed risk if protective measures are not employed: High risk / Possible - injury is likely

Engineering Control Risk Reduction Method Primary safety device used to reduce risk of injury (Mechanical Guarding): None Awareness Means: None Administrative Risk Controls Nature of person exposed to hazardous area: Local maintenance / set-up Qualification / Education level of the person exposed to hazardous area: Previous formal training provided by professional trainer Personal Protective Equipment (Based on task hazard assessment(s)): Task Hazard Document Activity See Elec01<601 VAC Trouble-shooting in panelboards or switchboards rated >240 V and up to 600 V Work place safety policies, procedures, and instructions: Corporate / Company Guidelines for all activities / written instruction Residual Risk Assumed by Facility

Low risk / Minimal - injury is highly unlikely Additional protective measures may be disproportionate to the benefit gained.


70E-204


Hazard Zone: 1.5 Robot 1 Outside of limited approach boundary electrical cabinet

Hazard Zone Details

Activity: Observation during trouble shooting of control system. Hazardous Event: Arc flash event with incident energy less than 8cal/cm2.

Hazardous Situation(s): While observing working in close proximity to energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing, personnel could be exposed to extremely high temperatures if they enter the limited approach area.

Notes: Policies shall be established and implemented in order to ensure that unqualified personnel remain outside of the limited approach boundary. Electrical hazard awareness training is required. Hazard Zone Picture:

Risk Estimation Severity of potential injury caused by hazard: Minor - Reversible Frequency of exposure to the hazard: Infrequent - Weekly or less Possibility of hazard avoidance: Unlikely - Unable to avoid Probability of the occurrence to the hazard event: Negligible possibility Supporting Documents: Engineered calculation(s) Incident history

Assessed risk if safety elements are not employed: Low risk / Minimal - injury is highly unlikely

Engineering Control Risk Reduction Method Primary safety device used to reduce risk of injury (Mechanical Guarding): None Awareness Means: Caution signs and chains Administrative Risk Controls Nature of person exposed to hazardous area: Local maintenance / set-up Qualification / Education level of the person exposed to hazardous area: Previous exposure in similar environment (formal employee training) Personal Protective Equipment (Based on task hazard assessment(s)): Task Hazard Document Activity

See Plant 001 Sample Entry into all production areas Sample

Work place safety policies, procedures, and instructions: Corporate / Company Guidelines for all activities / written instruction Residual Risk Assumed by Facility

Very Low risk / Minimal - Injury is a remote possibility Additional protective measures may be disproportionate to the benefit gained.


70E-205


Task / Hazard Personal Protective Equipment

Task / Hazard ID: Elec01.<601 VAC Task Hazard Notes: Entered By: Maintenance Manager Date Created: 11/10/2009 Activity: Trouble-shooting in panelboards or switchboards rated >240 V and up to 600 V

General Areas of Potential Injury: Head Specific areas of the potential injury Protection devices used Ears, Face, Eyes Arc flash hood 8 cal/cm2 Eyes Safety Glasses Nature of Injuries for the Above Area of Potential Injury Skin damage Cause of the potential injury Sparks / flames General Areas of Potential Injury: Whole body Specific areas of the potential injury Protection devices used Skin Arc flash FR clothing 8 cal/cm2 Nature of Injuries for the Above Area of Potential Injury Skin damage Cause of the potential injury Contact with live parts under fault conditions

General Areas of Potential Injury: Arms Specific areas of the potential injury Protection devices used Fingers, hands, forearms Electrical isolation gloves, Leather gloves Fingers Voltage rated tools Hand Nature of Injuries for the Above Area of Potential Injury Skin damage Cause of the potential injury Contact with live parts under fault conditions Contact with unguarded live parts Sparks / flames


70E-206


Task / Hazard Personal Protective Equipment

Task Hazard ID: Plant 001 Sample Task Hazard Notes: The listed PPE is required in all production areas. Additional PPE may be required in specific areas. Entered By: Maintenance Manager Date Created: 11/10/2009 Activity: Entry into all production areas Sample

General Areas of Potential Injury: Head Specific areas of the potential injury Protection devices used Eyes Safety Glasses Nature of Injuries for the Above Area of Potential Injury Sensory damage Cause of the potential injury Propelled objects

General Areas of Potential Injury: Legs Specific areas of the potential injury Protection devices used Foot Safety shoes Nature of Injuries for the Above Area of Potential Injury Skeletal damage Cause of the potential injury Falling material/objects


70E-207

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-521a Log #CP17 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (G.4) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Electrical Safety in the Workplace, Recommendation: Delete G.4.0. Substantiation: The recommended action correlates with the committee action on Proposal 70E-158 to delete 120.2(D)(1) covering the “individual qualified employee control procedure.” Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: CARPENTER, T.: See my negative comment on Proposal 70E-158. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-522 Log #381 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (Annex H, H.2, and Table H.2 (New)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Mike Doherty, Infrastructure Health & Safety Association / Rep. CSA Z462 Technical Committee Recommendation: Change the title of Annex H, add a new paragraph and table to read as follows: Annex H Simplified, Two-Category, Flame-Resistant (FR) Clothing System Guidance on Selection of Protective Clothing and Other Personal Protective Equipment (No changes to H.1 and Table H.1) H.2 Guidance on Selection of Arc-Rated Clothing and Other Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for Use with a Hazard Analysis. Table H.2 provides guidance on the selection of arc rated clothing and other personal protective equipment for users who conduct a hazard analysis to determine the incident energy exposure (in calories/cm2) to the worker. (See Table H.2 on page 70E-209.) Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the CSA Z462 Workplace Electrical Safety full Technical Committee. This is the third of three related proposals; the other two proposals relate to the FPN of 130.3(B)(1), 130.7(C)(13)(a) & (b). The existing guidance offered by the NFPA 70E-09 is inadequate for users selecting protective clothing and equipment when using the selection method based on incident energy determined with a hazard analysis. This is particularly the case for face/head protection. At present, the guidance provided by the NFPA 70E-09 for the selection of face/head protection while using this method is that the PPE must be selected based on the incident energy exposure determined with a hazard analysis. Using both PPE selection methods (Method (1) Incident Energy Analysis, and Method (2) Hazard/Risk Categories, results in the reverse engineering of Table 130.7(C)(10). Users currently have no other alternative because aside from the information contained in Table 130.7(C)(10) there is limited clarification provided for the type of face protection and body protection required. For instance, the potential exists for users to select arc rated goggles & ski mask type balaclava or faceshield & balaclava to meet the requirements of 130.7(C)(3) and 130.7(C)(4). This creates protection issues since the use of goggles and a balaclava does not provide protection against projectiles, and modified arc testing of face and head PPE from a range of orientations has shown that the use of a faceshield with a balaclava for exposures above 12 cal/cm2 can lead to convective heat exposures to the eyes, nose and mouth areas when the arc exposure is coming from behind or from side angles. In these exposures from behind or from side angles, the back edges of the faceshield tend to direct the convective portion of the arc incident energy into the facial areas that are not fully covered by the balaclava. Those who use the Hazard/Rick Category method of hazard analysis are required to use arc rated arc flash suit hoods for HRC3 and higher as indicated in Table 130.7(C)(10). Similar guidance is needed for users deciding to determine incident energy with a hazard analysis. The need for increased guidance in PPE selection also applies to protective clothing and other protective equipment for the body, hands and feet for users who determine incident energy with a hazard analysis. This proposed Annex H table provides the needed guidance for selection of protective clothing and equipment for users who determine incident energy exposure with a hazard analysis. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 80E-522a (Log #CP15) meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

Substantiation: It would appear that the current annex has been written in or to make the hazard analysis and risk assessment process very simple. I can only assume that this has been done in order to ensure that the workers are involved in the process. As a licensed electrician who specializes in OH&S, risk assessment and electrical system design I think that oversimplification of the risk assessment process does more damage than good in attempting to protect workers. The examples shown in the current annex do not reflect the detail and complexity of the risk management process outlined in the body of the standard with regard to determining the degree of compliance with this standard and as such should not be included. It is also not effective in estimating risk according to the ISO methodology or establishing the degree of residual risk once protective measures have been determined. I suggest that the TC totally replace the current Annex F with the proposed annex or delete the existing Annex F entirely. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-520 Log #20 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (Figure F.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Charles Mecham, General Physics Corp. Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Does task involve exposure to energized electric components operating at 50 volts or more? with voltage greater than 50 volts to ground? Substantiation: Other locations in 70E-2009, for example, section 110.6(D)(1)(b), use the term “50 volts or more”, with no reference “to ground”; and, in fact, the other references are correct. Adding the words “to ground” has caused some confusion with our engineering staff. The proposed correction should bring NFPA 70E into consistent use of the term “50 volts”. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-521 Log #422 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Annex Figure F.2.2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Michael A. Anthony, University of Michigan / Rep. APPA.ORG - Association of Education Facility Executives Recommendation: Modify Figure F.2.2 as shown on the following page. Substantiation: The main body of NFPA 70E text does not now contain any explicit references to the cost of electrical safety. In the subtext of nearly every sentence of the enforceable part of the text are the questions: 1. “In light of the cost of business interruptions, at what point is it less expensive to do the work with equipment de-energized as opposed to doing it live?” 2. “If the work must be performed while the equipment is energized, how much should we pay for means and methods to calibrate risk to an acceptable level?” 3. Cost considerations are at least implicit in every decision we make in the education facilities industry, and in many other industries. Recognizing cost considerations in this diagram, in this Annex, would be a solid first step in a discussion that should broaden in future updates. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Business interruptions and their associated economic and financial impact are not sufficient reasons to be used to justify unsafe work practices. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HITTEL, M.: See my negative comment on Proposal 70E-158. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

70E-208


70E-521 (Log #422) Reccommendation

70E-209


Table H.2: Guidance on Selection of Arc-Rated Clothing and Other Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for Use when Incident Exposure is Determined by a Hazard Analysis

Incident Energy Exposure Protective Clothing and PPE

Less than or Equal to 1.2 cal/cm2

Protective Clothing, nonmelting (according to ASTM F 1506-08) or untreated natural fiber

Shirt (long sleeve) and pants (long) or coverall

Other Personal Protective EquipmentFace shield for projectile protection (AN)Safety glasses or safety goggles (SR) Hearing protection Leather gloves or rubber insulating gloves with leather protectors (AN)

Greater than 1.2 to 12 cal/cm2

Arc Rated Clothing and equipment with an Arc Rating equal to or greater than the incident energy determined in a hazard analysis. (Note 3)

Arc-rated long-sleeve shirt and arc-rated pants or arc-rated coverall or arc flash suit (SR) (Note 3)Arc-rated face shield and arc-rated balaclava or arc flash suit hood (SR) (Note 1)Arc rated jacket, parka, or rainwear (AN)

Other Personal Protective Equipment

Hard hatFR hard hat liner (AN)Safety glasses or safety goggles (SR) Hearing protection Leather gloves or rubber insulating gloves with leather protectors (SR) (Note 4)Leather work shoes

Greater than 12 cal/cm2


Arc-rated long-sleeve shirt and arc-rated pants orArc-rated coverall and/or arc flash suit (SR) Arc-rated arc flash suit hood Arc-rated gloves Arc-rated jacket, parka, or rainwear (AN)


Hard hatFR hard hat liner (AN)Safety glasses or safety goggles (SR)Hearing protection Arc-rated gloves or rubber insulating gloves with leather protec-tors (SR) (Note 4)Leather work shoes

AN = As needed (in addition to the protective clothing and PPE required by 130.3(B)(1).SR = Selection of one in group is required by 130.3(B)(1)Notes: 1. Faceshields with a wrap-around guarding to protect the face, chin, forehead, ears, neck area are required by 130.7(C)(13)(b). For full head and neck protection, use a balaclava or an arc flash hood.2. All items not designated “AN” are required by 130.7(C).3. Arc ratings can be for a single layer such as a shirt and pants or a coverall, or for an arc flash suit or for a multi layer system consisting of a combination of shirt and pants, coverall and arc flash suit. The innermost layer of clothing can be, nonmelting (according to ASTM F1506-08) or non-FR natural fiber. Inclusion of the innermost layer of nonmelting or non-FR clothing as part of the multi layer system arc rating requires that the complete system including the innermost layer be arc tested to determine the system arc rating.4. Rubber insulating gloves with leather protectors provide arc flash protection in addition to shock protection. Higher class rubber insulating gloves with leather protectors due to the increased material thickness provide increased arc flash protection.


70E-210

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E tasks with 0 cal/cm2. The table should be changed to indicate that all PPE listed in the “Less than or Equal to 1.2 cal/cm2” is “AN” or “As needed. (2) Table H.2, note 3 implies that cotton clothes can be worn under arc rated clothes. It also says that the innermost layer of non-FR clothing can be included in the multi layer system arc rating if the complete system including the innermost layer is arc rated. This is in conflict with the action on 70E-352 which added this statement: “Garments that are not arc-rated shall not be permitted to be used to increase the arc rating of a clothing system. “ Note 3 should be deleted. (3) Table H.2 indicates that “arc-rated face shield and arc-rated balaclava or arc flash suit hood” are required for exposures calculated at greater than 1.2 to 12 cal/cm2. The action on 70E-348 requires balaclava at HRC 2. The panel statement on that proposal indicated clearly that it was not the intent of the committee to require balaclava at HRC1. But Table H.2 indicates that it is required at exposures down to 1.2 cal/cm2, which conflicts with 70E-348. Table H.2 should be revised to indicate that balaclava at greater than 1.2 to 12 cal/cm2 is AN or “As Needed.” _______________________________________________________________ 70E-523 Log #40 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (Annex H.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Palmer L. Hickman, NJATC Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: H.1 Use of Simplified Approach. The use of Table H.1 is suggested as a simplified approach to provide minimum personal protective equipment for electrical workers within facilities with large and diverse electrical systems. Substantiation: The words “suggested as” seem to imply that the 70E Technical Committee would prefer that users of 70E use this informational Annex that are “not part of the requirements of this NFPA document” to select PPE rather than the requirements of Sections and Tables 130.7(C)(9), 130.7(C)(10), and 130.7(C)(11). Removing the words “suggested as” from the first sentence of H.1 will still offer a simplified two-category approach without suggesting or recommending that it be used. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Committee Statement: The recommendation has been incorporated into the action on Proposal 70E-522a (Log #CP15). Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-524 Log #416 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (Annex H.1 and H.2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Lawrence S. Ayer, Biz Com Electric, Inc. / Rep. IEC Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: H.1 Use of Simplified Approach using Tables. The use of Table H.1 is suggested as a simplified approach to provide minimum personal protective equipment for electrical workers within facilities with large and diverse electrical systems. The clothing listed in Table H.1 fulfills the minimum FR clothing requirements of Table 130.7(C)(9) and Table 130.7(C)(10). The clothing systems listed in this table should be used with the other PPE appropriate for the Hazard/Risk Category. [See Table 130.7(C)(10).] The notes at the bottom of Table 130.7(C)(9) must apply as shown in that table. H.2 Simplified Approach using Fault-Clearing Times of Circuit Breakers. The use of Table H.2 is suggested as a simplified approach to provide minimum personal protective equipment for workers if the upstream protection fault-clearing time and short circuit time is know. Relocate Table D.9.1 from Annex D into Annex H and relabel as Table H.2. Include all associated notes at the bottom of Table D.9.1. Substantiation: Different approaches to using HRC clothing should be located in one annex. Table D.9.1 is another simplified two category approach but is used by individuals who understand the clearing times and fault currents in their facilities. It would be more appropriate to relocate Table D9.1 to Annex H which deals with 2-category clothing systems. A proposal by a 70E Task Group recommends deletion of a majority of Annex D material. This table should be retained. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-522a (Log #CP15) meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-522a Log #CP15 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (Annex H ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Electrical Safety in the Workplace, Recommendation: Revise Annex H to read as follows:

Revise Annex H as follows:Annex H Simplified, Two-Category , Flame Resistant Clothing System Guidance on Selection of Protective Clothing and Other Personal Protective Equipment.

H.1 Arc-Rated Clothing and Other Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for Use with Hazard/Risk Categories. Tables 130.7(C)(9) and 130.7(C)(10) provides guidance for the selection and use of personal protective equipment when using Hazard/Risk Categories.

H.12 Use of Simplified, Two-Category Clothing Approach for use with Table 130.7(C)(9) and 130.7(C)(10). The use of Table H.12 is suggested as a simplified approach to provide minimum personal protective equipment for electrical workers within facilities with large and diverse electrical systems. The clothing listed in Table H.1 fulfills the minimum FR clothing requirements of Table 130.7(C)(9) and Table 130.7(C)(10). The clothing systems listed in this table should be used with the other PPE appropriate for the Hazard/Risk Category. [See Table 130.7(C)(10).] The notes at the bottom of Table 130.7(C)(9) must apply as shown in that table.

Existing Table H.1 and to be renumbered as Table H.2. Retain notes at bottom of Table .

H.3 Arc-Rated Clothing and Other Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for Use with a Hazard Analysis. Table H.3 provides guidance on the selection of arc rated clothing and other personal protective equipment for users who conduct a hazard analysis to determine the incident energy exposure (in calories/cm2) to the worker. (See Table H.2 on the following page.)H.4 Guideline for the use of Hazard/Risk Category (HRC) 2 and HRC 4 Personal Protective Equipment Two-Level Clothing Approach for Use with known Short-Circuit Currents and Device Clearing Times. The following tables can be used to determine the suitability of 8 cal/cm2 Hazard/Risk Category (HRC 2) and 40 cal/cm2 HRC 4 personal protective equipment on systems rated up to 15 kV, line-to-line. See Table D.9.1 H.4.1 and Table D.9.2 H.4.2 for the recommended limitations based on bolted 3-phase short-circuit currents at the listed fault-clearing times. The limitations listed below are based on IEEE 1584 calculation methods. Existing Table D.9.1 to be renumbered as H.4.1. Existing Table D.9.2 to be renumbered as H.4.2.Substantiation: The committee revises Annex H to provide guidance on clothing selection. Annex H has been split into 4 sections; two sections which provide guidance on selecting personal protective clothing when using the Hazard/Risk Categories and two sections providing guidance on selecting personal protective clothing when using incident energy values. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: REGE, T.: Accept with comments(1) Table H.2 indicates that PPE is required for tasks “Less than or equal to 1.2 cal/cm2.” That means that PPE is required for tasks where the exposure has been calculated to be 0 cal/cm2. There should be a lower level where no PPE is required. Employers should not be required to wear PPE for tasks with 0 cal/cm2. The table should be changed to indicate that all PPE listed in the “Less than or Equal to 1.2 cal/cm2” is “AN” or “As needed.(2) Table H.2, note 3 implies that cotton clothes can be worn under arc rated clothes. It also says that the innermost layer of non-FR clothing can be included in the multi layer system arc rating if the complete system including the innermost layer is arc rated. This is in conflict with the action on 70E-352 which added this statement: “Garments that are not arc-rated shall not be permitted to be used to increase the arc rating of a clothing system. “ Note 3 should be deleted.(3) Table H.2 indicates that “arc-rated face shield and arc-rated balaclava or arc flash suit hood” are required for exposures calculated at greater than 1.2 to 12 cal/cm2. The action on 70E-348 requires balaclava at HRC 2. The panel statement on that proposal indicated clearly that it was not the intent of the committee to require balaclava at HRC1. But Table H.2 indicates that it is required at exposures down to 1.2 cal/cm2, which conflicts with 70E-348. Table H.2 should be revised to indicate that balaclava at greater than 1.2 to 12 cal/cm2 is AN or “As Needed.” WILMER, K.: (1) Table H.2 indicates that PPE is required for tasks “Less than or equal to 1.2 cal/cm2.” That means that PPE is required for tasks where the exposure has been calculated to be 0 cal/cm2. There should be a lower level where no PPE is required. Employers should not be required to wear PPE for

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Table H.2: Guidance on Selection of Arc-Rated Clothing and Other Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for Use when Incident Exposure is Determined by a Hazard Analysis

Incident Energy Exposure Protective Clothing and PPE





Face shield for projectile protection (AN)Safety glasses or safety goggles (SR) Hearing protection Leather gloves or rubber insulating gloves with leather protectors (AN)










Hard hatFR hard hat liner (AN)Safety glasses or safety goggles (SR)Hearing protection Arc-rated gloves or rubber insulating gloves with leather protectors (SR) (Note 4)Leather work shoes


Proposal 70E-522a (Log #CP15) Recommendation

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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-527 Log #180 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (Annex I) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Michael J. Johnston, National Electrical Contractors Association Recommendation: Revise the wording in the “Think” row as follows: Install and remove protective grounding equipment grounds Substantiation: The term “ground” is defined as “the earth” in Article 100. Literally this section would read...whether the earths shall be installed for the duration of the task...This revision is proposed to promote consistent use of terms throughout NFPA 70E to assist all users in understanding the meaning of rules using defined terms. The more appropriate term here would appear to be protective grounding equipment of safety grounding equipment. The term “protective grounding equipment” is used by OSHA in a few rules as in the following example: 1910.269(n)(4) “Protective grounding equipment.” 1910.269(n)(4)(i) Protective grounding equipment shall be capable of conducting the maximum fault current that could flow at the point of grounding for the time necessary to clear the fault. This equipment shall have an ampacity greater than or equal to that of No. 2 AWG copper. Note: Guidelines for protective grounding equipment are contained in American Society of Testing and Materials Standard Specifications for Temporary Grounding Systems to be used on De-Energized Electric Power Lines and Equipment, ASTM F855-1990. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise sentence as follows: Install and remove temporary protective grounding equipment grounds. Committee Statement: The word “temporary” was added to the suggested text to correlate with similar changes in other proposals. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-528 Log #60 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (Annex N.2(1)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas A. Carpenter, Aerospace Testing Alliance Recommendation: Revise wording as shown: … “Close proximity” is within a distance of 10 ft for systems up to 50 kilovolts, and adding an additional 4 in. for every 10 kilovolts, or part thereof, above 50 kilovolts. Substantiation: The revised wording better explains and clarifies the requirement. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise recommendation to read: Close proximity” is within a distance of 10 feet for systems up to 50 kilovolts, and should be increased 4 in. for every 10 kilovolts above 50 kilovolts. Committee Statement: The phrase “should be increased” has been added to increase clarity. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-525 Log #59 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (Annex H.1, Note) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas A. Carpenter, Aerospace Testing Alliance Recommendation: Revise the wording as shown. aNote that other PPE required for the specific tasks listed in Tables………, and voltage rated tools, may be required. Substantiation: The existing verbiage is not a complete sentence. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Committee Statement: The committee notes that this action modifies the action on Proposal 70E-522a (Log #CP15). Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-526 Log #240 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (Annex H.2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James T. Dollard, Jr., IBEW Local 98 Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Change the title of Annex H, add a new paragraph and a new table as follows: Annex H Simplified, Two-Category, Flame-Resistant (FR) Clothing System Guidance on Selection of Protective Clothing and Other Personal Protective Equipment

(No changes to H.1 and Table H.1)

H.2 Guidance on Selection of Arc-Rated Clothing and Other Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for Use with a Hazard Analysis. Table H.2 provides guidance on the selection of arc rated clothing and other personal protective equipment for users who conduct a hazard analysis to determine the incident energy exposure (in calories/cm2) to the worker.(See Table H.2 on the following page.) Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the Tables Task Group appointed by NFPA 70E Chairman Dave Dini. The task group consisted of Larry Ayer, Palmer Hickman, Jim White, Ron Widup, Vince Saporita, Daniel Roberts, Mike Doherty, Tom Neal, Paul Dobrowsky, John Luke, David Wallace, Daleep Mohla, Paul Hamer, Eric Glaude and Jim Dollard. This is the third of three related proposals; the other two proposals relate to the FPN of 130.3(B)(1), 130.7(C)(13)(a) & (b). The existing guidance offered by the NFPA 70E-09 is inadequate for users selecting protective clothing and equipment when using the selection method based on incident energy determined with a hazard analysis. This is particularly the case for face/head protection. At present, the guidance provided by the NFPA 70E-09 for the selection of face/head protection while using this method is that the PPE must be selected based on the incident energy exposure determined with a hazard analysis. Using both PPE selection methods (Method (1) Incident Energy Analysis, and Method (2) Hazard/Risk Categories, results in the reverse engineering of Table 130.7(C)(10). Users currently have no other alternative because aside from the information contained in Table 130.7(C)(10) there is limited clarification provided for the type of face protection and body protection required. For instance, the potential exists for users to select arc rated goggles & ski mask type balaclava or faceshield & balaclava to meet the requirements of 130.7(C)(3) and 130.7(C)(4). This creates protection issues since the use of goggles and a balaclava does not provide protection against projectiles, and modified arc testing of face and head PPE from a range of orientations has shown that the use of a faceshield with a balaclava for exposures above 12 cal/cm2 can lead to convective heat exposures to the eyes, nose and mouth areas when the arc exposure is coming from behind or from side angles. In these exposures from behind or from side angles, the back edges of the faceshield tend to direct the convective portion of the arc incident energy into the facial areas that are not fully covered by the balaclava. Those who use the Hazard/Rick Category method of hazard analysis are required to use arc rated arc flash suit hoods for HRC3 and higher as indicated in Table 130.7(C)(10). Similar guidance is needed for users deciding to determine incident energy with a hazard analysis. The need for increased guidance in PPE selection also applies to protective clothing and other protective equipment for the body, hands and feet for users who determine incident energy with a hazard analysis. This proposed Annex H table provides the needed guidance for selection of protective clothing and equipment for users who determine incident energy exposure with a hazard analysis. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee notes that the recommendation has been incorporated into the action on Proposal 70E-522a (Log #CP15).

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Table H.2: Guidance on Selection of Arc-Rated Clothing and Other Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for Use when Incident Exposure is Determined by a Hazard AnalysisIncident Energy Exposure Protective Clothing and PPE




Other Personal Protective EquipmentFace shield for projectile protection (AN)Safety glasses or safety goggles (SR) Hearing protection Leather gloves or rubber insulating gloves with leather protectors (AN)










Hard hatFR hard hat liner (AN)Safety glasses or safety goggles (SR)Hearing protection Arc-rated gloves or rubber insulating gloves with leather protec-tors (SR) (Note 4)Leather work shoes



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Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E incident energy values, arc flash protection boundaries, and PPE requirements. Operating times with relaying and circuit breakers can increase when regularly scheduled maintenance practices are not followed. It is vitally important to this process to ensure that the entire system functions properly, including the current sensors, relays, and trip circuits. Ensuring that power fuses follow a replacement-in-kind procedure is also an important part of this maintenance process. Assuming that electrical power distribution equipment will operate as designed without verifying the operating condition can result in an unexpected increase in the level of hazard. Q.3 Reliability-centred maintenance (RCM) Reliability-centred maintenance (RCM) is a risk-based study process for determining the least cost maintenance and surveillance actions needed to meet operating performance targets. It seeks the optimal mix of condition-based, time-based, and run-to-failure strategies. The objective is to be sure that there is the right level of preventive maintenance, at the right frequency, to ensure safety and reliability, while also maintaining a competitive cost position. The benefits of RCM are as follows: (a) Improved safety and environmental protection: the health, safety, and environmental implications of each failure mode, as well as economic factors, are considered in the selection of maintenance work. (b) Improved availability: the systematic monitoring of equipment within operating limits prevents premature degradation of equipment function. (c) Controlled costs: increased equipment reliability means lower maintenance costs. (d) Preventive maintenance database: RCM requires documentation of the reasons for performing maintenance, thereby providing a platform for learning using actual field results. The ideal maintenance program is reliability based and unique to the plant’s operating environment and power system, and to each piece of equipment. When information on the operating environment, power system, and equipment is not readily available, the maintenance frequency matrix provided by NETA can be used as a multiplier for determining regularly scheduled maintenance intervals (see Table Q.1). The frequency multiplier is used with a recommended baseline maintenance interval for power distribution equipment provided by ANSI/NETA MTS. For example, ANSI/NETA MTS specifies a baseline maintenance interval of 36 months for low-voltage power circuit breakers. Thus, if a low-voltage power circuit breaker is in poor condition and a medium level of reliability is needed, the frequency multiplier specified in Table Q.1 is 0.50 and the circuit breaker should receive maintenance every 18 months (36 months × 0.50).

_______________________________________________________________ 70E-529 Log #231 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Annex Q (New)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Terry W. Becker, ESPS Inc. / Rep. CSA Z462 Technical Committee, Working Group 8, Annexes Recommendation: Include a new Annex in NFPA 70E, Annex Q – Safety Related Electrical Maintenance. Annex Q Safety Related Electrical Maintenance This annex is not part of the requirements of this NFPA document but is included for informational purposes only. Q.1 General Regularly scheduled electrical maintenance is a critical part of any electrical safety program. Improper equipment operation can drastically increase the risk of worker exposure to electrical hazards. Studies by the Electrical Safety Authority of Ontario, Canada indicate that 66% of safety incidents can be attributed to maintenance-related issues. A survey performed by the InterNational Electrical Testing Association (NETA) in October 2007 indicated that 22% of service-aged circuit breakers had some type of malfunction and 10.5% did not operate at all during maintenance testing. Q.2 Risk categories and the need for maintenance Calculated incident energy levels and associated risk categories depend on the operating times of protective devices such as fuses, relays, and circuit breakers. The Hazard/Risk Category method of Table 130.7 (C)(9) requires careful attention to the clearance times specified in the notes to Table 130.7 (C)(9). A detailed engineering based arc flash hazard analysis determines the arc flash protection boundary and incident energy based on the operating time of the existing circuit-protection devices. Figure Q.1 shows a typical power system time–current curve used in determining arc flash hazard levels. In Figure Q.1, a circuit breaker instantaneous setting has been changed from 5X to 4X, reducing the operating time during an arc flash event from 1.5 to 0.04 s. This lowers the incident energy from 33.5 to 1.1 cal/cm2 and reduces the hazard/risk category from 4 to 0. However, these curves are based on manufacturer’s data for equipment in as-new condition. If the protective device’s graph does not correspond with how the breaker actually performs in the field, a dangerous situation exists, as these devices are typically slower than indicated in the manufacturer’s performance specifications. In some cases the devices do not operate at all. Lengthening the operating time of the protective device will vastly increase the

70E-215

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E breaker trip unit to operate faster while the worker is working within an arc flash boundary as defined in NFPA 70E, and then to set the circuit breaker back to a normal setting after the potentially hazardous work is complete. Committee Statement: The committee action removes mandatory text which is not permitted in informational annex material. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: TIEDE, T.: This proposal should be rejected. While Annex O.1.2 specifically states that “This annex does not discuss specific design requirements.”, the proposed text is exactly that. Further, the proposed text is misleading in that other methods can be utilized to reduce incident energy levels. Arc flash reduction is a complicated topic that cannot be reduced to 2 or 3 cookie cutter items like those mentioned. In addition, insufficient substantiation is provided to justify why 1000 Amps was chosen as the threshold or why this should apply to systems of all voltages. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. Comment on Affirmative: HICKMAN, P.: We suggest that this text be correlated with the text as adopted into the 2011 NEC. Therefore, we include the related 2011 NEC ROP and ROC actions and the resulting 2011 NEC text in our affirmative ballot for this action to allow that this action be correlated with the related 2011 NEC action. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-531 Log #230 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part (Annex P (New)) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: The Technical Correlating Committee requests that the committee action be reconsidered and correlated with the action taken on Proposal 70E-538. This action will be considered as public comment. Submitter: Terry W. Becker, ESPS Inc. / Rep. CSA Z462 Technical Committee, Working Group 8, Annexes Recommendation: Include a new Annex in NFPA 70E, Annex P - Aligning implementation of this Standard with occupational health and safety management Standards in NFPA 70E. This Annex is based on the CSA Z462 Annex A. AnnexP Aligning implementation of this Standard with occupational health and safety management Standards This annex is not a Part of the requirements of this NFPA document but is included for informational purposes only. P.I General Injuries from electrical energy are a leading cause of fatalities in the workplace in the United States, generally ranking as the fifth- or sixth-highest cause of occupational deaths. This Standard specifies requirements unique to the hazards of electrical energy. By itself, however, this Standard does not constitute a comprehensive and effective electrical safety program. The most effective application of the requirements of this Standard can be achieved within the framework of a recognized health and safety management system standard. ANSI/AIHA Z10 provides comprehensive guidance on the elements of an effective health and safety management system and is one recognized Standard, ANSI/AIHA Z10 is harmonized with other internationally recognized Standards, including CAN/CSA-Z100, ISO 14001, and OSHAS 18001. Some companies and other organizations have proprietary health and safety management systems that are aligned with the key elements of ANSI/AIHA Z1 O. The most effective design and implementation of an electrical safety program can be achieved through a joint effort involving electrical subject matter experts and safety professionals knowledgeable about safety management systems. This collaboration can help ensure that proven safety management principles and practices applicable to any hazard in the workplace are appropriately incorporated into the electrical safety program. This Annex provides guidance on implementing this Standard within the framework of ANSI/AIHA Z10 and other recognized or proprietary comprehensive occupational health and safety system Standards. Table P.1 summarizes the harmonization of the key elements-of recognized occupational health and safety management systems and the corresponding requirements of this Standard. (See Table P.1 on the following page.)

Q.5 Maintaining electrical drawings Electrical drawing maintenance is essential to the safety of electrical personnel. Single-line power distribution drawings need to be kept current so that proper switching can be performed when workers are establishing an electrically safe work condition. Other electrical drawings, e.g., layouts, three-lines, and schematic diagrams, are also critical for the safe operation of power distribution equipment and systems. These documents shall be kept current for the purposes of the detailed arc flash hazard analysis. Q.6 Maintenance Standards Two main standards are used in North America for maintenance of electrical power distribution equipment and systems. They are used along with a manufacturer’s recommendations to provide an overall quality program. NFPA 70B provides a complete guideline on maintenance requirements for electrical, electronic, and communications systems and equipment used in industrial and commercial applications. ANSI/NETA MTS specifies procedures for evaluating equipment for continued safe and reliable service, including recommended test levels and test values. Visual and mechanical inspection and electrical test requirements are provided for nearly every commonly known type of equipment. Guidance on frequency of maintenance testing is also provided. Substantiation: Currently there is limited to no direction in NFPA 70E 2009 with respect to specific implications of the requirement and importance of electrical equipment maintenance in sustaining clearing times of protective devices. The inclusion of this new Annex Q into NFPA 70E will enhance information available to users on the importance of electrical equipment maintenance. The existing CSA Z462 Annex B includes information on advising that without electrical equipment maintenance we may not be able to rely on the clearing time of protective devices. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: See the committee action and statement on Proposal 70E-539. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-530 Log #144 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (Annex O.2.3 (New)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas A. Domitrovich, Eaton Corporation Recommendation: Add new text to read as follows: O.2.3 Arc Energy Reduction. Where a circuit breaker rated for, or can be adjusted to, 1,000 amperes or more is utilized, one of the following or approved equivalent means shall be provided: (1) Zone-selective interlocking. (2) Differential relaying. (3) Energy-reducing maintenance switching with a local status indicator. FPN: An energy-reducing maintenance switch allows a worker to set a circuit breaker trip unit to operate faster while the worker is working within an arc flash boundary as defined in NFPA 70E, and then to set the circuit breaker back to a normal setting after the potentially hazardous work is complete. Substantiation: The ability to have electrical circuits open without delay in order to minimize arc flash hazards is a design technique that can reduce arc flash energy in industrial and/or commercial power systems. This proposal is focused on requiring the use of either currently available or future devices, technologies or design approaches that may be incorporated to further minimize arc flash hazards. These devices and technologies further enhance existing design and operational safety options such as the use of PPE and other arc resistant equipment. This is focused on requiring the use of these devices and technologies of circuit breakers rated for, or can be adjusted to, 1,000 amperes or more. This aligns with the rating established for Ground-Fault Protection of Equipment per NFPA 70, 230.95. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the recommendation to read: O.2.3 Arc Energy Reduction. Where a circuit breaker rated for, or can be adjusted to, 1,000 amperes or more is utilized, one of the following or approved equivalent means have proven to be effective in reducing arc flash energy: shall be provided: (1) Zone-selective interlocking. (2) Differential relaying. (3) Energy-reducing maintenance switching with a local status indicator. FPN: An energy-reducing maintenance switch allows a worker to set a circuit

Table Q.1Maintenance frequency matrix

(See Q.4)Equipment condition

Equipment reliability requirement

Poor Average Good

Low 1.0 2.0 2.5Medium 0.5 1.0 1.5High 0.25 0.50 0.75

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Table P.1Correspondences between this Standard and recognized occupational health and safety (OHS) management Standards

Key element of an effective occupational health and safety management system

Article number or other references

Questions on intent and objectives of OHS manage-ment system*NFPA 70E

CAN/ CSA Z1000

ANSI/ AIHA Z10

ILO-OSH 2001

OHSAS 18001

ISO 14001

Scope Article 90 1 1 1 1 1 —

Reference publications Annex A 2 — — 2 2 —

Definitions Article 100 3 2 Glossary 3 3 —

OHS system—General Who is responsible for estab-lishing, maintaining, and reviewing the electrical safety program? How are affected workers involved in develop-ment and implementation?

General — 4.1 3.1.1 3 4.1 4.1

Responsibility, account-ability, and authority

Article 110.7, Electrical Safety Program

4.2.2.1 3.1.3 3.3 4.4.1 4.4.1

Management represen-tative

— 4.2.2.2 — 3.3.3 4.4.1 4.4.1

Worker participation — 4.2.3 3.2 3.2 4.4.3 —

OHS policy Article 110, General Requirements for Electrical Safety-Related Work Practices

4.2.4 3.1.2 3.1 4.2 4.2

Planning This is not about task plan-ning, but about planning the overall electrical safety program. What are the rel-evant codes and Standards? What resources are needed to ensure sustainability?

General — 4.3.1 4.0 3.8 4.3 4.3

Review — 4.3.2 4.1 3.7 — —

Legal and other require-ments

Art. 130.2 Approach Boundaries to Energized Electrical Conductors or Circuit Parts, Annex C, Annex K

4.3.3 — — 4.3.2 4.3.2

Hazard and risk identi-fication and assessment

Article 110.7(F), Hazard/Risk Evaluation Procedure, Annex F

4.3.4 4.2 3.7.2(b) 4.3.1 4.3.1

OHS objectives and targets

— 4.3.5 4.3 3.9 4.3.3 4.3.3

Implementation Which systems, infrastruc-ture, and resources are needed to meet the program objectives?

General Article 110.7, Electrical Safety Program

4.4.1 4.4, 5.1 — — —

Preventive and protec-tive measures

4.4.2 5.1.1 3.10.1 4.4.6 4.4.6

Emergency preven-tion, preparedness, and response


4.4.3 5.1.5 3.10.3 4.4.7 4.4.7

Competence and train-ing


4.4.4 5.2 3.4 4.4.2 4.4.2

Communication and awareness

Annex I, Job Briefing and Planning Checklist

4.4.5 5.3 3.6 4.4.3 4.4.3

Procurement — 4.4.6.1 5.1.3 3.10.4 4.4.6 —

Contracting — 4.4.6.2 5.1.4 3.10.2 4.3.4 —

Management of change — 4.4.7 5.1.2 3.10.2 4.3.4 —

Documentation Which documents and document control systems are needed to implement an effective program and moni-tor compliance with objec-tives?

Proposal 70E-531 (Log #230) Recommendaton

70E-217


Table P.1Correspondences between this Standard and recognized occupational health and safety (OHS) management Standards (continued)

Control of records Article 110.8 Working While Exposed to Electrical Hazards(B)(2) Energized Electrical Work Permit and Article 130.1(B) Energized Electrical Work Permit

4.4.8.3 5.4 3.5.3 4.5.3 4.5.4

Evaluation and cor-rective action

How will program perfor-mance be monitored, mea-sured, and analyzed to enable ongoing improvement?

General — 4.5.1 6 — 4.5 4.5

Monitoring and mea-surement

Article 110.7(D) Electrical Safety Program Controls

4.5.2 6.1 3.11 4.5.1 4.5.1

Incident investigation and analysis

— 4.5.3 6.2 3.12 4.5.2 —

Internal audits Article 110.7(H) Electrical Safety Auditing and Article 120.2(C)(3) Audit Procedure

4.5.4 6.3 3.13 4.5.4 4.5.5

Preventive and correc-tive action

— 4.5.5 6.4 3.15 4.5.1 4.5.3

Management review How will senior management stay informed of progress toward, and what is needed for achieving, program objec-tives?

General — 5.1 7.1 3.14 4.6 4.6

Continual improvement — 5.2 4.3 3.16 4.6 4.6

Review input — 5.3 7.1 3.14.3 — 4.6

Review output — 5.4 7.2 3.14.4 — 4.6

*This column provides examples of questions that can be asked while implementing a comprehensive and effective electrical safety program. It is not an exhaustive list.

Proposal 70E-531 (Log #230) Recommendaton (continued)

70E-218


R.3 Examples of Arc Flash Warning labels that Meets the Requirements of Article 110.16 of the National Electrical Code, NFPA 70, and NFPA 70E, Article 130.3 (C) NFPA 70E, Article 130.3(C) imposes a requirement additional to Article 110.16 of the National Electrical Code, NFPA 70. Figure R.2 and Figure R.3 provide examples of an Arc Flash Warning labels that meet the requirements of Article 110.16 of the National Electrical Code, NFPA 70, and NFPA 70E, Article 130.3 (C).

WARNINGArc Flash Hazard

Appropriate PPE Required

10.2 cal/cm2 Flash Hazard at 18 Inches

Date of Analysis, 20XX


Appropriate PPE Required

HRC#3

Date of Analysis, 20XX

Substantiation: There is a lack of understanding in industry with respect to what is required in order to develop an appropriate management system that addresses the management of electrical hazards, specifically an Electrical Safety Program. NFPA 70E Article 110.7 outlines the requirement to “implement and document an overall electrical safety program” but doesn’t currently provide any direction on how this “electrical safety program” should be structured other than referencing in FPN No.2 to see ANSI-AIHA Z1 0-2005. The inclusion of the new Annex P would provide additional information to the users of NFPA 70E in how NFPA 70E aligns with the framework promoted in ANSI-AIHA Z1 0-2005 and other internationally recognized Occupational Health & Safety Management System Standards. This new Annex P has already been included in CSA Z462-08 as Annex A. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle in Part The committee accepts in principle the recommended text and rejects the recommended table. Committee Statement: See the committee action on Proposal 70E-538. The committee is concerned that the referenced standards in the recommended table will be constantly updated and the information in the table will be out of date at various times in each edition cycle of NFPA 70E. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-532 Log #372 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Principle (Annex R (New)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Terry W. Becker, ESPS Inc. / Rep. CSA Z462 Technical Committee, Working Group 8 Annexes Leader Recommendation: Include a new Annex in NFPA 70E, Annex R Arc Flash and Shock Warning Labels as shown below. Annex R Arc Flash and Shock Warning Labels This annex is not part of the requirements of this NFPA document but is included for informational purposes only. R.1 General. Arc flash and shock warning labels should meet the applicable production and installation requirements of ANSI Z535.4. Some of the requirements of ANSI Z535.4 are as follows: (a) Label content: labels consist of a signal word panel (“DANGER”, “WARNING”, or “CAUTION”) plus a message panel (concise explanation of the hazard). The signal word panel may include a safety alert symbol (triangle and exclamation mark). The label may also include a safety symbol panel (a symbol that effectively communicates the message in the message panel). (b) Safety alert symbol: if a safety alert symbol is used it needs to precede the signal word. The base of the symbol needs to be on the same horizontal line as the base of the signal word and the height of the symbol needs to be equal to or greater than the signal word. (c) Border: the label may include a contrasting border. (d) Colours: (i) danger labels need to have the word “DANGER” in safety white letters on a safety red background; (ii) warning labels need to have the word “WARNING” in safety black letters on a safety orange background; and (iii) if a safety alert symbol is used, it needs to be the same colour as the signal word lettering and the exclamation mark needs to be the same colour as the signal word panel background. (e) Location: a label needs to be readily visible to the worker and alert the worker to the potential hazard in time to take appropriate action. Note: Persons who will be producing and/or installing arc flash and shock warning labels should consult ANSI Z535.4 to ensure that all applicable requirements of ANSI Z535.4 are met. R.2 Example of an Arc Flash and Shock Warning label that Meets the Requirements of Article 110.16 of the National Electrical Code, NFPA 70 The label shown in Figure R.1 meets the minimum requirements and the intent of Article 110.16 of the National Electrical Code, NFPA 70. The rule is not retroactive; it applies to equipment installed or modified after the date the rule became effective. The owner of the electrical distribution equipment is ultimately responsible, either directly or through the installing contractor, for ensuring that the warning labels are installed when required.

WARNINGArc Flash and Shock Hazard

70E-219

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-533 Log #166 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Annex X (New)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Paul S. Hamer, Chevron Energy Technology Company Recommendation: Add a new Annex as follows: Annex XX - Phasing Procedure Using Voltage Transformers and Secondary Voltages versus Primary Voltages with “Phasing Hotsticks” XX.1 The Phasing Process. When a system is being commissioned, it is important to asure that the power system on either side of a main or tie circuit breaker or switch has the correct phase relationship or phase sequence. If the switching device is closed under an incorrect phasing condition, this will result in the equivalent of a short circuit on the system - with potentially damaging results to equipment or the interruption of a processing plant’s operations. The traditional approach has been for a qualified electrical worker to use hotsticks to prove the phasing. The hotstick probes are placed on the primary (high voltage) stabs within a circuit breaker cubicle to measure that there is zero voltage between each of the phases before an attempt is made to close a circuit breaker. This hotstick process can expose the worker to high incident energy levels from an arch flash, if a fault were to occur by accident during the operation. XX.2 Recommended Approach Using Instrument Voltage Transformers. Following is an outline that could be adapted as a procedure on a double-ended substation (see Figure XX.2) or other arrangement depending on the specifics of the installation: ● The use of the secondary, low voltage, side of voltage transformers (VTs) depends on the specification and supply of VTs on both the “line side” and “bus side” of the circuit breakers to be phased. ● Initially, open all circuit breakers. Insert only the circuit breakers necessary to perform the operation in each step described below. All other circuit breakers not involved in that step should be withdrawn from their cubicles to the “test position,” where the primary voltage stabs are not engaged. One source VT will be used as the reference VT for each measurement. In this example, the left-side source VT is used as the reference. ● First, insert and close the left-side source circuit breaker onto the left-side bus and measure that proper line-to-line voltages are present. Then measure the voltages between the respective A, B and C phase secondary terminals (A to A, B to B, and C to C) of the left-side source side VT and the left-side bus VT. All voltages should be zero. ● Insert and close the tie circuit breaker on the “dead” right-side bus and assure that proper line-to-line voltages are present. Measure the voltages between respective A, B, and C phase terminals of the left-side source VT and the right-side bus VT. All voltages should be zero. ● Open the tie and left-side source circuit breakers and withdraw the circuit breakers to the test positions. ● Measure the voltages between the respective A, B, and C phase terminals of the left-side source VT and the right-side source VT. All voltages should be zero. ● Insert and close the right-side source onto the right bus and measure that proper line-to-line voltages are present. Then measure voltages between the respective A, B, and C phase terminals of the left-side source VT and the right-side bus VT. All voltages should be zero. ● Insert and close the tie circuit breaker on the “dead” right-side bus and assure that proper line-to-line voltages are present. Measure the voltages between respective A, B, and C phase terminals of the left-side source VT and the left-side bus VT. All voltages should be zero. ● The phase relationships of all the VTs have been proven if the above steps have been followed. ● Open the tie circuit breaker and withdraw it, then insert and close the left-side circuit breaker. ● As a final verification step, measure that proper line-to-line voltages are present on the bus VTs on both sides of the open tie circuit breaker. Then measure the voltages between the respective A, B, and C phase terminals of the left-side bus VT and the right-side bus VT. All voltages should be zero. ● If the voltages measured in the above step are zero, the phasing is correct and the tie circuit breaker can be inserted and safely closed, as during a closed-transition bus transfer or for a normally-closed tie configuration.

R.4 Detailed Arc Flash Hazard Analysis Label When a detailed arc flash hazard analysis has been completed, a detailed label may be installed by the owner to provide additional information. A typical label consists of four sections (see Figure R.4): (a) The first section contains the information from the label required by Article 110.16 of the National Electrical Code, NFPA 70. (b) The second section contains information on arc flash hazards, e.g., arc flash protection boundary distance, arc flash incident energy levels that could be experienced at the assumed working distance, and the required of personal protective equipment. (c) The third section contains information on electrical shock hazards, e.g., voltage level, approach boundary distances, and insulation Class of rubber insulating gloves. (d) The fourth section contains information on the designation of the equipment. In addition, it can also identify the name of the individual or company that performed the analysis and the power system study file designation. To meet the requirements of NFPA 70E, Article 130.3(C), it should record the date that the analysis was completed.


Appropriate PPE RequiredARC FLASH PROTECTION

Equipment Name: MCC#3

SHOCK PROTECTIONWorking Distance: Shock Hazard when

cover is removed18 inches

Incident Energy: 5.0 cal/cm2

Arc Flash Prot. Boundary: Limited ApproachRestricted ApproachProhibited ApproachGlove Class:

42 inch12 inch1 inch0

Arc Flash Analysis by: XYZ Consulting File: “ABC PLANT Rev X.xyz”“STUDY DATE” Std. IEEE 1584

Refer to NFPA 70E/CSA Z462

43 inch

600VAC

Substantiation: Currently there is no specific direction on the required minimum Arc Flash & Shock Warning labels as required by NEC Article 110.16 or NFPA 70E, Article 130.3(C). The electrical power engineering software manufacturers provide a variety of their default label configurations and there are historical errors in referencing the Hazard/Risk Category on the detailed label as an example, but no specific direction has ever been provided. By including this new Annex Q in NFPA 70E additional clarity will be provided to users of the Standard on example formats for Arc Flash & Shock Warning labels, both simple to meet the intent of NEC Article 110.16, as well as those required to meet the intent of NFPA 70E Article 130.3(C), and for the owner of electrical equipment to voluntarily include a more detailed label with both arc flash and shock information included for reference by the qualified person. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 70E-537 meets the intent of the recommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

70E-220


Substantiation: 1. This proposal accompanies a companion proposal that would create a new Article 325 and delete the existing Article 320 for battery safety requirements. This proposed new Annex xx-1 could still be used even if the other proposal is rejected. 2. The proposal is included as an Informative Annex rather than as an amendment to the existing Table 130.7(C)(9) because it is a recommendation only, not mandatory (see next comment) 3. The Informational Note acknowledges that ac and dc arc flash hazards are different. There exists a large body of knowledge and scientific testing to justify PPE ratings on ac systems. Further arc flash characterization testing is still ongoing, including a joint NFPA/IEEE program, which will also include some dc data. NFPA 70E cannot remain silent on the issue. NFPA 70E needs to address the PPE requirements for work on dc systems but, in the absence of solid test data, it can only recommend, not mandate. The requirements in the proposed table closely parallel the requirements for comparable ac systems and activities. Where activities are unique to battery systems the recommendations are based on decades of field experience. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The technical substantiation does not support the recommendation. There is ongoing research related to dc hazards and to add this annex material at this time is premature. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-535 Log #241 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Annex X (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James T. Dollard, Jr., IBEW Local 98 Recommendation: New text to read as follows: See Table xx-1 on the following page. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the Tables Task Group appointed by NFPA 70E Chairman Dave Dini. The task group consisted of Larry Ayer, Palmer Hickman, Jim White, Ron Widup, Vince Saporita, Daniel Roberts, Mike Doherty, Tom Neal, Paul Dobrowsky, John Luke, David Wallace, Daleep Mohla, Paul Hamer, Eric Glaude and Jim Dollard. This new table will provide users with a very quick method to check if PPE rated for 4 calories/cm2 or greater will be sufficient for the potential arc-flash exposure. To utilize the table, the user determines the size of the Class J or RK1 fuses or circuit breaker that is protecting the equipment or conductors that are not in an electrically safe work condition. The user then also determines the available bolted short-circuit current. If the ampere rating of the overcurrent protective device does not exceed that shown in the table for the particular

Substantiation: The proposed Annex provides a much safer means of checking the proper phase relationships on each side of a circuit breaker than by the use of phasing hotsticks. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Substantiation has not been provided to support that the proposed phasing method is better than other phasing methods such as using hot-sticks. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: HAMER, P.: The proposed procedure of the Annex is a safer method than exposing personnel to the extreme hazards of using hot sticks in the confined space of a cubicle, and should be accepted. The public is encouraged to read the procedure and to comment during the review period. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-534 Log #238 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Annex X (New)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Stephen McCluer, APC by Schneider Electric Recommendation: New text to read as follows: Create a new Annex to Article 320 (or to new Article 325): NFPA 70E – NEW ANNEX TO ARTICLE 320(OR TO NEW ARTICLE 325)

Annex [xx] Battery System Hazard/Risk Category Classifications, Use of Insulating Gloves, and Use of Insulated and Insulating Hand Tools


1.1 Table xx-1 illustrates the recommended Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) for various tasks associated with battery systems. Informational note: Scientific testing is ongoing to characterize how dc arc flash hazards behave compared to ac arc flash, but at the time of this Standard nothing has yet been published upon which to base a standard for dc PPE. Table xx-1 is derived from best practices for comparable ac systems and from field experience with battery systems. (See Table xx-1 on the following page.)

70E-221


480Volt Secondary 208Volt Secondary

Maximum overcurrent protective device*. (This is the device that must open if an arc-flash occurs.)

Applicable for this range of available short-circuit cur-rents (bolted) that will flow through the overcurrent protective device if an arc-flash occurs

Approximate transformer size(s) to provide this range of available short circuit currents (kVA)

Maximum over-current protective device*. (This is the device that must open if an arc-flash occurs.)

Applicable for this range of available short-circuit cur-rents (bolted) that will flow through the overcurrent pro-tective device if an arc-flash occurs

Approximate transformer size to provide this range of available short circuit currents (kVA)

100 1,569-15,036 Amps 150 200 3,621-38,913 Amps 150

200 2,353-30,071 Amps 225, 300 400 5,431-79,309 Amps225, 300, 500,

750, 1000

400 5,230-75,178 Amps

500, 750, 1000, 1500, 2000,

2500

*Fuses types are Class J and RK1Circuit Breakers are MCCB 100-400


70E-222


Table xx-1 Battery System Hazard/Risk Category Classifications, Use of Insulating Gloves, and Use of Insulated and Insulating Hand Tools


Category

Rubber Insulating

GlovesNote 1

Insulated & Insulating Hand

ToolsBattery systems rated nominal 250 Vdc and Below per Article 325Perform infrared thermography and other non-contact inspections out-side the restricted approach boundary

0 N N

CB or fused switch operation with covers on 0 N NCB or fused switch operation with covers off 0 Y YWork on individual battery containers or series-connected cells < 50 Vdc nominal

0 N Y

Work on series connected batteries 50 to 250 Vdc nominal – Note 2 1 N YWork on energized dc distribution & charging systems 1 Y YRemove / install circuit breakers, battery disconnects, fuses, or fused switches

1 Y Y

Remove terminal covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conduc-tors and circuit parts) – Note 12

1 Y Y

Removal of bolted covers (to expose bare, energized electrical con-ductors and circuit parts)

1 Y Y

Removal of hinged covers (to expose bare, energized electrical con-ductors and circuit parts)

0 N N

Work on energized dc utilization equipment fed directly by a dc cir-cuit

1 Y Y

Battery systems rated nominal 250 Vdc to 600 Vdc per Article 325Perform infrared thermography and other non-contact inspections out-side the restricted approach boundary

0 N N

CB or fused switch operation with covers on 0 N NCB or fused switch operation with covers off 2 Y YWork on series connected batteries – Note 12 2 N YWork on energized dc distribution & charging systems 2 Y YRemove / install circuit breakers, battery disconnects, fuses, or fused switches

2 Y Y


2 Y Y


2 Y Y


1 N N


2 Y Y

Battery systems rated nominal 600 Vdc and Above per Article 325Perform infrared thermography and other non-contact inspections out-side the restricted approach boundary

1 N N

CB or fused switch operation with covers on 1 N NCB or fused switch operation with covers off 2 Y YWork on series connected batteries 3 Y YWork on energized dc distribution & charging systems 3 Y YRemove / install circuit breakers, battery disconnects, fuses, or fused switches

3 Y Y


2 Y Y


3 Y Y


2 N N


3 Y Y

Note 1 - This standard addresses electrical safety. Protection from electrolyte is not addressed in this table; see documents referenced in Article 325 for appropriate PPE for protection against chemical hazardsNote 2 - See Article 325; for Type 3 dc ground fault detection systems on open battery racks, the hazard class is 0 and gloves are not mandatory unless working with the main terminals of the battery system


70E-223

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E Committee Statement: The committee rejects the recommendation to add a new annex dealing with defining “Arc-Rating”, “Arc-Thermal Performance Value”, and “Breakdown Threshold Energy” because similar information has been added to Article 100 in the form of informational notes. See the committee action on Proposal 70E-23. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-537 Log #386 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept (Annex X (New)) _______________________________________________________________ TCC Action: It was the action of the Technical Correlating Committee that further consideration be given to the proposal to eliminate the use of mandatory language in the proposed Annex. Also, further consideration should be given to revise Figures X.2 and X.3 to remove the phrase “shock hazard” to correlate with the National Electrical Code. In addition, further consideration should be given to incorporating the label changes in X.3 from Proposal 70E-260. This action will be considered as a public comment. Submitter: Mike Doherty, Infrastructure Health & Safety Association / Rep. CSA Z462 Technical Committee Recommendation: Add text to read as follows:

Annex X Electrical Hazard Labels, Arc Flash and Shock Labelling

This annex is not a part of the requirements of this NFPA document but is included for informational purposes only.X.1 General

Arc flash and shock warning labels should meet the applicable production and installation requirements of ANSI Z535.4. Applicable requirements of ANSI Z535.4 are as follows:

(1) Label content: Labels consist of a signal word panel (“DANGER”, “WARNING”, or “CAUTION”) plus a message panel (concise explanation of the hazard). The signal word panel may include a safety alert symbol (triangle and exclamation mark). The label may also include a safety symbol panel (a symbol that effectively communicates the message in the message panel).

(2) Safety alert symbol: If a safety alert symbol is used, it needs to precede the signal word. The base of the symbol needs to be on the same horizontal line as the base of the signal word, and the height of the symbol needs to be equal to or greater than the signal word.

(3) Border: The label can include a contrasting border.

(4) Colors:

(a) Danger labels need to have the word “DANGER” in safety white letters on a safety red background;

(b) Warning labels need to have the word “WARNING” in safety black letters on a safety orange background; and

(c) If a safety alert symbol is used, it needs to be the same color as the signal word lettering and the exclamation mark needs to be the same color as the signal word panel background.

(5) Location: a label must be readily visible to the worker and alert the worker to the potential hazard in time to take appropriate action.

FPN: Persons who will be producing and/or installing arc flash and shock warning labels should consult ANSI Z535.4 to ensure that all applicable requirements of ANSI Z535.4 are met.

X.2 National Electrical Code and Canadian Electrical Code Label Example

The label shown in Figure X.2 meets the minimum requirements and the intent of Article 110.16 of the National Electrical Code (NEC), NFPA 70 and Rule 2-306 of the Canadian Electrical Code (CEC), Part 1.

The rule was first introduced in the 2002 edition of the National Electrical Code and in the 2006 edition of the Canadian Electrical Code, Part 1. The labelling requirement is not retroactive; it applies to equipment installed or modified after the date the respective Code was adopted by the authority having jurisdiction.

range of available short-circuit currents, then PPE rated for 4 calories/ cm2 will be sufficient for the potential incident energy level. For example, if a 480 volt circuit having between 5,230 and 75,178 amperes of bolted fault current available, on the load side of a 400 ampere fuse or circuit breaker, were to have an arcing fault on the load side of the 400 ampere overcurrent protective device, the incident energy would be expected to be less than 4 calories/cm2. Transformers between 500 and 2500 kVA, with a 480 volt secondary, would be typical of transformers that could deliver that range of available bolted fault currents. The spreadsheet from IEEE 1584 was utilized to calculate the incident energy values. The fuses and circuit breakers utilized for the calculations were those shown in the IEEE 1584 spreadsheet, which is attached. The method utilized for this proposal is based upon the attached paper presented at the 2009 IEEE/PCIC, titled “Impact of Available Fault Current Variations on Arc-Flash Calculations”, by two employees of Eaton Electrical. The paper demonstrates that the worst case incident energies can be determined by taking the greater of (1) the available short-circuit current on a transformer secondary assuming infinite utility on the primary, or (2) 50% of that value calculated in (1). The maximum available short-circuit current with infinite utility was calculated with the lowest impedances that have been observed in commercial/industrial applications. Then, 50% of the secondary short-circuit current was utilized with a 5.75% impedance. This procedure provides a spread to cover any transformer encountered in the field, from the very lowest impedance transformers to a high of 5.75% impedance transformers. The following table shows the results for both 490 and 208 volt secondaries. Whenever 4 calorie/cm2 or greater was encountered for any Class RK1 or J fuse or any type of circuit breaker, no additional calculations were performed and the lower overcurrent protective device case size was then chosen as the maximum. The boxes highlighted in yellow show those cases where 4 calorie/cm2 or greater were encountered. The boxes highlighted in red show available short-circuit currents that were higher than the parameters of the IEEE 1584 testing. In these cases, no suggestions are given and “NA” is shown in the suggested Annex table. In several cases, as shown in the calculations, larger ampere devices would provide the necessary protection but these higher sizes are not shown for the table for simplicity and ease of use. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The recommended table is not complete and no title has been provided. While the substantiation indicates that the proposed table will provide a quick method for determining where the incident energy will be 4 cal/cm2 or less, the submitter has not provided recommended text to insert with the Table to indicate this. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-536 Log #385 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Annex X (New)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Mike Doherty, Infrastructure Health & Safety Association / Rep. CSA Z462 Technical Committee Recommendation: Add text to read as follows: Annex X Arc-Rating, Arc Thermal Performance Value, and Breakopen Threshold Energy (new) X.1 Arc rating The definition of arc rating in Article 100 is taken from ASTM F 1959-06. An arc rating is a value attributed to materials that describes their performance when exposed to an electrical arc discharge. Arc ratings are expressed in cal/cm2 and derived from an arc thermal performance value (ATPV) or breakopen threshold value (EBT) (if a material system exhibits a breakopen response below the ATPV value). The arc rating can be either the ATPV or the EBT as determined in accordance with ASTM F 1959 (see Table 130.7(C)(11)). The arc rating is reported as either the ATPV or the EBT, whichever is the lower value. X.2 Arc thermal performance value ATPV is defined in ASTM F 1959-06 as the incident energy on a material or a multi-layer system of materials that results in a 50% probability that sufficient heat transfer through the tested specimen is predicted to cause the onset of a second-degree skin burn injury based on the Stoll curve, cal/cm2. X.3 Breakopen threshold energy EBT is defined in ASTM F 1959-06 as the incident energy on a material or material system that results in a 50% probability of breakopen. Breakopen is defined as a hole with an area of 1.6 cm2 (0.5 in2) or an opening with a 2.5 cm (1.0 in.) in any dimension. Substantiation: Additional clarification on the terms Arc Rating, Arc Thermal Peformance Value, and Breakopen Threshold Energy is provided by including this Annex in CSA Z462. These terms are currently imbedded at a Note to Table 130.7(C)(11) in NFPA 70E. Currently Arc Thermal Performance Value and Breakopen Threshold Energy are not included in the Article 100 Definitions in NFPA 70E. Committee Meeting Action: Reject

70E-224


WARNINGArc Flash and Shock HazardAppropriate PPE Required

ARC FLASH PROTECTION

Equipment Name: MCC#3

SHOCK PROTECTIONWorking Distance: Shock Hazard when

cover is removed18 inches

Incident Energy: 5.0 cal/cm2

Arc Flash Prot. Boundary: Limited ApproachRestricted ApproachProhibited ApproachGlove Class:

42 inch12 inch1 inch0

Arc Flash Analysis by: XYZ Consulting File: “ABC PLANT Rev X.xyz”March 26, 2008 Std. IEEE 1584

Refer to NFPA 70E/CSA Z462

43 inch

600VAC

Figure X.4 – Example of a Detailed Electrical Hazard Analysis Label

Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the CSA Z462 Workplace Electrical Safety full Technical Committee. Confusion exists in the electrical community regarding what label is mandated by the authority having jurisdiction and what label is required by users of the document. There is also a confusing array of electrical hazard analysis labels in use, most of which reverse engineer Table 130.7(C)(10) and provide a hazard/risk category number intended to be associated with the incident energy indicated on the label. This is inappropriate because Table 130.7(C)(10) is designed to be used only with Table 130.7(C)(9) and not as a general PPE list. As stated on-line in the NFPA Journal®, November/December 2008: “Some think they can do an incident-energy analysis, find the incident energy for the task, and use Table 130.7(C)(9) to select the PPE. If you choose to do an incident-energy analysis rather than using the tables, you cannot use Table 130.7(C)(9), Table 130.7(C)(10), or Table 130.7(C)(11).” http://www.nfpa.org/publicColumn.asp?categoryID=&itemID=40828&src=NFPAJournal The purpose of this Annex is to address the current confusion regarding labels and to provide guidance to users of the document regarding electrical hazard labeling. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Committee Statement: The committee understands that the labels shown in this recommendation may not be consistent with what was accepted by the committee in their action on Proposal 70E-260. The committee encourages public comment on this new annex. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: TIEDE, T.: This proposal should be rejected. The proposed label annex does not add clarity to the standard. Also see voting comment on proposal 70E-268. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-538 Log #387 EEW-AAA Final Action: Accept in Part (Annex X (New)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Mike Doherty, Infrastructure Health & Safety Association / Rep. CSA Z462 Technical Committee Recommendation: Add text to read as follows: Annex X Aligning Implementation of this Standard with Occupational Health and Safety Management Standards This annex is not a part of the requirements of this NFPA document but is included for informational purposes only. X.1 General Injuries from electrical energy are a significant cause of occupational fatalities in the workplace in the United States. This Standard specifies requirements unique to the hazards of electrical energy. By itself, however, this Standard does not constitute a comprehensive and effective electrical safety program. The most effective application of the requirements of this Standard can be achieved within the framework of a recognized health and safety management system standard.

Figure X.2 – Example of a Label that Meets the Requirements and Intent of the National Electrical Code and Canadian Electrical Code

X.3 NFPA 70E and CSA Z462 Equipment Label Example

NFPA 70E 130.3(C) and CSA Z462 Clause 4.3.3.4 requires that equipment be field marked with a label containing the available incident energy or required level of PPE. CSA Z462 has an additional requirement that the label contain the date of the hazard evaluation.

See Figure X.3 for an example of a label that meets the requirements of NFPA 70E 130.3(C) and CSA Z462 Clause 4.3.3.4 in addition to the requirements of the National Electrical Code and Canadian Electrical Code.

WARNINGArc Flash and Shock HazardAppropriate PPE Required

10.2 cal/cm2 at 18 Inches

Analysis performed March 26, 2008

Figure X.3 – Example of an Arc Flash Label that Meets the Requirements of NFPA 70E 130.3(C) and CSA Z462 Clause 4.3.3.4

X.4 Detailed Electrical Hazard Analysis Label

When incident energy calculations have been completed as part of an arc flash hazard analysis study, a more detailed label can be installed to provide additional information. A typical label consists of four sections (see Figure X.3):

(a) The first section contains the information from the label required by the National Electrical Code and Canadian Electrical Code(b) The Second section contains information from an arc flash hazard

analysis (e.g. Arc Flash Protection Boundary distance, energy levels at the assumed working distance).

(c) The Third section contains information from a shock hazard analysis (e.g. voltage, shock protection boundaries and Class of rubber insulating gloves).

(d) The fourth section contains information on the designation of the equipment or protective device, or both. In addition, it can also identify the name of the individual or company that performed the analysis, the engineering calculation method utilized, date of the evaluation, and the power system study file designation.

WARNINGArc Flash and Shock Hazard

70E-225

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E _______________________________________________________________ 70E-539 Log #388 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Annex X (New)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Mike Doherty, Infrastructure Health & Safety Association / Rep. CSA Z462 Technical Committee Recommendation: Add new Annex X to read as follows: Annex X Safety-Related Electrical Maintenance


X.1 General

Regularly scheduled electrical maintenance is a critical part of any electrical safety program. Worker safety can be compromised when an arc flash event occurs because equipment malfunctions due to lack of maintenance or when incident energy is higher than expected because equipment does not interrupt arcing faults within the expected time parameter. Studies by the Electrical Safety Authority of Ontario indicate that 66% of safety incidents can be attrib-uted to maintenance-related issues. A survey performed by the InterNational Electrical Testing Association (NETA) in October 2007 indicated that 22% of service-aged circuit breakers had some type of malfunction and 10.5% did not operate at all during maintenance testing.

X.2 Incident Energy and the Need for Maintenance

Incident energy levels are directly related to the operating times of protective devices such as fuses, relays, and circuit breakers. The hazard/risk category method of determining personal protective equipment requires careful atten-tion to the clearance times specified in the notes. Incident energy calculations determine the arc flash protection boundary and incident energy based on the operating time of the existing circuit-protection devices.

Figure X.1 is a typical power system time-current-curve used in determin-ing incident energy. Figure X.1 illustrates the effect that a slight alteration in an overcurrent device setting can have on incident energy. When the circuit breaker instantaneous setting is altered from a 4X pick-up value to a 5X pick-up value, the operating time during an arc flash event could increase from 0.04 seconds to 1.5 seconds. This potentially increases the incident energy from 1.1 calories/cm2 to 33.5 calories/cm2.

However, the time-current-curves in Figure X.1 are based on manufacturer’s data for equipment in as-new condition. If the time-current-curve does not correspond with how the breaker actually performs in the field, a potentially dangerous situation exists. In some cases the devices do not operate at all. A slower operating time can significantly increase the incident energy and arc flash protection boundary. Operating times with relaying and circuit breakers can increase when regularly scheduled maintenance practices are not followed.

It is vitally important to ensure that the entire fault detection and interrup-tion system functions properly, including the current sensors, relays, and trip circuits. Ensuring that power fuses follow a replacement-in-kind procedure is also an important part of this maintenance process. Assuming that electrical power distribution equipment will operate as designed without verifying the operating condition can result in an unexpected increase in the incident energy.

ANSI/AIHA Z10 provides comprehensive guidance on the elements of an effective health and safety management system, and is one recognized Standard. ANSI/AIHA Z10 is harmonized with other internationally recognized Standards, including CAN/CSA Z1000, ISO 14001, and OSHAS 18001. Some companies and other organizations have proprietary health and safety management systems that are aligned with the key elements of ANSI/AIHA Z10. The most effective design and implementation of an electrical safety program can be achieved through a joint effort involving electrical subject matter experts and safety professionals knowledgeable about safety management systems. This collaboration can help ensure that proven safety management principles and practices applicable to any hazard in the workplace are appropriately incorporated into the electrical safety program. This Annex provides guidance on implementing this Standard within the framework of ANSI/AIHA Z10 and other recognized or proprietary comprehensive occupational health and safety management system Standards. Table X.1 summarizes the harmonization of the key elements of recognized occupational health and safety management systems and the corresponding requirements of this Standard. (See Table X.1 on the following pages.) Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the CSA Z462 Workplace Electrical Safety full Technical Committee. There is a lack of understanding in industry with respect to what is required in order to develop an appropriate management system that addresses the management of electrical hazards. NFPA 70E 110.7(A) outlines the requirement to “implement and document an overall electrical safety program” but doesn’t currently provide any direction on how this “electrical safety program” should be structured other than referencing in FPN No. 2 to see ANSI-AIHA Z10-2005. The attached proposed Annex, currently found in CSA Z462 Workplace Electrical Safety, provides additional information to the users of NFPA 70E in how the document aligns with the framework promoted in ANSI-AIHA Z10 and other internationally recognized Occupational Health & Safety Management System Standards. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Part The committee accepts the recommended text except for the last sentence referencing the recommended table. The committee rejects the recommended new table. Committee Statement: The committee is concerned that the referenced standards in the recommended table will be constantly updated and the information in the table will be out of date at various times in each edition cycle of NFPA 70E. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

Figure X.1 Typical Power System Time-Current-Curve

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Proposal 70E-538 (Log#387)

70E-227


Proposal 70E-538 (Log 387) continued

70E-228

Report on Proposals A2011 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 70E results were obtained from InterNational Electrical Testing Association (NETA) accredited companies in the United States and Canada. The results yielded data of approximately 340,000 electrical protective devices under field test. Based on the results of the survey, approximately 22% of the circuit breakers tested (Question No. 3) had an issue affecting the protective device operation. On average 10.5% of the devices did not function at all when tested. Adding the proposed Annex to the document will provide needed guidance in the area of safety-related maintenance. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The material contained in the recommended annex is already covered by references to NFPA 70B and NETA standards contained in the current edition of NFPA 70E. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 22 Negative: 1 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Negative: WIDUP, R.: While the complete explanation of the proposed Annex data may reside in NFPA 70B and NETA documents, we should not lose sight of the intent of an Annex, and that is to provide the user of the document useful and relevant information to assist in the application of the 70E in the workplace. Most all information in the various Annexes within the 70E can be found at the source document[s], but that does not negate the need for inclusion. The proposed Annex provides the user with guidance on the importance and relevance of electrical safety-related maintenance, a topic so important to the 70E that we have an entire Chapter dedicated to it. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues. _______________________________________________________________ 70E-540 Log #491 EEW-AAA Final Action: Reject (Annex X (New)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Thomas E. Neal, Neal Associates Ltd. Recommendation: Annex X Incident Energy and Arc Flash Protection Boundary Tables and Risk Estimation Table Annex X Incident Energy and Arc Flash Protection Boundary Tables and Risk Estimation TableTables X.1 to X.5Tables X.1 to X.5 provide estimations of incident energy levels and arc flash protection boundary dimensions for common low and medium voltage equipment using typical short circuit current and fault clearing times.(See Table X.1 thru X.6 on the following pages on the following page.) Substantiation: Individuals that do not possess the resources to perform incident energy calculations are limited to using the hazard/risk category method. Providing tables in the document with incident energy levels and arc flash protection boundary dimensions for common industrial and commercial electrical distribution settings will provide another avenue for those individuals that do not wish to use the hazard/risk category method. Individuals that perform incident energy calculations do not have guidance to determine when arc flash protective equipment should be deployed. Providing a risk evaluation table in the document will provide these individuals with guidance to determine when arc flash protective equipment should be deployed. Note: Supporting Material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: In the existing Hazard/Risk tables the personal protective equipment requirements for certain tasks are already lessened due to the lower probability of injury from an arc flash event. The insertion of an Annex Table to allow for a similar reduction or elimination of PPE may confuse the user. For instance, under “normal operating interaction” in the proposed risk table, a user opening hinged covers would find that the risk is adequately reduced and arc flash PPE is not required. Yet, when opening similar hinged covers Table 130.7(C)(9) requires Hazard Risk Category 1 PPE for motor control centers and HRC 2 PPE for switchgear. Number Eligible to Vote: 25 Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1 Ballot Not Returned: 1 Selk, A. Explanation of Abstention: WALLIS, D.: I am abstaining in accordance with Agency policy against voting on technical issues.

X.3 Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM)

Reliability-centered maintenance (RCM) is a risk-based study process for determining the least cost maintenance and surveillance actions needed to meet operating performance targets. It seeks the optimal mix of condition-based, time-based, and run-to-failure strategies. The objective is to be sure that there is the right level of preventive maintenance, at the right frequency, to ensure safety and reliability, while also maintaining a competitive cost position. The benefits of RCM are as follows:

(a) Improved safety and environmental protection: The health, safety, and envi-ronmental implications of each failure mode, as well as economic factors, are considered in the selection of maintenance work.

(b) Improved availability: The systematic monitoring of equipment within operating limits prevents premature degradation of equipment function.

(c) Controlled costs: Increased equipment reliability means lower maintenance costs.

(d) Preventive maintenance database: RCM requires documentation of the reasons for performing maintenance, thereby providing a platform for learning using actual field results.

X.4 Frequency of Maintenance Tests

The ideal maintenance program is reliability based and unique to the plant’s operating environment and power system, and to each piece of equipment. When information on the operating environment, power system, and equipment is not readily available, the maintenance frequency matrix provided by NETA can be used as a multiplier for determining regularly scheduled maintenance intervals (see Table X.1). The frequency multiplier is used with a recommended baseline maintenance interval for power distribution equipment provided by ANSI/NETA MTS. For example, ANSI/NETA MTS specifies a baseline main-tenance interval of 36 months for low-voltage power circuit breakers. Thus, if a low-voltage power circuit breaker is in poor condition and a medium level of reliability is needed, the frequency multiplier specified in Table X.1 is 0.50 and the circuit breaker should receive maintenance every 18 months (36 months × 0.50).

Table X.1 Maintenance Frequency MatrixEquipment condition

Equipment reliability requirement

Poor Average Good

Low 1.0 2.0 2.5Medium 0.50 1.0 1.5

High 0.25 0.50 0.75

X.5 Maintaining Electrical Drawings

Electrical drawing maintenance is essential to the safety of electrical personnel. Single-line power distribution drawings need to be kept current so that proper switching can be performed when workers are establishing an electrically safe work condition. Other electrical drawings, e.g., layouts, three-lines, and schematic diagrams, are also critical for the safe operation of power distribution equipment and systems. These documents shall be kept current for the purposes of calculating incident energy exposures with an arc flash hazard analysis.

X.6 Maintenance Standards

Two main standards are used in North America for maintenance of electrical power distribution equipment and systems. They are used along with a manufacturer’s recommendations to provide an overall quality program.

NFPA 70B provides a complete guideline on maintenance requirements for electrical, electronic, and communications systems and equipment used in industrial and commercial applications. ANSI/NETA MTS specifies procedures for evaluating equipment for continued safe and reliable service, including recommended test levels and test values. Visual and mechanical inspection and electrical test requirements are provided for nearly every commonly known type of equipment. Guidance on frequency of maintenance testing is also provided. Substantiation: This proposal is submitted by the CSA Z462 Workplace Electrical Safety full Technical Committee. Regularly scheduled electrical maintenance is a critical part of any electrical safety program. Worker safety can be compromised when an arc flash event occurs because equipment malfunctions due to lack of maintenance or when incident energy is higher than expected because equipment does not interrupt arcing faults within the expected time parameter. According to the Heid, Widup paper presented at the 2008 IEEE IAS Electrical safety Workshop (attached), a survey was conducted of field testing results for low- and medium-voltage circuit breakers and related components. The

70E-229


Table X.1 - Estimated Incident Energy Levels and Arc Flash Protection Boundary 208 & 240 V Panelboards

Fault clearing time (Seconds)

0.5 0.33 0.1 0.033

SCC (kA)

IE (cal/cm2)

AFBP (inches)

IE (cal/cm2)

AFBP (inches)

IE (cal/cm2)

AFBP (inches)

IE (cal/cm2)

AFBP (inches)

35.0 24.7 113.0 16.3 87.7 4.9 42.4 1.6 21.6

30.0 21.9 105.0 14.4 81.5 4.4 39.4 1.4 20.0

25.0 19.0 96.3 12.5 74.8 3.8 36.1 1.3 18.4

15.0 12.7 75.6 8.4 58.7 2.5 28.4 0.8 14.4

10.0 9.3 62.4 6.1 48.4 1.9 23.4 0.6 11.9

7.5 7.4 54.4 4.9 42.2 1.5 20.4 0.5 10.4

Legend for Tables X.1 to X.5:SSC: Short Circuit CurrentIE: Incident EnergyAFPB: Arc Flash Protection Boundary

Notes Tables X.1 to X.5:1. Incident energy estimated using IEEE 1584 method2. Calculations are based on ungrounded systems as this produces higher incident energy levels and larger arc flash protection bound-ary dimensions than solidly grounded systems.3. Working distance used for Table X.1 and X.2 = 455 mm (18 inches)4. Working distance used for Table X.3 = 610 mm (24 inches)5. Working distance used for Table X.4 and X.5 = 910 mm (36 inches)

Table X.2 - Estimated Incident Energy Levels and Arc Flash Protection Boundary 480 & 600 V Panelboards & Motor Control Centers


0.5 0.33 0.1 0.033

SCC (kA)

IE (cal/cm2)

AFBP (inches)

IE (cal/cm2)

AFBP (inches)

IE (cal/cm2)

AFBP (inches)

IE (cal/cm2)

AFBP (inches)

65 107.9 277.8 71.2 215.7 21.6 104.2 7.1 53.0

55 91.3 251.0 60.3 194.9 18.3 94.1 6.0 47.9

45 74.8 222.3 49.4 172.5 15.0 83.4 4.9 42.4

35 58.2 190.8 38.4 148.1 11.6 71.6 3.8 36.4

25 41.7 155.6 27.5 120.8 8.3 58.3 2.7 29.7

15 25.0 114.1 16.5 88.6 5.0 42.8 1.7 21.8

10 16.7 89.2 11.0 69.3 3.3 33.5 1.1 17.0

7.5 12.6 74.9 8.3 58.2 2.5 28.1 0.8 14.3


Notes Tables X.1 to X.5:1. Incident energy estimated using IEEE 1584 method2. Calculations are based on ungrounded systems as this produces higher incident energy levels and larger arc flash protection bound-ary dimensions than solidly grounded systems.3. Working distance used for Table X.1 and X.2 = 455 mm (18 inches)4. Working distance used for Table X.3 = 610 mm (24 inches)5. Working distance used for Table X.4 and X.5 = 910 mm (36 inches)

70E-230


Table X.3 - Estimated Incident Energy Levels and Arc Flash Protection Boundary 480 & 600 V Switchgear


0.5 0.33 0.1

SCC (kA)

IE (cal/cm2)

AFBP (inches)

IE (cal/cm2)

AFBP (inches)

IE (cal/cm2)

AFBP (inches)

65 62.2 350.5 41.1 264.3 12.4 117.5

55 52.9 313.9 34.9 236.7 10.6 105.3

45 43.5 274.9 28.7 207.3 8.7 92.2

35 34.1 232.9 22.5 175.6 6.8 78.1

25 24.6 186.5 16.2 140.6 4.9 62.5

15 14.9 133.1 9.9 100.4 3.0 44.6

10 10.1 101.8 6.6 76.8 2.0 34.1

7.5 7.6 84.2 5.0 63.5 1.5 28.2


Notes Tables X.1 to X.5:1. Incident energy estimated using IEEE 1584 method2. Calculations are based on ungrounded systems as this produces higher incident energy levels and larger arc flash protection boundary dimensions than solidly grounded systems.3. Working distance used for Table X.1 and X.2 = 455 mm (18 inches)4. Working distance used for Table X.3 = 610 mm (24 inches)5. Working distance used for Table X.4 and X.5 = 910 mm (36 inches)

Table X.4 - Estimated Incident Energy Levels and Arc Flash Protection Boundary Switchgear 1 kV to 5 kV


0.5 0.33 0.1

SCC (kA)

IE (cal/cm2)

AFBP (inches)

IE (cal/cm2)

AFBP (inches)

IE (cal/cm2)

AFBP (inches)

65 59.3 1972.6 39.1 1287.0 11.9 377.3

55 49.6 1643.6 32.8 1072.4 9.9 314.4

45 40.1 1320.2 26.5 861.3 8.0 252.5

35 30.7 1003.3 20.3 654.6 6.1 191.9

25 21.5 694.8 14.2 453.3 4.3 132.9

15 12.5 397.7 8.2 259.5 2.5 76.1

10 8.1 255.4 5.4 166.6 1.6 48.9

7.5 6.0 186.6 3.9 121.7 1.2 35.7



70E-231


Some activities involving interactions with energized electrical equip-ment can be characterized as “abnormal” operating interactions. The activity is outside the equipment “normal” operating parameter. An example of an “abnormal” activity is removal of a bolted cover to expose energized electrical conductors.

“Abnormal” operating interactions can be characterized by the expression “1.”

The same logic can be applied to the condition of the electrical equipment. A “normal” condition would be a state approximating the original manufac-tured condition (i.e. properly maintained) and manufacturer’s operating condi-tions (i.e. covers in place). Table X.6 contains lists of activities and equipment conditions. The iterative nature of risk management means that activities and conditions will be monitored, reassessed and modified based on experience, history, new technology, etc.

Deciding to deploy arc flash personal protective equipment can be deter-mined by the combination of activity and condition using the Boolean opera-tion called disjunction (Activity OR Condition): 0 OR 0 = 0; 1 OR 0 = 1; 0 OR 1 = 1; 1 OR 1 = 1.

A result of “0” would not require the use of arc flash personal protective equipment, a result of “1” would require the use of arc flash personal protec-tive equipment. Table 2 illustrates this concept.

Table X.6 can be used with Tables X.1 to X.5; or with incident energy cal-culations.

The activity lists in Table X.6 can be modified to accommodate other work environments such as Utility, Telecommunications, Railways, Mines, etc.

Table X.6

Table X.6 is a risk estimation guide to assist in determining when arc flash personal protective equipment may be warranted. The likelihood of an arc flash event occurring relates directly to the probability that the insulation or isolation of an energized conductor may be compromised.

Factors affecting likelihood can be grouped into two broad, but interrelated categories:

1. Activities involving interactions with energized equipment. Examples of activity factors are found in NFPA 70E Table 130.7(C)9. The activities listed in Table X.6, which are typical industrial and commercial electrical activities, were derived from NFPA 70E Table 130.7(C)9.

2. The condition of the electrical distribution equipment, such as state of maintenance, frequency of operation, environment the equipment is located in, etc.

Probability can be characterized by a “0” and “1,” where “0” is the situa-tion where probability is impossible or “unlikely to give rise to a situation that could harm personnel” and “1” is every other situation.

Some activities involving interactions with energized equipment could be characterized as “normal” operating interactions. The equipment was designed to be inherently safe while operated within the design parameter, assuming that the condition of the equipment is also “normal.” An example of a “nor-mal” operating interaction is circuit breaker or fused switch operation with the enclosure door closed. Provided the equipment condition is “normal,” circuit breaker or fused switch operation with the enclosure door closed is “unlikely to give rise to a situation that could harm personnel” because the equipment was designed to be operated in that manner.

“Normal” operating interactions can be characterized by the expression “0.”

Table X.5 - Estimated Incident Energy Levels and Arc Flash Protection Boundary Switchgear > 5 kV to 15 kV


0.5 0.33 0.1

SCC (kA)

IE (cal/cm2)

AFBP (inches)

IE (cal/cm2)

AFBP (inches)

IE (cal/cm2)

AFBP (inches)

35 162.2 416.5 107.0 338.4 32.4 186.3

30 139.0 385.6 91.7 313.3 27.8 172.4

25 115.8 352.0 76.5 286.0 23.2 157.4

20 92.7 314.8 61.2 255.8 18.5 140.8

15 69.5 272.7 45.9 221.5 13.9 121.9

10 46.3 222.6 30.6 180.9 9.3 99.6

7.5 34.8 192.8 22.9 156.6 7.0 86.2

5 23.2 157.4 15.3 127.9 4.6 70.4



70E-232


Table X.6 – Risk guide for determining when to use arc flash personal protective equipment

Normal EquipmentCondition

Abnormal EquipmentCondition

Conductors in a guarded or enclosed •conditionInstallation compliant with applicable •codes, standards and manufacturer’s instructionsEquipment state of maintenance com-•pliant with manufacturer’s instructionsEquipment known to be free of electri-•cal faults (overload, short circuit)Conductor insulation and isolation not •suspect

Conductors not in a guarded or •enclosed conditionInstallation not compliant with appli-•cable codes, standards and manufac-turer’s instructionsEquipment state of maintenance not •compliant with manufacturer’s instruc-tionsEquipment may not be free of electri-•cal faults (overload, short circuit)Conductor insulation and isolation sus-•pect (deterioration due to contaminates or environmental conditions)

Nor

mal

Ope

ratin

g In

tera

ctio

n

Testing control components • ≤ 120 V (Note 1)Programming or reading a panel meter •(Note 1)Operating a panel meter switch (Note 1)•

0 N/A

Opening hinged doors/covers where use •of tools not requiredOperating circuit breakers or fused •switches rated < 1 kVContactor operation•

0 1

Abn

orm

al O

pera

ting

Inte

ract

ion

Work on energized conductors, including •voltage testingOpening hinged doors/covers where use •of tools requiredOperating circuit breakers or fused •switches rated > 1 kVRemoval of bolted covers•Insertion or removal of individual MCC •starter “buckets,” Insertion or removal of busway plug-in •devicesInsertion or removal (racking) of power •circuit breakers Installation of personal protective •grounding equipment

1 1

Legend for Table X.6

“0” = probability unlikely (“risk adequately reduced”): arc flash PPE not required“1” = probability not unlikely (“risk not adequately reduced”): arc flash PPE requiredN/A = Not Applicable

Notes for Table X.6:Due to the nature of these activities or the voltage level it is unlikely that an arc flash event would occur regardless of the condition of the 1. electrical equipment.