2011-048 Larson Release Document 04

8/11/2019 2011-048 Larson Release Document 04

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33/45

UNCLASSIFIED

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: North Eastern Air Defense Sector (NEADS) field site visit

fi\

Type of event: Interview with Major James Fox IltJ

Date: Wednesday, October 29,2003

Special Access Issues: Clearance check

Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown

Team Number: 8

Location: Commander's Conference Room, Building 102

Participants - Non-Commission: Major James Fox, Captain Daniel L. Warnock

Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown

Note: Please refer to the recorded interview for further details.

Background:

~

ox d the military through ROTC in 1990. He received his first assignment

in 199 indle Air Force Base (Tindle AFB) in Weapons Control and Training. In

February he completed his training and arrived at Griffis Air Force Base (Griffis

AFB) with NEADS. He was involved in Desert Shield and Desert Storm; as well as in

counter-drug operations in Panama.

He became a Weapons Assignment Officer, which is the same as a Senior

Director. He has been trained in various positions, including Mission Crew Commander

(MCC). Due to 9/11 and the increase in operations tempo, Fox needed to dedicate most

of his time to Weapons. Today Fox is working full-time again as a MCC.

The Senior Director of the Weapons Section, which is composed of the Weapons

Controller and the Weapons Controller Technician, monitors a number of teams of

controllers who are responsible for military aircraft. The Senior Director's immediate job

is to monitor the Senior Director Technician (SOT). The SDC monitors the Weapons

Controllers Technicians who are handling direction with the FAA and with all phone

calls that need to be coordinated so that the controller can stay on the frequency. Lt.

Powell, then Sgt. Powell, was working as a S. Dir. Technician, and so was Ron Bilicia on

9111.

The Weapons Director Technician is in communication with the FAA and

coordinates all issues over airspace. The Weapons Controller speaks directly to the

military aircraft, and directs those aircraft on their route progress through all airspace.

The progress of orders is from the MCC to the Senior Director, then to the Weapons

Controllers, then to the Operations floor.

Air defense mission:


UNCLASSIFIED

3~


34/45

UNCLASSIFIED


34

Fox understood NORAD's air defense mission as a task to survey and identify all

aircraft entering United States airspace. IfNORAD was unable to identify an aircraft,

then the mission would be to scramble and actively identify. NORAD is also tasked to

work with customs on counter-drug operations. Thirdly, NORAD is tasked with

defending against a coordinated air attack on the United States.

The NORAD hijack response mission is triggered by the FAA. NORAD's

standard operating procedure is to wait for a call from the FAA specifically requesting

military assistance. lfthe FAA does not request assistance, NORAD does not scramble.

After a scramble within US airspace NORAD is tasked with surveillance by air at a five

mile distance from the target. The mission only changes by agreement with Canada. In

Canadian airspace the air defense flight would maintain a l I trail instead.I-E-.' ':O-.-1-3-S-26 -,-s-e-ct-io

If an aircraft is intercepted over water, NORAD controllers are in charge of the

fighters. If it is in airspace over US land, then the FAA does the controlling to create air

space clearance; but NORAD still-maintains what is referred to as command and

guidance by a constant radio link.

Fox was a Weapons Controller during the Luftahansa hijack. On that day NEADS

received intelligence far ahead. He was told by a senior director to look at regulations

on hijacks. He was told the hijacked aircraft had intentions of entering US airspace, so

Fox reviewed the hijack exercises. He remembers later on in the day having Otis AFB.

aircraft off the coast that took the escort from the Canadian fighters and escorted the

hijacked aircraft to a landing. Fox does not recall many of the details.

Awareness of national military assets:

. Fox had awareness of where the Selfridge missions were taking place on 9/1l.

The SD for Weapons often keeps national airspace situational awareness since at times

the Weapons Controllers at NEADS control flights out to different areas of the country.

Though, pre 9/11 there NEADS had a limited knowledge of the exact weapons

configuration of their alert aircraft. He believes it was the default standard to have a

guns-only status, and one fuel tank. The alert fighters would possibly have AIM 9s as

well. On 9/11 however, the birds at Otis AFB were postured with more weapons and

three fuel tanks because of the Russian Bear exercise. Fox noted that when a scramble

order is issued, the alert fighters must take off as is.

Fox noted for Commission staff some of the technical issues regarding the control

of air weapons assets. He noted that AI0 fighters are considered fighters even though

they primarily serve an air to ground function.

The air alert fighters would often have AIM 9s, which are heat seeking, and called

Sidewinders or Heaters. Sometimes alert fighters would have AIM 7s as well; which

are a radar guided missile and also called Sparrows. The AMRAAM (Advanced .

Medium Rarige Air to Air Missile), or AIM-120, is a medium sized weapons that has its

C OM M ISS ION S ENS IT IVE

UNCLASSIFIED


35/45

UNCLASSIFIED


5

own targeting mechanism that is al-weather, and beyond-visible range. AMRAAMs are

also called Slammers .

I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(a) I

L..:--:--_~At that point it goes to a

pitbull

flight, which is self directed. At this point

in the targeting process, the AMRAAMs internal radar tracks to the target that was

designated by the fighter's radar by the pilot.

The F15s can obtain a speed of Mach 1.1 if fully loaded. But when there is more

than one tank on the fighter it creates a large amount of drag, which in turn compromises

the pilot's ability to control the fighter. Thus, usually when a fighter goes supersonic and

is fully loaded it drops two of its tanks beforehand.

Fox believes the F16s armed at an alert mode would be have a max speed of

roughly 1.2 macho He also noted that supersonic speed and maneuverability is not very

different between the F15 and the F16.

During day to day operations by agreement with the FAA fighters will not go

supersonic overland at an altitude of less than FL 300. There are airspace sections in the

US where this can be coordinated. And at further than 10 miles outside the coast

a

fighter

can go supersonic at 10,000 feet and above. These agreements between the FAA and the

military do not completely apply in active air scrambles ifthere is intelligence. or reason

to believe it is a dire situation. Fox underscored this point by saying that on an active air

defense mission the mission is paramount. Pilots have the capability to make their own

decisions regarding what is necessary to fulfill their mission; but if a flight goes

supersonic the order comes through Weapons. And Fox does recall voicing for the Otis to

go super directed towards New York on 9/. 1 1 .

Scramble procedures:

Fox noted to Commission staff that scramble orders are always directed by either

the Senior Director or the Senior Weapons Director. Further, he explained that there are

shout lines used between different sections on the floor to coordinate timely

information. And that these lines are used in a scramble situation. This timely

coordination is practiced and the NEADS readiness posture is to have fighters airborne

after a scramble is issued within 17 minutes.

Fox explained that once fighters are in the air, both the FAA and HUNTRESS

only speak with them when they have guidance to give. The flight lead would be in

charge ofthe flight's configuration. The lead can have both frequencies in ear, and direct

which member of his flight he is speaking with. For example, the flight lead could have

one radio monitoring and communicating with the FAA, and another radio to his


~UNCLASSIFIED


36/45


37/45

UNCLASSIFIED


37

practice identification methods. A small exercise like this or a large scale Vigilant

Guardian type exercise all deal with in part identification of an aircraft entering US

airspace from over water. .

By posse commatadus NORAD was not allowed to intercept aircraft internal to

the United States. That mission was considered a law enforcement mission. Fox noted

that he was trained to that point of understanding. He noted that this understanding stems

from his early training. It was always the understanding at the Operation Floor level that

to intercept something that originated in US airspace the intercept would have to be

approved from a level over NORAD (ie. Joint Chiefs of Staff or National Security

Council). Fox noted the operational knowledge at NORAD was that it would never

consider taking that action on its own authority. At NEADS, they would seek higher

command guidance. Fox made the distinction to Commission staff that it is that authority

to intercept that needs higher authorization; but that scrambles can be order from

NEADS. .

racticed for counter-dru 0 erations are onl

racticed on

In Fox's

'-r-e-co-:I:7le-c-:-t-:-:-io-n-m-o-st:-o-f;:t:7h-:-is-ex-e-r-c:-is-e-w-as--;,7.'i-n '7h-o-u-se-;':;-'-;In~t;-he-e-v-en--'t-o--'f 'a-n-ac-.Jtualnterce t

coordination with FAA would be in as an aircraft comes

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(a)

I

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(a)

I

Fox commented that NEADS may give operationa ra ar support on

'------;---:--7-'

tracks over the Maine/Canada airspace to the FAA.

Fox does not know ofa counter-drug intercept that has happened real world at

NEADS. He commented that NEADS personnel have been trained, but Fox has never

participated in one of those exercises; he does know that SEADShas a greater counter-

drug focus. J

Fox stated that small scale exercises include scheduled training in the controlled

military airspace off the coast. Large scale exercises are completely simulated and would

include the entire coordination and steps between the initial intelligence of an event and

the deployment response. To Fox's knowledge, Vigilant Guardian was building towards a

large scale simulated exercise.

Fox does not recall any real world, actual flying exercises coordinated with FAA

to practice hijack procedures. Any live exercises would happen over the off-coast

airspaces. Fox believes there may have been live intercepts in practice over the coast that

would be with the purpose of practicing hij ack scenarios.

Fox recalls a small number of occurrences in which a simulated intercept of a

hijacked aircraft coming in from over seas crashes into something in US territory. It

was always an aircraft coming in from over water. He does not know what the reason for

why these flights might have been simulated to crash. He believes that disgruntled pilots

may have been a scenario that was exercised. Fox does not recall an exercised s i tua t ion

C OMMISS ION S EN S IT TVE

lJNCLASSIFIED


38/45

3

. UNCLASSIFIED


that the pilots were not controlling the aircraft, or a situation practiced in which there was

no communication from the aircraft. Fox noted that other MCCs may remember these

scenarios in more detail, or may have been involved with other exercises that interest the

Commission.

9/11:

Fox recalls that on 9/11 the Weapons Section was preparing for the start of the

Vigilant Guardian exercise. He commented that because of this they had a more robust

staff then would have been normal, but it is a requirement that there be a dedicated team

of controllers per group, of aircraft. And since

a

mission can vary in size from a pair of

fighters to as many as twentyaircrafts, including tankers and other types of military

aircraft, the number of controllers reporting and working at the Weapons Section at a

given time can vary. Powell, Gardner and Bilucio were all sitting at the Weapons desk

on 9/11.

The Vigilant Guardian exercise that NEADS had been preparing for was on hold

already because of the Russian Bear activity. They were expecting it to begin, and Fox

went to perform some administrative duties. As Fox entered the floor, Powell was

informing Colonel Deskins (then a Major) of the possible hijack. Fox understands that the

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was attempting to locate a hijacked aircraft on

their radar, and thus made the appropriate call to the Senior Director Weapons Technician

(Powell) to notify NEADS of the situation. Deskins was on the Operations floor at the

time. That is why Powell spoke to her instead of Nasypany. Powell carne back to the desk

and plugged into the SD Tech position. Shortly thereafter the Weapons position was

voiced to scramble Otis. He remembers asking for a target for thescramble. Eventually

the MCC said to direct the fighters towards New York.

Most of the details once the Weapons position knew ofthe possible hijack would

have come into the Huntress illposition. Fox only knew the hijack was in Boston Air

Route Control Center CZBW) airspace. He was not informed of the details. At that point,

at the Weapons position, they were primarily concerned of where the scramble was to be

from, and where the fighters should go. Since it takes a period of time to get the aircraft

airborne, it is important to initially know where the aircraft is going. Fox says he does not

need the altitude, since that can be adjusted. The speed is important though so that the

heading for the intercept will be accurate.

Fox remembers that by the time the scramble order was given Nasypany was in

the Battle Cab, and Deskins was no longer there

Once the FAA asks for assistance, if the Battle Commander is not available, the

Director of Operations (DO) has the authority to scramble aircraft. Colonel McNealy was

the DO on 9/11. It would be procedure to check with the Battle Cab and the DO before an

MCC would issue an order to scramble. Fox has seen the scramble order voiced before

without the DO, but the MCC would immediately be informed.


UNCLASSIFIED

_ .._._--------------------------------


39/45

3

UNCLASSIFIED

C OM M IS SIO N S EN SITIV E

Once Fox received the scramble order on 9/11, he told Powell to activate the

scramble line and head the Otis alert fighters towards New York City.

They brought the fighters out over water since that was an easier route for

command, guidance, and control from Huntress D. Coordination with the FAA regarding

clearing airspace over the United States may have hampered the progress of the fighters if

the fighters had been vectored to approach New York City over land.

Commission staff began to use documents reflecting the scrambled fighter tracks

to assist the interview:

On 9/11 Fox had limited information, Fox explains to Commission staff that the

vector given to the fighters was off magnetic north (pilots always operate off of magnetic

north). The basis for Flight Level 290 (FL 290) is that it is simply an appropriate altitude

for fuel efficiency. That is a default altitude if there is limited information on the reason

or destination governing a hijack. When he launched the fighters, he asked the MCC for

information. Nasypany only gave the information to head them to New York City, and,

according to Fox, it is possible that Nasypany may have had more information then what

was given to Fox.

The fighters left Otis headed towards the Northeast which is the quickest route out

from the Otis runway and alert barn. They performed a tight turn, and moved towards

their assigned vector. They were told to hold south of Long Island, and Fox directed the

WD Tech to pick up a new heading in line with this.

Commission staff showed Fox a rough transcript from the MCC position, and

began to play an audio file provided to Commission staffby NEADS labeled DRMI

DA T 2 Channel 2 MCC:

According to the transcript at 8:40 AM, MCC Nasypany asked Fox to scramble

Otis. Nasypany told Fox to scramble to a Z point north ofNYC. Major Fox explained that

a Z track is a track that is put into the Q radar system that is not meant to move. It is

meant to be stationary and mark a position for an aircraft.

At 8:52 AM on the tape when the information that an aircraft hit the WTC

reached Fox, he looked for more updated information as to whether or not the scramble

mission was still necessary.

At 8:54 AM Fox was told to continue the fighter's flight towards John F.

Kennedy (JFK) airport. Fox does not remember if the fighters were airborne yet. But he

did suggest to Nasypany that the quickest route was over water. Nasypany told him to

work with the FAA on clearing aircraft. Fox noted to Commission staff that the traffic in

the area a\ that time is extremely heavy and would need to be cleared.

The controllers at Huntress actively attempted to coordinate with the fighters to

maintain the best course for intercept and to stay away from FAA controlled aircraft. The


UNCLASSIFIED


40/45

UNCLASSIFIED

C O MM IS S IO N S E NS IT IV E

o

control of the aircraft in air was through the FAA, and at 8:55 the fighters were told to go

to JFK at a heading of260. This heading would put the fighters south of JFK. Fox

decided that if the fighters followed a course to place them in one of the warning areas,

they could hold outside of New York and wait for an accurate position. Fox reiterated to

Commission staff that the reason to give the scrambled fighters from Otis AFB a FL 290

is most likely independent from the last known altitude of AA II.

Fox was informed that the last known position for the AA 11 was 20 miles south

of JFK, and attempted to get other accurate information on the flight.

According to the transcript at roughly 8:56 AM they were informed that AA 11

was the aircraft that hit the World Trade Center (WTC). Fox believes this information

came from a ZBW call to Huntress that informed them that ZBW was almost certain the

flight that hit the WTC was AA II.

Fox estimates that if at 8:53 FAA had passed situational awareness to the military

regarding UAL 175's location, the Otis fighters barely would have gotten to New York

City. Fox continued this line of thought and noted that they would not have been able to

1) find the aircraft (fighter radar would not have been able to pick up the aircraft in the

midst of the buildings in New York City, and the pilots would have had to visually make

contact with the aircraft); 2) intercept the aircraft; and 3) receive permission from a

national command authority to shoot. Fox explained that the lower an aircraft flies the

harder it is for fighter radar to distinguish the target from terrain and buildings. It would

have been nearly impossible for the radar to pick up the aircraft. The process would

have potentially taken longer than the actual flight from Otis.

Sometime during the initial events there was a CNN feed piped into the Battle

Cab. That morning Fox does not recall seeing the second impact, or CNN' After ZBW

reported that they believed AA 11 crashed into the WTC to NEADS, Fox does not.recall

discussion that AA 11 was not the airplane that hit the WTC.

Fox was receiving information regarding the hijack through the MCC. It is the

MCC'sjob to continually inform the Weapons Desk on any amplifying information so

the Weapons Desk can acquire its target, and facilitate the intercept. The point at which

the MCC communicates to the Weapons section that fighters from Langely need to be

scrambled and headed towards Washington is Fox's first indication that there is more

going on .

According to the transcript, between 9:03 AM and 9:04 AM Major Nasypany told

Fox that there was a report of a second hit on the WTC. The fighters at this point were

off the tip of Long Island. Fox guessed that the fighters were roughly 100 or 120 miles

out of New York City. Fox explained to Commission staff that he might have known that

there were additional hijacks, but he does not have any awareness of the reports of

additional hijacks being associated with AA II.


1..JNCLASSIFIED


41/45


42/45

UNCLASSIFIED


4

through is extremely overlaid. So it would not surprise Fox if out over the coast - the

mouth of the James River south of Langley and north of Oceana - not over open water,

would be the first area the pilots would have the chance to speak with Huntress. If the

pilots are jumping between the FAA agencies on the radio they may not have had the

time to speak with NEADS. For Huntress to know they were off course would take

either a notice of the change in course on the Huntress radar or for the pilots to notify

Huntress. .

Fox noted that as the other scramble (Langely AFB F-16s) was called there

should have been another Weapons team brought in. Fox is not absolutely sure if another

Weapons team was brought in at that point. To set up for a new WD team is complicated

- a necessary step to control another air defense flight. It does take a solid five minutes

before the team begins to observe radar data. The WD relies on Command Post calls that

fighters are airborne. The second notice would be an FAA call to transfer the fighters

over (that would be the latest). Ideally when the Command Post calls to inform that is

when the WD Tech and WD begin actively watching the radar. Fox noted that after the

scramble from Langley the only instructions that the Weapons Desk was asked to give

the fighters was to head them towards Washington, DC.

An FAA transcript indicates that at 9:32 AM Huntress asks that the fighters start

to move towards Washington via the Baltimore area. After reviewing the audio file, staff

learns that the direction given is for BWI (Baltimore Washington International Airport).

The route vector given is 230 degrees. Fox noted that as far as the range on the old Q

radar system Baltimore and Washington are for all vectoring purposes co-located. Quit

24 mentioned it was squawking Quad 7 (beacon code 7777), which is an indication that

the pilots had been given the authorization to intercept (AFIO).

Declaring AFIO and Quad 7 is a statement that the pilots are excepting all

responsibility for any air incident resulting from the pilots clearing their own airspace.

Quad 7 and AFIO had only happened once previously in Fox's entire career. The lowest

level that Quad 7 and AFIO can be declared is from the DO (Col McNealy) position. Fox

believes prior to September

1 1

th AFIOhad

o n ly

been declared once.

Regarding a military controller and guiding a fighter or fighter flight that has

declared AFIO, Fox commented that the military controllers have to communicate to the

fighters the traffic ahead of the fighters at numerous scopes. The positions are trained to

do this, but are not federally qualified so it can be difficult for the controllers. The

flight leader confirmed with Huntress that his full team was squeaking Quad 7.

Shoot down order: According to the audio recording that Commission staff and Fox

reviewed, the armament configuration on

91 1 1

was referred to around 9:20 AM as F-l5s

with zero (refers to AIM 120s), 2 (AIM 7s), 2 (AIM 98) by gun (armed guns) . The

expression used for how the fighters would engage the commercial airliner if a shoot

down order had been given was Heaters in the face ; this indicated the suggestion that

the fighter head towards the target aircraft and fire heat seeking missiles. At some point

during the day NEADS received authority to shoot down aircraft that were deemed


UNCLASSIFIED


43/45

4

UNCLASSIFIED


hostile by CINC, NORAD, and/or others. He believes this was sometime after the

Pentagon impact (9:37 AM). Without reviewing more transcripts, Fox stated that the

MCC was mostlikely thinking ahead when he gave the above statement. (audio file

49:00 mark)

Military / FAA relations on

9/11:

NEADS deals with Boston, Cleveland, New York, Washington and Minneapolis

Air Route Control Centers. All those sectors have direct hotlines. They rarely spoke with

Chicago, and never to Indianapolis. NEADS worked with ZBW often; so probably

coordinated the best with ZBW on 9/11. Centers like Washington and (New York Air

Route Control Center) ZNY, who NEADS rarely worked with, were not as familiar with

NEADS. Fox stated that this did not effect the coordination on 9/11 since the space of

time between the initial notice of hijack and the point at which the military took over the

national airspace was only a few hours. .

Fox stated the following educated asswnptions regarding the Langley APB

fighters: Ifthe FAA had put the Langely APB fighters on a 010 heading from the initial

scramble, Fox approximates that they would have been at the most 10 to 20 miles south

of Washington headed north at the time in which they were actually turned toward BWI.

In this case they definitely could have gotten to Washington, and there may have been

time to acquire the target and perhaps intercept. Fox was receiving the guidance to vector

them directly to Washington, and ifhe had greater situational awareness and information

the fighters probably would have been pushed at a greater pace. Even though Washington

is an extremely congested arrival/departure area, the fighters could have gone afterburner

until short of that area, and then slowed a bit to intercept. It has been reported officially

that the impact at the Pentagon is roughly 9:37 AM. If the FAA had been aware of the

location of AA 77 at sometime between 9:09 AM and 9:24 AM then the Langley fighters

might have been in position in the area to intercept AA 77, according to Fox. But he

notes that if they knew in that time frame arid were able to give a position Langley could

have launched earlier. Fox speculates that if they had five or more minutes and had gotten

the position in timely manner they would have had time to intercept; but that the orders to

shoot down the aircraft would still have taken time.

There is a point in the audio file at 1:20:00 that the MCC expressed .frustration

with Giant Killer. Fox explained to Conunission staff that at Giant Killer there are FAA

controllers. The reason they are certified to work with the FAA is because they follow

FAA procedures, and are FAA controlled. Giant Killer is a Navy operation, and is tasked

by the FAA. The scope operators are military persormel but are FAA controllers.

Fox, speaking for the lower operations level not the official level, noted that there

was not too much discussion about the difficulties between the military and the FAA on

9/11. He noted that it was commonplace that the FAA would have acted the way it did.

With the severity of what had happened and the increased tempo of operations there was

not, according to Fox, any real time devoted to discussing the FAA's actions on 9/11

regarding the Langely fighters' coordination.


UNCLASSIFIED


44/45

44

UNCLASSIFIED


According to Fox, when SCAT ANA and NESCAT operated, the airspace

coordination worked well for the military. But Fox does not want to see military control

over civilian aircraft. Initially post-9/11 there was little resistance by the FAA against

having military fighters operate in and out of the caps. But now there is more and more

resistance on the FAA side to allowing fighters to perform their operations as best they

can.

According to Fox, communication is good but could still be better between the

FAA and the military. Fox notes that one of the first things done for new recrui ts for

military positions is to send that personnel to an FAA center to review those operations

and be familiar so communications are easier. Fox noted that there was relatively positive

coordination with the FAA in three orfour missions prior to 9/11. This positive

coordination was increased by the fact that the FAA is now helping with 8 or 9 flights a

day. Fox noted that post 9/11 coordination with the FAA is faster and more accurate,

especially through the DEN line.

General notations from Fox on operations on 9/11:

At one point on 9/11 NEADS had a Weapons Control team up for almost every

flight. The sector has identified the first team that sat down , but Fox can not confirm

based off his memory. He does not know if there exists a direct record of who was at

which position during the course of September 11

tho

On multiple occasions over. the last

two years the DOC (the office that supervises the Operations Floor) has asked for this

information, but Fox does not know where this information might be.

Usually the Weapons SD Tech and the Weapons SD position are both plugged

in to the communications board at the Weapons desk. But on 9111 Fox, the Weapons SD

Tech, very quickly unplugged and coordinated with the multiple Weapons teams that

were being set up on the floor. This affects the amount of times he appears in the

recordings. According to Fox, as the day got more organized, at approximately around 11

or 12 o'clock, a Canadian Captain Bilicio came in as another SD and Fox may have

plugged in.

On 9/11, the capability for the radars on the coast is to give information at most

150 miles, and the radar will not see below 10,000 feet. There was radar coverage for the

Langley fighters on their way to Washington. There was no good low level picture. There

was enough coverage so they could bring the fighters to Washington, but the extent of the

coverage and thus the ability for the fighters to communicate was less.

Fox noted that the Chicago area had an extremely limited amount of radar

coverage, and only at 30,000 alt. NEADS would not have been able to speak with them.

Recommendations:

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Fox noted that it should be a joint responsibility between the military and the

FAA to coordinate and direct a scramble, instead of it being controlled by the FAA over

national airspace unless an ATHIO order is given. Fox explained that if there is a real

world air defense scramble order, he would like the FAA to give the fighters the highest

priority. Fox commented that on 9/11 the FAA should have been fully aware that it was a

real world scramble out of Langley, and should have prioritized NEADS route request.

Fox also noted to Commission staff that at NEADS the radar capability has

increased ten- fold at least . He would like to see better radar picture coordination, and

would like to see those pictures linked operationally. He explained this by noting that

NEADS generates its picture with the new radar they have. There are deployed

representati ves in Washington who see the same picture as the radar operators at

NEADS. He would like to see total coordination with these technologies.

Fox believes a generated air picture, tracks, and radar data being coordinated and

simultaneous would be a large step towards greater situational awareness. The military is

gathering the same data from the same radar-but the FAA generates its own set of data.

The military computers take that data and generate their own necessary data.

Hotlines to sectors are not present to Chicago, Indianapolis or Kansas City. There

are multiple sectors at which there is not even one voice page hotline. The DEN line is a

good step, but on the operational side the communication could be better.

Documents

2011-048 Larson Release Document 04