2008-The Religious Role and the Sense of Control

The Religious Role and the Sense ofPersonal Control*

Scott SchiemanUniversity of Toronto

Is the belief in divine control associated with the generalized sense of personal control? Using datafrom a 2005 nationally representative survey of 1,800 adults in the United States, I test two com-peting views: the relinquished control versus the personal empowerment hypotheses. Results supportthe relinquished control hypothesis. Individuals who believe in divine control tend to report signifi-cantly lower levels of personal controlbut that association is contingent upon other dimensions ofthe religious role. Specifically, I observe a significantly stronger negative association between belief indivine control and personal control among individuals who report lower levels of subjective religiosityand less frequent praying and attendance activities. Moreover, the interrelationships among these fourdimensions of the religious role reveal important suppression effects in their influence on personal con-trol. I discuss the ways that these observations contribute to theoretical views about the complex inter-actions among religious precepts, practices, and generalized expectancies of personal control.

Scholars have long been interested in the effects of religion on individualspersonal and social functioning. One key debate revolves around the effects ofreligious precepts and practices on the sense of personal control (Ellison, et al.2001; Jackson and Coursey 1988; Schieman, et al. 2001). The sense of control isa learned, generalized expectancy that is largely shaped by social conditions(Mirowsky and Ross 2003a). Individuals who possess a high sense of controlclaim that, in general, they determine the positive and negative events and out-comes in their lives. By contrast, individuals with a low personal control clusterat the other end of the continuum, experiencing powerlessness, and the sensethat chance, luck, fate, or powerful others dictate the direction of their lives(Ross and Sastry 1999). The sense of control shares conceptual ground withother constructs in the literature, including mastery, self-efficacy, internal locusof control, and instrumentalism (Pearlin and Schooler 1978; Rotter 1966;Wheaton 1985).

Sociology of Religion 2008, 69:3 273-296

*Direct all correspondence to Scott Schieman, Department of Sociology, 725 Spadina Ave.,University of Toronto, Toronto, ON M5S 2J4 Canada ([email protected]). A grant awardfrom the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health at the Centers for Disease Controlsupports this study (R01 OH008141; Scott Schieman, P.I.). I thank John Mirowsky for his helpfulcomments and feedback.

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In the present study, I seek to extend the scope of prior research by describ-ing the effects of several core dimensions of the religious role on personal con-trol. Analyses of the links between the religious role and personal control areimportant for a number of reasons. First and foremost, stress process theory under-scores the centrality of personal control for stress and health processes, docu-menting its negative association with psychological distress, poor self-ratedhealth, and physical functioning (Ross, et al. 2001; Ross and Wu 1995; Wheaton1985). Moreover, as a personal resource that individuals draw upon to avoid orcope with the deleterious effects of stressors, personal control bolsters resilienceto adversities in daily life (Pearlin 1989); it enables individuals to discoverin amore flexible fashionan array of paths for the resolution of stressors (Thoits1994). Thus, adversity often has fewer negative health consequences for individ-uals who possess a sense of control (Pearlin 1999).

Given the well-established significance of the sense of control, sociologistshave sought to understand the social conditions that influence it (Mirowsky andRoss 2003b). Most of this research focuses on the major roles of individuals lives,especially in work and family contexts. Objective conditions in these roles culti-vate fertile grounds for experiences with successes and failures that, in turn, con-tribute to generalized expectancies about control (Ross and Sastry 1999). Thus,perceived control represents a cognitive link between objective, social conditionsand inner experience (Mirowsky and Ross 2003a). Less is known, however, aboutthe ways that dimensions of the religious role are associated with the sense of per-sonal control. To address this gap, I begin by first focusing on the associationbetween the belief in divine control and personal control. In addition, I assess theways that subjective identification with and the core activities in the religiousrole modify that association. The potential contributions of this research revolvearound analyses of whether or not these aspects of the religious role function ascontingencies in the association between divine control and personal control.The sections that follow provide a theoretical framework for the hypothesizedfocal associations.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Belief in Divine Control and the Sense of Personal ControlHumans generally strive to understand the causes of the events and outcomes

in their lives in order to maintain a sense of meaning, control, and esteem(Gorsuch and Smith 1983; Ritzema, and Young 1983; Spilka et al. 2003). As ageneral framework, attribution theory describes the ways that individuals explainthese conditions by invoking situational or dispositional conditions as causal fac-tors (Fiske and Taylor 1991). A central element of attribution theory involvesthe view that people are motivated to attain a cognitive mastery of the causalstructure of their social worlds (Kelley 1967:193). Although naturalistic expla-

274 SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION



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nations and attributions are most common, there is some evidence that individ-uals invoke religious explanations, especially when naturalistic explanations failto satisfactorily account for phenomenon (Lupfer, et al. 1992).

Beliefs about God as a causal agent are central elements in attributionalprocesses (Jackson and Coursey 1988). In the present study, I focus specifically onthe belief in a personal God who is highly influential and has causal relevance inones lifethe sense of divine control. More specifically, this involves the extent towhich an individual believes that God exercises a commanding authority overthe course and direction of his or her own life (Schieman, et al. 2005).Individuals who sustain a belief in divine control perceive that God controls thegood and bad outcomes in their lives, that God has decided what their life shallbe, and that their fate evolves according to Gods plan. They tend to rely heavi-ly on God in their decision-making and more fervently seek His guidance forsolutions to problems.1 To address the central question about the associationbetween belief in divine control and the sense of personal control, I develop andtest two competing hypotheses: the relinquished control versus the personalempowerment hypotheses.

The relinquished control hypothesis. Drawing upon a tradition of critical schol-arship that emphasizes the deleterious personal and social consequences of reli-giosity, the relinquished control hypothesis predicts that individuals who believe indivine control will report a lower sense of personal control compared to thosewho do not. Jackson and Coursey (1988:399) contend that a common secularperspective on religion assumes that believing God is an active agent in ones liferequires relinquishing a sense of personal or internal control. Conceptual speci-fications of the external pole of Rotters (1966) I-E scale differentiate thechance and powerful other dimensions from the God control dimension(Jackson and Coursey 1988; Levenson 1974; Kopplin 1976). Although scholarshave distinguished between the powerful other and God dimensions of exter-nal control, Mirowsky and Ross (2003a:201) argue that the external attributionof control to God acts as a logical opposite of internal control: either I controlmy life or control rests elsewhere. Ceding control to a powerful other contradictsa core conceptual feature of personal control theory: The individualnot a pow-erful otherdictates events and outcomes in their own lives. If it is assumed thatthe causal attribution to God represents processes similar to attributions to otherexternal forces such as luck or powerful others, then individuals who believe indivine control should tend to report a low sense of personal control. Moreover,

RELIGIOUS ROLE AND SENSE OF PERSONAL CONTROL 275

1This construct shares conceptual terrain with related concepts such as God control(Kopplin 1976), divine relations (Pollner 1989), God as a Causal Agent (Ritzema andYoung 1983), religious coping (Pargament 1997), and God-mediated control (Krause2005; Westman and Campbell 1999; also see Berrenberg 1987). These concepts identify thebelief in an intensely personal God who is intimately engaged in and concerned about theindividual lives of believers.



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the reliance on or deference to Gods causal influence may erode feelings ofpotency because it detracts from personal efforts to problem-solve (Ellison 1993).In analyses of religious coping, Pargament and colleagues (1988) identify this asdeferential coping in which one defers to an omnipotent God who solves peoplesproblems. Summarizing these ideas, Ellison (1991:81) contends that divine rela-tions may reduce worry or self-blame by encouraging individuals to cede psycho-logical control of problematic situations that appear irreconcilable, or to attrib-ute responsibility for particularly difficult life events to a divine other.

The personal empowerment hypothesis. As an alternative to the relinquishedcontrol view, the personal empowerment hypothesis asserts that beliefs aboutGods omnipotent power provide a sense of coherence and meaning to life thathelps people reconcile lifes uncertainties and adversities. In turn, these condi-tions are hypothesized to enhance personal control. Central tenets of Judeo-Christian theology maintain that individuals can collaborate with God to navi-gate and solve the adversities of life (Pargament et al. 1988; Pargament, et al.2005). Does this form of divine interaction enhance the sense of personal poten-cy? Common notions that proclaim that God is my co-pilot and All things arepossible through Christ imply direct connections between divine interactionand personal empowerment. This suggests that individuals are cognizant of Godspersonal involvement and guidance (Wikstrm 1987). While it might seem thatpeople come to rely upon an external source to feel personal control, there is someevidence that devout religious belief is related positively to feelings of internalcontroleven if these processes involve the control of an omnipotent deity(Ellison and Taylor 1996; Maton 1989; Pargament et al. 1990). Thus, Gods giftof free will is the ultimate enabler for the sense of personal control (Jackson andCoursey 1988). As Pargament (1997:468) observes, the knowledge that believerscan call on God for help and knowing that God is on their side would notdiminish their sense of efficacy and mastery. It would enhance it. The criticaldistinction is that, unlike the deferring orientation, individuals who adhere to acollaborative style perceive God as a partner in navigating the adversities ofeveryday life.

Prior studies. The relinquished control and personal empowerment hypothe-ses are both plausible. To date, empirical tests of these views have yielded mixedresults. Studies have documented negative (Pargament, et al. 1982), positive(DeVellis, et al. 1988; Jackson and Coursey 1988; Silvestri 1979), or null associ-ations (Benson and Spilka 1973; Ritzema 1979) between various measures ofGod-related control and personal control-type measures. These inconclusivefindings are likely due to variations in methodologies and study designs. Forexample, many of these studies focus solely on undergraduate students, some-times at universities in more conservative Christian regions of the United States.Others have focused specifically on highly religious samples such as fundamen-talist Baptist African Americans. Moreover, it is possible that prior findings havebeen inconclusive because most of these studies have not considered elements of




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the religious role as contingencies. In highly religious samples, the ability to teaseout the contingent effects of the religious role is problematic because thesedimensions are often largely invariant. Simply put, the samples are too homoge-nous with respect to religious role dimensions such as subjective religiosity andthe frequencies of praying and attendance. These constraints limit the capacityto test for the contingencies that I consider below.

The Relevance of Subjective Religiosity and Religious Activities The belief in divine control represents only one aspect of the religious role.

Other important dimensions include subjective religiosity and the frequency ofpraying and religious service attendance. Two perspectives contribute to myanalysis of the impact of these dimensions in the association between the beliefin divine control and personal control: (1) the distinction between intrinsic andextrinsic religiosity, and (2) the availability heuristic. Individuals with an extrin-sic orientation tend to approach religion in a utilitarian, self-serving, and self-protecting manner, and are less likely to participate in religious activities(Allport and Ross 1967). By contrast, an intrinsic religious orientation regardsfaith as a supreme value in its own right and is marked by higher levels of par-ticipation and commitment (Strickland and Shaffer 1971:366). Scholars havesought to determine whether extrinsic and intrinsic religious orientations differin their associations with the belief in divine control and personal control. Someevidence suggests that the belief in God control is associated positively withintrinsic religious commitment, subjective religiosity, and frequency of churchattendance (Gorsuch and Smith 1983; Jackson and Coursey 1988; Kopplin 1976;Pargament, 1997; Ritzema 1979; Spilka and Schmidt 1983). Likewise, othershave argued that individuals characterized by intrinsic religiousness are morelikely to have a sense of personal control because they actively integrate anddeploy religious beliefs in the important decisions of their daily life (Spilka et al.2003).

The availability heuristic (availability hypothesis) is also relevant in theseprocesses (Fiske and Taylor 1991; Spilka, et al. 1985). For example, with theirmore frequent participation in religious activities, individuals with an intrinsicorientation may have greater exposure to messages about Gods influence ineveryday life. Moreover these are self-reinforcing processes: Those who believethat they are Gods chosen and enact facets of the religious role may holdstronger beliefs about divine control, which, in turn, reinforces the instrumentof Gods will aspect of the self-concept (Lupfer et al. 1992). Collectively, thesebehavioral and cognitive components of faith represent an influential perceptu-al set (Ludwig and Blank 1969). As a perceptual set, subjective religiosity andmore frequent religious activities may tend to increase the likelihood that onewill invoke causal attributions to God. The more intense and internalized thereligious precepts and practices, the greater the likelihood of religiously-basedcausal explanations.




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Taken together, these ideas have implications for the interrelationshipsamong religious precepts, practices, and the sense of personal control. It is plau-sible that individuals with a higher level of subjective religiosity and more fre-quent participation in religious activities are more likely to believe in divine con-trol. If so, these patterns have implications for the net associations between thereligious role and personal control. Specifically, suppression effects are likely,especially if there is a negative association between the belief in divine controland personal control. In this scenario, there should be positive associationsbetween each aspect of the religious role and personal control, but these associa-tions will appear after I account for the higher levels of divine control amongindividuals who are deeply involved in the religious role. This suppressionhypothesis predicts that belief in divine control masks or conceals the psychoso-cial benefits of the religious role.

In addition to suppression effects, there are sound reasons to propose inter-action effects between belief in divine control and dimensions of the religiousrole. For example, some studies have observed no association between attribu-tions to divine interaction and personal control among samples of highly reli-gious individuals (Ritzema 1979). When comparisons among individuals withdifferent levels of religiosity have been made, those who are more religiouslycommitted or fundamentalist tend to experience a stronger positive associationbetween God control and personal control (Furnham 1982). Thus, it is plausiblethat the belief in divine control is empowering only among individuals who aremore committed to the religious role. Some scholars contend that the deeplyreligious tend to believe that although God ultimately controls everything, Healso endows people with free will to behave in a manner that pleases Him(Silvestri 1979; Tipton, et al. 1980). When combined with higher levels of sub-jective religiosity or more frequent participation, belief in divine control mayhave especially positive effects on personal control. These ideas imply a synergis-tic version of the personal empowerment hypothesis. Alternatively, individualswho believe in divine control without also possessing a devotion to other dimen-sions of the religious role may exhibit a more deferring orientation that is associ-ated with less personal control. In this scenario, the predictions of the relinquishedcontrol hypothesis are more relevant. However, these divergent scenarios bothpredictin different directionsthat the divine control-personal control associ-ation is contingent upon other salient aspects of ones religious role.

Ruling Out Socioeconomic Status as an ExplanationMany of the prior studies just reviewed that examine the association between

the belief in divine control and personal control neglect socioeconomic status(SES). This oversight is often due to a focus on samples of undergraduate stu-dents, highly religious individuals, or members of specific congregations (oftenconservative Christian). These designs truncate SES variations that may haveimplications for the complex interrelationships among religious precepts and




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practices and personal control. Given sociological theorizing about and empiri-cal evidence of social class variations in religion, it is essential to integrate coredimensions of SES to accurately elucidate these patterns of association in thegeneral population. There is substantial evidence that each of the main dimen-sions of SESeducation, occupation, and incomeare associated with personalcontrol (Mirowsky and Ross 2003a, 2003b) and elements of the religious role(Pyle 2006; Smith and Faris 2005). Moreover, recent studies underscore the linksbetween SES and beliefs about Gods influence in everyday life (Krause 2005;Schieman, et al. 2005; Schieman, et al. 2006). Although SES is associated posi-tively with personal control and associated negatively with belief in divine con-trol, the evidence about SES and other elements of the religious role are lessstraightforward. Thus, analyses that seek to establish an association betweenbeliefs in divine control and personal control and the functions of the religiousrole in this association need to rule out the possibility that any observed interre-lationships are spurious. Essentially, this implies that the association betweenSES and each focal measure may influence the patterns predicted by the relin-quished control and personal empowerment hypotheses. Thus, by adjusting forSES, I attempt to rule out the possibility that any observed support for eitherhypothesisand potential suppression and interaction effectsare attributableto SES influences.

METHODS

SampleThe data derive from the Work, Stress, and Health (WSH) survey which

conducted telephone interviews with 1,800 adults in the 50 United States fromFebruary through August of 2005.2 To be eligible for the study, individuals had tobe 18 years of age or older, participating in the paid labor force, and sufficientlyfluent in English to complete the interview. Of those people contacted and iden-tified as eligible, 71 percent agreed to participate. The age range is 18 to 94, witha mean of 43.5 (Std. Dev. = 13.2), 59 percent are women, and 72 percent are


2To obtain the sample, a list-assisted random digit dialing (RDD) selection was drawnproportionally from all 50 states from GENESYS Sampling Systems. The sampling approachemployed the List +1 method, which tends to yield a higher proportion of productive num-bers (Lepkowski 1988). List-assisted RDD is widely accepted now by most social surveyresearch organizations as a cost-effective alternative to the pure RDD methods originallydeveloped by Waksberg (1978). List-assisted RDD increases the probability of residentialnumbers while minimizing the biases often associated with non-traditional RDD techniques.The final sample was based on: (1) telephone numbers for residential households; (2) house-holds agreeing to answer screening questions; (3) successfully screened households with oneor more employed adults; and (4) eligible households with a subsampled adult who agreed toparticipate in the interview.



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white. The sample demographic characteristics are similar to those of workingadults in other national datasets such as the 2002 National Survey of theChanging Workforce, the 2005 American Community Survey (ACS), and 2005labor reports from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Using the ACS data, I weight-ed analyses to achieve conformity with the population in terms of sex, age, race,marital status, and occupation.

MeasuresThe generalized sense of personal control. I use Mirowsky and Rosss (2003a) 2

x 2 index, which asks participants to report their level of agreement of disagree-ment with the eight statements; there are two statements in each of the four cat-egories. Statements that measure the level that individuals claim control overgood outcomes include: (1) I am responsible for my own successes, and (2) Ican do just about anything I really set my mind to. Items that measure claims ofcontrol over bad outcomes include: (3) My misfortunes are the result of mistakesI have made; and (4) I am responsible for my failures. Items that assess theextent that individuals deny control over good outcomes are: (5) The reallygood things that happen to me are mostly luck; and (6) Theres no sense plan-ning a lotif something good is going to happen it will. The last two statementsmeasure the denial of control over bad outcomes: (7) Most of my problems aredue to bad breaks; and (8) I have little control over the bad things that happento me. Responses to statements one through four are coded strongly disagree(2), disagree (1), neutral (0), agree (1), and strongly agree (2).Responses to statements five through eight are coded strongly disagree (2),disagree (1), neutral (0), agree (1), and strongly agree (2). Followingthe procedures set forth by Mirowsky and Ross (1991), I averaged responses tocreate the index; higher scores indicate a higher sense of personal control ( =.512). Numerous other researchers have established the psychometric propertiesof this sense of control index and used this measure in a variety of analyses(Mirowsky 1995; Mirowsky and Ross 1996, 1998, 2003a; Ross and Mirowsky1992; Ross et al. 2001; Ross and Sastry 1999; Ross and Wu 1995; Wolinsky, et al.2004).

Belief in divine control. Participants were asked the extent to which they agreeor disagree with the following five statements: You decide what to do withoutrelying on God, When good or bad things happen, you see it is part of Godsplan for you (reverse coded), God has decided what your life shall be (reversecoded), You depend on God for help and guidance (reverse coded), and Thereis no sense planning a lotmy fate is in Gods hands (reverse coded). Responsechoices are: strongly agree (1), agree (2), disagree (3), and strongly dis-agree (4). I averaged the items, with higher scores indicating a greater sense ofdivine control. Factor analysis confirms that each item loads highly on a singleunderlying construct; one factor was retained with an eigenvalue of 2.96 ( =.83).




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Subjective religiosity. One item asks: Overall, would you describe yourselfas (1) not religious at all, (2) slightly religious, (3) moderately religious,or (4) very religious?

Frequency of praying. One item asks: About how often do you pray?Response choices are: never (1), less than once a week (2), once a week(3), several times a week (4), once a day (5), and several times a day (6).

Frequency of attendance. One item asks about the frequency of attending reli-gious activities or services. Response choices are: never (1), once or twice inthe past year (2), once a month (3), 2 to 3 times a month (4), once a week(5), and several times a week or more (6).

Education. Education is coded as 8th grade or less (1), some high school butdid not graduate (2), high school graduate or GED (3), specialized (vocational)training (4), some college but no degree earned (5), associates degree (2-year)(6), college graduate (BA or BS) (7), and post graduateadvanced degree (MA,PhD) (8).

Personal income. Income is assessed with the question: For the complete yearof 2004, what was your total personal income, including income from all of yourpaid jobs, before taxes? In all analyses, income is logged to reduce the positiveskew caused by several outliers.

Occupation. Participants were asked about the title of the main job at whichyou worked last week. This question refers to the job at which participants spendthe most time. Participants were also asked about some of the main duties inorder to more accurately code responses. Using the open-ended information pro-vided, responses were coded into five main categories in accordance with theBureau of Labor Statistics codes. These include: professional, administrative,service, craft, and labor. In regression analyses, labor is the omitted refer-ence category.

Control measures. Gender is coded 1 for women and 0 for men. Age is codedin years. For participants race, I contrast Non-Hispanic White, with African-American and Other race (includes Hispanic, Asian, and other). Marital sta-tus is coded as married (1) versus all others (0). Religious affiliation is dummy-coded: Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Other Religion, and No Religion(the omitted/contrast code in analyses).3 Table 1 provides summary statistics.


3The distribution of religious affiliation/denomination (or religious family) is similar tothose found in two other recent nationally representative surveys of the United States: the2004 General Social Survey (53.0% Protestant, 23.4% Catholic, 2.0% Jewish, 7.2% otherreligion, and 14.4% no religious affiliation) and the 2005 Baylor Religion Survey (60.7%Protestant, 21.2% Catholic, 2.5% Jewish, 4.9% other religion, and 10.8% no religious affilia-tion). The Baylor survey may contain slightly more Protestants and slightly fewer individualswith no religion because it is specifically about religion; thus, when asked to participate ina survey specifically about religion, individuals who are more religious may tend to agree toparticipate slightly more than those who do not feel religious (see Bader, et al. 2007).



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Plan of Analyses Using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression techniques, model 1 regresses

personal control on divine control. Model 2 regresses personal control on sub-jective religiosity. Model 3 includes the belief in divine control and subjectivereligiosity simultaneously to assess potential suppression effects. Model 4 includesan interaction term between divine control and subjective religiosity in order toassess if the association between divine control and personal control varies acrosslevels of subjective religiosity. Model 5 adjusts for socioeconomic status to ruleout any potential spuriousness among the focal associations because of their rela-tionship with SES. Models 15 are repeated for praying and attendance.4 Allvariables in the interaction terms are centered; this reduces multicollinearitybetween the interaction coefficient and lower-order terms and increases the effi-ciency of the lower-order coefficient estimates (Mirowsky 1999).


4I repeat the same model 1 across Tables 2, 3, and 3 because of the different Ns in theanalyses for subjective religiosity (N = 1,714), frequency of praying (N = 1,795), and fre-quency of attendance (N = 1,791) The Ns change because of the exclusion of cases with miss-ing values on these measures.

TABLE 1

Summary Statistics for all Study Variables

Variable Mean SD Min Max

Sense of Personal Control .831 .452 .75***

2

Sense of Divine Control 2.728 .633 1 4

Subjective Religiosity 2.775 .894 1 4

Frequency of Praying 4.085 1.638 1 6

Frequency of Attendance 3.338 1.730 1 6

Education 5.185 1.946 1 8

Personal Income (Logged) 3.432 .831 .182 8.218

Professional .293 0 1

Administrative .351 0 1

Service .182 0 1

Craft .067 0 1

Labor .102 0 1

Women .590 0 1

White .739 0 1

African-American .152 0 1

Other Race .127 0 1

Age 43.51 13.205*

18 94

Married .549 0 1

Protestant .526 0 1

Catholic .232 0 1

Jewish .024 0 1

Other Religion .091 0 1

No Religion .126 0 1



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RESULTS

Subjective Religiosity, Belief in Divine Control, and the Sense of PersonalControl

Model 1 of Table 2 shows that belief in divine control is associated negative-ly with the sense of personal control. By contrast, model 2 suggests that subjec-


TABLE 2

Unstandardized Coefficients from OLS Regression of the Sense of Personal Control on

the Sense of Divine Control, Subjective Religiosity, Religiosity x Divine Control,Socioeconomic Status, and Basic Controls (Standard Errors in Parentheses, N = 1,714)

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5

Focal Associations

Divine Control - .081***

(.020)

-.123***

(.022)

.110***

(.022)

-.078***

(.022)

Religiosity .027*

(.014)

.066****

(.015)

- .068******

(.015)

- .060****

(.015)

Divine Control x Religiosity

.054****

(.017)

.040***

(.017)

Socioeconomic Status

Education .028***

(.007)

Income .062***

(.015)

Professional a

.114**

(.042)

Administrative a

.071

(.039)

Service a

.056

(.042)

Craft a

.069

(.052)

Basic Controls

Women -.046****

(.023)**

-.065****

(.023)**

.049***

(.023)**

.050***

(.023)**

.052***

(.024)**

African-American b

-.007*

(.033)

.025*

(.032)

.011**

(.033)**

.012**

(.033)**

.012**

(.032)**

Other Race b

.128******

(.034)**

.134*****

(.034)**

.130*****

(.033)**

.128*****

(.033)**

.120****

(.033)**

Age .004******

(.001)**

.004******

(.001)**

.005******

(.001)**

.005******

(.001)**

.006*****

(.001)**

Married - .010*****

(.023)**

- .093*****

(.023)**

- .090*****

(.023)**

- .089*****

(.023)**

-.056***

(.022)**

Protestant c

-.077*

(.039)

.020

(.040)

.025*

(.041)

.055*

(.041)

.025*

(.041)

Catholic c

.024

(.040)

.052

(.042)

.019

(.042)

.017

(.043)

.017

(.043)

Jewish c

.076*

(.079)

.063*

(.080)

.054*

(.079)

.075*

(.079)

.013*

(.077)

Other Religion c

.011

(.043)

.078

(.044)

.039

(.044)

.006

(.045)

.018

(.044)

Constant .963*

1.066*

1.034*

.987*

.670*

R2

.048 .040 .058 .063 .110

a Compared to Labor

b Compared to White

c Compared to No Religion/Religious Affiliation

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests)



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tive religiosity is unrelated to personal control. However, when I include divinecontrol and subjective religiosity simultaneously in model 3, the effect of subjec-tive religiosity becomes positive and significant at the .001 level. Several condi-tions contribute to this suppression effect. First, individuals who report higherlevels of subjective religiosity also tend to report higher levels of divine control(see Appendix). Second, model 3 indicates that divine control is associated neg-atively with personal control. These interrelationships suppress what would oth-erwise be a positive association between subjective religiosity and personal con-trol. That is, once I take into account the positive association between subjectivereligiosity and divine control, a net positive association between religiosity andpersonal control emerges.

The suppression effect, however, is only one component of the story. Asmodel 4 indicates, there is also a positive and significant interaction effectbetween divine control and subjective religiosity. Figure 1 illustrates these effects:The negative association between divine control and personal control is strongeramong individuals who self-identify as less religious. However, among those whoself-identify as highly religious, the belief in divine control is unrelated to per-sonal control. Model 5 of Table 2 indicates that education, income, and profes-sional occupations are each associated positively with personal control. Theinclusion of these SES conditions has little influence on the overall main andinteraction effects of divine control and subjective religiosity.


FIGURE 1

The Association between Beliefs in Divine Control and Levels of

the Sense of Personal Control at Different Levels of Subjective Religiosity

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

1.1

1.2

-1.8 -1.5 -1.2 -0.9 -0.6 -0.3 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2

Sense of Divine Control

Sense o

f P

ers

onal C

ontr

ol

not religious

slightly religious

moderately religious

very religious



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Praying, Belief in Divine Control, and the Sense of Personal ControlModel 1 of Table 3 reiterates the negative divine control-personal control

association. By contrast, model 2 indicates that the frequency of praying is unre-


TABLE 3


the Sense of Divine Control, Praying, Divine Control x Praying, Socioeconomic Status,and Basic Controls (Standard Errors in Parentheses, N = 1,795)


Focal Associations

Divine Control --.079***

(.019)

-.115***

(.021)

-.107***

(.022)

-.073**

(.021)

Praying .010*

(.007)

.029****

(.008)

- .033******

(.008)

- .031****

(.008)

Divine Control x Praying .029****

(.010)

.022***

(.010)


Education .026***

(.006)

Income .065***

(.015)

Professional a

.110**

(.042)

Administrative a

-.058

-(.038)

Service a

-.031

-(.041)

Craft a

-.070

(.051)

Basic Controls

Women -.046****

(.023)**

.066****

(.023)**

.055***

(.023)**

.057***

(.023)**

.055***

(.024)**

African-American b

-.002*

(.032)

.031*

(.032)

.005**

(.032)**

.011**

(.032)**

.005**

(.032)**

Other Race b

.126******

(.033)**

.130*****

(.033)**

.125*****

(.033)**

.124*****

(.033)**

.114****

(.032)**

Age .004******

(.001)**

.004******

(.001)**

.005******

(.001)**

.005******

(.001)**

.006*****

(.001)**

Married - .098*****

(.022)**

- .094*****

(.022)**

- .095*****

(.022)**

- .095*****

(.022)**

- .061****

(.022)**

Protestant c

--.084**

(.037)

-.007*

(.036)

.066*

(.037)

.086**

(.038)

.058*

(.037)

Catholic c

.028

(.039)

.028

(.038)

.015

(.039)

.042

(.040)

.010

(.039)

Jewish c

.059*

(.076)

.058*

(.076)

.063*

(.076)

.070*

(.076)

.019*

(.074)

Other Religion c

.026

(.040)

.045

(.040)

.006

(.041)

.028

(.041)

.018

(.041)

Constant .968*

1.052*

1.012*

.983*

.670*

R2

.046 .037 .053 .057 .107

a Compared to Labor

b Compared to White





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lated to personal control. However, the simultaneous inclusion of divine controland praying in model 3 causes the association between praying and personal con-trol to become positive and significant at the .001 level. As I reported for sub-jective religiosity, several interrelationships play a role in this suppression effect.Individuals who pray more frequently tend to report higher levels of divine con-trol (see Appendix). Moreover, divine control is associated negatively with per-sonal control. Taken together, these interrelationships suppress what would oth-erwise be a positive association between praying and personal control. Afteraccounting for the positive relationship between praying and divine control,there is a net positive relationship between praying and the generalized sense ofpersonal control.

In model 4, I observe a positive and statistically significant interaction effectbetween the belief in divine control and the frequency of praying. Figure 2 illus-trates these effects: The negative association between belief in divine control andpersonal control is stronger among individuals who infrequently or never pray.However, there is a weaker (or nonexistent) association between divine controland personal control among individuals who pray frequently. Moreover, theadjustments for SES in model 5 reduce the main and interaction effects of divinecontrol and praying only slightly and each effect remains statistically significant.

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

1.1

-1.8 -1.3 -0.8 -0.3 0.2 0.7 1.2


Se

nse

of

Pe

rso

na

l C

on

tro

l

never prays

prays once a week

prays once a day

FIGURE 2


the Sense of Personal Control at Different Frequencies of Praying



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Attendance, Belief in Divine Control, and the Sense of Personal Control While the belief in divine control is associated negatively with the sense of

personal control (see model 1 of Table 4), the frequency of attendance is unre-lated to personal control. Although individuals who attend more frequently


TABLE 4


the Sense of Divine Control, Attendance, Divine Control x Attendance, andSocioeconomic Status, and Basic Controls (Standard Errors in Parentheses, N = 1,791)


Focal Associations

Divine Control -.079***

(.019)

-.090***

(.020)

-.082***

(.021)

.048*

(.020)

Attendance .001*

(.007)

.011*

(.007)

- .009***

(.007)

-.007***

(.007)

Divine Control x Attendance

.023***

(.010)

.017**

(.010)


Education .027***

(.007)

Income .065***

-(.015)

Professional a

.119**

-(.042)

Administrative a

--.069

--(.039)

Service a

--.044

--(.041)

Craft a

--.079

--(.051)

Basic Controls

Women -.049****

(.023)**

.063****

(.023)**

.049***

(.023)**

.048***

(.023)**

.050***

(.024)**

African-American b

-.002*

(.032)

.026**

(.032)**

.004**

(.033)**

.004**

(.033)**

.001**

(.032)**

Other Race b

.121******

(.033)**

.125*****

(.033)**

.124*****

(.033)**

.124*****

(.033)**

.113****

(.032)**

Age .004******

(.001)**

.004******

(.001)**

.004******

(.001)**

.004******

(.001)**

.006*****

(.001)**

Married - .097*****

(.022)**

- .094*****

(.022)**

- .092*****

(.022)**

- .093*****

(.022)**

- .059****

(.022)**

Protestant c

- .084**

(.037)

-.021*

(.037)

.070*

(.038)

.088**

(.039)

.061*

(.038)

Catholic c

.028

(.039)

.021

(.039)

.016

(.040)

.039

(.041)

.007

(.040)

Jewish c

.060*

(.076)

.057*

(.076)

.052*

(.076)

.062*

(.076)

.010*

(.076)

Other Religion c

.029

(.041)

.028

(.041)

.016

(.042)

.037

(.043)

.028

(.042)

Constant .970*

1.032*

.991*

.958*

.635*

R2

.045 .035 .046 .049 .100

a Compared to Labor

b Compared to White





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report higher average levels of divine control (see Appendix), the simultaneousinclusion of divine control and attendance in model 3 fails to increase the atten-dance coefficient to statistical significance. That is, even after accounting for thepositive relationship between attendance and divine control, there is a net nullrelationship between attendance and personal control. The weaker associationbetween attendance and divine control (compared to religiosity and praying)contributes to the lack of suppression effects that were observed in Tables 2 and3.

In model 4, I document a positive and significant interaction effect betweendivine control and attendance. Figure 3 illustrates these effects: The negativeassociation between belief in divine control and personal control is strongeramong individuals who infrequently or never attend religious services. However,there is a weak or nonexistent association between divine control and personalcontrol among individuals who attend more frequently. Moreover, the adjust-ments for SES in model 5 reduce the main effect of divine control, and the inter-action effect between divine control and attendance is no longer statistically sig-nificant.5

DISCUSSION

This study addressed a long-standing question: Is the belief in divine controlassociated with the sense of personal control? The present study makes threemain contributions: (1) it assesses the association between divine control andpersonal control among a large 2005 survey of American adults; (2) it documentsand describes the net and contingent influences of the religious role in that asso-ciation; and (3) it accounts for the potential spurious influence of the centraldimensions of socioeconomic status. Overall, individuals who believe in divinecontrol tend to report lower levels of personal control. This pattern is consistentwith the relinquished control hypothesis. However, the negative associationbetween divine control and personal control is stronger among individuals whoreport low levels of subjective religiosity and less frequent praying and attendanceactivity. By contrast, divine control and personal control are unrelated amongindividuals who are more deeply invested in and committed to the religious role.


5It is important to note that there are many individuals who are weakly committed to thereligious role but simultaneously endorse divine control items. For example, 50 percent ofthose who describe themselves as not religious at all or slightly religious score at or abovethe mean on the divine control index. Likewise, 39 percent of people who report that theynever or rarely pray score at or above the mean on the divine control index. Finally, 67 per-cent of those who never attend or attend only 1-2 times per year score at or above the meanon the divine control index. Collectively, these observations indicate that substantial num-bers of individuals who report low levels of subjective religiosity or infrequent praying andattendance activity maintain beliefs about Gods determinative influence in everyday life.



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My findings both reinforce and refine prior claims that the strong belief inGod as a causal agent requires relinquishing a sense of personal or internal con-trol (Jackson and Coursey 1988:399). Although earlier conceptual specifica-tions of Rotters (1966) I-E scale had distinguished between the chance/power-ful other and God control dimensions of the external pole of the continuum,my observations imply a correspondence between the belief in divine control anda lower sense of personal control. However, the fact that the negative associationis not observed among individuals who are more committed to the religious roleis consistent with prior research that found no association between attributionsto divine interaction and the sense of control among samples of highly religiousindividuals (Ritzema 1979). By contrast, my findings do not reinforce prior stud-ies which have found that the religiously committed tend to experience astronger positive association between God control and personal control(Furnham 1982). It is plausible that those who are more deeply religious tend tobelieve that God controls everything and that He also bestows the faithful withfree will. Yet, the evidence does not support the personal empowerment hypoth-esis (irrespective of the religious role). Thus, individuals who believe in divinecontrol but who do not engage in other aspects of the religious role may be moredeferring to God in their orientation. This scenario is consistent with the relin-quished control view. Either way, these observations underscore that the associa-tion between divine control and personal control is contingent upon the reli-

RELIGIOUS ROLE AND SENSE OF PERSONAL CONTROL 289FIGURE 3


the Sense of Personal Control at Different Frequencies of Religious Attendance

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

1.1

1.2

-1.8 -1.5 -1.2 -0.9 -0.6 -0.3 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2


Sense o

f P

ers

onal C

ontr

ol

never attends

attends 1-2 times/year

attends once/week



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gious role. Believers who endorse God as a causal agent in their lives but who failto simultaneously enact the other salient aspects of religious role tend to have thelowest levels of personal control.

These findings also speak directly to Mirowsky and Rosss (2003a:200) claimthat the external attribution of control to God acts as a logical opposite of inter-nal control: either I control my life or control rests elsewhere. The mental rep-resentation of a powerful and controlling God contradicts a central element ofpersonal control theory: The individualnot a powerful otherdeterminesevents and outcomes in his or her own life. Is the causal attribution of life eventsand outcomes to God simply the same as the attribution to other external forcessuch as luck, chance, or powerful others? If it were, then I should have observedthat believers in divine control have the lowest personal control. My findingssuggest some support for this pattern, but only among individuals who are notdevoted to other dimensions of the religious role. By contrast, individuals whobelieve in divine control and maintain a strong devotion to the religious rolereport levels of personal control similar to nonbelievers. For them, causal attri-butions to God may be meaningfully distinct from external attributions and rep-resent a personally empowering orientation.

As I noted above, evidence about the association between the belief indivine control and the sense of personal control has been mixed, with some stud-ies documenting negative, positive, or null associations. However, the observedinteraction between divine control and other dimensions of the religious role ina socioeconomically diverse sample of the United States provides insights aboutthe mixed findings of prior research. Variations in methodologies, study designs,and analytic strategies may have contributed to these mixed results. For example,studies that have examined data from religious samples will likely have insuffi-cient variation in the conditions that represent important contingencies: subjec-tive religiosity and the frequency of praying and attendance at religious services.That is, the more homogenous samples are with respect to religious role dimen-sions, the more difficult it is to accurately specify the association between beliefin divine control and personal control across levels of other indicators of the reli-gious role. The suppression and interaction effects that I have documented indi-cate that samples of exclusively religious individuals will misrepresent the associ-ation. Moreover, my observations suggest that many individuals maintain beliefsabout Gods determinative influence in everyday life even if they are notinvolved in the religious role. The exclusion of such individuals from analyseswill yield two problems: (1) a failure to document that these individuals tend toreport the lowest levels of personal control; and (2) the association betweendivine control and personal control is artificially inflated in the positive direc-tion.

Several other findings, especially the observed suppression patterns, deserveattention because they speak in subtle ways to the predictions of the relinquishedcontrol and personal empowerment hypotheses. Specifically, the findings indi-




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cate that the negative association between divine control and personal controlsuppresses an otherwise positive association between some dimensions of the reli-gious role and personal control. To some degree, and paradoxically, these findingsboth confirm and challenge the critical tradition of scholarship that has under-scored the deleterious personal and social consequences of religiosity. The pat-terns confirm the critical (relinquished control) view because I have observed anoverall negative association between divine control and personal control.However, these findings also challenge those same critical perspectives by show-ing that when individuals possess the same level of the belief in divine control,individuals who are more strongly devoted to the religious role tend to reporthigher levels of the sense of personal controlpatterns that support the person-al empowerment thesis.

Some Caveats and Future Research DirectionsOne of the most glaring limitations of the present research involves causal

ordering. I acknowledge that it is not possible to make definitive claims about thecausal ordering among the focal measures. For example, it is plausible that thegeneralized sense of personal control influences beliefs about the causal role ofGod in everyday affairs. People who feel powerless in their daily lives may turnto God in order to explain the events and outcomes of their daily lives. While Iacknowledge that this is a distinct possibility, it does not negate the likelihoodthat some substantial and important part of the association flows from beliefsabout divine control to the sense of personal control. Prior theory and evidencehelps bolster that claim. Most previous research about the availability hypothe-sis implicates the importance of religion in specific situations for the ways thatindividuals invoke of religious-based causal attributions. In my view, there isroom for theoretical development in this areaespecially a theory of the senseof divine control. In those efforts, I argue that it is critical that scholars focus lesson situation-specific instances (i.e., God did or did not have a role in my gettinga job promotion or getting a divorce) and more on the generalized sense of divinecontrol. It seems more plausible, at least for those highly devoted to and involvedin the religious role, that God is always present, always available. The faithfuldo not simply switch on or off the extent of Gods influence. Instead, they maybelieve that God decides the parameters of all events and outcomes. These ideasconnect with more recent theoretical perspectives on the proximity of Godsinfluence for believers causal explanations (Weeks and Lupfer 2000).

Another direction for future investigation involves the analysis of the relax,God is in control hypothesis. Anecdotal accounts commonly observed in onlineforums or religious media suggest that the belief that God controls the events andoutcomes in daily life should put the faithful at ease. Is this accurate? Althoughstudies of undergraduate (often psychology) students and members of religiouscongregations have provided a rich foundation of research over the past severaldecades, it is essential that sociologists and others begin to address these ques-




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tions in representative samples of religiously and socioeconomically diverse indi-viduals. These efforts can contribute to a more accurate assessment of the com-plex link between the sense of divine control and emotional well-being in the gen-eral population. Comparisons across levels of commitment to the religious role areessential, especially if some of the patterns of association are contingent uponinvolvement in the religious role. Individuals who believe in divine control butwho are the least committed to other dimensions of the religious role may reportthe poorest mental health. Moreover, the association between the belief indivine control and mental health may be mediated and/or moderated by thesense of personal control. One scenario is that the belief in divine control is ben-eficial for mental health among individuals who also maintain a sense of person-al control. Alternatively, the belief in divine control may have especially nega-tive emotional consequences for those who do not possess a sense of personalcontrol. These questions remain ripe for future analyses that investigate repre-sentative samples of religiously and socioeconomically diverse adults.

Despite the strengths of the present studys design, it is also worth discussingthree potential implications of the focus solely on working adults: (1) To theextent that the involuntarily unemployed have a lower sense of personal control,their exclusion likely inflates the overall average of the sense of personal controlin this sample. (2) To the extent that the retired have a lower sense of personalcontrol (likely attributable in part to older age), the overall average sense of per-sonal control is elevated in this sample. (3) To the extent that these groups mighthave lower SES characteristics, it is likely that the average level of the sense ofdivine control is lower in this sample than it would be if the unemployed wereincluded. Thus, collectively, one could argue that the exclusion of the unem-ployed and retired might actually cause an underestimation of the overall associ-ation between the sense of divine control and personal control in this sample.Future research can address these concerns by replicating these analyses with anationally representative sample that includes working and nonworking adults ofall ages.

Finally, it is critical to underscore that the vast and diverse array of mentalrepresentations of God require caution in the interpretation of survey questionsabout beliefs about divine control. It is well-documented that individuals acrossand within particular faiths often maintain different beliefs about God. Althoughthere is a rich tradition of research that has effectively conceptualized and oper-ationalized religious concepts with survey items, a great deal of complexity andmeaning is potentially ignored or disregarded in the process of standardization.Here, qualitative research can extend knowledge on this issue and offer innova-tive directions for survey research. At the same time, however, some may arguethat there is a general consensus or intersubjectivity about the role of God ineveryday life; that is, the meaning of statements about Gods will or plan tendto converge. Theological accounts, many of which find their way into the main-stream media to explain major events (e.g., 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina), rein-




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force the notion of a God who is personally involved in worldly affairs. Althoughthis does not imply absolute uniformity in beliefs about divine control, it doessuggest that such beliefs remain pervasive and resonate with much of the popu-lation.

CONCLUSION

Is the belief in divine control personally empowering or do individuals whorelinquish control to God feel powerless to control their own fates? Long ago,James ([1902] 1999:54) tapped into this theme: There is a state of mind, knownto religious men, but to no others, in which the will to assert ourselves and holdour own has been displaced by a willingness to close our mouths and be as noth-ing in the floods and waterspouts of God. The answer depends on other compo-nents of the religious role. Individuals who profess a stronger belief in divine con-trol tend to report a lower sense of personal control only if they also report lessfrequent praying and attendance activities and lower subjective religiosity. Forthose more strongly devoted, belief in divine control is unrelated to personal con-trol. Collectively, these findings reinforce and refine a tradition of scholarshipabout the complex interplay between religious precepts, practices, and feelings ofpersonal potency.

APPENDIXCorrelations among Focal Variables

Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 71. Sense of Personal Control ..1.00*2. Sense of Divine Control - .10 1.003. Subjective Religiosity -.02 .-.56* - 1.004. Frequency of Praying -.00 .-.56* .-.57* -1.005. Frequency of Attendance -.01 - .46 - .59 - .47 1.006. Education -.21 -.18 - .01 -.05 .. .03 1.007. Income -.18 -.16 -.03 -.07 -.07 ...36 1.008. Professional Occupation -.15 -.09 -.02 -.03 - .01 - ..47.. .309. Administrative Occupation - .02 -.01 -.01 - .00 -.02 -.02 .0710. Service Occupation - .10 .. .11* .. .06* .. .11* .. .08* -.24 .26 11. Craft Occupation - \ .00 . .01* . .00* -.02 -.04 .18 .03 12. Labor Occupation - .07 . . .00 * .. .04* -.09 -.06 .23 .04

Note: All coefficients .05 are statistically significant at the .05 level.




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Documents

2008-The Religious Role and the Sense of Control