2008 Cases

Republic of the Philippines v. RoyalesG.R. No. 168742September 3, 2008

FACTS:

On July 7, 1970, the Director of Lands filed a cadastral case in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Camarines Sur for several parcels of land to be declared as public land. Norma Royales was a claimant of the said lots. Subsequently, a notice was published in the Official Gazette.

On September 17, 1975, the CFI ruled in favour of Royales and ordered the registration of the lots in her name. However, before the certificate of the finality of the decision and the order of the issuance of the decree of registration could be issued by the court, the Registry of Deeds of Camarines Sur was razed by fire, burning all the titles and documents therein.

After about 27 years, herein respondent filed a petition for the reconstitution of the CFI decision in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camarines Sur. The RTC then set a date for the hearing without directing the respondent to cause the publication of the said order in the Official Gazette. Subsequently, the RTC granted the petition and ordered the reconstitution of the 1975 decision.

The Republic of the Philippines appealed to the CA, which upheld the decision of the RTC. A motion for reconsideration was also denied, ruling that held that publication was no longer required because the CFI, through the Land Registration Commission (predecessor of the LRA), had already caused the publication of the order in the Official Gazette.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication was necessary for the court to acquire jurisdiction over a petition for reconstitution of a final and executory decision in a cadastral case.

HELD:

Yes, publication is an indispensible requirement in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter.

The action is one of a cadastral proceeding as it was initiated by the Republic of the Philippines and this remains to be the case despite the earlier ruling of the CFI in favor of respondent since the decree of registration has not yet been issued. This means the case remains to be a pending cadastral case. The pertinent provision, therefore, is Section 10 of Act 3110 which applies to the reconstitution of a pending cadastral action, a distinct kind of land registration process. It provides:

SEC. 10. Pending cadastral case shall be reconstituted as follows:The Court shall issue an order directing the person interested to file anew their replies, for which purpose reasonable time may be allowed. The order shall be published in the Official Gazette and by local notices during a period fixed in said order.

Consequently, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over respondents petition for reconstitution for failing to comply with the publication requirement.

However, this does not mean that the cadastral case should be filed anew. What the respondent has to do is to file the petition for reconstitution anew and observe the requirements under Section 10 of Act 3110. Considering that there is already a final decision in her favor, the case can continue and the court, if proper, may order the issuance of a decree of registration.Pasio vs. MonterroyoG.R. No. 159494July 31, 2008

FACTS:

Petitioners filed an action for recovery of possession and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, against the respondents. The petitioners alleged that the subject land was occupied, cultivated and cleared by Laureano Pasio in 1933 and that the land was part of the 24-hectare public land, which was later declared alienable and disposable. Also, they alleged that Laureano filed a homestead application over the entire 24-hectare land and the same was approved by the Director of Lands on in 1941. Laureano died in 1950. Thereafter, the Director of Lands ordered the issuance of a homestead patent in his favor. However, the heirs of Laureano did not receive the order. Consequently, the land was not registered under Laureanos name or under that of his heirs.

Between 1949 and 1954, a cadastral survey was conducted and found that the subject land was divided by a creek into two portions, identified as Lot No. 2138 and Lot No. 2139. Petitioners contended that they continuously possessed and cultivated both lots. Jose Pasio, the son of Laureano, secured a title in his name for Lot No. 2138 and later disposed of Lot No. 2139 in favor of his children (petitioners in this case) who, in 1994, simultaneously filed applications for grant of Free Patent Titles over their respective shares of Lot No. 2139 before the Land Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The latter granted the applications and issued an Original Certificate of Title in favor of the petitioners, who alleged that their possession of Lot No. 2139 was interrupted in 1993 when respondents forcibly took possession of the property.

Respondents contended that they had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject lot by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest for over 30 years or since July 10, 1949. Furthermore, the respondents alleged that Jose was not the owner of Lot No. 2139 and as such, he could not sell the land to his children. They claimed that petitioners OCTs were null and void for having been procured in violation of the Public Land Act and that the Land Management Bureau had no authority to issue the free patent titles because Lot No. 2139 was a private land.

The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents stating that as of January 1994, Lot No. 2139 had already acquired the character of a private land by operation of law thus the Land Management Bureau had no power or authority to dispose of it by issuing free patent titles. According to the trial court, the order for the issuance of a patent in favor of Laureano lapsed and became functus officio when it was not registered. Also, trial court found that the respondents were in physical, open, public, adverse and continuous possession of the disputed lot in the concept of owner for at least 30 years prior to petitioners application for free patent titles over the land. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject land had already become a private land prior to petitioners application for free patent titles filed in 1994

HELD:

The Court ruled in favor of the respondents. In Director of Lands vs. IAC (146 SCRA 509 , 1986), the Court held that alienable public land held by a possessor, continuously or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period of 30 years is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period, ipso jure.The Court stated that once a homestead patent is registered in accordance with law, the certificate of title issued by virtue of the patent has the force and effect of a Torrens title issued under the land registration law. In this case, the issuance of a homestead patent in 1952 in favor of Laureano was not registered hence rendered it functus officio under Sec. 103 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Furthermore, considering that petitioners application for free patent titles was filed only in 1994, when Lot No. 2139 had already become private land ipso jure, the Land Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to entertain petitioners application.Finally, according to the Court, the factual findings of the trial court and the CA support that the respondents were able to establish that they have a better right to the subject land since they had long been in possession of the property in the concept of owners, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest. Therefore, despite the irrevocability of the Torrens titles issued in their names and even if they are already the registered owners under the Torrens system, petitioners may still be compelled under the law to reconvey the property to respondents.

DEHEZA-INAMARGA v. ALANOG.R. No. 171321December 18, 2008 FACTS:Tomas Alano, husband of respondent Celenia Alano, owned two parcelsof land covered by Original Certificates of Title (OCT). He mortgaged the properties in favor of Renato Gepty on September 20, 1972. In 1976, Gepty demanded that Tomas pay the loan. Tomas, however, did not have money at that time to redeem his properties so he sought help from his niece, petitioner Mary Ann Deheza-Inamarga. Petitioner agreed to pay the loan while the spouses, in turn, mortgaged said properties to her. Petitioner kept in her possession Original Certificates of Title (OCT) and asked the spouses to sign blank pieces of paper which petitioner said will be converted into receipts evidencing their indebtedness to her.In November 1990, after Tomas had passed away, respondents Celenia and her children went to petitioner to redeem the property. Petitioner, however, told them that she had mortgaged the property to the Rural Bankof Libacao. Respondents verified the matter with the bank and discovered that OCT have been cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-9080 and T-9081 were issued in petitioners name. Respondents learned that the TCTs in petitioners favor were issued by virtue of a Deed of Sale purportedly executed by the Spouses Alano in her favor.On January 24, 1991, respondents filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of document, reconveyance and damagesagainst petitioner and the Rural Bank of Libacao. Respondents contended that the deed of sale is null and void because the signatures of the Spouses Alano were forged and even if they were the signatures of the spouses, they were affixed on blank sheets of paper which were not intended to be a deed of sale.Petitioner, on the other hand, denied the allegation of forgeryand maintained that the deed of sale was valid. She claimed that the spouses offered to sell her the property so they can use the purchase priceofP7,000 to redeem the property from Gepty. Petitioner added that the action is barred by prescription, laches and estoppel.On November 26, 1998, the RTC rendered its decision in favour of the respondents. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but her appeal was denied. The Court of appeals affirmed in toto the RTCs decision. Thus, a petition for review oncertiorariassailing the decision of the Court of Appeals is filedISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Deed of Sale is a forgery; (2) Whether or not the transaction between petitioner and the Spouses Alano is one of sale or equitable mortgage; and (3) Whether or not respondents action is already barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.

HELD:1. After a careful perusal of the records and a thorough consideration, the Court finds sufficient basis for the finding of the Court of Appeals that the said signatures were indeed forged, signatures on the deed of sale appeared to be different in characteristics, spacing and strokes from the signatures of the Spouses Alano. The question of forgery is one of fact.It is well-settled that when supported by substantial evidence or borne out by the records, the findings of fact of the trial court and Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court. 2. The Court sustained the decision of the trial court holding that the transaction between the parties is an equitable mortgage. An equitable mortgage is one which, although lacking in some formality, or form, or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute, nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge real property as security for a debt and contains nothing impossible or contrary to law. In the instant case it is correctly found that more than one of the circumstances enumerated in Article 1602 are present, to wit: the inadequacy of the selling price of the properties in relation to its true value; the vendors (Spouses Alano) remained in possession as lessee or otherwise; respondents paid the real property taxes; and the spouses secured the payment of the principal debt owed to petitioner with said properties.On this score, the Court ruled that the parties intended an equitable mortgage and not a contract of sale.3. Where there is no consent given by one party in a purported contract, such contract was not perfected; therefore, there is no contract to speak of. The deed of sale relied upon by petitioner is deemed a void contract. This being so, the action based on said deed of sale shall not prescribe in accordance with Article 1410 of the Civil Code.Lucasan v. Philippine Deposit Insurance CorporationG.R. No. 176929July 4, 2008

FACTS:

Spouses Lucasan were owners of 2 lots situated in Bacolod City. In 1979, Pacific Banking Corporation (PBC) extended a P5, 000.00 loan to Lucasan, with Benares as co-maker, which they failed to pay when it became due and demandable. As a consequence, PBC filed a collection case with the RTC of Bacolod. The RTC rendered a decision ordering Lucasan and Bernales to pay PBC. Lucasan failed to pay the monetary award, thus, to satisfy the judgment, the RTC issued a writ of execution directing the sheriff to effect the levy on the properties owned by Lucasan and sell the same at public auction. A Notice of Embargo was issued by the sheriff in 1981, which was annotated on the Transfer Certificate of Title covering the two properties of Lucasan. Annotations as prior encumbrances on the same titles were the mortgages in favor of two more banks, executed to secure Lucasans loans with said banks.

On May 13, 1981, the lots were sold at public auction and were awarded to PBC as highest bidder. A certificate of sale was executed in its favor, registered and annotated on the titles on June 5, 1981. Mortgagee banks did not assail the auction sale nor did Lucasan and the mortgagee banks redeemed the properties within the redemption period. PBC, on the other hand, did not file a petition for consolidation of ownership.

In 1997, Lucasan wrote to PDIC, PBCs receiver and liquidator, seeking the cancellation of the certificate of sale and offered to pay PBCs claim against him. PDIC denied the request stating that it was already beyond the redemption period. Lucasan then filed a petition denomicated as declaratory relief seeking confirmation of his rights provided in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the 1964 Rules of Court in relation to Section 75 of PD 1529. PDIC moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action. RTC granted PDICs motion. Lucasan filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the RTC. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling, declaring that Lucasan already lost his right of redemption when he failed to exercise it within prescribed period. The effect of such failure was to vest in PBC absolute ownership over said properties.

ISSUE:

Is the annotations regarding the notice of embargo and certificate of sale beclouded the validity and efficacy of Lucasans title which would warrant an action for quieting of title under Rule 63 of the 1964 Rules of Court.

HELD:

No.

Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud of doubt or uncertainty with respect to real property. The Civil Code authorizes the said remedy in the following language:

ART. 476. Whenever there is cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.

ART. 477. The plaintiff must have legal and equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject-matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property.

To avail of the remedy of quieting of title, two (2) indispensable requisites must concur, name: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Stated differently, the plaintiff must show that he has a legal or at least an equitable title over the real property in dispute, and that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity.

Unfortunately, the foregoing requisites are wanting in this case.

Admittedly, the subject parcels of land were levied upon by virtue if a writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 12188. On May 13, 1981, a public auction of the subject parcels of land was held and the lots were awarded to PBC as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale in favor of PBC was issued on the same day, and was registered and annotated on TCT Nos. T-68115 and T-13816 as Entry No. 112552 on June 5, 1981.

Under the 1964 Rules of Court, which were in effect at that time, the judgment debtor or redemptioner had the right to redeem the property from PBC within twelve (12) months from the registration of certificate of sale. With the expiration of the twelve-month period of redemption and no redemption having been made, as in this case, the judgment debtor or redemptioner lost whatever right he had over the land in question.

Lucasan admitted that he failed to redeem the properties within the redemption period, on account of his then limited financial situation. It was only in January 1997 or fifteen (15) years later that he manifested his desire to reacquire the properties. Clearly thus, he had lost whatever right he had over Lot Nos. 1500-A and 229-E.

Spouses Santos v. Heirs of LustreG.R. No. 151016August 6, 2008

FACTS: Lustre owned a lot which she mortgaged and later on sold to Natividad Santos, who subsequently sold it to her son Froilan for which a TCT was issued in his name. Lustres heirs Macaspac and Maniquiz filed with RTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija a Complaint for Declaration of the Inexistence of Contract, Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and Damages against Froilan Santos. Lustres other heirs filed a Complaint for Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title and Deed of Absolute Sale against spouses Santos, Froilan Santos, R Transport Corp, Cecilia Macaspac with the same RTC. Macaspac was impleaded as defendant in the 2nd case because she refused to join the other heirs as plaintiffs. Alleging that the plaintiffs right of action for annulment of the Deed of Sale and TCT had long prescribed and was barred by laches, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, also on the ground of litis pendentia. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. They then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed the petition for lack of merit. ISSUE:Whether or not prescription or laches apply.HELD: The action for reconveyance on the ground that the certificate of title was obtained by means of a fictitious deed of sale is virtually an action for the declaration of its nullity, which does not prescribe. Moreover, a person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years. And in such case, the prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. Otherwise, if plaintiff is in possession of the property, prescription does not commence to run against him. Thus, when an action for reconveyance is nonetheless filed, it would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible. It follows then that the respondents present action should not be barred by laches. Laches is a doctrine in equity, which may be used only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law. Obviously, it cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right.

Eagle Realty Corporation v. Republic of the PhilippinesG.R. No. 151424July 4, 2008

FACTS:

On May 21, 1963, the spouses Casiano de Leon and Maria Socorro de Leon filed with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal an application for registration of Lots 1 and 2, Plan Psu-173022-B, located at Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal. The case was raffled to Branch II presided over by Judge Pedro C. Navarro and docketed as LRC Case No. N-4140. On December 11, 1979, the CFI rendered a decision in favor of Casiano de Leon and his children, namely, Esmeralda, Rosario Rodriguez, Bernardita, and Cesario.

Another decision, similar to the De Leon Decision but adjudicating the property to a certain Martina G. Medina, was surreptitiously inserted in the records of the LRC. Medina Decision, was similarly dated December 11, 1979 and purportedly signed by Judge Pedro C. Navarro. Likewise inserted in the records of the LRC was the Order for the Issuance of the Decree dated February 14, 1980, also bearing what purports to be the signature of Judge Pedro C. Navarro, with a Certification dated February 17, 1980 by Clerk of Court Nicanor G. Salaysay, attesting that the decision has not been supplemented, amended or otherwise modified. Pursuant to these documents, Hon. Oscar R. Victoriano, then Acting Land Registration Commissioner, issued Decree of Registration No. N-188044. In accordance with this Decree, the Register of Deeds of Pasay City issued OCT No. 129 on July 7, 1983 in the name of a Martina G. Medina.

Medina later exchanged the property for a 3,000-hectare parcel of land in Norzagaray, Bulacan owned by Pilarita Reyes through a Deed of Exchange dated September 12, 1983. On November 2, 1983, OCT No. 129 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 74216 issued in the name of Reyes. Thereafter, through a Deed of Sale dated February 22, 1984, Reyes sold the property to petitioner for P1,200,000.00. On March 1, 1984, TCT No. 74216 was cancelled, and TCT No. 78982 was issued in petitioners name.

Cesario de Leon discovered that OCT No. 129 was issued to Martina G. Medina. The De Leons sent a letter-complaint to the LRC asking for an investigation on the matter. This was referred to Atty. Manuel Panis, Chief of the Inspection and Investigation Division of the LRC. In a report dated July 20, 1984, Atty. Panis concluded that the Medina Decision and the Order for the Issuance of Decree dated February 14, 1980 were fake. He then recommended that the appropriate action be filed for the nullification of OCT No. 129 and its derivative titles TCT No. 74216 in the name of Pilarita Reyes, and TCT No. 78982 in the name of petitioner Eagle Realty Corporation.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Acting Land Registration Commissioner, filed a complaint for Annulment of Judgment and Cancellation of Decree and Titles against Martina G. Medina, Pilarita Reyes and petitioner Eagle Realty Corporation.

The complaint alleged that the LRC received a copy of the De Leon Decision but this was surreptitiously substituted with the Medina Decision, together with the Order for the Issuance of the Decree dated February 14, 1980, in the LRC records. It further alleged that the LRC, unaware of any irregularity, issued OCT No. 129 to Martina Medina on the basis of these fake documents.

Medina averred that she purchased the property from Justino de Leon on March 5, 1973. Justino, in turn, acquired this property from Casiano and Maria de Leon on October 29, 1971 through a Deed of Absolute Sale. Eagle Realty Corporation alleged, inter alia, as affirmative defenses, that (a) the Republic of the Philippines is not the real party-in-interest since the subject property is private, (b) the one-year prescriptive period within which to seek a review of a decree of registration has already lapsed, and (c) it is a buyer in good faith and for value. Petitioner also filed a cross-claim against Pilarita Reyes to seek reimbursement for the purchase price and the Register of Deeds to hold the Assurance Fund liable in case Reyes fails to pay. Later, petitioner filed a third-party complaint against the National Treasurer of the Philippines, the public officer entrusted with the payment of claims against the Assurance Fund.

Pilarita Reyes interposed the same defenses as the petitioner. She further claimed that she had no knowledge of any infirmity in Medinas title and that she entered into the Deed of Exchange in good faith and for value. As for the petitioners cross-claim, she averred that she acted in good faith in selling the property to petitioner. Heirs of Casiano and Maria de Leon filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene which the trial court granted. On July 19, 1985, they filed a Complaint-in-Intervention praying that judgment be rendered in accordance with the prayer alleged in the complaint and, in addition, order defendants jointly and severally to pay intervenors actual, moral and nominal damages, attorneys fees plus legal interest. RTC ruled in favor of the private respondents Heirs of De Leon. On appeal, the CA, affirmed the RTC decision with modifications.

The CA held that the complaint is actually an action for the annulment of a certificate of title, not for annulment of judgment as alleged by petitioner; hence, the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction. It also upheld the LRCs personality to institute the complaint based on Section 100 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 in order to protect the Assurance Fund from being held accountable by the private respondents for the erroneous issuance of a certificate of title to Medina. It dismissed the issue on prescription, ratiocinating that an action to declare the nullity of a void title does not prescribe and, moreover, prescription does not run against the State.

According to the CA, the trial court was correct in finding that the Medina Decision and the Order for the Issuance of Decree were both spurious and that petitioner was not an innocent purchaser for value because it failed to make a prior inspection of the subject property which would have revealed that it was being occupied by the private respondents. This omission amounted to a failure to exercise diligence which prevented it from becoming an innocent purchaser for value. Hence, the Assurance Fund cannot be made liable.

ISSUE: Whether of not the Court of Appeals erred that petitioner is not an innocent purchaser for value entitled for the Assurance fund.

HELD:

No. Case law has it that he who alleges that he is a purchaser in good faith and for value of registered land bears the onus of proving such statement. This burden is not discharged by involving the ordinary presumption of good faith. Petitioner failed to discharge this burden. In its Answer, petitioner merely alleged that it is an innocent purchaser for value since it acquired the land from Pilarita Reyes for P1,200,000.00, without notice of any defect in her title and after verifying the genuineness of the title in the Register of Deeds of Pasay City and the LRC. Petitioner did not present any proof that would substantiate this allegation nor did it present any evidence to show that it took other steps to verify the authenticity of its predecessors title.

The general rule is that a purchaser may rely on what appears on the face of a certificate of title. He may be considered a purchaser in good faith even if he simply examines the latest certificate of title. An exception to this rule is when there exist important facts that would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man to go beyond the present title and to investigate those that preceded it. The presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor as appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith, hence, does not merit the protection of the law.

As correctly observed by the public respondent, the property covered by the void titles was transferred from Medina to petitioner with unusual haste. Only 8 months lapsed since OCT No. 129 was issued on July 7, 1983 until it was transferred to petitioner on February 22, 1984. The property was transferred to petitioner from Reyes only more than five months after she herself acquired the property. These circumstances, plus the fact that the subject property is a vast tract of land in a prime location, should have, at the very least, triggered petitioners curiosity.

Moreover, petitioner is a corporation engaged in the real estate business. A corporation engaged in the buying and selling of real estate is expected to exercise a higher standard of care and diligence in ascertaining the status and condition of the property subject of its business transaction. Similar to investment and financing corporations, it cannot simply rely on an examination of a Torrens certificate to determine what the subject property, looks like as its condition is not apparent in the document.

Petitioners claim against the Assurance Fund must necessarily fail. Its situation does not come within the ambit of the cases protected by the Assurance Fund. It was not deprived of land in consequence of bringing it under the operation of the Torrens system through fraud or in consequence of any error, omission, mistake or misdescription in the certificate of title. It was simply a victim of unscrupulous individuals. More importantly, it is a condition sine qua non that the person who brings the action for damages against the Assurance Fund be the registered owner and, as the holders of transfer certificates of title, that they be innocent purchasers in good faith and for value and the petitioner does not qualify as such.

Lourdes vs. PascualG.R. No. 162097February 13, 2008FACTS:Pascua petitioned for the reconstitution of the original title of a parcel of land (Lot 3209) located in Pagsanjan, Laguna. She said that the lot was sold to her parents in 1930 by a certain Limuaco who earlier acquired the land via a cadastral proceeding. However, in the Deed of Absolute Sale between Limuaco and Pascuas parents, it was indicated that the land was unregistered. Also, because of the war, the original copy as well as the duplicates were destroyed.Pascua presented as evidence the said Deed of Sale as well as a tracing cloth plan and technical description and a tax declaration. She claimed that the land issued to Limuaco was pursuant to a cadastral decree. And that she has been paying taxes however the land reflecting on the tax declaration is Lot No. 19-pt. Pascua averred that Lot No. 19-pt is one and the same as Lot 3209; that Lot 19-pt was the Assessors designation to the same land when the cadastral survey was made but when the decree was issued, it was turned to Lot 3209.The lower court denied her petition due to lack of evidence. She was not able to prove that Lot 19-pt is the same as Lot 3209.ISSUE: Whether or not to grant Pascuas petition.HELD: No. The evidence presented by Pascua to grant reconstitution are not those included in Section 2 of RA 26 which provides:

SEC. 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available in the following order:

(a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;(b) The co-owners, mortgagees, or lessees duplicate of the certificate of title;(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued;(e) A document, on file in the Registry of Deeds by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original has been registered; and(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

Further, she presented two tax declarations: one pertaining to her parents and the other to hers. Her parents tax declaration failed to reflect any Lot No. while hers reflected Lot No. 19-pt. It cannot be legally concluded that the land is one and the same. She was not able to adduce any additional document to prove her claim.

Even if Lot No 3209 and Lot 19-pt are one and the same, no title can still be reconstituted to Pascua because there is no convincing evidence that a certificate of title was ever issued for either land. Note that even the Deed of Sale between Limuaco and Pascuas parents indicated that the land is unregistered.

2009

G.R. No. 175788 June 30, 2009Petitioners: ENRIQUITA ANGAT and the LEGAL HEIRS OF FEDERICO ANGATRespondent: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESPonente: Justice CHICO-NAZARIO

Doctrine:It does not mandated under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 26 that notice be specifically sent to adjoining property owners; it only necessitated publication and posting of the notice of the Petition for Reconstitution in accordance with Section 9 of the Republic Act No. 26. Sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act No. 26,requiring notice to adjoining property owners, are actually irrelevant to the Petition for Reconstitution filed by Federico and Enriquita considering that these provisions apply particularly to petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated under Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e) and/or 3(f) of Republic Act No. 26.However, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is already final and executory, and absolutely binds this Court, despite any errors therein. And even if it were otherwise, the error committed by the appellate court as regards the notice requirement would not necessarily result in a judgment favorable to petitioners. The failure of Federico and Enriquita to immediately seek the reconstitution of TCT No. T-4399, and their procrastination for four decades before actually filing their Petition, had allowed laches to attach. Facts: In February 1999, Federico and Enriquita (sister of Federico) filed before the RTC a verified Petition5for the reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. T-4399 covering a 3,033,846-square meter parcel of land located in Sapang, Ternate, Cavite (subject property), presenting the owners duplicate copy of said TCT in their possession. Federico and Enriquita claimed that the subject property has been registered with the Registry of Deeds of Cavite in their names, as the true and absolute owners thereof, under TCT No. T-4399, covered by a certain plan PSU-91002. In 1959, the old Provincial Capitol Building housing the former office of the Register of Deeds of Cavite was burned to ashes, totally destroying all the titles and documents kept inside the office, including the original copy of TCT No. T-4399.According to Federico and Enriquita, the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-4399 was intact and has been in their possession since the time of its issuance and up to the present. The owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-4399 has not been delivered to any other person or entity to secure payment or performance of any obligation nor was any transaction or agreement relative to said TCT presented or pending before the Registry of Deeds of Cavite when its former office was burned. No other lien or encumbrance affecting TCT No. T-4399 exists, except the right of Federico and Enriquita therein.Federico and Enriquita attached to their Petition for Reconstitution a photocopy of their owners duplicate certificate of TCT No. T-4399.They also appended to the Petition, however, a Certification issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite stating that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-4399, registered in the names of Federico A. Angat and Enriquita A. Angat, 3,033,846, more or less, are not existing and does not form part of their records. Based on the fact that all records and titles were burned during the fire which razed to the ground the Old Capitol Building of Cavite City housing the Office of the Register of Deeds we could not now find OCT No. 391 and TCT No. T-4399 or any trace thereof and their supporting papers for its issuance including the Entry Book on which the pertinent documents were inscribed.Finding the Petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued an Order dated 16 February 1999, setting the initial hearing in LRC Case No. 1331 on 10 June 1999 at 8:30 in the morning. Publication, posting, and mailing requirements are complied with. However, all the notices to the adjoining owners were returned unserved for the following reasons: Ambrocio Arca: unlocated, no such name; heirs of Mariano Angat: deceased; Santiago de Guia: unlocated, no such name; and the Office of the Provincial Governor, representing Palikpikan Creek: refused to receive.The petitioners submitted to the LRA the survey plan of the subject property, PSU-91002, the tracing cloth plan with two blueprint copies thereof; the technical description of the subject property; and the Certification dated 25 March 1998 of the Register of Deeds of Cavite. On motion of the counsel of Federico and Enriquita, there being no oppositor nor written opposition, the RTC declared a general default against the public and proceeded with the ex parte hearing. However, Ternate Development Corporation (TDC) filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and a Complaint-in-Intervention, questioning the authenticity and genuineness of TCT No. T-4399. It claimed that a portion of the subject property covered by TCT No. T-4399, with an area of 1,783,084 square meters, is owned by and already registered in the name of TDC under TCT No. (T-97541) RT-19915 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite. Federico and Enriquita opposed the Motion for Leave to Intervene of TDC.The RTC denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene of TDC reasoning that TDC could not challenge the validity of TCT No. T-4399 in the reconstitution proceedings since it would constitute a collateral attack on the title of Federico and Enriquita. The RTC declared that the reconstitution proceedings in LRC Case No. 1331 was not the proper forum to resolve the issue of authenticity/genuineness of title sought to be reconstituted, nor a remedy to confirm or adjudicate ownership. It concluded that a separate civil action must be instituted to assail the validity of or seek the annulment of the certificate of title since the same cannot be done in the reconstitution proceedings where the issuance of the reconstituted title is ministerial on the part of the court after a factual finding that the original was indeed existing but was lost or destroyed.After trial and consideration of the oral and documentary evidence submitted by Federico and Enriquita, RTC proceeded to rule on the merits of the Petition for Reconstitution and granted the Petition and ordered that Register of Deeds of Cavite Province to reconstitute the original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-4399 as shown on plan Psu-91002 in the name of Federico A. Angat and Enriquita A. Angat, subject to existing liens and encumbrances with annotation at the back thereof and that said title was reconstituted and issued in lieu of the lost one which is hereby declared null and void for all legal intents and purposes. The Republic appealed the RTC Order to the Court of Appeals, claiming that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the reconstitution proceedings on the following grounds: (a) no showing that the owners of the adjacent properties were duly notified according to Sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act No. 26; and (b) failure of Federico and Enriquita to prove their valid interest in the subject property covered by TCT No. T-4399. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 72740. The Court of Appeals issued a Decision granting the appeal of the Republic and reversing the RTC because RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the Petition for Reconstitution because the notices of the hearing sent to the owners of the adjoining properties via registered mail were returned without having been served on them. The names of the owners of the adjoining properties were taken from the survey plan made in 1930, and it was not surprising that by the time the notices were sent in 1999, 69 years later, these persons could no longer be located. The Court of Appeals also found that Federico and Enriquita failed to prove that at the time the original copy of TCT No. T-4399 was lost; they were the only lawful owners of the subject property. The Court of Appeals declared the Decision final and executory for the reason that no motion for reconsideration thereof had been filed. Federico and Enriquita file a Motion for Reconsideration, however, CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration decision become final and executory. Petitioners insist that the Petition for Reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. T-4399 filed by Federico and Enriquita complied with all the legal requirements therefor. They claim that the Court of Appeals committed serious error in requiring notice to adjoining property owners. Petitioners citePuzon v. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc.,in which the Court ruled that notice to adjoining property owners is not necessary where the basis for reconstitution is the owners duplicate, following Section 10, in relation to Section 9, of Republic Act No. 26. Assumingarguendothat such notice is mandatory, petitioners contend that they were able to substantially comply with the same, only that the notices they sent to the adjoining property owners were returned unserved.According to the OSG, the RTC gravely erred when it assumed jurisdiction over the Petition for Reconstitution despite failure by Federico and Enriquita to comply with the notice requirements under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26. It should be recalled that notices to the adjoining property owners were returned unserved for various reasons. The OSG is adamant in its stance that nothing but strict compliance with the requirements of the law will do, and failure to do the same prevents the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction over the Petition for Reconstitution and voids the whole reconstitution proceedings. Likewise, the OSG maintains that Federico and Enriquita were not able to show that they were the only owners of the subject property at the time of the loss of TCT No. T-4399. Finally, the OSG asserts that the Petition at bar deserves outright dismissal considering that the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals had already become final and executory.Issue:Whether or not the respondent court of appeals also erred in requiring the petitioners to notify the adjoining owners, although the petitioners also substantially complied with the additional requirements imposed by the trial courtRuling: We find that there is no merit in the present Petition.The Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal of the Petition for Reconstitution of Federico and Enriquita was because of the lack of notice to the adjoining property owners, which supposedly deprived the RTC of jurisdiction over the said Petition.The nature of the action for reconstitution of a certificate of title under Republic Act No. 26, entitled "An Act Providing a Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of Torrens Certificate of Title Lost or Destroyed," denotes a restoration of the instrument, which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed, in its original form and condition.The purpose of such an action is merely to have the certificate of title reproduced, after proper proceedings, in the same form it was in when its loss or destruction occurred. The same Republic Act No. 26 specifies the requisites to be met for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over a petition for reconstitution of a certificate of title. As we held in Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Velasco,failure to comply with any of these jurisdictional requirements for a petition for reconstitution renders the proceedings null and void. Thus, in obtaining a new title in lieu of the lost or destroyed one, Republic Act No. 26 laid down procedures which must be strictly followed in view of the danger that reconstitution could be the source of anomalous titles or unscrupulously availed of as an easy substitute for original registration of title proceedings.Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 26 identify the sources for reconstitution of title. Section 2 and 3 enumerates the sources for reconstitution of OCTs and TCTs, respectively:Section 2. Original Certificates of Title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:(a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;(b) The co-owners, mortgagees, or lessees duplicate of the certificate of title;(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued;(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

Sec. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;(d) The deed of transfer or other document, on file in the registry of deeds, containing the description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original had been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was issued;(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.It is worth stressing that Federico and Enriquita sought the reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. T-4399 based on the owners duplicate of said TCT, a source named under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 26. The publication, posting and notice requirements for such a petition are governed by Section 10 in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 26. Section 10 provides:Sec.10. Nothing hereinbefore provided shall prevent any registered owner or person in interest from filing the petition mentioned in section five of this Act directly with the proper Court of First Instance, based on sources enumerated in Sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and/or 4(a) of this Act: Provided, however, That the Court shall cause a notice of the petition, before hearing and granting the same, to be published in the manner stated in section nine hereof: and, provided, further, That certificates of title reconstituted pursuant to this section shall not be subject to the encumbrance referred to in section seven of this ActIn relation to the foregoing, the provision of Section 9 on the publication of the notice of the Petition for Reconstitution reads:Section 9. x x x Thereupon, the court shall cause a notice of the petition to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land lies, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing, and after hearing, shall determine the petition and render such judgment as justice and equity may require. The notice shall specify, among other things, the number of the certificate of title, the name of the registered owner, the names of the interested parties appearing in the reconstituted certificate of title, the location of the property, and the date on which all persons having an interest in the property must appear and file such claim as they may have. x x x.It is evident from a perusal of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 26, as quoted above, that it does not mandate that notice be specifically sent to adjoining property owners; it only necessitated publication and posting of the notice of the Petition for Reconstitution in accordance with Section 9 of the same Act. Sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act No. 26,requiring notice to adjoining property owners, are actually irrelevant to the Petition for Reconstitution filed by Federico and Enriquita considering that these provisions apply particularly to petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated under Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e) and/or 3(f) of Republic Act No. 26.InPuzon, we explained that when the reconstitution is based on an extant owners duplicate TCT, the main concern is the authenticity and genuineness of the certificate, which could best be determined or contested by the government agencies or offices concerned. The adjoining owners or actual occupants of the property covered by the TCT are hardly in a position to determine the genuineness of the certificate; hence, their participation in the reconstitution proceedings is not indispensable and notice to them is not jurisdictional.The Decision of the Court of Appeals is already final and executory, and absolutely binds this Court, despite any errors therein. And even if it were otherwise, the error committed by the appellate court as regards the notice requirement would not necessarily result in a judgment favorable to petitioners. The failure of Federico and Enriquita to immediately seek the reconstitution of TCT No. T-4399, and their procrastination for four decades before actually filing their Petition, had allowed laches to attach. Laches is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 5 December 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72740 dismissing the Petition for Reconstitution of TCT No. T-4399, filed by Federico A. Angat and Enriquita A. Angat, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 143573 January 30, 2009ADORACION ROSALES RUFLOE, ALFREDO RUFLOE and RODRIGO RUFLOE,Petitioners,vs.LEONARDA BURGOS, ANITA BURGOS, ANGELITO BURGOS, AMY BURGOS, ELVIRA DELOS REYES and JULIAN C. TUBIG,Respondents.FACTS:Petitioner Adoracion Rufloe is the wife of Angel Rufloe, now deceased, while co-petitioners Alfredo and Rodrigo are their children. During the marriage of Adoracion and Angel, they acquired a 371-square meter parcel of land located at Barangay Bagbagan, Muntinlupa, which is the subject of the present controversy. Sometime in 1978, respondent Elvira Delos Reyes forged the signatures of Adoracion and Angel in a Deed of Sale dated to make it appear that the disputed property was sold to her by the spouses Rufloe. On the basis of the said deed of sale, Delos Reyes succeeded in obtaining a title in her name. IThe Rufloes filed a complaint for damages against Delos Reyes alleging that Angel Rufloe died in 1974, which was four (4) years before the alleged sale in favor of Delos Reyes.During the pendency of the case, Delos Reyes sold the subject property to respondent siblings Anita, Angelina, Angelito and Amy (Burgos siblings). A new title was then issued in their names. The Burgos siblings, in turn, sold the same property to their aunt, Leonarda Burgos. However, the sale in favor of Leonarda was not registered. Thus, no title was issued in her name. The subject property remained in the name of the Burgos siblings who also continued paying the real estate taxes thereon.The trial court rendered its decision declaring that the Deed of Sale in favor of Delos Reyes was falsified as the signatures of the spouses Rufloe had been forged. The trial court ruled that Delos Reyes did not acquire ownership over the subject property. Said decision had become final and executory. Respondents interposed an appeal to the CA. In their appeal, respondents maintained that they bought the property in good faith after they were shown a genuine copy of the title of the disputed property by Delos Reyes. They also insisted that they were innocent purchasers in good faith and for value. The CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the trial court, declaring in the process that respondents were purchasers in good faith and for value.ISSUE:(1) Whether the sale of the subject property by Delos Reyes to the Burgos siblings and the subsequent sale by the siblings to Leonarda were valid and binding; and (2) Whether respondents were innocent purchasers in good faith and for value despite the forged deed of sale of their transferor Delos Reyes. RULING:It is undisputed that the forged deed of sale was null and void and conveyed no title. It is a well-settled principle that no one can give what one does not have, nemo dat quod non habet. One can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more right than what the seller can transfer legally. Due to the forged deed of sale, Delos Reyes acquired no right over the subject property which she could convey to the Burgos siblings. All the transactions subsequent to the falsified sale between the spouses Rufloe and Delos Reyes are likewise void, including the sale made by the Burgos siblings to their aunt, Leonarda.As a general rule, every person dealing with registered land, as in this case, may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property. However, this rule admits of an unchallenged exception: The circumstances surrounding this case point to the absolute lack of good faith on the part of respondents. The evidence shows that the Rufloes caused a notice of adverse claim to be annotated on the title of Delos Reyes and a action for damages and criminal case for estafa, filed by the Rufloes against Delos Reyes, were both pending before the court. This circumstance should have alerted the Burgos siblings as to the validity of Delos Reyes title and her authority and legal right to sell the property. Equally significant is the fact that Delos Reyes was not in possession of the subject property when she sold the same to the Burgos siblings. There was no showing that Amado or any of the Burgos siblings exerted any effort to personally verify with the Register of Deeds if Delos Reyes certificate of title was clean and authentic. Although it is a recognized principle that a person dealing with registered land need not go beyond its certificate of title, it is also a firmly established rule that where circumstances exist which would put a purchaser on guard and prompt him to investigate further. without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as a buyer in good faith. Moreover, the defense of indefeasibility of a Torrens title does not extend to a transferee who takes it with notice of a flaw in the title of his transferor. To be effective, the inscription in the registry must have been made in good faith. A holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of the law, for the law cannot be used as a shield for fraud.SOTERO ROY LEONERO, RODOLFO LIM, ISIDORO A. PADILLA, JR., AMY ROSE FISMA, and NORMA CABUYO, vs.SPOUSES MARCELINO B. BARBA and FORTUNA MARCOS-BARBA, represented by IMELDA N. FORONDO, and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITYFacts: Petitioners filed a complaint against respondents for Quieting of Title before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 216.praying that Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 59721, 59725, 59726 and 59727, be declared null and void. Petitioners alleged that this had been declared void in a Partial Decision. Respondents maintaining that all in their names in the tile were all genuine. They further argued that the Partial Decision could not possibly have any effect on them, as they were not parties to said case. RTC dismissed the petition for quieting of title. Petitioner appealed to the CA and the decision of the RTC was affirmed. Issue: was dismissal of the complaint for quieting of title despite the lack of trial on the merits, hence, allegedly depriving petitioners of the opportunity to prove their allegations that respondents' aforementioned TCTs were null and voidHeld: petitioners admit that they are mere possessors of the parcels of land in question and have been ordered to vacate the same. The gist of their claim in the action for quieting of title is that the Decision in the ejectment case against them should not be implemented, because respondents' TCTs are spurious, having emanated from OCT No. 614, which has been declared null and void in a Partial Decision rendered in Civil Case No. Q-35672. Petitioners' main prayer is for the nullification of respondents' TCTs.Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree provides that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can only be altered, modified or cancelled in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. In Vda. de Gualberto v. Go, the Court held that the validity of a certificate of title cannot be assailed in an action for quieting of title; an action for annulment of title is the more appropriate remedy to seek the cancellation of a certificate of title Clearly, petitioners' complaint is unfounded and the RTC acted properly in dismissing the same for petitioners' failure to establish the factual basis for it.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for utter lack of merit.RABAJA RANCH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,Petitioner vs. AFP RETIREMENT AND SEPARATION BENEFITS SYSTEM,Respondent.The Supreme Court ruled that in our jurisdiction, fraud is never presumed. Mere allegations of fraud are not enough. The intentional acts to deceive and deprive another of his right, or in some manner, injure him must be specifically alleged and proved. The burden of proof rests on petitioner, and the petitioner in this case failed to discharge the burden. Petitioner did not show that the Homestead Patent issued to Charles Soguilon is indeed spurious. More importantly, petitioner failed to prove that respondent took part in the alleged fraud which dated back as early as 1966. Only actual and extrinsic fraud had been accepted and is contemplated by the law as a ground to review or reopen a decree of registration. Thus, relief is granted to a party deprived of his interest in land where the fraud consists in a deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not contested when in fact they are. Moreover, a Homestead Patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens Title. Section 103 of P.D. No. 1529 mandates the registration of patents, and such registration is the operative act to convey the land to the patentee. The deed, grant, patent or instrument of conveyance from the Government to the grantee shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land but shall operate only as a contract between the Government and the grantee and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration. It is the act of registration that shall be the operative act to affect and convey the land.The Supreme Court also reiterated the rule that, where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the Court cannot disregard such rights and order the cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such outright cancellation will be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title. The sanctity of the Torrens system must be preserved; otherwise, everyone dealing with the property registered under the system will have to inquire in every instance as to whether the title had been regularly or irregularly issued, contrary to the evident purpose of the law. Thus, every person dealing with the registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor, and the law will, in no way, oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property.FACTS:Petitioner Rabaja Ranch Development Corporation is a domestic corporation and a holder of TCT No. T-88513covering the subject property located at Barangay Conrazon, Bongabon, Oriental Mindoro.Respondent Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) is a government corporation, which manages the pension fund of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and a holder of TCT No. T-51382covering the same subject property.On September 1, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaintfor Quieting of Title and/or Removal of Cloud from Title before the RTC. It averred that on September 6, 1955, a Free Patent was issued in the name of Jose Castromero, and on June 1, 1982, the Free Patent was registered, and an OCT covering the subject property was issued in the name of the latter. Sometime in 1982, Jose sold the subject property to Spouses Sigfriedo and Josephine Veloso and TCT No. T-17104was issued in favor of the spouses. On January 17, 1997, Spouses Veloso, in turn, sold the subject property to petitioner for the sum ofP634,116.00 and TCT No. T-88513 was issued in petitioners name. Petitioner alleged that it was the lawful owner and possessor of the subject property.In its Answer, respondent claimed that its title over the subject property was protected by the Torrens system, as it was a buyer in good faith and for value, and that it had been in continuous possession of the subject property since November 1989, way ahead of petitioner's alleged possession in February 1997.Respondent stated that on April 30, 1966, a Homestead Patent was issued in the name of Charles Soguilon, and upon registration, an OCT was issued in Charles's name, covering the same property. On October 18, 1982, Charles sold the subject property to JMC Farm Incorporated, which was then issued TCT No. 18529.On August 30, 1985, JMC obtained a loan from respondent in the amount ofP7,000,000.00, with real estate mortgage over several parcels of land including the subject property.JMC failed to pay, hence, after extra-judicial foreclosure and public sale, respondent, being the highest bidder, acquired the subject property and was issued TCT No. T-51382 in its name. Respondent contended that from the time it was issued a title, it took possession of the subject property until petitioner disturbed respondent's possession thereof sometime in 1997. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner on the ground that petitioner's title emanated from a title older than that of the respondent. Moreover, the RTC held that there were substantial and numerous infirmities in the Homestead Patent of Charles. The RTC found that there was no record in the Bureau of Lands that Charles was a homestead applicant or a grantee of the Homestead Patent. Thus, the RTC held that Charles's Homestead Patent was fraudulent and spurious, and respondent could not invoke the protection of the Torrens system, because the system does not protect one who committed fraud or misrepresentation and holds title in bad faith. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the ruling of the lower court. It held that Charles's Homestead Patent was earlier registered than Jose's Free Patent. The CA held that Jose slept on his rights, and thus, respondent had a better right over the subject property. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied.ISSUES:a. Whether or not respondent's title which originated from a fake and spurious homestead patent, is superior to petitioner's title which originated from a valid and existing free patent.b. Who, between the petitioner and respondent, has a better right over the subject property?RULINGS:a. The Supreme Court ruled that in our jurisdiction, fraud is never presumed. Mere allegations of fraud are not enough. The intentional acts to deceive and deprive another of his right, or in some manner, injure him must be specifically alleged and proved. The burden of proof rests on petitioner, and the petitioner in this case failed to discharge the burden. Petitioner did not show that the Homestead Patent issued to Charles Soguilon is indeed spurious. More importantly, petitioner failed to prove that respondent took part in the alleged fraud which dated back as early as 1966. Therefore, the petition was denied.b. The Supreme Court held that respondent is an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value. Thus, as far as respondent is concerned, TCT No. 18529, shown to it by JMC, was free from any flaw or defect that could give rise to any iota of doubt that it was fake and spurious, or that it was derived from a fake or spurious Homestead Patent. Likewise, respondent was not under any obligation to make an inquiry beyond the TCT itself when, significantly, a foreclosure sale was conducted and respondent emerged as the highest bidder. Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the Court cannot disregard such rights and order the cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such outright cancellation will be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title. The sanctity of the Torrens system must be preserved; otherwise, everyone dealing with the property registered under the system will have to inquire in every instance as to whether the title had been regularly or irregularly issued, contrary to the evident purpose of the law. Every person dealing with the registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor, and the law will, in no way, oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property.Moreover, a Homestead Patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens Title. Section 103 of P.D. No. 1529 mandates the registration of patents, and such registration is the operative act to convey the land to the patentee. The deed, grant, patent or instrument of conveyance from the Government to the grantee shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land but shall operate only as a contract between the Government and the grantee and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration. It is the act of registration that shall be the operative act to affect and convey the land.HEIRS OF THE LATE JOSE DE LUZURIAGA vs. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 168848HEIRS OF THE LATE JOSE DE LUZURIAGA vs. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 169019June 30, 2009FACTS:Subject of the instant controversy isLotNo. 1524 of the Bacolod Cadastre.Petitioners filed anApplication for the Registration of Title before the RTC.In it, the subject lot was specifically identified as Lot No. 1524, AP-06-005774, Cad. 39, Bacolod Cadastre, situated in the City ofBacolod,IslandofNegros. The survey plan duly approved by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Regional Office, Iloilo City; and the technical description of the subject lot were submitted to the RTC.The application was amended to stating that the parcel of land in question be ordered registered and that an original Certificate of Title be issued in the name of the late Jose R. [De] Luzuriaga, Sr. pursuant to Decree No. 22752 covering Lot No. 1524 of Bacolod Cadastre.Subsequently, the RTC issued an Order of general default except as against respondent Republic of thePhilippines, which entered its due appearance through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which, in turn, designated Bacolod Assistant City Prosecutor Abraham Bayona to represent the OSG at the trial.Among the evidence petitioners adduced during the hearings was a copy of Decree No. 22752[8]dated October 7, 1916, issued by the General Land Registration Office (GLRO) pursuant to the decision in the cadastral case confirming and granting unto the late Jose R. De Luzuriaga full ownership of Lot No. 1524.By Decision dated May 24, 1999, the trial court ratified its order of general default and judicially confirmed the incomplete title of the late De Luzuriaga, Sr. over Lot No. 1524 pursuant to Decree No. 22752.The OSG, for the Republic, received a copy of the Decision on June 22, 1999, but opted not to file an appeal. Pursuant to the above decision the Bacolod Registry issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-58 in the name of De Luzuriaga, Sr.Meanwhile, in September 1999, Dr. Antonio A. Lizares, Co., Inc. (DAALCO) filed a Complaintagainst petitioners before the RTC forQuieting of Title, Annulment and Cancellation of [OCT] No. RO-58with prayer for injunctive relief and damages. DAALCO claimed that its predecessor-in-interest, Antonio Lizares, was the registered, lawful, and absolute owner of Lot No. 1524 as evidenced by a Transfer Certificate of Title issued by the Register of Deeds (RD) ofBacolodCityon February 8, 1939.On November 24, 1999, or six months after the RTC rendered its Decision, the Republic through the OSG, however, sought the annulment thereofviaan unverifiedPetition for Relief from Judgmentfiled before the RTC. The RTC denied the petition for relief from judgment because it is not sufficient in form and substance and filed out of time.The Republic moved for reconsiderationof the above denial order arguing that its procedural lapses are not fatal to its case. Moreover, the OSG alleged that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over Cadastral Case No. 97-583 inasmuch as the corresponding amended application for registration dated May 5, 1998 was not published and a copy of which the Republic was not served. Finally, the Republic raised anew the argument on the unavailability of Decree No. 22752 as basis for the application of land registration in view of the implementation of Sec. 39 of PD 1529.The Republic later filed a Supplement (To Motion for Reconsideration) reiterating the merits of its case.The RTC denied the Republics motion for reconsideration. Thus, the Republic elevated the case before the CA. The appellate court rendered the assailed decision granting certiorari and ordered the remand of the instant case to the trial court for reception of evidence to determine whether the RTCs Decision confirming the title of the late Luzuriaga, Sr. overLot1524 will result in a double titling of the subject lot.Through the equally assailed May 25, 2005 Resolution, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, these petitions. ISSUES:1. Whether or not a cadastral case and Quieting of Title case can proceed independently?2. Whether or not the contention of the OSG that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over Cadastral Case No. 97-583 due to non-publication of the amended application for registration is tenable.?RULING:1. Yes, they can proceed independently. The Supreme Court ruled that petitioners contention that a petition for relief from judgment and the special civil action for quieting of title cannot proceed separately is without solid basis.Cad. Case No. 97-583 and the suit for quieting of title in Civil Case No. 99-10924 each involves different concerns and can proceed independently.The cause of action of the Republics petition for relief from judgment of double titling of the subject lot is different from DAALCOs quest for quieting of title. From another perspective, DAALCO basically seeks to nullify the issuance of OCT No. RO-58 in the name of the De Luzuriaga heirs, while the Republics petition assails the grant of ownership to De Luzuriaga, Sr. over a parcel of land duly registered under OCT No. 2765 in the name of Lizares, who thereafter transferred the title to his heirs or assigns. In fine, both actions may proceed independently, albeit a consolidation of both cases would be ideal to obviate multiplicity of suits.2. No. As the Supreme Court held that the Republic, after participating in the proceedings below, has raised the issue of jurisdiction, drawing attention to the non-publication of the amended application for registration during the trial of Cad. Case No. 93-857. The Court cannot see its way clear to the jurisdictional challenge posed by the Republic. As it were, the Republic entered its appearance in Cad. Case No. 97-583 represented by prosecutor Bayona. The petitioners in that case appeared to have complied with the essential jurisdictional requirement of publication. The required survey plan, technical description, and original tracing cloth have been duly presented and submitted as evidence. Prosecutor Bayona obviously found the cadastral proceedings to have been in order, else, he would have duly protested and assailed the same.We hardly can subscribe to the Republics argument that the publication of the amendment in petitioners application is a conditionsine qua nonfor the RTC, acting as cadastral court, to acquire jurisdiction. Sec. 7 of Act No. 2259, otherwise known as the Cadastral Act, and Sec. 35of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration Decree, provide for the publication of the application for registration and the schedule of the initial hearing.This is so since judicial cadastral proceedings, like ordinary administrative registration, arein rem, and are governed by the usual rules of practice, procedure, and evidence. Due publication is required to give notice to all interested parties of the claim and identity of the property that will be surveyed.And any additional territory or change in the area of the claim cannot be included by amendment of the plan or application without new publication, otherwise the cadastral court does not acquire jurisdiction over the additional or amended claim.But where the identity and area of the claimed property are not the subjects of amendment but other collateral matters, a new publication is not needed.In the case at bar, there is no dispute that due publication was made forLotNo. 1524, its identity and area.The amendment in petitioners application in the relief portion neither altered the area and identity of the subject lot nor added any territory. Thus, no new publication is required.Besides, the Republic, through Prosecutor Bayona, has been duly notified of such amendment.Consequently, the Republic could not plausibly argue that it was deprived of its day in court.SPOUSES. VILLAMIL, ETC. VS. VILLAROSAG.R NO. 177187April 7, 2009

Facts:Petitioner-spouses Villamil alleged that they were the registered owners of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 223611. That they visited the said lot and found that a residential house was being constructed by a certain Villarosa. Petitioners verified their title with the office of the register of deeds and found out that the title in their names was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of Paterno by virtue of a deed of assignment purportedly executed by them in favor of Paterno. A Deed of Assignment was likewise executed by Paterno in favor of Spouses Tolentiono, and on the basis of the said document, a new title was issued in favor of the latter. Thereafter Spouses Villamil instituted a complaint for annulment for annulment of title, recovery of possession, reconveyance, damages and injunction against the Spouses Tolentino and Villarosa. Spouses Villamil averred that since Paternos transfer to Sps. Tolentino is spurious, the Spouses Tolentino could not also transfer any right to Villarosa on account of the principle that no one can transfer a greater right to another than he himself. The trial court found that the deed of sale executed by sps. Villamil in favor of Paterno is fake; that Paterno is a fictitious person, and that spouses Tolentino and Villarosa are both buyers in bad faith. However, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial courts decision and declared void the title of the Spouses Tolentino and Paterno but upheld the validity of the title of Villarosa holding that the latter is a purchaser for value and in goodfaith.Issue:Whether or not Villarosa can be declared a purchases for value and goodfaith? Held:Yes, well settled is the rule that every person dealing with a registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property. A forged or fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title if the property has already been transferred from the name of the owner to name of the forger. This doctrine serves to emphasize that a person who deals with registered property in good faith will acquire good title from a forger and be absolutely protected by a torrents title. Having made the necessary inquiries and having found that the title to be authentic, Villarosa need not go beyond the certificate of title. He examined the transferors title, which was then under the name of Spouses Tolentino. He did not have to scrutinize each and every title and previous owners of the property preceding Tolentino. In sum, Villarosa was able to establish good faith when he bought the subject property. Therefore, the title issued in Villarosas name is valid.

Republic v. Lee TsaiG.R. No. 168184. June 22, 2009.

FACTS: Respondent filed an application for the confirmation and registration of the subject property under Presidential Decree No. 1529. She (alleged that she is the owner of the subject property and the improvements thereon. She also declared that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive andnotorious possession and occupation of the subject property for more than 30 years. The trial court granted respondents application for registration. Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision. It ruled that respondent need not prove that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier because Section 48(b) of CA 141 was already superseded by Republic Act No. 1942 (RA 1942), which provides for a simple 30 year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of title.

ISSUE: Whether or not it is required for respondent to prove her open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier.

HELD: YES. Note that respondent did not specify under what paragraph of Section 14 of PD 1529 she was filing the application. But it appeared that respondent filed her application under Section 14(1) of PD 1529. There are three requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14(1) of PD 1529:(1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (2) that the applicant by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and (3) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June1945 or earlier. The right to file the application for registration derives from a bona fide claim of ownership going back to 12 June 1945 or earlier, by reason of the claimants open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

There were various amendments to PD 1529. In Republic v. Doldol, the Court provided a summary of these amendments:

"The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No.141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942, which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or more is not sufficient. Therefore, since the effectivity of PD 1073 on 25 January 1977, it must now be shown that possession and occupation of the piece of land by the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in interest, started on 12 June 1945 or earlier. This provision is in total conformity with Section 14(1) of PD 1529."

In this case, respondent failed to comply with the period of possession and occupation of the subject property, as required by both PD 1529 and CA 141. Respondents earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration issued in the name of her predecessors-in-interest only in the year 1948. In view of the lack ofsufficient showing that respondent and her predecessors-in-interest possessed the subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, respondents application for confirmation and registration of the subject property under PD 1529 and CA 141 should be denied.

The same ruling was reiterated in Republic v. Javier (G.R. No. 179905, 19 August 2009).

2010HEIRS OF DOMINGO VALIENTES VS HON. REINERIO B. RAMAS AND VILMA MINORG.R. No. 157852 December 15, 2010

FACTS:Petitioners claim that they are the heirs of Domingo Valientes who, before his death, was the owner of a parcel of land in Zamboanga del Sur then covered by anOriginal Certificate of Title. Domingo Valientes mortgaged the subject property to secure his loan to the spouses Belen, but later on failed to retrieve the subject property.

In 1969, the spouses Belen obtained a Transfer Certificate of Title on the land in their name.The legitimate children of the late Domingo Valientes, had their Affidavit of Adverse Claimduly entered at the back of the TCT.Upon the death of the spouses Belen, their surviving heirs sold the property in favor of private respondent Vilma Valencia-Minor, the present possessor of the subject property.On 1998, petitioners filed a Complaint for the Cancelation of the TCT of the subject land, Reconveyance plus Damages. The RTC dismissed the case. Petitioners brought the case to the Court of Appeals, which decided that the case cannot prosper on the grounds of prescription and laches because the complaint was filed almost 29 years after the issuance of the TCT.

Petitioners brought the matter to the Supreme Court alleging that although the complaint was captioned Cancellation of Transfer Certificate and Reconveyance, it is substantially in the nature of an action to quiet title which allegedly does not prescribe.

They also alleged that given that prescription will apply, the prescriptive period that should be used is 30 years as provided in Article 1141 of the Civil Code, in connection with Articles 1134 and 1137 thereof, because the respondents predecessor-in interest acquired the property thru fraud which constitutes bad faith on their part. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the action filed by the Valientes is an action to quite title, thus, imprescriptible

2. Whether or not the prescriptive period in case of reconveyance based on implied trust is 30 years because the one in possession acquired the property thru fraud, thus, constituting bad faith

HELD:1. The petitioners are not in possession of the subject property, hence their action is one of reconveyance and not action to quite title.The action being based on implied trust has already prescribed because it was filed 29 years after the issuance of the TCT.

An action for reconveyance is a legal remedy granted to a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers name, which must be filed within ten years from the issuance of the title since such issuance operates as a constructive notice.

The cause of action of petitioners in the case, wherein they claim that private respondent Minors predecessor-in-interest acquired the subject property by forgery, can indeed be considered as that of enforcing an implied trust, as stated in Article 1456 of the New Civil Code.

Art. 1456.If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

The action of the petitioners Valientes was filed on 1998 which was way beyond the prescriptive period since the TCT was issued on 1969.

2. Art. 1141. Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.

This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription.

Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.

Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.

Articles 1141, 1134 and 1137 of the Civil Code, however, are general rules on prescription which should give way to the special statute on registered lands, Presidential Decree No. 1529. Under the Torrens System as enshrined in P.D. No. 1529, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of entry of the decree of registration, without prejudice to an action for damages against the applicant or any person responsible for the fraud.

Yet, the right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust is not absolute nor is it imprescriptible. An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.

As discussed above, the case was filed almost 29 years from the issuance of the TCT. This period is unreasonably long for a party seeking to enforce its right to file the appropriate case.

REPUBLIC VS HON. MANGOTARAGR NO. 173401, January 7, 2010,

FACTS:This includes the 1914 and 1997 Cacho cases. Sometime in the early 1990s, the late Dona Demetria Cacho applied for the registration of two parcels of land, namely, a smaller parcel with an area of 3,635 sq. meters and a larger parcel with an area of 378,707 sq. meters. Both were situated in what was then the Municipality of Iligan, Moro Province, which later became later the Sitio Nunucan, then Barangay Suarez, in Iligan City, Lanao del Norte. In one of the Courts decision, it affirmed in toto the decision of the land registration court. Come 1997, Teofilo Cacho, claiming to be the son and sole heir of Dona Demetria, filed before the RTC a petition for the reconstitution of two original certificates of title. After so many legal battles, the decrees of registration were re-issued bearing new numbers and OCTs were issued for the two parcels of land in Dona Demetrias name.

On October 13, 2004 , the Republic filed a complaint for the cancellation of OCTs and reversion against late Dona Demetria, represented by her alleged heirs together with AZIMUTH and LANDTRADE. Vidal and AZIMUTH filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Republic has no cause of action and their present petition is barred by res judicata and prescription. The trial court ruled against Republic.

ISSUE:Whether or not the action for prescription is barred by prescription

HELD:The Supreme Court ruled in the NEGATIVE.

Reversion is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert back the land back to the Government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.

Nonetheless, elementary is the rule that prescription does not run against the State and its subdivisions. When the government is the real party in interest and it is proceeding mainly to assert its own right to recover its own property, there can be as a rule no defense grounded on laches or prescription. Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the State in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. The right of reversion or reconveyance to the State is not barred by prescription.

IF the Republic is able to established after trial and hearing of Civil Case no. 6686 that decrees and OCTs are void for some reason, then the trial court can still order the reversion of the parcels of land covered by the same because indefeasibility cannot attach t