2008 CarswellOnt 3515, [2008] W.D.F.L. 3854, [2008] O.J ... · was made out in statement of claim — Judicial immunity from negligence exists for law society's ... was directed at

Hartmann v. Amourgis, 2008 CarswellOnt 3515

2008 CarswellOnt 3515, [2008] W.D.F.L. 3854, [2008] O.J. No. 2388...

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2008 CarswellOnt 3515Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Hartmann v. Amourgis

2008 CarswellOnt 3515, [2008] W.D.F.L. 3854, [2008] O.J. No. 2388, 168 A.C.W.S. (3d) 40

Peter Hartmann, Plaintiff and Julie Evelyn Amourgis, Jaroslava Frantel, theLaw Society of Upper Canada, and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario

Jarvis J.

Judgment: June 13, 2008Docket: 07-CV-333718PD2

Counsel: Peter V. Hartmann, for himselfSusan M. Sack, for Defendant, AmourgisHelen A. Daley, for Defendant, Law SocietyStephen Scharbach, for Defendant, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Public; Torts; Constitutional; Family; Human Rights

HeadnoteCivil practice and procedure --- Disposition without trial — Stay or dismissal of action — Grounds — Action frivolous,vexatious or abuse of process — General principles

Parties separated and wife petitioned for divorce — Years of legal proceedings ensued — Plaintiff husband failedto pay court-ordered interim support — As result, his answer and counter petition were struck — When matterof division of marital property and ongoing support came before court for final determination, wife was awardedlump sum equivalent of $800 per month spousal support over 10-year period due to plaintiff's complete disregardfor earlier court orders — Plaintiff's non-payment of support continued — Director of Family Responsibility Officeobtained enforcement order and arrears were fixed at $45,337.58 — Plaintiff brought action against wife's counselA, law society, and provincial Crown — Defendants brought motion to strike action as frivolous and vexatious andabuse of process, submitting that issues had already been litigated and decided against plaintiff — Motion granted— Test for striking out claim is whether, assuming all facts pleaded can be proven, it is plain and obvious that claimcannot succeed — Proceedings have been held to be vexatious in circumstances where there were no reasonablegrounds to institute action, issue has already been determined by court, or litigant persistently pursues unsuccessfulappeal — Plaintiff had appealed almost every issue and courts had consistently decided against him — Plaintiff hadno cause of action against A — No cause of action against law society was made out in statement of claim — Claimagainst Crown failed to comply with s. 7(1) of Proceedings Against the Crown Act and was nullity on that basis— Plaintiff's action dismissed in its entirety.

Civil practice and procedure --- Judgments and orders — Res judicata and issue estoppel — Res judicata — Introduction— Where abuse of process

Abuse of process occurs when litigants are intent on re-litigating or re-defending causes of action or issues that havealready been decided — Abuse of process by litigation has now become accepted doctrine.

Professions and occupations --- Barristers and solicitors — Relationship with others — Relationship with opposite party— In family law matters




Parties separated and wife petitioned for divorce — Years of legal proceedings ensued — Plaintiff husband failedto pay court-ordered interim support — As result, his answer and counter petition were struck — When matterof division of marital property and ongoing support came before court for final determination, wife was awardedlump sum equivalent of $800 per month spousal support over 10-year period due to plaintiff's complete disregardfor earlier court orders — Plaintiff's non-payment of support continued — Director of Family Responsibility Officeobtained enforcement order and arrears were fixed at $45,337.58 — Plaintiff brought action against wife's counselA, alleging that A lied to court and was party to conspiracy to harm plaintiff — A brought motion to strike actionpursuant to R. 21.01(3)(d) of Rules of Civil Procedure on basis that it was frivolous and vexatious and otherwiseabuse of process — Motion granted — Allegations in statement of claim could only mean that A misstated evidenceto court or misstated applicable law — Lawyer, in acting for client, is merely agent and not distinct entity andis therefore incapable of being party to conspiracy — A owed no duty of care to plaintiff — Facts which mighthave grounded any award of damages against A had been litigated — All other available relief against A had beenlitigated by plaintiff without success — It was plain and obvious that claim could not succeed.

Professions and occupations --- Barristers and solicitors — Organization and regulation of profession — Law societies— Proceedings against law society

Parties separated and wife petitioned for divorce — Years of legal proceedings ensued — Plaintiff husband failedto pay court-ordered interim support — As result, his answer and counter petition were struck — When matterof division of marital property and ongoing support came before court for final determination, wife was awardedlump sum equivalent of $800 per month spousal support over 10-year period due to plaintiff's complete disregardfor earlier court orders — Plaintiff's non-payment of support continued — Director of Family Responsibility Officeobtained enforcement order and arrears were fixed at $45,337.58 — Plaintiff brought action against law society,alleging that it failed in its statutory duty to protect public and him from "gross professional misconduct" of wife'scounsel A and to take responsibility for her conduct — Law society brought motion to strike action as disclosing nocause of action, pursuant to R. 21.01(1)(b) of Rules of Civil Procedure, and as abuse of process in that it sought tore-litigate matters, pursuant to R. 21.01(3)(d) — Motion granted — Potential liability of law society is governed bys. 9 of Law Society Act — Since plaintiff did not allege bad faith on part of law society, no cause of action against itwas made out in statement of claim — Judicial immunity from negligence exists for law society's discipline process,provided it acts in good faith — Plaintiff failed to connect his complaints to law society — Claim should be struckas it was deficient.

Public law --- Crown — Practice and procedure involving Crown in right of Canada — Institution of proceedings

Parties separated and wife petitioned for divorce — Years of legal proceedings ensued — Plaintiff husband failedto pay court-ordered interim support — As result, his answer and counter petition were struck — When matterof division of marital property and ongoing support came before court for final determination, wife was awardedlump sum equivalent of $800 per month spousal support over 10-year period due to plaintiff's complete disregardfor earlier court orders — Plaintiff's non-payment of support continued — Director of Family Responsibility Officeobtained enforcement order and arrears were fixed at $45,337.58 — Plaintiff brought action against provincialCrown — Crown brought motion to strike action pursuant to R. 21.01(1)(b) of Rules of Civil Procedure, and byreason of plaintiff's failure to comply with statutory notice provisions — Motion granted — Claim against Crownfailed to comply with s. 7(1) of Proceedings Against the Crown Act and was nullity on that basis — Pleadingwas directed at legislation and general government policy, rather than operational decisions or actions, and wasunsustainable — There was no basis for Crown liability based on impugned conduct of its agents or servants —Crown was not responsible for law society or its decisions; nor could it be held liable in tort for alleged "genderbased discrimination" in Family Court system — It was plain and obvious that claim could not succeed.

Public law --- Crown — Principles of tort regarding Crown — Liability of Crown for torts of servants — Conditionsfor imposition of liability — Whether duty of care existing




Parties separated and wife petitioned for divorce — Years of legal proceedings ensued — Plaintiff husband failedto pay court-ordered interim support — As result, his answer and counter petition were struck — When matterof division of marital property and ongoing support came before court for final determination, wife was awardedlump sum equivalent of $800 per month spousal support over 10-year period due to plaintiff's complete disregardfor earlier court orders — Plaintiff's non-payment of support continued — Director of Family Responsibility Officeobtained enforcement order and arrears were fixed at $45,337.58 — Plaintiff brought action against provincialCrown — Crown brought motion to strike action pursuant to R. 21.01(1)(b) of Rules of Civil Procedure, and byreason of plaintiff's failure to comply with statutory notice provisions — Motion granted — Claim against Crownfailed to comply with s. 7(1) of Proceedings Against the Crown Act and was nullity on that basis — Pleadingwas directed at legislation and general government policy, rather than operational decisions or actions, and wasunsustainable — There was no basis for Crown liability based on impugned conduct of its agents or servants —Crown was not responsible for law society or its decisions; nor could it be held liable in tort for alleged "genderbased discrimination" in Family Court system — It was plain and obvious that claim could not succeed.

Constitutional law --- Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Nature of rights and freedoms — Equality rights — Generalprinciples

No reasonable cause of action disclosed in purported claim based on "rampant discrimination against fathers andmen in general".

Constitutional law --- Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Nature of rights and freedoms — Life, liberty and security— General principles

Presumption of innocence not engaged in default proceedings under Family Responsibility and Support ArrearsEnforcement Act, 1996.

Family law --- Support — Spousal support under Divorce Act and provincial statutes — Enforcement of award —General principles

Presumption of innocence not engaged in default proceedings under Family Responsibility and Support ArrearsEnforcement Act, 1996.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by Jarvis J.:

Brignolio v. Desmarais, Keenan (1995), 1995 CarswellOnt 4761 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — followed

Brignolio v. Desmarais, Keenan (1996), 1996 CarswellOnt 5875 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Brignolio v. Desmarais, Keenan (November 4, 1996), Doc. 25403 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Calvert v. Law Society of Upper Canada (1981), 32 O.R. (2d) 176, 121 D.L.R. (3d) 169, 1981 CarswellOnt 782(Ont. H.C.) — referred to

Canam Enterprises Inc. v. Coles (2000), 139 O.A.C. 1, 5 C.P.C. (5th) 218, 2000 CarswellOnt 4739, 51 O.R. (3d)481, 194 D.L.R. (4th) 648 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Canam Enterprises Inc. v. Coles (2002), 167 O.A.C. 1, 24 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 61 O.R. (3d) 416 (note), [2002] 3 S.C.R.307, 2002 SCC 63, 2002 CarswellOnt 3261, 2002 CarswellOnt 3262, 220 D.L.R. (4th) 466, 296 N.R. 257 (S.C.C.)— referred to

http://nextcanada.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&pubNum=6407&serNum=1995402115&originationContext=document&transitionType=Document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&contextData=(sc.History*oc.Search)











Carnegie v. Rasmussen Starr Ruddy (1994), 19 O.R. (3d) 272, 1994 CarswellOnt 865 (Ont. Gen. Div.) —considered

Club Pro Adult Entertainment Inc. v. Ontario (2006), 2006 CarswellOnt 8170, 150 C.R.R. (2d) 1, 27 B.L.R. (4th)227 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Cooper v. Hobart (2001), [2002] 1 W.W.R. 221, 2001 CarswellBC 2502, 2001 CarswellBC 2503, 2001 SCC 79,8 C.C.L.T. (3d) 26, 206 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 96 B.C.L.R. (3d) 36, (sub nom. Cooper v. Registrar of MortgageBrokers (B.C.)) 277 N.R. 113, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537, (sub nom. Cooper v. Registrar of Mortgage Brokers (B.C.))160 B.C.A.C. 268, (sub nom. Cooper v. Registrar of Mortgage Brokers (B.C.)) 261 W.A.C. 268 (S.C.C.) —considered

Dufort Testing Services Ltd. v. Berube (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 8053 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Dufort Testing Services Ltd. v. Berube (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 7042 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Edwards v. Law Society of Upper Canada (2000), 188 D.L.R. (4th) 613, 2000 CarswellOnt 1964, 24 Admin. L.R.(3d) 203, 46 C.P.C. (4th) 30, 1 C.C.L.T. (3d) 193, 133 O.A.C. 286, (sub nom. Edwards v. Law Society of UpperCanada (No. 2)) 48 O.R. (3d) 329 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

Edwards v. Law Society of Upper Canada (2001), 34 Admin. L.R. (3d) 38, 2001 CarswellOnt 3962, 2001CarswellOnt 3963, 2001 SCC 80, 8 C.C.L.T. (3d) 153, 13 C.P.C. (5th) 35, 206 D.L.R. (4th) 211, 277 N.R. 145,[2001] 3 S.C.R. 562, (sub nom. Edwards v. Law Society of Upper Canada (No. 2)) 56 O.R. (3d) 456 (headnoteonly), 153 O.A.C. 388 (S.C.C.) — followed

Foy v. Foy (No. 2) (1979), 1979 CarswellOnt 458, 26 O.R. (2d) 220, 12 C.P.C. 188, 102 D.L.R. (3d) 342 (Ont.C.A.) — referred to

French v. Law Society of Upper Canada (1975), 9 O.R. (2d) 473, 61 D.L.R. (3d) 28, 1975 CarswellOnt 907 (Ont.C.A.) — followed

Hartmann v. Hartmann (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 136 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Hunt v. T & N plc (1990), 1990 CarswellBC 216, 43 C.P.C. (2d) 105, 117 N.R. 321, 4 C.O.H.S.C. 173 (headnoteonly), (sub nom. Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc.) [1990] 6 W.W.R. 385, 49 B.C.L.R. (2d) 273, (sub nom. Hunt v.Carey Canada Inc.) 74 D.L.R. (4th) 321, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959, 1990 CarswellBC 759, 4 C.C.L.T. (2d) 1 (S.C.C.)— referred to

Lang Michener Lash Johnston v. Fabian (1987), 16 C.P.C. (2d) 93, 59 O.R. (2d) 353, 37 D.L.R. (4th) 685, 1987CarswellOnt 378 (Ont. H.C.) — considered

Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) (1999), 170 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 1999 CarswellNat 359,1999 CarswellNat 360, (sub nom. Law v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development)) 60 C.R.R.(2d) 1, 236 N.R. 1, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, 43 C.C.E.L. (2d) 49, (sub nom. Law v. Minister of Human ResourcesDevelopment) 1999 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8350 (headnote only) (S.C.C.) — referred to

Lawrence v. Peel Regional Police Force (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 608, 250 D.L.R. (4th) 287 (Ont. C.A.) —distinguished

































Mancuso v. Mancuso (1991), 35 R.F.L. (3d) 265, 1991 CarswellOnt 319 (Ont. Prov. Div.) — referred to

Mascan Corp. v. French (1988), 26 O.A.C. 326, 1988 CarswellOnt 1031, 64 O.R. (2d) 1, 49 D.L.R. (4th) 434(Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Ontario (Family Responsibility Office) v. Stockton (2000), 2000 CarswellOnt 3675 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to

Shuman v. Ontario New Home Warranty Program (2001), 2001 CarswellOnt 3666 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered

Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79 (2003), 232 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 9 Admin. L.R. (4th) 161, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77,17 C.R. (6th) 276, 2003 SCC 63, 2003 CarswellOnt 4328, 2003 CarswellOnt 4329, 311 N.R. 201, 2003 C.L.L.C.220-071, 179 O.A.C. 291, 120 L.A.C. (4th) 225, 31 C.C.E.L. (3d) 216 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Toronto Dominion Bank v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells (1991), 8 C.C.L.T. (2d) 322, 5 O.R. (3d) 417, 1991CarswellOnt 768 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Voratovic v. Law Society of Upper Canada (1978), 20 O.R. (2d) 214, 1978 CarswellOnt 772, 87 D.L.R. (3d) 140(Ont. H.C.) — considered

Statutes considered:

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11

Generally — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 11(d) — referred to

s. 15(1) — referred to


Courts of Justice Act, 1984, S.O. 1984, c. 11s. 150 — referred to

Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 31Generally — referred to

Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8Generally — referred to

s. 9 — considered

Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27Generally — referred to
















s. 7(1) — considered

Rules considered:

Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99Generally — referred to

R. 15(14)(a) — considered

Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194Generally — referred to

R. 21 — referred to

R. 21.01(1)(b) — considered

R. 21.01(2)(b) — considered

R. 21.01(3)(d) — considered

R. 25.11 — considered

R. 59.06(2) — considered

MOTION by defendants to strike action as frivolous and vexatious and abuse of process.

Jarvis J.:

1 The defendants brought this motion principally on the ground that this action is frivolous and vexatious in natureand is essentially an abuse of process.

Background

2 This matter has a lengthy history. I will attempt to briefly outline the background. Peter Hartmann ("Mr. Hartmann")and Jaroslava Frantel ("Ms. Frantel") separated in 1999, having begun cohabitating in 1979 and marrying in 1985. In1999, Ms. Frantel issued a petition for divorce. Years of legal proceedings followed. Two main issues arose: the firstbeing the division of matrimonial property and spousal support, the second being proceedings to enforce support orders.

3 In March 2002, Wright J. awarded Ms. Frantel interim exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and interimsupport. Mr. Hartmann paid no support and in May 2002, the Court ordered that his Answer and Counter Petitionwould be struck if the previously ordered support was not paid within 30 days. Mr. Hartmann's failure to pay promptedan Order by Low J. to strike his pleadings in September 2002. His appeal from Low J.'s Order was dismissed by theCourt of Appeal in January 2004. Mr. Hartmann also attempted to appeal the Order of Wright J., which was rejectedby the Divisional Court on March 2, 2004.

4 Owing to his earlier Answer and Counter Petition being struck, Mr. Hartmann had no standing to make submissionswhen the matter of division of marital property and ongoing support came before Croll J. for final determination inMay 2004. In the uncontested trial, Croll J. awarded the equivalent of $800/month spousal support over a ten-yearperiod to be paid by lump sum ($47,735.25) owing to Mr. Hartmann's complete disregard for earlier court orders. Mr.Hartmann's appeal to the Court of Appeal on this matter was dismissed on January 19, 2005 [Hartmann v. Hartmann,





2005 CarswellOnt 136 (Ont. C.A.)]. His subsequent application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canadawas dismissed in June 2005.

5 In March 2002, the Director of the Family Responsibility Office ("FRO") started enforcement action against Mr.Hartmann for the interim support awarded by Wright J. The enforcement was postponed, at Mr. Hartmann's requestfor a delay, until the matter came before Croll J. After final determination, his non-payment continued. The Director'sapplication for enforcement came before Katarynych J. of the Ontario Court of Justice on April 4, 2004, and both theDirector and Mr. Hartmann made submissions.

6 Katarynych J. issued the Order sought by the Director, citing specifically Mr. Hartmann's failure to make full andfrank disclosure of his financial affairs. Arrears were fixed at $45, 337.58, to be discharged in full by June 30, 2005, failingwhich Mr. Hartmann was to be imprisoned for a period of 90 days. Mr. Hartmann's appeal of this Order was dismissedin November 2005 by Backhouse J. with costs payable by Mr. Hartmann to the FRO.

7 Thereafter, Mr. Hartmann commenced the present action by way of statement of claim. The defendants have movedfor relief as follows:

Ms. Amourgis

(a) For an order dismissing the action pursuant to rule 21.01 (3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990,Reg. 194, on the basis that the action is frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.

(b) To strike the statement of claim pursuant to Rule 25.11 as being abusive, scandalous, frivolous, vexatiousand prejudicial to a fair trial

The Law Society of Upper Canada

(a) To strike the statement of claim as it: discloses no cause of action, pursuant to Rule 21.01(b) and is an abuseof process in that it seeks to re-litigate matters, pursuant to rule 21.01(3)(d).

(b) In the alternative, the Law Society submits that the claim offends the rules of pleading in a variety of waysand should thus be struck pursuant to Rule 25.11.

Her Majesty the Queen in the Right of Ontario

(a) For an order striking the statement of claim pursuant to Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

(b) Striking the action by reason of the plaintiff's failure to comply with the provisions of section 7(1) ofthe Proceedings Against the Crown Act requiring service of a notice of the claim at least 60 days before thecommencement of the action.

8 I note that in motions brought pursuant to Rule 21.01(1)(b), no evidence is admissible as directed by 21.01 (2)(b).I must take the allegations in the Statement of claim to be true and afford them a broad and liberal interpretation inMr. Hartmann's favour.

Admissibility Issues

9 There were two issues regarding admissibility which were raised at the outset of argument. The first was theadmissibility of the compendium and the second was an affidavit offered by the Crown on the issue of notice underProceedings Against the Crown Act, c. P. 27 ("PACA").

10 Mr. Hartmann took objection to the admission of the compendium saying that these documents were irrelevant tothe present proceedings as they involved matters which had already been decided and also involved different defendantsand issues than in the present case.





11 Proceedings in court are public and their use in another proceeding is limited primarily to the issue of their relevanceto that proceeding. Here, one of the core issues before me is whether the present proceedings are frivolous, vexatious, oran abuse of process. To decide this issue without recourse to the record of the earlier proceeding would be impossible.These records are relevant and are admissible for this limited purpose. See Foy v. Foy (No. 2) (1979), 102 D.L.R. (3d)342 (Ont. C.A.).

12 Ms. Daley, on behalf of Ms. Amourgis, prepared a "re-litigation of issues" chart (appended hereto) which waspresented as part of her argument. The source of this summary is the six volume compendium referred to above. Apartfrom Mr. Hartmann's argument relating to the admissibility of the compendium, he took no issue with the accuracy ofthe chart. In coming to my decision, I have referred to the chart and the underlying compendium in a general fashion.I have not attempted to verify the accuracy of each entry in the chart.

13 The Crown sought to admit an affidavit by Chancey Glass, a clerk with the Ministry of the Attorney General,dealing with the issue as to whether notice of the claim had been given by the plaintiff in accordance with the PACA.The plaintiff took no serious objection to that affidavit, but rather asked that his own affidavit be admitted with nointerpretation of these events. No objection was taken to that by the Crown and I ruled that the affidavit is to be received.

Analysis

14 The essence of the defendants' submissions is that the very issues raised here as the underlying acts giving riseto the relief claimed have already been litigated and decided against Mr. Hartmann. In response, Mr. Hartmann saysessentially that these proceedings are against different parties and involve different issues and that I ought hot to grantthe relief sought. For the sake of convenience, I propose to deal with the issues of the defendants separately althoughthey do overlap to a large extent.

15 The test for striking out a statement of claim is whether, assuming all facts pleaded can be proven, it is plainand obvious that the claim cannot succeed. It must be read generously with allowance for inadequacies due to draftingdeficiencies. See: Hunt v. T & N plc, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959 (S.C.C.), at 979-980; Toronto Dominion Bank v. Deloitte, Haskins& Sells (1991), 5 O.R. (3d) 417 (Ont. Gen. Div.), at 419 . This applies to Rule 21 motions. Given that both Ms. Amourgisand the Law Society moved under 21.01(3)(d), I will outline the legal principles that are applicable to both together.

16 The rules which apply speak of frivolous and vexatious proceedings. The Oxford English dictionary defines thosewords as follows:

Frivolous — "manifestly futile";

Futile — "incapable of producing any result"; useless, ineffectual, vain.

Vexatious — "of legal actions; Instituted without sufficient grounds for the purpose of causing trouble or allianceto the defendants".

These words clearly characterize what the plaintiff seeks to accomplish by this action. No. positive result is possible forhim.

17 The Court has the inherent power and residual discretion to invoke the doctrine of abuse of process to controlits own process apart from Rule 21.01(3)(d): Canam Enterprises Inc. v. Coles (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.), rev'don other grounds (2002), 220 D.L.R. (4th) 466 (S.C.C.).

18 In Canam Enterprises Inc. v. Coles, supra, Mr. Justice Finlayson noted, at para. 31, that the doctrine of abuse ofprocess can be relied upon by persons "who were not parties to the previous litigation, but who claim that if they weregoing to be sued they should have been sued in the previous litigation."











19 Generally, proceedings have been held to be vexatious, as objectively determined, in circumstances where therewere no reasonable grounds to institute the action, the issue has already been determined by the court, or the litigantpersistently pursues unsuccessful appeals. See Foy v. Foy (No. 2), supra; Mascan Corp. v. French (1988), 49 D.L.R. (4th)434 (Ont. C.A.); and Lang Michener Lash Johnston v. Fabian, 1987 CarswellOnt 378, 37 D.L.R. (4th) 685 (Ont. H.C.).

20 The Court in Lang Michener Lash Johnston v. Fabian, supra, at para. 20, considered the criteria for determiningwhether an action is vexatious within the meaning of section 150 of the Courts of Justice Act (now section 140). Theseinclude:

(a) the bringing of one or more actions to determine an issue which has already been determined by a court ofcompetent jurisdiction constitutes a vexatious proceeding;

(b) where it is obvious that an action cannot succeed, or if the action would lead to no possible good, or if noreasonable person can reasonably expect to obtain relief, the action is vexatious;

(c) vexatious actions include those brought for an improper purpose, including the harassment and oppressionof other parties by multifarious proceedings brought for purposes other than the assertion of legitimate rights;

. . .

(e) in determining whether proceedings are vexatious, the court must look at the whole history of the matterand not just whether there was originally a good cause of action;

(f) the failure of the person instituting the proceedings to pay the costs of unsuccessful proceedings is one factorto be considered in determining whether proceedings are vexatious;

(g) the respondent's conduct in persistently taking unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions can beconsidered vexatious conduct of legal proceedings.

21 Courts have recognized that an abuse of process occurs when litigants are intent on re-litigating or re-defendingcauses of action or issues that have already been decided. Abuse of process by litigation has now become an accepteddoctrine. See Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, [2003] S.C.J. No. 64 (S.C.C.), at paras. 35 and 37.

Ms. Amourgis

22 The statement of claim alleges various ways that Ms. Amourgis lied to the court and thereby harmed the plaintiff.Ms. Amourgis appeared as counsel for the wife. She was not a witness and did not testify. The allegations in the statementof claim can therefore only mean that she misstated the evidence to the court and/or misstated the applicable law.

23 The propriety of the conduct of trial and counsel's behavior are entirely within the purview of a trial judge. Judgeshear argument and make rulings which are subject to appeal. Mr. Hartmann has appealed almost every issue that canconceivably be seen in the current pleading and appellate courts have consistently decided against him.

24 Insofar as the statement of claim can be said to assert that Ms. Amourgis was a party to a conspiracy against theplaintiff, it is clear that a lawyer, in acting for a client, is merely an agent of the individual and not a distinct entity andtherefore incapable of being a party to a conspiracy. See: Dufort Testing Services Ltd. v. Berube, 2004 CarswellOnt 8053(Ont. S.C.J.), aff'd 2005 CarswellOnt 7042 (Ont. C.A.).

25 Generally a lawyer holds no duty to the opposite party. This issue was before the court in Brignolio v. Desmarais,Keenan, 1995 CarswellOnt 4761 (Ont. Gen. Div.), appeal dismissed [1996] O.J. No. 4812 (Ont. C.A.), appeal dismissed[1996] S.C.C.A. No. 326 (S.C.C.). In his decision, Lane J. held, at para.17, that an action does not lie against an adverse















party based on breaches of ethical duties since such duties are owed to the Court and to the Law Society of UpperCanada, but not to the opposite party in litigation.

If the policy of the court were otherwise, the same difficulties would arise as would arise in the case of negligence.There would be a temptation, which many would find irresistible, to re-litigate in actions against their opponent'scounsel the issues which they have lost in the main litigation, or to attempt to handicap the other side by eliminatingexperienced and knowledgeable counsel from the case. The public policy in such instances is referred to by LordDonaldson of Lymington M.R. in Al-Kandari v. J.R. Brown & Co. [1988] 1 All E.R. 833 at p. 835 cited in the Cluthecase (supra) as follows:

I would go rather further and say that, in the context of 'hostile' litigation, public policies were usually required thata solicitor be protected from a claim in negligence by his client's opponent, since such claims could be used as abasis for endless relitigation of disputes.

In my view, the same principles apply to allegations of breaches of ethical conduct.

26 Similarly in Shuman v. Ontario New Home Warranty Program, 2001 CarswellOnt 3666 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 25,Swinton J. held that such claims cannot succeed:

"Moreover, as to the claims against [the opposing party's solicitors] in negligence, or breach of fiduciary duty, thereis no legal authority to support the proposition that a solicitor for a party owes a duty of care to an opposingparty. Therefore, there is no basis for a claim in negligence or fiduciary duty against these defendants (Geo. ClutheManufacturing Co. v. ZTW Properties Inc. (1995), 23 O.R. (3d) 370 (Ont. Div. Ct.) at 380). Moreover, it has beenheld that complaints relating to an opposing solicitor's allegedly unethical conduct during proceedings does notprovide a basis for a cause of action (Brignolio v. Desmarais, Keenan & Robert...), appeal dismissed (Ont. C.A.).

27 One exception to this rule is fraud. The Rules of Civil Procedure and the Family Law Rules specifically address howan order might be challenged on the basis of fraud. Rule 59.06(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure states:

A party who seeks to,

(a) have an order set aside or varied on the grounds of fraud or of facts arising or discovered after it was made; ....

May make a motion in the proceeding for the relief claimed

Rule 15(14) of the Family Law Rule states:

The Court may, on motion, change an order that,

(a) was obtained by fraud; ...

(Emphasis added)

28 Mr. Hartmann referred me to the decision of Sharpe J.A. in Lawrence v. Peel Regional Police Force, [2005] O.J.No. 604 (Ont. C.A.). A motions judge had struck a pleading in a statement of claim as disclosing no reasonable causeof action. In that case, the defendant solicitor was alleged to have advised his client (the wife) "to fabricate allegationsof criminal conduct ... which he knew to be false" and that he "counseled, directed, advised, and instructed" (the wife)to lay seven criminal charges against (the husband) and that he "advised and coached (the wife) to give false evidenceagainst (the husband) in the criminal proceedings in order to gain advantage in the matrimonial litigation".

29 In reviewing the motion judge's decision, Mr. Justice Sharpe, for the majority, ruled, at para. 6:

http://nextcanada.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1988181662&pubNum=0004660&originatingDoc=I4ffe1bed226900fde0440003ba0d6c6d&refType=IC&fi=co_pp_sp_4660_835&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.History*oc.Search)#co_pp_sp_4660_835


http://nextcanada.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1995397464&pubNum=0005506&originatingDoc=I4ffe1bed226900fde0440003ba0d6c6d&refType=IC&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.History*oc.Search)

http://nextcanada.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1995397464&pubNum=0005506&originatingDoc=I4ffe1bed226900fde0440003ba0d6c6d&refType=IC&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.History*oc.Search)






In my view, these facts are at least arguably capable of implicating the respondent in several intentional torts,including false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and civil conspiracy. These intentional torts,unlike negligence, are not defeated by the rule that a lawyer owes no duty to the opposite party in litigation.

30 Justice Sharpe said at para. 8,

I recognize that in this case it is not pleaded that the respondent had any direct contact with the police, whoimprisoned and prosecuted the appellant. However, no established legal principle prevents a third party from beingconsidered liable as an instigator of an intentional tort. The torts of abuse of process and civil conspiracy are stilldeveloping, and their outer limits have not been defined. The legal issues this case raises would be best consideredon a full record after trial.

In any event Lawrence is distinguishable in that the wife in the present case had recourse to the criminal proceedingsbefore Ms. Amourgis was retained.

31 Ms. Amourgis owed Mr. Hartmann no duty. The only remedy unavailable to him against Ms. Amourgis in theother proceedings was damages. He could have achieved adverse cost orders against his ex-wife and Ms. Amourgis hadhis arguments been successful. The facts which might have underlay any award of damages against Ms. Amourgis havebeen litigated. The fact that Amourgis was not a party is relevant only to the remedy of damages. All other availablerelief against her has been litigated by him without success.

32 I recognize that the allegations against Ms. Amourgis might be recast and reformulated in many ways. While Imust take the allegations in the statement of claim to be true on the issue of cause of action, I consider it my duty toconsider this action in the context of what has preceded it. I remain convinced that this action amounts to re-litigatingissues previously tried and is an abuse of process.

The Law Society of Upper Canada

33 The Law Society submits that only eight paragraphs of the statement of claim relate to the plaintiff's claim againstthat body. The Law Society in its factum fairly summarizes those paragraphs:

(a) That the Law Society "repeatedly failed in its statutory duty to protect the public in general — and the plaintiffin particular — from Amourgis"...;

(b) That Amourgis, having been disbarred in 1987, was re-admitted to the bar in 1999;

(c) That upon her reinstatement she continued in a pattern of "gross professional misconduct", motivated by whatHartmann alleges to be "a clearly obvious attempt to recover — by means, legal or illegal — the huge economicloses [sic] caused by her 12 year disbarment and thus denial of access to the legal profession's overflowing moneytrough ..."

(d) He further alleges that this conduct "can be explained as her ruthless revenge on society (and the Plaintiff) forher 12 year disbarment". Presumably this refers to the Law Society;

(e) That he made complaints against Amourgis to the Law Society; and

(f) That the Law Society's "lack of response to the Plaintiff's complaints clearly indicate that it has not concerneditself with any of these facts, and thus must take full responsibility for its inaction".

34 The Law Society also observes that the plaintiff does not allege that it acted with malice in its response tothe plaintiff's complaint and that the statement of claim does not assert that the Law Society knew of Amourgis's"misconduct" in the conduct of the wife's case.





35 The potential liability of the Law Society and its officials is governed by section 9 of the Law Society Act whichprovides as follows:

Liability of benchers, officers and employees

9. No action or other proceedings for damages shall be instituted against the Treasurer or any bencher, officialof the Society or person appointed in Convocation for any act done in good faith in the performance or intendedperformance of any duty or in the exercise or in the intended exercise of any power under this Act, a regulation, abylaw or a rule of practice and procedure, or for any neglect or default in the performance or exercise in good faithof any such duty or power. R.S.O. 1990, c.L.8, s.9; 1998,c.21,s.4.

36 Since the plaintiff does not allege bad faith on the part of the Law Society, no cause of action against it is madeout in the statement of claim.

37 The Law Society argues that at every stage of the matrimonial litigation, including appeals and matters involvingthe FRO, the plaintiff raised the identical allegations against Ms. Amourgis as he raises in this claim. These allegationsalso form the foundation of his claim against the Law Society. All levels of court have dealt with these allegations andhave rejected them. These decisions are res judicata and are not subject to a collateral attack by the present action.

38 In French v. Law Society of Upper Canada (1975), 9 O.R. (2d) 473 (Ont. C.A.), the principles applicable in suchproceedings are instructive:

We are all satisfied that the acts of this Society's functionaries, complained of as being tainted with negligence, werepart of the performance of a quasi judicial function of the respondent Society ... The investigative function of theLaw Society and the preparation and swearing of the complaints against the appellant solicitor were discretionary andquasi judicial acts pursuant to a statutory duty and called for the exercise of discretion and judgment on the part of theofficials concerned ... If on the Harris and Partridge decisions defective proceedings of the statutory body do notgive rise to a cause of action for damages, a fortiori, regular proceedings, judicial in nature, cannot be attacked onthe grounds of negligence. Therefore we are all of the view that this action based on negligence was certain to fail.

(emphasis added)

39 Another useful decision is Edwards v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 562 (S.C.C.). In Edwards,at the Court of Appeal, (2000), 48 O.R. (3d) 329 (Ont. C.A.), Mr. Justice Finlayson gave reasons and concluded thatthe law "clearly establishes a judicial immunity from negligence for the Law Society's discipline process, including theinvestigative functions at the front end". Justice Finlayson concluded that imposing liability on the Law Society would,absent bad faith, be inconsistent with its "public interest" role.

40 In Voratovic v. Law Society of Upper Canada (1978), 20 O.R. (2d) 214 (Ont. H.C.), the plaintiff complained to theLaw Society regarding the conduct of a solicitor who had acted against him in a lawsuit. The Law Society decided totake no further steps regarding the complaint. Cromarty J. held the Law Society was not liable for the erroneous exerciseof its discretion, provided it acted bona fide without malice. See also: Calvert v. Law Society of Upper Canada (1981),32 O.R. (2d) 176 (Ont. H.C.).

41 The decision of Chadwick J. in Carnegie v. Rasmussen Starr Ruddy (1994), 19 O.R. (3d) 272 (Ont. Gen. Div.)involved somewhat similar circumstances to those of the present case. The Law Society was sued on the basis on asolicitor's alleged wrongdoing. It was alleged that the Law Society was liable for these improper actions "by virtue of theLaw Society knowingly condoning such flagrant and illegal practices by their registered members and professionals." Indismissing the case against the Law Society, Chadwick J. said,











The Law Society of Upper Canada cannot be held responsible nor is it required to conduct a supervisory role intothe day to day actions of every solicitor in the province of Ontario. Likewise the Law Society has no obligation to laydisciplinary charges against its members based upon every complainant who writes to them. ...

(emphasis added)

42 Here the plaintiff has failed to connect his complaints to the Law Society. There is no logical connection possiblebetween the complaints in paras. 1 to 7 of the statement of claim and the damages which are claimed. The claim isdeficient and for that reason should be struck.

43 The Law Society in its submission supported the submissions of Amourgis with respect to the statement of claim.It was their submission that the defects could not be cured by amendment and I agree with this proposition.

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario

44 The test, as above, is whether it is plain and obvious that the claim cannot succeed. It is the submission of theCrown that Mr. Hartmann's statement of claim is deficient in that the allegations do not give rise to a recognized cause ofaction and that those parts of the statement of claim which plead a recognized cause of action fail to plead the necessarylegal elements. The Crown has raised a number of separate issues, each alone which could provide the basis for strikingthe claim. I will deal with them in turn.

Non-Compliance with PACA

45 The Crown submits that Hartmann failed to comply with the provisions of the Proceedings Against the Crown Actand that his actions are a nullity insofar as that, a proceeding against the Crown. Section 7(1) of PACA provides:

.... no action for a claim shall be commenced against the crown unless the claimant has, at least sixty days before thecommencement of the action, served on the crown a notice of the claim containing sufficient particulars to identifythe occasion out of which the claim arose, and the Attorney General may require such additional particulars as inhis or her opinion are necessary to enable the claim to be investigated.

46 The evidence discloses that the Crown had received no notice as required in section 7(1) when the statement ofclaim was served. The Crown quite fairly offered to treat that statement of claim as notice. Mr. Hartmann waited forthe required 60 days and re-served the existing statement of claim. By doing so, his breach of the PACA continued.He needed only to have discontinued the action and commenced a new one and served that new statement of claim onthe Crown. This procedure was outlined to Mr. Hartmann by letter dated August 7, 2007, from Mr. Scharbach. Mr.Hartmann failed to heed this advice and the present action remains a nullity against the Crown.

47 This alone provides the basis for striking the statement of claim. However, I will deal with other bases upon whichthe claim could be struck.

Claim based on policy and legislation.

48 Paragraphs 129 to 173 of the statement of claim detail these aspects of the claim. It is specifically acknowledgedthat the claim is not directed at those who carry out such policies but rather at the Government of Ontario which causesdamages arising from

a deliberate, systemic, pervasive and unconstitutionally discriminatory malice targeted against a major segment ofour society — the adult male population — which the Government of Ontario legislated and institutionalized underan overwhelming pressure from politically overpowering women's protection groups.




49 In Cooper v. Hobart, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court of Canada discussed the appropriate test todetermine whether a public authority owes a private law of duty of care to an individual. The Court found, at para. 38,that government actors are not liable in negligence for policy decisions, only operational ones.

50 Similarly, a legislature cannot be held liable for anything it does in exercising its legislative powers: Club Pro AdultEntertainment Inc. v. Ontario, [2006] O.J. No. 5027 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras. 101-102.

51 This pleading is clearly directed against the legislation and general policy of the Government of Ontario and is notdirected at operational decisions or actions, and it is unsustainable.

Conduct by Agents/Servants of Her Majesty the Queen

52 The allegations contained in the statement of claim regarding the decisions and actions taken both by agentsor servants of Her Majesty the Queen (FRO, Crown Attorneys) fail to disclose any cause of action. The plaintiff hasspecifically stated that their actions were in compliance with the extant legislative and policy framework at the time.There is no tort alleged. There is simply no basis for liability of the Crown to be based on the impugned conduct (sees.5(2), PACA).

Ontario Policing Standards Manual

53 The Crown submits that the allegations regarding the Ontario Policing Standards Manual — Police Response toWife Assault are frivolous and vexatious, and on this basis should be struck. The Crown submits that it is improper tomisquote or misrepresent the contents of the Manual.

54 In line with Rule 21.01(3)(d) and case law discussed above, I find that the plaintiff's misrepresentation of theManual is misleading and provides another basis for striking his claim.

Responsibility for the Law Society

55 The Crown submits that the plaintiff's claim regarding the Government of Ontario's responsibility for LSUC isbased on incorrect premises. First, that the Crown can be held liable in tort for the establishment of legislation, namelythe Law Society Act. Second, that the Crown is liable for the LSUC.

56 I accept the Crown's submission on both counts. The Law Society is an independent professional body with itsown discipline system. Apart from passing the legislation that created the Law Society, the Crown has no responsibility,direct or otherwise, for the LSUC or its decisions.

Family Court System

57 The plaintiff has attempted to claim that the Government of Ontario could be held liable for the "embedded andpervasive gender based discrimination in the Family Court System" and goes on to cite specific decisions rendered byjustices on the bench.

58 I agree with the submissions of the Crown. The Crown cannot be held liable in tort for decisions made by judgescarrying out their judicial functions (see PACA, s.5(6)). There is no basis in law for such a claim.

Crown Attorney's Office

59 The plaintiff attempted to commence a private prosecution against Ms. Amourgis and Ms. Frantel, which itappears as though the attending Crown Attorney at the hearing declined to support the issuance of process. The plaintiffalleges the Crown is liable in damages for an alleged policy that he says required the Crown to refuse to support hisprivate prosecution.






60 For the same reasons set out above under "Claims based on policy and legislation," the plaintiff's claim disclosesno cause of action. In the absence of malice or fraud, a Crown cannot be held liable for decisions or actions taken inthe course of his/her duties. With no cause of action against the servant/agent of Her Majesty the Queen, no liabilitycan be imposed. This claim must be struck.

Charter Claim — Discrimination

61 The plaintiff attempted to ground a claim on s.15(1) of the Charter, alleging that there was "rampant discriminationagainst fathers and men in general". This claim arose out of dealing with the FRO, related legislation, and the OntarioPolicing Manual.

62 Mr. Hartmann has failed to set out the most basic grounds that are required in a s.15(1) claim: Law v. Canada(Minister of Employment & Immigration) (1999), 170 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.). There is no reasonable cause of actiondisclosed in his purported s.15(1) Charter claim.

Charter Claim — Presumption of Innocence

63 Mr. Hartmann claimed that the default hearing procedure contained in the Family Responsibility and SupportArrears Enforcement Act, S.O. 1996, c. 31, ("FRSAEA") violated his right to be presumed innocent (and wouldtheoretically violate s.11 (d) of the Charter, although the Charter breach is not specifically pleaded).

64 While he has not grounded his claim in the Charter, that is where we look to find the basis for one's right to bepresumed innocent. Section 11 however is not engaged in the context of default proceedings under the FRSAEA as beingin default does not constitute an "offence" for the purposes of s.11. See: Mancuso v. Mancuso, [1991] O.J. No. 1291 (Ont.Prov. Div.); Ontario (Family Responsibility Office) v. Stockton, [2000] O.J. No. 3812 (Ont. Div. Ct.).

65 The plaintiff brought a claim based on s.11(d) before Backhouse J. in previous proceedings. In addition to disclosingno cause of action here, this issue is also res judicata and a further abuse of process.

Damages Claim

66 While I have found the plaintiff's claims of Charter violations disclose no reasonable cause of action and must bestruck, I will note here as well that there is no basis that would support resort to remedies under s.24(1) of the Charter.

67 Mr. Hartmann's pleadings do not give rise to any claims of bad faith, abuse of power, or clearly wrong conducton the part of the Government.

Conclusion

68 For all these reasons, this action is dismissed in its entirety. There is no possibility that any amendment could serveto make it whole. The plaintiff's statement of claim is struck and the action dismissed against all defendants.

69 The defendants are clearly entitled to their costs, if demanded. I will accept written submissions in this regardif necessary.

Motion granted and action dismissed.

APPENDIX

Re-Litigation of Issues Chart

Conductalleged tohave been

Hartmanv.

Amourgis,

SuperiorCourt ofJustice

DivisionalCourt File

# 64/04

Court of AppealFile # C38878, File# M30840, File #

Supreme Court ofCanada File # 30830(Divorce Proceeding)

Ontario Court ofJustice File # 05-

FA-13386, File







committedby

Amourgis

et. al.,File #07-

CV-333718PD2(CurrentAction)

File #99 FP253234

FIS(Divorce

Proceeding)

(DivorceProceeding)

C41898 & M31499(Divorce Proceeding)

# F10687/03 A3,(FRO Proceeding)

Fraud SofCPara 1:AmourgisandFrantelareallegedto haveconspiredtodefraudPlaintiffof all hisassetsby wayof thedivorceproceedings.

Tab 3.MotionRecordat Tab 2paras 16:HartmannsubmitsthatAmourgistookadvantageofHartmann'sloss ofemploymentbybringing afraudulentmotionforinterimsupportandpossessionofmatrimonialhomeratherthan waitfor trial.

Tab 5, Answer's toDefendant's CrossMotion at para 16, seealso, Tab 6, Factumat tab 3 para 96 andtab 4 para 180, seealso, Tab 7, Factumpara 105, see also,Tab 8, Factum para95, see also, Tab 17Motion Record at tab2 para 16: Hartmannsubmitted thatAmourgis establisheda pattern of repeateddenial of Hartmann'sdefence by servingcourt documents onHartmann while thecourt proceedingswere in progress,and by fraudulentlyarranging courtproceedings to takeplace in Hartmann'sabsence.

Tab 29. Noticeof Dispute ofGarnishment at para1: Hartmann submitsthat as a result of thefrauds perpetratedon him by Franteland Amourgis in thedivorce settlementHartmann was leftwith no assets andtherefore unableto satisfy the fundssought by theGarnishment.

SofCPara 1:AmourgisandFrantelareallegedto havedefraudedthePlaintiffof all hisassetsby wayof thedivorceproceedings.

Tab 6, Factum at tab 4paras 113, 177(iii) seealso, Tab 7, Factumparas 72-83, seealso—Tab 8, Factumparas 81-91, see also,Tab 9, Appeal Booktab 1 para 11-14:It is submitted thatAmourgis obtainedby fraudulent meansthe March 19, 2002Interim SupportOrder and the April26, 2002 SupportDeduction Order.

SofCPara 2:Loss ofPlaintiff'shome to

Tab 10,SupplementaryFactum paras10-23. It is allegedthat Amourgis




Frantelwas aresult ofthe fraudperpetratedbyFrantelandAmourgis.—SofCPara 4:Amourgisis allegedto haveexercisedher legalskill andstrategizedin such amannerduring thedivorceproceedingsso as todefraudthePlaintiff.

colluded with Frantelto conceal fromHartmann and theCourt the facts withrespect to Frantel'sinheritance and tonot produce relateddocumentationincluding the trueLast Will.—Tab11, Cross-MotionRecord, para 16:Hartmann states thatthree weeks after thefiling of his Noticeof Appeal of theWright, J., and Low,J., Orders, Amourgisacted fraudulently tobreach Harmann'sprivacy with the useof a Summons toWitness to obtainHartmann's financialinformation for thepurpose of obtainingrelief at the October29, 2002 FinancialSettlement Trial.

SofCPara 6:LSUC isallegedto haveallowedAmourgistodefraudthePlaintiff.—SofCPara8: TheGovernmentofOntariois allegedto haveallowedAmourgistodefraudthePlaintiff.—SofCPara 42:Amourgisand




Frantelareallegedto haveperpetrateda fraudon thePlaintiffby wayof thedivorceproceedings.

SofCPara 43:AmourgisandFrantelareallegedto havedefraudedthePlaintiffof all hisassetsby wayof thedivorceproceedings.—SofCPara 47:Amourgisis allegedto haveprovided"overenthusiasticassistance"to Frantelfor thepurposeofdefraudingthePlaintiffwhich isalleged tohave beenlong-termobjectiveofFrantel.—SofCPara64: ThePlaintiffallegesthat a"crucial




step" inAmourgis'andFrantel'sfraudon thePlaintiffwas toAbusethe Courtprocessby filingcourtdocumentslate anddeny thePlaintiffanopportunityto defendagainstthesubmittedevidence.

SofCPara 82:AmourgisandFrantelsucceedin their"wickedstrategy"to deceivethe courtat theFinancialSettlementTrial withAmourgis'deceptivesubmissionsso as toperpetrateda "courtsanctionedfraud".—SofCPara92: It isallegedthat themainelementsin thestrategyofAmourgis




andFrantel todefraudthePlaintiffof hishousewere:1) "theunlawfulcircumventionof the6-yearstatutorylimit forclaims";2) "thefalseclaim ofa $10,000downpayment";3) "thehousemarketdeception";4) the"overinflatedassetclaims".

Tab 30,MotionRecord(Noting inDefault)at para 4:Hartmannsubmitsthat partof theallegedfraud tobe provenin theactioninvolvescountlessperjuriesbyAmourgisandFrantel.

Perjury SofCPara 43:AmourgisandFrantel

Tab 14,MotionRecord attab 1 para20-21:

Tab 4, MotionRecord, Appellant'sAffidavit at para14-20, also see,Tab 5, Answer's to




areallegedto havemade"countlessmajorperjuries"in courtfor thepurposesofdefraudingthePlaintiffduring thedivorceproceedings.

It issubmittedthatAmourgissworeand filedwith thecourt aAffidavitof Servicefalselyclaimingthat aNotice ofAppointmentto Settlethe Orderwasproperlyservedon thePlaintiffallowingher toobtainfrom thecourt anOrder,in theabsenceof thePlaintiff.—Tab 15,MotionRecordat tab 2para 12:HartmannsubmitsthatAmourgisused herlegal skillto takeadvantageof thecourtsystemand theunsophisticatedHartmannbyabusingthe laws,rules andengagingincriminal

Defendant's CrossMotion at para 16and 21(ii), also see,Tab 6, Factum at tab3 para 97 and tab 4paras 113, 152-157:It is submitted thatAmourgis swore andfiled with the courta Affidavit of Servicefalsely claiming that aNotice of Appointmentto Settle the Orderwas properly servedon the Plaintiffallowing her to obtainfrom the court anOrder in a form andcontent to her liking,in the absence of thePlaintiff.—Tab 6,Factum tab 4 para177(iii), see also, Tab7, Factum paras 2(ii)41), see also, Tab 8,Factum paras 2(ii),28 see also, Tab 8,Factum paras 43-45,62-63 see also, Tab13, Motion Recordat pg 4 para 19-21:Hartmann submitsthat Amourgisobtained a SupportDeduction Order andthe Interim SupportOrder by criminalacts of perjury andobstruction of justice.




acts,includingswearinga falseaffidavitfor thepurposeofdenyingHartmanna defenceandcausingthe"intentionalobstructionandperversionofjustice".

SofCPara53: It isallegedthatAmourgisandFrantelextensivelylied tothe courtunderoathaboutFrantel'sinheritanceandsource ofincome.—SofCPara 109to 113,126: It isallegedthatAmourgissworeand filedwith thecourt aAffidavitof Servicefalselyclaimingthat aNotice ofAppointmentto Settle




the Orderwasproperlyservedon thePlaintiffallowingher toobtainfrom thecourt anOrder in aform andcontent toher likingin theabsenceof thePlaintiff.

CriminalConduct

SofCPara 3:Conductalleged tohave beenperformedbyAmourgisto thedetrimentof thePlaintiffduring thedivorceproceedings.—SofCPara 4:Amourgisallegedexerciseof herlegal skillduring thedivorceproceedingsfor thepurposeofdefraudingthePlaintiffamountsis allegedto bebeyondprofessionalmisconductand to be

Tab 15,MotionRecordat tab 2para 12:HartmannsubmitsthatAmourgisused herlegal skillto takeadvantageof thecourtsystemand theunsophisticatedHartmannbyabusingthe laws,rules andengagingincriminalactsfor thepurposeofdenyingHartmanna defenceandcausingthe"intentionalobstructionand

Tab 6, Factum tab4 para 177(iii), seealso, Tab 7, Factumparas 2(ii) 41), seealso, Tab 8, Factumparas 2(ii), 38 seealso, Tab 8, Factumparas 43-45, seealso, Tab 13, MotionRecord, pg 1 para 3:Hartmann submitsthat Amourgisobtained a SupportDeduction Order andthe Interim SupportOrder by criminalacts of perjury andobstruction of justice.

Tab 26, Reply toRespondent's Responseat para 15(iii-v):Hartmann submitsthat Amourgisconduct during thedivorce proceedingscaused a miscarriageof justice and werecriminal in nature.

Tab 28, Factumat para 39(iii-iv):Hartmann submitsthat Amourgisdeceptive conductduring the divorceproceedings caused amiscarriage of justiceand is criminal innature.




a criminalact.

perversionofjustice".

Deceivingthe Court

SofCPara 43:AmourgisandFrantelareallegedto havedeceivedthe courtin anundefendedFinancialSettlementTrial.

Tab 1,RevisedFactumat Para15, seealso, Tab3, MotionRecordat tab2 paras16 to 19,34, 44:HartmannsubmitsthatAmourgisknowinglyfiled falseFinancialStatementsin supportof themotionseekinginterimsupportandpossessionof home.

Tab 14MotionRecordat tab 1para 13:HartmannsubmitsthatAmourgislied to thecourt byadvisingthatHartmannwas indefault ofa supportorderthat didnot exist.—Tab 14,MotionRecord attab 1 para14 & 19:HartmannsubmitsthatAmourgisdeceivedthe courtby filingfalseFinancialStatementsandmisleadingthe courtaboutFrantel'struefinancialsituationandhealthcondition.—Tab 14,MotionRecord attab 1 para16-18:HartmannsubmitsthatAmourgis

Tab 4, MotionRecord, Appellant'sAffidavit at para12, see also, Tab5, Answer's toDefendant's CrossMotion at para 6see also, Tab 7,Factum at paras51-53, 57, see also,Tab 8, Factum paras62-63, see also, Tab10, SupplementaryFactum at paras 1-5:Hartmann submitsthat Amourgisobtained a SupportDeduction Order andthe Interim SupportOrder by criminalacts of perjury andobstruction of justice.Hartmann statesthat Amourgiswrongfully obtainedthe Wright J.,Order by knowinglypresenting falsedocuments and claimsto the court.

Tab 25, Applicationfor Leave to Appealat pg 2 para 4:Hartmann submitsthat Amourgisknowingly providethe court falseevidence to supportthe Order of LowJ.—Tab 26, Replyto Respondent'sResponse at paras5-6 & 15: Hartmannsubmits thatAmourgis engagedin the followingdeceptive conductthroughout thedivorce proceedings:—i) that Amourgisfailed to deliverupdated financialstatements;—ii)deliberately concealedthe date of the trialfrom Hartmann toprevent him fromupdating his financialstatements.—iii)Amourgis submittedmisled the courtabout Frantel'sfinances, her healthand her father'salleged purchaseof the matrimonialhome.

Tab 27, Notice ofAppeal at para 2,see also, Tab 28,Factum at paras28, 47-48, 87-88:Hartmann submits:Hartmann submitsthat Amourgisdeliberately andwilfully concealedfrom the courtand the FinancialSettlement TrialFrantel's financialsituation by notsubmitting a currentfinancial statement,a current propertystatement or anysupporting evidencefor claims to assetsmade by Frantel.—Tab 28, Factumat para 31-32:Hartmann submitsthat Amourgis at theFinancial SettlementTrial "grosslymisrepresentednumerous crucialfacts and profuselylied" about Frantel'sfinances, her healthand the value ofthe home, whileconcealing from thecourt her knowledgeof contradictingevidence.




misledthe courtaboutFrantel'sinheritanceandrefused toprovidea copy ofthe trueLast Will.—Tab 14,MotionRecordat tab 1para 23,see also,Tab 16,Reply toRespondentsCross-Motion atpara 3-4:HartmannsubmitsthatAmourgislied tothe courtto delaythe trialand denyHartmanntrialwithin areasonableperiodof time.—Tab 16,Reply toRespondentsCross-Motionat paras19-21:HartmannsubmitsthatAmourgisdeliberatelysworea falseaffidavitand ismisleadingthe courtintomaking




errors injudgment.

SofCParas48-52: Itis allegedthatAmourgiswas awareand hadin herpossessionevidencesupportingthePlaintiff'scontentionthatFrantelwasdeceivingthecourt byclaimingthat thedate ofseparationwasAugust1999and notMay 12,1993 inorder to"unlawfullycircumventthe 6-yearstatutorylimit onfinancialclaimsagainstformerspouses."

Tab 3,MotionRecordat Tab3 para15(iv):Hartmannstates thatAmourgisknowinglyfiled falseevidencein supportof themotionseekinginterimsupportandpossessionof homeand liedto thecourtabout theout comeof theDecember13, 2001motionhearing.

Tab 5, Answer's toDefendant's CrossMotion at para14(i) see also, Tab10, SupplementaryFactum at para 7-9:Hartmann submittedthat Amourgismislead the courtin advising that theterms of adjournmentof the motion werethat Hartmanncontinue to make allhis support paymentswhen in fact it wasagreed that Hartmannwould only make onesupport payment.—Tab 5, Answer'sto Defendant's CrossMotion at para14(iii): Hartmannsubmitted, that inregards to the housepossession Order,Amourgis lied to thecourt by stating thatFrantel did not havean alternative place ofabode despite hr sonseach owning a home.

SofCPara 53,55, 56: Itis allegedthatAmourgisandFrantelknowinglyprovidedanoutdatedandinvalid

Tab 3,MotionRecordat Tab2 para39-41:HartmannsubmittedthatAmourgismisleadthecourt inadvising

Tab 5, Answer's toDefendant's CrossMotion at para 14(iv-vi), see also, Tab 13,Motion Record at pg3 para 9: Hartmannsubmitted thatin regards to theinterim support OrderAmourgis lied to thecourt by regardingHartmann's andFrantel's finances.—Tab 22, Factum




Will ofFrantel'slatefather,allegedlyin apurportedcompliancewith aCourtOrder.—SofCPara59: It isallegedthatAmourgisactedintentionallyto concealFrantel'sinheritancein ordertomaximizeFrantel'sunjustenrichmentin thedivorcesettlement.

that theterms ofadjournmentof themotionwere thatHartmanncontinueto makeall hissupportpayments,when infact it wasagreedthatHartmannwouldonlymake onesupportpayment.

at para 70-71:Hartmann submitsthat Amourgisknowingly filed falsefinancial statementswith the court andrefused to updatesame after repeatedrequests. Hartmannsubmits that suchdeceit was highlycalculated andwilful in attempt tohide Frantel's truefinancial situationresulting in the courtmaking a favourablejudgment for Frantel.—Tab 5, Answer'sto Defendant's CrossMotion at para 20:Hartmann submitsthat Amourgis lied tothe court when askedwhether she wasallowed to bring theFinancial SettlementTrial while "the casewas under appeal".—Tab 6, Factumat tab 3, para 95:Hartmann submitsthat Amourgisknowingly fileda false FinancialStatements at themotion hearing forinterim support andpossession of thematrimonial home.—Tab 6, Factumat tab 3, para 99see also, Tab 8,Factum para 39:Hartmann submitsthat Amourgismislead the courtinto confirmingFrantel's compliancewith the February8, 2000 Order byfalsely claiming thatthe Last Will issuewas resolved bythe court on May19, 2003.—Tab 6,Factum at tab 3, para106 and tab 4 para




(v), see also, Tab17 Motion Recordat tab 2 para 4-5:Hartmann submitsthat Amourgissurreptitiouslybrought the FinancialSettlement trialwithout informingthe court that theMarch 19, 2002 Orderwas under appeal,and without notice toHartmann.

SofCPara78: It isallegedthatAmourgisdeceivedthe courtby failingto informthe courtthat herBill ofCostsat theFinancialSettlementTrialin May2004,includedthe costfor herappearancebeforeJusticeFerrierwhichwerepreviouslydenied byJusticeFerrier.—SofCPara79: It isallegedAmourgissubmissionsto thecourtat theFinancialSettlement

Tab 3,MotionRecordat Tab2 para42, 44:HartmannsubmittedthatAmourgisgrosslyoverstatedherclient'ssituationin notadvisingthe courtthatFrantelcouldstay ather sons'homes asalternativeaccommodations.

Tab 6, Factum at tab3, paras 108-111 andtab 4 para 178(i):Hartmann submitsthat Amourgislied to justify herdelays in the divorceproceedings byadvising the courtthat she had filedher Trial Recordwhen she had notand by blamingcourt staff.—Tab 6,Factum at tab 4 para178, see also, Tab 7,Factum para 103 seealso, Tab 8, Factumpara 93, see also,Tab 12, Costs andDamages Report pg2: Hartmann submitsthat Amourgisengaged in variouslies throughout thedivorce proceedingsto the detriment ofHartmann.—Tab10, SupplementaryFactum paras 10-23,see also, Tab 13,Motion Record at pg3 para 13-18: It isalleged that Amourgiscolluded with Frantelto conceal fromHartmann and theCourt the facts withrespect to Frantel'sinheritance and tonot produce relateddocumentationincluding the trueLast Will.—Tab




Trial(April 13and May21, 2004)were"outrightlies,fabricationsand grossmisrepresentations".—SofCPara81: It isallegedthatAmourgis"extensivelylied" tothe courtat theFinancialSettlementTrial inorder to"deceivethe courtintovestingtheformermatrimonialhome toFranteland granther verysubstantialspousalsupportlumpsum,whileconcealingfrom thecourt herknowledgeof thePlaintiff'sfinancialstatus.

13, Motion Recordat pg 3 para 12:Hartmann submitsthat Amourgis liedto the court thatHartmann was indefault of a non-existent spousalsupport Order.

—Tab 21, AppealBook at paras 17-23,41-43: Hartmannsubmits thatAmourgis misled thecourt regarding hisability to meet thesupport award byproviding the court




with false informationregarding his assets.—Tab 21, AppealBook at para 30:Hartmann submitsthat Amourgis misledthe court by claimingthat Frantel's fatherpurchased thematrimonial home.—Tab 21, AppealBook at paras 44-48:Hartmann submitsthat Amourgismisled the court byconcealing Frantel'sassets and allegingthat Frantel sufferedfrom poor health.—Tab 21, AppealBook at paras 50:Hartmann submitsthat Amourgisengaged in variouslies and submittingfalse evidencethroughout thedivorce proceedingsfor the purpose ofunlawfully enrichingherself and her client.—Tab 23, AmendedAppeal Book at tab 1para 4, see also, Tab24, Amended Factumat tab 4 para 118:Hartmann submitsthat Amourgisat the FinancialSettlement Trialdeceived the courtby:—i) concealingevidence of Frantel'strue finances andhealth condition; and—ii) misrepresentedto the court the courtFrantel's legal costs.

SofCPara81: it isallegedthatAmourgisat theFinancialSettlementTrial lied




about thefollowing:—(i)aboutFrantel'sfathermaking a$10,000downpaymenton thehouse;—(ii)that themarketvalue ofthe housewas only1/2 ofits truevalue;—(iii)about thecottagebeingused as amatrimonialhome;—(iv)about thePlaintiffdeceivingCPPAdministratorsand neverpayinganyspousalsupportand theFrantelwasinfectedwithtuberculosis;—(v)aboutFrantelclaimingto haveno assetsdespiteherinheritance;—(vi)about thePlaintiffassets by




grosslyinflatingtheirworth tomaximizeFrantel'senrichment;

(vii)aboutcostsorder anddeniedcourtcosts.—SofCPara 82:AmourgisandFrantelsucceedin their"wickedstrategy"to deceivethe courtat theFinancialSettlementTrial withAmourgis'deceptivesubmissionsso as toperpetrateda "court-sanctionedfraud".—SofCPara 85:Amourgisis allegedto havebreachedher dutiesto thecourt ascounselmakingsubmissionsat an ex-partehearingbymakingfalseclaimsat theFinancial




SettlementTrial,"lying anddeceivingthe courtin everywhichway, anddeliberatelyconcealingfrom thecourtincontrovertibleevidencein herphysicalpossessionwhichirrefutablycontradictedheroutrageouslies".—SofCPara 85:Amourgisis allegedto havelied to thecourt bysubmittingtheFrantel'sfathermade a$10,000downpaymenton thehousefor thepurposesofcreating aconstructivetrust infavour ofFrantel sothat thecourt mayvest thehouse toFrantel.—SofCPara88, 126:Amourgisis alleged




to havehad in herpossessionalldocumentswithrespect tothe homehoweverdid notpossessanyevidencein supportof herclaim thatFrantel'sfathermade a$10,000downpaymenton thehome.—SofCPara 89:Amourgisis allegedto havelied tothe courtat theFinancialSettlementTrialabout themarketvalueof thematrimonialhome.—SofCParas 93and 96:Amourgisis allegedto havelied tothe courtat theFinancialSettlementTrial byclaimingthat thecottagewas usedas a




matrimonialhomeso as to"unlawful"claim anentailmentbyFrantel toits value.—SofCPara 97:Amourgisis allegedto havelied tothe courtat theFinancialSettlementTrial byclaimingthat thePlaintiffneverpaidspousalsupporttoFrantel.—SofCParas 98and 99:Amourgisis allegedto havelied tothe courtat theFinancialSettlementTrial byclaimingthat "theCPPAdministratorwasdeceivedby thePlaintiffwithrespect toFrantel'sentitlementto hisCPPcredits'so as todeprive




Frantelof her fullentitlementto thePlaintiff'sCPP.—SofCParas100, 103:Amourgisis allegedto havelied to thecourt thatFrantelwasinfectedwith TB.

SofCPara 104:Amourgisis allegedto havelied tothe courtat theFinancialSettlementTrialabout thePlaintiff'sassets inorder tomaximizetheequalizationamount infavour ofFrantel.—SofCPara 105:Amourgisis allegedto havelied tothe courtat theFinancialSettlementTrialabouther courtcosts.

ProfessionalMisconduct

SofCPara 3:Conductalleged tohave been

Tab 1,RevisedFactumat Para15, see

Tab 14MotionRecordat tab 1para 22:

Tab 4, MotionRecord, Appellant'sAffidavit at para 12:Hartmann statesthat Amourgis

Tab 26, Reply toRespondent's Responseat para 16-17:Hartmann alleges thatAmourgis' persistent

Tab 28, Factumat para 36-37:Hartmann submitsthat Amourgisdeception of the




performedbyAmourgisto thedetrimentof thePlaintiffduring thedivorceproceedings.

also, Tab3, MotionRecordat tab2 paras16 to 19,34, 44:HartmannsubmitsthatAmourgisknowinglyfiled falseFinancialStatementsin supportof themotionseekinginterimsupportandpossessionof home.

HartmannsubmitsthatAmourgis'conductinobtainingtheMarch 19,2002 andSupportDeductionOrdersare a clearcontinuationof herpattern ofprofessionalmisconduct.

obtained the WrightJ., Order by meansof fraud, namelyAmourgis lied tothe court; Amourgisknowingly presentedfalse documents andclaims; and Amourgiscontravened theRules.—Tab5, Answer's toDefendant's CrossMotion at para 21(i):Hartmann submitsthat Amourgisconduct through thedivorce proceedingsconsisted of breachesof the Rules and thepurposeful delayingof the proceedingsto drain out anymoney from thematrimonial home.—Tab 5, Answer'sto Defendant's CrossMotion at para21(iii), see also,Tab 12, Costs andDamages Report pgs4 & 8: Hartmannsubmits thatAmourgis conspiredwith Frantel topervert the course ofjustice.

deceptive conductthroughout thedivorce proceedingsis a violation of theRules of ProfessionalConduct and proofof Amourgis' ownpersonal "vendetta"against Hartmann.

courts throughout thedivorce proceedingsis a continuedpattern of a careerof professionalmisconduct

SofCPara 4:Amourgisallegedexerciseof herlegal skillduring thedivorceproceedingsfor thepurposeofdefraudingthePlaintiffamountstoprofessionalmisconduct.

Tab 3,MotionRecordat Tab3 para15(iv):Hartmannstates thatAmourgisknowinglyfiled falseevidencein supportof themotionseekinginterimsupportandpossessionof homeand lied

Tab 6, Factum at tab4 paras 152-15 seealso, Tab 7, Factumpara 79 see also,Tab 8, Factum para97, see also, Tab 9,Appeal Book tab 1para 23, see also,Tab 24, AmendedFactum at tab 4 para123: It is submittedthat Amourgis isguilty of "conduct onbecoming a solicitor"as a result of herflagrant violationsof the rules of theLSUC the Rules ofCivil Procedure, andher swearing andfiling with the courta Affidavit of Service




to thecourtabout theout comeof theDecember13, 2001motionhearing.

falsely claiming that aNotice of Appointmentto Settle the Orderwas properly servedon the Plaintiffallowing her to obtainfrom the court anOrder in a form andcontent to her likingin the absence of thePlaintiff.

SofCParas 109to 113,126: It isallegedthatAmourgisin breachof theRules ofProfessionalConduct,sworeand filedwith thecourt aAffidavitof Servicefalselyclaimingthat aNotice ofAppointmentto Settlethe Orderwasproperlyservedon thePlaintiffallowingher toobtainfrom thecourt anOrder in aform andcontent toher likingin theabsenceof thePlaintiff.—Tab 30,MotionRecord(Noting in

Tab 6, Factum attab 4 paras 179,181-184, see also,Tab 7, Factum para104 see also, Tab 8,Factum para 94: Itis submitted thatAmourgis engagedin professionalmisconduct andthe perversion andobstruction of justiceby:




Default)at para 4:HartmannsubmitsthatAmourgishas a longhistory ofprofessionalmisconductandthereforeis unableto putforth adefenceto theaction.

i) failing to complywith court orders toprovide documentspertaining to thedisbursement ofFrantel's father'sestate;—ii) filing falseFinancial Statementswit the Court;—iii)blaming court stafffor her delays;—iv)refusing to providemedical reports;—v)refusing to complywith undertakings;—vi) failing to respondto Hartmann'scorrespondence re:Appointment toSettle Order.—Tab10, SupplementaryFactum paras 10-23,see also, Tab 12,Costs and DamagesReport pg 2: It isalleged that Amourgiscolluded with Frantelto conceal fromHartmann and theCourt the facts withrespect to Frantel'sinheritance and tonot produce relateddocumentationincluding the trueLast Will.—Tab22, Factum at para126 Tab 23, seealso, AmendedAppeal Book at tab




1 para 4 (xiv-xv):Hartmann submitsthat Amourgis andFrantel "teamed-up" in the divorceproceedings toresume Amourgislong patternof professionalmisconduct &dishonesty.

Abuse ofProcess

SofCPara 23:Amourgisis allegedto havewilfullydelayedthedivorceproceedingsby filing a"vexatiousdelayingmotion"in orderto preventthe matterfromproceedingto trialso thatFrantelcouldclaimsubstantialspousalsupport.

Tab 3,MotionRecordat Tab2 paras35, 44:HartmannsubmitsthatAmourgisbreachedthe Rulesafterfailing tocorrectherclient'sfalsefinancialstatementswhichwere filedin supportof themotionseekinginterimsupportandpossessionof home.—Tab 18,Affidavit(ContemptMotion)at paras 3,10 & 12:HartmannsubmitsthatAmourgisis failingto complywith theMay 21,2004Judgment

Tab 15,MotionRecordat tab2 paras7-11:HartmannsubmitsthatAmourgisdeliberatelypreventedthe casefromproceedingto trialuntilHartmannwas re-employedto allowfor afavourable"incomeequalization"for herclient andbroughta motionforinterimsupport inviolationof theRules.

Tab 4, MotionRecord, Appellant'sAffidavit at para 12:Hartmann states thatAmourgis wrongfullyobtained the WrightJ., Order by blatantlycontraveningthe Rules.—Tab5, Answer's toDefendant's CrossMotion at para 5:Hartmann submitsthat Amourgisbreached the Rulesby bringing a motionfor interim supportand possession ofmatrimonial homerather than waitfor trial.—Tab5, Answer's toDefendant's CrossMotion at para13, see also, Tab10, SupplementaryFactum para 6: It isalleged that Amourgisbreached the Rules byfiling with the courtand serving on thePlaintiff during athe motion hearingfor interim spousalsupport and housepossession, her courtdocuments whichincluded an Affidavitof Frantel thusdenying Hartmannthe opportunity toreview and rebutevidence.—Tab5, Answer's toDefendant's CrossMotion at para 18:Hartmann submits

Tab 28, Factum atpara 21: Hartmannsubmits thatAmourgis Motion forinterim support wasvexatious as she filedthe motion to delaythe trial and allowtime for Hartmann tobecome re-employedso that Frantel couldseek a better financialsettlement.—Tab 28,Factum at para 24:Hartmann submitsthat Amourgis usedher legal skill totake advantage ofthe unsophisticatedHartmann so as tosway the court in herfavour.




bywithholdingFrantel'ssignedRedemptionform toallow thereleaseof fundsfromTempletonMutualFund,unlessHartmannpays hercosts, aswell as itbeing partof herstrategyto forceHartmanntoabandonhis appealof theMay 21,2004Judgment.

that Amourgisobtained Orderby exploiting theweaknesses of theFamily Court whichinclude a tendencyof the court to passorders without only acursory examinationof the evidence,as well as judgeshaving "a very strongbias against self-represented parties".—Tab 5, Answer'sto Defendant's CrossMotion at para 19:Hartmann submitsthat Amourgisbreached the Rulesby bringing to thecourt the FinancialSettlement trial onOctober 29, 2002without notice toHartmann.

SofCPara 43:AmourgisandFrantelareallegedto haveengagedin "grossabuses ofjudicialprocesses"and"perversionsof justice"in thedivorceproceedings.

Tab 15,MotionRecordat tab 2para 12:HartmannsubmitsthatAmourgisused herlegal skillto takeadvantageof thecourtsystemand theunsophisticatedHartmannbyabusingthe laws,rules andengagingincriminalactsfor the

Tab 6, Factum at tab3 para 82-87 and tab4 para 112, see also,Tab 9, Appeal Book attab 1 para 8, Tab 23,Amended Appeal Bookat tab 1 para 4 (xi):Hartmann submitsthat Amourgisbrought the motionfor interim supportand possession ofmatrimonial homerather than waitfor trial in orderto delay trial untilHartmann was re-employed to allowfor a more favourable"equalization ofincomes" for herclient.




purposeofdenyingHartmanna defenceandcausingthe"intentionalobstructionandperversionofjustice".

—SofCPara53: It isallegedthatAmourgisdeliberatelyfailedto file amandatoryFinancialStatementat theDivorceTrial ingrossviolationof theRules inorder tocover upFrantel'strueinheritanceandsource ofincomeandmaximizeFrantel'sdivorcesettlement.—SofCPara59: It isallegedthatAmourgisbreachedtheRules bydeliberatelyfailingto file a




mandatoryFinancialStatementat thetrial inorder toconcealFrantel'sallegedsubstantialsource ofincome.—SofCParas 60and 62: Itis allegedthatAmourgisbreachedtheRules bydeliberatelyfailing tofile thetranscriptof thecross-examinationof theestateexecutorJerryJezek Jr.,to concealhistestimonythat hedid notrecognizethe Willfilled byAmourgisas thelast WillSofC ofFrantel'sfather.—SofCPara64: It isallegedthatAmourgisbreachedthe Rulesby filingwith thecourt and




servingon thePlaintiffduring amotionhearingher courtdocumentswhichincludedanAffidavitof Frantelconsistingof "onehugecollectionof lies andfabrications".ThePlaintiffallegesthis stepdeniedhim anopportunityto defendandcontradicttheevidenceleading toFrantelbeinggrantedexclusivepossessionof thehouse andspousalsupport.

SofCPara65: It isallegedthatAmourgishad astrategyto servedocumentsat thecommencementof ahearingand notprierwhich

Tab 16,Reply toRespondentsCross-Motionat para 8:HartmannsubmitsthatAmourgismotionforinterimsupportwasvexatiousand abuse

Tab 6, Factum attab 3 para 82-87 andtab 4 para 177(iv),see also, Tab 7,Factum para 102(iv):Hartmann submitsthat Amourgissabotaged theMay 17, 2002 Pre-trial ManagementConference byintentionally bringingat the conference aCase ManagementBrief rather than aPre-trial ManagementConference Brief, in




put herin breachof theRules, inorder todeny thePlaintifftheopportunityto defendagainstthesedocuments.—SofCParas 66,67: It isallegedthatAmourgiswilfully,unlawfullyandvexatiousdelayedthe trialon thebasisthat thePlaintiffwas laidoff fromwork itis allegedthat themotivebehindthe delaywas toprovidetimefor thePlaintiffto becomere-employedso thattheremay beincome toequalizeandthereforeallowAmourgisto ask for$2,000 inspousalsupport

of courtprocessas theproceedingwas setdown fortrial.

order to frustrate theproceedings.—Tab 7,Factum paras 32-35,102 see also, Tab 8,Factum para 92, seealso, Tab 12, Costsand Damages Reportpg 2, see also, Tab17 Motion Recordat tab 2 paras 15:Hartmann submitsthat Amourgis usedher legal skill to takeadvantage of thecourt system andthe unsophisticatedHartmann by abusingthe laws, rules andengaging in criminalacts for the purposeof denying Hartmanna defence and causingthe "intentionalobstruction andperversion of justice".—Tab 22, Factumat paras 46-47,see also Tab 24,Amended Factumat tab 3 para 45:Hartmann submitsthat Amourgis"surreptitiously"and without noticeto the Plaintiffbrought the FinancialSettlement Trial tocourt despite thePlaintiff having fileda Notice of Appealof the outcome ofthe Wright J. andLow J., Orders.—Tab22, Factum at paras66-67, see also, Tab23, Amended AppealBook at tab 1 para4(xiii), see also, Tab24, Amended Factumat tab 4 para 120:Hartmann submitsthat Amourgisdeliberately concealedthe timing of theFinancial SettlementTrial and the filingof fresh financial andproperty statements




forFrantel.

so as to ensure thatHartmann runs out oftime for launching anappeal before findingout that a trial hastaken place.

SofCParas 70,71, 73: Itis allegedthatAmourgisin Nov.14, 2001"unlawfullyfilled" amotionrequestinga spousalsupportorderfollowingthePlaintiffandwas inviolationof Rule48.0491)requiringthat oncea case isset downfor trialno partyshallinitiate orcontinuea motion,and alloutstandingissuesmust bedealtwith inthe trial.—SofCPara74: It isallegedthatAmourgisconductofabusingcourtprocessduring the




divorceproceedingsis conductthat "isintrinsicto herprofessionalpractice".—SofCPara75: It isallegedthatAmourgis"surreptitiously"andwithoutnoticeto thePlaintiffbroughtthe"DivorceTrail,part 2(FinancialSettlementTrial)"to courtdespitethePlaintiffhavingfiled aNotice ofAppealof theoutcomeof the"DivorceTrial,Part 1" inwhich thePlaintiff'spleadingswerestruck.—

SofCPara 85:Amourgisis allegedto havebreachedher dutiesto thecourt ascounselmaking




submissionsat an ex-partehearingbymakingfalseclaimsat theFinancialSettlementTrial,"lying anddeceivingthe courtin everywhichway, anddeliberatelyconcealingfrom thecourtincontrovertibleevidencein herphysicalpossessionwhichirrefutablycontradictedheroutrageouslies".

SofCPara 103:Amourgisis allegedto havebreacheda courtOrder toproduceFrantel'smedicalreports insupportof hersubmissionto thecourt thatFrantelhadsufferedfrom TB.—SofCPara114: It isalleged




thatthroughoutthedivorceproceedingsAmourgis"refused"to complywith"numerouscourtordersandundertakings,displayinganabsolutecontemptfor thecourt andjudicialprocesses"

(i)Amourgisis allegedto haverefused toprovideFrantel'sbankaccounthistories,medialreportsand otherundertakingsfromFrantel'scross-examination;—(ii)Amourgisis allegedto haverefused tocomplywith theLastWill anddisbarmentCourtOrder, aswell asJusticeCroll'sOrder toreleasethe




TempletonMutualFundto thePlaintiff.

Bad Faith SofCPara66: It isallegedthatAmourgisactedin badfaith bydelayingthe trialto providetimefor thePlaintiffto becomere-employedso thattheremay beincome toequalizeandthereforeallowAmourgisto ask for$2,000 inspousalsupportforFrantel.—SofCpara 106:Amourgisis allegedto bepersonallyandprofessionallyliable forall costsincurredby thePlaintiffas sheactedin badfaith anddeliberatelyto delaythe

Tab 2,TrialProceedingsat pg 67,line 21:HartmannsubmitsthatAmourgisknowinglyfiled falseFinancialStatementsin supportof themotionseekinginterimsupportandpossessionof home.—Tab 3,MotionRecordat Tab 2paras 16,32, 45:HartmannsubmitsthatAmourgisandFranteltookadvantageofHartmann'sloss ofemploymentand actedin badfaithbringinga motionforinterimsupportandpossessionofmatrimonialhome

Tab 14,MotionRecordat tab 1para 3:HartmannsubmitsthatAmourgisactedin badfaith todelay thedivorceproceedingto thedetrimentofHartmann.—Tab 14,MotionRecordat tab 1para 5-7:HartmannsubmitsthatAmourgistookadvantageofHartmann'sloss ofemploymentand actedin badfaithbringinga motionforinterimsupportandpossessionofmatrimonialhomeratherthan waitfor trial.

Tab 5, Answer's toDefendant's CrossMotion at para 4:Hartmann submitsthat Amourgistook advantage ofHartmann's loss ofemployment andacted in bad faithbringing a motionfor interim supportand possession ofmatrimonial homerather than wait fortrial.—Tab 6, Factumat tab 4 paras 117and 177(i)-(ii) seealso, Tab 7, Factumparas 44-45 see also,Tab 8, Factum para107, see also, Tab13, Motion Recordpg 1 paras 3 & 6, seealso, Tab 17 MotionRecord at tab 2 para15(iii), see also, Tab24, Amended Factumat tab 4 para 118 (ix):Hartmann submitsthat Amourgisacted in bad faithto delay the divorceproceeding tothe detriment ofHartmann.—Tab 20,Reply to RespondingMotion at para 4:Hartmann submitsthat Amourgisdeliberately liedto him about theexistence of aproperly signed courtorder vesting thematrimonial home inthe name of Frantelleading to the sale ofthe home by Frantel

Tab 28, Factum atpara 21: Hartmannsubmits thatAmourgis' Motion forinterim support wasvexatious as she filedthe motion to delaythe trial and allowtime for Hartmann tobecome re-employedso that Frantel couldseek a better financialsettlement.




divorceproceedingswhichwere toproceedto trial inDecember2001, andthereforecause thePlaintiff"astronomicalcosts".

ratherthan waitfor trial.

MaliciousConduct

SofCPara 3:Conductalleged tohave beenperformedbyAmourgisto thedetrimentof thePlaintiffduring thedivorceproceedings.

Tab 3,MotionRecordat Tab 2para 16:HartmannsubmitsthatAmourgistookadvantageofHartmann'sloss ofemploymentand actedmaliciouslybybringinga motionforinterimsupportandpossessionofmatrimonialhomeratherthan waitfor trial.

Tab 5, Answer's toDefendant's CrossMotion at para 4:Hartmann submitsthat Amourgistook advantage ofHartmann's loss ofemployment andacted in bad faithbringing a motionfor interim supportand possession ofmatrimonial homerather than wait fortrial.

Tab 26, Reply toRespondent's Responseat para 16-17:Hartmann alleges thatAmourgis persistentdeceptive conductthroughout thedivorce proceedingsis a violation of theRules of ProfessionalConduct and proofof Amourgis' ownpersonal "vendetta"against Hartmann.

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