2007, Valsiner, Conf Lausanne

7/30/2019 2007, Valsiner, Conf Lausanne

1/22

Invited Presentation at the ConferenceInteraction et pense: perspectives dialogiquesLausanne, October 13, 2006

From Double Stars to Dialogical Self:Constructing New Theoretical Explanatory Systems

Jaan Valsiner

Clark University, Department of Psychology, Worcester, Ma 01610, USA

E-mail:[email protected]

ABSTRACT: The recently advancing theoretical focus on dialogicality in different sciencesmost directly exemplified by the work in the Dialogical Self Theory of Hubert Hermans, MiguelGonalves, and Joo Salgadoleads to a new way of looking at scientific explanatorysystems that break with the rule of parsimony: explanations must be simpler than thephenomena they explain. It is clear that a dialogical perspective would look at any onephenomenon in terms of at least two mutually related components of the explanatorysystems. The historical background for dialogism can be found in astronomytheobservation of single lighted objects in the sky of variable brightness have been found tooperate as double stars. In contemporary genetics, the ratio of number of components ofexplanatory systems to the phenomenon to be explained can be of magnitude ofunexpectedly great size (e.g., 19 to 1 in case of C. elegans). We need to develop newunderstandings of the principle of parsimony that transcend the nave interpretations of the

Occams razor, and consider the multi-level dynamic hierarchical self-organization ofphenomena.

We lietherefore we think. This parody of a well-known phrase capturesthe realities if our thinking and interacting processesin both, we act from thevantage position X of the present state of affairs of the thinker or interlocutoron a trajectory of goals-oriented movement towards the position {X as if Y},based on the reconstruction of the trajectory {as was before X}. We are inthe process of movement from somewhere to somewhere else (Josephs, 1998;Valsiner, 2007)hence all descriptions of the thinking or interacting that can be

observed in the present are functionally speaking un-truthsthey are functionallies in the service of overcoming the present state of affairs.

The inevitability of un-truths: functional significance of lying

Of course calling a constructed form of interaction or thought a lie is agood example of the hidden moral imperatives embedded in the signs wehabitually use. A combination of statements this is X and the statement this is

1
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


2/22

X is a lie evokes the implicit imperative but you should not lie!. Yet themovement beyond what is is already encoded into our perceptual system (seeFigure 1).

Figure 1. Our perceptual system as a liar--or a pre-organizer for thought?

(from Kanizsa, 1998, p.246)

The two triangles one can see in Figure 1 are formed by two opposingprocesses known from traditional Gestalt psychologythat of tendency toclosure (of the black contour that leads us to see the downwardly orientedtriangle) and of amodal completion (-- of the upwardly oriented perceivedtriangle, see also Kanizsa, 1979, p. 216). Both of these processes work to add tothe immediately given reality of black-and-while contrasts of objects (lines,incomplete circles) a particular holistic configuration that unites the different

elements into a new whole that cannot be reduced to its parts. In a senseourperceptual processes lie to usin ways that allows us to integrate our worlds.They make it possible to see immediately what is not there in our objectiveenvironmentcombinations of forms, or sounds (that we integrate into melodiesEhrenfels, 1890/1988, 1932/1988).

Thus, from the outset the perceiving/acting organisms are in relation withboth real and unreal objects (Meinong, 1907). This focus on transcending theimmediate here-and-now setting is even more is this the case in thinking. As

2


3/22

thinking entails going beyond the information given it is a functional andpurposeful lie in relation to the information given. If a parent of a baby saysabout the baby that she is ugly (or, more Occidentally speakingshe isbeautiful)we are encountering an act of social presentation that takes intoaccount the implied presence of powerfulyet bogussocial others like

malevolent spirits or the central invented organizer of the parentthe self. It isas important for that latter mystical beast in our Euro-minds to present the babyto ourselves as if it were beautiful as it is for South Asian parents to symbolicallyhide the baby from the dangerous gaze of the malevolent spirits.

Hencewe are not who we claim we are, but precisely through suchclaims-- we are in the process of becoming someone else. Human psychologicalfunctions are normatively liminalthey are needed to deal with tensions on theborder of the domains of AS-IS and various states of AS-IF (Vaihinger,1935/1911), or its derivates (e.g., AS-COULD-BEsee Josephs, 1998; also

Abbey, 2007). The movement towards who-we-are-not (yet) is a complexcoordination process within the self.

The concept of Selffrom monological to dialogical models

This liminality as a regular (normal) state has become the cornerstone forour contemporary Dialogical Self Theory (Hermans, 1996, 2002, 2003; Hermans& Kempen, 1993; Hermans and Hermans-Jansen, 2003; Gonalves & Salgado,2001, 2007; Salgado & Hermans, 2005). No longer is the self treated as anentitya thing or essence of the person. Instead, it is a process of negotiationof its components (voices, I-positions) within the structured field differentiatedinto internal, external, and peripheral regions. The I-Positions

are organized in an imaginal landscape. In this conception, the Ihas the possibility to move, as in space, from one position to theother in accordance with changes in situation and time. The Ifluctuates among different, and even opposed, positions and hasthe capacity to imaginatively endow each position with a voice sothat dialogical relations between characters in a story, involved in aprocess of question and answer, agreement and disagreement.Each character has a story to tell about its own experiences from itsown stance. These characters exchange information about theirrespective ME-s, resulting in a complex, narratively structured self.In this multiplicity of positions, some positions may become moredominant than others, so that the voices of the less dominantpositions may be subdued. (Hermans, 1996, pp. 10-11, addedemphases)

So, each I-position creates a voice which relates to other voices ofother I-positions in a dynamic dialogical relation. Yet the picture charted out forthe DS remains staticit is the process of transforming the dominance structure

3


4/22

of the given state of DS into a new one that provides us with a glimpse of howthe self system works. The map of the DS is the basis for investigating thedynamics of the voices (see Figure 2)

Figure 2. An example of the mapping of I-positions structure in the DS

analysis (I-positions repertoire of an Algerian man living in the Netherlands andmarried to a Dutch woman - from Hermans, 2001, p. 359)

PartnerFather

Mother

Children

Father-in-lawMother-in-law

GregariousSacrificing

Enjoyer

Like to be aloneDisillusioned

Vulnerable

DiscriminatingMichaelBouquet

Sister

Dutchpeople

4

INTERNAL I- POSITIONSEXTERNALI-POSITIONS

OUTSIDE POSITIONS


5/22

Figure 2 shows how difficult it is to set up a structural-dynamic contourmap for the DS. While the specific I-positions are empirically specified andstructurally located, their relations are not (yet) conceptualized. This is a generalproblem in psychology.

Talking in entitiesreferring to relations. The problem with the terminology ofthe self in psychologywhether meant in the monological or dialogical senseisthe overlap of the meaning of the term between scientific and lay discourses.Thus, the lay discourses may deny the marking of self as a personal entity. TheSelf is best conceptualized as self-in-relations rather than some characteristicof (or in) the person. Traditional occidental psychology has overlookedorunder-conceptualizedthat aspect of the self (see Figure 3)

Figure 3. Blind spots in the look at the self by lay and scientific meaningsystems.

All four perspectives depicted in Figure 3 miss the chance of creatingbasic knowledge about the self, although the Oriental lay thought comes closest.The Occidental sciences follow the lead of cultural blinders of the Europeanthought to attribute causality for processes that are necessarily in-betweenperson and the world to either some causative sign in the person (self,personality traits, etc) or to some similarly constructed explanatory notion in theenvironment. Even attribution of causality to the relationship if left unspecified

person

THE

WORLD

(Umweltofthe person)

PSYCHOLOGYlocalicizes the SELF

within the person

OCCIDENTAL LAY thoughtalso locates the SELF within

the person

Occidental post-modernsocial sciences tend to reduceSELF to social contexts:texts, activities, etc.all parts ofthe Umwelt

ORIENTAL LAY thought alsolocates the SELF within the

person word relating

5


6/22

is no solution. Yet these explanations have immediate cognitive economythey are laypersons ways of not having to dwell in the intricacies of how theperson lives in ones world. Furthermore, such explanations seem deceptivelysimpleand seem to fit the Occams razor or the principle of parsimony.

The principle of parsimony and the complexity of the world

The "principle of parsimony" attributed to William of Occam (1295-1349)plurality should not be posited without necessity (pluralitas non est ponendasine neccesitate)-- has served as a frequently evoked moral imperative forscientific thinking that has guided a number of generations of researcherstowards avoiding superfluous and supernatural explanations for phenomena. Themoral imperative of the principle is expressed well by its popular labelOccamsrazorbringing the traditional cutting instrument image to bear upon thecleaning (shaving off) the excesses of philosophical kind when explanation ofreality is attempted.

The parsimony notion presumes the ground of economic rationalityminimization of the costs of creating complex explanations while maximizing thewidth of coverage of the phenomena that the created explanation caters for. Ithas worked positively in the physical sciences after the social prejudices wereovercome (e.g., the eventual acceptance of the Copernican heliocentric model ofthe solar system over the Ptolemaic geocentric model).

As a meta-scientific guide (promoter sign) for selection and retention ofdifferent explanations, the principle of parsimony is a hostage to the socialconstruction of what is (and what is not) adequate yet simple explanation. Thephenomena in the biological, psychological, and social realms do not facilitatethe application of economic rationality to efforts to explain their functioning. Themajor principle in these worlds is the production of over-abundance of theorganismic materials for maintenance of continuity across generations of carriersof the genes (in the biological realm), of meanings (in the psychological realm),and social practices (in the society). The uncertainty of survival of any of theproduced transfer materials requires the operation of redundant controlgranting the expected outcomes through multiple possible pathways. The latter inthe biological world leads to the creation and maintenance of fields ofpotentialities for novel forms to emerge. Contemporary geneticswith newgene splicing techniquesinvestigates the extent of such potentialities.

The reality of biological, psychological, and social phenomena is thus not

economically rationalat least in the minimizing costs/maximizing benefitssense of rationality. This sets up constraints upon the feasibility of directapplication of the Occams razor requiring careful interpretation of what is thenecessity that limits the proliferation of plurality. For example, the simplenotion of classical genetics that mutually linked dominant/submissive gene pairs(Aa) encode some phenotypic singular character constitutes the first steptowards proliferating plurality of explanation in comparison to the phenomenonexplained.

6


7/22

Parsimony in psychology: Morgans Canon

The Occam razor has been widely used in psychology to prescribe areductionist direction for causal explanations. Psychology has been a disciplinein trouble with acceptance of the notion of reality of its phenomenahenceexplanations have been regularly sought from physiology or genetics (e.g., the

gene for general intelligence), orin the social sciences orientationreducingpersons to social roles (or even texts). The principle of parsimony is often citedin these reduction efforts. The principle of parsimony is usually cited in the formof the "Morgan's Canon":

... In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of theexercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted asthe outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in thepsychological scale. (Morgan, 1894, p. 53, added emphasis)

The usual rendering of this imperative is that or reduction of the complexto the simple(r)social phenomena to psychological explanations, psychologicalphenomena to physiological explanations, the latter to genetic explanations, andso on. The qualifier if it can be interpreted in Morgans original is discountedand Morgan is seen as a promoter of the Occams razor1.

In case of biological, psychological and social phenomena there is anecessity to posit plurality. It begins from the acceptance of the notion that realphenomena are generated by causal systems of hierarchical nature. Themoment an hierarchy is posited (e.g., a causal system of {A>B} to result in P) weare creating the minimal necessary plurality within the explanatory construction.There is a system where the higher level and lower level of organization areperacting (Thompson & Valsiner, 2002) through each other.

The contrast of higher or lower levels of interpretation can be treated interms ofexclusive orinclusive forms of separation of the levels (see Figure 4).In the case of systemic phenomena the inclusive separation makes it possible tomap out the actual work of any explanatory system. In contrast, the operation ofexclusive separation guarantees an accounting system where all parts of thefunctioning whole are classified into separate categories. Even if such categoriesmay be viewed as inclusive of one another, and even as the categoriesthemselves adequately reflect the distinguished parts of the whole phenomenon--the access to the functioning of the whole is lost2.

1 This is an exampleof many in the history of the scienceswhere the recipients deep underlyingassumption (in this case the assumption of no hierarchy in organizational levels) blinds the interpreters to

selectively view one part of the original authors claim. Morgan not only accepted, but emphasized, the

hierarchical order in nature, his caution against its using more complex explanations when not needed was

in fact similar to rejection of reductionism.2 Consider the contrast between counting discernible biological substances (cells, RNA, DNA) and

accumulating those into frequency countsthe categories are adequate, the counts may be preciseyet

the functioning of RNADNA relations within cells is not available from that operation.

7


8/22

Figure 4. Exclusive (A) and Inclusive (B) relationship between higher andlower levels.

In Figure 4.A. we can observe the selectionist look at the explanatorysolutions that makes a choice between H(igher) and L(ower) levels, rejects onebecause it cannot coincide with the other (if A then not possible that non-A).Discussions of the kind of nature or nurture in lay minds look at biologicaldevelopment are of that kind. In Figure 4.B. we see the use of inclusiveseparation of the levelsthe focus here isafter distinguishing H and Lto findout how Lower level mechanisms function through the constraints set by theHigher level (and vice versa). This look guides the investigator to look at theregulatory mechanisms that operate between adjacent (i.e. both "lower" and

"next higher") levels of the "psychological scale." The following reformulation ofthe principle of parsimony allows for the study of processes located at differentlevels of organization:

If we assume development to be a multi-level probabilisticallyepigenetic process, in no case may we interpret an observable (i.e.emerged) outcome as being caused by a unitary lower levelprocess (within the hierarchical network of processes), but alwaysas a result of causal systemic processes that operate betweenlevels. Attribution of causality to a singular-level ("higher", or"lower") causal systems is possible only and only if we have ruledout any possible regulatory impacts from adjacent levels, especiallyby a process at the next higher level in the hierarchy (Valsiner,2006c, p. 180).

Thus the first step is the analysis of the multi-level explanatory system thatwe posit is in place to explain a phenomenon. If that examination fails to rule outpossible ties between levels (i.e., posits the mode of organization similar to theone in Figure 4.B.), then the construction of explanatory frameworks needs to

Higher level Higher level

Lower level Lower level

EITHER H or L here

A. Exclusive separation B. Inclusive separation

H and L here

8


9/22

retain the hierarchical (between-levels) nature of the phenomena under study, atleast to the extent of immediate next levels of the hierarchy.

Lessons from astronomy: transcending the immediately given

Psychologists epistemological difficulties are similar to those ofastronomers. At first glance this seems unrealafter all, the person whom westudy in psychology may be next to us, and agree to answer any of ourquestions. In contrast, astronomers deal with objects of investigation that are atlight-years distance from us. Yet I would claim that this difference is superficialboth astronomers and psychologists are facing the principled inaccessibilityof their target phenomena. In one casethat of astronomythat is set up by thephysical distance in space and time, and the limits of the investigativetechnologies (from naked eye to visual and radio telescopes to inteferometers).In the otherpsychology-- it is limited by the distance from the surface levelpsychological phenomena (of behavior or verbal responses) to the depth

mechanisms that generate such responses. Here too we have limits on accessintrospection is limited, physiological indicators do not tell us the story aboutpsychological phenomena, and so on. Both astronomys and psychologysobjects of investigation are in constant movement. Psychologys handling ofsuch movement is further complicated by the fact that the process ofinvestigation itself can contribute to such movement. Andboth astronomicaland psychological objects developthis is obvious for human life courses, butequally present in the birth, development, and death of stars and galaxies.

Astronomy of course has a longer history than psychology as anindependent science. Yet similarly to our contemporary psychologys struggleswith the socio-moral restrictions upon its research in the 21 st century3, astronomywent through a similar fight for its rights to produce knowledge that underminedthe religious belief systems of the time in early 17 th century4. Similarly tochemistry (Roberts, 1991), astronomy distanced its theoretical instruments fromthat of common sense by the 18th century. In contrast, psychology is in thepresent time struggling with the tension between the richness of common sense(and language) as it can richly describe objects of psychological kind throughnarratives, conversations, focus groups, and through anecdotal evidence on theone handand the limited abstractive generalization of the quantified data on theother (Valsiner, 2005a). Psychology in the past century has moved towardsaccepting the notion of dominance of inductive generalization as the major wayof generating knowledge, while in astronomyalso a science deeply reliant uponempirical observationsthe unity of deductive and inductive pathways togeneralization have been operating together around 200 years. Furthermore

3 See the controversies around the human ethics committees, called Institutional Review Boardsor the

acceptability of evolutionary thought in education.4 As exemplified in the disputes by Galilei with the Catholic Church about the adequacy of acceptance of

the Copernican planetary system. Astronomical knowledge in the 17th century was not socially and

ideologically neutral basic science, but knowledge that could threaten the dominance of the prevailing

world views.

9


10/22

both sciences like any other basic sciencecreate new knowledge throughabductive generalization (Rosa, 2007).

What is seen and what is not? The history of making sense of multiple stars inastronomy is a fitting analogue to the investigation into the Dialogical Self in

psychology. The originalcommon senseobservation in both sciences is thesame. An astronomer charting out the map of the sky creates a description ofconfiguration of single dots (stars) that can be united through one or anotherusually mythologicalcontour of a beast or deity. Likewise, a psychologist givesthe respondent a rating scale to rate your self on THIS |--------------|NOT THISscale characteristic and gets a single responsea rating put on the scale (THIS|-----X--------|NOT THIS) that can be put into many configurations with otherresponses through cluster or factor analyses, or through multi-dimensionalscaling techniques. In both cases the questionwhat do these configurationsmeanremains as the next step in inquiry.

It turns out that in both astronomy and in psychology such single data

pointsand configurations that are seen in the constellations of such pointsaremerely a starting point for inquiry. The psychological world behind the singlerating (Wagoner & Valsiner, 2005) or simple answers (Diriwchter, Valsiner, &Sauck, 2004) is complex and dynamic. Its measurability itself is an open question(Valsiner, 2006a). Yet the definitive data base for all psychology is the singlecase (Molenaar, 2004). The reality is always singular in time and spaceyet ourgeneralizations transcend the uniqueness of these singular moments and give usabstract generalizations about how the uniqueness is possible. Both astronomyand psychology are examples of idiographic sciencelike there is only one Earthcirculating the Sun, and the Earth has only one Moonall the empirical evidenceavailable in astronomy is unique. It makes no sense to find the results for anaverage planet of our Solar system on any parameters, or to draw a sample ofsatellites to put into one group the moons of Earth, Jupiter, Saturn, or any otherplanet.

Importantlythe uniqueness of each celestial object is no obstacle forastronomy. Its ways of arriving at generalized knowledge about the universe arebased on general principles as those operate to generate such uniqueness. Thescenario would be similar for psychology. Yet it is not just the singularobservations that matter. In conjunction with them comes systemic theoreticalthinking about the single observationwhich needs some abstractive distancefrom the perceptual information.

10


11/22

Figure 5. Going beyond the pointdiscovering multiplicity in unity

A. Locating a point-- Mizar (in the configurationUrsa Major)

B. From the viewers perspective that point is a visual double star:(the two stars look as if they are next to each otherdiscovered in 1617)

C. Spectroscopically, Mizar is a binary star (discovered in 1889)

OBSERVER

Mizar(78 light years)

Alcor(81 light years)

OBSERVER

Mizar A

Alcor

Mizar B

11


12/22

The history of astronomys move beyond the immediately available lightstimuli is depicted in Figure 5. First, Benedetto Castellia student and colleagueof Galileo Galileipointed the attention to the second star on the handle of UrsaMajor that got the name of Mizar. It was observed to be a double starup to thepoint of testing visual acuity of warriors on whether they can see two, or one

stars on the given spot (second location oh the handle of Ursa MajorFigure5.A. Yet the immediate detection of two stars next to each other in the sky doesnot prove that they are mutually relatedoptical double stars may be a firstindication for a binary star (two stars that move in unison around a shared centerof gravity). Thus, the visual double observable for Galilei consisted of close-looking stars (Mizar and Alcor) still at considerable distance of 3 light years fromeach other (Figure 5.B.). Yet Mizar is a binary staras two stars functionallymoving together around each other (Mizar A and Mizar B) were discovered in1889. Furthermore, Mizar B and Mizar A are themselves binary starsso thewhole Mizar complex is claimed to be a binary star of binary stars. The criticaltechniques of discovery of their nature are the functions of alterations in the

brightness of the one object that can be observed from the Earth, and thespectral pictures that show how many stars are involved and their movement.Furthermore, most of the stars in the universe are presumed to beor havebeenbinary or multiple5. New stars emerge from the relations within suchbinary stars.

The Dialogical Self as a set of binary constellations

The state of theoretical affairs in the study of DS is caught in a typicalpsychologys problemthe tension between common sense understanding andabstractions from it. In analogy with the astronomical observations, psychology ofDS is still detecting the double nature of what seems to be unitary. The DSTheory has posited the binary self behind the unitary faade of selfpresentation. It has also quickly accepted the multiplicity of such selfthepolyphony of voices that has become popular through renewed interest in thework of Mikhail Bakhtin (1934/1975; 1981; 2000). Yet where the DS theory hasnot yet made substantial progress is in charting out the relationships between thevoices in the cacophony-- or music-- of the DS.

It is here where the parallels of the theoretical models of DS and binarystars continue furtherthe self moves into ruptures (Zittoun, 2006a) and to there-organization of the binary relations (see Markov, 1990, on three-stepanalysis), while the binary starsafter they circulate around one another by lawsof gravitycan become either singular stars, or burst out into supernovas. In

5 Astronomy has changed its perspective on stars, moving from accepting the manifest picture to that of

multiplicity behind uniformity:

While but few double stars were known it was possible to regard them as celestial monstrosities,

objects out of accord with the harmonious universe in which they found a place, but in view of the

increasing numbers that have been discovered, their exceptional character can no longer be

maintained. A recent high authority, has gone so far as to regard a double star as the normal

condition of stellar existence, and single stars, like the Sun, as exceptions. (Fison, 1906, p. 140)

12


13/22

both cases the relative stability is interspersed by rupturesemergence of new,self or celestial, phenomena.

DS theory posits some form of dynamic abductive relationship betweenthe I-positions, rather than assume variable quantitative calculable relationsbetween these positions. The relative stability of the DS is the result of

movementof constant relating with oneself (Salgado, 2006; Salgado, &Gonalves, 2007, Salgado & Hermans, 2005). Elaborating the dynamics of theDS along Meadian lines (I ME relations),

self-identity processes can be directly associated with themythical figure of the double-faced Janus: there is always the activeI that addresses an Other-in-self, but this Other is still Me. Humanexistence always becomes co-existence, even if only with oneself;and co-existence is an ambiguous kind of existence. In eachpassing moment, the self becomes a new blurred image and achallenge to the last image we have just created to ourselves.

Thus, we are constantly thrust in a space filled with our ownambiguous features. (Ferreira, Salgado & Cunha, 2006, p. 31)

The constant inherent ambiguity of being is not measurable in realnumbers since a numerical assignment of value (e.g. 2)fails to represent the co-present coordinated opposites (e.g., -2 and +4 and -235 and +237 asmeasures of the diametric opposites give us precisely the same unitary result(2see on measurability Valsiner, 2006a). New analytic directions are beingworked out for the study of DS (Duarte et al, in preparation)

Unity of opposites: dynamic seamlessness of functioning and its rupture .If the notion of co-existing ambiguity within the DS is to be taken seriouslyandif the phenomena of DS are not measurable through assignment of real numberswe are left with the inevitability of transcending psychologys rich borrowing ofquantitative methods and explore the realm of qualitative mathematics. Dynamicsystems perspectives (Lewis, 2005; Valsiner, 2005c) as well as topologicalmodels (Rudolph, 2006) are of potential use.

The image of a single-edged loop made of a flat strip with a half twistgives us a topological figure of seamless unity of opposites. This imagepresented in mathematics in 1858 and known as the Mbius Stripmayadequately describe the unity of dynamic stability of the DS. Movement along thestrip (see Figure 6) entails constant unity of the opposites of both sides of thestrip while each of them temporarily appears in the front (presented) position.Yet at every possible cross-section of the strip by a line (cut A and cut B in Figure6) we get an opposition of {A > non-A} {non-A > A} a tension betweenthe different compared locations across the strip. In terms of the DS this is thetension between constantly moving dual (A & non-A) structural oppositions of I-positions that fluctuate in their dominance relationships as they move along thestrip.

13


14/22

Figure 6. Slicing of the Mbius strip always reveals opposites that areunited; breaking out of the cycling oppositions is development

Yet, as long as they remain within the surface of the strip, there is no emergenceof new features within the DS. The picture of ever-rotating stable oppositionswithin the DS is unrealistic, and hence the Mbius Strip model needsmodification. This comes with the introduction of bifurcation regions to the stripwhere a rupture might lead to a qualitative synthesis of novel structures of DS.Yet the structure of the loop does not afford specifying any concrete area withinit. There is no specifiable boundary that can be located in any definable locationwithin the loop:

Our common sense suggests that if we want to move from theoutside of a form into its inside, we must cross a boundary througha material region of discontinuity However, moving from theoutside of the Mbius strip to the inside of the strip and vice versais done without crossing a boundary! The Mbius case shows usthat it is possible to think of boundary not necessarily as an entity, aset of points, or a point of material discontinuity, but as an event, acertain dynamic, that moves us from the inside of the system to itsoutside, and by so doing delimits the boundaries of a form. This

14

Cut A

Cut B

NEW STATE

BIFURCATIONPOINT WITHIN A SMOOTH EVENT

Non-A Non-A


15/22

point is specifically important because the dynamic that creates abinary world of self versus non-self, true versus false, sign versussignified, and other binaries is the dynamic boundary constructionthat underlies many phenomena. (Neuman, 2003, p. 143)

The area for ruptureor bifurcational move of the stripcan occur atany location within the loop. Reality of this flexibility (and unpredictability) is inthe affective worlds of human beings- who can endure their life circumstancesuntil a rupture emerges-often triggered by the smallest of life events that maytrigger the largest innovations in ones life (Zittoun, 2006a, 2006b). Thebreakthroughs in human livescommunication processesare guided by meta-level organizers (Branco & Valsiner, 2004). This multiplicity of regulatory levelsthat jointly includes openness (to ruptures) and closedness (to the sameruptures) makes the human psychological system very similar to the epigeneticnature of biological systems.

Lessons from modern genetics: abundance within the explanatory system

The field of contemporary science where new forms of explanatory modelsare being constructed is that of genetic regulation. The introduction of the notionof gene regulation in the 1960s (see Morange, 2000 for its history) has changedthe intellectual domain of genetics from tracing causality back to single orcombined genes6, to that of dynamic operation of some parts of the DNAsequence upon others as enabling/blocking them, and to the role of variousforms of RNA in the actual process of protein generation. A beloved empiricalmodel for contemporary geneticists is a tiny nematode Caenorhabditis elegans(C. elegans).

Figure 7. The friend of contemporary genetics: Caenorhabditis elegans

6 in psychology the old belief in genetic determinacy continues, supported by the traditions of behavior

genetics.

15


16/22

C. elegans is a tiny nematodea worm that lives in the groundwho is abacteriovorous hermaphrodite with a life span of about 3 days, with a genomethat consists of 5 pairs of chromosomes (and a pair of sex chromosomes: XXand XOthe latter constituting male version that is very rare0.05% of

population) of total genome length of 97 Megabases (for comparisonhumangenome length is 3000 Megabases). The genome contains around 19,099protein-encoding genes (+ around 1000 RNA genes).

This abundance of genetic material encodes a relatively simple organismof adult (hermaphrodite) body of 959 somatic cells, and nervous system of 302neurons. If we look at the proportion of elements of the whole causal system(using the 19,000+ count of genes as a base) to that of the total body elements,the ration of causal elements: outcomes is roughly 19:1 (around 19,000 genesnear 1,000 somatic cells). At least by the quantitativeand admittedly crudeindicator the complexity of the causal system here surpasses that of theoutcome, by a large margin.

Of course this kind or ration is merely important for rhetoric purposestomake the point of normal regularity of abundant causal systems. No simple countof elements is sufficient. It is the principle of structural organization of theseelements into a whole that matters for the revealing of the actual causal system.

Constructing causal systems: Occams razor displaced

As the examples from the genetic encoding ofC. elegans implypluralityis the name of the game in the biological causal systems. The question is,howeverhow are the different plural parts of the causal system organized?

How does the system as a whole operate to guarantee the stable outcomes?A general scheme of systemic causality is presented in Figure 8. It is

cyclical in natureone of the ways to create unity within the plurality of theelements of a causal system is to link them in auto-reproductive and innovations-producing cycle. For example, In Figure 8.A. the process of synthesizing twoseparate substrates (a, b) into a new compound (ab) is made possible through acatalyst (c) which temporarily binds to the input substrates. First it is bound to a(arriving at intermediate compound ca), then to b (arriving at intermediatecompound cab through that binding a and b into one whole). The catalyst thenreleases the newly synthesized compound ab and recreates itself (c). Withoutthe binding role of the catalyst the synthesis need not be possible-- the direct,

unmediated synthesis {a + b ab} cannot proceed. Yet the catalyst by itselfdoes not cause the binding to take placeit enables it through the process oftemporary binding (and un-binding) in a cyclical structure that grants bothcontinuity and change.

16


17/22

Figure 8. An example of catalytic process that produces synthesis

A. The basic scheme

B. The causal cycle between levels of organization

17

A

C

CA

CAB

AB

B

LEVEL X+1

LEVEL X


18/22

Figure 8.A. shows the general organizational scheme of systemiccausality, yet it overlooks a crucial feature of such systemsdifferent parts of thecycle of causality can be located at different levels of generality, and the causalcycle can work between adjacent levels (Figure 8.B.). This feature of systemiccausality introduces into the explanatory system the notion of hierarchical

systems of intransitive kind.As becomes clear, we have in this paper used the help of three sciences

astronomy, genetics, and chemistryto offer theoretical thought models forpsychology. The example of catalysis-based synthesis needs to be translatedinto a psychological realm. Perhaps the most solid fact in psychology concerningthe introduction of European-style formal schooling in traditional societies hasbeen the change in the reasoning patterns. After a few years in school -- whereall the school activities act as catalysts for social interaction and thinkingprocessesthe persons begin to use deductive reasoning strategies anddiscount the inductive reasoning processes of everyday living. The latter do notdisappearthey are merely subordinated to the deductive line of thought. It is a

case of dominance shiftthe deductive reasoning scheme is set to dominate theinductive one in school-like tasks (which are expected to include all tasksrelevant for social institutions), while in private life the inductive reasoningorientation may still prevail.

The school leads also to a side effect-- unconditional acceptance of theauthority figures utterancewho sets task and defines what success is. This isan emerging phenomenonand an example of downward causality vector in thepsychological realm. It is one of the major social-institutional reasons forintroducing formal schooling in the history of education (Valsiner, 2003). Thedialogical nature of schooling operates on the basis of GETTING TO KNOW GETTING NOT TO KNOWthe latter part of the opposition being that of the

socially guided and positively valued ignorance..Downward causality. Together with the emergence of multi-level causalhierarchies of cyclical kind we can conceptualize the directionality of causality.While in the case of history of the sciences the main focus has been in discoveryof upward causality (i.e., looking for lower-level causal entities that can beviewed to explain complex phenomena), then our new look at hierarchicalsystemic causality entails the focus on downward causality (Andersen,Emmeche, Finnemann & Christiansen, 2000). This is particularly appropriate incase of the semiotic perspective where the emergence of higher levels ofgeneralized signs becomes causative in relation to lower levels.

General Conclusions

Researchers lives are filled with frustrations. We try to find solutions toproblemsmostly understanding of how limited our invented solutions are. Thisis not only due to our limitationsit is part of the research encounter itself. In hisauthors foreword to Argonauts of the Western Pacific in 1921, Bronislaw

18


19/22

Malinowski lamented about the hopeless nature of empirical anthropologicalinvestigations:

Ethnology is in the sadly ludicrous, not to say tragic, position, thatat the very moment it begins to put its workshop in order, to forge

its proper tools, to start ready for work on its appointed task, thematerial of its study melts away with hopeless rapidity. Just now,when the methods and aims of scientific field ethnology have takenshape, when men fully trained for the work have begun to travelinto savage countries and study their inhabitantsthese die awayunder our very eyes. (Malinowski, 1984, p. xv)

It becomes clear from the present paper that Malinowski captured the strength ofall human biological, psychological, and social phenomenathese are adaptiveto new pressures (including those brought to the field by researchers), and opento development precisely through intended or unintended interventionsand in

predicted and non-predicted ways. Human thinking and interaction processesare perhaps the best example of our adaptive flexibilities. Theoretical models thatare meant to make sense of such flexibilities cannot be built up inductivelynordeductivelybut abductively. The primacy in science belongs to abstract modelsof complex dynamic processes. These models themselves may be complexinvolving many partsyet their principles of operation at the abstract level maybe simple. Maybe the principle of parsimony needs to be re-thought as that ofabstracting generalizationdiscovering hyper-complex causal systems thatoperate in practice with flexibility of stability and instability as the contextdemands it. Psychological phenomena of thinking, interactingas well as thedynamics of Dialogical Selfmay be arenas for such abstracting generalizations.

References

Abbey, E. A. (2007). Perpetual uncertainty of cultural life: becoming reality. In J.Valsiner & A. Rosa (Eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Socio-cultural

psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press.Andersen, P. B., Emmeche, C., Finnemann, N. O., & Christiansen, P. V. (Eds.)

(2000). Downward causation. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press.Bakhtin, M. M. (1934/1975). Slovo v romane [Discourse in the novel]. In M.

Bakhtin, Voprosy literatury i estetiki(pp. 73-232). Moscow:Khudozhestvennaya Literatura. [in English translation Bakhtin, 1981]

Bakhtin, M. M. (1981). The dialogic imagination. Austin, Tx.: University ofTexas Press.

Bakhtin, M,. M. (2000). (Pod maskoi). Moscow: Labyrint.Branco, A. U. & Valsiner, J. (Eds). (2005). Metacommunication and

communication in human development. Greenwich, Ct: InfoAge PressDiriwchter, R, Valsiner, J. & Sauck, C. (2004). Microgenesis in Making Sense of

Oneself: Constructive Recycling of Personality Inventory Items [49

19


20/22

paragraphs]. Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: QualitativeSocial Research [On-line Journal], 6(1), Art. 11. Available at:http://www.qualitative-research.net/fqs-texte/1-05/05-1-11-e.htm

Duarte, F., Rosa, C, Valsiner, J., & Gonalves, M. (in preparation). Self anddialogical articulation of multivocality: Proposal of an analysis model.

Ehrenfels, C. von (1890/1988). ber Gestaltqalitten. In R. Fabian (Ed.),Psychologie, Ethik, Erkentnistheorie (pp. 128-167). Mnchen:Philosophia Verlag. English version: On Gestalt Qualities. In B. Smith(Ed.), Foundations of Gestalt theory(pp. 82-117). Mnchen:Philosophia Verlag

Ehrenfels, C. von (1932/1988). On Gestalt qualities (1932). In B. Smith (Ed.),Foundations of Gestalt theory(pp. 121-123). Mnchen: PhilosophiaVerlag. [Original German version: R. Fabian (Ed.), Psychologie, Ethik,Erkentnistheorie (pp.168-170). Mnchen: Philosophia Verlag]

Ferreira, T., Salgado, J. & Cunha, C. (2006). Ambiguity and the dialogical self:search for a dialogical psychology. Estudios de Psicologia, 27, 1, 19-32.

Fison, A. H. (1906). The evolution of double stars. In T.B. Strong (Ed.), Lectureson the method of science (pp. 132-172). Oxford: Clarendon Press.Gonalves, M., & Guilfoyle, M. (2006). Dialogism and psychotherapy: therapists

and clients beliefs supporting monologism. Journal of ConstructivistPsychology, xxx, vvv-nnn.

Gonalves, M, & Salgado, J. (2001). Mapping the multiplicity of the self. Culture& Psychology, 7, 3, 367-377.

Hermans, H. J. M. (1996). Opposites in a dialogical self: constructs ascharacters. Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 9, 1-26.

Hermans, H. J. M. (1999). The innovative potentials of agreement anddisagreement in dialogical history. Culture & Psychology, 5, 4, 491-498.

Hermans, H. (2001). The dialogical self: Toward a theory of personal andcultural positioning. Culture and Psychology, 7, 3, 243-281.

Hermans, H. J. (Ed) (2002). Special Issue on dialogical self. Theory &Psychology, 12, 2, 147-280.

Hermans, H.J.M. , Kempen, H., & van Loon, R. J. P. (1992). The dialogical self:beyond individualism and rationalism. American Psychologist, 47, 1,23-33.

Hermans, H. J. & Hermans-Jansen, E. (2003). Dialogical processes in thedevelopment of the self. In J. Valsiner & K. J, Connolly (Eds), Handbookof developmental psychology(pp. 534-559). London: Sage.

Hermans, H.J.M. , Kempen, H. (1993). The dialogical self: meaning as

movement. San Diego,Ca.: Academic Press.Hermans, H.J.M. , Kempen, H., & van Loon, R. J. P. (1992). The dialogical self:beyond individualism and rationalism. American Psychologist, 47, 1,23-33.

Josephs, I. E. (1998). Constructing ones self in the city of the silent: dialogue,symbols, and the role of as if in self development. Human Development,41, 180-195.

20
http://www.qualitative-research.net/fqs-texte/1-05/05-1-11-e.htmhttp://www.qualitative-research.net/fqs-texte/1-05/05-1-11-e.htm


21/22

Kanizsa, G. (1979). Organization in vision: Essays on Gestalt perception .New York: Praeger.

Kanizsa, G. (1998). Gramtica de la vision. 2nd ed. Barcelona: Paids.Lewis, M. (2005). Bridging emotion theory and neurobiology through dynamic

systems modeling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28, 169-245.

Malinowski, B. (1984). Argonauts of the Western Pacific. Long Grove, Ill:Waveland Press (original in 1922).Markov, I. (1990). A three-step process as a unit of analysis in dialogue. In I.

Markov & K. Foppa (Eds.), The dynamics of dialogue(pp. 129-146).Hemel Hempstead: Harvester.

Markov, I. (2003). Dialogicality and social representation. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

Meinong, A. (1907). ber die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im Systemder Wissenschaften. Leipzig: R. Voigtlnder.

Molenaar, P.C.M. (2004). A manifesto on psychology as idiographic science:Bringing the person back into scientific psychology, this time forever.

Measurement: Interdisciplinary research and perspectives, 2, 201-218.Morange, M. (2000). The developmental gene concept. In P. J. Beuton, R. Falk &

H-J. Rheinberger (eds), The concept of the gene in development andevolution (pp.193-215). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Morgan, C. L. (1894). An introduction to comparative psychology. London:Walter Scott Ltd.

Molenaar, P.C.M. (2004). A manifesto on psychology as idiographic science:Bringing the person back into scientific psychology, this time forever.Measurement: Interdisciplinary research and perspectives, 2, 201-218.

Neuman, Y. (2003). Mbius and paradox: on the abstract structure of boundaryevents in semiotic systems. Semiotica 147, , 135-148.

Ondra, L. (1999). A new look of Mizar. http://leo.astronomy.cz/mizar/article.htmRoberts, L. (1991). Setting the table: the disciplinary development of eighteenth-

century chemistry as read through the changing structure of its tables. InP. Dear (Ed.), The literary structure of scientific argument: historicalstudies (p.99-132). Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press

Rosa, A. (2007). Acts of psyche: Actuations as synthesis of semiosis and actionIn J. Valsiner & A. Rosa (Eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Socio-cultural

psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press.Rudolph, L. (2006a) Mathematics, models, and metaphors. Culture &

Psychology, 12, 2, 169-204.Salgado, J. (2006). The feeling of dialogical self: affectivity, agency and

otherness. In L. M. Simo, & J. Valsiner (Eds.), Otherness in Question:Labyrinths of the self.Greenwich, Ct.: Information Age Publishers

Salgado, J.,. & Hermans, H. (2005). The return to subjectivity: From a multiplicityof selves to the dialogical self. E-Journal of Applied Psychology:Clinical section, 1, 1, 1-13.http://www.swin.edu.au/lib/ir/onlinejournals/ejap/

21
http://leo.astronomy.cz/mizar/article.htmhttp://www.swin.edu.au/lib/ir/onlinejournals/ejap/http://leo.astronomy.cz/mizar/article.htmhttp://www.swin.edu.au/lib/ir/onlinejournals/ejap/


22/22

Salgado, J., & Gonalves, M. (2007). The Dialogical Self: Social, personal, and(un)conscious. In J. Valsiner & A. Rosa (Eds.), Cambridge Handbook ofSocio-cultural Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Thompson, N. S., & Valsiner, J. (2002). Doesnt a dance require dancers?Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25, 5, 641-642.

Vaihinger, H. (1935). The philosophy of as if. London: Kegan Paul, Trench,Trubner & Co. [German original 1911]Valsiner, J. (2003). Missions in history and history through a mission: Inventing

better worlds for humankind The First Annual Casimir Lecture--Studies in History of Education, Leiden University, December, 12.

Valsiner, J. (2005a). Transformations and flexible forms: where qualitativepsychology begins. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 4, 4, 39-57.

Valsiner, J. (2005b). Scafolding within the structure of dialogical self: Hierarchicaldynamics of semiotic mediation. New Ideas in Psychology, 23, 197-206.

Valsiner, J. (2005c). Attractors, repulsors, and directors: making DynamicSystems Theory developmental.Annual Report 2003-2004 of Research

and Clinical Center for Child Development, Graduate School of Education,Hokkaido University. Sapporo, No. 27, 13-25.Valsiner, J. (2006a). Ambivalence under scrutiny: returning to the future.

Estudios de Psicologia, 27, 1, 117-130.Valsiner, J. (2006b). Dangerous curves in knowledge construction within

psychology: fragmentation of methodology. Theory & Psychology, 16, 5,587-595.

Valsiner, J. (2006c). Developmental epistemology and implications formethodology. In. R. M. Lerner (Ed.). Theoretical models of humandevelopment(pp. 166-209). Vol. 1 ofHandbook of Child Psychology(W. Damon and R. M. Lerner, Eds.). 6 th edition. New York: Wiley.

Wagoner, B., & Valsiner, J. (2005). Rating tasks in psychology: from staticontology to dialogical synthesis of meaning. In A. Glerce, A. Hofmeister,I. Staeuble, G. Saunders and J. Kaye (Eds.), Contemporary theorizingin psychology: Global perspectives (pp. 197-213). Toronto: CaptusPress.

Zittoun, T. (2006a). Transitions. Greenwich, Ct: Information Age Publishers.Zittoun, T. (2006b). Dynamics of interiority: Ruptures and transitions in the self

development. In L. M. Simo, & J. Valsiner (Eds.), Otherness inQuestion: Labyrinths of the self.Greenwich, Ct.: Information AgePublishers

Documents

2007, Valsiner, Conf Lausanne