AIRWORTHINESS RELEASE

STUDY GUIDEV 1.5

16 Sep 2012

This document was produced for the 1-211th ARB and is intended for use inside this organization. This guide contains excerpts of Airworthiness Releases (AWRs), Aviation Maintenance Action Messages (AMAMs), and Aviation Safety Action Messages (ASAMs). Aviators are still responsible for reviewing the AWRs, and other related messages in their entirety and becoming familiar with all the available information contained in those documents. This study guide contains sensitive information and will not be reproduced outside of this organization. Detailed information about AWRs, and other aviation related messages can be accessed through the JTDI website (https://upw.jtdi.mil).

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Table of Contents AWR # By Date Posted Title Page

2006D-A19 R5 2012/07/01 MSPU…………………………………………………………………………………….……..32005D-A52 R2 2012/06/04 701D/CC Engine Installed with 701C / Transient Tq Split………………32007D-A39 R8 2012/05/02 OPERATION OF AH64D w/ ASPI Gen II………………………………….………42009D-A19 R4 2012/03/27 CPG Map Case Strap/Use of Elect. Logbook CF-19 Toughbook…….6

2009D-A67 R4 2011/10/04 Asymmetrical Wing Stores……….……………………………………………….....72008D-A54 R1 2011/09/26 ARC-231 SATCOM/UHF Radio……………………………………………………….102010D-A28 R1 2011/09/15 Block II, Ver. 13 Perf Page Non ASPI 701C/701D-CC engines…..…..102010D-A25 2011/08/16 Fielding of Ver. 13 Software on Block II…………………………………………132009D-A74 R7 2011/08/11 Second Generation ASPI…………………………………………………..…...……..192008D-A08 R11 2011/08/10 UAS Level II System……………………………………………………………………….202004D-A44 R1 2011/03/23 NVGs in Both Crew Stations (AN/AVS- 6)……………………………………..202008D-A05 R2 2011/01/27 PHODS………………………………………………………………………………………….21

2006D-A28 R9 2010/12/22 AFT CG 1.75……………………………….………………………………….…………….222010D-A31 2010/11/23 ELT (EBC-406HM) INSTALLATION ………………………….…………………….222010D-A50 2010/08/30 CMWS 5th SENSOR………………………………………………….……….…….......23 2010D-A29 2010/08/30 ASE AGP Install w/ v13 Software………………………………………………….252006D-A55 R1 2010/07/09 IR STROBES.…………………………………………………………………….……….....27

2008D-A27 R1 2009/04/14 ANTI-ICE VALVE SWITCH………………………………………………….………....272008D-A72 R2 2009/04/09 114F-A MISSLE…………………………………………………………………..……….28

2007D-A34 R1 2008/10/17 IZLID…………………………………………………………………………….…………....29

2005D-48 R1 2007/08/21 USE OF THE CRV7 ROCKET ON THE AH-64D HELICOPTER…………..302007D-A04 2007/04/19 HELLFIRE MISSILE DEBRIS DEFLECTOR……………………………….………312007D-A05 2007/03/20 114K-2A, 114M FRAG, 114N THERMO…………………………………..…..31

2006D-A02 2006/05/08 CMF…………………………………………………………………………………….…….322006D-A14 2006/03/24 M-4 STOWAGE……………………………………………………………………..…...332005D-A51 R1 2006/03/21 21M-206 FLARE………………………………………………………………….……..34

2005D-A21 2005/09/08 Firing MK 40/M 151 and MK 40 / M 156 Rockets………………………34

2003D-A09 R1 2003/03/31 MK40 AND MK66 FLECHETTE ROCKETS ………………….…………………36

AMAMs and ASAMs

H64-09-AMAM-11 2009/07/16 CPG CYCLIC STOWED DURING IBIT…………………………………............37H64-07-ASAM-17 2007/07/18 EGI CHECK DURING RUN-UP………………………………….………............37H64-04-ASAM-02 2004/03/10 GUN INSPECTION………………………………………………….…………………..38H64-03-ASAM-03 2003/02/24 COCKPIT CANOPY FOGGING…………………………………..………............39

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2006D-A19 R5 2012/07/01MODERNIZED SIGNAL PROCESSING UNIT (MSPU)

CAUTIONAfter AC power is applied to the MSPU for approximately 1.5 to 2 minutes, UFD or EUFD annunciation "GRBX VIB" or "Gearbox Vibration" will be displayed for a duration of 5 seconds to indicate a successful MSPU system boot-up. Failure of the UFD or EUFD annunciation may indicate the MSPU drive system monitoring capability is compromised resulting in flights without vibration exceedance monitoring of the Intermediate Gearbox (IGB), Tail Rotor Gearbox (TGB), and Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) driveshaft. In the event the UFD or EUFD annunciation does not display, corrective action must be taken prior to next flight.

NOTESome MSPUs with certain vibration cards installed will have a brief flash of the UFD or EUFD annunciation "GRBX VIB" or "Gearbox Vibration" immediately after applying AC power to the MSPU. This initial flash is one second or less and is considered normal operation; however, this does not indicate that the MSPU has successfully booted. To ensure that the MSPU has successfully booted, wait approximately 1 to 2 minutes after applying AC power to the MSPU and monitor the UFD or EUFD for proper annunciation.

2005D-A52 R2 2012/06/04T700-GE-701D ENGINE USING T700-GE-701C ENGINE CONTROL SYSTEMS

CAUTIONDuring testing with a T700-GE-701D engine and a T700-GE-701C engine installed in the same aircraft, transient engine torque splits as great as 25% were observed during large, rapid collective applications. However, these torque splits were self-corrected in 2 to 3 seconds without pilot intervention. During transient torque splits, a flashing torque indication in the HDU may be present and crews should not be complacent in addressing this cue.

NOTEThe T700-GE-701D and T700-GE-701C engines are nearly identical in appearance. Flight crews should confirm engine type and note the installed position by referencing the engine core’s identification plates during pre flight.

CAUTIONAbove 13,000 ft pressure altitude, closely monitor the start sequence for T700-GE-701D engines, both during the start and after starter dropout, for signs of a hot start.

Limited flight test data on the T700-GE-701D engine has shown an increased tendency to experience hot starts above 13,000 ft pressure altitude. Some of these hot starts occur after starter dropout, with normal TGT indications prior to starter dropout. In these cases, NG speed actually decreases (below starter dropout speed) with a steady increase in TGT. This AWR is based on results of U.S. Government performed flight testing (Appendix D10) and Boeing performed flight testing (Appendix D-11). The Preliminary Airworthiness Evaluation and Safety Confirmation Recommendation of the AH-64D Helicopter Equipped with T700-GE-701D Engine (Appendix D-10) certifies the compatibility of the T700-GE-701D as installed on the AH-64D helicopter. This AWR allows flight with any combination of installation of T700-GE-701D and T700-GE-701C engines.

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2007D-A39 R8 2012/05/02 OPERATION OF THE AH-64D HELICOPTER w/ ASPI GEN II >see the actual AWR for Performance Charts

NOTEMission data (i.e., frequencies, waypoints/flight plans, etc.) loaded from the Aviation Mission Planning System (AMPS) should be verified before use, onboard the aircraft and as needed during flight.

NOTEWhen operating the aircraft with extreme longitudinal and lateral centers of gravity, or with asymmetric store loading such as those experienced after selective stores jettison, the electronic yaw trim indicator may lag actual trim and should not be used as the primary indication of coordinated flight.

NOTEPerformance planning for all ASPI equipped aircraft shall be in accordance with the performance planning charts in Appendix E for ASPI configured aircraft. Appendix E represents the performance of aircraft with the ASPI exhaust system(either Gen. 1 or Gen. 2) and the modifications listed in paragraph III.b(5) of that appendix. Appendix F represents the performance of aircraft with the legacy exhaust system and the modifications listed in paragraph III. b( 5) of that appendix. These charts will be added to the Operator's Manuals, references D.l through D.3, and shall be used in lieu of those charts presently contained in these reference Manuals when the aircraft has been modified from the originalManufacturers’ configuration. The performance charts contained in Appendix D .1- D.3 represents the performance of aircraft in the original manufacturer's configuration for AH -64 D aircraft.

NOTEFor all configurations not covered in Appendix E and F, the hover torque required charts in Appendix F shall be used for calculating hover torque required.

NOTEUse of the Perf Page and Computer based PPC program is not authorized for ASPI equipped aircraft. All performance data for ASPI equipped aircraft will be calculated using the charts found in App E of this A WR.

CAUTIONThe aircraft software performance (PERF) page contains errors and shall not be used for determination of flight performance capabilities and operating limits of aircraft configuration with respect to weight and balance. Pilots shall relay upon DD Form 365-4 and applicable AWR’s to determine proper aircraft loading and limits. Prior to flight, pilots must complete performance planning based upon this loading and limits data using the AH-64D Operator’s manual (D.1) or Performance Planning Card (PPC) software listed in the approved software memo (D.6, D.7) to determine flight performance capabilities and limits.

CAUTIONAH-64D Longbow aircraft equipped with T700-GE-701C\T700-GE-701D/CC engines do not correctly indicate TGT limits for 30 minute and 10 minute limit dual engine operations or 2 ½ minute single engine operation. This can result in engines being operated at TGTs within the 10 minute limit for as long as 30 minutes, without providing indication to the pilots of over-temperature limit exceedances and without triggering consequent maintenance actions to inspect for premature degradation of life-limited engine components. Use the TGT values listed below. The aircraft displayed limits and AH-64D operators manuals will be changed to reflect the below values.

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TGT Limits

The following warning will be added to the 1-1520-251-10-1 Operator’s Manual BLOCK I:

WARNINGIn the event of a GUN EL MISTRACK fault, the gun will be stowed in elevation. Gun azimuth may not provide proper Wire Strike Protection due to wire cutter angle.

In the event that a GUN EL MISTRACK fault is encountered, the WP will sever power to the gun. This will freeze the gun turret in its current azimuth and stow in elevation. An EUFD advisory, “GUN EMERG EL STOW” will display to alert the aircrew that the gun has been disabled.

All software authorized is defined in the software memorandums (Appendix D.5 and Appendix D.6).

The following applies to the Block II remanufactured aircraft serial numbers 0905667 and subsequent and new production Block II aircraft serial numbers 0907053 and subsequent equipped with the RT-1912(C)/APX-123 transponder. The use of Mode 5 is NOT ALLOWED when the APX -123 is configured with the Version 6.71 software being introduced under this Airworthiness Release. In this configuration, the following NOTE applies:

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NOTEUpon power up, the UFD advisory will indicate NO M5 KEYS and give an IFF M5 CAUTION. This advisory can be removed by disabling Mode 5 and Mode 5 Squitter in the IFF page. Upon disabling Mode 5 and Mode 5 Squitter the IFFM5 CAUTION will be disseminated and the Mode 5 information will also be disabled including the National Origin, Mission Code and PIN. This action has to be repeated every power up as the aircraft is set by requirements to EnableMode 5 upon power up.

In the event of a conflict between this A WR, applicable manuals, and other A WRs, the information in this A WR shall prevail. This A WR does not take precedence over SOF or ASAM messages.

2009D-A19 2012/03/27CPG Map Case Strap Install and Use of Panasonic CF-19 Toughbook

The laptop will be stored and secured in the CPG map case during flight, except as noted by this AWR.

WARNINGThe lithium batteries are capable of ignition and subsequent explosion due to overheating resulting in thermal runaway, and the resulting fire can flare repeatedly as each battery cell in turn ruptures. The laptop may overheat and fail at high temperature, and instances of fires in laptop lithium batteries are known. Do not attempt to pick up and move a smoking or burning device, or bodily injury may result. Do not cover the device or use ice to insulate or cool the device, as doing so increases the likelihood that additional battery cells will also reach thermal runaway. If thermal anomalies or fumes are detected, disconnecting/removing power from the laptop may help to resolve the problem, but do not remove the batteries in these circumstances.

CAUTIONUse of the electronic logbook shall only be allowed during aircraft weight on wheels. The laptop shall be permanently stowed horizontally in the copilot's map case and secured during flight by buckling the strap. Failure to buckle the strap could result in injury during a crash. Failure to install the laptop horizontally in the map case could impair full travel of the seat and result in injury during a crash.

CAUTIONThe laptop shall remain battery operated while on the aircraft.

NOTEWireless 802.11 and Bluetooth functionality on the laptop shall be prohibited from use.

The laptop must remain securely strapped into the map case during flight. Use of the laptop as an electroniclogbook is only permitted during aircraft weight on wheels. Use of the laptop in flight for data collection is only permitted during MTFs lAW the MSPU A WR (Appendix 0.7).

The laptop is authorized to remain secured in the map case during flight only after the copilot's map case strap installation per the instructions in Appendix D.4.

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2009D-A67 R4 2011/10/04ASYMMETRICAL WING STORES

This AWR supersedes AWR 2009D-A67 R3 dated 31 May 2011 and AWR 2002D-A13 dated 3 June 2002. AWR 2002D-A13 permitted rocket firings from the inboard position on either inside store station during combat only. The information from that AWR has been added to this AWR. This AWR is valid whenever asymmetrical wing store configurations, as defined in Appendix E (below), are used on AH-64D helicopters.

CAUTIONFor the two outboard M261 rocket launchers and single inboard Hellfire launcher per Appendix E Configuration 2, the lateral center of gravity can be exceeded by asymmetric rocket loads. To ensure lateral limits are not exceeded, rockets shall be loaded and expended symmetrically to the greatest extent possible.

CAUTIONFor the outboard and inboard M261 rocket launchers on one wing and one outboard M261 rocket launcher on the opposite wing (Appendix E configuration 5) the lateral center of gravity can be exceeded by asymmetric loads. To insure lateral limits are not exceeded, rockets shall be loaded and expended symmetrically to the greatest extent possible.

CAUTIONRocket firing restrictions have been made to limit the chance that engine compressors will surge due to ingestion of excessive rocket motor exhaust gas. These surges result in loss of power in one or both engines and cumulative engine damage.

Firing of rockets from the inside stores locations, in any configuration permitted in this release (Appendix E Configuration 4 or 5) or the Operators Manual, is only permitted in combat.

The use of the inner pylon rocket launcher shall be restricted to only firing at airspeeds above 60 knots, and firing of up to a single pair every three seconds. Ripple fire is not permitted in this configuration.

When configured with outboard and inboard pylon mounted M261 rocket launchers on the same wing and one outboard Hellfire launcher on the opposite wing (Configuration 4 of Appendix E) the takeoff gross weight shall be limited to 18,000 lbs and total rocket stores shall be limited to 700 lbs.

CAUTIONThe maximum gross weights for authorized configurations are conditional to normal stores expenditures. Weapon stores malfunctions will result in excursion outside the lateral CG envelope and degraded handling qualities. Caution should be used when performing aggressive maneuvers in a Lateral CG condition. Correction of the degraded handling qualities can be rectified by jettisoning of the external wing stores.

CAUTIONSlope landing data is not available for this asymmetric configuration. Attempts to land on terrain which produces a roll attitude greater than 5* should be avoided.

CAUTIONGround stability data is not available for this asymmetric configuration. Potential for aircraft roll over during ground taxi or ground maneuvering is unknown and may be critical during adverse wind conditions. Precaution should be taken in forecast winds or wind gusts over 25 knots.

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NOTEThe determination of a safe lateral center of gravity condition has been made for using these asymmetric configurations only. Permission for any other desired asymmetric configurations must be requested separately.

NOTEFor performance planning with asymmetric store configurations, use the (Delta)F and MULTIPLYING FACTOR from the applicable configuration in Appendix E and apply to cruise torque in accordance with Chapter 7 of Reference D.1, D.2, or D.3.

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2008D-A54 R1 2011-09-26ARC 231 SATCOM / UHF RADIO SET ON AH-64D

The following ARC-231 SATCOM system cautions apply:

CAUTIONIn the AH-64D aircraft, Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) testing has indicated that transmitting on the ARC-231 SATCOM radio may cause interference on some AN/ ARC- 164 radio frequencies; transmitting on the AN/ARC-201D #2 may cause interference on some AN/ ARC-231 SATCOM radio frequencies. The full extent of interference and frequencies affected has not been determined due to the limited AN/ ARC-231 SATCOM frequencies/channels tested. If such interference occurs and does not allow satisfactory communications on the receiving (victim) radio, the aircrew is advised to request an alternate frequency or channel for one ofthe radio nets or, otherwise, avoid concurrent transmissions on the offending radio while receiving on the victim radio. Affected radios and frequencies should be noted and reported to the POC provided in the AWR.

CAUTIONTesting with the ARC-231 installed and operational has determined several frequencies where excessive Radio Frequency (RF) interference is generated during transmission with the ARC-231. This interference occurred at frequencies at which navigational and communication equipment operate. In conditions where critical communications and navigation are required, transmission on the ARC-231 should be minimized.

Operation with the ARC-231 radio is authorized with the following hardware and software versions.a. ANI ARC-231 Mod 7 radio setb. AN/ARC-231 Mod 10 with version 9 CI

2010D-A28 R1 2011/09/15Block II, Aircraft Software Version 13 Performance (PERF) Page for NON-ASPI equipped aircraft utilizing T700-GE-70 1 C and T700-GE-701D/CC engines.

The aircraft performance data has been updated for Go-to-War configured aircraft. The results of the update have been published in reference D.2, but are not reflected in the existing on-board PERF Page. Because of this, commanders and crew may only use the PERF Page as called out in this memorandum if performance planning would otherwise be done utilizing the charts and data in the operator's manual, reference D.1. Appendix A indicates which calculations can be used, which can be used with limitation or restrictions, which cannot be used, and numerous advisories provide explanations why.

WARNINGAircraft basic weight and basic moment must be verified from DD Form 365-4 reference 1 and if needed a correction made on the Weight (WT) page. G WT on CUR page must be verified as correct within ± 100 pounds on DD Form 365-4 Reference 12, Takeoff GWT ± any fuel difference when comparing DD Form 365-4 to the Performance Page. The pilot incommand shall verify the correctness of GWT on CUR page to account for fuel burned and expendables throughout the mission. Incorrect GWT values invalidate PERF Page values.

WARNINGThe values displayed by the PERF page reflect pre-wartime configurations which exclude kits such as such as the Common Missile Warning System, ARC231, IR Laser, AVR-2B, etc., resulting in increased torque required with diminished torque margins for performing maneuvers. Attempting to perform maneuvers without adequate torque margins will result in loss of airspeed or altitude, or both.

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NOTEMax Q available dual engine represents Maximum Torque Available 10 Min-limit chart for T700-GE-70 1 C and T700-GE-70 1 D/CC engine configurations lAW TM 1-1520-251-10. Max Q available single engine represents Single Engine Maximum Torque Available 2.5 Min-limit chart for T700-GE-701C and T700-GE-701D/CC engine configurations lAWTM 1-1520-251-10.

a. Restricted Performance Page elements:

CAUTIONCRUISE Status Window values are prohibited from use due to inaccuracies in PERF pg calculations. Drag effects are not taken into account for aircraft configured with CMWS, ARC231, IR Laser, A VR-2B, etc., or other go to war kits.

b. Validated / Verified Performance Page elements:

CAUTION

CUR PERF Hover Q Status Window Go-No/Go Q IGE is not calculated lAW ATM TC 1-251, page 4-21 items, 13 and 14. HOVER Q GONO/GO IGE is calculated based on MAX GWT OGE at current environmental conditions.

CAUTIONRecent flight test data indicate current fielded configurations operating under A WR instructions may require up to 5% increase in HOVER Q required IGE and OGE.

CAUTIONIn the event of a single engine configuration MAX Q SE and TM 1-1520-251-10 T700-GE-701C Max Torque Available Chart - 2.5 Minute Limit accounts for Yz of total bleed losses associated with IPAS. MAX Q SE can be optimistic by as much as 3% Q available, affecting Max Q SE, VSSE, and Max GWT to hover SE.

CAUTIONMax Torque available DE and SE can be relied upon if ETF is 1.0. Max Torque available DE and SE can be relied upon if ETF is less than 1.0 if the ambient temperature falls between -5°C and +35°C. ETF on the engine page must be verified against aircraft health indicator test (HIT) log. MAX Q DE and SE displayed on PERF Page is optimistic up to 4% ifFAT falls outside of allowable ambient temperature range and ETF < 1.0. MAX Q DE and SE, HOVER Q GO-NO/GO IGE and OGEQ, MAX GWT and VSSE are affected.

CAUTIONPERF Page interpolates between charts to obtain a valid VSSE calculation. In regions where there is no upper bound value VSSE will return a '?' where VSSE capability may exist. These regions correspond to upper VSSE limits. For example, if a given GWT, PA, FAT solution returns a valid VSSE at 4,000 FT and no solution exists at 6,000 FT, the performance pages will display'?' at 4,001 FT. Crewmembers should be aware of minimum single engine speeds for mission profile, based on cruise charts.

NOTEHover Q Status Window REQUIRED IGE and OGE are lAW TM 1-1520-251-10 provided the aircraft basic weight and moment are verified per DD Form 365-4 reference 1 and GWT is within ±1 00 of aircraft GWT throughout the flight.

NOTEPERF Page VNE calculation is IA W TM 1-1520-251-10.

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NOTEPERF Page VSSE calculation is lAW TM 1-1520-251-10 provided aircraft GWT range is 13,000 to 23,000 pounds and VSSE solution is bound by a known upper limit (see above caution).

PERF Page display limitations:

NOTEMax G WT to Hover is calculated using the lesser of Max Q and the transmission limit, 100% for dual engine operation and 110% for single engine operation.

NOTEThe PERF page will compute and display a maximum GWT of 23,000 pounds if environmental conditions permit, exclusive of tactical or ferry mission configuration. Go-No/Go is calculated on the maximum GWT displayed.Actual GWT must be lAW TM 1-1520-251-10, chapter 5 limitations.

NOTEThe PERF Page Torque display is limited to 140%.

NOTEThe PERF Page Pilot and CPG weight is limited to 300 pounds each entry.

NOTEThe CUR PERF page dynamically calculates anti-ice penalty when anti-ice inlet is activated. The MAX or PLAN performance pages contain an ANTI ICE switch, independent of CUR PERF page setting to account for anti ice penalty in the MAX or PLAN performance page calculations.

NOTEThe PERF Page does not account for applicable drag for any modified configuration requiring A WR instruction for the completion of performance planning. Drag must be calculated lAW TM 1-1520-251-10 and A WR instructions for modified configurations. No ability exists to adjust drag on performance pages and the lack of drag additions invalidates Cruise status window values and T AS Range.

NOTET AS VNE is calculated on dual engine operation unless there is a greater than 12% torque split between engine 1 and engine 2. TAS VNE then becomes calculated as TAS VNE SE which is the greater of 67% ofVNE or maximum rate-of-climb airspeed in accordance with TM 1-1520-251-10, Chapter 5, airspeed limits with one engine inoperative.

NOTEJettison weight is calculated as the aircraft gross weight minus wing stores, external fuel tank weight and weight of any external fuel in pounds.

NOTEJettison Weight VSSE displays the VSSE calculated using the Jettison weight.

NOTEVSSE is limited by single engine contingency limit, 122%

NOTEThe PERF Page displays TAS RNG airspeed values that may be beyond aircraft limits. Reference cruise charts for applicable airspeeds.

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2010D-A25 2010/08/16Fielding of version 13 aircraft software on all Block II, Extended Block II, and War Replacement AH-64D helicopters .

CAUTIONManual selection of a single SP on the processor select panel may result in continuous single DP operation. Reselection of the AUTO position or selection of the other SP should restore the system to normal DP operation.

NOTEDuring the degraded SP operational mode, data is not being written to the Maintenance Data Recorder (MDR).

2. The Warnings, Cautions and Notes (WCNs) for digital, satellite and chart maps are as follows:

CAUTIONThe "DIG" map selection of the Digital Map shall not be used for navigation. The available data is inadequate toproduce a zoomed resolution suitable for navigation of terrain.

3. The WCNs for communications and navigation are as follows:

NOTEEMERGENCY PANEL ZEROIZE function does not zeroize SOl or UTO data. If SOl or UTO data will be compromised a MASTER ZEROIZE should be initiated.

4. The WCNs due to environmental and electromagnetic environmental effects or incomplete testing are as follows:

WARNINGTesting has determined that during exposure to certain electromagnetic environments the aircraft will exhibit the following behavior due to erroneous activation of the squat switch: Altitude Hold will be disengaged; no stationkeeping commands will be generated; Heading Hold will be lost; the Directional Controls become "sluggish"; and the weapons will go to ground stow thereby limiting the usefulness of the weapons and requiring that the crew activate theground override to utilize the weapons in a limited method in scenarios where weapons firing is not prohibited. Upon exiting the electromagnetic environment, the crew will have to reinitialize and activate the weapons and the flight control augmentation system.

NOTEIn an electromagnetic (HIRTA) environment, false fault codes for the AEPMS may be displayed on the applicable maintenance pages.

NOTEThe ECS limited testing accomplished indicates the ECS may fail to operate entirely, trigger fail messages, or fail to maintain the set temperature when encountering an electromagnetic environment.

5. The WCNs associated with software anomalies are as follows:

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WARNINGA generator power interrupt will result in single DP operation for approximately 21 seconds. If the power interrupt is from the #2 generator, various combinations of BUCS FAIL messages and FMC axis disengagement may also occur. If, during NVS flight, a power interrupt occurs, the CPG HDU video will change to the PLT FORMAT (PLT video), which will not correlate to the CPG head position. If the CPG is on the controls, the combination of loss of CPG FUR video anddegradation of aircraft stability could be hazardous to the aircrew. If a power interrupt occurs during NVS flight, the PLT shall immediately assume control of the aircraft.

NOTEThe pilot and CPG C-Scope targets are placed incorrectly with respect to the other virtual symbols and underlying video on the MPD Video page. This can cause the pilot to point the aircraft in the wrong direction during target engagement.These symbols are placed correctly on the HMD and ORT/TEDAC displays and these displays should be used for C-Scope target engagement.

6. The WCNs associated with APX-118 are as follows:

CAUTIONMODE 4 CAUTION indications may be generated every 2-3 minutes when the Mode 4 selection on the transponder page is set to OFF. Care should be taken to avoid complacency when canceling the caution audio tone.

NOTEMode S was not fully tested. The correct functionality and accuracy of data has not been verified.

NOTEGround initiate transponder IBIT may result in a "TRANSPONDER MODE S FAULT" message.

NOTEDeactivation of the XPNDR button on the emergency panel will reset the transponder mode 31 A from 7700 to the previously selected transponder code contrary to the operators manual.

7. The WCNs associated with the -304 IDM and BFT operation for the Lot 9 configuration and subsequent are listed below:

WARNINGSignificant latency, unrelated to voice traffic, may be experienced during transmission of digital messages over both the Tactical Internet and Fire Support protocols. Present position/SA icons shall not be used for combat identification of friendly forces. Digital messages should not be used to issue time sensitive commands.

WARNINGThe BFT system shall not be used as an Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system or as a backup to the IFF system. The BFT system is not an approved Combat Identification system.

NOTEThe BFT transceiver may occasionally lose satellite lock without automatically regaining it. If the transceiver does not regain lock for several minutes, power cycle the BFT transceiver.

8. WCNs associated with the MTADS/PNVS are as follows:

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WARNINGThe M-TADS/PNVS has exhibited susceptibility to certain electromagnetic fields that cause the turret to slew to the hard stops. Strict adherence to the published HIRTA messages should prevent occurrences due to known sites. However,unknown and mobile emitters are not accounted for in the published HIRTA messages. If these conditions are encountered follow the procedures for MTDS/PNVS failure under Mission Equipment as described in Chapter Nine ofthe Operator's Manual.

WARNINGThe CPG workload associated with the multi-target tracker (MTT) significantly reduces the overall crew capacity to manage collision avoidance. Pilots should be well trained in using MTT to mitigate this risk.9. The other WCNs are as follows:

WARNINGThreat inter-visibility is based on threat ring size and may show incorrect inter-visibility depending on selected map scale. Do not rely on displayed threat inter-visibility to prevent detection by threats.

WARNINGDuring cooperative Rocket engagement the aircraft will accept manual range. Once the selected sight is switched back to HMD and the GUN is actioned, the previously selected manual range will be displayed. The crewmember must thenreenter the desired manual range.

CAUTIONThe MFD/MPD performance planning pages shall be disregarded and performance data obtained from Appendix D.1.

CAUTIONThe Electronic Trim ball may not indicate accurate yaw trim during climbing and descending.

CAUTIONThe SP's continuous built in test (BIT) may continue after the ALQ-13 6 is powered off resulting in a reported BIT failure of the ALQ-136 by the primary SP #1 and a subsequent erroneous detected failure of the primary SP #1. Whenpowering off the RF jammer during a mission, a system processor (SP) failure (SP# SRU 3 FAIL) may be reported on the fault page of the primary SP #1, and an automatic SP switchover may occur immediately. Possible pilot techniques toavoid the ALQ-136 & primary SP failures are to either (1) continuously leave the RF jammer in powered operation, (2) switch the RF jammer to standby mode, or (3) leave it powered off throughout the mission if the ALQ-136 is not required. These techniques will prevent an automatic primary SP #1 switchover to the backup SP #2 as a result of powering down the ALQ-136 in-flight. If an automatic SP #1 switchover to the backup SP #2 should occur, the RF jammer should be switched to either the operate or standby modes in order to clear the BIT fault, SP #1 should be manually selected, and the SP automatic mode should be reselected.

NOTEAfter transition to flight with dual external auxiliary fuel tanks, verify the fuel quantity entered into the system data. External fuel quantities may zeroize following take off and must be re-entered.

NOTEFollowing the EG I alignment verifications required in Appendix D.l, operator's manual, the automated EGI switchover function is still operable. However, the Velocity Error comparison of both EGIs is no longer taken into consideration bythe Navigation System in determining an EGI switchover.

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NOTEA noticeable jitter of the rocket CCIP reticule, approximately 2 to 3 pixels vertically exists and increases with aircraft vibration and speed.

NOTEThe operator may have to reselect the desired TSD MAP settings upon completion of a ground initiated DP IBIT. A ground initiated DP IBIT may not restore the TSD to the previously displayed TSD MAP selection.

NOTEThe operator may have to cycle the IDM to STBY and OPER if the AMPS AWE IDM SWB 1 or 2 setting loaded on the DTC is different than the current IDM SWB setting when a MASTER load is initiated. Command fail indications may be displayed at the various IDM page settings if the new IDM SWB mode is different than the last stored IDM SWB mode.

NOTEThe aircraft AUTO-SA present position message transmission may be delayed and therefore present an incorrect aircraft location. Increased message latencies may occur over the Tactical Internet during high situational awareness (SA) loading with high bandwidth BFT connectivity (2X beam speed).

NOTERoll attitudes beyond 90 degrees will result in incorrect turn rate indications upon aircraft recovery to wings level attitude. The system may take up to 20 seconds before proper turn rate indications are restored.

NOTEIf GROUND STOW is selected (via MPD) and aircraft is powered down in this mode, the status is saved in Nonvolatile Random Access Memory (NOVRAM). Upon next aircraft power on, GROUND STOW will be restored and will not be released until crew de-selects GROUND STOW from the MPD.

NOTEIf the RF handover target reference altitude is invalid and the target is selected for AF or ARTY message population, the altitude data can either be rejected as being out of range or may provide an incorrect altitude reference which could result in pre-pointing to the wrong point on the ground.

NOTEWhen entering or exiting RIPL mode, the WP commands SAL missiles to be "Powered" instead of ACQ/PLCH" causing the missiles to not search for laser energy. Deselecting and then reselecting the missiles will allow the missile to function properly.

NOTEThe Engine 1 and Engine 2 torque color representation as displayed only on the PERF HIT PAGE do not change from green regardless the actual Torque values. The numeric displays of Torque on this page are correct

Additional WCNs unique to Version 13 are as follows:

a. Appendix A

WCNs for CMWS contained within AWRs 2007D-A61-RS and 2006DASO-RS (reference D.S and D.6, respectively) applies to the federated (non-AGP) configuration.

The following CAUTION also applies:

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CAUTIONCMWS will not detect sequencer or dispenser failures. The only way for the pilot to verify sequencer and dispenser functionality is to temporarily select "BYPASS" and return to the "Auto" mode with the federated CMWS control head. The updated inventory provides the updated sequencer and dispenser status and indicates flares available as countermeasures.

b. WCNs associated with weapons:

NOTEChanging rocket types on the LOAD page while in the weapons system training mode may result in the incorrect display of rocket types on the rocket page and inability to select different rocket zones. All discrepancies can be cleared by reselecting the rocket types using the tactical LOAD page.

c. WCNs associated with the Enhanced Data Transfer Unit (EDTU):

NOTEUse of commercial cards may result in degraded EDTU operation or EDTU failure (disconnected from the fibre channel), which will prevent use until aircraft power is cycled. Commercially available PCMCIA card read/write speeds varyand may impact EDTU functionality.

d. WCNs associated with the Improved Data Modem (IDM):

NOTEPerforming a MASTER or THRU FLIGHT load from the DTC may result in incorrect data on the IDM page with numerous associated faults. The pilot may have to reload or manually re-enter data on the IDM page after completing a MASTER or THRU FLIGHT load.

NOTEA DTC load will not correctly change the IDM page SWB mode button from SWB2 to SWB 1. The pilot must set the IDM SWB mode manually.

NOTEThe DTU/ A VIONICS UPDATE page UTO selection may be barriered under certain circumstances. If the barrier is present change the own-ship URN to all zeros. The barrier will then be removed and a UTO upload can be completed.Then reload the correct own-ship URN to restore normal IDM functionality.

e. WCNs associated with the COMM Page COMSET tuning:

NOTEDo not use COMSETs that contain an HF entry when the ARC231 is installed. Performing a COMSET tune with a COMSET that contains an HF frequency when the ARC231 is installed will result in a continuous OIP TUNE button that cannot be cleared. This condition renders any further COMSET tuning inoperative for the remainder of the flight.

f. WCNs associated with RF Handover (RFHO) Target Range Display:

WARNINGWhen an aircraft without an FCR (or FCR turned off) receives and uses an IDM RFHO the correct range and range source to the RFHO target are not displayed in the range and range source of the high action display (HAD). The previously

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established range and range source are displayed in the HAD. To update the HAD range and range source with RFHO range and range source information: After the CPO receives the RFHO, sight select TADS, CAQ the newly receivedtarget on the TSD page and slave the TADS to the target. Sight select FCR and proceed with the missile handover. After the pilot receives the RFHO, sight select HMD, CAQ the newly received target on the TSD page. Sight select FCRand proceed with the missile handover.

g. WCNs associated with ARC-201D operations:

NOTEDo not use the ARC-20ID with radio software version 7.3 (displayed on the aircraft versions page as HIB34 SOD04) in the aircraft. Anomalies can occur when using the radio, including voice and digital muting when attempting to transmit.

h. WCNs associated with Display Processor (DP) operations:

NOTEIf a display discrepancy is observed between the CPG and pilot TSD where symbology does not match between cockpits a DP fibre channel chip failure may be present. A DP IBIT will not detect this failure and a DP replacement is required to restore correct matching TSD symbology between cockpits.

NOTEThe ground initiated DP IBIT will intermittently return a false SQUAT SWITCH INPUT FAIL message upon the conclusion of the DP IBIT. A valid squat switch input failure has occurred if the SQUAT SWITCH INPUT FAIL message is displayed on the FAULT page.

1. WCNs associated with System Processor (SP) switchover operations:

NOTEAn SP switchover will result in an ASE BACKUP fault logging on the W/C/A page. This fault indication is a software anomaly associated with SP switchovers and does not indicate an AGP failure.

J. WCNs associated with Environmental Control System (ECS) operation:

NOTEThe ECS page pilot HEAT MODULATION indicates zero and does not change with changes in the modulation valve position.

k. WCNs associated with Anti-Ice controls:

WARNING

The pilot must de-select SENSOR anti-ice prior to de-selecting sensor ground (GND) override. De-selection of the anti-ice page sensor ground override button (GND) will not result in de-selection of SENSOR anti-ice, which may present a shock hazard to ground personnel.

2. The aircraft software configuration shall be as defined in the software memorandum referenced in Appendix DA and the following table.

Item Cockpit ID #SP SA V 13 006000WP WAV13 007000DP DAV13 013000

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2009D-A74 R7 2011/08/11Authorizing flight for AH-64D Helicopters with the Installation of the Second Generation ASPI Kit

WARNING

The ASPI kit significantly increases torque required at high speeds, especially at high gross weights and high density altitudes. This increase in torque required will result in diminished torque margins for performing maneuvers, including turns. Attempting to perform maneuvers without adequate torque margins will result in loss of airspeed, altitude, or both.

WARNING

The ASPI kit has not been tested for dive recovery data. There may be a loss in capability to perform dive recovery.

WARNING

Autorotation correction testing for One Engine Inoperable (OEI) has not been performed. Autorotation checks in this mode may result in loss of capability.

CAUTION

Rotor-locked engine starts shall not be performed with a rotor blade directly over the exhaust of the engine being started. Extreme temperatures from the upturned exhaust will damage the underside of the rotor blade. Dual engine rotor lock starts shall not be performed.

CAUTION

During preflight inspections, when entering and exiting the aft equipment bay area (turtleback area), crew shall not use the exhaust shroud as a handhold. Damage will occur to the cantilevered shroud assembly.

CAUTION

During preflight and post flight inspection, crew should ensure that the drain holes in the bottom of the scoops are clear of dirt and debris. Collected water and dirt in the shroud or scoops will reduce component life.

NOTE

The maximum bank angle at which level flight (constant airspeed and altitude) can be maintained has not been defined.

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2008D-A08 R11 2011/08/10Helicopters with the Video from UAS for Interoperability Teaming Level II (VUIT-2) System Installed.

WARNING

The OSRVT provided grid as displayed on the VUIT-2 video can be in error up to 6 km. Do not use the VUIT video and OSRVT provided grid for weapons employment such as call for fire.

CAUTION

The VUIT-2 equipment located in the EFAB is heat sensitive and has been shown to fail when operated without conditioned cooling air when operating in a hot ambient environment. The VUIT-2 system should not be powered until the ECS has cooled the EFAB to its normal operational temperature (maximum return air temperature of 105*F).

CAUTION

The MDR-80V Video Recorder operational environment is ambient temperature of +25*C +/- 10*C, and altitude less than or equal to 7000 FT MSL. If the flight profile requires operations outside of the above standard temperature and altitude ranges, then the MDR-80V shall be monitored for anomalous operation.

2004D-A44 R1 2011/03/23NVGs in Both Crew Stations (AN/AVS-6)

This AWR authorizes the use of NVGs (ANVIS-6) in both crew stations in US. Army AH-64D helicopters. This release does not render invalid any other AWRs currently covering the AH-64D helicopters indicated above.

When using the ITT NVGs during exposure to certain electromagnetic emitters, the low battery voltage light may be observed as constantly lit. The battery connector to the goggles may also get warm to the touch. The goggle operating time on battery power or normal goggle operation should not be affected. This light should extinguish after non exposure of six hours. For true low battery voltage, this light should blink.

Video Underlay reflection in the CPG overhead canopy may negatively impact NVG performance in the pilot station.

WARNINGTYPE 1, 2, and 3 ANI A VS-6(V) 1 are no longer authorized for flight crew use. The only NVDs authorized for use by Army aircrew members operating Army Aircraft are Type 4 (MX-I0160A tube) and above NVDs specifically belonging to the designated ANVIS AN/AVS-6(V) 1, AN/AVS-6(V)lA, and AN/AVS-6(V) 3 version.

This memorandum does not certify safe use of any NVG not controlled by Product Manager Sensors and Lasers.

NOTEThis A WR does not render invalid any other A WRs currently covering the aircraft indicated above. Any interference (physical or operational) between this installation and other installations shall be reported, prior to flight, to the POC inparagraph 4.

NOTEAny change in ANVIS configuration is not authorized and will void this AWR

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2008D-A05 R2 2011/01/27Aqualung Portable Helicopter Oxygen Delivery System (PHODS) on AH-64D Helicopters

Special Inspections and Instructions:

A visual inspection of each PHODS installation shall made prior to flight operations to ensure that no operational or physical deterioration is occurring. Any occurrence of the preceding shall be corrected prior to further flight operations.

An operational check shall be performed immediately prior to use at high altitudes.

The following operating restrictions should be noted:

WARNINGWhen operating PHODS around high power emitters PHODS may stop providing oxygen, or may start pumping oxygen when not expected or required. If unit is not operational, power cycling shall be required. An operational check shall beperformed immediately prior to use at high altitudes.

WARNINGPHODS oxygen cylinder may burst from impact of small arms fire, resulting in blast overpressure and/or flash fire. Temporary loss of hearing and internal injury may be experienced from the blast overpressure.

CAUTIONPHODS Regulator Warning indicator light is difficult to see under night Vision Goggles (NVGs) unless looking directly at warning indicator. Users are required to periodically check warning light during NVG operations to ensure properPHODS operation.

CAUTIONDaytime ambient conditions may make detection of the warning light difficult. Users are required to periodically check the status to ensure proper PHODS operation.

CAUTIONOperation at temperatures below -2SoF has not been verified and performance may be degraded resulting in altitude sickness or hypoxia at these temperatures.

CAUTIONDuring high or moderate levels of exertion it is human nature to breathe through the mouth. Usage of a nasal cannula during these times could potentially lead to oxygen deprivation. Complete PHODS training to learn the correct breathingtechniques and become more familiar with the proper use of the system.

CAUTIONThe Portable Helicopter Oxygen Delivery System (PHODS) has not been tested for full environmental qualification (Rain, Sand/Dust, Salt Fog, etc.). Proper operation of the PHODS system in the AH-64D when exposed to these environments cannot be verified. If exposed to these environments the PHODS shall be inspected for degradation and functionally tested prior to use.

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CAUTIONThere is a potential for the oxygen tubes to bend or kink resulting in degradation in oxygen flow. Check tubes periodically for bending.

NOTEThe pigtail hose poses a potential snag hazard during egress.

2006D-A28 R9 2010/12/22TO EXTEND THE CENTER OF GRAVITY (CG) ENVELOPE AFT 1.75 INCHES FOR ALL AH-64D’S

The intent of this AWR is to provide an extended center of gravity envelope for the Apache Longbow helicopter with Blue Force Tracker, ARC 220 Radio, CMWS, Block II survivability Modification Kit, and Robertson Aviation IAFS (Internal Auxiliary Fuel System) installed.

Commanders should ensure that aircrews and maintainers are briefed on taking appropriate measures to ensure that the CG is maintained within the 1.75-inches aft as shown for all flight regimes currently approved by the Operator’s Manual (Appendix D-1). Emphasis should be placed on minimizing the time spent in the extended aft CG condition and on using fuel management when possible as the means to do that. At no time should the aircraft be flown beyond the 1.75-inch aft CG extension.

The CG envelope for this AWR will consist of a new chart with the maximum aft CG of 208.2 inches for gross weights of less than 15,620 lbs. This new aft CG line will parallel the existing AH-64D aft CG line up to a gross weight of 20,900 lbs, where the aft CG will be 205.2 inches. The aft CG line for gross weights in excess of 20, 900 lbs. will be the same as the existing AH-64D aft CG limit.

2010D-A31 2010/11/23ELT - (EBC 406HM) INSTALLATION

The EBC-406HM is authorized for operation under an FAA certification. Operate the ELT lAW the ELT operation and maintenance manual, reference D.6.

NOTEThe SSU fairing does not provide sufficient structural rigidity to ensure that the ELT will activate in the event of a crash. Crewmembers must manually ensure ELT activation in the event of a crash.

NOTEDue to possible interference between metallic airframe and the ELT antenna, it is recommended that the ELT be removed from the airframe after activation to ensure signal reception by rescue crews.

NOTEElectromagnetic testing has not been conducted on the EBC-406HM ELT. Inadvertent activation of the ELT may lead to communication, navigation, flight control or other aircraft system interference.

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2010D-A30 2010/08/30FLEET WIDE INSTALLATION OF COMMON MISSLE WARNING SYSTEM/5 TH SENSOR ON AH-64D

(All CMWS AWR’s were incorporated into this section. Review of all AWR’s in their entirety is encouraged.)

All crews shall receive the US Army Aviation Warfighting Center (USAAWC) approved CMWS AH-64D training prior to operating 5S CMWS/ICMD B-kit equipped AH-64D helicopters.

All crews shall review the memorandum (appendix D.8) containing the classified CMWS restrictions and operating information prior to operating 5S CMWS/ICMD B-kit equipped AHA-64D helicopters.

For performance planning, increase frontal area (ΔF) by 2.4 sq ft. and increase the multiplying factor by 0.24.

WARNING

The following should be taken into account when deciding whether to arm the CMWS in-flight:

Flares can cause ground fires when launched from altitudes of 400 feet above ground level and below. The proximity of the aircraft to personnel, vehicles, fuel depots, etc. should be considered.

Flares launched from low altitude (50-100 feet above ground level) may bounce off the ground, potentially striking the aircraft. During low speed, low altitude flight over hard surfaces, launched flares may cause burning flare fragments or other debris to strike the aircraft.

Flare dispensing at night will illuminate the aircraft, potentially exposing the aircraft to hostile fire.

The following Caution is associated with the CMWS built in test functionality and failure modes:

CAUTION

CMWS will not detect sequencer or dispenser failures. The only way for the pilot to verify sequencer and dispenser functionality is to temporarily select ‘BYPASS’ and return to the ‘AUTO’ mode. The updated inventory provides the updates sequencer and dispenser status and indicates flares available as countermeasures.

The following Warnings are associated with CMWS Human Factors (HF) issues:

WARNING

Dispensing flares during Night Vision Goggles (NVG) operations can shut down the NVGs for 2-3 seconds. Consider restricting use of NVG to a single cockpit to ensure safe control of the aircraft can be maintained through crew coordination measures.

WARNING

During NVG operations from the pilot station, the CI/CCP will obstruct the Pilot’s FOV on the right side. This may cause degraded ability to maintain approach path and reduce depth perception cues on the right side of the aircraft during the approach sequence. Consideration should be given to restricting use of NVG in the pilot station to allow full ability to maintain approach path on the right side of the aircraft during the approach sequence.

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WARNING

Dispensing of flares during Night Vision System (NVS) operations may cause binocular rivalry and loss of night vision in the unaided eye. Concentration on the NVC imagery for pilotage tasks is required. Use caution when performing aggressive maneuvers and increase formation flight separation during NVS/NVG operations with 5S CMWS/ICMD operational.

Other CMWS Warnings/Cautions/Notes:

WARNING

Flares have the potential to hang fire or become trapped in the dispenser payload module after being fired. In addition, flares may be impacted and ignited by small arms fire. Fire/sustained burning of lodged flares could occur and result in damage to the aircraft. If flares are ignited and lodged in the dispenser, jettison all flare munitions and land as soon as possible.

WARNING

The CMWS system may fail to respond to threats if the EOMS lenses are dirty. The EOMS should be inspected prior to flight to determine if the lenses need to be cleaned. The inspection and cleaning procedures shall be IAW the CMWS technical manuals.

WARNING

The Electro-Optical Missile Sensors (EOMS) contain LZI, a hazardous nickel compound that may cause cancer. Avoid contact with broken internal lenses and inhalation of dust. Handle and dispose in accordance with technical manuals.

CAUTION

Switching from external power to aircraft generator power can cause damage and or system resets, resulting in mission delays or possible permanent damage to the CMWS hardware. To avoid damaging the CMWS hardware, do not apply electrical power to the CMWS until the aircraft is running on aircraft generator power.

NOTECMWS will not provide a CM DEGR caution to the flight crew if a failure of the ICMD dispenser occurs during flight. ICMD operation can be determined by switching to BYPASS mode and back to AUTO mode on the CCP. If the indicated flare inventory varies significantly from prior count, partial or full ICMD dispenser functionality may have been lost. Only the indicated inventory is available for subsequent dispense.

NOTE

If the CMWS is found to be in a degraded mode after completing IBIT/SBIT and the pilot attempts to fault isolate the problem to an LRU via the CI, remaining in the fault isolation page of the CI for 30-60 seconds will cause the degraded mode to extinguish. The CMWS programming logic indicates that the pilot has “acknowledged” the fault even though the original degraded condition still exists and the fault remains. The only way to verify correct CMWS operational status in this situation is to recycle power and wait 2-3 minutes for SBIT to be completed.

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NOTE

Activating the master ZEROIZE switch will destroy the data contained on the UDM PCMCIA card in the ECU, rendering the JETTISON switch inoperable, and will not permit the crew to jettison flares.

NOTE

The CMWS safety pin is difficult to engage fully and requires confirmation that the pin is fully seated. After insertion, the safety pin must be tugged by the handle to ensure that it is fully seated.

NOTE

When the CMWS is in BYPASS mode, the Pilot and Copilot/Gunner can only manually dispense a single flare at a time up to 10 total that was zone loaded in a M206 position in each dispenser. The flares in the M211 and M212 zones will not manually dispense when CMWS is in the BYPASS mode.

NOTEDo not power on the CMWS with the EOMS covers installed, or in an enclosed area. Doing so can yield incorrect BIT results.

2010D-A29 2010/08/30ASE AGP Install w/ v. 13 Software

Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) Warnings, Cautions and Notes (WCNs), refer to the CMWS Fifth Sensor (5S) AWR (Appendix D.5). Additional WCNs for the AGP are as follows:

CAUTION

Do not use BYPASS 2 when the chaffbuck.et is inverted and loaded with flares. The CMWS BYPASS 2 program will dispense multiple rounds simultaneously and could result in tail boom damage.

NOTE

Bypass programs 3 and 4 (BYP3 or BYP4) are not functional. Bypass programs 3 and 4 are available for selection during missile warning systems degraded operations, but are non-functional.

NOTE

Perform a system start-up or ASE/UTIL page re-inventory to detect dispenser failures. The processor does not poll the dispensers due to a known issue within the current sequencer software that occasionally reports the dispenser as inoperative.

NOTE

An ASE IBIT initiated on a failed AGP will result in a "TEST FAILED TO RUN" message. An ASE BACKUP advisory and AGP FAIL on the DMS FAULT page indicates an AGP failure.

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NOTE

The software versions ASE page displays the missile warning system software version incorrectly. The Missile Warning System Operational Flight Program (MWS OFP) decimal point is off by one digit. Example: the MWS OFP is displayed as 50.x- when it should be displayed as 5.0X-, where "X" is a digit, such as 4 or 6.

NOTE

When a specific flare category drops below 20%, the inventory count will not be specific, but will only have a "CMDS INV LOW" advisory, therefore there is the possibility, when low enough, that the dispense may be incomplete .. The pilot will not get an indication that it was incomplete. .

NOTE

Degraded CMWS faults were not annunciated to the crew until the ARM/SAFE switch was placed in the ARM position.

NOTE

An AGP failure (ASE BACKUP) only provides an advisory to the aircrew regardless of the ASE system SAFE or ARM status.

NOTE

Laser Detecting System (LDS) Laser Beam Rider threat was incorrectly displayed in the middle threat ring.

NOTE

Occasionally, the ASE page Laser Warning Beam Rider was annunciated as "laser designator" then immediately annunciated the threat as "laser Beam Rider". The L WR reports the same threat as a lower priority threat and then follows with a corrected higher priority threat report.

NOTE

The AGP has not passed all required safety of flight testing. If the AGP presents anomalous behavior, it shall be disabled. Report such anomalous behavior to the POC in paragraph 4 of page 1.

NOTE

A System Processor (SP) switchover will result in an ASE BACKUP fault logging on the W/C/A page. This fault indication is a software anomaly associated with SP switchovers and does not indicate an AGP failure.

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2006D-A55 R1 2010/07/09IR STROBE LIGHTING KITS ON AH-64D HELICOPTERS

WARNING

An IR strobe light-equipped aircraft may not be detected under NVGs when viewed within relative observer to aircraft aspect angles of ±5 degrees off the nose. Beyond ranges of 500 feet, position lights become obstructed at a 24 degree look up angle, and at a 42 degree look up angle position lights and strobe are obstructed.

WARNING

Installation of the IR strobe light without IR position lights significantly reduces the ability to detect the aircraft and increases the risk of air-to-air collisions with NVG equipped aircraft.

WARNING

An IR strobe light-equipped aircraft may not be detected under NVGs when there is little or no relative motion between the aircraft and a culturally lit background.

WARNING

The IR lighting is visible in excess of 4 kilometers with the aid of night vision equipment. This range should be accounted for in operations planning.

2008D-A27 R1 2009/04/14AH64-D HELICOPTERS WITH INGINE INLET ANTI-ICE VALVE SWITCH

CAUTION

It is possible that a switch failure may result in the anti-ice valve sticking open. If abnormally high TGT’s (approximately 30 deg C above expected) are noticed, any time after engine startup – check if switch is in the “Norm” position. If not, then return switch to the “Norm” Position, notify maintenance personnel as soon as practicable.

CAUTION

If an engine is shut down from above idle without being cooled for two minutes at IDLE and it is necessary to restart the engine, the restart should be accomplished within five minutes after shutdown. If the restart cannot be accomplished within five minutes, the engine shall be allowed to cool for four hours before attempting an engine start.

NOTE

When performing Before Takeoff and Before Landing Checks, verify the Warm Start Override switch is in the NORM or centered position.

The switch is being installed as a fix for engines experiencing warm restart stalls. The switch should be useful in preventing cold start stalls. The valve allows bleed air to vent overboard reducing the probability of an engine warm start stall. The switch only affects the aircraft mounted engine inlet anti-ice valve, not the engine mounted anti-ice start bleed valve. This is an interim hardware fix until a software fix can be developed and fielded.

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The Warm Start Override Switch is designed to improve the Warm Engine Start of the 701C/D engines. The Warm Start Override Switch is a three position lever locked toggle switch. The three positions are labeled ENG1 (up position), NORM (center position), and ENG2 (down position). When the Warm Start Override Switch is activated to either the ENG1 or ENG2, 28vdc will be removed from the valve, thereby allowing the valve to open. The toggle switch will remain in the selected position and the valve in the open position until the switch is manually returned to the NORM or centered position, giving valve control back to the aircraft ELCs.

The pilot should activate the Warm Start Override Switch to either ENG1 or ENG2 prior to engine start if less than 4 hours have elapsed since last engine shutdown (warm engine start). When conducting the warm engine start procedure the pilot will be required to position the Warm Start Override Switch to the desired engine position prior to initiating the start. This should be conducted prior to placing the engine start switch to the IGN OVRD position.

In addition, the aborting engine start emergency procedure should include the step “WARM START OVRD switch – NORM”. This step should be added to the procedure immediately after step 2 placing the start switch in the IGN OVRD position.

Warm Start Procedure:

WARM START OVRD switch - Select appropriate ENG1 or ENG2. START switch IGN OVRD – Allow Ng speed to increase to 18-20% then off. START switch – START after Ng decreases below 5% POWER lever – IDLE at first indication of Ng increase, TGT below 80°C. ENG OIL PRESS – Monitor. Ng – Monitor. MSTR WARN MSTR CAUT, and EUFD – Monitor. WARM START OVRD switch – NORM, when Ng stabilized at idle speed. Second Engine - Same as first start.

If the switch has malfunctioned and the “ENG1 or 2 Inlet anti-ice valve remains open there will more than likely be an “ENG1 or 2 Inlet Anti-Ice Valve Fail” on the Fault History page. Check Fault History Page on shut down when you are checking for exceedences.

2008D-A72 R2 2009/04/09USE OF THE AGM-114F-A MISSILE ON THE AH-64D HELICOPTERS

WARNING

Do not fly aircraft greater than 90 knots TAS when firing the Hellfire AGM-114F-A missiles. Targets shall be a minimum of 700m from the firing point for hover fire and 800m from the firing point for running fire engagements. In case of premature fuse detonation, an immediate evasive maneuver should be executed to avoid the debris.

Use of the Hellfire Missile Debris Deflector (HMDD) is required when firing AGM-114F-A missiles that have the ATK Hercules motors. For such configured missiles, refer to SOF message AH-64-07-01 (D.4), use of Hellfire Debris Deflector on the Apache AH-64D, for additional notes, cautions, and warnings.

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2007D-A34 R1 2008/10/17OPERATION OF EITHER 1000P-W OR GCP-2C FANG IZLID FOR PRE-DEPLOYMENT OR COMBAT

WARNING

The 1000P-W is a Class IV and the GCP-2C Fang is a Class IIIB invisible non eye-safe laser. All personnel should be alerted to the hazards specific to these lasers. Avoid direct exposure to the beam to prevent eye injury. The laser is not disabled with the master arm switch; therefore it can be operated with the aircraft weight on wheels. In order to prevent eye injury, ground personnel should wear eye protection with a minimum optical density of 3.0 at a wavelength of 860 nanometers if the 1000P-W laser is installed and a minimum optical density of 2.2 at a wavelength from 810-860 nanometers if the GCP-2C Fang laser is installed. The minimum safe skin distance is 43 meters for the 1000P-w laser and 12m for the GCP-2C Fang laser. Use with the precautions of any direct fire weapon.

WARNING

The purpose for this installation is to provide the pilot and gunner with the capability to confirm target location with ground forces and thereby minimize the potential for fratricide. The lasers should be limited to target illumination/pointing and not be used as a means of directing AWS fire.

WARNING

Energy from the lasers may be reflected back at the crew during use. The minimum safe employment range for the 1000P- W laser is 620 meters. If the 1000P- W is installed, recommend an employment range of greater than 620 meters be maintained to minimize the risk to the crew and ground personnel. The minimum safe employment range for the GCP-2C Fang laser is 170 meters. If the GCP-2C Fang is installed, recommend an employment range of greater than 170 meters be maintained to minimize the risk to the crew and ground personnel. The lasers should only be powered when the A WS is weapons actioned and a target is being designated. Direct View Optics (DVO) will increase the minimal safe range.

CAUTION

Testing has shown that the bore sight alignment on the lasers is not maintained during AWS engagements. If a noticeable offset is observed between the laser designated point and the area of impact of the AWS, the lasers can be bore sighted IAW with the procedures in Appendix B paragraph 3.

CAUTION

During operations with the lasers, and night vision goggles are not being worn, a laser-visor or spectacles must be worn for eye protection. When night vision goggles are being worn, CLEPIR spectacles must also be worn for eye protection. The use of laser eye protection (spectacles) with Night Vision Goggles (NVGs) may degrade the NVGs transmissivity.

NOTE

To illuminate targets with the lasers beyond 1000m, a manual range of 1000m must be entered into the weapons processor (WP) to prevent the gun barrel from elevating above line-of-sight (LOS).

NOTE

The lasers should be limited to target illumination/pointing and not be used as a means of directing AWS fire.

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Use of these lasers is permitted only during Combat Operations or pre-deployment training. Therefore, the aircraft aircrew and maintenance personnel shall be thoroughly familiar with the Warnings/Cautions (noted above) associated with the operation of the lasers.

2005D-48 R1 2007/08/21AUTHORIZING THE USE OF THE CRV7 ROCKET ON THE AH-64D HELICOPTER

This revision incorporates the weight and balance figures for the CRV -7 rocket. This AWR supersedes 2005D-A48 authorizing the use of the CRV7 rocket on the AH-64D helicopter and will remain effective until superseded or rescinded. Weight and balance shall be adjusted using the data below:

Unit SOP shall be modified to include local tracking of the number ofCRV7 Rockets fired from each aircraft by tail number. The number of CRV7 Rockets fired may be recorded in any unused DA Form 2408-12 rounds blocks available as outlined by unit SOP. The cumulative total ofCRV7 Rockets fired by each aircraft shall be submitted to the POC in the memorandum on a monthly basis. Monthly submissions should include aircraft tail number, number ofCRV7 rockets fired and aircraft engine changes in the remarks column (example: #2 Engine changed on 10125107) for each tail number. The monthly recording period will begin on the first day of each month and conclude on the last calendar day of each month. Monthly submissions may be completed by email, fax or mail to the POC by the 15th day of the following month. Below is a basic recording format to use when reporting data.

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2007D-A04 2007/04/19HELLFIRE MISSILE DEBRIS DEFLECTOR (HMDD) ON AH64D

WARNING

DO NOT jettison an inboard launcher that has launch rails populated with HMDDs above 40 KTAS if no Hellfire missiles are present.

WARNING

Jettison of an inboard launcher that has launch rails populated with HMDDs should occur during level flight with minimal sideslip and downward motion.

2007D-A05 2007/03/20

USE OF THE AGM-114 K-2A , AGM-114 M (FRAG), AGM-114 N (THERMO) MISSILE ON AH-64D HELICOPTERS

WARNING

Unlike the armor penetration versions of the Hellfire Missile, the AGM-114K-2A and AGM-114M blast fragmentation Missiles and AGM-114N thermo baric missile disperse fragments in all directions upon detonation. These missiles may prematurely detonate at distances as close as 181 meters from the firing point. The explosion debris is potentially hazardous to the aircraft and crew. In case of premature fuse detonation, an immediate evasive maneuver should be made to avoid the debris. Targets shall be a minimum of 800m from the firing point when firing these missiles.

NOTE

Installation of the blast fragment sleeve turns the AGM-114K into a dual-purpose munition, effective against both hard and soft targets, capable of both armor penetration by the warhead, as well as immediate shrapnel dispersion by the blast fragment sleeve. If employed against personnel in the open, aiming at the ground just short of the target may achieve the maximum shrapnel dispersion.

NOTE

The -114M and -114N missiles cannot be uniquely inventoried by the aircraft software, and therefore cannot be uniquely identified in the cockpit displays. The missiles will display as -114K missiles. Therefore, the crew will have to know exact station and rail position of the missiles so they can manually select the missiles when needed.

When loading AGM-114K-2A missiles, verify that there is no interference between the blast fragmentation sleeve (BFS) on the missile and the launcher.

Make entries for items added as required on DD form 365-4 weight and balance clearance form F. Changes to the appropriate technical manual (if applicable) must also be made to list these new form F items.

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2006D-A02 2006/05/08COMBAT MANUEVERING TRAINING

CAUTION

Maneuvering flight requiring large abrupt collective, pitch, roll or yaw inputs at airspeeds below 45 knots should be avoided. Flight at reduced G levels aggravate the normal flapping which occurs in this environment and if combined with aggressive control inputs can result in damage to the aircraft. Regardless of the control strategy used to recover from this environment the control inputs should be made at a rate no faster than the aircraft fuselage can react.

CAUTION

In lot 7 and previous aircraft the turn rate indicator is unreliable for up to 1 minute following a roll attitude of greater than 90 degrees. If bank angles of greater than 90 degrees are required or encountered and turn-rate should subsequently be important to the crew the pilot should use bank angle to estimate turn rate until the turn rate indication becomes functional.

The aircraft shall be operated IAW Appendix D references 1, 4, and this AWR. In the event of a conflict between Appendix D reference 1 or 4 and this AWR, the limitations in this AWR shall prevail. A weight and balance form must be executed or be on file per AR 95-1. Exceeding flight limitations of Appendix D reference 1, up to +/- 60 degrees in pitch and/or +/- 120 degrees in roll, while performing flight operations IAW Appendix D, reference 4, is authorized.

WARNING

Extended maneuvering flight below 0 G and / or high sideslip angles with nose low attitudes with low fuel can result in the fuel pickup in the fuel cell ingesting nitrogen instead of fuel. This can result in momentary loss of power or engine flameout. The lower the fuel quantity the more sensitive the fuel system becomes too high sideslip angles and or low G maneuvering, thereby increasing the possibility of flameout. If indications of loss of engine oil pressure or potential impending engine flameout occur, return to level flight as soon as possible.

During training, these maneuvers shall not be flown with less than 400 pounds fuel remaining in each fuel cell. Performing aggressive aircraft maneuvers may cause oil leaks past the engine #3 bearing seal which could result in high oil consumption.

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1. Unit instructor pilots must be trained by Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization /US Army Aviation Center (USAAVNC) or WAATS instructors in an established curriculum.

2. Maneuvers beyond +/- 30 degrees in pitch or +/- 60 degrees in roll are only permissible in combat or when conducting authorized training that has been outlined in the mission brief. Units will establish approval authority for combat maneuver training at company/troop commander level or higher, unless conducting training per the program of instruction (POI) at USAAVNC or WAATS.

3. After receipt of this AWR, the quantity of each maneuver flown listed in the spreadsheet provided by DES (Maneuvering Flight Reports example enclosed) shall be reported to the point of contact (POC) on a weekly basis.

4. The aircraft shall be inspected and maintained IAW all applicable maintenance manuals and associated Maintenance Advisory and Safety of Flight Messages. Any discrepancies shall be evaluated / repaired prior to the next flight to ensure continued airworthiness of the helicopter.

2006D-A14 2006/03/24M4 RIFLE STOWAGE SYSTEM IN THE AH-64D HELICOPTER

WARNING

Do not stow the rifle in the rack with a round chambered.

NOTE

Flight crews shall familiarize themselves with emergency egress procedures with the rifle racks installed.

NOTE

All M4 slings (if available) shall be securely fastened to the weapon in such a manner so as to prevent a trip or snag hazard.

NOTE

The front seat strap on the upper clamp may get in the way of the SSU when there is no weapon in the clamps.

NOTE

The M4 rifle mount in the CPG station does not have any positive restraint against rotation. When the M4 rifle is present, ensure that the mount does not rotate prior to flight as this would be an indication of loss of security. Report any rotation to the POC in memorandum paragraph 4 for disposition.

2005D-A51 R1 2006/03/21

FIRING OF THE M-206 FLARE FROM THE M-141 CHAFF DISPENSER IN THE AH-64D HELICOPTER33

WARNING

Flares can cause ground fires when launched from altitudes of 400 feet and lower. The proximity of the aircraft to personnel, vehicles, fuel depots, etc should be considered.

WARNING

The chaff arm switch should be placed in the SAFE position (to safe the flares) in the vicinity of a Forward Area Rearming and Refueling Point (FARRP).

WARNING

The M141 dispenser safety pin shall be installed during all ground operations.

WARNING

During Night Vision Goggle (NVG) multi-ship operations, flare firing can adversely affect the NVG trail aircraft/aircrew, shutting them down for up to 5 seconds. During multi-ship NVG operations, the crew should be cognizant of the potential for NVG shutdown due to flare launch.

WARNING

Flares launched from low altitude (50-100ft or less) may bounce off of the ground, potentially striking the aircraft.

WARNING

Shipboard landings are strictly prohibited with Plastic Flare Cartridges (DODIC L410) installed. Plastic Flare Cartridges (DODIC L410) shall be considered as a Hazard of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance (HERO) susceptible ordnance.

2005D-A21 2005/09/08 FIRE THE MK40/M151 and MK40/M156 ROCKETS ON AH-64D HELICOPTERS

Operations and Restrictions:

NOTE

When using the 6PD setting to fire the MK40/M151 or the MK40/156 rocket, the impact location will be much shorter than anticipated (up to 56% of down range). The range should be clear between the firing aircraft and aiming target. Do not use a mixed load of MK66 and MK40 rocket types. A data table of expected MK40/M151 and MK40/M156 rocket performance is included for reference.

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Firing MK40/M151 or MK40/M156 with MK66/M151 selection

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The aircraft operating instructions, procedures, and limitations shall be IAW reference 1a, as modified by reference 1b, and this document. In the event of a conflict between these references and this document, this AWR shall take precedence.

b. A weight and balance form must be executed or be on file per AR 95-1.c. Select “6PD” to fire the MK40/M151 or the MK40/M156 rockets.d. As an example, in order to fire the Mk40/M151 Rocket at a target range of 500 meters, the gunner should use the Mk66/M151 “6PD” setting and manually input a range of 1034 meters. To manually input the new range, select the WPN page MANRNG button and enter a numeric “1034” using the keyboard unit. The display will present this in kilometers (1.034).e. The minimum recommended firing distance is 500 meters.

Special Inspections and Instructions:

The aircraft shall be inspected and maintained IAW all applicable maintenance manuals and associated Maintenance Advisory and Safety of Flight Messages. Any discrepancies shall be evaluated/repaired prior to the next flight to ensure continued airworthiness of the helicopter.

2003D-A09 R1 2003/03/31

MK40 AND MK66 FLECHETTE ROCKETS

The following apply for firing MK66 flechettes:

1. The range to target must be at least 800 meters.

2. The effective range is 1 to 3 kilometers with reduced effectiveness beyond 3 km.

3. To fire the MK66 select “6FL”

NOTE

The ballistic coefficients (accuracy of the MK66 flechette rockets) in the AH-64D without version 6 S/W have not been optimized.

The following apply for firing MK40 flechettes

1. The range to target must be at least 800 meters.

2. The effective range is 800 to 1200 meters.

3. To fire the MK40 select “6PD”

NOTE

Accuracy of the MK40 flechette rockets is not optimized. The difference between the aim point and impact point will be 100 meters long at a hover and 100 meters short at an airspeed of 40 kts.

The following notes apply when firing flechette rockets or any rockets with M439 fuze:

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NOTE

When firing flechette rockets or any rockets with M439 fuze (6FL, 6SK, or 6MP) and no launch occurs upon trigger pull, it may be due to an incorrect rocket type, an out of tolerance fuze, or a dirty launcher port for the fuze connector. Pull up the DMS page on the MPD for more details of the failure. In all three cases noted, the incident will indicate a LOB/LIB/ROB/RIB PYLON ROCKET FUZE FAIL. If no fault is noted, the aircraft will still report an inventory discrepancy in the total rockets status window of the rocket page display under the weapons page.

NOTE

In the RKT INV page, make sure the rocket type of each zone is matched with the actual rockets loaded for that zone. If rockets fail to fire, follow the proper unloading procedures in TM 9-1055-480-13&P.

AVIATION MAINTENANCE ACTION MESSAGE

H-64-09-AMAM-11 (CPG CYCLIC STOWED DURING IBIT) 2009/07/16

Background – Recent field reports indicate that some AH-64D aircraft fail the Backup Control System (BUCS) Initiated Built-In Test (IBIT) when it is done with the Co-Pilot Gunner (CPG) cyclic in the extended position IAW the Operators Manual. This may be due to the presence of counterbalance weights on the longitudinal bell crank. These weights were added to AH-64A aircraft to counteract an imbalance that caused the CPG cyclic to fall forward if the Force Trim is turned to the "Off" position. Approximately 200 aircraft never had counterbalance weights installed. This condition also exists on the AH-64D aircraft; however, the Force Trim Switch does not have an "Off" position and the Force Trim defaults to "On".

Message Purpose

Provide publication changes to the appropriate AH-64D Technical Manuals to perform the BUCS IBIT with the CPG cyclic in the retracted (stowed) position.

Inspect all AH-64 aircraft for longitudinal bell crank counterbalance weights.

AVIATION SAFETY ACTION MESSAGE

AH-64-07-ASAM-17 (EGI CHECK DURING RUN-UP) 2007/07/18

Background - Since May 2004, Honeywell's Embedded Global Positioning and Inertial Navigation Units (EGI) have been constructed with Voltage Regulator (VR) diodes without a nickel barrier and can degrade resulting in erroneous acceleration outputs. These suspect diodes can fail causing increasing errors in position confidence and velocity data, as well as possible attitude and heading errors. These errors can cause AH-64A and AH-64D navigation and weapon inaccuracies, as well as erroneous inputs into the AH-64D Flight Management Computer (FMC) for flight control solutions. AH-64D flight control issues may include incorrect stabilator scheduling, erratic flight symbology, incorrect hover and bob-up symbology cues, and erratic hold modes. Erroneous position, heading and velocity data from the EGIs may also cause incorrect weapons constraint calculations and trajectory calculations. This failure will not be detected by any Built-In Test (BIT). The crew may be able to identify this failure during the preflight operations. However, if the failure occurs in flight, it will not be detected or reported by the Continuous Built-In Test (CBIT) and may not be obvious to the crew. Unscreened EGIs produced from May 2004 to March 2005 are the most susceptible to the VR diode failures (listed in ADDENDUM-List 1).

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In March 2005 Honeywell instituted a screening procedure testing the EGIs to reduce the VR diode failures in the field (ADDENDUM-List 2). However, there have also been 8 reported failures in the field from the screened EGI population. Beginning in June 2007 Honeywell will reintroduce the VR diodes with the nickel barrier which will correct this problem. These diodes will be installed at production, repair, and overhaul intervals. Product Management, (PM) Aviation Mission Equipment (AME) is coordinating these efforts with CECOM and Honeywell.

Message Purpose

Inspect the aircraft to determine if any suspected EGIs are installed. Suspected EGI's are to be removed from service IAW this message.

Brief all AH-64 crewmembers of the possible EGI failure modes and provide risk mitigation information until the suspect EGIs are removed from service. END ITEMS AFFECTED - All AH-64 series aircraft.

AVIATION SAFETY ACTION MESSAGE, MAINTENANCE MANDATORY

AH-64-04-ASAM-02 (GUN INSPECTION) 2004/3/10 There have been multiple recent incidents where firing M789 (DODIC B129, NSN 1305-01-268-9373) 30mm High Explosive Dual Purpose (HEDP) ammunition resulting in damage to the barrel and/or flash suppressor; with some causing damage to the aircraft when the barrel ruptured. Damage is caused by in-bore detonation of the M789 HEDP ammunition. Typical barrel damage includes bulges, longitudinal cracks, holes, and/or missing pieces. Weakened barrels from previous in-bore detonations may have contributed to barrel ruptures that resulted in aircraft damage. Damage to the barrel renders it unsafe for further service and presents a risk to aircraft and crew. Subsequent investigations have identified potential issues associated with the one-piece base fuze 30 mm HEDP ammunition. A technical team has been formed to further investigate and address potential issues associated with the ammunition.

Message Purpose Initial inspections of the barrel and flash suppressor of the M230 gun system are required. THRU-FLIGHT inspections of the barrel and flash suppressor are required when the M230 gun system is fired.

Recurring inspections by armament personnel during rearming procedures are required when the M230 gun system is fired.

END ITEMS AFFECTED - All AH-64 series aircraft.

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AVIATION SAFETY ACTION MESSAGE, INFORMATIONAL

AH-64-03-ASAM-03 (COCKPIT CANOPY FOGGING)Cockpit fogging has been encountered on the ground and in flight when heating is commanded during a moderate temperature day. A moderate temperature day equates to approximately 40 to 70 degrees Fahrenheit (4.5 to 21 degrees Celsius) with high humidity of 70 percent RH and higher. The fogging of the canopy and all other glass surfaces in the cockpit can create possible simultaneous loss of outside visibility and electro-optical sensors during all flight conditions in adverse weather flight conditions. This condition can result in crew disorientation, loss of control and/or obstacle impact.

Message Purpose - Provide operational procedures to reduce the frequency of cockpit canopy fogging.

END ITEMS AFFECTED - All AH-64D series aircraft.

The following procedures should be used during all flight modes and ground operations when environmental conditions are in the range of 40 to 70 degrees Fahrenheit (4.5 to 21 degrees Celsius) and greater than 70 percent relative humidity.

Set the cockpit temperature to 60 degrees Fahrenheit (16 degrees Celsius) and select DEFOG OFF.

Select CANOPY ANTI-ICE ON for the remainder of the flight.

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