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1 ® 2002 Prentice Hall Publishing Chapter 23 Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control

®2002 Prentice Hall Publishing 1 Chapter 23 Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control

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Page 1: ®2002 Prentice Hall Publishing 1 Chapter 23 Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control

1®2002 Prentice Hall Publishing

Chapter 23Mergers and the Market for

Corporate Control

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What Is Control Worth

• Maximum a company is worth as a “stand-Maximum a company is worth as a “stand-alone” company is its value if it were alone” company is its value if it were managed efficientlymanaged efficiently

• Value gap is the difference between this Value gap is the difference between this value and the company’s current market value and the company’s current market valuevalue

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Reasons to Pay a Premium to Gain Control

• Manage a company more efficientlyManage a company more efficiently

• Synergy that might be achieved by Synergy that might be achieved by combining with another companycombining with another company

– Economies realized through a mergerEconomies realized through a merger

• Value of combining companies A & BValue of combining companies A & B

VVabab = V = Vaa + + VVbb + Synergy + Synergy

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Features of a Merger• Acquire only the assets of a company without assuming Acquire only the assets of a company without assuming

any of the liabilitiesany of the liabilities• Acquire the stock of another company assuming its assets Acquire the stock of another company assuming its assets

and liabilities and liabilities • Purchase with cash or stockPurchase with cash or stock• Purchases made with cash or debt are taxablePurchases made with cash or debt are taxable• Purchases made with voting preferred or common stock Purchases made with voting preferred or common stock

are not taxable at the time of saleare not taxable at the time of sale– Capital gain or loss is recognized only when the stock Capital gain or loss is recognized only when the stock

is soldis sold

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Accounting Treatment• In a state of change with FASB exploring the In a state of change with FASB exploring the

elimination of pooling of interestselimination of pooling of interests

• In a purchase the buyer treats the acquired company as In a purchase the buyer treats the acquired company as an investmentan investment

– Tangible assets are reported at fair market value Tangible assets are reported at fair market value making it possible to write up the acquired making it possible to write up the acquired company’s tangible assetscompany’s tangible assets

• In a pooling of interests, the balance sheets of two In a pooling of interests, the balance sheets of two companies are combined, with assets and liabilities companies are combined, with assets and liabilities being added together being added together

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Strategic Acquisition Involving Stock• Occurs when one company acquires another as part Occurs when one company acquires another as part

of its overall strategyof its overall strategy• With a stock acquisition, a ratio of exchange occurs, With a stock acquisition, a ratio of exchange occurs,

denoting the relative value weightings of the two denoting the relative value weightings of the two companies with respect to earnings and to market companies with respect to earnings and to market pricesprices

• Initial increases and decreases in EPS are both Initial increases and decreases in EPS are both possiblepossible

• Possibility of a future growth in earnings owing to Possibility of a future growth in earnings owing to the mergerthe merger

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Market Value Effect• Major emphasis in the bargaining process is on Major emphasis in the bargaining process is on

the ratio of exchange of market prices per sharethe ratio of exchange of market prices per share

Market price per shareMarket price per shareof acquiring company X # of shares offeredof acquiring company X # of shares offeredMarket price per share of acquired companyMarket price per share of acquired company

• Acquiring company must offer a price in excess Acquiring company must offer a price in excess

of the current market price per share to motivate of the current market price per share to motivate

the company being acquired the company being acquired

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Bootstrapping EPS• If the P/E ratio of the acquiring company stays If the P/E ratio of the acquiring company stays

the same, the market price of its stock will the same, the market price of its stock will increaseincrease

• Increase in EPS through acquisitionIncrease in EPS through acquisition

• Unlikely that the market will hold constant the Unlikely that the market will hold constant the P/E ratio of a company that cannot demonstrate P/E ratio of a company that cannot demonstrate growth potential in ways other than acquiring growth potential in ways other than acquiring companies with lower P/E ratioscompanies with lower P/E ratios

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Reasons for a Merger

Salesenhancement

Informationeffect

Wealth transfer

Operatingeconomies

Tax reasons Hubrishypothesis

Improvedmanagement

Diversification Management'spersonal agenda

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Valuation Analysis for Acquisitions

• Equity value-to-book value of the stockEquity value-to-book value of the stock• Enterprise value-to-salesEnterprise value-to-sales• Equity value-to-earningsEquity value-to-earnings• Enterprise capitalization-to-EBITDAEnterprise capitalization-to-EBITDA• Effect on acquiring company’s EPSEffect on acquiring company’s EPS• Discounted cash flow analysisDiscounted cash flow analysis• Hidden valuesHidden values• PEG ratio = P/E ratio growth in EPSPEG ratio = P/E ratio growth in EPS

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Voting Procedures• Under majority voting system, stockholders have Under majority voting system, stockholders have

one vote for each share of stock they own, and they one vote for each share of stock they own, and they must vote for each director position that is openmust vote for each director position that is open

• If management can garner 50.1 percent of the shares If management can garner 50.1 percent of the shares voted, it can select the entire boardvoted, it can select the entire board

• Under a cumulative voting system, a stockholder is Under a cumulative voting system, a stockholder is able to accumulate votes and cast them for less than able to accumulate votes and cast them for less than the total number of directors being electedthe total number of directors being elected– Permits minority interests to elect a certain Permits minority interests to elect a certain

number of directorsnumber of directors

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Formula for Cumulative Voting

• Minimum number of shares necessary to Minimum number of shares necessary to elect a specific number of directors elect a specific number of directors

Total shares outstanding x specificTotal shares outstanding x specific number of directors sought__number of directors sought__ Total number of directorsTotal number of directors to be elected plus oneto be elected plus one

+ 1

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Thwarting Minority Interests

• Reduce the number of directors to preclude Reduce the number of directors to preclude minority interests from obtaining a seat on minority interests from obtaining a seat on the board of directorsthe board of directors

• Stagger the terms of the directors so only a Stagger the terms of the directors so only a portion is elected each yearportion is elected each year

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Proxies and Proxy Contests• Proxy is a form a stockholder signs giving his Proxy is a form a stockholder signs giving his

or her right to vote to another or her right to vote to another • Management solicits proxies to vote for a Management solicits proxies to vote for a

recommended slate of directors and proposalsrecommended slate of directors and proposals• Outsiders can seize control of a company Outsiders can seize control of a company

through a proxy contestthrough a proxy contest• Proxy contests are few, owing to management Proxy contests are few, owing to management

having the upper handhaving the upper hand

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Dual-Class Common Stock

• To retain control for management, founders, To retain control for management, founders, or some other groupor some other group

• Classified according to voting power and to Classified according to voting power and to claim on incomeclaim on income

• Superior voting-right stock tends to trade at Superior voting-right stock tends to trade at a premium above the class of stock having a premium above the class of stock having inferior voting powerinferior voting power

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Tender Offers• Offer to purchase shares of stock of another Offer to purchase shares of stock of another

company at a fixed price per share from company at a fixed price per share from stockholders who “tender” their sharesstockholders who “tender” their shares

• Price is usually set significantly above the present Price is usually set significantly above the present market price, as an incentivemarket price, as an incentive

• Allows the acquiring company to bypass Allows the acquiring company to bypass management management

• Appeals directly to stockholders are always hostileAppeals directly to stockholders are always hostile• SEC requires extensive disclosuresSEC requires extensive disclosures• Under a two-tier offer, the first tier of stock Under a two-tier offer, the first tier of stock

usually represent control and is more attractive in usually represent control and is more attractive in terms of price and/or form of paymentterms of price and/or form of payment

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Company Resistance

• Persuade stockholders that the offer is not in Persuade stockholders that the offer is not in their best interesttheir best interest

• Raise the cash dividend or declare a stock Raise the cash dividend or declare a stock splitsplit

• Legal action like an antitrust suit may Legal action like an antitrust suit may provide a powerful deterrent to the bidderprovide a powerful deterrent to the bidder

• Seek a merger with a “friendly” company, Seek a merger with a “friendly” company, known as a white knightknown as a white knight

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Antitakeover Amendments• Managerial entrenchment hypothesis suggests that Managerial entrenchment hypothesis suggests that

the barriers erected are to protect management jobsthe barriers erected are to protect management jobs• Stockholder interest hypothesis implies that Stockholder interest hypothesis implies that

corporate control contests are dysfunctional and take corporate control contests are dysfunctional and take management time away from profit-making management time away from profit-making activitiesactivities

• Voting devicesVoting devices– Stagger the terms of the directorsStagger the terms of the directors– Change the state of incorporationChange the state of incorporation– Super majority approval provisionSuper majority approval provision

• Poison pill is the most effective of the antitakeover Poison pill is the most effective of the antitakeover devicesdevices– Have available a security offering that is unpalatable to Have available a security offering that is unpalatable to

thethe acquirer acquirer

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Other Antitakeover Devices• Fair merger price provision coupled with a Fair merger price provision coupled with a

supermajority provisionsupermajority provision

• Lock-up provisionLock-up provision

• Management contracts such as a golden parachuteManagement contracts such as a golden parachute

• Premium buy-back offer known as greenmailPremium buy-back offer known as greenmail

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Takeover Defenses and the Courts

• Board of directors must be guided by the legal Board of directors must be guided by the legal environment in which it finds itselfenvironment in which it finds itself– Exercise good business judgmentExercise good business judgment– Act in a way that is fair to all partiesAct in a way that is fair to all parties– Response to a takeover threat must be proportionalResponse to a takeover threat must be proportional

• Present legal environment is one of Present legal environment is one of management having the upper hand in control management having the upper hand in control contestscontests

• Some states make hostile takeovers difficultSome states make hostile takeovers difficult

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Shareholder Proposals and Activism

• Institutional investors and shareholder activist Institutional investors and shareholder activist groups want to change the ways of governancegroups want to change the ways of governance

• Want management more responsive to Want management more responsive to shareholders and the creation of valueshareholders and the creation of value

• Shareholder proposals usually are submitted Shareholder proposals usually are submitted under Rule 14a-8 of the SECunder Rule 14a-8 of the SEC

• Puts pressure on management to reformPuts pressure on management to reform• Some institutional investors negotiate directly Some institutional investors negotiate directly

with managementwith management

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Empirical Evidence on Mergers and Takeovers

• Substantial excess returns to the stockholders of the Substantial excess returns to the stockholders of the selling company if the merger or tender offer is selling company if the merger or tender offer is successful successful

• If it fails, share price falls back to the pre-offer level If it fails, share price falls back to the pre-offer level unless there is a subsequent bidunless there is a subsequent bid

• Hard to make a case for positive excess returns to Hard to make a case for positive excess returns to buying company stockholders, and some recent studies buying company stockholders, and some recent studies show negative excess returnsshow negative excess returns

• Modest negative share price effects have been found Modest negative share price effects have been found around the announcement of some antitakeover around the announcement of some antitakeover amendmentsamendments