2) Rizal Cement Co. v. Villareal

10/19/15, 02:45SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 135

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VOL. 135, FEBRUARY 28, 1985 15

Rizal Cement Co., Inc. vs. Villareal

No. L-30272. February 28, 1985.*

RIZAL CEMENT CO., INC., petitioner, vs. CONSUELO C.VILLAREAL, ISABEL C. VILLAREAL, FLAVIANO C.VILLAREAL, ALFREDO V. GOMEZ, AURORA V. GOMEZand the COURT OF APPEALS, ALS, respondents.

Civil Law; Land Titles; Property; Possession in concept of

owner; Possession, how acquired.·aptly found by the appellatecourt, respondents possess the property in the concept of an owner.„Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or theexercise of a right or by the fact it is subject to the action of our will,or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiringsuch right.‰

Same; Same; Same; Ownership; Tax receipts, tax declaration

and survey plan, not conclusive and indisputable basis of ownership

of property; Assessment alone, of little value as proof of title.·PetitionerÊs evidence, consisting of tax receipts, tax declaration andsurvey plan are not conclusive and indisputable basis of oneÊsownership of the property in question. Assessment alone is of littlevalue as proof of title. Mere tax declaration does not vest ownershipof the property upon the declarant. Settled is the rule that

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

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16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


neither tax receipts nor declaration of ownership for taxationpurposes alone constitutes sufficient evidence of ownership or of theright to possess realty. They must be supported by other effectiveproofs. Neither can the survey plan or technical descriptionsprepared at the instance of the party concerned be considered in hisfavor, the same being self-serving.

Same; Jurisdiction; Supreme Court; Jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals; Rule

on conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals;

Exceptions.·A painstaking review of the evidence on record failedto disclose any evidence or circumstance of note sufficient enough tooverrule said findings and conclusions. The jurisdiction of thisCourt in cases brought to Us from the Court of Appeals (nowIntermediate Appellate Court) is limited to the review of errors oflaw, said appellate courtÊs findings of fact being conclusive upon usexcept (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely onspeculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made ismanifestly absurd, mistaken or impossible; (3) when there is graveabuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when thejudgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when thefindings of fact are conflicting; and (6) when the Court of Appeals,in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case and thesame is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee,none of which obtain in the case at bar.

Same; Same; Same; Findings of the Court of Appeals when

supported by substantial evidence beyond the power of review by the

Supreme Court.·The appellate court did what is required of itunder the law and it cannot be faulted after reaching a condusionadverse to herein petitioner. The decision on the merits of the casehinges on the determination of the pertinent facts, and the findingsof the Court of Appeals when supported by substantial evidence arebeyond our power of review.

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Courtof



„1.

2.

3.

4.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Amanda V. Viray for petitioner, Luis Ma. Guerrero for respondents.

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VOL. 135, FEBRUARY 28, 1985 17


CUEVAS, J.:

Petition for Review on Certiorari of the decision of thedefunct Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 36700 whichREVERSED the decision of the then Court of First lnstanceof Rizal in Land Registration Case No. 1204, LRC Rec. No.N10480.

Sometime in December 1955, private respondents filedwith the then Court of First Instance of Rizal in Pasig, anApplication for Registration, alleging, inter alia:

That the said land consists of two agricultural lotsbounded and described as shown on plan Psd-147662 as Lots Nos. 1 and 2 and technicaldescriptions attached hereto and made integral parthereof;

That Lots Nos. 1 and 2 of plan Psd-147662 at thelast assessment for taxation were assessed at atotal amount of ONE THOUSAND FIVEHUNDRED (P1,500.00) PESOS per TaxDeclaration Nos. 11994 and 11995 in the values ofONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY (P1,190.00) PESOS and THREE HUNDRED TEN(P310.00) PESOS, respectively, in the Land Recordsof Rizal Province;

That to the best of their knowledge and belief, thereis no mortgage or encumbrance of any kindwhatsoever affecting said parcels of land nor isthere any person having any estate or interestthereon, legal or equitable in possession, remainder,reversion or expectancy;

That the applicants have acquired said lands by



5.

8.

purchase from the spouses VICTORIANO CERVOand IGNACIA GUILLERMO as evidenced by aDeed of Sale executed by the latter in favor of theformer, before Notary Public for the City of Manila,Mr. Manuel M. Paredes on the 3rd day ofNovember, 1955, per Doc. No. 352, Page No. 42,Book No. II, Series of 1955;

That the said parcels of land are not occupied byanybody; x x x x x x x x x x

That the said lots included in this applicationadjoins the National Road and the applicants do notclaim any part of the said National Road; x x x x x

18



Petitioner then prayed that the aforesaid parcels bebrought under the operation of the Land Registration Act,and to have the title thereto confirmed and registered intheir names,, Petitioner filed an OPPOSITION to saidapplication alleging·

„That the Rizal Cement Co., Inc. is the owner of unregistered three(3) parcels of land known as Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 4, located inDarangan, Binangonan Rizal, the full technical description andbearing distance of which can be found in Plan Psu-2260 approvedby the Director of Lands in 1912;

That the land which is the subject of this petition forregistration, full technical description of which are found in Psu-147662 approved by the Director of Lands in October, 1955, coversportions of Lots 1 and 4 of Psu-2260;

That Lot No. 1 under Psu-2260 contains an area of 122,982square meters, a portion of which is designated as Lot No. 2 ofPsu147662 containing an area of 6,133 square meters;

That Lot No. 4 of Psu-2260 contains an area of 27,530 squaremeters, a portion of which is designated as Lot No. 1 of Psu-147662



containing an area of 19,916 square meters; andThat the oppositor Rizal Cement Co., Inc. is in possession of said

land and has been religiously paying the real estate tax in theMunicipality of Binangonan, Rizal from the time it had acquiredsaid property from the previous owner (Old Tax Declaration No.30662) now 10570."

Petitioner then prayed that the said petition be dismissed.Private respondents, in REPLY to said OPPOSITION,

countered that the whole three (3) parcels of land known asLots Nos. 1, 2 and 4 of Plan Psu-2260 do not belong to thepetitioner; that a portion of Lot No. 1 consisting of 6,133square meters and portion of Lot No. 4 consisting of 19,918square meters belong to them; that they and theirpredecessors-ininterest have been in continuous, adverseand open possession of said portion since time immemorial;and that they have been religiously paying the real estatetaxes thereon.

After trial, judgment was rendered by the Court of FirstInstance on April 28, 1985 which was amended on May 21,1965, denying the application for registration and orderingthe is-

19

VOL. 135, FEBRUARY 28, 1985 19


suance of a decree of registration after finality of saiddecision in the name of Rizal Cement Company.

Respondents appealed to the then Court of Appealswhich reversed and set aside the lower courtÊs decision.Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the appellatecourt denied the motion in its Resolution of February11,1969.

Hence, the present petition alleging that the Court ofAppeals, in reversing the decision of the trial court, hasarrived at grossly mistaken, absurd and impossibleconclusions of law and has decided the appeal in a mannertotally at war with and entirely contrary to law and theapplicable decisions of this Court, In fine, petitionersubmits the following errors allegedly committed by the



a)

b)

c)

d)

e)

appellate court for Our review and consideration:

Reliance on the Deed of Sale purporting to havebeen executed by Maria Certeza in 1924 in favor ofApolonia Francisco, the due execution of whichhave been duly established, and made capital of thisdeed of sale as having effected the transfer of rightsover the lots in question, successively from theoriginal vendor down to herein private respondents;

Giving much weight to private respondentsÊevidence to the effect that former Justice Marianode Joya and one Gonzalo Certeza were formerowners of the property in question, and that theyare the predecessors-in-interest of the applicants-respondents. However, the Court of Appeals failedto consider the fact that these persons who werethen available and were the best witnesses tosubstantiate applicantsÊ claim, were not presentedas witnesses thereby giving rise to the legalpresumption that their testimonies would havebeen adverse had they testified in this case;

Failure of the Court of Appeals to consider the factthat the two (2) lots sought to be registered byprivate respondents were not listed in the inventoryof Maria CertezaÊs properties submitted to thecourt;

Failure of the Court of Appeals to rule that privaterespondents were not able to prove that theproperties covered by Exhibit „H" were the sameproperties covered in Exhibit „I". The Court ofAppeals has acted contrary to the doctrine laiddown in land registration cases to the effect that anapplicant must prove not only the genuineness ofhis title but also the identity of the land applied for;

20



Stressing that the evidence of petitioner (then



f)

(a)

oppositor) was weak to substantiate its claim butfailed to apply the doctrine that the burden is uponthe applicant for registration of land to provesatisfactorily that .he is the owner and it is notenough to prove that the property does not belongto the opponent. The evidence must be absolute andnot merely preponderant; and

In stating that applicants by themselves and theirpredecessors-in-interest have an unbroken adversepossession under claim of ownership for over thirtyyears thus failing to consider that petitioner hasalso been in possession of the properties since 1911,while several portions thereof were only under leaseto several persons.

Based on respondents-applicantsÊ testimonial anddocumentary evidence, it appears that the property appliedfor, designated as Lots Nos. 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-147662,have a total area of 26,015 square meters; that these lotsoriginally belonged to one Maria Certeza; that upon herdeath, the property was involved in a litigation betweenher grandchildren and Gonzalo Certeza and that the lotswere given by the latter to former Justice de Joya as thelatterÊs attorneyÊs fees; that the lots were then sold by deJoya to Filomeno Sta. Ana who, in turn sold the same tospouses Victoriano Cervo and Ignacia Guillermo in 1939;that sometime in November 1955, the said spouses sold thesaid lots to the herein applicants as shown by a dulynotarized deed of sale;

1 that the spouses Cervo declared the

property for taxation purposes in the name of the wife,Ignacia Guillermo, and paid for the realty taxes duethereon; that prior to the sale, the spouses Cervo had thetwo parcels surveyed first in 1950 and then in 1955.

Upon the other hand, oppositor, (now petitioner) RizalCement Company, claims to be the owner of the subjectlots, having bought the same from Maria Certeza, and tohave in continuous and adverse possession of the propertysince 1911. To substantiate its claim, petitioner submitteddocumentary evidence, the most important of which are thefollowing·

Plan Psu-2260 which covers the survey of a big




(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(a)

tract of land for the company designated as Lots 1,2 and 4 of the Plan with a total

_______________

1 Exhibit „I".

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VOL. 135, FEBRUARY 28, 1985 21


area of 210,844 square meters. The survey wasmade in 1911 and the plan was approved in 1912;

A sketch plan of the geographical position of thereal properties of Madrigal and Company;

Tax Declaration No. 1066 secured in 1949 from theRizal Provincial Assessor which is a consolidation ofall lands of the Rizal Cement Company located inDarangan with a total area of 2, 496, 712 squaremeters and which includes the land in litigation;

Tax Declaration No. 10570 which cancels TaxDeclaration No. 1066; and

Real estate tax receipts issued for Madrigal andCompany, covering among others the land appliedfor.

As to who had been in actual possession of the land inquestion, the Court of Appeals gave credence to thetestimony of the witnesses for respondents applicants,namely:

Santiago Picadizo·one of the tenants of the landfrom the time it was owned by Maria Certeza up tothe present. He stated that he knew for a fact thatthe lots in question were given to Justice Marianode Joya as attorneyÊs fees, who in turn sold thesame to lgnacia Guillermo; that from the time hestarted working as tenant, he successively gave theshare of the harvests to Maria Certeza; and thatduring all the time that the parcels of land were



(b)

(c)

possessed by the previous owners, no other personsever claimed ownership of the property,

Isaac Reyes·who started working on one-half ofthe 2 parcels of land since 1934 up to the present,and declared that there was no other person otherthan Ignacia Guillermo who claimed ownership ofthe parcels in litigation; and

Mr. Valentin Marquez·a rebuttal witness whoaverred that he began to live in Darangan,Binangonan, Rizal, since 1910; that he bought aportion of his land from Maria Certeza when he wasworking with Rizal Cement Company in 1924; thatthe sale was evidenced by an absolute Deed of Sale;that he occupied the portion sold to him up to 1931;that ever since he possessed the property therewere no other adverse claimants thereto; that hesaw a small house on a portion of the land of MariaCerteza built by Rizal Cement Company whointended to make a location where it could built afactory; that after 4 to 5 months, the small housewas removed, after which, this witness purchasedthat portion from Maria Certeza; that

22



during his stay in Darangan, the company did nottake possession of the land; that Maria Certeza hadthe possession of the land until her death and thatthe tenants gave the harvest of the land to MariaCerteza.

On this score, the Court of Appeals in its assailed decisionheld and rightly so·

„Being an attribute of ownership, appellantsÊ possession of the landin question goes far to tip the scale in their favor. The right topossess flows from ownership. No person will suffer adversepossession by another of what belongs to him. Were the oppositor-



appellee rightful owner of the land in question, it would not haveallowed the tenants to cultivate the land and give the ownerÊs shareto appellants and/or their predecessors. It would have opposed thesurvey for applicantsÊ vendors on May 21 and 28, 1950 and July 31,1955, but did not as shown in the surveyorÊs certificate, Exhibit E.If oppositor really bought Lot 2 from Maria Certeza in 1909 asclaimed, it has not been explained how she could sell a portionthereof to Apolonia Francisco, married to Valentin Marquez for ?100.00 on April 16,1924 by deed, Exhibit R,·an ancient document·as confirmed by the husband in his deposition who as employee ofoppositor would have known of its acquisition. On the other hand,applicantsÊ vendors in mortgaging the two lots to Pedro Picones in1952, Exhibits O and O 1, for P 1.1,000.00, exercised a dominicalact; and Aniano BautistaÊs testimony that the Cervos were notowners of the land challenges belief since Bautista was a witness toExhibits O and O-1, being uncle of Picones.‰

Very significantly petitioner did not present any witness inactual possession of the land in question.

As aptly found by the appellate court, respondentspossess the property in the concept of an owner.

„Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or theexercise of a right or by the fact it is subject to the action of our will,or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiringsuch right."

2

PetitionerÊs evidence, consisting of tax receipts, taxdeclarations

_______________

2 Article 531, New Civil Code.

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VOL. 135, FEBRUARY 28, 1985 23


of oneÊs ownership of the property in question. Assessmentis of little value as proof of title. Mere tax declaration doesnot vest ownership of the property upon the declarant.

3

Settled is the rule that neither tax receipts nor declaration





of ownership for taxation purposes alone constitutessufficient evidence of ownership or of the right to possessrealty. They must be supported by other effective proofs.

4

Neither can the survey plan or technical descriptionsprepared at the instance of the party concerned beconsidered in his favor, the same being self-serving.

5

Apropos thereto is the appellate courtÊs finding that·

„Against the chains of tax declarations presented by the applicants-appellants which originated beyond 1920 from Maria Certeza,undisputably the original owner of Lots 1 and 2, the oppositor-appellee presented no tax declaration which could refer specificallyto the two lots in question. Tax Declaration No. 10570 (Exhibit 35–1949) for the oppositor-appellee admittedly does not indicate any ofthe two lots in question. Indeed, the senior deputy assessor of Rizal,as witness for the oppositor-appellee, categorically declared that hisoffice refused to issue tax declaration for the land covered by itsPlan Psu-2260, for the reason that the same had been in possessionof various persons in Darangan.‰

Anent the allegation of petitioner to the effect that thesubject lands, full technical description of which are foundin Psu-147662 approved in October 1955, covers portion ofLots 1 and 4 of Psu-2260, the Court of Appeals correctlyobserved·

„The only documentary evidence which the oppositor-appellee maycapitalize for its claim of ownership is the notation in applicantsÊplan Exhibit D that the lots in question are portions of a previoussurvey made in 1911 for oppositor, Plan Psu-2260. The survey planhowever has no original record in the Bureau of Lands. Be that as it

_______________

3 Province of Camarines Sur vs. Director of Lands, 84 Phil. 613; Elumbaring

vs. Elumbaring, 12 Phil. 384.

4 Evangelista vs. Tabayuyong, 7 Phil. 800; Casimiro vs. Fernandez, 9 Phil.

562; Elumbaring vs. Elumbaring, 12 Phil. 385; Province of Camarines Sur vs.

Director of Lands, 64 Phil. 600, 613; Bañez vs. CA, 59 SCRA 30.

5 Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 740.

24







may, survey plans merely delimit areas sought to be registered,Besides, the annotation relied upon by the lower court in its judgment in favor of the oppositor is nothing more than what it imports·a previous survey, Neither the plan nor its approval carried withit any adjudication of ownership. The Director of Lands throughapproval merely certifies that the survey has been made inaccordance with approved methods and regulations in force.‰(Philippine Executive Commission vs. Antonio, CA-G.R. No. 8456,February 12, 1943)

A painstaking review of the evidence on record failed todisclose any evidence or circumstance of note sufficientenough to overrule said findings and conclusions. Thejurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to Us from theCourt of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate Court) islimited to the review of errors of law, said appellate courtÊsfindings of fact being conclusive upon us except

6 (1) when

the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely onspeculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inferencemade is manifestly absurd, mistaken or impossible; (3)when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciationof facts; (4) when the judgment is premised on amisapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact areconflicting; and (6) when the Court of Appeals, in makingits findings went beyond the issues of the case and thesame is contrary to the admissions of both appellant andappellee, none of which obtain in the case at bar.

The appellate court did what is required of it under thelaw and it cannot be faulted after reaching a conclusionadverse to herein petitioner. The decision on the merits ofthe case hinges on the determination of the pertinent facts,and the findings of the Court of Appeals when supported bysubstantial evidence are beyond our power of review.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby and the decisiondated January 6, 1969 of the Court of Appeals (nowIntermediate Appellate Court) is hereby AFFIRMED. Costsagainst petitioner.

_______________




6 Luna vs. Linotoc, 40 Phil. 16; Bongco vs. People, 95 Phil. 453;

Joaquin vs. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257; Castillo vs. CA, 124 SCRA 808; People

vs. Gamayon, 121 SCRA 643; Ramos vs. CA, 63 SCRA 331.

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VOL. 135, FEBRUARY 28, 1985 25

Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer

SO ORDERED.

Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Abad Santos and Escolin,

JJ., concur. Makasiar, J., no part,

Petition dismissed and decision affirmed.

Note.·The rule that factual findings of the Court ofAppeals are binding on the Supreme Court, admits of someexceptions, namely: (1) where there is a grave abuse ofdiscretion; (2) when the finding is grounded entirely onspeculation, surmises or conjecture; (3) when the inferencemade is manifestly absorb or impossible; (4) when thejudgment of the Court of Appeals was based on amisrepresentation of fact, (5) when the factual findings areconflicting; (6) or when the Court; of Appeals, in making itsfindings, went beyond the issues of the case and the sameare contrary to the admissions of both appellant andappellee. (Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the

Philippines, 19 SCRA 289),

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2) Rizal Cement Co. v. Villareal