2. Ermita Malate Hotel v. City Mayor of Manila

8/11/2019 2. Ermita Malate Hotel v. City Mayor of Manila

1/13

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-24693. July 31, 1967.]

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION,

INC., HOTEL DEL MAR, INC. and GO CHIU,petitioners-appellees,vs.THEHONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA,respondent-appellant,VICTOR

ALABANZA,intervenor-appellee.

Panganiban, Abad & Associates andAsst.City Fiscal L.L.Arguelles for appellant.

Jose M .Aruego, Arsenio Tenchavez andLuis Go for appellees.

Alfreo Concepcion for intervenor.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; VALIDITY, PRESUMPTION OF.

An ordinance, having been enacted by councilors who must, in the very nature of things, be familiar

with the necessities of their particular municipality or city and with all the facts and circumstances

which surround the subject and necessitate action, must be presumed to be valid and should not be

set aside unless there is a clear invasion of personal property rights under the guise of police

regulation. Unless, therefore, the ordinance is void on its face, the necessity for evidence to rebut

its validity is unavoidable. In the case at bar, there being no factual foundation laid for overthrowingOrd. No. 4760 of Manila as void on its face, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail.

2. ID.; POLICE POWER; MANIFESTATION OF. Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is a

manifestation of a police power measure specifically aimed to safeguard public morals. As such it

is immune from any imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything

of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power

which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of

powers extending as it does "to all the great public needs."

3. ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL INQUIRY. On the legislative organs of the government, whether nationalor local, primarily rests the exercise of the police power, which is the power to prescribe

regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the

people. In view of the requirements of certain constitutional guaranties, the exercise of such police

power, however, insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person, is subject to

judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious,

whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable

constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.

4. ID.; ID.; LICENSES INCIDENTAL TO. Municipal license fees can be classified into those


2/13

imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-

useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only. Licenses for non-useful

occupations are incidental to the police power, and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the

power to license and regulate, but in taking the amount of license fees the municipal corporations

are allowed a wide discretion in this class of cases. Aside from applying the well known legal

principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts

have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing

restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, ofcourse, generally an important factor in the determination of the amount of this kind of license fee

(Cu Unjieng v. Patstone [1922], 42 Phil,, 818, 828).

5. ID.; ID.; EXERCISE OF. Much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining

the amount of license fees to be imposed for revenue. The mere fact that some individuals in the

community may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living

cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. Persons licensed to pursue occupations which ma

in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of the police power embark in those

occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result from the exercise of that power.

6. ID.; DUE PROCESS; STANDARDS OF LEGAL INFIRMITY. There is no controlling and

precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action

should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be

valid. The standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite

to free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from imputation of

legal infirmity, is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.

It would be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a

municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capriciou

exercise of authority. What should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to be an

abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state ofpublic morals.

7. ID.; ID.; MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; PROHIBITIONS IN. The provision in Ordinance No.

4760 of the City of Manila making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized

representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent

any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full

payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as transgression against the command of due process.

The prohibition is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, because there appears a correspondence

between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at

correction. Moreover, every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty, which cannot

be absolute.

8. ID.; ID.; PUBLIC INTEREST; GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE. The policy of laissez faire

has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even

in contractual relations affected with public interest.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SCOPE. If the liberty invoked were freedom of the mind or the person, the

standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the


3/13

liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory

measures is wider.

10. ID.; DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT; AMBIGUITY OF STATUTES AS DENIAL OF DUE

PROCESS. What makes a statute susceptible to a charge that it is void on its face for alleged

vagueness or uncertainty is an enactment either for bidding or requiring the doing of an act that me

of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.

D E C I S I O N

FERNANDO,J p:

The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibitio

is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause. The

lower court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void." For

reasons to be more specifically set forth, such judgment must be reversed, there being a failure ofthe requisite showing to sustain an attack against its validity.

The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the

petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del

Mar, Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of the second

petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such

"charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give

the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It wa

alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of

the interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate

businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities regularly paying taxes, employing and

giving livelihood to not less than 2,500 persons and representing an investment of more than P3

million." 1(par. 2). It was then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of

Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio

Astorga, who was at the time acting Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).

After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the

assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact

insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manilaor in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is

unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would

impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second c]ass motels; tha

the provision in the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly

authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or

accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons

without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his

presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the

occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, i


4/13

any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his

residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a

person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of

such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and

records kept and bound together, it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such

hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the

Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due

process grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague,indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the

guaranty against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels

into two classes and requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels

such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or restaurant and laundry similarly offends against

the due process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which applies

to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a dining room; that the

provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from

being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied

by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly

authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more thantwice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its

unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for in

Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would cause the automatic

cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business

and loss of its investments, there is once again a transgression of the due process clause.

There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the

above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ ofpreliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No.

4760 from and after July 8, 1963.

In the answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal circumstances

regarding the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel

or motel business in the City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its

alleged nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition

did fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation to a

proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power and

that only the guests or customers not before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of th

right to privacy and the guaranty against self- incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of

the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed for its dissolutio

and the dismissal of the petition.

Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts dated

September 28, 1964, which reads:

"1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel


5/13

del Mar, Inc. are duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, both with

offices in the City of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chiu is the president and general manager

of Hotel del Mar, Inc., and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all

having the capacity to sue and be sued;

"2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief

executive of the City of Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances

of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and

enforcement of such ordinances;

"3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and

motels in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;

"4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No.

4760, which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the

acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the respondent regular City Mayor, amending

sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of ordinances of the City of

Manila besides inserting therein three new sections. This ordinance is similar to the one vetoedby the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in his 4th Indorsement dated

February 15, 1963 (Annex B);

"5. That the explanatory noted signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted with

the proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is

attached hereto as Annex C;

"6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from license

fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City of

Manila."

Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on th

presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of

conformity to the Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not only U.S.v.Salaveria,

but likewise applicable American authorities. Such a memorandum likewise refuted point by point

the arguments advanced by petitioners against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on February

4, 1965, the memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the

petition, with citations of what they considered to be applicable American authorities and praying

for a judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and making

permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued.

After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association, and

referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party the lower court observed: "The

only remaining issue here being purely a question of law, the parties, with the nod of the Court,

agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to submit the case for decision of the Court." It does

appear obvious then that without any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision passed upon th

alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is

undoubtedly right and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of

Manila to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of


6/13


7/13

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain

practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the then Councilor Herminio Astorga

included as annex to the stipulation of facts speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of

prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels,

which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become

the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill seekers." The challenged ordinance then "proposes to

check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these

transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open topublic view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to

shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the

increase in the license fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating

for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government."

It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the

validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.

It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its approval,ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant;8providing a license

tax for and regulating the maintenance or operation of public dance hall;9prohibiting gambling;11

and monte; 12prohibiting playing of panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal holidays;13

prohibiting the operation of pinball machines;14and prohibiting any person from keeping,

conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium is smoked or otherwise

used, 15all of which are intended to protect public morals.

On the legislative organs of the government, whether national of local, primarily rest the exercise

of the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulation

to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In viewof the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties

however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of

any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered

as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of an

other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.

We are thus led considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is raised to the

question of due process. 16There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It

furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation

of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due

process which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free the challenged

ordinance, or any government action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity;

sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the

dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the

due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of

reasons and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by

lack of reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the

embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.17It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and


8/13

judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch" in the light of reason drawn from considerations

of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought."18It is not a narrow

or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,"19

decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental

principles of our society."20Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or

pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.21

It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what amunicipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capriciou

exercise of authority. It would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable and what would

amount to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration

of the state of public morals. To be more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt

the need for a remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. A

strong case must be found in the records, and as has been set forth, none is even attempted here, to

attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due

process requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners'

indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such features as the

increased fees for motels and hotels, the curtailment of the area of freedom to contract, and, incertain particulars, its alleged vagueness.

Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the challenged

ordinance for both hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter, first-clas

motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has

been the settled law however, as far back as 1922 that municipal license fees could be classified

into those imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or

restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprise and for revenue purposes only.22As was

explained more in detail in the above Cu-Unjieng case: "(2) Licenses for non-useful occupations

are also incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the powerto license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are

allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying

the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or

tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability

of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful

enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the determination of the amount of this

kind of license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have

frequently been upheld, especially in cases of licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter

cases the fees have rarely been declared unreasonable."23

Moreover, in the equally leading case of Lutz V. Araneta24this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier

announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's

police power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority

conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to

cover a wide range of subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for public purpose,

just and uniform. 25

As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of


9/13

Manila in imposing licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that "much

discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the license fee of

the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure. 26

The discussion of this particular matter may fitly close with this pertinent citation from another

decision of significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement

of the ordinance would deprive them of their lawful occupation and means of livehood because

they can not rent stalls in the public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in

refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of which outside the city markets under certainconditions is permitted . . . And surely, the mere fact, that some individuals in the community

may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent

the exercise of the police power. As was said in a case, persons licensed to pursue occupations

which may in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of the police power

embark in those occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result from the legal

exercise of that power."27

Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it

unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel,

lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof morethan twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, call for a

different conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the

command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb

the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, accordin

to the explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there

appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the

legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every regulation of

conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty, which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be

absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is plainly

apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by

law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good o

the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases.

Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to

reasonable restraint by general law for the common good . . . The liberty of the citizen may be

restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within

the proper scope of the police power." 28

A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the

enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere withpersonal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be

subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and

prosperity of the state . . . To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual

are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be mad

to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be

made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should

achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal

discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order

and happiness for all."29


10/13

It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of undue

deprivation of freedom to contract, People v.Pomar, 30no longer "retains its virtuality as a living

principle. The policy of laissez fairehas to some extent given way to the assumption by the

government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest."

31What cannot be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or

the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting,but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of

regulatory measures is wider. 32How justify then the allegation of a denial of due process?

Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by invoking the

principle of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the petition itself that what

seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed and

specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners, however, point to the requirement that a guest

should give the name, relationship, age and sex of the companion or companions as indefinite and

uncertain in view of the necessity for determining whether the companion or companions referred

to are those arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room withhim at about the same time or coming at any indefinite time later to join him; a proviso in one of it

sections which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent

upon the discretion of its owners or operators; another proviso which from their standpoint would

require a guess as to whether the "full rate of payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof

means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked, do these allegations suffice to render

the ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answe

it. From Connally v.General Construction Co. 33to Adderley v.Florida, 34the principle has been

consistently upheld that what makes a statute susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either

forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of common intelligence must necessarily gues

at its meaning and differ as to its application. Is this the situation before us? A citation from JusticeHolmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal

laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in constructing laws as

saying what they obviously mean."35

That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the arguments presse

with such vigor and determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged ordinance canno

be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for constitutional law principles so uniformly held

and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision.

Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith.

With costs.

Reyes, J .B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J .P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, CastroandAngeles, JJ .,concur.

Concepcion, C .J .andDizon, J ., are on official leave.

Footnotes

1. The eighteen members are Waldorf Hotel, Hotel Monte Carlo, Golden Gate Motel, Miami Hotel, Palm


11/13

Spring Hotel, Flamingco Motel, Holiday Motel, Rainbow Motel, Palo Alto Hotel, Paradise Hotel,

Mayfair Hotel, Siesta Court, Sun Valley Hotel, Springfield Hotel, New Palace Hotel, Hotel del Mar,

Longbeach Hotel and Ritz Motel.

2. U.S. v. Salaveria (1918) 39 Phil. 102, at p. 111. There was an affirmation of the presumption of validity of

municipal ordinance as announced in the leading Salaveria decision in Eboa v. Daet, (1950) 85 Phil.

369.

3. 282 U.S. 251, 328, January 5, 1931.

4. Cf. Ichong v. Hernandez (1957) 101 Phil. 1155, at p. 1163. Also: "To Frankfurter the police power, true to

its etymology, is the power to shape policy. It defies legal definition; as a response to the dynamic

aspects of society, it cannot be reduced to a constitutional formula. The law must be sensitive to life; in

resolving cases, it must not fall back upon sterile cliches; its judgments are not to derive from an

abstract dialectic between liberty and the police power. Instead, in a world of trust and unions and

large-scale industry, it must meet the challenge of drastic social change. For him as for Holmes, 'society

is more than bargain and business' and the jurist's art rises to no higher peak than in vindicating interests

not represented by the items in a balance-sheet. In a progressive society, new interests emerge, newattitudes appear, social consciousness quickens. In the face of the unknown one cannot choose with

certainty. Nor as yet, has the whole truth been brought up from its bottomless well: and how fragile in

scientific proof is the ultimate validity of any particular economic adjustment. Social development is a

process of trial and error; in the making of policy the fullest possible opportunity must be given for the

play of human mind. If Congress or legislature does not regulate, laissez faire not the individual

must be the regulator. (Hamilton, Preview of a Justice (1939) 48 Yale Law Journal, 819).

5.Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 US 412.

6. U.S. v. Gomez-Jesus (1915) 31 Phil. 218.

7. Rubi v. Provincial Board (1918) 39 Phil. 660.

8. U.S. v. Giner Cruz (1918) 38 Phil. 677.

9. U.S. v. Rodriguez (1918) 38 Phil. 759. See also Sarmiento v. Belderol, 60 Off. Gaz. (2) 196; Lapera v.

Vicente, L-18102, June 30, 1962.

10. U.S. v. Pacis (1915) 31 Phil. 524.

11. U.S. v. Espiritu-Santo (1912) 23 Phil. 610; U.S. v. Joson (1913) 26 Phil. 1; People v. Chan Hong (1938)65 Phil. 625.

12. U.S. v. Tamparong (1915) 31 Phil. 321.

13. U.S. v. Salaveria (1918) 39 Phil. 102.

14. Uy Ha v. The City Mayor, 108 Phil. 400; Miranda v. City of Manila L-17252, May 31, 1961.

15. U.S. v. Ten Yu (1912) 24 Phil. 1.


12/13

16. There is no occasion to consider even cursorily the alleged invasion of the right of privacy or the prohibition

against self- incrimination. Petitioners obviously are not the proper parties to do so. Nor may such an

incurable defect be remedied by an accommodating intervenor "who has always taken advantage of, as

he exclusively relies on, the facilities, services and accommodations" offered by petitioner-motels. A

general merchant, doing business not only in Baguio City but in the City of Manila, has no legitimate

cause for complaint. At least, not according to the case as it has been developed.

17. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court (1938) pp. 32-33.

18. Frankfurter, Hannah v. Larche (1960) 363 US 420, at 487.

19. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy (1961) 367 US 1230.

20. Bartkus v. Illinois (1959) 359 US 121.

21. Pearson v. McGraw (1939) 308 US 313.

22. Cu Unjieng v. Patstone, (1922) 42 Phil. 818, 828.

23. Citing Swarth v. People, 109 Ill. 621; Dennehy v. City of Chicago, 120 Ill. 627; 12 N.E., 227; United

States Distilling Co. v. City of Chicago, 112 Ill., 19; Drew County v. Bennet, 43 Ark., 364; Merced

County v. Fleming, 111 Cal., 46; 43 Pac., 392; Williams v. City Council of West Point, 68 Ga., 816;

Cheny v. Shellbyville, 19 Ind., 84; Wiley v. Owens, 39 Ind., 429; Sweet v. City of Wabash, 41 Ind.,

7; Jones v. Grady, 25 La. Ann., 586; Goldsmith v. City of New Orlean, 31 La. Ann., 646; People

exrel., Cramer v.Medberry, 39 N.Y.S., 207; 17 Misc. Rep., 8; McGuigan v.Town of Belmont, 89

Wis. 637; 62 N.W., 421;Ex parteBurnett, 30 Ala., 461; Craig v.Burnett, 32 Ala., 728, and

Muhlenbinck v.Long Branch Commissioners, 42 N.J.L., 364; 36 Am. Rep. 518. At pp. 829-830.

24. 98 Phil. 148 (1955) citing Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v.Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 81 L. Ed. 1193; U.S. vButler, 297 U.S. 1, 80 L. Ed. 477; M'Culloch v.Maryland, 4 Wheat, 316, 4 L. Ed. 579. The Lutz

decision was followed in Republic v.Bacolod-Murcia Milling, L-19824, July 9, 1966.

25. Ormoc Sugar Co. v.Municipal Board of Ormoc City, 65 Off. Gaz. (12) 2861.

26. Physical Therapy Organization v.Municipal Board (1957) 101 Phil. 1142.

27. Co Kian & Lee Ban v.City of Manila (1955) 96 Phil. 649, 654, citing City of New Orleans v.Stafford,

27 L. Ann. 417.

28. Rubi v.Provincial Board (1919) 39 Phil. 660, at 706, citing Hall v.Geiger-Jones (1916), 242 U.S., 539;

Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. v.Cruz (1914), 189 Al., 66.

29. Calalang v.Williams (1940) 70 Phil. 726, at 733-734.

30. 46 Phil. 440 (1924). The Philippines was then under American sovereignty, American Supreme Court

decisions having thus an obligatory effect. No alternative was left to this Court except to follow the

then controlling decision in Adkins v.Children's Hospital (1924) 261 US 525, which subsequently was

overruled in West Coast Hotel v.Parrish (1937) 300 US 379.


13/13

31. Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v.Court (1940) 70 Phil. 340, at 360, quoting a concurring opinion of

Justice Laurel in Ang Tibay v.Court, G.R. No. 46496.

32. Cf. "In weighing arguments of the parties it is important to distinguish between the due process clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument for transmitting the principles of the First Amendment and

those cases in which it is applied for its own sake. The test of legislation which collides with the

Fourteenth Amendment, because it also collides with the principles of the First, is much more definite

than the test when only the fourteenth is involved. Much of the vagueness of the due process clause

disappears when the specific prohibitions of the First become its standard. The right of a State to

regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so far as the due process test is concerned,

power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a 'rational basis' for adopting. But

freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on such slender

grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests

which the state may lawfully protect." (West Virginia State Bd. of Edu v.Barnette, (1942) 319 US

624, at 639).

33. 269 US 385 (1926).

34. 17 L. Ed. 2d 149, Nov. 14, 1966.

35. Roschen v. Ward (1929) 279 US 337, 339.

2012 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. Click herefor our Disclaimer and Copyright Notice
http://www.cdasiaonline.com/myaccount/disclaimer

Documents

2. Ermita Malate Hotel v. City Mayor of Manila