1~UJ11 - Go.comdig.abclocal.go.com/wtvd/docs/051611_search_warrants.pdfI Jake Oakley being duly sworn depose and say: I am a(n) Special Agent, Office ofExport Enforcement, U.S. Department

A0106(Rev.5/851 Affidavit for Search Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

In the Matter of the Search of:

Premises of Law Enforcement Associates (LEA) located at 2609 Discovery Drive, Suite 125, Raleigh, NC 27616 and a Late Model White Renault Van

APPLICATION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

CASE NUMBER: 5: i1-mJ- /3'-J-1 I Jake Oakley being duly sworn depose and say: I am a(n) Special Agent, Office ofExport Enforcement, U.S. Department

ofCommerce and have reason to believe that 0 on the person of or lXI on the property or premises known as (name. description

and or location) : Law Enforcement Associates (LEA), 2609 Discovery Drive, Suite 125, Raleigh, North Carolina 27616 (as more particularly described in Attachment A which is incorporated herein) in the Eastern District ofNorth Carolina, there is now concealed a certain person or property, namely (describe the person or property to be

seized)

SEE Attachments B and B1

which is (state one or more bases for search and seizure set forth under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure)

Fruits, evidence, or instrumentalities of crimes against the United States

concerning a Conspiracy to Export a Controlled Item from the United States in violation of Title 50, V.S.c. §§ 170 I - 1706 and 18 V.S.c. 371. The facts to support a finding of Probable Cause are as follows:

SEE Attached Affidavit herein.

Continued on the attached sheet and made a part hereof. lXI Yes o No

Sworn to before me, and subscribed in my presence

at Raleigh, NC 1~UJ11

ture of Judicial Officer

Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 1 of 29

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SEARCH WARRANT

Your AffiiUlt, Jake O. Oakley, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:

1. I am a Special Agent of the United States Department of Commerce (DOC), Office

of Export Enforcement (OEE). I have been a Special Agent with OEE since February 2010, and

have conducted numerous investigations involving the illegal export of items from the United States. In

the course ofmy duties, I am responsible for investigating violations of laws relating to the export of

controlled commodities and technology from the United States, as established by the Export

Administration Act (EAA) of 1979, as amended, 50 U.S.c. App. § 2401, et seq., and its

implementing regulations, the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), 15 C.F.R., Parts 730

through 774. Prior to my position as a Special Agent with OEE, I was employed as an officer and

program manager with the Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border

Protection, for five years. I served honorably for four years in the United States Marine Corps. I have

completed the Criminal Investigator Training Program as well as other federal law enforcement

training courses held at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.

2. This affidavit is being submitted in support of an application for a search warrant

for the business location of Law Enforcement Associates (LEA) located at 2609 Discovery

Drive, Suite 125 Raleigh, NC 27616, more fully described in Attachment A. Based on the

investigation conducted, there is probable cause to believe that evidence currently exists at this

location relating to a conspiracy to illegally export a commercial van which has been outfitted

with devices that makes the van capable of surreptitiously intercepting wire, oral or electronic

communications, in violation of the EAR and the International Emergency Economic Powers

Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 as well as 18 U.S.C. § 371.

3. On January 14,2011, the Honorable William A. Webb, U.S. Magistrate Judge,

~ Case 5:11-mj-01347-JG Document 1 Filed 05/13/11 Page 2 of 29

United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, issued a search warrant

for the e-mail accounts npholding20 [email protected] and 101 [email protected]. This

warrant and supporting affidavit is incorporated by reference herein. The warrant was issued in

support of an investigation into a conspiracy to export a commercial van which I believe is

intended to be outfitted with devices useful in the surreptitious interception of communications,

and then re-exported from the U.S. to Morocco by a U.S. company identified as Law Enforcement

Associates (LEA), headquartered in Raleigh, NC. Export of this van when equipped with such

devices requires an export license from the Department of Commerce. Individuals previously

identified in this transaction are Mark White and Paul Briggs of LEA, Driss Hilmi ofNew Prime

Holdings, and Joseph Nounou of Airadionet Maroc.

4. I have personally participated in the investigation underlying the instant matter and

have witnessed many of the facts and circumstances described herein. In addition, I have received

information from other federal law enforcement officials, federal government officials, and

industry sources. I also have reviewed documents obtained during the course of the

investigation. The statements contained in this affidavit are based on my own observations and

review of documents, or reliable information provided to me by the other personnel identified

above. This affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose of obtaining a search warrant. I

am setting forth only those facts and circumstances necessary to establish probable cause for the

issuance of the requested search warrant. Unless otherwise indicated, all written and oral

statements referred to herein are set forth in substance and in part, rather than verbatim.

EXPORT CONTROL LAWS AND REGULATIONS

5. Pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.c. §§ 1701-1706


("IEEPA"), the President through the Department of Commerce regulates and licenses the export of

various commodities, technology and software (collectively referred to as "items") to foreign countries

under the Export Administration Regulations ("EAR") (codified at 15 C.F.R. Parts 730-799). The

EAR place limitations on the export of those items that (l) could make a significant contribution

to the military potential of other countries; (2) could prove detrimental to the national security of the

United States; or (3) are contrary to United States foreign policy. The Secretary of Commerce

implements the authority provided by IEEPA (and fonnerly the predecessor statute the Export

Administration Act) through the EAR and maintains the EAR at the direction of the President, who

identifies items over which the Department of Commerce (DOC) exercises regulatory jurisdiction.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (mS) within the DOC is the Office which controls the issuance

of a license or other export authorization requirement before an item subject to the EAR may be

lawfully exported from the United States.

6. IEEPA authorizes investigations into violations ofregulations, such as the EAR, issued to

implement the President's authority under IEEPA. See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1) and (2).

The EAR prohibits any person from exporting or causing to be exported from the United States any

controlled commodity without having first obtained a validated export license from the DOC.

Pursuant to 15 C.F.R. § 764.2(a), "No person may engage in any conduct prohibited by or contrary

to ... the EAA, the EAR, or any order, license, or authorization issued thereunder." According to

15 C.F.R. § 764.2 (b), "No person may cause or aid, abet, counsel, command, induce, procure, or

pennit the doing of any act prohibited, or the omission of any act required, by the EAA, the EAR or

any order, license or authorization issued thereunder." Under 15 C.F.R. § 764.2 (e), ''No person may

order, buy, remove, conceal, store, use, sell, loan, dispose of, transfer, transport, finance, forward, or

otherwise service, in whole or in part, any item exported or to be exported from the United States, or


that is otherwise subject to the EAR, with knowledge that a violation of the EAA, the EAR, or any

order, license or authorization issued thereunder has occurred, is about to occur, or is intended to

occur in connection with the item."

7. Willful violations of regulations issued or promulgated by the Executive Branch

under the authority of IEEPA are criminal offenses subject to 20 years imprisonment and a

maximum fine of $1 ,000,000. See 50 U.S. C. § 1705(c). IEEPA prohibits persons from violating,

attempting to violate, conspiring to violate, or causing a violation of any license, order, regulation

or prohibition issued under IEEPA. See 50 U.S.C. § 1705(a).

8. Specific items controlled by the DOC are identified on the Commerce Control List

(CCL), which is found in Supplement No.1 to Part 774 of the EAR. These items are further

classified through the use of Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCN). Each ECCN contains

a commodity description, license requirements, potential valid license exceptions, and the reasons

the item is controlled for export. If a license is required from the DOC, it is the responsibility of the

exporter to obtain such a license. DOC export licenses are processed and evaluated by the Bureau of

Industry and Security (BIS), and records of export licenses and license applications are maintained

in a system known a<; the Export Control Automated Support System (ECASS). I conducted several

queries of this system and determined that none of the parties I have identified below as being

involved in this transaction have applied for or received an export license from the DOC in either

their personal names or any company name known to be associated with them for this

specific transaction.

9. Included on the CCL is ECCN 5A980, which details the licensing requirements for

the export of "Devices primarily useful for the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic

communications; and parts and accessories therefor." Section 742.13 of the EAR states, in


relevant part, "In support of U.S. foreign policy to prohibit the export of items that may be used for

the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications, a license is required for all

destinations, including Canada" of communications intercepting devices. According to Section

742.13(d), export controls on these items and devices are maintained by the United States

government for foreign policy purposes.

10. According to section 742. 13(b) of the EAR, there is a general policy ofdenial as to

licenses for the export of all surreptitious listening devices unless the applicant is either a provider of

telecommunications services, a government agency or employee thereof.

BACKGROUND REGARDING LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSOCIATES, INC.

11. Law Enforcement Associates, Inc. (LEA) is physically located at 2609 Discovery Drive,

Suite 125, in Raleigh, NC. LEA is a publicly traded security and surveillance technology company

that manufactures and markets a diverse product line to the worldwide law enforcement, military,

security, and corrections market. The company manufactures and distributes a complete line of

audio intelligence gathering equipment including radio frequency RF) disguised transmitters,

receivers, and repeaters for use by law enforcement agencies. I reviewed the company's website

and noted that LEA describes itself as "the only U.S. manufacturer of covert surveillance audio

devices in disguised housings." I reviewed a 2010 product catalog from LEA, and noted that the

company advises potential purchasers that "certain products may not be exported from the U.S.A.

without specific approval by the Department of Commerce and/or the Department of State."

12. In a review ofa Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) filling from 2010, I noted

that LEA lists Paul Briggs as the President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Mark White as

the Vice President - Operations

FACTS ESTABLISHING PROBABLE CAUSE


13. As noted in the previously referenced affidavit, in February and March 2010,

LEA entered into a contractual agreement with New Prime Holdings to outfit a Renault van

with a variety of electronic equipment, including devices useful for the surreptitious

interception of wire, oral or electronic communications. To the best of my knowledge, new

Renault vehicles are not available for purchase domestically in the United States. In March

2010, LEA indicated receipt of a bank transfer in the amount of $32426 from New Prime

Holdings, which I believe represents a down payment of approximately 25% by New Prime

for the alteration of this van. The van which was to be equipped by LEA was imported into

the United States from France in April 2010.

14. Information obtained from the aforementioned e-mail search warrant

and industry sources are detailed below. Unless otherwise stated, the following individuals

are associated with the corresponding email accounts:

Mark White - [email protected]

Driss Hilmi - npholding201 [email protected]

15. On October 4, 2010, Driss Hilmi ("Hilmi"), using the e-mail account

[email protected]. sent an e-mail to Mark White's ("White") e-mail account,

[email protected]. In this e-mail, Hilmi states in part: "the clearance has been done and

the van is on it's way to Raleigh, eta tomorrow." Hilmi also inquires about training needed

to operate the equipment in the van: "Is it possible for you to send an engineer/trainer to

Morocco to perform the training of the team involved? If yes, what will be the costs for one

week?" On October 4,2010, White responded to Hilmi and writes in part: "This is good

news. We will be prepared for the arrival of the chassis. Training in Morocco is included in

the contract. I will confirm back to you when the chassis arrives at our location."

16. In an e-mail dated October 7, 2010, Hilmi writes to White asking: "Did you


receive the Renault Master?" On the same date, White responded to Hilmi stating: "Yes. We

have the Renault Master and the chassis has been moved to the fabrication shop to begin work

on the modifications."

17. In an October 11, 2010 e-mail message to White, Hilmi writes: "it may seem

early to you but we don't want to face the same situation as when importing this vehicle into

the USA. We have been advised that if the vehicle is modified to a military application, it will

require and (sic) export license DSP-5. The application for the DSP-5 can be made by the

shipper with the State Department. .. In this case - are you taking care of this?" On October

19,2010, White responds to Hilmi stating: "The proposal/contract does not include

exporting the vehicle. It is the customer's responsibility to arrange for transportation and any

paperwork (i.e. export license, etc.) needed to get the vehicle from our facility in Raleigh, NC

to final destination."

18. On October 20, 2010, Hilmi responds to White stating in part: "I understand

you are not the exporter - but can you at least tell me for what equipment we will need an

export license - so I can at least make a start".

19. In an e-mail message dated November 2,2010, Hilmi sends an e-mail to White

asking: "Do you have some news? I have read that it takes quite a long time to obtain an

export license so please be so kind as to come back with some details on the equipment".

20. On November 24,2010, Hilmi sends White an email stating in part: "Please let

us know soonest if export licenses are needed - we only have limited import authorisation

(sic) and cannot exceed that period".

21. In an e-mail correspondence between Hilmi and White dated November 30,

2010, Hilmi asks White: "Do you already have details on the necessity of an export license


needed?" White responds: "I spoke with our agency which provides confirmation on what

mayor may not need export license. There are only two possible items that they feel mayor

may not need export license. They are still awaiting feed back from the State Department and

the US Dept of Commerce. Unfortunately, both the State Department and the Commerce

Department of the federal government have laws related to exporting of goods."

22. On January 5, 2011, White sends Hilmi and e-mail stating in part: "At present,

I'm projecting the vehicle to be complete and available for your customer to come to our

facility the week of January 24 ... It also appears that there is no equipment that would require

an export license."

23. In an e-mail dated January 11,2011, White writes to Hilmi stating in part:

"Attached are pictures. I apologize I did not get these to you yesterday as promised. We had

a snow storm / ice storm and we shutdown early. Very unusual for Raleigh, NC."

24. Attached to the January 11,2010 e-mail from White to Hilmi, are seven photos

showing various electronic devices and wiring installed in the rear compartment of a white

van. These photos were shown to industry sources that are familiar with LEA equipment and

have numerous years of experience in the outfitting of surveillance vehicles. The sources

stated that some of the equipment installed in the van is used for surreptitious monitoring.

These items include a four comer listening post and audio/video receiver equipment. Another

piece of equipment was identified as a power inverter - 220 to 12 volt. The sources stated

that this equipment would not be installed in anything that would be utilized in the U.S.

25. Also identified in the aforementioned photos is a piece of electronic equipment

bearing the identifier "aid RX-1225." Research on the RX-1225 identified this device as a

Synthesized Intelligence Receiver which operates on the frequency range of 150 to 174 MHz.


This frequency range is reserved for law enforcement conducting surreptitious surveillance.

This receiver is used in conjunction with synthesized transmitters which operate in the same

MHz range. The manufacturer of the RX-1225 is "aid" which is identified as a division of

LEA in LEA company literature. The RX-1225 was also listed under the "Recording and

Monitoring" section of the original sales quotation dated February 25,2010 that was provided

by LEA to Hilmi.

26. An industry source with knowledge of the details of the LEAlNew Prime

transaction at issue here, specifically an internationally known customs broker and freight

forwarder, provided the U.S. Government an e-mail dated on or about February 4, 2011, from

Hilmi regarding the export of the van. In the e-mail, Hilmi writes in part: "We have been

advised by Law Enforcement Associates in Raleigh that the Renault Van is ready for re

export to Morocco. According to Mr. White there is no material 0 (sic) board requiring an

export license. If needed for the export we can send you the copy of invoice of LEA".

27. LEA's 2010 Product Catalog contains the following relevant wording: "Certain

products may not be exported from the U.S.A. without specific approval by the Department of

Commerce (Part 370, Export Administration Regulations.) .. .It is the BUYER's (emphasis in

original) responsibility, not LEA's, to obtain such licensing, unless agreed upon otherwise. "

28. An industry source who has provided reliable information in the past stated

that s/he engaged in numerous conversations with private counsel and an attorney from the

Office of Chief Counsel within BIS from 2004 to 2006, in order to determine the specific

license requirements for the exporting of surreptitious monitoring systems. According to

this source, White was in Source's office on an almost daily basis during this time period

and was frequently involved in discussions regarding the export licensing requirements for


surreptitious monitoring systems. Source advised that White knows U.S. export laws very

well, is extremely familiar with them and is aware of what is legal and illegal regarding

exports. Source also indicated that White's former company, Audio Intelligence Devices,

frequently exported surveillance equipment from the United States while White was

employed there prior to 2004.

29. In an e-mail message sent from White to Briggs on April 29, 2010, White

states in relevant part "Vehicles are difficult to deal with on the import and the export

side ... bottom line, and this is why we quoted everything based on customer being

responsible to get chassis to Raleigh and then when complete is responsible to get the

chassis back out from Raleigh, is to maintain the position that it is customer responsibility to

get the chassis to us. Then this simply becomes a domestic transaction for LEA. When

complete, we notify the customer that the unit is ready to re-export. The customer's

responsibility to deal with the import/export issue. It was estimated to me that if we get

involved with the import/export issue, we will spend 80+ hours just to accomplish the

import/export process in addition to the cost associated. Seeing as we probably don't have

somebody who has this expertise, we would be buying 80+ hours in addition to the

associated costs."

30. I reviewed a four page sales quotation issued by LEA and noted a section of

the quote entitled "Surveillance Equipment Options." The technical specifications of this

surveillance van as equipped, along with the specific equipment line items were provided to

licensing officers of the DOC's Bureau ofIndustry and Security. The technical specifications

were obtained from an invoice prepared by LEA and sent to New Prime Holdings in the

course of contract negotiations. Photographs of the interior of the van, obtained with a search


warrant from New Prime's email account ([email protected]). confinned that

the van had in fact had the surreptitious listening devices described in LEA's invoice

installed.. A preliminary classification based on this infonnation detennined that the

surveillance van, as described by LEA, would be classified under Export Control

Classification Number 5A980 on the Commerce Control List. See 15 CFR 774, Supplement

No.1. Items classified under ECCN 5A980 require an export license for all destinations,

including Canada. See 15 CFR 742. 13(a).

31. As noted previously, I know through a review of BIS records that no party to

this transaction has applied for an export license from the Department of Commerce.

32. On February 28,2011, at the request of the government, an email was sent to

Mark White from the entity which had been contacted by Hilmi to ship the van back out of

the United States. The message asked LEA: "Wanted to let you know we are ready to

proceed with the shipment. Need to verify for our paperwork that no license is required as it

is our understanding that none ofthe other parties (the Moroccans or New Prime) have a

license. Please get back with us as soon as possible so we can get the paperwork finished

up." Mark White replied: "It is our understanding that no license should be required for

export."

33. A confidential source who was a former employee of LEA reports that during

the time period that the contract with New Prime Holdings was being considered within LEA,

LEA applied for a license to export another surreptitious listening device for export to

Bennuda. This application was denied by the Department of Commerce because LEA was

neither a governmental agency nor employee nor a telecommunications company. This


denial was confirmed by the Department of Commerce.

34. The same confidential source referenced in paragraph 32, as well as a second

confidential source who was also a former employee of LEA, both confirmed that their own

discussions with Mark White and Paul Briggs, made clear that they were well aware that the

Commerce Department would not grant LEA a license for export of a surreptitious listening

device. These same confidential sources reported their belief that White's reason for stating

that the surreptitious listening equipment built into the white van did not require a license was

simply because White knew that the license requirement would put an end to the transaction.

Location of Evidence at 2609 Discovery Drive, Suite 125, Raleieh, NC

35. In an e-mail provided by an industry source, dated February 17, 2011, White

states in part: "Vehicle is at our location, 2609 Discovery Drive, Raleigh, NC 27616."

36. I have determined through investigation that LEA utilized their place of

business, located at 2609 Discovery Drive, Suite 125, Raleigh, NC, to arrange and facilitate

the outfitting of the surveillance van.

37. I know through training and experience that businesses engaged in

international sales and the export ofgoods from the United States usually maintain records related

to those transactions at their business location. Section 762.2 of the EAR describes the specific

records which individuals and/or businesses are required to maintain if engaging in a transaction

subject to the EAR. These documents include, but are not limited to, export control documents

(which are further defined as items such as Shipper's Export Declarations, dock receipts and bills of

lading), memoranda, notes, correspondence, contracts, financial records and invitations to bid.

38. On 2010 SEC Filings, 2609 Discovery Drive, Suite 125, Raleigh, NC 27616 is listed


as LEA's principal executive offices.

Computers

39. Computers are frequently used in transactions related to exports, and the

transmittal and receipts of funds to and from transacting parties. The term "computer" as

used here, is defined as an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed

data processing device performing logical or storage functions, and includes any data storage

facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such

device. Based on the above e-mail exchange, your affiant believes that computers, computer

systems, and related equipment located at 2609 Discovery Drive, Suite 125, Raleigh, NC,

contain evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of illegal exports and conspiracy to commit the

same.

Conclusion

40. Bas~:d upon the information above, I believe probable cause exists to conclude

the following: LEA has entered into a contractual agreement with New Prime Holdings to sell

that company a vehicle equipped, in part, with equipment and devices useful for the

surreptitious interception of wire, oral or electronic communications.

41. This vehicle has been outfitted with this equipment and is currently ready for

export at the LEA facility, located at 2609 Discovery Drive, Suite 125, Raleigh, NC. Export

of this vehicle, which is classified under Export Control Classification Number 5A980

requires a license from the Department of Commerce for export to any destination outside of

the United States, including the People's Republic of China or Morocco. Based my training

and experience, it is my understanding that customs brokers and freight forwarders are not

typically responsible for obtaining export licenses.


42. According to information developed during the course ofthis investigation,

LEA and its employees are aware that the export of some items sold by LEA fall under the

jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce.

43. No party to this transaction has applied for an export license from the

Department of Commerce.

44. For the foregoing reasons, I submit that there is probable cause to believe that

export of this van would be a violation of the export laws of the United States, and that

employees of LEA, specifically Mark White and Paul Briggs, have engaged in a conspiracy

to violate those laws, specifically Title 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 and Title 18 U.S.C. § 371. I

further submit that there is probable cause to believe that fruits, evidence and

instrumentalities of this conspiracy, as set forth in Attachment B, will be found at the LEA

facility, located at 2609 Discovery Drive, Suite 125, Raleigh, NC. More particularly, I

believe the evidence gathered in this matter leads to the following conclusions relative to the

activities of LEA, Mark White and Paul Briggs:

a) Both Briggs and White were well aware that the van they contracted to outfit

would as outfitted require a license before it could be exported.

b) The van was in fact outfitted as agreed, specifically to serve as a surreptitious

listening device and did in fact require a license to be exported anywhere out side the United

States.

c) Both White and Briggs were well aware that because LEA was neither a

government agency or an employee of same nor a telecommunications provider, it was not

even eligible to be given an export license.

d) Both white and Briggs were well aware of the licensing requirement and their


ineligibility at the time they contracted to outfit the van and in fact did outfit the van.

e) LEA, in the person of White, engaged in a series of emails designed to mislead

New Prime and the broker freight forwarder into believing that no license was required.

f) LEA accepted approximately $32,426 as a down payment for their work on the van

and expected to receive $209,902 in total for their work.

g) On February 28, 2011, LEA, in the person of Mark White, was told via email that a

license for the van had not been obtained by the other parties in the transaction and knowingly

lied when representing that the van did not require a license to be exported. Their purpose in

doing so was to induce the export to Morocco and thus collect the balance of their fee.

h) Thus White and Briggs, for the purpose of making an illicit profit, conspired to

cause an unlicensed export of surreptitious listening device in violation of the law as detailed

above and committed a series of overt acts in furtherance of such conspiracy, including

emails, preparation of an invoice, outfitting a Renault van with electronic devices designed to

be used for the purpose of surreptitious listening.

i) That there is probable cause to believe that evidence of this conspiracy, including

the altered van, documents and other items as detailed in Attachment B are currently located

at 2609 Discovery Dr., Suite 125, Raleigh NC.

Evidence obtained durine: search on March 3, 2011

45. On Thursday, March 3, 2011, pursuant to a warrant issued on Wednesday,

March 2, 2011, federal law enforcement agents representing the Department of Commerce

and other federal agencies executed a search of the premises located at 2609 Discovery

Drive, Suite 125, Raleigh, NC. In the course of conducting this search additional evidence of

a series of exports of surreptitious listening devices was found. Based on the training and


experience of the undersigned it is believed that each of these exports required a license from

the Department of Commerce before they could be lawfully exported to any foreign country.

As a result of a search of Department of Commerce records the undersigned is aware that no

such license was applied for or issued. The evidence of the additional illegal exports includes

the following LEA invoices reflecting shipments already sent::

An LEA invoice dated April 20, 2010. This invoice reflected the repair and reexport of three PST1000BWs. These items were shipped by LEA to ASTC Matrix International in Cairo, Egypt on April 20, 20 IO. According to information provided by LEA, the PST-I OOOBW is a covert body wire, used in the surreptitious audio monitoring of conversations. The documents related to the original export of these items have not been located. No export license was noted in the sales file.

An LEA invoice, dated November 24, 2010, reflecting repair and reexport of three PST-IOOOBW body wires. These body wires were shipped to ASTC Matrix International on November 24,2010. The documents related to the original export of these items have not been located. No export license was noted in the sales file. .

An LEA invoice dated June 15, 20 10, reflecting the sale of 20 video key fobs, model number 921 OOA, to Griff Comm Limited, in Powys, Great Britain. According to LEA sources, this key fob is an undercover digital and audio recorder. These items were shipped by LEA on June 16,2010. No export license was noted in the sales file.

An LEA invoice, dated July 21, 2010, reflecting the sale of three video key fobs, model number 1492100A, to Safe Tactics BV in Amersfoort, The Netherlands. According to LEA sources, this key fob is an undercover digital and audio recorder. These items were shipped by LEA on July 21, 2010. No export license was noted in the sales file.

An LEA invoice dated January 10,2011 reflecting the sale of two video key fobs, model number 92100A, to Safe Tactics BV in Amersfoort, The Netherlands. According to LEA sources, this key fob is an undercover digital and audio recorder. These items were shipped by LEA on January 10,2011. No export license was noted in the sales file.

An LEA invoice dated January 27,2011. This invoice reflected the repair and reexport ofa PST-lOOOBW. This item was shipped by LEA to ASTC Matrix International in Cairo, Egypt on January 27, 2011. According to information provided by LEA, the PST-1 OOOBW is a covert body wire, used in the surreptitious audio monitoring of conversations. The documents related to the original export of these items have not been located. No export license was noted in the sales file.

46. The undersigned believes these invoices constitute evidence of additional

criminal activity in violation of Title 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 and Title 18 U.S.C. § 371 as

well as evidence of intent relative to the intended export of the Renault van described above.

During the search conducted on March 3, 2011, the agents also found the Renault van fully


outfitted with surreptitious listening gear as described above.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this J~2011


Attachment A

2609 Discovery Drive, Suite 125, Raleigh, North Carolina (NC) is an office complex housing multiple businesses. This brick single story structure contains glass doors and windows on the front and white bay or garage type doors in the rear. Law Enforcement Associates (LEA) leases approximately 10,000 square feet of space at this location, which is marked with signage, "LEA" in white letters above the front entry door. The rear garage is door is also marked with signage identifying it as LEA space.

Late model, white Renault "Master" van possibly bearing Vehicle Identification Number (VIN)

VF1FDB1H642299376. This v.an has been outfitted with electronic surveillance equipment which is capable ofsurreptitiously intercepting wire, oral or electronic communications.

2609 Discovery Dr, Raleigh, NC 2761&-1904

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ATTACHMENTB

ITEMS TO BE SEIZED

"Document" as that tenn is used herein, means records, notes, letters, correspondence,

forms, financial records, checks, ledgers, accounting papers, computer printouts, saved e-

mail, information on computer hard drives and disks, computer input and output reports,

and writings, and any other item of any type that conveys information.

1. Documents pertaining to the export activities of Law Enforcement

Associates, Inc., or any individual acting on their behalf, which provide evidence of any

illegal export activity. Such activities include, but are not limited to, the purchase,

export, intended export, re-export or transshipment of any U.S. origin item to an ultimate

licensable destination. These documents include, but are not limited to:

a. Shipper's Export Declarations b. Shipper's Letters of Instructions c. Air Waybills d. Bills of Lading e. Purchase Orders f. Invoices g. Delivery Receipts h. Inventory Records 1. Contracts J. Powers of Attorney k. Payment Records 1. Letters of Credit m. Product Literature n. Product Specifications o. Correspondence p. Ledgers and other financial records q. Product Registration and Warranty Infonnation r. DistributorlDistribution Agreements s. End User Statements t. Customer Mailing Lists il. Documents related to U.S. export laws v. Document indicating knowledge of such activity


2. Documents related to surreptitious listening devices or devices primarily

useful for the surreptitious interception of wire, oral or electronic communications and

related parts and accessories.

3. Documents related to the proposed sale, sale, purchase, brokering, export,

or intended export of surreptitious listening devices or devices primarily useful for the

surreptitious interception of wire, oral or electronic communications and related parts and

accessories.

4. Notes, letters documents and other papers, whether in handwritten or other

form, which document any correspondence or discussions between Marc White, Paul

Briggs, Driss Hilmi, or any other representatives of Law Enforcement Associates, New

Prime Holdings or the Government of Morocco, related to the purchase and export of a

White Renault van equipped with various electronic components.

5. Any and all documents related to U.S. Export Laws~

6. Documents related to the training of foreign nationals on items or

technology controlled under the Export Administration Regulations.

7. Documents reflecting names, addresses, telephone numbers, pager

~numbers. facsimile telephone numbers and/or telex numbers of co-conspirators, sources


and institutions with whom a financial relationship exists, and safes, including the

contents within.

8. Documents related to travel to the People's Republic of China or

Morocco, including but not limited to passports and visas.

9. Late model, white Renault "Master" van possibly bearing Vehicle

Identification Number (VIN) VFlFDBlH642299376. This van has been outfitted with

electronic surveillance equipment which is capable of sIDTeptitiously intercepting wire,

oral or electronic communications.

lO. All computer, computer hardware, system peripherals, computer software,

computer documentation, computer storage media and data storage devices, computer

passwords, and other data security devices, computer printouts, and computer programs

which contain. or were used to transmit or store any of the foregoing records, documents,

and materials.

A U.S. Department of Commerce Special Agent or Computer Forensic Analyst specially

trained in computer evidence recovery shall supervise the retrieval of digital evidence,

computers and related storage devices from 2609 Discovery Drive, Raleigh, North

Carolina 27616. The computer forensics agent/analyst will make an initial review of any

computer hardware, system peripherals, and computer storage media to determine if it is

possible to search these items during the execution of the search warrant without

~I ~11


jeopardizing the government's ability to preserve the electronically stored information in

its original state. As an alternative, a computer forensics agent/analyst will determine if it

is possible to make forensically sound images of the original computer hardware and

storage media on-site within a reasonable period of time, and if these forensically sound

images will be useable for an off-site examination conducted at a later date without the

ori.ginal equipment.

If it is not possible to perform an on-site review of these materials or to create usable

forensic imagf:s, the agent executing the warrant will seize all computer hardware,

computer storage media, system peripherals, software, documentation, password and data

security devices, and storage media as set forth in this attachment and as defined below.

The seized items will be transported to an appropriate law enforcement facility for a

timely analysis and review.

Any electronically stored information or data that does not fall within the list of items to

be seized will be returned to the subject premises within 30 days from the execution of

the warrant. However, any electronically stored information, data, image, or file found to

contain, or constituting, contraband (as defined by law), shall not be returned.

Any computer equipment taken from the subject premises in order to perform an off-site

search for electronically stored information and data shall be returned to the subject

premises within 30 days from the execution of the warrant. If it is not possible to conduct

the offsite examination within the 30-day time period because of the volume of


electronically stored infonnation to be reviewed or the need for specialized equipment of

expertise to conduct the review, the government may apply for a Court-ordered extension

of the 30-day time period. However, items which constitute evidence of the commission

of a criminal offense or contraband, the fruit of a crime, or things otherwise used as the

means ofcommitting a criminal offense need not be returned. Instead, the government

may seize and maintain custody of these items pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 41 (c).

For purposes of this warrant, the foregoing terms are defmed as follows:

a. Hardware: computer hardware consists of all equipment which can

collect, analyze, create, display, convert, store, conceal, or transmit electronic, magnetic,

optical, or similar computer impulses or data. Hardware includes (but is not limited to)

any data-procc~ssing devices (such as server, desktop, laptop, and notebook computers,

tablets, hand-held electronic organizers, personal digital assistants (PDA), and cellular

phones which contain capabilities found on a PDA or a computer - such as the ability to

send and receive e-mail and store and edit documents. It); internal and external storage

devices (magnetic storage devices such as hard disk drives, diskette drives, and tape

drives, optical storage devices such as CD-ROM drives, CD-R/CD-RW recorders, and

DVD drives, recorders, and other electronic memory storage devices); internal computer

components (such as motherboards, central processing units, graphics processing units,

power supplies and RAM modules); and related communication devices such as modems,

routers, cables, and connectors, programmable telephone dialing or signaling devices, and


electronic toUl~ generating devices, as well as devices, mechanisms or parts that can be

used to restrict access to computer hardware such as physical keys and locks.

b. System Peripherals: A piece of equipment which sends data to, or

receives data from, a computer, keyboards, mousse, printers, scanners, plotters, video

display monitors, and certain types of facsimile machines are examples of peripherals.

c. Software: Computer software is digital information which can be

interpreted by a computer and any of its related components to direct the way they work.

Software is stored in electronic, magnetic, optical, or other digital form. It commonly

includes programs to run operating systems, applications (like word processing, graphics,

or spreadsheet programs), utilities, compilers, interpreters, and communications

programs.

d. Documentation: Computer related documentation consists of written,

recorded, printed, or electronically stored material which explains or illustrates how to

configure or use computer hardware, software, or other related items.

e. Passwords and Data Security Devices: Computer passwords and other

security devices are designed to restrict access or to hide computer software,

documentation, or data Data security devices may consist ofhardware, software, or

other programming code. A password or pass phrase (a string of alphanunieric

characters) usually operates as a sort of digital key to ''unlock'' particular data security

devices. Data security hardware may include encryption devices, chips, cards, and circuit

boards. Data security software or digital code may include a prograrhming code that

creates ''test'' keys or "hot" keys, which perform certain preset security functions when

touched. Data security software or code may also encrypt, compress, hide, or "booby


trap" protected data to make it inaccessible or unusable, as well as reverse the process to

restore it.

f. Storage Media: Storage media includes any material capable of storing

. information in. a manner that can be used by computer hardware to save and/or retrieve

information. Examples of storage media include diskettes, CD-ROMs, DVDs, Blue-Ray

discs, magnetic tapes, ZIP disks, JAZ disks, flash memory storage devices and EPROMS.


ATTACHMENT B-1

Notwithstanding any language in this Attachment B to the contrary, this warrant authorizes (i) the search of the items listed in this Attachment B for only the following and (ii) authorizes the seizure of the items listed in this Attachment B only to the extent they constitute the following:

(a) evidence of violations of both 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 and 18 U.s.C. § 371 with respect to only:

1. the sale ofthe outfitted Renault "Master" van (Vehicle IdentificationNumber VFIFDBIH642299376) described in paragraph 13, among numerous other paragraphs, of the affidavit supporting the application for this warrant ("Affidavit"), including, but not limited to, the subject Renault van;

ii. the transaction involving the surreptitious listening device for which an application to export to Bermuda was denied, as described in paragraph 33 of the Affidavit; and

111. shipments or intended shipments to overseas locations of surreptitious listening devices which fall within Export Control Classification Number 5A980 (collectively "the subject violations").

(b) any item constituting contraband due to the subject violations, fruits of the subject violations, or other items possessed whose possession is illegal due to the subject violations; or

(c) any property designed for use, intended for use, or used in committing any subject violations.


AD 93 (Rev. 01/09) Search and Seizure Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for the

Eastern District of North Carolina

In the Matter of the Search of ) (Briefly describe the property to be searched ) or identifY the person by name and address) ) Case No.5: 1/- rnj - J3'-17

)Premises at Law Enforcement Associates (LEA) located

)at 2609 Discovery Drive, Suite 125, Raleigh, NC 27616 )and Late Model Renault White Van

SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANT

To: Any authorized law enforcement officer

An application by a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government requests the search of the following person or property located in the Eastern District of North Carolina (identifY the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location):

See Attachment A

The person or property to be searched, described above, is believed to conceal (identifY the person or describe the

property to be seized):

SeeAttach~e~~~B1andC. ~~~/_f-~$ ..r~ of- ~ U>I"1rU C1U~{' Rr5 ~t:.-n.v7~ ~ULGA.fv:··

I find that the affidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish probable cause to search and seize the person or property.

YOU ARE COMMANDED to execute this warrant on or before J 7 ~?-O ( ) (not to exceed IMays)

lilt' in the daytime 6:00 a.m. to 10 p.m. 0 at any time in the day or night as I find reasonable ~ruse has been established.

Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the property was taken.

The officer executing this warrant, or an officer present during the execution of the warrant, must prepare an inventory as required by' law and P~0!IWt1y.reJiurn this Wl£,.a12.t and invent9fY,..to United States Magistrate Judge James E. Gates 0(1... Av'( &1)ttf L,.. IeA' tvC l~ ,ey.<Jv(,O(/'-lV" .

(name)

o I find that immediate notification may have an adverse result listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (except for delay of trial), and authorize the officer executing this warrant to delay notice to the person who, or whose property, will be searched or seized (check the appropriate box) ofor days (not to exceed 30).

Date and time issued: 3~+U1l( S: l> f·f\1. •

Ountil, the facts justifying, the later specific

City and state: Raleigh, NC 28601 JAMES E. GATES, United States Magistrate Judge Printed name and title


AO 93 (Rev. 01/09) Search and Seizure Warrant (Page 2)

Return

Case No.: Date and time warrant executed:

S".'6fi:>

FILED

MAR 1 8 2011 DENNIS P. IA\lllRONE. ClEflU( US OIS~O\JfI.T, EONe

ISY' O!PCLK,

Certification

I declare under penalty of perjury that this inventory is correct and was returned along with the original warrant to the designated judge.

Date: OS/a/lkl(


Inventory Listing of All Items Seized at Search Warrant Site

Site Name: Investigation Number: Report Date: Law Enforcement Associates EE444710 Monday, January 10, 2000 Inc. Starting Date and Time: 2609 Discovery Drive, Suite 03/03/2011 06:05 PM 125 Raleigh, NC 27616

Ending Date and Time:

03/03/2011 08:10 PM

Control #: 1

Location: Garage Found: Middle of garage Description: Seized Per Warrant

Evidence Box: Locator Code: L

White outfitted Renault "Master" surveillance van - VIN VF1 FDB1 H642299376. Contents of van: (1) Rainbow lens controller; (1) Aid vision 1 gig thumbdrive; (5) Rolls of cabling; (1) Power extension cord; (2) Harware mounts; (3) Remote controls; (6) AAA batteries; (1) Bag of misc. hardware accessories; (1) Desk chair.

Control #: 2 Evidence Box: 2 Location: Garage Locator Code: L Found: Inside LEA facility Description: Seized Per Warrant Master key for white surveillance van.

Control #: 3 Evidence Box: 2 Location: Sr. Vice President Locator Code: D Found: File cabinet

Description: Seized Per Warrant Russia Ford Transit documents

Control #: Location: Found:

Description:

4 Sr. Vice President Inside LEA facility Seized Per Warrant Egypt sales order

Evidence Box: Locator Code:

2 L

Control #: Location: Found: Description:

5

Main Lobby Lateral files Seized Per Warrant Various intemational files.


2 L

Control #: Location: Found: Description:

6 Lateral files Lateral files Seized Per Warrant Various lateral files.


2 K

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