Rogelio C. Lascoña Jr Wills and Succession-1st Bacth Midterms

1. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo), petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, respondents.

Phil. Com. and Ind. Bank v. Escolin (no fideicommissary)L-27860, 27936-37, and L-27896 Mar. 29, 1974

Doctrine: Where under the will the whole estate is bequeathed to X “to be owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with the absolute dominion over them only during his lifetime, which means that while he could completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof during his lifetime(inter vivos) to anyone, he cannot do so after his death(mortis causa).

FACTS: An American citizen from Texas, Linnie Jane Hodges, died in the Philippines, leaving certain properties,both real and personal, in our country. In her will, she made her husband, Mr. Hodges, her only heir. She likewise stated in the will that upon her husband’s demise, the undisposed properties from her estate would be given equally among her own brothers and sisters. Some fi ve years later, Mr. Hodges, also a citizen of Texas, died. The administrator of the estate of Mr. Hodges, the PCIB, claims that the designation of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges was an attempted substitution, but cannot be given effect because it is not a simple nor a vulgar nor a fideicommissary substitution, and that under American law, the estate of Mrs. Hodges consists of 1/4 of the total conjugal estate.

Issues: Is the designation of Mrs. Hodges’ brothers andsisters valid? If under Texas law, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is less than 1/4, how much must be regarded as her estate?

HELD: The designation of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges is not a valid substitution (not a simple or vulgar

substitution because the will does not say that said relatives would inherit if Mr. Hodges would predecease, be incapacitated, or should repudiate the inheritance; and not a fideicommissary substitution for Mr. Hodges was not obliged to preserve and transmit said properties to the relatives of Mrs. Hodges). But this does not mean that no effect should be given to their designation, for the truth is that they were also instituted to said remaining properties.

The institution of Mr. Hodges partakes of a resolutory condition, this is really a resolutory term, because Mr. Hodges would surely die, sooner or later that is, ownership of the inherited properties would end at his death (that is, while he was free, as owner, to dispose of the properties inter vivos, he was not free to do so mortis causa). The institution of Mrs. Hodges’ brothers and sisters is on the other hand an institution subject to a suspensive condition (this is really a suspensive term), their inheritance having become vested at the time of Mrs. Hodges’ death, but only operative upon the death of Mr. Hodges. With respect to the second issue, the allegation of the PCIB that Mrs. Hodges’ estate is 1/4 of the total mass is a judicial admission of a fact (the existence of the foreign law being a fact), and by the principle of estoppel, would prevent the PCIB from alleging that Mrs. Hodges’ estate is less than 1/4.

2. G. de Perez v. Garchitorena (fideicommissary)54 Phil. 431

Doctrine: Provision in the will that the whole estate shasll pass “unimpaired” to the children of heiress in the event heiress should die after the testatrix, was held a fideicommissary substitution. It implied an obligation to preserve and to transmit. Necessary consequence derived from the nature of fideicommissary is that second heir does not inherit from fiduciary but from testator.

FACTS: Ana instituted Carmen as her heir with the following stipulations in her will:(a) Should Carmen die, the whole estate should pass unimpaired to Carmen’s children.(b) The estate should never pass out of the hands of Carmen and her children as long as this was legally possible.(c) Should Carmen die after Ana while Carmen’s children are still minors, the estate would be administered by the

executrix.

It should be noted that in the will, no express mention was made of a fideicommissary substitution. Neither was there any statement as to whether Carmen was to die before or after Ana. It was thus alleged that no fideicommissary substitution was made, and so, after Carmen’s death, the property belonged to her estate and not to the children as substitutes, and therefore, creditors could attach the same.

HELD: The properties belonged to the children, and not to Carmen’s estate. This is because all the requirements of a fideicommissary substitution are present here, and consequently, the creditors cannot go against the property. The requisites for a fideicommissary substitution are present because the first and second heirs exist, in the proper relationship, and were both alive at the testatrix’s death. The phrase “shall pass unimpaired” and the phrase “should never pass out of the hands,” show an obligation to preserve and transmit. Finally, the phrase “should Carmen die after Ana” anticipates a situation where a first heir, Carmen, will later die after having enjoyed the inheritance.

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3.TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS, Administratrix, petitioner-appellee, vs. MARCELLE D. VDA.DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors-appellants.

Ramirez vs Ramirez (no fideicommissary)

Doctrine: No fideicommissary because two persons not related to the original heir is instituted.

FACTS: Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate.

On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow “en plenodominio” in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or “free portion” shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez “en nudapropriedad.” Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widow s usufruct and the remaining two-third (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.‟

-APPEAL for the partitioning of testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez (a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964) among principal beneficiaries:

Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez

-widow-French who lives in Paris-received ½ (as spouse) and usufructuary rights over 1/3 of the free portion

Roberto and Jorge Ramirez-two grandnephews-lives in Malate-received the ½ (free portion)

Wanda de Wrobleski-companion-Austrian who lives in Spain-received usufructuary rights of 2/3 of the free portion-vulgar substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez

-Maria Luisa Palacios -administratix-Jorge and Roberto Ramirez opposed because

a. vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda wrt widow’s usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez, wrt to Wanda’s usufruct is INVALID because first heirs (Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testatorb. fideicommissary substitutions are INVALID because first heirs not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree as provided in Art 863 CCc. grant of usufruct of real property in favor of an alien, Wanda, violated Art XIII Sec 5d. proposed partition of the testator’’s interest in the Santa Cruz Building between widow and appellants violates testators express will to give this property to them

-LC: approved partition

ISSUEWON the partition is valid insofar as

a. widow’s legitimeb. substitutionsc. usufruct of Wanda

HELDa. YES, appellants do not question ½ because Marcelle is the widow[1]and over which he could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever[2]

-the proposed creation by the admininstratix in favor of the testator’s widow of a usufruct over 1/3 of the free portion of the testator’s estate cannot be made where it will run counter to the testator’s express will. The Court erred for Marcelle who is entitled to ½ of the estate “enpleno dominio” as her legitime and which is more than what she is given under the will is not entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the testator’s intention for as stated above his disposition even impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.

b. Vulgar substitutions are valid because dying before the testator is not the only case where a vulgar substitution can be made. Also, according to Art 859 CC, cases also include refusal or incapacity to accept inheritance therefore it is VALID.

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BUT fideicommissary substitutions are VOID because Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace Ramirez are not related to Wande and according to Art 863 CC, it validates a fideicommissary substitution provided that such substitution does not go beyond one degreefrom the heir originally instituted. Another is that there is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufructuary to the substitutes and in fact the apellee agrees that the testator contradicts the establishment of the fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties be subject to usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement ofthe usufructuaries and naked owners.

c. YES, usufruct of Wanda is VALID

-Art XIII[3]Sec 5 (1935): Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except toindividuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold land of the public domain in the Philippines.[4]

The lower court upheld the usufruct thinking that the Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession BUT SC is of the opinion that this provision does not apply to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land BUT an alienmay be bestowed USUFRUCTUARY RIGHTS over a parcel of land in the Philippines. Therefore, the usufruct in favor of Wanda, although a real right, is upheld because it does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary (Wanda) and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.

Decision: ½ Marcelle (as legitime), ½ Jorge and Roberto Ramirez (free portion) in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace Ramirez.

4.Crisologo vs Singson

Doctrine: Only Simple substitution because it merely provides that upon the granddaughter’s death, whether it happens before or after that of testator, her property shall belong to the brothers of the testator. Substitution becomes effective only upon such death.

FACTS:

Donya Leona left a will stating that upon Consolacions Crisologo's death death—whether this happens before or after that of Donya Leona's death—Consolacion's share shall belong to the brothers of the Donya Leona.

ISSUE:Whether or not such substitution is a fideicommissary substitution.

HELD:No, it is not fideicommissary substitution, only a Simple Substition.A careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration shows that the substitution of heirs provided for therein is not expressly made of the o fideicommissa kind, nor does it contain a clear statement to the effect that appellee, during her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As already stated, it merely provides that upon appellee's death—whether this happens before or after that of the testatrix—her share shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix.

Designation of heirs; Purpose of fideicommissary substitution.—It is of the essence of a fideicommissary substitution that an obligation be clearly imposed upon the first heir to preserve and transmit to another the whole or part of the estate bequeathed to him, upon his death or upon the happening of a particular event.

The last will of the deceased Dña. Leona Singson, established a mere sustitution vulgar, the substitution Consolacion Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be effective or to take place upon the death of the former, whether it happens before or after that of the testatrix.

5. Morente v. De la Santa 9 Phil. 387

FACTS: In her will, a wife provided as follows:“1. I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to me shall pass to my husband, Gumersindo de la Santa;“2. That my said husband shall not leave my sisters after my death, and that he shall not marry anyone; should my husband have children by anyone, he shall not convey any portion of the property left by me, except the one-third part thereof and the two-thirds remaining shall be and remain for my brother Vicente or his children should he have any;“3. After my death, I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin in which the bakery is located, which is one of the properties belonging to me.”

Questions:(a) If the husband marries again, will he forfeit the devise?(b) If the husband leaves the sisters of the wife, will he forfeit the devise?

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(c) If the husband does not live in the camarin, will he forfeit the devise? (d) if the husband has children by anyone, will he forfeit a part of the devise?

HELD: (a), (b), and (c) — No. Reason: The happening of these events should not be considered as the fulfillment of conditions

which would annul or revoke the devise. They were mere orders and there was no condition or statement that if he should not comply with the wishes of the testatrix he would lose the devise given him. The condition should have been expressly provided. It was not.

In this case, he would lose two-thirds of the devise. Reason: There was a statement that should he have children by anyone, the forfeiture would take place. Here the condition was expressly provided.

6. Broce vs Marcellana CA L-10896-R, June 21, 1954

(Remember that it only applies to the free portion of the estate of wife not to the legitime)Doctrine: The condition is for the surviving spouse, should he remarry, to choose a relative of the deceased spouse within the 6th degree.

FACTS: Wife provided in her last will and testament: “I want and I direct my husband that I am dead, and he should want to remarry, he should choose a relative of mine within the 6th degree, and if he disregard this wish of mine, my brothers and sisters will have the right to claim or recover my properties as if they were only the heirs.”

Husband however, one month prior to his death, married another woman who was not within the 6 th degree of the deceased spouse, notwithstanding the fact that there were 3 of them available.

ISSUE: Is the condition imposed in the will for the husband to marry one of the relatives of his late wife within the 6 th degree against good morals?

HELD: Article 793 (now Article 874) of the old Civil Code which was in force that time provides: “An absolute conidition of not contracting a first or subsequent marriage shall be disregarded unless such condition has been imposed on the widower or widow by the deceased spouse, or by the ascendants or descendants of the latter”.

Thus, the condition is valid. Undoubtedly, the purpose of the lawmakers was to preserve the property of the testator in favor of her nearest of kin in case of non compliance with the condition. In the instant case, the heirs of the husband are not entitled to any of the properties which he inherited from his late wife because her heirs are entitled to recover all the properties which the husband received because of his failure to marry any of her relatives within the 6th degree.

7. Miciano v. Brimo 50 Phil. 867

Doctrine:

FACTS: Joseph G. Brimo’s will provided that even if he was a Turk, still he wanted his estate disposed of in accordance with Philippine laws; and that should any of his legatees oppose this intention of his, his or her legacy would be cancelled. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, did not want this disposition in accordance with Philippine laws, and so he opposed practically every move that would divide the estate in accordance with Philippine laws.

ISSUE: Does Andre Brimo lose his legacy?

HELD: No, Andre Brimo does not lose his legacy, because the condition, namely, the disposal of the testator’s estate in accordancewith Philippine law, is against our laws which provide that “intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law (Turkish law) of the person whose succession is under consideration whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.” (2nd paragraph, Art. 16). The condition being disregarded, the legacy becomes unconditional, and therefore Andre Brimo is entitled to his legacy.

8. Leonor Villafl or Vda. de Villanueva v. Delfi n N. Juico, etc.L-15737, Feb. 28, 1962

FACTS: Don Nicolas Villaflor gave, among other things, a legacy to his wife by virtue of which she was given the “use and possession” of a certain piece of property on condition that she would never remarry, OTHERWISE, the legacy would go to a grandniece. The widow NEVER remarried. Upon the widow’s death, the grandniece claimed full ownership over the property, but it was contended by the heirs of the widow, that they (the heirs) should own the property because the widow never remarried.HELD: The grandniece gets the property, for although the widow never remarried, still she was never given the full ownership of the property (she had been given merely its use and possession). If the testator had intended otherwise, why did he have to specify “use and possession.’’

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LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant, vs.DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the testate estate of FAUSTA NEPOMUCENO, defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-15737 February 28, 1962.

FACTS: On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor, a wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales, executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing in[[-5 favor of his wife, Dona Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and personal properties, giving the other half to his brother Don Fausto Villaflor. Clause 6th , contained the institution of heirs. The 12th clause of the will provided, however, that Clauses 6th and 7th thereof would be deemed annulled from the moment he bore any child with Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any child with his wife Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. The latter, already a widow, thereupon instituted Special Proceeding No. 203 of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, for the settlement of her husband's estate and in that proceeding, she was appointed judicial administratrix. On May 1, 1956, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno died without having contracted a second marriage, and without having begotten any child with the deceased Nicolas Villaflor. Her estate is now being settled in Special Proceeding No. Q-1563 in the lower court, with the defendant Delfin N. Juico as the duly appointed and qualified judicial administrator.The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is admitted to be the same Leonor Villaflor mentioned by Don Nicolas Villaflor in his will as his "sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor".Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the administrator of the estate of the widow Fausta Nepomuceno, on February 8, 1958, contending that upon the widow's death, said plaintiff became vested with the ownership of the real and personal properties bequeathed by the late Nicolas Villaflor to clause 7 of his will, pursuant to its eight (8th) clause. Defendant's position, adopted by the trial court, is that the title to the properties aforesaid became absolutely vested in the widow upon her death, on account of the fact that she never remarried.

ISSUE: How should the will of the Testator be interpreted.

RULING: The intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise. ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to use them in another sense can be gathered, and that other can be ascertained." .Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the context clearly indicates a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely by the testator, and that he was unacquainted with such technical sense. In this case the testament of Don Nicolas Villaflor clearly and unmistakably provided that his widow should have the possession and use of the legacies while alive and did not remarry. It necessarily follows that by the express provisions of the 8th clause of his will, the legacies should pass to the testator's "sobrinanieta", appellant herein, upon the widow's death, even if the widow never remarried in her lifetime. Consequently, the widow had no right to retain or dispose of the aforesaid properties, and her estate is accountable to the reversionary legatee for their return, unless they had been lost due to fortuitous event, or for their value should rights of innocent third parties have intervened.PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellant Leonor Villaflor Vda. de VILLANUEVA is declared entitled to the ownership and fruits of the properties described in clause 7 of the will or testament, from the date of the death of Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. The records are ordered remanded to the court of origin for liquidation, accounting and further proceedings conformably to this decision. Costs against the Administrator-appellee.

9. Santos vs. Buenaventura18 SCRA 47

Doctrine: Timely withdrawal of opposition to the probation of “no contest and forfeiture” will must not be penalized.

FACTS:Decedent: Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas.Nearest kin: Brothers, a sister, nephews and nieces.Rosalinda Santos, petitioner-appellee, is one of the nieces.

Among the grounds for the opposition of Flora Blas and Justo Garcia were that the will was not executed in accordance with law; that undue and improper pressure was exerted upon the testatrix Maxima was secured through fraud; and that at the time of the will Maxima was mentally incapable of making a will.

After the probate court had received the evidence for both the petitioner and oppositions, but before the latter could close their evidence, Flora filed a manifest action that she is withdrawing her opposition to the probate of the will.The will provides a “NO-CONTEST & FORFEITRURE” clause.

ISSUE:Did Flora actuations amount to violation of no-contest and forfeiture clause of the will?

HELD:No. Where after realizing her mistake in contesting the will – a mistake committed in good faith because grounded on strong doubts – appellant withdrew her opposition and join the appellee in the latter’s petition for the probate of the will, appellant must not now be penalized for rectifying her error. Such act of withdrawing before she rested her case contributed to the speedy probate of will.

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TESTACY OF MAXIMA SANTOS VDA. DE BLAS. ROSALINA SANTOS (Executrix), petitioner and appellee, vs.FLORA BLAS DE BUENAVENTURA (Legatee), oppositor and appellant.G.R. No. L-22797 September 22, 1966

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

FACTS: On October 22, 1956, Rosalina Santos filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the probate of the last will allegedly executed on September 22, 1956 by the deceased Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas. 1The nearest of kin of the deceased were her brothers and a sister, nephews and nieces. Rosalinda Santos, petitioner-appellee herein, is one of said nieces. Among the legatees — or more accurately, devisees — mentioned in the will is Flora Blas de Buenaventura. She is not related by blood to the deceased. Flora Blas de Buenaventura and Justo Garcia opposed to the probate of said will on grounds that the will was not executed in accordance with law; that undue and improper pressure was exerted upon the testatrix Maxima Santos in the execution thereof; that the signature of Maxima was secured through fraud; and that at the time of the execution of the will Maxima was mentally incapable of making a will.The will likewise contained a "no contest and forfeiture" clause .

ISSUES: (1) Did Flora's actuations, under the facts and circumstances herein, amount to a violation of the "no-contest and forfeiture" clause of the will; and (2) Is the "no-contest and forfeiture" provision of the will valid?

RULING:(1)NO. after realizing her mistake in contesting the will — a mistake committed in good faith because grounded on strong doubts — she withdrew her opposition and joined the appellee in the latter's petition for the probate of the will. She must not be penalized for rectifying her error. After all, the intentions of the testatrix had been fulfilled, her will had been admitted and allowed probate within a reasonably short period, and the disposition of her property can now be effected.(2) Fourteenth.—I request all my heirs, devisees and legatees to look after each other, love and help one another and accept with thanks what I have bequeathed to them, and treasure, love and cherish the same. Any one of them who contests or opposes the probate of my will or the carrying out of its provisions shall lose any right to receive any inheritance or benefit under my will, and their inheritance or share shall pertain to the other heirs who have not opposed. This is the "no-contest and forfeiture" clause of the will. However due to the non-violation of this clause,th court did not bother to discuss the same.

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