Moving Beyond Conflict in the Middle East

A breakout strategy for Mediating success between the israelis and palestiniansREPORT AUTHORS: Clarence Culbert, Jr., Namita Vatsa Eveloy, Michael Kennard, Joshua Monteyne, Adolfo SolaresGM4802|

IntroductionThe collective failure over the last 50 years for Israel and Palestine to negotiate agreement on the issue of Israel’s right to exist as a state, and Palestine’s right to exist as a state, has become a metaphor for intractable problems. The violence and animosity between the two sides has been passed down for generations, and there appears to be no amicable solution in sight. Particularly with the re-election of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for a new term, and his firm declaration leading up to the polls that he would never support a two-state solution. Negotiations between Israel and Palestine appear to be, yet again, at an impasse. Based upon our newfound knowledge of negotiation theory and practice, we would like to develop a “Breakout Strategy” that would propose a framework to help each side work towards a negotiated agreement.

In the paper that follows, we will look first at the negotiations that have occurred. In particular, we will look closely at the Oslo Accords and the Camp David Summit, and describe root causes that contributed to the collapse of both talks. Within these failures, we have sought to find clues for how to engineer a future successful process for achieving peace. Ultimately, we will make the case that previous approaches towards brokering a peace between Israel and Palestine have been fundamentally flawed. They have fixated upon negotiating a strictly political solution to a problem that is far more complex than just politics.

The conventional approach is premised on a belief that resolving the political question is a necessary first step, one that will lead to a cascading series of next steps, ultimately resulting in a return to normalcy for the region and its peoples and reaching a final agreement. Our approach inverts that model by proposing that the political solution be negotiated last. Just as it would be premature for a couple to discuss the financial terms of a marriage before falling in love, so too is an emphasis on focusing on highly-specific political details, when much more substantive issues still remain to be addressed. What must be focused on first, are the emotions of the people. The violence of the last half-century has permanently scarred both Israelis and Palestinians, and there is tremendous hatred, animosity, and general ill-will between the groups. This cannot be ignored, and it cannot be relegated to the end of the process. It must be addressed in earnest, immediately, and this paper will put forth the mechanics on how to bring action to that process.

If progress is to be made, and true and lasting peace is to be achieved, these negative feelings must be quelled. This paper will advocate a position that resolving this conflict will require compromises on both sides. Compromises on very emotional, religious, and spiritual issues. And those compromises cannot be made when each respective side has not addressed the anger it feels towards the other. Compromises cannot be made until steps are taken towards acceptance and forgiveness. A political solution cannot bridge this divide. Only a proactive part by the respective communities to work towards developing empathy, understanding and ultimately, forgiveness, will enable the two sides to close the gap.

The Actors DefinedWhile it is easy to attempt to reduce the conflict to a disagreement between neighboring peoples, the Arab-Israeli conflict is symbolic of a much larger rift within the region. Virtually all of the Middle East has a stake in the outcome of this process, and the unique interests of the major countries within the region should be considered and leveraged in all future negotiation efforts. Below, we have identified the major regional actors and summarized their respective interests.

Primary Actors

Israel Palestine United States

Peace Security

End of violenceRecognition of Israel’s right to

existSole control of Jerusalem

PeaceCreation of Palestinian State

Self-DeterminationSecurity

Right of Return for Palestinian Refugees

Return of West Bank, GazaParticipation in the control Jerusalem

PeaceSecurity

Reduce U.S. military presence in Middle East

2 State SolutionSecure borders

Regional StabilityAppeasement of Pro-Israel

Domestic Lobby

Secondary Actors

Egypt Lebanon Syria

PeaceNon-Militarized Sinai

PeninsulaMaintain status of 1978 Peace

Treaty with IsraelU.S. foreign aid dependent on non-hostile relationship with

Israel

Home to Hezbollah, powerful Shi'a Islamist group funded by Iran

considered to be sidelined from the peace process because of Hezbollah

Syria wants to have the Golan Heights returned to them, seized by Israel in

1967.Aligned with Iran, biggest

anti-Israel player in the region

Jordan Iran Turkey

The only country that gives full citizenship rights to Palestinian

refugeesConsidered to be Palestine’s

greatest supporter in the region

Regional InfluenceGreater Integration in regional and

global economyRestoration of its former role as power

player in the regionSupports Hamas, Hezbollah and Syria

- which form the anti-Israel coalition called the Axis of Resistance

Integration with EuropeOne of the few countries that has maintained relationships with both Israel & Palestinian

AuthorityRegional stability

Economic growth in Middle East is good for its domestic

companies

Saudi Arabia

Shares a common enemy with Israel in Iran

Largest financial contributor to the PLO

Initiated and launched the Arab League Peace Plan

Past Failures Analyzed - Lessons Learned Oslo Accords (OA) - On September 13, 1993, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat negotiated a groundbreaking ‘Declaration of Principles’ that established the framework for future negotiations. The historic handshake between the two heads of state signaled a new high water mark only to fail years later. The OA was a historic event in Arab-Israeli relations because it caused both sides to come to terms with each other's existence. Israel agreed to recognize Yasser Arafat as the PLO

President and its partner in peace talks, and agreed to recognize Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip by beginning to withdraw from the cities of Gaza and Jericho. This agreement was essentially centered on exchanging land for peace. The Palestinians on-the-other-hand recognized Israel's right to exist while also rejecting the use of terrorism and its long-held call for Israel's destruction. Palestinians would police the territories they controlled, cooperate with Israel in the fight against terrorism, and amend those sections of the PLO charter that called for Israel's destruction. Israel would withdraw almost entirely from Gaza, and in stages from parts of the West Bank. An elected Palestinian Authority would take over governance of the territories from which Israel withdrew. The failure of the Oslo agreements can be attributed to the similar reasons that are usually the cause of most agreement failures: both parties felt that the OA had not delivered what they had expected from it. The OA was basically meant to be an interim agreement as a prelude to the expected difficult negotiations toward a final agreement.

Palestinian View● Palestinian expectations were centered in the belief that there would be a halt in the

construction and expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Israeli withdrawals were to follow a fixed schedule leading to Palestinian Authority control over more than 90% of the Gaza Strip and West Bank, setting the stage for final Israeli departure back to the 1967 borders. Palestinians felt that the collapse of the OA peace process was due to the expansion of Israeli settlements and the lack of territorial control of the Palestinian Authority. Palestinians believed that the OA included a firm Israeli commitment to halt the expansion of settlements and to begin dismantling them. While there was no such explicit commitment in the signed agreements, Palestinians believed that this was understood by the Israelis as entirely self-evident, and that such conditions would be a minimally necessary precondition for Palestinian agreement.

● An Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank that was expected by 1995 was not carried out. The West Bank was divided in a complicated arrangement into three zones, labeled areas A, B, and C, with complete Palestinian Authority control in area A, complete Israeli control over area C, and joint control in area B, which was intended to provide civilian Palestinian rule alongside Israeli security control. The Palestinian Authority was thus confined to about

50% of the West Bank, far less than the 90% or more that the Palestinians had originally expected.

● A “free passage” route connecting the West Bank and Gaza Strip running through Israeli territory was never realized, but Israeli military roadblocks were established on the roads between Palestinian cities. For the Palestinians this was seen as an ultimate Israeli betrayal indicating that Israel never intended to come to a peace agreement.

The Israeli View● Israeli expectations were mostly centered on security. Decades of Palestinian terrorism had

led many Israelis to fear that giving up control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip would leave Israel exposed to hostile Palestinian movements which would use the territories as hot spots from which to launch terrorist acts well within Israel.

● The OA initially established joint patrol involving Israeli and Palestinian soldiers patrolling side by side to prevent terrorist attacks. Many Israelis felt that the Palestinian Authority was doing very little to prevent terrorist attacks arising from its territory. It refused to take steps towards disarming terrorist militias, permitted terrorist organizations to operate open offices in its territory, and refused to arrest terrorists. It was noted by Israeli observers that the number of Palestinians in arms and the types of weapons being brought into Palestinian Authority territory were significantly exceeding the limits established by the agreements. This led to the suspicion that Arafat was constructing an offensive army rather than a police force.

● Many incidents caused the Israeli public to wonder whether Arafat and the PLO had ever truly intended to lay down arms and seek negotiated peace agreements. They felt that the PLO supported terrorist infrastructures and Palestinian police took up arms against Israeli soldiers. For Israelis, this was the ultimate breach of agreement.

Unfortunately, the upbeat mood of confidence-building was short-lived and each side began to perceive the other as violating its negotiated agreements. Oslo ultimately failed because while the negotiating agreement set in motion a process that could potentially lead to trust and confidence, it did not establish controls for monitoring violations or ensuring that claims of violations could be arbitrated and corrections could be made. Without safeguards and controls, the OA peace process fell victim to longstanding sentiments of mistrust and anger between Palestinians and Israelis. While many commentators were pessimistic about the results of the talks, the assassination of PLO Leader, Yitzhak Rabin, in 1995 by Yigal Amir, an Israeli who was staunchly opposed to the nascent peace process, was the catalyst that led to its slow collapse. The killing of Rabin sparked a string of retaliatory bombings by Hamas on civilian targets in Israel, and what little momentum the Accords had generated was quickly extinguished.

Camp David Summit 2000 In the wake of the Oslo Accords, there were numerous follow-up conferences, though none as momentous as the Camp David Summit in 2000,

hosted by U.S. President Bill Clinton at Camp David in Maryland. Israeli President Ehud Barak and PLO Leader Yasser Arafat convened to discuss the major issues dividing Israel and the Palestinians: The refugees, Jerusalem, the borders between a future Palestinian state and Israel, the Israeli settlements, and the problem of water supplies and pollution. Over the summit hung the threat by Arafat that, in the absence of a final status agreement, the Palestinians would unilaterally declare statehood (and, presumably, the state's borders) on September 13. A crucial sticking point was Jerusalem. Barak, breaking from earlier campaign promises, agreed to a division of Jerusalem, with the Palestinians to receive sovereignty over most of the Arab-populated neighborhoods in the walled Old City and, more particularly, the Temple Mount (Haram ash Sharif) area within it, containing the Dome of the Rock and the al-Aqsa Mosque as well as the (presumed) underground remains of King Solomon's and Zerubbabel’s (and Herod's) temples. Arafat stuck firm to his demand that the Temple Mount and the whole of the Old City come under Palestinian sovereignty; he rejected President Clinton's last-minute proposal that the Old City be divided between Israel and the Palestinians, with the Temple Mount to be governed conjointly by the Security Council, Morocco (the permanent president of the Islamic states' 'Jerusalem Committee') and the Palestinians. Major disagreement also surfaced over the Palestinian demand for recognition and implementation of 'the right of return' of the refugees (based on U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194, from December 1948) to their homes, villages and towns in Israel (Israel rejected this 'right' and the return of millions of refugees, though it agreed to absorb 'several thousand' refugees over ten years as part of a 'family reunion scheme' and to participate in paying compensation for the refugees' lost property). There was also contention over the Palestinian demand that Israel hand over all of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to Palestinian rule (Barak was willing to concede 84-90 percent of the West Bank and almost all of the Gaza Strip). The summit collapsed, with both the Israelis and Palestinians letting fly with recriminations."

In interviews that have emerged since these talks, much has been made of Ehud Barak’s fear of losing precious ‘political capital’ were he to make any concessions that the Israeli public did not approve. In a poll done by the Harry S. Truman Research Center for the Advancement of Peace, 65% of Israeli Jews felt that Barak offered “too much of a compromise”, and only 26% of them said that they felt his position was “just right”. Meanwhile, Palestinians resoundingly supported Arafat’s hardline. The same poll discovered that 68% of Palestinians felt that Arafat’s position was “just right”, while only 15% felt that he compromised too much.1

Again, we identify a running constraint that deters effective compromise. If all political solutions are dependent upon the support of the people, then attempting to implement a political solution first, without the backing and support of the people on the issues seems both wrong-headed, and an

1 http://truman.huji.ac.il/.upload/Polls%202000-2001.pdf

exercise in futility. Ehud Barak was hamstrung in his ability to negotiate, because the Israeli public, at that time, did not relish the idea of ceding territory or control.

Yet despite fears of suffering at home for being too liberal in his compromises, Barak appeared to offer the most generous terms to date. While these terms were never formally written and presented, they included two major concessions, which included:

● Palestinian sovereignty over the Arab Sector of Jerusalem● Palestinian state covering ~90% of the West Bank

Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, wrote in their book “Camp David: Tragedy of Errors” specifically about those concessions, that “[i]f there is one issue that Israelis agree on, it is that Barak broke every conceivable taboo and went as far as any Israeli prime minister had gone or could go.”2

And yet despite those stretches, Arafat was adamant in his refusal. Which led many to question his sincerity to negotiate. US Diplomat Dennis Ross, who was actively involved in the facilitation of the summit, noted that “For him to end the conflict is to end himself.”3 He had invested so much of himself, that to settle for anything less than a perfect agreement would be a failure. However, in his defense, both Malley & Agha noted that Arafat felt that the US and Israelis had put him in a difficult position. “It was high-wire summitry, designed to increase the pressure on the Palestinians to reach a quick agreement while heightening the political and symbolic costs if they did not. And it clearly was a Clinton/ Barak idea both in concept and timing.”

Rightly or wrongly, there was - and continues to this day - to be a feeling within the Palestinian camp that the historical relationship between Israel and the US impacts its ability to be a true facilitator of these talks. It was apparent that many times during this negotiation, Arafat felt that he was ganged-up on. Which begs the question of what future involvement the US should have in future negotiations? We will address that topic next.

A Way Forward – A Breakout Strategy for Negotiating Peace After reviewing some of the key failures in previous negotiations, we have developed a robust set of lessons learned. Critical lessons that must be applied in future negotiations. By applying some of the principles we have learned throughout this trimester, we wish to apply the works of Gary Friedman and Jack Himmelstein, who have pioneered an approach that encourages warring parties to work together on building a mutually-agreed upon solution to the problem, or problems, that divides them. We draw the following precepts from their book, “Challenging Conflict - Mediation Through Understanding.” The core focus of their approach revolves around helping parties work, in partnership, to acknowledge, discuss, and then resolve their conflicts together. There have identified four core principles in their approach, and below, we highlight them and apply them to the Arab- Israeli negotiation process.

Understanding → In the absence of communication, misinformation and untruths can quickly grow out of control. Wild rumors about the intentions, motivations, and ultimate aims of the other party can spiral dangerously out of control. Over decades of separation from each other, both geographically and socially, communication between the two groups has steadily declined. If there

2 http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2001/aug/09/camp-david-the-tragedy-of-errors/3 https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/cd2000art.html

are no Israelis or Palestinians in your social network, it is easy to fall prey to caricatures or stereotypes of each. Mediation through Understanding seeks to bridge this communication gap by bringing the parties closer together. And one of the ways in which it accomplishes that goal is by prohibiting caucusing. Or rather, it forces the warring parties into the same room, and places them both in the driving seat towards arriving at an agreement. The current state of Arab-Israeli negotiations is very much a caucus environment. Very small delegations of leaders travel to faraway places and attempt to work out solutions. While the people sit separate and divided. During the Camp David Summit, Arafat felt that the Israelis and US were huddling and plotting, and that lack of communication and distrust ultimately played a role in sabotaging those talks.

We propose that this must change. Additionally, the approach seeks to bypass the traditionally adversarial environment that is often fostered by the presence of ‘professional arguers” like lawyers. Again, when we look at the negotiation process to date, we see that all of the negotiating has been run by professional negotiators, lawyers, politicians and diplomats. Absent from the talks are everyday citizens. Our proposal would be for the creation of a summit of Arabs and Israelis to gather freely, and talk. A conference of thousands designed to spur dialogue, debate, and most importantly, to remind each other of the similarities that exist between them.

Party Responsibility → The people, not the Palestinian Authority or the American government, or the Israeli government, must ‘own’ the conflict. They must be the ones who say “Enough is enough - this situation is untenable.” For the last fifty years, a trickle-down style of diplomacy has been attempted, and it has not proven to be effective. The affected parties, must choose to fix the situation. Their unified voice to seek peace must trickle upwards. To date, this voice has not been heard.

The challenge is how to empower the people to take ownership of this situation? After so many years of feeling disconnected and powerless, the public attitude must shift. The only way that this will happen is at the local level. One person at a time. Community activism can play a role here. But it requires a core group of supporters, who are willing to act and inspire their neighbors to work towards peace.

Working Together→ The Middle East is one of the oldest continuously inhabited regions in the world. Christians, Muslims, and Jews have co-occupied the region for centuries. And while that history has been littered with some astounding violence (e.g. The Crusades, The Spread of Islam), these three groups, all ‘Descendants of Abraham’ have found ways to co-exist peacefully. This long tradition of co-existence must be re-emphasized as a reminder that the current antagonism is not ‘how it has always been’, but is instead a deviation from a historical trend that has been more peaceful than violent.

As Thunderbird students, we embrace the words of William Schurz who wrote “Borders frequented by trade seldom need soldiers.” Trade can be a powerful medium for both the restoration and continuation of peaceful relationships between neighbors. In trade, both parties enrich themselves through their dealings with each other. Their families’ economic welfare becomes tied to one another, and webs of interdependencies develop. Trade helps bring the self-interests of different groups into alignment with each other. So what can be done to stimulate and facilitate Arab-Israeli

trade partnerships? First, we would strongly recommend re-evaluating the present barriers to trade that exist. A 2011 report by the UN Conference on Trade and Development identified that West Bank businesses and traders were largely cut off from global markets. While security concerns have largely been responsible for the onerous checkpoints that exist, we would argue that anything that can be done to foster greater business ties between the communities would help achieve the greater goal of bringing normalcy to the region.

Going Under the Conflict → In order to truly understand the conflict, each side must be willing to look at the conflict from a deeper level. They must make a sincere effort to understand the “why” of the conflict. What are the root causes of the conflict? Often times, what perpetuates the conflict isn’t necessarily the root causes - but rather the emotions, the anger, and the subsequent retaliations. These create layers, and often obscure the parties from focusing on what the original conflict was about.

Here lies an opportunity to leverage the power of big data analytics. IBM, for instance, has been seeking thought leadership in the space of big data for years. What if they were to deploy a team of data scientists, to poll citizens about their thoughts on the conflict? What are their interests? What are their complaints? What might an analysis of social media posts reveal about the nature of the conflict? This information hasn’t been collected and analyzed yet, but we argue that it must. Negotiators have failed to architect a proposal that could be ‘sold’ back to the respective groups because they haven’t asked the ‘why’ question. They have been blindly guessing about what the people want. The technology exists to both collect the data, and to deliver insights about it. This conflict presents a revolutionary opportunity for commercial and diplomatic interests to align to produce real, actionable social progress. Our call would be for a company like IBM to seize upon this opportunity and leverage its resources to help assess and quantify the feelings of the people about this conflict.

Recommendations For Energizing the Community Around ChangeSeek Opportunities to Encourage Cross-Cultural Exchanges Sports → Soccer is a shared love between the Israelis and the Palestinian. Think about the symbolism of a combined squad of Israelis and Palestinians, scrimmaging against a neutral third country like Finland or Chile. While relatively simple, the symbolism could be quite powerful and would generate a short-term win that could be crucial early on in developing momentum in support of change.

Academics → Education has always been a potent force for unification. Israel is home to nine universities, and dozens of colleges. What better way to demonstrate a country’s willingness to seek broader cultural understanding than to create opportunities and mediums for the two parties to collaborate around higher education? A university might consider opening a satellite campus in the West Bank, or increase its efforts to recruit Palestinian students. Additionally, an Arab state, such as Jordan, might demonstrate its willingness to ‘work across ethnic and religious lines’ by offering to fund a center of excellence on an Israeli university campus. A center dedicated to peace studies or conflict resolution, might be an appropriate area of concentration. Of course, at the faculty level, any opportunities for Arab - Israeli collaboration on research should be strongly encouraged.

Social Media→ As was seen with the “Je Suis Charlie” campaign, and thousands of others before it, social media can be a powerful force in uniting seemingly disparate groups. The ‘virality of actions and ideas’ is potential game changer. Never before could such small acts have such global impact. Students, with their natural affinity for social networks, could play a major role in seeding social media networks with campaigns in support of peace. The “Ice Bucket Challenge”, a viral social media campaign to support ALS research, generated over 2.4 million related videos, and 30 million views. A pithy phrase and a hashtag could be the catalyst for sparking a global dialogue about peace and reconciliation that is long overdue.

The US Must Step Back / A New Mediator Must Step Forward→ While the US should be commended for its efforts to broker peace in the region, they are, unfortunately, a flawed mediator. A mediator must not be viewed as partial to one side, or have a pre-existing relationship with a party in the negotiation that might call into question its ability to act impartially. The historically strong US-Israel relationship makes it difficult for Palestinians to believe the US is acting equally in its best interests as well.

This perception is quite evident in the following Gallup Poll:

Trust is one of the most important elements in a successful negotiating process. Polls like the one shown4 provide a clear indication that 67- 71% of West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians do not believe that the U.S. President is capable of negotiating a peace treaty that is fair and equitable to both sides.

The United States has clearly not been effective as a facilitator and should step aside or turn the negotiations over to a partner that is credible in the region. Transitioning this role to another Western country such as England would only revive anti-colonial sentiment. The Swiss or the Swedes who have historically been brokers of peace are too far culturally to build trust with the Palestinians, who have felt that the negotiations have been set up against them. So, for any headway to happen, a facilitator needs to have an established relationship with Israel and the Middle East - that is not one sided skewed to one side.

Interestingly, Turkey fits the bill well. Turkey is a moderate Muslim country, with a coveted and strategic geographic position, that serves as a natural bridge between the West and the Middle East. Istanbul, its capital city, is partly in Europe, partly in Asia. Turkey was also the first Muslim country to recognize Israel. As M. Hakan Yavuz and Mujeeb R. Khanfeeb noted in a New York Times Op-Ed, “Turkey remains far more democratic than its neighbors. Its elections are free and fair, and it does not eliminate its political opponents or persecute its ethnic and religious minorities.”5

4 http://www.gallup.com/poll/161456/israelis-palestinians-pro-peace-process-not-hopeful.aspx5 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/12/opinion/turkey-asserts-its-role-in-the-middle-east.html?_r=0

Historically, Turkey has been an ally of the United States in the region, and followed the American lead in the foreign policy. Since 2007, Turkey has asserted itself more, defining its’ own role and foreign policy. Over the last few decades, Turkey has had a positive relationship with Israel, with minor setbacks here and there. The only cause for concern is the increasingly divisive rhetoric of President Erdoğan. The President has been criticized by foreign observers for his increasing support of more conservative Muslim groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. This could undermine Turkey’s ability to be seen by both sides as a trusted mediator. However, despite the fact that Turkey is an imperfect mediator, they are still the best available option, and stand the best chance for moving the process forward.

Enlarge the Pie → Current thinking regarding territorial disputes is limited to a binary discussion revolving around Israel losing territory and Palestine acquiring territory. This forces the parties to adopt a zero-sum mentality, and negotiation strategies have historically devolved into distributive bargaining tactics. Furthermore, each leader faces tremendous pressure to not capitulate to the other side. This pervasive feeling of appearing ‘soft or weak’ to the electorate has constrained the options leaders feel that they have available to them.

Gandhi said that “You must be the change that you wish to see in the world.” The result of decades of sterile, formal peace talks is that it has disengaged the people from the process. They feel disconnected. They feel disempowered and powerless. Work must be done to unite both Israeli and Palestinians around a momentum of change. Particularly if compromise is ever to be worked out towards developing a framework around the administration of Jerusalem, steps must be taken to focus first on the preservation of city and its religious grounds for future generations.

Neighboring states such as Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt could play pivotal roles in offering territory to help support a nascent Palestinian state. With the neighboring states all vested in a secure and stable backyard, the ceding of a relatively small amount of frontier territory might be a small price to pay for an agreement. Saudi Arabia could help to compensate countries losing territory, since they have been pouring hundreds of millions in to the PLO for years. Saudi Arabia put forth a peace plan previously called the Arab League Peace Plan, and perhaps some elements of this could be resurrected. Saudi’s are not one sided, and have a strong point of commonality with Israel, because of their mutual hostility towards Iran.

Lastly, Iran has shifted leadership recently and has made great progress in its relationship with the United States recently. Iran wants to be respected globally, and demonstrating that they have a nuclear capability is part of that status game. (Similar to India in that sense) Bringing Iran to the table is crucial, as Iran funds anti-Israeli terrorism. What can Iran get out of being a positive player in the process – perhaps respect, a status as a leader, if not nuclear weapons? The United States does not want to see them have a nuclear weapon - so perhaps, in helping to broker an agreement with Palestine we may end up with a better relationship with Iran. There are numerous players here and each has been acting as a leader or as a detractor. For there to be a lasting solution, the negotiations must include all of the players.

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