1D- Lupango, Vince

Lupango, Vince Noel L. 1-D

CASE NO. 2

During the Eleventh Congress, twenty-four (24) bills seeking the conversion of numerous municipalities into component cities were not acted upon by the members of the House of Representatives.

On September 25, 2000, Senator See Ty introduced Senate Bill No. 2157 to amend Section

450 of the Local Government Code. The proposed legislation sought to increase the income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from P20,000,000.00 annual income to P100,000,000.00 locally-generated income.

On March 20, 2001, Senate Bill No. 2157 was signed into law as R.A. No. 9009. It became effective on June 30, 2001. As revised, Section 450 of the Local Government Code now states, among others, that [a] municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices.

Immediately after the opening of the Twelfth Congress and with R.A. No. 9009 already in full force and effect, the House of Representatives adopted House Joint Resolution No. 29,

entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress Before June 30, 2001 from the Coverage of Republic Act 9009. The resolution sought to exempt from the income requirement of P100,000,000.00 in R.A. No. 9009 the twenty-four (24) municipalities whose conversions into cities were not acted upon during the Eleventh Congress. The reasons for exempting these municipalities were the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigation into the jueteng scandal; the impeachment against former President Joseph Estrada by the House of Representatives; the aborted impeachment proceedings in the Senate; the leadership reorganization in both Houses of Congress; the EDSA Dos and EDSA Tres uprisings; the campaign period; and the May 2001 elections.

Notwithstanding the several public hearings, caucuses, dialogues, and informal discussions, the favorable committee report did not translate into legislation. The Twelfth Congress ended without favorable action.

During the Thirteenth Congress, the House of Representatives reinitiated the move, this time via House Joint Resolution No. 1, and forwarded it to the Senate for approval.

On July 25, 2006, the Senate Committee on Local Government submitted its Committee Report No. 84 recommending approval of House Joint Resolution No. 1, with amendments.

Out of the twenty-four (24) municipalities enumerated in House Joint Resolution No. 1,

sixteen (16) municipalities filed their individual cityhood bills. Each of the cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting the particular municipality from the income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009.

On December 22, 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills and transmitted them to the Senate for its approval. The required consent of the Senate was attained.


When the cityhood bills were forwarded to the Office of the President, they were allowed to lapse into law pursuant to Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution, after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo chose not to sign them.

Under the cityhood laws, respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is directed to conduct and supervise plebiscites in respondent municipalities within thirty (30) days from the approval of each of the cityhood laws.

Subsequently, three (3) separate petitions for prohibition were filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas as taxpayer, against the COMELEC and the sixteen (16) concerned municipalities.

The League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas collectively prayed for the issuance of lawful orders from the Court, enjoining COMELEC and the concerned sixteen (16) municipalities from implementing the provisions of the challenged cityhood laws and conducting plebiscites in the affected areas or, in the alternative, for the COMELEC not to proclaim the plebiscite results. They likewise prayed that the cityhood laws be struck down as unconstitutional. I. RULING: IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER’S CONTENTION

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional.

RULING:

YES, The Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional as it violates Section 6, Article X of the

Constitution. They preclude a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government

units, as a compliance with the uniform and non-discriminatory criteria to implement it.

Section 6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national

taxes, which shall be automatically released to them.

If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there

can be no fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.

A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not

receive the same share in national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100 million or more.

The criteria of land area, population and income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local

Government Code, must be strictly followed because such criteria, prescribed by law, are material

in determining the "just share" of local government units in national taxes. Since the Cityhood

Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, they

prevent the fair and just distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6,

Article X of the Constitution.


Cityhood Laws also violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution which requires that

Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code

and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. The provision reads:

Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged,

abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria

established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of

the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria

established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local

Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code

all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into

a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.

The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation of a

city. No other law, not even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of

the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the

same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code.

Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates

Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

Republic Act No. 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase

the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect

on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that any

municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Section

450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption

from this income requirement.

In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities,

even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The

Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent

municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government

Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the

Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written

in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

In RA 9009, the intention to apply P100 million income requirement to the present case

shall be apply in prospective, not a retroactive application.


Section 450 of the Local Government Code, which now provides:

Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays

may be converted into a component city if it has a locally generated average annual

income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One hundred

million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based

on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by

the Land Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as

certified by the National Statistics Office.

The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original

unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed

herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes

and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be

created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it

comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,

exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a

city from P20 million to P100 million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by

RA 9009, does not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement.

The criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA

9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort

to any statutory construction.

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any

doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for

application. As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal

meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-

meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or speech is the

index of intention. Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the

words of a statute there should be no departure.There can be no resort to extrinsic aids – like

deliberations of Congress – if the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous. Courts

determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the law, within the law's four corners.

If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law according

to its express terms. If a literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility or injustice,

then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the

law.


Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local Government Code, did

not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement, not even to respondent

municipalities whose cityhood bills were then pending when Congress passed RA 9009. Section

450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contains no exemption whatsoever.

Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city

must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the

law in applying Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.

II. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLES APPLIED IN THE INSTANT CASE

1. Amendment of Statute

Amendment means the change or modification, by addition, deletion or alteration of a

statute, which survives its amended form.

A statute and its amended act should be read together as a whole. An amended act is

ordinarily construed as if the original statute has been repealed and a new independent act in the

amended form had been adopted in its stead. In other words, it means that the amended act is

to be considered as if the statute has been originally enacted in its amended form.

Where an amendment leaves certain portions of the act unchanged, such portions are

continued in force, with the same meaning and effect they have before the amendment. Those

portions are regarded as a continuation of the existing law and not as a new enactment. The

general rule is that an amendatory act operates prospectively unless the contrary is provided or

the legislative intent to give it a retroactive effect is implied from the language used and only if

no vested right is impaired.

2. Passing of Laws

A bill passed by Congress becomes a law in either of three ways, namely:

(1) When the President signs it

(2) When the President does not sign nor communicate his veto of the bill within

thirty days after his receipt of the bill

(3) When the vetoed bill is repassed by Congress by two - thirds vote of all its

Members, each House voting separately.

3. General and special statutes

A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari materia and

should be read together and harmonized with a view to giving effect to both. Where there are

two acts, one is special and the other is general, if standing alone, would include same matter

and thus conflict with the special act, the special act must prevail since it evinces the legislative


intent more clearly than that of a general statute and must be taken as intended to constitute an

exception to the general act.

The fact that one law is special and the other general creates a presumption that the

special act is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general act, one as general law

of the land and the other as the law of the particular case.

4. Mandatory Statutes

A mandatory statute is a statute which commands either positively that something be

done, or performed in a particular way, or negatively that something be not done, leaving the

person concerned no choice on the matter except to obey. A mandatory statute is one that

contains to follow which renders the proceeding to which it relates illegal and void, or the violation

of which makes the decision therein rendered invalid. Acts executed against the provisions of

mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.

Where a statute is mandatory, the court has no power to distinguish between material and

immaterial breach thereof or omission to comply with what it requires. What the law decrees

must be obeyed against pain of sanction or declaration of nullity of what is done in disregard

thereof.

III. APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE and CITATIONS

Passage of a Bill Into Law

The 16 Cityhood Bills in question underwent a number of struggles. It was only in the

13th Congress when the Cityhood Bills were filed through their respective sponsors, when these

bills were originally introduced in the deliberations in the 11th Congress. The Cityhood Bills were

later approved after President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo failed to sign them. Failure to sign by the

President of a bill passed to him or her is one of the ways by which a bill may be passed into law,

the means being through inaction to avoid pocket veto.

The assailed law in ALDABA VS. COMELEC was allowed to lapse by reason of the

President’s inaction. In the said case, RA 9591 is the law which amends the charter of Malolos,

Bulacan by creating a separate legislative district for the said city. In the end, the law was declared

unconstitutional because the city of Malolos failed to comply with the minimum population

requirement of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district in the city. The population of

Malolos city at the time of the filing of the bills was only 223, 069. Applying this to the present

case, the cityhood laws are unconstitutional in the same way because of failure to comply with

the requirement of P100M income in order to declare a municipality to be turned into a city, even

if the law was initially passed by virtue of inaction of the President.


Unconstitutionality of Cityhood Laws

Petitioners argue that The Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional as they violate Section 6,

Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes

to local government units, as a compliance with the uniform and non-discriminatory criteria to

implement it.

Prior to 1987 and 1973 Constitution, there was a lack of clarity with regard to the power

to create, divide, merge, dissolve, or change the boundaries of municipal corporations. In

PELAEZ V. AUDITOR GENERAL, conceded that the power to fix such common boundary, in

order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of

an administrative nature-involving as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect

the law creating said municipalities. But Pelaez was silent about division, merger, and dissolution

of municipal corporation. Since division in effect creates a new municipalities, and both dissolution

and merger in effect abolish a legal creation, it may fairly be inferred that these acts are legislative

in nature.


Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the

national taxes, which shall be automatically released to them.

If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there

can be no fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.

A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not

receive the same share in national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100 million or more.

The criteria of land area, population and income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local

Government Code, must be strictly followed because such criteria, prescribed by law, are material

in determining the "just share" of local government units in national taxes. Since the Cityhood

Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, they

prevent the fair and just distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6,

Article X of the Constitution.

In RA 9009, the intention to apply P100 million income requirement to the present case

shall be applied prospectively, and not be given a retroactive application. Thus, RA 9009 increased

the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100

million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide

any exemption from the increased income requirement.

The criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA

9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort

to any statutory construction.

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any

doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for

application. As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal

meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-


meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or speech is the

index of intention. Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the

words of a statute there should be no departure. There can be no resort to extrinsic aids – like

deliberations of Congress – if the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous. Courts

determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the law, within the law's four corners.

If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law according

to its express terms. If a literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility or injustice,

then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the

law.Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local Government Code, did not

provide any exemption from the increased income requirement, not even to respondent

municipalities whose cityhood bills were then pending when Congress passed RA 9009. Section

450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contains no exemption whatsoever.

Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city

must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the

law in applying Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.

COMELEC's Jurisdiction to Hold Plebiscite Regarding the Cityhood Laws

Respondents argue that the Cityhood Laws did not violate Article X, Section 10 of the

Constitution while petitioners argue that the Cityhood Laws gave the COMELEC the authority to

conduct plebiscite for the passing of Cityhood Laws.

In BAGABUYO V. COMELEC, it was held that creation of representative district is not

the same as the creation of new political subdivision. The petitioner herein was under the

erroneous impression that the creation of a new political subdivision for which a plebiscite is

required by Article X, Section 10. Section 10 of Article X which is a legacy taken from the 1973

Constitution, goes beyond further than the doctrine in the Pelaez case. It also subjects such to

criteria established by the Local Government Code, declaring these actions properly legislative

but also makes creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries subject

to approval by majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

TAN V. COMELEC explained the required plebiscite, that, if what is dissolved is a

Barangay, the plebiscite should be municipality-wide; if municipality city, province-wide; if the

plebiscite is to be carved to form another province, it should be from the mother province. This

is a step in the direction of fuller local autonomy and diminution of the legislature's power of

control.

Cityhood Laws also violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which requires that

Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code

and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. The provision reads:

Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged,

abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria

established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of

the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.


The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria

established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local

Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code

all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into

a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.

The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation of a

city. No other law, not even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of

the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the

same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code.

Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates

Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities,

even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The

Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent

municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government

Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the

Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written

in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws

Mandatory Statute


No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished

or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established

in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a

plebiscite in the political units directly affected

In this provision, the clear intent of the law is that in the creation of local government

units, the criteria established in the Local Government Code must be followed—the Congress

should have already outlined all such criteria as would be necessary for the creation of a city,

such that it cannot write these in any other law, such as the Cityhood Bills in question. This is

because, as mentioned, the clear intent of the law is to ensure uniformity and non-discrimination

in the criteria for the creation of such cities, which used to be municipalities.

In determining whether a statute is mandatory or not, the test is to consider possible

consequences upon non-compliance with what is required in the act. Usually, such consequence

is the declaration of the nullity of the act. In this case, the Cityhood Laws were declared null

because of non-compliance with the requirement that any municipality desiring to be a city should

come within the P100M income requirement. RA 9009 did not grant any exemptions—so the act

of the Cityhood Laws in explicitly exempting respective cities from increased income requirement

of Article 450 of the LGC would violate the constitutional mandate itself.

Documents

1D- Lupango, Vince