1995. Are ICDPs Sustainable

8/8/2019 1995. Are ICDPs Sustainable

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Pergamon WorldDev&pment, Vol. 23, No. 7, pp. 1073-1084, 1995Copyright 0 1995 Elsevier Science LtdPrinted in Great Britain. All rights reserved0305-750x/95 $9.50 + 0.00

0305-750x(95)00031-3

Are Integrated Conservation-Development Projects(ICDPs) Sustainable?On the Conservation of Large Mammals in

Sub-Saharan AfricaCHRISTOPHER B. BARREIT

Utah State University, Logan, U.S.A.andPETER ARCESEUniversity of Wisconsin, Madison, U.S.A.

Summary. - Initiatives to link rural development and species conservation, known as integrated conser-vation-development projects (ICDPs), have been launched with considerable fanfare and funding aroundthe world. Although ICDPs hold appeal as broader ecological efforts than the conservation and develop-ment strategies that preceded them, they also suffer conceptual flaws that may limit their appropriatenessand potential sustainability, at least when applied to the protection of large African mammals.

1. INTRODUCTIONTraditional techniques of protected area manage-

ment, sometimes referred to as the fences and finesapproach, are increasingly viewed as having failed intheir goals of preserving biological diversity in thetropics (e.g., Bell, 1986a; 1986b; Leader-Williamsand Albon, 1988). In their place, integrated conserva-tion and development projects (ICDPs) are being pro-moted and portrayed as the vanguard of what willundoubtedly be a broad array of initiatives attemptingto link conservation and development.1 In sub-Saharan Africa, ICDPs are frequently designed toencourage conservation by linking the controlledexploitation of wildlife resources in protected areas tothe curtailment of human encroachment into theseareas (Kiss, 1990). Despite their nearly universalacceptance, however, ICDPs have recently drawnattention because of what are viewed as ill-conceivedand untested assumptions about their sustainabilityand appropriateness to local conditions. In a review of23 such projects in Africa, Asia, and South America,for example, Wells, Brandon and Hannah (1992)noted that measurable progress has been rare, andthey concluded that all projects had failed to meet theirstated objectives becausethe critical linkage betweendevelopment and conservation is either missing orobscure.

We are concerned about the ICDP approach forseveral reasons, and in this paper we comment onthese from the perspectives of an economist workingon African agricultural development and rural povertyalleviation, and a wildlife ecologist concerned withthe conservation of African wildlife. We first offersome background to the problem. Second, we list twoparticular concerns for the sustainability and feasibil-ity of ICDPs from a biological perspective, and aslightly greater number of concerns based on socialand economic arguments. Finally, we list potentialalternatives to the ICDP approach of encouraging theincreased reliance of rural peoples on the exploitationof wildlife resources.

Much early development theory applied in colonialand postcolonial Africa advocated rapid resourceextraction. Conservation strategies of these periods, astypified by the fences and fines approach, were as bio-centric as the contemporaneous development strate-gies were anthropocentric. In contrast, ICDPs assumethat human and nonhuman systems are interdependentand, therefore, that the challenges of conservation anddevelopment are inextricable. The core philosophy ofthe ICDP approach is revealed in the language used to

*We thank John Peck for helpful discussions. Final revisionaccepted: February IO, 1995.1073


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describe them as community-based programs,employing participatory methods to simultaneouslyempower rural residents and conserve threatenedspecies, and this language may also account for muchof the enthusiasm with which international develop-ment agencies and conservation groups support them.3The distinctive feature of ICDPs as conservationstrategies is that rural residents are induced to surren-der access to, or to curtail illegal offtake of, nativespecies and their habitats in exchange for alternativesources of income and sustenance, or for the provisionof direct compensation, infrastructure, or social ser-vices associated with an improved standard of living.Such exchanges are sometimes contractual, butwhether formalized or not, the basic notion of anexchange of access for material consideration is cen-tral to ICDPs.In the case of plans to promote the sustained use andconservation of large African mammals, the CAMP-FIRE program of Zimbabwe offers a general modelof a project design that is being emulated acrossAfrica. Kiss (1990) and Child and Peterson (1991)provide details of this program, which we summarizebriefly here. In several semi-arid districts ofZimbabwe, tsetse flies are often abundant to the pointof preventing the successful production of domesticstock. Moreover, rainfall is erratic and the soils aretypically shallow and infertile. As a result, local peo-ple have subsisted, particularly in times of scarcity, onwildlife taken illegally from parks, game-controlledareas, or other undeveloped lands in the region. Priorto the mid- 1980s this situation pitted local people try-ing to better their lives against government officialswith a mandate for the protection of wildlife, with nei-ther group realizing substantial progress in partbecause of interference by the other. The sentiments oflocal people were summarized by Chief Malama forone region near Nyaminyami: Tourists come here toenjoy lodges and to view wildlife. Safari companiescome here to kill animals and make money. We areforgotten. Employment here is too low. LuamfwaLodge employs only about four people and safarihunting employs no one. How can you ask us to coop-erate with conservation when this is SO?~In an effort to ameliorate conditions of humanpoverty, dwindling wildlife, and a lack of cooperationbetween local people and government workers,CAMPFIRE has attempted to promote the sustainable,legal use of certain wildlife species (particularly ele-phants, Cape buffalo, and several antelope species) bysmall. homogeneous communities in order to provideboth employment and cash. Harvests are determinedby ecologists of a nongovernmental trust, who work inconsultation with villagers and receive a portion of theproceeds from the sale of wildlife products (mainlymeat) for their continued involvement. Local peopleare said to react positively to these initiatives becausethey typically receive employment, tangible benefits

in cash or in kind, and also because they develop asense of ownership over wildlife after havingbecome involved in decisions having to do with its use(Lewis, Kaweche and Mwenya, 1990; Peck, 1993).The aims of conservation are also said to be served,ostensibly because local people come to realize thelong-term benefits of healthy wildlife populations viatheir ability to generate revenues from tourism, safarihunting, and meat sales, as well as their traditionalvalue as food. What is less clear from a biological per-spective, however, is (a) the degree to which presentday harvests are sustainable over the long term, (b) theassumption that, even though present day benefits maybe viewed favorably, they will suffice in the future topromote sustainable harvest policies and curtail sup-plementary, illegal exploitation, and (c) that it is a bio-logically sound policy to base human needs, whichmust be assumed to grow, on the harvest of wildlifepopulations that will not grow and which may beinherently unstable in size. We now consider theseconcerns in more detail before considering some ofthe social and economic ramifications of ICDPs.

2. THE BIOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITYOF ICDPsIt is clear that most populations of large Africanmammals can sustain some harvest without declining

to extinction (Dasmann, ,1964; Parker, 1984, 1987;Child and Child, 1987; Child, 1990; Muir-Leresche,1987; Macnab, 1991; Burton, 1994). The economicsof commercial or cooperative cropping ventures,however, are uncertain for most species of largeAfrican mammals, mainly because of the difficultiesof obtaining, processing and transporting animals andtheir products. Where careful analyses have beendone, the evidence suggests that cropping will bemarginally profitable for only a handful of species thatcan be easily slaughtered, without relying on refriger-ation or vehicle transportation; and further, that undermost environmental conditions domestic stock willhave higher productivity than wild species in the samearea (Macnab, 1991). Nevertheless, if croppingschemes are initiated and monitored as ecologicalexperiments (Macnab, 1983) there is reason tobelieve that something more could be learned aboutthe conditions under which they might be operatedsuccessfully within protected areas; i.e. at a profit,without causing undue depletion of a particularspecies or irreversible change to the structure andfunctioning of the protected ecosystem. At present,however, cropping schemes as components of ICDPsare being promoted uncritically (Macnab, 1991:Sinclair and Arcese, 1995) and with little or no eco-logical monitoring (Kremen, Merenlender andMurphy, 1994). Below, we list some areas where theassumptions that underlie these schemes remain


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untested and are likely to be false. If we are correct andthese problems are ignored, the collapse of these pro-grams may be inevitable.

(a) Estimating sustainable harvests over thelong term

Given reliable information on the number, socialsystem, and survival and reproductive rates of aspecies, it is a relatively straightforward task to esti-mate how many animals may be killed each year with-out causing the population to decline to extinction,given that the environment remains constant(Caughley, 1977). Several additional pieces of infor-mation are required, however, if one wishes to main-tain a stable harvest in the face of a varying environ-ment, as is found in many protected areas in Africa(Sinclair, 1977, 1979a, 1979b; McNaughton, 1983,1985). This information can be summarized as thatwhich answers the question: what maintains the cur-rent population size at present? Experience shows thatfor many large African mammals, the answer to thisquestion rests mainly on the amount and temporalavailability of food resources (Sinclair, 1977, 1979a;Hilbom and Sinclair, 1979; Caughley and Sinclair,1994). Resource abundance depends in turn on thequality of the habitat utilized, the amount of habitatavailable, and the overall rate of resource production,which is typically linked to rainfall in savanna systems(Sinclair, 1977; McNaughton, 1983, 1985; Caughleyand Sinclair, 1994).

Many critical assumptions underlie wildlife crop-ping schemes initiated in these conditions. We nowhighlight two particular assumptions that are probablyfalse for ICDPs as they are presently conceived. First,managers are assumed to be able to respond to changesin rainfall by increasing harvests following goodyears and decreasing them following bad years,because the degree to which these adjustments can beachieved will determine the success of the cullingoperation, in terms of maintaining populations at theiroptimal or maximal size for harvest. Increases mightbe arranged successfully within the ability to harvest,process and transport additional animals. Decreases,however, are likely to be politically unpalatable in theICDP context, since the benefits of off-take areassumed to be linked to the willingness of local resi-dents to comply with regulation (Lewis, Kaweche andMwenya, 1990). If political pressure limits a man-agers ability to reduce harvests, a downward spiral inthe size of the harvested population will result,because short-term overexploitation will lead to lowerfuture sustainable harvests, less local cooperation, andso on. Clearly, for the assumption of sustainable har-vest to be upheld, managers must be flexible to thepoint of closing harvests during years when rainfall islow and when demand by local people is at its peak.

The problem of flexibility in management policywill be worsened by the fact that many large Africanmammal populations slated for harvest are unstable insize. For example, Young (1994) lists 47 die-offsinvolving 20 species of large African mammals, all ofwhich occurred by natural causes in the last fivedecades. Die-offs resulted most often from droughts,but also from natural disease outbreaks and increasesin predator populations. Young (1994) did not includedie-offs resulting from human causes, such as overex-ploitation or the introduction of exotic diseases (e.g.,rinderpest). Even so, natural die-offs resulted in anaverage 63% reduction in population size. Young(1994) concluded that severe natural reductions in thesize of large African mammal populations are a wide-spread and not uncommon phenomenon.Instability further complicates the estimation ofsustainable harvests in large mammal populations,and it is also likely to affect the dynamics of humanresource interactions. This is because reductions in thesize of harvested populations that result from naturalcatastrophes are difficult or impossible to predict. Butwhen they occur, the conservation goals of ICDPs dic-tate that managers must curtail harvest to allow popu-lations to recover. As noted above, however, becausethe needs of local people are likely also to vary withenvironmental conditions, managers can expect toface the difficult decision of choosing between humanneeds and conservation goals. In this case, one of twooutcomes is inevitable. First, if managers curtail thelegal harvest, the credibility of the ICDP scheme isimperiled and resumption of illegal harvest is likely.Second, if managers yield to public pressure to main-tain or increase harvests, the depletion of the harvestedpopulation is ensured. Neither of these alternatives isconsistent with the goals of ICDPs.

A second assumption of wildlife harvestingschemes promoted in ICDPs is that the quality andamount of habitat available to the harvested popula-tions will remain constant or increase. This is requiredbecause a stable resource base for animal productionis essential to maintaining stable harvests over thelong term. Many populations slated for harvest, how-ever (e.g., the migratory wildebeest and zebra of theSerengeti and Tarangire regions of Tanzania, andmigratory wildebeest of the Central Kalahari,Botswana), utilize large amounts of habitat in areasthat are only marginally protected or completelyunprotected at present (Sinclair, 1995; Hilborn et al.,1995). Thus, in areas such as the Loliondo andIkorongo Game Controlled Areas, which straddle theeast and west boundaries of Serengeti, habitat israpidly being usurped by commercial grain and veg-etable farms, peasant settlements, and domestic stockgrazing (Sinclair and Arcese, 1995). Loss and degra-dation of habitats, particularly those which may onlybe used by wild ungulates in times of severe stress dueto drought, will reduce the sustainable size of harvests


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in the absence of land protection and restoration pro-grams. For example, in a year of record low rainfall in1992-93, the Serengeti wildebeest herd moved intominimally and unprotected areas west of the parkwhere rainfall is typically greatest. Coincident withdoing so, the population experienced a loss of approx-imately 30% in size (from circa 1.25 million animalsto 0.90 million animals) because of the joint effects oflimited food supply and intense poaching as the herdmoved through areas inhabitated by humans. Thus,unless aggressive habitat restoration and protectionprograms are made part of the ICDP approach, there islittle reason to believe that sustainable harvests will bemaintained without there being mechanisms in placeto reduce the dependence of local peoples on wildlife.

In summary, we predict that normal variation inenvironmental conditions will often force ICDP man-agers into situations that pit human needs against con-servation goals. We also suggest that many largemammal populations offered as examples for harvestare artificially large, because the habitats utilized atpresent extend well beyond those that are suitably pro-tected, and because no allowance for habitat degrada-tion is factored into long-term projections of sustain-able harvests. We must expect that as unprotected andless-protected habitats degrade, or are usurped forother purposes, carrying capacities for harvestedmammals will decline accordingly. In the face of sta-tic harvests, we therefore predict that a point of unsus-tainability will be reached in the absence of harvestadjustment. Furthermore, we also predict that suchdownward adjustments will be difficult for managersto enact because they will be politically unpalatable,and because they run counter to the main thrust ofICDPs.

(b) Willpresent-day benejts promote sustainableharvests in future?

A second area of concern for the sustainability oflarge mammal harvests involves assumptions aboutthe growth rates of human and harvested populations.If the main cause of noncooperation between pro-tected area managers and local people is that the latterrealize few or no benefits from protected areas, it isreasonable to assume that by initiating ICDPs, man-agers will experience increased cooperation as thelevel of satisfaction with protected areas increases. Inaddition, if increased satisfaction is reflected in lowerrates of illegal activity, ICDPs may thus enhance theconservation of biological resources. By the sameargument, however, we must also accept that ashuman populations grow, the level of satisfaction willdecline if gross benefits remain static, because thiswill result in declining benefits per capita. The criticalquestion with respect to the conservation of largemammals, therefore is whether their harvest, as part of

ICDPs, can provide benefits that will be sufficient toprevent declines in human satisfaction, cooperationand lawful behavior over the long term.

In answering this question it should be clear thatwhenever the main benefits provided to local peopleare derived directly or indirectly from the harvest oflarge mammals, these benefits will be limited by thesize of the sustainable harvest. Because of this, weenvisage only two scenarios in which the initiation ofharvests in protected areas can offer anything betterthan a short-term solution to the problems of dissatis-faction, noncooperation and illegal exploitation.

First, several protected areas in Africa are sur-rounded by human populations that are at relativelylow densities. In these areas, the initial harvestrequired to meet the needs of local people may be lessthan the sustainable harvest. At least initially, there-fore, harvest programs in such areas may help toincrease cooperation and curtail illegal exploitation.But, if human populations grow past the point where asustainable harvest can provide satisfactory benefitson a per capita basis, ICDPs should be expected to failfor the same reasons that local cooperation may havebeen lacking prior to their initiation. Therefore, in thelow human-density scenario, whether harvest pro-grams can provide substantial long-ferm benefits willdepend on the size and growth rate of the human pop-ulation, relative to the size of the sustainable harvest oflarge mammals in the area.

Our second scenario concerns more populatedareas, where initial harvests will have to be set at ornear sustainable levels at the outset of the ICDP inorder to provide per capita benefits that will yield gen-eral satisfaction, cooperation and lawful behavior.This is the typical case in most areas where ICDPs arebeing promoted (Kiss, 1990). In such cases, however,only two policies can prevent the erosion of local sup-port for ICDPs as human populations grow.

First, managers could increase harvests above sus-tainable levels in order to prevent declines in benefitsper capita to local people. This has been the tack takenby managers of several marine fisheries (Clark, 1990;Hilborn, 1992; Ludwig, Hilborn and Walters, 1993).Under this strategy, however, the depletion of har-vested populations is inevitable. An alternative is formanagers to attempt to increase the size of harvestedpopulations in order to increase the size of the sustain-able harvest. This might be achieved, for example, byremoving predators, competitors and diseases, or byimproving the productivity of harvested species byselective breeding, increasing food resources via fer-tilization and/or irrigation, or increasing the size of heavailable habitat (Macnab, 1991). In this ca5e, the har-vested populations may be mamtained, but the charac-ter and diversity of the biotic community. whichICDPs are meant to conserve. will have been lost.In addition, by enhancing the living stanckmla 01humans adjacent to protcctcd ;irc;is. ICDPr miturall~


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stimulate greater per capita demand for meat and otherwildlife products; the income elasticity of demand issurely positive and likely greater than one. Moreover,improving local standards of living will probably con-tribute to higher rates of local population growth thanwould be observed in the absence of an ICDP that issuccessful in enhancing the well-being of local popu-lations. This may occur especially rapidly in regionswhere living standards are depressed, and thus immi-gration into areas with enhancements is made moreattractive.

In summary, we suggest that it is biologicallyunsound to base human needs, which must be assumedto grow, on the harvest of wildlife populations thatwill not grow. Although the present-day benefits oflarge mammal harvest may be viewed favorably, thesebenefits are unlikely to be large enough to promotesustainable harvests and curtail illegal exploitation inthe future. This is because as human populations andincomes grow, per capita benefits will decline whileper capita demand increases. Eventually, these bene-fits will approach the levels realized by local peopleliving adjacent to protected areas without ICDPs.Finally, because ICDPs may enhance local populationgrowth, they may also accelerate the rate at whichlocal satisfaction declines. In the end, therefore, wepredict that many ICDPs will leave local communitieswith access to fewer animals, and with higher popula-tion densities, than if development dollars were spentin other ways. In particular, we suggest that the aboveconcerns point towards a critical, biological need fordevelopment projects to decouple human needs fromthe harvest of large mammals.

3. A SOClOECONOMlC CRITIQUEICDPs generally employ several different instru-

ments to induce behavioral change in humans livingadjacent to protected areas. We first address some con-ceptual and design flaws in specific tactics before turn-ing to more fundamental critiques of the current ICDPapproach.

(a) Who s responsible for nddlife rleplerion?A crucial first question to ask is: who poaches large

mammals and degrades their habitats? It is oftenassumed that poor rural inhabitants are the principalculprits, but this assumption is based primarily onanecdotes because few systematic studies of illegalharvest exist. Leader-Williams, Albon and Berry( 1990) found that offenders involved in relativelymmor offences within the Luangwa Valley, Zambia,oripinated locally. but that the well-organized, armed%mgs that decimated Luangwas rhinoceros and ele-?phant populations originated from outside areas.

Hofer, East and Campbell (1993) cite limited evidencefor the primary role of local people in the illegal har-vest of ungulates in Serengeti National Park,Tanzania. This study did not address, however,whether individuals arrested in the park were orga-nized by people living in urban centers farther away,as is often suggested in this and other wildlife areas(Lewis, Kaweche and Mwenya, 1990; Thomson, 1992;our unpublished results). Marks (1991) noted that inthe case of Luangwa, westerners have had an exces-sive tendency to blame the locals for wildlife deple-tion. In the absence of systematic studies, the extent ofresponsibility for illegal exploitation and subsequentwildlife depletion will remain a subject of debate.Clearly, several other groups of potential culpritsdo exist. Damage in some cases has been done by pri-vate hunting concessions that operate with unlimitedquotas and no specific protection for endangeredspecies (Turner, 1987; Newby, 1990; Cloudsley-Thompson, 1992; Sinclair and Arcese, 1995).Widespread and serious damage has also been done byregional warfare. Insurgents and armies in Angola,Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, SouthAfrica, Uganda and Zimbabwe are all alleged to haveturned to poaching, especially of elephant and rhinoc-eros, as a source of meat and finance. Perhaps mostdisappointingly, it is also often the case that parks staffthemselves are a threat to wildlife. Bonner (1993, p.134) attributed more than one-third of Kenyan rhinolosses to employees of the services mandated to pro-tect them. Even so, no careful decomposition of theincidence of encroachment and exploitation by ruralpeoples versus other groups yet exists. It is essential tothe success of ICDPs that these analyses are under-taken because programs designed around falseassumptions are unlikely to succeed.

(b) Nonpecuniary benejits of illegal harvestIf we nonetheless assume that rural Africans bear

primary responsibility for the threats posed to largemammals, it follows that it is crucial to understandwhy they do so. For example, implicit in theexchanges designed into ICDPs is the notion thatwildlife are poached, or their habitats exploited, so asto generate income or provide food for a household orcommunity. While these reasons are likely to beimportant in some cases, they may be insufficient toexplain many relationships between rural human andlarge mammal populations in sub-Saharan Africa.This is because many cultures vest hunting, foragingand shifting cultivation with great nonpecuniaryimportance. Ceremonial feasts that require freshlykilled game, rites of passage to adulthood or marriage,as well as a sometimes mdomitable sense of tradition,all add intrinsic value to wildlife depredation that gen-erally goes unrecognized in the design of ICDPs. Such


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values underlie the opinion of several senior enforce-ment personnel in the Serengeti, for example, that noamount of provisioning of meat or cash will dissuadesome traditional groups from hunting lions, ostrichesor Cape buffalo, even if this requires entering the parkand risking arrest to do so. Although there is a sub-stantial literature on human relations with wildlife inAfrica, conservation planners apparently do notappreciate the nonpecuniary dimensions of these rela-tions sufficiently to incorporate them into their plans.

(c) Demand for wildlife products andfoodEven if we accept that wildlife uses are based on

pecuniary or subsistence motives, there are economicreasons to doubt the sustainability of ICDPs, in addi-tion to the biological concerns mentioned above.Consider, for example, the structural effects on fooddemand patterns of the establishment of previouslynonexistent programs of wildlife meat distribution.We would expect relative price changes to inducechanges in demand patterns, but they may also inducechanges in food preparation, diet, or even subsistencecultivation patterns, especially of the oilseeds andvegetables that complement the principal sources ofcalories and protein.8 Such structural changes havepersistent effects on demand patterns. Thus, if ICDPsincrease a rural populations dependence on gamemeat, these projects may fuel local demand for gameand, in the event legal harvest distributions are cur-tailed for biological reasons (see above), they mayultimately foster the activities they are designed tocounter.As an alternative to distributing game meat forlocal consumption, project managers may opt to mar-ket game meat in urban areas or overseas where pricesare higher, and then distribute the proceeds to localcommunities. Many ICDPs have a revenue-sharingcomponent, whereby some portion of the profits fromsales of meat, hides and other wildlife products, orreceipts derived from park fees or tourist receipts, aredistributed to local residents as cash transfers. Evenrevenue-sharing arrangements, however, face poten-tial shortcomings.First, a fallacy of composition might apply withrespect to the sale of hides, meat and other wildlifebyproducts. High domestic and international pricesfor exotica probably result in large part from theirscarcity. If many parks in Africa or elsewhere enterinto the business of marketing wildlife products,prices might well respond as did cocoa prices to theglut induced by widespread export promotion in thelate 1980s and early 1990s. Unfortunately, too little isknown about demand for wildlife products to deter-mine how to produce and market them so as to maxi-mize net revenues, particularly if one wishes to jointlyoptimize herd size.

(d) The efJicacy of ecotourism and rural foodmarketing

Second, although tourism is widely touted as hav-ing great potential to generate distributable surpluses,it has yet to deliver substantial sums in excess of costs.This is due in part to extreme variability in tourist rev-enues in response to political turmoil, exchange ratefluctuations and international economic conditions. Itis also due, however, to a substantial proportion ofgross tourism revenues being consumed by the cost ofimported goods and services, and the repatriation ofprofits by foreign investors. Thus, there is often littlenet receipt to share locally; almost surely not enoughto significantly alter incentives to encroach on pro-tected areas and species (International ResourcesGroup, 1992).y Even in Masai Mara National Reserve,which is Kenyas premier wildlife attraction and gen-erates some $20 million in foreign exchange revenuesannually, locals received only an estimated 1.6% ofrevenues in 1989. At Amboseli National Park, anotherof Kenyas major tourist spots, the corresponding fig-ures were 1%distributed locally out of $15 million inwildlife tourism revenues.10 Thus, even among themost accessible, attractive, well-equipped and publi-cized sites in Africa, only modest surpluses are gener-ated with which ICDPs can compensate locals for sur-rendering access to wildlife and habitats. Finally, onlya minority of protected areas in Africa attract suffi-cient visitors to cover costs (Wells, Brandon andHannah, 1992). Given that few protected areas arecapable of generating a surplus, tourism is probablyoveremphasized as a primary source of funds withwhich conservationists can entice rural residents toleave species and habitats alone.

Third, and perhaps most fundamentally, for cashinducements to work rural inhabitants must be able toconvert cash income into food. Opportunities to dothis, however, are often severely constrained by theorganization of the rural food marketing network.Sens (1981) entitlements approach to understandingpoverty and famine suggests that trading access tospecies for monetary compensation will expose ruralresidents to new risks associated with exchange enti-tlements. In that setting, price variability and quantity-rationing in rural food markets conspire to threatenhousehold food security. Households faced with suchsituations actively work to diversify income and foodprocurement sources so as to mitigate consumptionrisk. This leads, however, to using protected areas andthe species conserved within them as prime diversifi-cation strategies. Thus, the capacity of cash transfersto induce rural peoples to withdraw from subsistencecultivation, grazing or hunting in protected areas,thereby exposing themselves to further market risks.will depend in part on the state of the rural food mar-keting network. Food marketing in rural Africaremains poorly understood. It is known. however. that


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Second, ICDP managers are in a difficult positionwith respect to establishing the credibility of their pro-jects with local populations. Rapport is often poor, duein large measure to a history of confrontation underthe fences and fines approach, and thus dependsinordinately on rural residents perceptions of parkofficials commitment to human development. Becausedevelopment is merely a means to conservation inICDPs, however, one might expect that rural residentsanticipate that when scarce funds dry up, as often hap-pens in rural Africa, they will be abandoned in favor ofother mammals, and that they plan accordingly.

In particular, covariate shocks (e.g., drought,rinderpest outbreaks) are a special threat to the credi-bility of a projects promise to deliver meat or cash tolocal communities. In such circumstances, as residentsmost need the transfer and can least afford to purchasefood on their own, lCDPs also will be least able toensure compensation as sustainable harvests, and per-haps tourist revenues, drop. Poaching is likely to be animportant alternate means for consumption smoothingin these cases, as suggested by events associated withthe drought of 1992 in southern Africa. In arid zonessuch as the Gonarezhou area of southern Zimbabwe,for example, rural communities became disillusionedas conservationists worked to build water points andprovide nourishment for protected wildlife whileneighboring human populations, their fields and live-stock perished from thirst, hunger and disease.

Third, the remarkable rate of African urbanizationhas important ramifications for protected areas andtheir species. Urbanization appears to correlate withincreasing demand for meat and status goods made ofhides or ivory. Thus, even where rural inhabitantshave been the agents of wildlife depletion, they are inmany cases responding to market signals induced bydistant urban or international demand for wildlifeproducts. Wells, Brandon and Hannah (1992) pointout that the benefits of ICDPs are directed towardactual or potential agerlrs of park depletion, and not tothe ultimate sources of demand for the resources.Urban demand for firewood or meat, for instance, mayheavily influence the incentives for rural residents toexploit protected areas.

Fourth, one must question the administrative andfinancial capacity of conservation agencies, especiallylocal ones, to add rural development interventions to apotentially overwhelming portfolio of current responsi-bilities. This general problem may be most formidablewith respect to preservation of migratory large mammalpopulations, where the spatial breadth of protectedareas would necessitate interventions in many scatteredcommunities and jurisdictions. While comprehensiveinterventions are probably infeasible, selective inter-ventions can introduce moral hazard problems,15 inwhich communities will quickly perceive that abuse ofhabitats or wildlife will bring rewards.16 Rather thanrectifying the behavior of encroaching communities,

selective compensation and development schemes maytherefore induce delinquency on the part of communi-ties which have historically been better stewards.

Finally, one needs to step to a more aggregated levelof analysis and operation than local projects to achievefeasibility and uniformity of treatment across commu-nities. In this sense we echo Cheru (1992, p. 497) incautioning that a fruitful coexistence between largemammal and human populations requires a funda-mental reorientation of government policies andresources towards solving rural problems. Povertyand ecological degradation have both micro and macroorigins. National policies have up to now contributedto the overexploitation of the natural resource base andimmiseration of rural populations.17 As others havesuggested, it is possible that the adverse impacts ofindirect, economywide interventions on wildlife con-servation have and will continue to swamp any directeffects of sectoral interventions, whether they are pos-itive or negative.18 Until African regimes devote seri-ous attention and resources to combating the twinblights of biodiversity depletion and rural poverty andstagnation, it is unlikely that any amount of tinkering inthe hinterland will have its desired effect.

4. SUMMARY AND SOME SUGGESTIONSICDPs excite the interest and imaginations of con-

servation groups and international development agen-cies. Nonetheless, ICDPs are not yet analytically orempirically sound approaches. They proceed fromuntested biological and economic assumptions, manyof which are likely false. If these problems continue tobe ignored, the collapse of ICDPs may be inevitable.

We close by summarizing the broad themes of thiscritique and offering several suggestions toward rem-edying important weaknesses of ICDPs. First. it isunsound-and arguably unethical -to base sstisfac-tion of inevitably increasing human demands oninherently unstable wildlife populations that will notgrow in the absence of serious disruption of the bioticcommunities that ICDPs are meant to preserve. WhileICDPs explicit recognition of the interdependence ofhuman and nonhuman species is a laudable advanceover earlier conservation and development strategiesthat were excessively biocentric and anthropocentric,respectively, too many ICDPs go beyond recognitionto promote the reinforcement of interdependence.Schemes that depend on the granting of material ben-efits (e.g., cash, employment or meat) generated bymanaged wildlife cropping or ecotourism run counterto the objective of decoupling rural livelihoods fromresource exploitation, and they are unlikely to besustainable in any significant volume per capita.Furthermore, the covariate environmental risks toboth human and wildlife populations will inevitablyforce managers to make politically perilous choices.


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Second, the selective provision of benefits fromICDPs is problematic. At present, only select commu-nities on the periphery of protected areas enjoy directtransfers (in cash, kind or public works projects) fromICDPs. It is not clear that these transfers reach thosewhose behaviors threaten protected species or theirhabitats. Marginal employment creation and publicworks projects (e.g., irrigation) aimed at sedentarizinglocal populations are necessarily incomplete in cover-age across the local population and seasons, respec-tively, and the subpopulations and periods of greatestconcern from a conservation perspective are thosemost likely excluded. Moreover, ICDPs clearly do notaddress demand-side impulses of urban or intema-tional origin. In addition, selective, discretionary dis-tribution may lead to moral hazard problems, or mayinduce endogenous effects in human migration pat-terns that could increase population densities aroundprotected areas above what they would otherwise be.While selective distribution is clearly problematic,conservation agencies clearly lack the capacity toextend ICDPs coverage substantially.

So what productive steps might be taken? First,ICDPs must be regarded as no more than short-termpalliatives in a longer term struggle to refocus atten-tion and resources on parallel processes of rural devel-opment, poverty alleviation and wildlife conservation.There is no substitute for broader commitment by gov-ernments, external donors and nongovernmental orga-nizations to solving these rural problems and to coor-dinating, if not necessarily integrating, such efforts.

Second, ecological and social monitoring andapplied research activities must be made organic toICDPs. Kremen, Merenlender and Murphy (1994,p. 389) make a compelling case that comprehensiveecological monitoring is critical in shaping ICDPmanagement plans and in furthering the integration ofconservation and development. Similarly, more mustbe done on the social science side to understand theetiology of the human threat to large mammal popula-tions in sub-Saharan Africa, in terms of identifying theagents and economic or social impulses responsiblefor encroachment, poaching and habitat degradation,as well as in terms of agents motivations. Researchersmust identify not just the social correlates of wildlifeoverexploitation, but also its root causes, and theymust monitor ICDP-induced changes in human activ-ity and consumption patterns. For example, if the prin-cipal threat IS locals poaching to supplement their foodsupply, then improved marketing infrastructure tofacilitate lower-cost and more reliable access to com-mercial food supplies may reduce illegal off-take. If,

however, poaching is mainly by nonlocals or if urbandemand for meat and other wildlife by-products issubstantially responsible, improving transport andcommunications infrastructure in the area may wellexacerbate the problem. Unfortunately, allied socialscience research to answer such fundamental ques-tions has been strikingly absent from ICDPs to date.

Third, ICDPs focused on large mammals in Africaare partly a reaction to the perceived failures of boththe fences and fines approach to conservation andstate-directed rural development projects. Yet, ICDPsrun a serious risk of ignoring lessons of earlier disap-pointments. Evidence from east and southern Africasuggests that the efficacy of law enforcement remainsa crucial determinant of the conservation status oflarge mammals (Milner-Gulland and Leader-Williams, 1992; Caughley, 1993; Arcese, Hando andCampbell, 1995). Proper equipment, training andcompensation of parks staff still promise high payoffsin conservation of protected species, but have beenprovided in exceptionally few African circumstances.Likewise, active habitat maintenance and restorationis central to maintaining the carrying capacity of pro-tected areas and the sustainability of managed har-vests (Sinclair and Arcese, 1995). but it is rarely prac-ticed consistently.

On the development side, more serious nationalefforts are needed to stimulate agricultural produc-tivity and rural development through smallholder-oriented national development strategies (Mellor,Delgado and Blackie, 1987). Improved domestic stockand veterinary services not only benefit pastoralists,but can encourage the sedentarization of agricultureand have positive, epidemiological spillover effectson wildlife conservation. A priority must likewise beplaced on the development and dissemination ofstress-resistant seed varieties and water managementpractices. These could permit panseasonal cultivationand thus dampen the inclination of human populationsto exploit wildlife illegally at their most vulnerabletimes, such as in periods of drought. Investments inextending and deepening rural financial systems canbe expected not only to facilitate adoption of moreadvanced technologies, but also in promoting ruralindustry and services that may reduce human depen-dence on wildlife exploitation. In conclusion, the onlysustainable way to advance both the conservation sta-tus of large mammals and the well-being of ruralhuman populations in Africa is to decouple humanneeds from wildlife harvest. Insofar as many contem-porary ICDPs fail to do this, we fear these efforts areunsustainable.


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NOTES1. Brandon and Wells ( 1992). p. 577.2. Wells, Brandon and Hannah (1992). p. 60.3. This enthusiasm has been backed up financially. Basedon figures reported in Kiss (1990). Brinkerhoff Gage andYeager (1992). and Wells, Brandon and Hannah (1992) weestimate that at least $160 million had been committed tolarge mammal-oriented ICDPs in sub-Saharan Africa as ofearly 1991. The World Bank alone presently has almost $50million further approved or pending for similar ICDPs inAfrica (World Bank, 1994).4. The acronym stands for the Communal AreasManagement Programme for Indigenous Resources.

5. Cited in Lewis, Kaweche and Mwenya (1990).6. Kiss (1990). See also Lewis, Kaweche and Mwenya(1990) for an example from Zambia.7. See Cater (1989). Duming (1990). SouthScan (1992a.1992b). and Galster (1993).8. These effects are evident in the evolution of grains con-sumption patterns in West Africa in response to food aid andcurrency overvaluation (Delgado, 1991).9. West and Brechin (199 I), and the papers therein, makethe point that the degree to which tourism benefits local pop-ulations depends in large measure on the political economyof the tourism sector. Large-scale, highly capitalized tourismis generally controlled by outside interests, has a highimported cost component, and returns little or nothing posi-tive to locals. On the other hand, a small-scale, locally con-trolled tourist trade is more likely to benefit locals.IO. These figures originate with Norton-Grifliths (1995)who marshals considerable evidence against the proposition

that wildlife based tourism can arrest socioeconomic trendsthat threaten migratory species such as the wildebeest.11. See Barrett and Carter (1994) and notes therein for moredetailed discussion of food marketing in Africa.12. Weber et al. (1988) document net buyer proportions inexcess of 30%. and as high as 73%, in four of five sub-SaharanAfrican countries in which Michigan State Universityresearchers conducted extensive surveys in the 1980s.13. Again, the calculus of wildlife predation is more com-plex than mere income-maximization. The point here is thateven were agents motivations this simple, the compensation,substitution and development components of ICDPs areunlikely to have much of an impact on the behaviors thatthreaten biodiversity.14. Wells, Brandon and Hannah (1992), p. 30, emphasis inthe original.15. The concept of moral hazard comes from the economicliterature on asymmetric information and, in particular, theproblems of insuring persons against risk when the existenceof insurance is likely to induce some endogenous (upward)change in the likelihood of risk-taking.16. Brandon, Wells and Hannah (1992, p. 564) share anenlightening story that relates directly to this point: One pro-ject provided a health clinic as compensation for lost access.Illegal activities to the protected area decreased for a fewyears, then soared. When the project met with villagers to findout why. they smiled and said, Now we want a school.17. Lipton (1977) and Bates (1981) are perhaps the mostfamiliar social science critiques of urban bias in development.18. Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988) have made this pointwith respect to agricultural pricing.

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Documents

1995. Are ICDPs Sustainable