1990_Dialogue in Narration (1990)

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Jochen Mecke. Diolugue in IlUrraliun - (Ihe IUJrral;vt principle). IN: Thllio Maranhao (cd.).Intc[prdjlljou or diaIOGu(. Olicigo/London:' Chicigo U n i y e r ~ i r ) ' P r e ~ . (1990):195-2IH.

Dialogue in Narration(the Narrative Principle)

Jochen MeckeWriting, when properly managed, (as you may be sure I thi nk mine is) isbut a different name for conversation: As no one, who knows what he isabaut in good company, would venture to t.a1.k aU;-so no author, whounderstands the just baundaries of decorum and good breeding, wouldpresume to think aU: The truest respect which you can pay to the readersunderstanding, is to halve this matter amicably and leave rum somethingto imagine, in his turn, as weH as yourselfLaurence Sterne, The Lift lind Opinwns ofTrislrllm Sharuly: ,Gentleman

Monologic versus Dialogic NarrationAt first glance narration seems to be the antipo de of dialogue. A morestriking example of monologic, one-sided, and c10sed discourse canhardly be found, it seems. Whether it is presented in its original oralform in everyday situations or presented by an author highly versedin narrative techniques using all the artistic devices of the "schematism of traditionality" (Ricoeur 1983, 1(6), the result is apparentlyalways ~ h e same: an active author is telling a story to a listener orreader patiently and passively listening to the messages that reachhirn. In written narration the rea der is even reduced to pure receptionof the text without any opportunity for asking questions, forinforming the narrator of his opinions, for manifesting his disapproval of or agreement with the actions of the characters or thetechnique of the narrator, or for expressing his desire that the storycontinue in a certain way. Thus the fundamental condition fordialogue is no t fulfiUed: th e roles of (active) spe aker and (passive)hearer do not alternate. However, the reality of the complex anddynamic system of narration does not correspond at all to thisoversimplified view. A doser examination of the novelistic genre,which contains both dialogue and narration, will help to establish thatnarration and dialogue are not mutually exdusive notions but are

Mecke, Jochen, "Dialogue in Narration - (the Narrative Principle)",

in: Tullio Maranhao (ed.), The Interpretation of Dialogue, Chicago/London: Chicago UP, (1990), p. 195-218.


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dialogic character of narration itself. Trying to perceive the entirerange of such polymorphie phenomenon as dialogue, Mukarovskys t a k ~ s out the tundamental eh4uaeteristics of dialogic communication:

1. Every participant must have the opportunity to rcalize theroles of both the active and the passive partner of communication. Conselluently the roles of speaker an d hearer alternate(Mukarovsky 1977, 86).2. Speaker and Jistener must be able to incorporate the situationsurrounding them into their exchange by making elements ofitthe theme of their conversation or by designating them bymeans of gestures or deictic words ("there," "here," etc.) (1977,87).3. There must be a characteristic specific to dialogue, whichdefines its semantic structure: "Unlike monologic discourse,which has a single dnd continuous contexturc, several or at leasttwo eontextufl'S interpenetrate or alternate in diaJogic discourse" (1977, 87). Of course there must be a frame of referencewithin which the ditferences bctween the two contextures canoperate. This unity, however, is granted not by the subjcct butby the object, that is, by the theme of the conversatton.Since as a functionalist Mukarovsky conceives of language as a

means appropridte to the realization of certain goals of expression(1940, 82), he presuppOSes that dialogue functions as an instrumentalready at hand; dialogue evolves within the framework of apreexisting Janguage. Although the participants can detcrmine thechoice among different functionaJ languages (emotional, Jiterary, orintellectual), Janguage preconceived as a whole circumscribes the~ c t u a l c o m m u n i ~ a t i o n . Indecd, if we translate Mukarovsky's aspectsmt o the terms ot Jakobson's model of communication, it appears thatMukarovsky takes into account only the emotive (speaker), conative(hearer), phatic (channe!), referential(context), an d semantic funetions of ' linguistic signs; he comp]etely neglects the metalinguisticfunction, which deals with the relation between utterances an d thecode they are derived from. There is no reason the code should notalso become the object or theme of dialogue. Moreover, metacommunication as an extreme case of conversational practice can bc reaJizedonly in a dialogic way, and pcrhaps this is one of the most interestingcases of dialogic practice. Thus w e can comptete Mukarovsky's list offeatures by adding the c1aboration of new common codes, of newlanguages (cf. KJoepfer 1982, 88 H.). Here, as in alJ other dimensions

Dialogue in Narmtimz

of diaJogical communication, a certain unity an d interpenetTation is acondition for d i a l o g u ~ , as weil as the tension that breaks up virtualmonologic unity.

Having thus e s t a b l i s h ~ d the basis for his ,the9ry of dialogue,Mukarovsky uses the c1assical diffcrentiati0!l ~ w e e n the concretepsychophysical individual an d the subject 'to ~ r s t i n g u i s h betweensuperfidal dialogic features an d a deeper 11dialogic quality." ~ h e essential conditions for dialogue are provided chiefly by the thlrdaspect mentioned above, that is, by the interpenetration of s e v ~ r d l eontextures. The indispensable eondition of the "interpenetratlonof two semantic contextures" is no t necessarily bound to the existence of two individuals but can also be fulfilled by a singlepsychophysical individual's becoming the vehicle for two w e l l - ~ i t ferentiated subjects of an utterance. Thus, in the so-ca Ied soh]oquy, on e individual assurnes the roles of two subjects an d alternately takes the roles of speaker an d hearer. l\1ukarovsky partlyanticipates what Roman Jakobson would reformulate twenty yearslater in Iinguistic terms: it is the possibility of splitting an d therebydoubling aJI the constituents of literary communication that permitsa single author to divide into two weJl-distinguished subjects or"voices" wh o aetually engage in a dialogue. In the light of Jakobson's terminology, Mukarovsky's claim brings to the fore hownarration may be dialogic. The concrete individual author is capable of entering into a true dialogue with his real counterparts; sucha dialogue takes place on the first level of literary communication,which is the principaJ objcct of traditional her.meneutics. Yet theproblem of dialogue really asserts itself on the seeond level, that ofthe literary work. On this level, the participants of the internaldialogue of the novel (narrator an d narratee, implicit author ~ n d implicit reader) result from the doubling of the concrete author mtotwo different subjects. Thus the real author can address the receiver in qute a direct way, as Sterne does with prediJeetion inTristram Shandy , begging his reader, for instance, to close the dooror advising hirn to skip over the next chapter because it might notplease hirn (Sterne 1967, 38). Narration, however, need notpouse such an explicit form of dialogue. Ev.en when .not e ~ b o d ~ e ~ as a figure of narration,the reader may eXlst as a kind of Imphcltcounterpart to the narrator. Actually, the anecdote above aboutDickens listening to his readers ilIustrates very weIl what happensbetween the narrator and thc implicit reader. The narrator knowsvery weIl the readers' "horizon of expectation" Oauss 1975, 131)


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one wh o controls and manipulates them in conformity to his ownintentions. In parody and irony, for instance, the narrator uses theutterances of others for the purpose of unmasking and ridiculingthem, thus manifesting his superiority. Bakhtin introduces anothermodality of polyphony, one in which the voice of the Otherrepresented by the discourse of the Self is active and dominates theauthor's discourse. In the modalities mentioned above the authoruses the discourse of the Other to express his own orientations. In thefourth type, which Bakhtin christens "polemic," the Other's discourse remains outside that of the author and is thus promoted to thelatter's independent autonomous counterpart,acting upon it anddetermining it (Todorov 1984, 71). The degree of the presence anddoininance of one of the voices is variable: the hero's or the reader'svoice, ideological system, conception of the world, may obtain such apredominance that the narrator's voice vanishes and loses controlover the making of the novel. This happens, for instance, in The Lifeand Opinions ofTristram Shandy and in./acques le fataliste et SO" maHre, inwhich the heroes, by their strange and eccentric behavior, compel theauthors to modify their programs. The modification of the narrator'sattitude by his own creations mayaIso affect the real author: fof. exam pie, Lou is-Ferdinand CeJine (Destouches), who adopted not onlythe name but also the character 01 his principal picaresque hero,progressively identifying hirnself with his creation. Thus the literarydialogue may (quite similarly to the so-called inner monologue, whichis in fact a poJyJogue) induce the person to obey t he voice of the fictiveOther; the paranoiac execution oE the orders given by a stranger'svoice is only an extreme case of this.H, on the one hand, a true dialogue may take place within asingle p erson, on the other hand, the existence of several participantsin communication does not guarantee its dialogic character. As theexample oE so-caUed discussions in totalitarian systems illustrates,one voice or subject may be disseminated through different individuaIs having the same opinions, 'sharing the same value system andthe same language. Even though all external premises for dialoguearefulfilled, the internal condition, the tension between two or moresemantic contextures, is completely missing. The case of the nove]illustrates very weH the opposite phenomenon, that of a dia)oguetaking place within a single individual. If one accepts Mukarovsky'sexplicit replacement of the concrete individual by the subject ofdialogue, apresupposition that also underlies Bakhtin's definition ofdialogism, then the objection that the dialogue between narrator and

Dialogue in Narration

herD is not real because one of the partners controls the other is nolonger pertinent. Of course, authors can manipulate their charactersfor their own purposes (Ehre 1984, 176). But the "manipulations" ofthe individual and concrete author are a result of a dialogue betweentwo or more voices that has already taken place w ~ t h i t t hirnself; this isso irrespective of whether it was the narrator's' v o ~ , the i m p l i ~ i t reader's, or the hero's that got the upper hand. Here the Lahnetymology of the word "concrete" (from concrescere, "to mergelt)reveals its fuH sense: the concrete author is a result of the polyloguebetween different voices merging with different degrees of predominance. On this basis we can shqw that it must not be that themore-or-Iess implicit narrator dominates the dialogue in the novel,but that the actual writing and final position of the concrete authorcan also be due to a predominance of the reader's voice. If we admit,on the basis of Mukarovsky's distinction between subject andindividual, that the main premise of dialogue is not the existence oftwo individuals exchanging messages but the tension of two s u b j e c ~ s penetrating each other, then the dialogue is reaL even though thlsmight not be the case for the individuals t a k . i ~ g p a ~ it. .The commonsense objection to Bakhtin s thesIs m fact has ItSroots elsewhere. lt is an objection not so much to the fictionality of theparticipants of dialogue as to the hidden narrative base that sustainsdialogic communication. The argument that the. concrete a.uthormanipulates his heroes as a marionette play.er hiS pupp.ets. notprimarily concerned with the fact that there IS onJy one mdlvldualsupporting the conversation. In particular it is based on the presupposition of an author completely unmodiEied by the concrete andmaterial process of writing, which is carried out in time and ,in !hecourse of which the author may himseIf change. The obJerhonexcludes from dialogue the very element within which it evolves: itpresumes that the concrete authoris an already and forever finishedsubject and thus eliminates time. In fact the concrete author of.a workdoes not exist before the act of writing, but only after the dlaloguewith his persons has come to an end. The authoris author only afterwriting the book, not before. As author he is the result the p . r o c e ~ s of writing, which progresses in the form of a conversabon wlth hiScharacters and with the implicit reader.The gist of the argument against the virtually dialogic nature ofnarration consists in the reversal of the actual perspective. lt looksback on the narrative process from the point of view reached by theauthor at its end" explaining the whole as a realization of his initial


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20706 Literary Experiments with Dialog!Jei

encomp asses mer e ontological difference without reducing it to a finalidentity but unfolds the diiference between the land the Other, timeconstitutes the dimension in which the dialogic relation can evolve.The ontologicaJ foundation of dialogue in time is confirmed by

the anthropological analysis of the constitution of identity. Identitycannot he realized in a kind of Munchausen act in which oneextricates oneself from the morass by pulling on one's own hair. Theprocess of self-identification can be c10sed only in relation to others:Being, abstracted from the relation binding it to the Other, isinconceivable. According to Bakhtin, we can neither conceive norperceive ourselves as a unity without referring to something thattranscends and encompasses us. "I achieve self-consciousness, Ihecome myself only by revealing myself to another, through anotherand with another's help. The most important acts, constitutive ofself-consdousness, are determined by their relation to anotherconsdousness. . . . must find myself in the other, finding the otherin me" (Todorov 1984, 96). Just as the body is initially formed in thewomb of the mother, so human consciousness awaken s surroundedby the c o n s d o u s n ~ s s of others (p. 96). Moreover, the I hides in theOther and in others: it wants to be but another for others, to juUypenetrate the world of others as another.Despite this congruence between narration and dialogue, consisting of their common foundation in time, there seems to be afundamental difference: the dialogic mode of time is contingent,while the time of the story is teleological, because it is founded on ourpreconception of action. Although both are rooted in time, dialogueand narration seem to be incompatible, espedally because of thedifferent modes that time espouses in them. Perhaps the analysis ofdialogue in the light of Buber' s phi losophy of time may heIp to makec1ear the real structure of dialogic time. Buber differentiates twofundamental attitudes of man toward the world; The relation fromthe I to It as a relation of subject to object is only one humanpossibility, which exists in addition to the encounter of the I and theYou. In contrast to the It, the You cannot be fixed by notions or serve'as means to our ends (Buber 1984, 16 H.). The encounter with the Youtranscends the subject-object relation. Nevcrtheless, the You musthecome an It when dialogic communication is not actually realized orfinished. This is, for instance, the case in memory, where the You isperceived as an object and thereby transformed into an lt (Buber 1984,37). On e might object that this reification of the Other at the end of adialogic relation must not at all confer a narrative structure on dialogic

Dialogue i" Narration

temporality, because the end itself might oceur as a mere c o n t i ~ gency. Dialogic time thus would stiJI lack any of the orgamcdevelopments characteristic of traditional narration. 1?: resolve theapparent ineompatibility between the specific times of narration andof the dialogic relation, we have to examine how rite fundamentalcontingency resulting from the relation between the l.and the Otheris transformed into the narrative time of concrete dialogue.From DiaJogic Relation to DiaJogue: Narrativization of DialogicTemporality by the Pragmatic Rules of Dialogic SpeechThe narrative transformation of the contingency of the relation'between the You and the I is due to the pragmatic rules of dialoguetaken as a specific form of speech, as established by Plato. In theGorgias, Socrates reminds Polos that the dialogic genre and Hs rulesare quite different from the rules of the agonistics of sentencescomposed for validity before a tribunal and in dialectics (Gorgias471e-472c). In dialogue, only the opinions of the two partidpants arerelevant,. and the aim of their conversation is their assent alone(475d). In contras t to the participant s of the agon, those of dialogue arewitnesses and judges at once (Republic 348b). The simultaneousaccomplishment of the tw o roles naturally requires a higher c o m m ~ nicative competence, a condition that some partidpants do not fulflU(cf. Sophist 346c; UlWS 893a-b). Hs specific pragmatic rules confer ateleological structure on dialogue, which places it in opposition toother communicative genres. The participants in dialogue are forcedto arrive at a consensus by themselves, since no judges are availableto propose a solution to their conflict. A final consensus thusconstitutes the aim toward which the d i a l o g ~ e is directed. Thereforeit is necessarily progressive; the participants solve one problem afteranother, establishing agreement first on the premises and rules andthen on the content of their confrontation. By contrast, progression isnot obligatory for the agonistic genre, since the final sentence of thejudge is not necessarily the natural and organic result of a maturingprocess, but rather puts an external and in some sense artificial end tospeech. The partners can maintain their position from beginning toend because the judgment is the duty of a third party. Since they arenot provided with this higher third party, the participants in dialogue(pleading and judging at the same time) are obliged to constitute ajudgment of t h e m s e l v e ~ by finding a consensus that functions as thishigher instance. Actua11 y, the c o n s e n s ~ s is credible only if . thepartners can be sure it was arrived at by a dialogue f ~ e e of coerClon.


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subjects; they even presuppose the dispersal of the members of acommunity (1986, 78), creating their unity by relating them not to acommon origin but to a common future or end of history. Forexample, the na rrative script of enlightenment is that of a continuousprogression toward the emancipatilln of the subject from ignoranceby cognitionj th e Marxist script is that which progresses toward aliberation from alienation and exploitation by the socialization ofwork; and the capitalist script narrates the emancipat ion from povertyby technoscientific developme nt. Yet according to the pragmatics ofnarration, these scripts legitimate the subject to speak in the name ofthe liberty toward which history is striving and to assurne the role ofthe universal subject who e n ~ o m p a s s e s and absorbs aB particularity.The differences between theindividuals in dialogue are transcendedby a collective singular, a process tha t creates the universal subject ofhis tory Analogous to the double position of the narrator of the nove](who, onthe one hand, is himself included in the time of narration asone subject among others but, on the other hand, transcendsnarrative time, anticipating the final point of the story and thusauthorizing himself to speak in the name of all his characters), theparticular individual derives his legitimation to speak in the name ofothers through. the anticipation of the aim of his ory t hat will bl'fngabout a unitarian subject. In both cases dialogue takes place withinthe limits of a virtually collective monologue, and the individualsbecome the inner voices of a universal subject to be realized in thefuture. This universal subject will also encompass the pe rsons who asyet are admitted only as objects of the dialogueand who later willacquire the competence necessary to participate as autonomoussubjects in the course of the formation of universal history. This doesnot at all mean that dialogue is ;11 reality monologic and that it consistsonly of the ' monologue of r eason excluding its Other; itsimplyrelativizes the notions of dialogue and monologue with regard to thelevel an d to the temporal dimension of communication. However, themetanarrative apriori of dialogue, which confers a narrative structureon dialogic communication, is not transcendental in the Kantiansense but historical in the sense of Foucault's notion of discourse(Foucault 1966, 13 H.).The End of the Erao! Metallarratives: Dialogue beyond Narratioll? Since metanarratives of emancipation refer not to the past but to thefuture, they are virtually subject to falsification. And according to

Dialogue in Narratioll

Lyotard, falsification by history has taken place. For hirn all metanarratives are rejected without exception. Like Adorno, he states tha t thespeculative narration was refuted by Auschwitz, the capitalist one bythe economic crises of 1917, 1929, and 1974-79, the Marxist discourseby the bloody crushing of the revolts in Hungary (1959); the GermanDemocratic Republic (1958), Czechoslovakia (1968), and1!oland (1982)(Lyotard 1986, 53). One could add the refutation of thitechnoscien tifie discourse by the increase of pollution and the accident ofChernobyl (1986). The progre ss of scientificand technical knowle dgehas not liberated human beings, but rather has sub.ugated them tothe necessities of technical and economical reason, thus producing afurther alienation instead of liberating mankind. In this situation theuniversal metanarratives of emancipation lose their credibility, a lossthat fundamental1y transforms the pragmatic conditions of the grandnarratives. The subjects of the narration' are n o Ion ger universal butare dispersed among many particular individuals. The fundamentalontological structure of dialogue that was bound to the narrative apriori breaks down. The You a ~ d the I of dialoguebecome particularinstanccs, no longer authorized to speak in the name of theemancipation of mankind. .Yet the delegitimation of the grand narrations destroys theatmosphere surrounding and protecting dialogue. Since there is nomore authority to legitimize the sender and receiver, the presupposedmetalanguage disseminates into a multiplicity of particular autonomous languages. This has theconsequence that an utterancebelonging to one language will be a victim of injustice through itsexposition to another. The sequence of speech acts is 00 longerregulated: the initial contingency of the dialogic relation breaksthrough and also determines the concrete dialogic speech. Thesubjects of communication lose their universal characterand are cutdown to particular voices amqng a multiplicity of others. Sincedialogue is no longer synthesized by a consensus or a commonmetalanguage, no universal pragmatics can dose the gaps openingbetween the utterances. Dialogue no longerfollows narrative scriptsconforming to certain rules: rather, the latter are incorporated intoand made the objects of conversation itself. Thus they empha size oneelement of narration, the event that transforms the structure ofdialogue itself, changing the rules of communication and allowing forthe development of new codes and thus new ideas. In dialoguewithin the framework of the grand narratives, the rules precededcommunication: now theyare induded in it . This is exactly the caseWittgenstein refers to: 11And is there not also the case where we play


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tal tension between language games and the dissemination principleis grounded upon a negative history . The end of this history would bea universal languagc, some Orwellian Newspeak that has becomereal, quite independent of whetherit was achieved by consensus orby coercion. Thus, Lyotard's concept of dialogue as constantlytransgressing and modifying its own rules does not presuppose theabolition of all narrative, but rather assumes their negative transformation. The negativity of the telos changes the temporal form ofdialogic time by emph asizing the c0r:'tingency of Iinguistic events. Butstill narrative remains what it has always been to dialogue in themodem epoch: Hs temporal structure and historical apriori.RefererzcesBakhtin, M.1981. Tht! dialogic i " , t l ~ i " a l i ( l l l : Four essays by M. M. Bakllti", Ed. M.Holquist, trans. C. Emerson and M. Holquist. Austin: University ofTexas Press.Benjamin, W. 1977. 1IlIwlillatiotu:,,: Ausgewahlte Schriften. Frankfurt: Suhr

kamp.Buber, M. 1984. OIlS diulogiscllt' Pri1lzil'. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgemeinschaft. .Derrida, J. 1967. Oe la grammatoJogit'. Collection Critique. Paris: Minuit.---. 1972. La dissbtlillatioll. Collection Tel Quel. Paris: Seuil.--. 977. Limited, Inc. In GIY/)Ir, 2:162-254. Baltimore: Johns HopkinsUniversity Press.Diderot, D. 1972. Jacqut'S le fillalis/t' cl s,'" maUr,'. Paris: Librairie General e Fran

~ a i s e . Eagleton, T. 1983. Literary tJrt'ory: Au iutroductiotl. Oxford: Blackwell. Ehre, M. 1984. M. M. Bakhtin: The dialogic imagination. Poetics Today 5:1:172-77.Foucault, M. 1966. US mots et les dlOses. Paris: Gallimard.---. 1974. ScJrriftt!tI :ur Liftratur. Munieh: Nymphenburger Verlagshand

lung.Cadamer, H. 1960. Wahrheit tutti lvkthodt': Grtrdzuge ei1ler I,Jlilosoplrisdle1lHermcueutik. 4th cd. T b i n ~ e h : Mohr.Genette, G. 1972. Figures IIl. Paris: Seuil.Habermas, J. 1971. Vorbcreitendl' Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der

kommunikativen Kompetenz. In Theorie der Gesellschaft oder S01.ialtecJ, nologie- Was leistt't Jit' S.I/stemrorsc}luug, ed. J. Habermas and N.Luhman. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.Jakobson, R. 1979. Linguistik un d Poetik. In Pot'lik: Ausgewlllte Aufstu,1921-1971, ed. E. Holenstein and T. Schelbert, B2-121. Frankiurt:Suhrkamp. Origindlly published 1960.Jauss, H. 1975. Literaturgeschichte ab Provokation dcr literaturwissenschaft.In Reuptiuus,'sthdik, ed. R. Warning. Munich: Fink.

Dialogue i" Narratioll

Kloepfer, R. 1980. Dynamic structures in narrative literature: The dialogicprinciple. P"t'lics Tvdtl.'/ 1:115,-34.. "

__ . 1982. G r u n d l a ~ e n des dialogischen Pnnzlps in de r Literatur. InDialogizitt, ed. R. Lachmann. 85-106.Levinas, E: 1979. Le temps t't l'alllre. Paris: Quadrige. ~ ~ . " , . .'Lyotard, J. 1979. La comiition postmoderne: Rapport sur savo,!r. Pans: MmUlt.

__ . 1986. Le postmodeme explique dUX eufauts: Corresporidance, 1982-1985.Paris: Galilee.Mukarovsky, J. 1977. Two studies of dialogue. In The W?rd and t'erbal art:Sekcted ESSllro/s, trans. and ed. J. Burbank and P. Stemer. 65-80. NewHaven: Y a l ~ University Press. Originally published 1940.

Plato. 1961. Wake. Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider.Ricoeur,P. 1983. Tt'mps el rkit. Vol. 1. Paris; Seuil.Saussure, F. deo 1979. Cours de l i u ~ u i s t i t , u e generale. Ed. Tuillio de Mauro.

Paris: Payot. .Sterne, L. 1967. rl,e life atrJ opilliotls of Tristranr Slratldy, gentleman. Mlddlesex:Penguin. Originally published 1760. '.. . .Todorov, T. 1984. MikJUlii BakJrtitr: The dralogrcal prmClple. Trans. WladGodzich. Minnea'polis: University of Minnesota Press.Wittgenstein, L. 1958. PlrilosopJrical itrt'estigations. Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe.New York:" Macmillan.


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Dialogue in Narration(the Narrative Principle)

Jochen, MeckeWriting. when properly managed.


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c1usely link ....d in a wi d .... r a n ~ l ' o( rdlltlons. The purpose uf lhis c1mpteris tu analyze sl'veral dimensiolls u( thl'ir intt'rrelation. Th e first secliunexamines the virtu"lIy di.llugic lilialily ur narrative; in thesecundseclion I disClISS fhe narr.llive struchln' of di.lloguc; the third sectilliluUllines smnl' dl.lngl's inll", disCtmrsl' on narration "n d c.li"tngul' lhathave lllkl'n pl.Kl' "'(,Pl l t l r,

TIze Dilliogic Slrllclure Of Narrnl;ollDiaJugue t h r u l l ~ h N.trfillionIt is perhaps wurth asking whelher the reader is reaJly condemned tuIhe passive roje sketched uutabovt.', In reaJity he has the uppurtunity ..tointervene in literary communkalioll in various ways. He ma ycommunicate hi s npiniun uf thl' work lu the illithnr an d illflu('ncc..' thelatters writing by means u( this nitilJul. If we consider th e econornicdimension uf th .... lillrary institutiun as a p.1rt uf its communkativesituation, lhal is, as a dim(,llsion o( lhe semiulic system wilhin whichit functiol1s, ahen lh e success ur f.lilllrc..' uf onl' bonk mighl innuel1cethe l'ompusitiol1 of th e l1ex1. Furthermore, th l re"der's l ' ( ) l 1 l r o ~ d O t ' s not apply unly tu thl' cuml1lunic.'live sp.we hl'lween olle novl'l an dthe ensuing une, but can also innuence the aelual compositiun of abook. Prt'publicatinn of variuus ch"plers in newspapers or literaryreviews, which happens so Ufll'll in lhl' era of mass media, give thereader occasiun tn mudify lh e compusition of a nuvel and thus toassume the rule uf an actiVl' counll'rpart. rinaJly, the possibililies offeedback lhat ar e at th e dispns'll of Ihe Ust'rs of nt'w media (e.g., lh eeJectronic novels) levl'l most uf th e diHl'rcnces in the degree o( a(liveparticipatinn ui aulhor an d n'.ldl'r; llwst" pllssibilities will probablydeeply transfurm, i( not ddinitdy dissulve, nu r lJolions ul" theauthor/reader rles more e'fl'clivcly than ilil Foucauldian crilicismever could do (cf. roucault 1974, 17 rf.) Wl' can also resort to literaryhistory to find examples ur dialogkaI narration: th e most famuus (aseof an author's including hi s readers directly in lhe writing prucess isprobably Charlt's Dkkells, WhOSl' Ilnvels were prepuhlisht'd byinstaUments in lh e feuilll'lons o( important newspapt'rs. This gaveoccasion for Dickens to invert rules an d tu hecome in the pubs ufLondon th e attentive listener of his rt'aJers; they explained tn hirnho w they imagined th e continuation of the story and what theythought about its characters an d compusilion. These "grea t !xpecta.lions" or th e public m.lde it possible to cnntin\le th e dialngue thuslw"lIn \\'ilhi" Ilw n.I\'I1 il ... t1f TI", rl'.,d.'r ... look p;ut in thC" enmpn ...i

..D ; a / ( ) ~ l l e ill Nt",,,tio,, 197 t 1

tion of the work, an d thl' author conceived his actual writing partly asan answer tu thcir requests ilnd anticipations. By such a procedurereaders' reactions are systematically in corporated into. th e signifyingprocess ilself, an d lhe author can use them as i! basis for furtherdevelopment. He may (ulfill readers' h o p e s ~ o ; ~ g i s a p p o i n t lhernironkally allli IIms inili"le a pleasant, stimulating game withthem.In his thenry u( h ....rl1lelleutics Gadamer shows that this di.tlog ical element ofliterary communication is not acddental to understanding. 5ince the rneaning an d sense contained in a_ work exceedthe intentions of the author (Gadamer 1960, 354)-an assumptionshared by both deconstruction an d hermeneutics-and since noreconstruclion of the question to which the work is an answercoincides with Jater reconstructions, since the tw o are separated, bylhe necessary pr!judice given by their respective horizons of sense(1960, 282), understanding means more than mere reaJization of theaulhur's intentions. Heading ,operates in a never-ending diaJuguebelween past an d present, the actual understanding consisting of afusion between the horizon of ou r ow n historical sense and the one inwhich the work is plac('d (1960, 2R9).

llowl'vl'r, Oll ( ! is indined to uhjt'ct, all these exarnples are nutvillic..l illustrations for the dialogical nature of narration itself, sincethey only elucidate th e fact that narration might be inc1uded in adialogue belween past author an d present reader. They are farremoved from showing the dialogic fundamentals of narration itseJe.In other words, the exampJes given confirm that narration canengt'nder a diaJugue E."xternal to itself, but not at aJl that narrationilself functions as a dialogue. Th e remarks made above deal only withthe work as an ubject of a dialogue between author and reader, butnut wilh th(' nuvel itself as a semiotic system realizing dialogue withinits huund.uies. UntiJ 1l0W nuthing has been advanced t.o suspend thestrict opposition between d.ialogue an d narration within the workitself. 50 (ar I have shown only an alternation of the rofes betweenauthor an d reader, which occurs not within the confines of the texthu t outside them, on a level of cornrnunication that transcends th ework in lluestion.

Nllrralioll IlS Dilliogu/!Mu karovsky's Definition of DialogueIt was lhe Russian semiotician Mikhail Bakhtin an d the structuralistlim M l 1 k i 1 r o v ~ k v wh n ( I I r n i c : : h p ~ th p h!\c:1C fn .. sr . ..........1....... ,..1 , L ~


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I

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200 I . i t l ~ r a r y Experiments wHh Oialogue

an d C.ln n l l l ~ l ' l l l l l ' J H l y Stllisfy, I r u ~ t r a t l ' l just play with thoseexpecll.Hlcies to tlw l'xtent tiMt thl' narr.dee finally l''Il'comes anclutonollltlllS "vuin' , " ilu:.,rn,lting .1 Lerlain cunn'plion ui the world.lltogelher different from tiMt of thl' narr.ltor. Thoughconfretc realrCclJers is ahst'nt, tlwir Iltlrr.ltive. vniee is present in thc Jialogue ufwriling. If tlw dislinclivt' mark of ( l i a l o ~ i c cunvl'rs,1tion is abovl' ,,1/lh e inkrpt'lll'trdlion 01 dillt'n'lIl ('OIll't'plioIlS uf IIw world, thPIl t1u.'tl'llsion hl't\vl't'n lwo nmtl'xtllfl'S will slIHiet, lur tlu . reclJizdtion 01'dicllugue. Instt'cld of .1 slrict Sc"paralion between monologue an ddiCJlogUl', we h.1VC .1 !'lc"I" o( sc"vt'r.ll d l ' ~ r c t ' S of dialngul' accordingtu thc rddtivl' dumin.l/\l"c ()f tlw two cunlcxtures.Uakhtin's Conn'pt o( Di.llogism in the NovclIn dist.lgrcenlt'nt with wh,\l Sl'l'nlS lu OC the commonsense opinion,Uclkhtin d.lims that tht, novl'l is the di.llogic genre p.u e x c e H ~ n c e an dtiMt novclizillion subvl'rts llll kinds 01 .monologic speech. SinceJilerature cnnsists of a discoursl' that represents anolher discourse, itoficrs a gl:'nuin c Ofc.lsion (ur dicllogUl" In the novel even the sm,lllestl'ntity uf diM'ours(', tlw ...ingl" word, is not as h0ll10gl'l1l'OllS as ilSl:'t..'IIl!'J. In tlll' sl,lrdllir.hl "I U.I"-hlin's IIwllry 01' ditllogisllI il h . ~ ' c o m l ' s dbsL'min.ltl.J. .

Thl' rl',lson fur this virlu'll tlissl'mination belongs tu tJw verystructure of Icillguage ,lnd clllllnllillication: thl' identity uf cm lItterance(its bl'ing prt'sl'nl to itsl'lf) ,llrt'"dy has lhe structure uf diffl1rentiation,becausc the nmslitutioll uf linguistie uttL'rances presupposcs thciriterability, which givt..'s p l ~ r r e to dl'viations uf sellse. 1 - l e n C ( . ~ the semiotie mark grounds in the rcmark (Derrida 19771 186). The sameness ofan utterllilce ....onstqulnlly is gUclrilnteed no t by the permanence of asense but by a "nunprl:'Seflt rt'mainder" (n'sttllln' mm l'"h:it.'IltcJ thatsubverts aB "hsolult> prt'Sl'nce (p. 191). Sinn) the reiteration presumesby virtue of a genuinl:' tt'mporaJ ga p th e possibiJity of the absence ufinitial intcntiolls anel meanings, alternation uf sense is alreadyinherent in l.lnguage tlll' nl'Cl:'SSary condition fur ils funclioning.Every mark is divided (1I1 of l , l n ~ l I . l ~ l ' , and since no word can be dost'li It)ulht..'r lISi.lgtS, every wonl h.IS dlre.ldy served fur other subll'lots .md bdCl'ply m.Hked by lhis previous lIs,tge. Uy virluc of its o p c n n l ~ ~ . cvery word necessarily estabJishes a relation not only with thc ob jects but also with other individuals wh o used it before an d will lIseit I,ller.

Bakhtin's concept of dialogism brings tu the fore that d i l l l o ~ u e contains a temporal kerne!, which unfolds under appropriate conditions. Of course every word, simply by virtue of it s diacritic nature.by drawing its meaning from its relation lo other words (Saussurc1979, 166), already carries the marks of these others. Narration,however, owing to its temporal dimension, is especiaJly appropri.ltefo r the development of this dialogicality. Particularly the noveI, withits syntagmatic dimension, is able to unfold the story ot the dilferentuses of utlerances made by different subjects an d thereby to set oif .1tension between different conceptions of the world. In the cuurse ota novcJ words acquire thcir ow n history an d assume thl' mark!'t ofdifferent users, with whom they rnaintain a elose relation.

On e is immediately indined to object that the pulyphlmicstructure of the noveIistic word, which aJlows the hero an d theimpJicit reader to become autonomous entities of narrative discourse,is only superficial, beeause it will always be basically hierarchie andtherefore rnonologic. ActualJy, it is to the author that the wordsbdong: he pronounccs them with the voices oE the uthers; he is the
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202 203f . i h . ' r ~ l r y Explrimlnts wilh Didlogue

on e wh o controls.md lll.mipul.lllS ttwlll in nmformity to his .ownintentions. Jn parody dtut irony, ior inst.lncl, the narrlltor uses theulleranl'cs of ulhl'rs fur thl' purpose of unmasking ,md ridiculingthein, thus manife!'lting his slIpl'riority. Bdkhtin introduces ,lnothermudality o( polyphony, OfW in which the voke of the Otherreprl'sented by ttw d i s r o l l r ~ t ' oi tlw St'l( is al'liVl' an d domin.lhli llw,m thor' s d bc.:oUr!'ll'. In Ihl' IIlUd,llilil'!-I IIwntitHll'J ilbllVl' I.lll ' ,111 thoruses the discourse uf lhe Othl'r to l'Xpfl'SS his own orientations. In thefourth type, whic.:h H.lkhtin duistens "poll-mie," the Other's discuurse rernains outside thlll ui tlll' ,Ulthor emd is thus promotl'd to lheJdller's independ('1I1 dutOIlOIl\OUS counll'rp.lrl, ,lcting upon it mutdetermining it (ToJorov 1lJX.j, 71). Thc degree of tht.> presl'nce an ddominance of on e uf lhe voices is v,uiable: the hero's or the reader'svoice, ideologkaJ system, cOIKt:'plion of the world, may obtain such apredominance tl\clt the narratnr's VUkl' vanishes and luses controlover the making uf the novel. This happlns, for instance, in 'fhe Li/eami 0l'li


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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 205(J.j I.ill'r.lry Experinwnts with Di.llogueintention. Tlw VOicl'S 01 his dl.lr.lch'l"s .1W thus cunsiJl'reJ to beobjects uf his m . H 1 i p l J J ~ l i o n , .lIld tlll'n'by writing is Sl.'l'n oS Llmonologue, ur lll'!'tt .IS d di.llugllt.' in which Ol1l ' SUbjl'ct m.lsh.'rs theothers. H thc ~ u l h o r Ilhlllipul.lll's his Cl'ccltiuns, Wl' must no t forgctthat the " u bjcl'IS" 01' Ihis I1hllliplll.llion Wl'H.' UlKe counterparts inJ i a l o ~ u L ' with tlu.' ..1ullwr. Th\. :-ulllll' ,ul;lIl1H.'nt is valid with reSpl'l't tothe ~ u t h o r hilH!"Il'It. b it pl.'rtml.'ul Iu St'Y 111.11 tl w ~ l I l h o r .11 Ihe l'"lI urthc narratinn m ~ n i p u l ~ t c s tlw iUllhor .It Ihe bl.'ginning only becausethe first has attained thefin.ll point 01 ni.trrative? Surely in a c10sedsystem {)f narration thl.' final vuiee uf tlw ni.lrrator has the last word,bu t Ihis is not tlw t ' ~ S l ' during Ihe ",'I ul n',lding .md writing. Thus lltl'monologic charaeter ur Iill.'ri.lturl.' appl'drs only wlwn une inverts theperspective uf writillg an d reading .\nd looks back on the work; to duthis, un e m u ~ t t.lke aw.1Y thl' tlmpur.11 element essential to it- theaesthetic prucess hy whieh it W.lS eonstituted. This kind uf backwardprophecy pruvides a dislortl'd visiun ur narrdliun. Thc circularity ufthe arguOlt-nt is ohviulIs. Thl' l:'onerl'lc author is supposed tomanipulate the dialoguc with his herol's ~ l n J readers: however, lhis isimpossible i n ~ o f d r as he h i U l ~ l ' I r is bounJ tu the finaltempur.\1 slale ofhis wriling.

The assumptiull lllt.l lill'r.lllIH' IIwnologil'tll discoursl' .lI'iSlfSunly on the grounds 01 lhl.' idl'i.llislic prl'mise tlMt the ,luthur l'xisls .\San enlity t h ~ t rt.'lll.tins unch.tngl'd by tlw didlogietlJ an d materialprocl."ss uf writing. In rl',llily, 1l1lH.ltion suppurls C"d.llller's l.'l.lim urthe " c u n v l ' r s ~ t i o l l th,tl Wl.' .lre" in " spel'i,1I W.1Y (ur the conereteauthor: he is the eOl1vl'rstllion retllil.l'd by his work, as it appears in ilsfinal ~ t a t e . J le is- sn tu sJle&lk- the hdrmollY or disharmony of thevoices uf the narrator, ut thl' implicit rl'i.lJer, an d of the here). Thesamt- is also v"liJ (or Ihe fl'.lder, who, in Ji,tlugie narration , becmnesa true coauthor.

In summary, I h ~ V l ' "rgul'd th,lt nilrrdtioll hi.1S a virtually dialugicstructurt- that is l'SSl'ntial lu it. dnd tiMt this stl."IllS from the filet thatboth I1Jrrdtion ~ I l d J ittlogue "re grounded in a specific strUl'ture oftime.

Tht.' Telll/Joral DilllL'IISioll of Na ,-ralh", tlml Dialog ueTh e OntulugicaJ an d Anthropologie.ll FUUlldatiunuf the Oialugic 1{c1atioll in Tl'mpor.llityThe similarity hl'hvl'l'll n.lrrlllion M1U dialogue is fuunded upon theirCll l l lmnn hmpor.ll ch.lr,hh'r, .1 tl'"llIn' Ih.ll distingllishes tlll'1ll Irnm

the epistl'mic attitude. According to Emmanuel Levinas, the dialogicrelation exdudes representatiun an d presence o( the Other. Incontrast tu knowll'dge tiMt n'gJrds the Olher as an object, which is"present" and "at hand," the dialogic r t : l ~ \ t i o n dues n o t - . r ~ d u ( e thl!partner to presence or cupresencl!. The Other trAPscends therepresenti.ltiun u( the subjel:'t-object-rel.ltion an d ,ann,Qt be m.ldepl'esl'lIt. Time l'Orl'l'sponds to .1 I'el,lliun I.h.lt dOl'S nu r exduUl' tlwotherness of the Other, that guarantees the nonindifference of thisrelation to the thinking mind (Levinas 1979, 9). Between "You" an d'T ' there is no coincidence in synchrony bu t only the diachrony uf afundamL'nllll dHfl'renee; henee timl' me.lns the e v e r l ~ s t i n g relation utnoncorrespondence to the Other (1979, 10).

However Levinas's ontological ioundation of the dialogic relation inHme confronts the philosophy of dialogue with two problems:first, as merely negative definitions, nonpresence and the negation o(representation are perhaps no t sulficient conditions (or the constitution of time; second (and this is dosely linked to the first), theontological analysis has to darify wh y we need the dimension of timeat aJl, beCi.lUSe heteroglossia alulle might aJready serve as theontologieal foundiltiun oi di'llogue.

The Ill'n'ssity uf il Ill"gi.ltivl' Jl'finitioll ur time by nunpreSl'llL'l'stl'lllS from the ontological status uf time itself, because it resistsmetaphysics of presence that is firmly anchored in Western culturean d langlhlf,e. The only positive statement that can be made abouttime is that it "temporalizes," that it engenders its ow n forms incontact with Western metaphysicaJ presuppositions and reducesthem to substance and essence. The pure negativity of time withregard to these logocentric assumptions compels it to hyposfatizeitsdf: time is already and at onee Hs difference, Hs substantifiedOther. Th e basic negativity of temporality expresses itself by differentpositive figurations or forms of time. Thus the impossibiHty of apositive definition oi time on the ontological level is intrinsictotemporality. For the sake uf terminological transparency a distinctinncan be made between the general principle of temporality an d thl."different specific forms uf timt' it produees.

If there were only the noncorrespondence between the land theOther (Illere heteroglossiil), a b,lSic condition of dialogue woulJ notbe fulfilled: an element would be lacking in which this diff-:rencecould be artieulated. However, since every identity that serves as abasis for the articulation of the ontological diHerence would reduceotherness to sameness, there "emains only an element whose identityconsists predscly b}', in , and through differcnce itself. As temporality
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206 207ill'rary Experiments wHh Dialoguc

eneompasses mere untologieal ditfen..ncf! without reducing it to a finalidtmtity but unrolds the differt'un' lwtween the land the Other, timeeonstitutes the dimt..nsion in whi ....h the dialogic relation ean evolve.

Th e o n t o l o g i c ~ 1 rOlindatiull or dialogue in time is eonfirmed bythe anthrnpolugical ilnalysis or thl' nmstitution of identity. Identitycann"t bc rC&llized in Il kind ur Munctlausen act in which on eextrjcates olll'sclf rrom 'l w 11l0r.IS!'t hy pullil1g Ol l olle's ow n Ihair. Th eprocess uf self-identific.. tion c.m he dused unly in relation to others:Being, abstraeted from the relation binding it to the Other, isineoneeivabJe. Aecording to BClkhtin, we ean neither eoneeive norpcreeive u u r s d v l ' ~ as a unity WitllOut rcfcrring to something thattranscends an d encompasses us. "I achieve self-conseiousness, Ibecome myself only by revcaling myself to another, through anotheran d with another's help. Thc most important aets, constitutive ofsclf-consciousness, are determined by their relation to anotherconsciousness. . . . must find myself in the other, finding the otherin me (Todorov 19H4, 96). Just as the body is initially formed in thewomb of the muttwr, so human consciuusness awakens surroundedby the consciousn\!ss uf others (p. Y6). Murcover, the I hides in th eOther ,m d in otlwrs: il Wemls to ht' hut anollll'r for otlwrs, to f . llypellelratl' lh e wurld 01 oltll'rs i:lS .HlOllll'r. 0'.

Despite this congruellfl' helwl'l'll narr lion anti di.llogue, consisting of their eommon foundatiun in time, there secms to be afundamental difference: the dialogic mode of time is contingent,while the time of the story is t c l c ( ) I ( ) ~ i . c a l , becausc it is founded onourpreconception uf actiun. Although both are rooted in time, dialoguean d narration seem to be incompatible, especially because of th edifferent modes that time espuuses in them. Perhaps lhe analysis ofdialogue in the I i ~ h t uf Buber's philosophy of time may help to makec1ear the relll slrueture ur d i ~ l I o ~ i c timl. Buber differentiates twofundamental attitudes 01' m .. n tow.trJ the world. Th c rcldtion fromthe J to H as a rl'lalilHl of suhje .... t to llbjeet is only on e h u m ~ n possibiJity, which cxbts in addition tu the encounter of the land theYou. In contrast to the It, the You Cilnnut be fixed by notions or serveas means tu our ends (Buber lYlH, In tf.). The encounter with the You .transcends the subjeet-objeet r c l ~ l l i o l \ . Nl'vertheless, the You mustbecome an It whcn dialogic cummunication is not actually realized orfinished. This is, for inst.1llCe, th4! CdSe in nll'lllory, where the You isperceived dS an objel't an d thercby transiormed into an 1t (Buber 19H4,37). One might object that this reifkation of the Other at the end of adialogic relation must not at ,,11 l'onfer a narrative structure on dialugic

Dialogllf! i" Narm/iOtI

temporality, because the end itself might occur as a mere c o n t i ~ gency. D i a l o ~ i c time thus would stiU lack any of the orgamedevelopments charaeteristic of traditional narration. J? resolve theapparent incompatibility between the s p e e ~ f i c t i m e s ~ ~ o f narration an dof the dialogic relation, we have to examme ho.w fh,..e fundamentalcontingency r e s u l t i n ~ from the relation between t h e ~ an d the Otheris tnmsfurmed intu the n,urative time of euncreie d i a l o g u ~ . From Dialogic Relation to Dialogue: Narrativization of DialogicTemporality by the Pragmatic Rules of Dialogic SpeechT h ~ n a r r a t i v ~ transformation of the eontingency of the relationbetween the You and the I is du e to the pragmatic rules of dialoguetaken as a specific form of speech, as established by Plato. In theGorgias, Socrates reminds Polos that the dialogic ~ e ~ r e an d its .rulesar e quite different from the rules of lhe agomstics of sentencescomposed for validity before a tribunal an d in dialectics (Gorgias471e-472c). In dialogue, only the opinions of the two participants arerelevant, an d the aim of their conversation is their assent alone(475d). In contrast tnthe participants of the aso", those of dialogue areWitlWSSl 'S ,md j U d ~ l ' S .tt OIll 'l ' (Rt',ml1Iic J4Hh). The simultaneul1saccoillplishmcnt uf the two roles naturally requires a higher c o m m ~ ~ nkative competcnce, a condition that some participants do not fulflll(cf. SOIJJJisl 346c; Laws 893a- b). lt s specific pragmatic rules confer ateleological structure on dialogue, which places it in opposition toother eommunicative genres. The participants in dialogue are forcedto arrive at a consensus by themselves, since no judges are availableto propose a solution to their conmct. A final consensus thusconstitutes the aim toward which the dialogue is directed. Thereforeit is necessarily progressive; the participants solve one problem aiteranother, establishing agreement first on the premises an d rules an dthen on the content of their confrontation. By contrast, progression isno t obligatory for the agonistic genre, since the final sentence of thejudge is no t necessarily the natural an d organic result ~ a t u r i n ~ process, but rather puts an external an d in some sense artiflClal end tospeech. The partners can maintain their position from beginningtoen d because the judgment is the duty of a third party. Since they arenot provided wilh this higher third party, the participants in dialogue(pJeading an d judging at the same time) are obliged to constitute djudgment of themselvcs by !inding a consensus that functionsas thishigher instance. Actually, the consensus is credible on]y if thepartners can be sure it wasarrived at by a dialogue free of coercion.


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20M Litt.r"ry Expl'rimenls w i l h D i a l o ~ u e

Thus di.llogul preSlipposCS, .lS IldLwnnas dl'darcs in his thcory of(ommuniG.llivl' compl'll'ncl', .111 idl'al spl'l'ch situation with thl'following fl'.llufl'S: (1) systlm.ltic .md l'LJual distribution uf theopportunity lu seIL'cl anti perform spel'ch (lets; (2) exchange of thed i a l o ~ i c rules uf Spl'llker an d hC&lrl'r; (3) l'qual distribution of choosing( , ~ o m n l l H l i r ~ l t i v l ' , n'gul.lliVt', n'pn'spnl,llivl', i lml stativt.' spl..ch acts;(4) Th e pussibility 01 p l i l l i n ~ in ql1l'slion (\11 possible norms i.lIHtopiniuns; (5) presupposilion 01 good iaith uf lhe partners (Hi.lbermas197141, 136-39).Tht.'Sl' t.'onditions , ln' Ilt'Vl'r flllly rt..llizl'd, hut rwvl'rtlwl ..,ss tlu.'possibility uf tlu..ir rl.lliz.llioll is lhl'


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210 211ih'r.lry Experiments with Dialugue- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ .subjects; they eVl'n presuppose tlw dispersal of the members of acommunity (19Kh, 7K), Cfealing thcir unity by rclating them not to acommon urigin bUl to a common Iltlure ur end of history. Porcxample, thc narr.llive saipt o( enlightenmcnt is that of i.l continuousprogression tow.lrd lhe c..nMncipatiun ur lhe subject Irom ignoranceby l"llgnitiun; thl' M,trxist scripl is thal which progresses tuward aIiher&1tion frum ,IIWI1.lllon .md ,'xpltlll.,tion hy t1w sOl'i.lli/ llion ofwurk; an d the l"dpit.llist ~ a i p t n.lrr,lll'S the el1hmcipdtion (rom povertyby technoscientifif Jevdupmellt. Yl' l accorJing tu the pragmatics ofn.lrration, these scripls Icgitim.llc ttll' subjcct to speak in the name ofthe liberty toward whirh hislory is slriving an d lu assume lhe roll' ofthe universal suhject wh o encompasses and absorbs all particlilarity.The Jifferences between the individuals in dialugue are transcendedby a colleclive singul.lr , a proCl'ss that creates the universal subject ofhistory . Analogous tn the double position of the narrator of the novel(who, on tht' on e IMnd, is himseH indudcd in the time of narration ason e subjt."ct among uthers but, on the uther hand, transcendsnarrative timt', anticipating the final point of the story and lhusauthurizing himsdr to speak in tlw ...une or alt his characters), thep.lflicular individ'ItlI dt'rivl's his Jtgitinl.ltion tu stll'ak in llll' n.un l' 01'u t h ~ r ~ lhrough llw .snli .:ipi.llion uf llw .dul uf hislory ltMt will hriftgabuut a unit.uian subjecl. In bolh G1SCS d i . l l u ~ l I e takes place wilhinl h ~ limits of a virlually c u l 1 e c t i v ~ monologue, and lhe individualsbl.'come the innt'r voicl's of cl univl'rs,ll suhj(\ct tu be realized in thefuture. This univl.'rscll subjl.'ct will .ll so l.'nc ompass lhe persons whu asyet are admillt'J only .lS ohjects 01 the dialogue an d wh o taler willacquire the compl'tence necess.uy tu participate as autonomoussubjecls in the course of the formatiun oi universal history. This doesnot 61t aU mean lhat Jidloglle is j" rt'llIity monologic an d that it consistsonly of the monologue uf n'ason l'xcluding its Other; it simplyrelativizes the notions uf dialoguc and monolngue with regard to thelevel an d to the tempr,,1 dimension o( communication. However, themetanarrativl.' apriori of dialogue, which confers a narrative structureon dialogic communircstion, is not t m n ~ c e n d e n t a l in the Kantiansense but historieal in the sense uf Foucault's notion of discourse(Foucault 19h6, 13 fL).

'fhe E"d of the Era Of Mt'tlllwrraljpt's:DiaJogue beyond Narrtioll?Since metanarratives of emancipation rder not to the past bu t to thefuture, they art' virtu4llly subjt'ct to (.llsifk.ltinn. And according to

.Lyotard, falsification by history has taken place. For hi m all metanarratives are rejected without exception. Like Adorno, he states that thespeculative narration was refuted by Auschwitz, the capital.ist one bythe economic crises of 1917, 1929, and 1974-79, the Marxjstdiscourseby the bluody crushing of the revolts in Hungary ( 1 9 5 6 ~ t h e GermanDemocratic Republic (1958), Czechoslovakia (1968), and l?eland (1982)(Lyot rd l'JH6, 5J). Olll' l'ulIld ,.dd lhe rdul.,tinn 01 the 1l'dlllusdl'ntific discourse by the increase of pollution and the accident oiChernobyl (IY86).The progress oJ scientific an d technical knowledge'has not liberated human beings, but rather has subjugated them tuthe necessities of technicill an d economical reason, thus producing afurther alienation instead of liberating mankind. In this situation theuniversal metanarratives of emancipation lose their credibility, a lssthat fundamentalJy transforms the pragmatic conditions of the grandnarratives. The subjects of the narration are no longer univerSell butare dispersed among many particular individuals. The fundamenteliontological structure of dialogue that was bound to the narrative apriori breaks down. The You an d the I of dialogue become particularinstances, no Junger authorized tu speak in the name ot the('mcuu.:ipation of mllnkind.

Yc..'l lhe dcll'HitiUli.llioll of lhl' grdnd Ili.urdtiuns dcstruys lheatmosphere surruunding an d prutecling dialogue. Since there is nomore authority to legitimize the sender and receiver, the presupposedmetalanguage disseminates into a multiplicity oE particular autonomous languagcs. This has the consequence that an utterancebelonging to one language wiJI be a victim of injustice through itsexposition to another. Th e sequence of speech acts is no longerregulated: the initial contingency of the dialogie relation breaksthrough an d also determines the concrete dialogic speech. Thesubjects of communication lose their universal character an d are cutdown tu particular voices among a multiplicity of others. 5 i n n ~ dialogue is no longer synthesized by a consensus or a commonmetalanguage, no universal pragmatics can dose the gaps openingbetween the utterances. Dialogue no longer follows narrative scriptsconforming to certain rules: rather, the laUer are incorporated intoan d made the objects of conversation itself. Thus they emphasize oneelement of narration, the t"'Vt"Plt that transforms the structure ofdialogue itself, changing the rules of communication an d allowing forthe development of ne w codes an d thus new ideas. In dialoguewithin the framework of the grand narratives, the rules precededcommunication: no w they are included in it. This is exactly the caseWittgenstein refers to: 11 An d is there not also the case where we play
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213_ __ _______ LiIL' ...lry Experiments with Dialogue)_12 ________ilnd m.IKL' IIp Ilw rull's as Wl' go .dung? An d llwre is evell onL' wlll'rewt. dlll'r tht.'1ll .I!'t \"l' gu '1Iong" (J lJ5H, ]9). In lhis case narmlion is notItll ' ., priori fr'lIlll'wurk ur di.lluglll'; il dOLos not l 'ncomp.lssit as ap r o g n ~ s i ( ) 1 l tow.m.l .1 nt.'vlr-flilfilll'd idl.ll but r"llwr is indudl'd indi ..lloglll itsl,11. TIll.' n,l.llilm hl'l\vl'L'n di.llogUl ,lnd Ili:Hriltion ch.lracl t . ' r i ~ t i c ur llIodpmilV ~ l ' P I l l S 10 ht' I'l'\'l'rsl'd: di.,luglll' is not Illgitilllall'dhy nolrr.lliun; r.IIIH'I', "01 .....llioll 1.11-."", pl,u'l' in ., 1II "dolllH'lIlo.1 1lU'loldi"IUgLJL' or 1lll'1.lpolylogllL' 01 dilll'rl'nl 1.1Ilgu.lges UMt motiv ..llL' il.Lilerlltu rl' IhiS vl'ry ottcn tril'cJ to eSI.,hlish dialoglil' hy Cfe.lting newcodL's tllld nl'W 1.1IlgU.lgl'S. Tl w nl'W 1.lIlguagl's l'ould corllJll'lls.lh .' to rthl' wrong dl .IW lu illl individlldl by tlw rllll' 01'.1 singll', monologicdiscoursl' bl'l"lllSl' IIll'Y proJUfl' nl'W mOVl'S, rn'll' nl'W 1,1Ilgllagesthat


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214 215Literary Experiments with Dialogue

tal hmsion bdwc..'c..'u lom).;lIol).;l' ).;.lml'S an d the dissemination principleis gruunc..led UPOll ., nl'g.ltivl hislory. Tlw en d of this history wouldbea uniVl'rSoll l.ln).;lI.\).;,!, ~ o m e Orwl,lIiom Newspeak that has becomereal, quite indl'pl'nc..ll'nt oi wlll 'tlwr il W,lS achieved by consensus orby l 'oerdun. Thus, I.yot.lrd's nHlCl'pl uf dialogue as constantlytrans).;rt:ssin).; ,m d mudilyill).; ils ow n rull's dol's not prl'SUppOSl' tlw.lbulition 01 .. 11 .hlrr.llivl', hu t .... tlwr clSSlIlIles tlwir Ill.,).;.ttivl' transformatiun. Thc neg.ttivity of lhe klos changes the temporal form ofditllogic time by l 'mphasizing lhe contingency of linguistic evenls. Butstill narrativl ' rcmains wh.ll it has i\Jways been to dialoguc in th emodl'rn l 'poch: its tc..omporotl slruc..'lun . an d historieal aprior i .Refert'IIces a ~ h t i n , M. IYHI. '1'11,' d;,II"S;" imll"':;'IIII;,,,,: I'CUtr t'SSlIIjS '/11 M. M. lJdkl,'ill, Ed. M.I tu1'luist, tr.lns. C. Ell\l'rSOn und M. I l u l l . . l ~ i s t . Austin: University of

Tex .. !> Press.l ~ n j a m i n , W. 1'177. IIImui,lIIlillll,'U: AIISSt"i,,"IrJt(' SeI,,;/tl''', Frankfurt: SuhrIwmp.Buber, M. 19K4. n, sd i I l I I l S i ~ d h I ' " , , - : . i l D,mnsl.ldl: Wisst.'nsrh.lfllidll' Ihll'llgel J l l ' i n ~ d " l r l . /Dcrrid.a, J. I'Jf,7. I),' 1., gr"""'lIll"/o"",', ('ulh'dhm ('riti'lul'. !'..ris: Mim;it.- - - . 1972. l,u ,/bSt'mi"d/iml. ColIl'l'liun Td Qud. PMis: Scuil.---. 1977. l.imih..'c..I, Inc..'. In G1"'1"1 , 2:162-254. Baltimore: Juhns llopkinsUniv,..'rsily Press.Dic..lerot, D. Il)72./Ilt'II'Il'S '" Jilll'IiSIL'l'1 Si/" IIIII;'r('. Pouis: Librai ric Gcrll!rllie Fran\,aise.Eagleton, T. lYH3. Lilaar" '''''lIr,,: /I " i,,'rotluclioll. Oxford: Blackwell.Ehre, M. 1984. M. M,' ndkht'in: lhc..' Jialogic imagination. p,lt'/ics rtlday

5:1:172-77.FOUCdUIt, M. IlJ66. 1..t.!:J mols t'I "'s d w ~ , s . PMis: Callimard.- - - . 1Y74. 5d"",1'11 ::ur 1.11t'rlllur. Munifh: Nymphenburger Verlagshand

lung.C ...damcr, 11. 1')60. W" J"Jrt'iI II"d A'ktl,ollt': Griilltlwge t'iner I'"i/{)sophisrlllmlIerm"lItu/ik. 4th c..'c..I. Tbingen: Mohr.Genelle, G. IY72. fi.to:lI"s 111. Paris: Sluil.II.abcrmas, J. 1971. Vorberc..'itc..'mh Uc..'l1llrkungc..n zu einer Theorie de r

kummunil..alivcn Kompelc..'l\z. In Tht'''''C: da Gt'sellsdlll{1 ()dt'r Soziallfl:lrlI(//",-':;l'-W"s I"ist'" ,h,' ~ Y ! t l t ' " " o r s d l l l l l , ~ , cd. j. Ilaberm.ls amt N.LuhmtJn. F r . l n ~ f u r t : Suhrk.lInp.

JdkobsOfl, R. 1'179. Linguislik, un d I't.l'lik.. In P(lt'/ik: AlIs,,\t."it.jiJrllt' Auf!'iiilZt',1921- 1971, ,,'d. E. I l o l l . . n ~ l I . ' i n ,lnd T. Sdll'tbert, K2- 121. FrMlk.iurt:Suhrk.lmp. O r i , . ; i n . J I I ~ ' puhli!'llll'c..I !lJhO. '

JdUSS, tl . lY75. I . i t e r . l l u r ~ " , s c h i d l h ,l b I'w\'ok.llion Jl.'r Utcr.tturwissc..'nsl'haft.In ~ ' : ' l ' I ' I I t / . , . , . , t " c t l ~ , Id. K \ V . t r l l I l l I ~ Muni, h: Fink.

Dialogut' ;" N'lrratioll

Klocpfcr, R. 19HO. Dynamic structures in narrative literature: Th e dialogicprincipll.'. P,'di('s r"I/"y 1:115-34.

___ . 19M2. C r u n J l a ~ e n des dialogischen Prinzips in de r Literatur. InDidltl,,{izitiil, cd. R. Lachmann. 85-106.

Levinas, E. 1979. l..t' It'l1Il's t'I rautre. Paris: Quadrige. . 'Lyolard, J. 197Y. IJI l'lll"/il;"" l",:;;tmlltll'rt/l'; ~ 1 I 1 ' 1 l ( ) r l Sllr 1 c . ' ~ s a t i C t i r . Pans: ~ h n U i t . ___ __ I'JK(i. I.,' lJ,'!'1 "/II,lall" ""I'Ii,/Ift' 1111.\ 1'''11111 I ~ : ( ' l l n l ' ~ 1 1 ( ' ' ' ' J : n ' t ' t ' , 198::! - I ! , ~ ~ .P.lris: Gcllil":-c.Mukarovsky,.J. 1977. Two. studies of dialogue. In rl,e ~ r d alld llirwl art:Se/ff/t'd ESSIlI/S, trans. and ed. J. Burbank and P. Stemer. 65-80. Newt l'lVl'n: Yal ..: Univc..'rsity Press. O r i ~ i n a l l y p u b l i s h e d 1940.

()Iato. lY61. Walt'. IlciJdbeq;: Ldmbl.'rt Schneider.Ricoeur, P. 1983. T('mps t" rlcit. Vol. 1. Paris: Seuil.Saussure, F. deo 1979. Cours tle liliSuis/i'Iue gillhalt. Ed. Tuillio de MdUru.

Paris: Payot. . .Sterne, L 1967. 'flrt! lift: ami 0I,i";Oll5 of Tristram SlJuudy, gemlltman. MldJlesex:Penguin. Originally pubHshed 1760... . ,Todurov, T. 1984. Miklwil Bakl,';,,; rllt , " a l o . ' ~ , c a l prmclplt!. Trans. W\adCodzil.:h. Minneapolis: Universily of Minnesota Press.

Wittgenstein, L 1958. PlriloS01'hit.'al im.lt'S/ixatiolls. Trans. G. E. M. A n s c o m ~ . New Yl)rk: M,u:mill,lIl.
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1990_Dialogue in Narration (1990)