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D
739
.F6713no.A-855Fgn MS
UNCLASSIFIEDM S # A-855
HISTORY INSTITUT
U . S . A r m y M i l i t a r y H i s t o
English Copy
HISTORY^ OF_Tj IE_ATj :gMiPT O N HITLER'S LIFE
(20 Jul 1944)
UNCLASSIFIED
HISTORICAL DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY EUROPE
FOREIGN MILITARY STUDIES BRANCH
PROPERTY OF US ML
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UNCLASSIFIED
MS # A-855
HISTORY OF THE ATTEMPT ON HITLER'S LIFE
(20 July 1944)
Freiherr Rudolf Christoph von G-ersdorff, G-eneralmajor a. D.
Ed ltor: R . S . Iv eyReviewer: G . C . Vanderstadt
Hi s t o r ic al Di v i s i o nHEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
-i-
^CLASSIFIED
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^CLASSIFIED
MS # A-855
Rudolf-Christopf Freiherr von GersdorffG e n e ralmajor a . . D .Date o f Birth: £ 7 March 1905Place o f Birth: L u e b e n , Silesia
Von Gersdorff joined t h e A r r a y a s a n officercandidate i n 1 924 and w a s commissioned a s a secondlieutenant o f cavalry t w o years later after training
in t h e Infantry S c h o o l , Ohrdruf and t h e Cavalry S c h o o l ,Hannover.
When World War I I broke o u t , von Gersdorff, bynow a captain o f cavalry, was serving a n assignmenta s assistant intelligence officer o n t h e s t a f f o f t h e 14th A r m y . After participating i n t h e Polish Campaign,h e was transferred a s intelligen ce officer t o t h e XIICorps i n position a t Saarbruecken. On 3 0 April 1940he was awarded General Staff Corps Status and a monthlater was transferred a s operations officer t o t h e86th Division, with which division h e took part i n
t h e ' 1 9 4 0 offensive i n P r a n c e .
Promoted major on 1 June 1 9 4 0 , lieutenant colonel i n March 1 9 4 2 , colonel i n July 1943 andGeneralmajor i n March 1 9 4 5 , von G ersdorff s further employment during t h e w a r included assignments a sintelligence officer o f Army Group C e n t e r , i n Russia,from April 1941 - September 1 9 4 3 , a s chief o f s t a f f ,LXXXII C o r p s , o n t h e Channel c o a s t , from Feb - J uly 1944 and a s chief o f s t a f f , Seven th A r m y , in Normandy,Belgium and during t h e retreat through Germany fromJuly 1 944 - May 1 9 4 5 .
On 9 May 1945 t h e G e n e r a l , w a s taken prisoner a tEllboge, near Karlsbad, Czechoslovakia.
-il-
UNCLASSIFIED
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CLASSIFIED
CONTENTS
P a |
I . INTRODUCTION. ................
I I . THE BIRTH OF THE CONSPIRACY ......... 4
III. THE FIRST PRACTICAL STEPS ..........
I V . MY ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT OF 15 MARCH 1 9 43 . . 15
V . THE CONSPIRACY ACQUIRES A BROADER BASIS ... 18
VI. THE OKGAiMl'ZA TION OF THE CONSPIRACY . . ... 21
VII. THE ATTEMPT ................. 4
-iii- UNCLASSIFIED
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I . INTRODUCTION
One o f the essential conditions for t h e success o f the
conspiracy o f 20 July 1944 w a s the maintenance o f absolute
secrecy. Even those persons who played a n active role i n the
development o f t h e conspiracy were not informed o f a l l it s
details. Naturally, t o o , very few written notes \ v e r e made
upon which an exhaustive, documented report could " b e prepared.
For that reason, I will s e t down my own experiences in detail,
while giving only genera l treatment t o informat ion derived
from others.
When, i n 1 9 3 3 , National Socialism came t o power by legal
methods, the army was presented with a fait accompli. T h e
training and s t r u c t u r e , o f t h e Reichswehr had intentionally
b een kept non-political by i t s creators. The only general
who played a political role, von Schleicher, was defeated
by parliamentary methods in his attempt t o gain power. T h e
rest o f the generals held themselves aloof from politics,
adopting the same neutral attitude with which formerly, under
the V / e i m a r regime, they had carried out their militar y duties,
untouched and unmoved by party hatreds and partiality. The
younger memb ers o f the officer corps either adopted this
same attitude or allowed themselves t o be driven through
patriotic feeling, which was skilfully directe d by propaganda
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into a more or less enthusiastic acceptance o f National
Socialism.
However, the experiences during t h e first years after
th e s e i z u r e , o f power, especial ly during t h e purge o f 3 0 June, * - S\
^9441 . c o u l d only bri n g disillusionment t o m a n y . Those who
were already skeptical o f Nazism or were inwardly opposed
t o it s principles were now driven into the opposition, while
many others began for t h e first time t o think for themselves,
without, however, fully recognizing t h e extent o f t h e menace.
The N a z i s ' objectives and above a l l their methods o f attaining
them we re a t this time s o outwardly obscure that t h e m a s s , o f
the officer corps could not conceive o f t h e t ru e nature o f
the movement, expecially o f its criminal asp e ct s. Only t h e
most farsighted persons, who were able t o gain partial insight
into t he intenti ons and ideas o f those in high party circles,
could predict the disaster which Hitler and his Movement were
t o bring 1 t o Germany and t o t h e whole world.
Three officers recognized t h e danger and sought t o
exercise some influence on t h e subsequent course o f events.
They v / e r e Generaloberst Freiherr von Hammerstein, former chief
o f t h e Army High Command; Generaloberst B e c k , , a t that t ime
chief o f the General Staff; and Generaloberst Freiherr von
Fritsch, commander in chief o f t h e A r m y i T h e first t w o ,
especially, had already decided t o place themselves in
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active opposi t i o n t o H i t ler and his regime. Thus t h e little
group around Hammerstein and Beck became t h e first cell o f
opposition, gradually developing into the conspiracy o f 2 0
July 1 9 4 4 . '
A t that t i m e , however, t h e movement failed t o gain
greater influence. Hi tler's successes i n the political,
economic, a r i d social spheres tended t o overshadow t h e negative
aspects o f the Nazi program. Various events, the murder o f
Generals v on Schleicher and von Bredow, the deposing o f von
Fritsch, and t h e departure o f Beck, were of significance only
a s they influenced a gradual increas e in the number of those
who joined the opposition. . B u t the time was not ripe for the
a c t o f liberation; the important perso nalities o f t h e
Wehrmacht were not sufficiently concerned with politics, the
majority o f the officer corps lacked orientation.
I n the period from 1938 t o 1940 t h e storm o f events
overshadowed a l l other thoughts and efforts, and any active
opposition a t t hat time would have been considered by t h e mass
o f the German people t o be stupidity and high treason. Ap
parent - s u c c e s s e s i n t h e political and economic fields d e
stroyed the healthy instincts and sound judgment o f the
people and prepared t h e way t o t h e criminal objectives o f the
Nazi leaders. V / e must not forget here t h e great effect o f
propaganda, which had never before in w o rld hi st o ry been
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aoplied with s u c h s k i l l and f o r c e .
I t i s t r u e t h a t again a n d again s o m e individuals tried
t o interfere with developments. For instance, there was t h e
action o f " G - e n e r a l o b e r s t Blaskowitz i n P o l a n d . But such
heroism was swallowed up by t h e rapid course o f e v e n t s ,
especially a s t h e Nazi s employed skilful propaganda either
t o cover up such news o r t o reduce i t t o insignificance .
Germany 1 s victorious military leadership, which appeared
t o t h e world t o h a v e risen t o t h e peak o f f a m e , had actually
fallen t o t h e lowest depths o f i t s century-long history.
Because o f their political naivete and instinctive trust
fulness, t h e military leaders had l e t power slip gradually
from their h a n d s . When Nazism dropped i t s m a s k , t h e Army was
, a t grips with i t s military enemy a n d , driven by a desire t o
defend t h e Fatherland, became t h e witless t o o l o f a criminal
leadership.
I I . T H E BIKTH OF T H E CONSPIRACY
! Reasoning. T h e shattering fact t h a t t h e t o p
political leadership was criminal i n character x v a s recognized
a t first only by a very few w i s e and farseeing m e n . But i t
i s true that those men were immediately ready t o a c c e p t , t h e
full consequences o f their realization.
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T o the soldiers in t h e field, the fi nal impetus, a t
least i n part, was given by a n abhor ence o f the obje ctives
and me thods o f the Russian campaign, w h e n for t h e first time
the Nazi le ade rs felt t h e mselves s t r o n g ; enough t o put t h eir
cards on t h e table and t o s h o w t h e ir true colors. The ord ers
t o s h o o t ' ra t h er t han t o capture Russ ian commissars and the
partial suspension o f jurisdict ion in of f e nse s against the
Russian civilian population made a mockery o f h uman i t y and
expose d t h e ut t e r b rut ality o f t h e Nazi m i n d . The orders
aroused a storm o f indign ation a t all h ig h e r h e adquarte rs.
While at t e mpts t o alter these policie s were a t first un
successful, i t was felt that t heir e ffect s could be mit ig a t e d
b y changing t h e form o f t h e orde rs or by pre ve n t i n g t h e ir
t r a n s r a i t t a l . In 1 9 4 4 ' the stubborn e f for ts ' o f the military
were successful in ha ving t h e order t o shoot commissars
rescinded.
When, during the e arly part o f t h e Russian campaig n, the
objective s and me t hods o f t h e S S were gradually made known
t o t h e military commanders, t h e last scruples against
b e t r ayi n g t h e ir count ry's leadership were overcome. The
military commander s h ad jurisdict ion over S S unit s only i n
cases where tactical interests appe ared t o be endangered.
Wh ile f ar-reach in g advant age w as taken o f t h i s , t h e Ar my
h ad absolutely n o influence over acts w h ich occurre d be h ind
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the military z o n e , where most o f t h e crimes took place. There
remained only one way t o b ring these crimes t o an end and t o
free G ermany and t h e world: that was t h e removal o f Hitler
and his regime.
I t . i s true that Stalingrad had a great psychological
effect on many persons, but i t did not have the decisive effect
on t h e participants in con spiracy o f 20 J uly that has general
ly been assumed. Their decision resulted from a knowledge o f
the cruel methods us ed in Russia, the persecution of the J ews,
t h e atrocities in the concentration camps, and other criminal\
acts foster ed by Nazi pow er politics. The soldiers a t t h e
front kn ew less than anyone about t h i s . That is why t h e
conspiracy originated only with members o f t h e higher commands;
i t i s also why s o many person s now say that they k n e w practical
ly nothing o f t h e crimes. Anyone w ith a n advanced k n ow ledge
o f the situation could s e e that t h e ideas which led t o these
mon strous methods could only have sprun g from the diseased
b rain o f Hitler. While his followers offered variations in
method, the origin o f all crimes was t o be foun d i n H itler
himself. The Fuehrer* s personal power, w hich was raised t o
mystical heights b y his apparent successes and by propaganda,
x v a s great en ough that his significance a s a n individual was
easily recognized. All deliberati ons on t h e part o f the
conspirators led t o the final con clusion that H itler must d i e .
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Although i t was clear t o all that this man deserved
death a thousand times, i t was not easy for a G - e r m a n officer
t o reach a decision. A century o f tradition and training
had exerted too strong a n effect, and this fact was skillfully
exploited t o the last by t h e Nazi leadership. Covered by the
mantle o f patriotism, military spirit, a n a pride o f powe r,
t h e Nazis hitched their wagon t o - t h e A r r a y and its officer
corns.
The conspirators fully realized that t h e existanc e and
unity o f the G - e r m a n Army must not be jeopardized by the
planned coup d 1 e i t a t . A Russian break-through on the Eastern
F r ont would bring chaos t o t h e heart o f Europe; Germany
would be overrun by millions of Slavs and Asiatics. The
Western P o x v e r s could not appreciate this menace a t , t h e t i m e .
Only a sudden powerful stroke and careful leadership by t h e
higher Army headquarters could prevent a violent eruption
within t h e Wehrmacht.
2 . Beginning o f the Conspiracy. I feel certain that
similar i c . e a s aros e and similar conclusions were arrivedo
a t in t h e above-mentioned Beck g z ' o u p . I n civilian circles
i t was chiefly Oberbuergerrae ister Goerdeler o f Lei pzig and
the Prussian minister, Popitz, who saw things clearly and
decided t o reverse their course. One o f the most active
cells i n the conspiracy v / a s t o be found in the staff o f Army
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G - r o u p Center on t h e Eastern Front, in which I was G 2 f r o m -
1941 t o 1 9 4 3 . I t i s here that we meet von Tresckow, a t that
time a colonel in the General Staff a n d . G 3 o f the Army G r o u p .
A man o f do mi n a t i n g personality, he handled with great energy
both discussion and action. A t first von Tresckow confided
his views only t o the assistant operations officer, Colonel
( G - S C ) Schultze-Buettger (murdered after 2 0 July), t h e intel
ligence officer, Colonel von Kleist, and his special mi ssi o n s
staff officer, 1st Lieutenant ( R e s e r v e ) , von Schlabrendorff.
Then he turned t o m e in early 1 9 4 2 , a s near a s I remember,
with his first request t o prepare the explosive and fuse fo r
the actual attempt.
For reasons o f security, Tresckow gave m e n o indication
o f the scope o f t h e conspiracy or o f t h e extent t o which
preparations would be made. While I can o n ly speak general
ly o f the subject, I assume that i n the year 1942 the fo llo w
ing main centers o f the conspiracy were already in existance:
a . Army Group Center (led by Colonel von Tresckow);
b . Ar my High Command (led by Colonel Stieff);
c . Replacement Army and civilian circles (led by
Generaloberst Beck).
The connect i o n b e t \ ? e e n Beck and T r e s c k o ' w resulted from
the fact that Schultze-Buettger had for many years been
Beck's adjutant. Pr om Beck, connecting threads ran t o t h e
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civilian group headed by Goerdeler and Popitz. Tresckow took
advantage o f official communications t o maintain Ms contact
with t h e Army High Command. A t the s a m e t i m e , there was
already i n existence the germ o f an organization t o deal with
the reforming o f . t h e government and wit h the realization o f
specific milit ary a i m s . I d o not know whet her discussions
were opened a t that time wit h t h e Western Powers. All o f
this planning was only outlined t o us " b y Tresckow, who
continually proved himself t o " b e t h e most active and fanatical
fighter. I believe today that Tresckow, a t this initial stage
in t h e conspiracy (by \ « / h i c h time h e had already made up his
mind on definite action), desired t o present Germany and t h e
Wehrmacht with a fait accompli through t h e removal o f Hitler,
Goering, and Himmler. In view o f what h e knew t o be the
attitude o f nearly all the Army leaders, T r e s c k o x v probably
assumed that after t h e death o f Hitler the course o f events
could be s o directed that t h e other object ives could be
reached.
III. THE FI RST PRACT I CAL STEPS'
A t any event, w e h e circle around Tresckow ad
a l r e a d y , made up our minds in 1942 t o kill Hitler and i f
possible t o remove Goering and Himmler a t the same t i m e . At
other places different plans were being considered, a s , for
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example, the proposal t o kidnap Hitler and then t o force a
change in the t op military a n d political leadership. However,
i t was always clear t o Tresckow that such a half-way measure
would only lead t o civil t f a r , and that only the shock o f the
death o f the "mystic Fue hrer" t o the entire German people
would make i t possible for t h e coup d'etat t o proceed
according to p l a n .
Immense difficulties appeared in considering plans for
the attempt:
1 . How would i t b e possible t o come into contact
with Hitler?
2 . Y / h a t weapons o r methods could be used in order
t o make certain t h e attainment o f the desired end?
I t was clear from the beginning that the attempt had
t o be made in such a manner a s t o assure absolute certainty
o f success, since an unsuccessful attempt would destroy the
entire enterprise. And i t was axiomatic that the attempt
must be carried o u t a s soon a s possible, since time only
brought a further deterioration i n the political and economic
position of Germany. Moreover, with the passing o f each day
there was an ever increasing danger that t h e conspiracy might
be discovered.
Many ideas were developed and discarded. One plan was
t o have a reliable unit imprison Hitler during his visit to
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the h eadquarters o f - A r r a y Group Center in Smolensk and then
t o eliminat e h i m . For this purpose t here was a suitable
unit a t hand in t h e ne wly est ablis h e d Cavalry Regiment
"Center," and a suitabl e leader i n its commander, Major
Freiherr von Boeselager (later kill e d on t h e Eastern Front).
An assassinat io n by pistol-was ruled out because there was
n o assurance that Hitl e r would be hit; besides, i t was
ge nerally be l i e v e d that Hitler always wore a bulletproof
vest. Tresckow finall y decide d on a bombing attempt.
Reque st i ng me t o prepare t h e e xplosive and fuses, he s e t
up the fol l owi ng requireme nts:
' A n , explosi ve about the s i z e o f a book or bundle
o f documents, with sufficient force t o destroy a small house
and its occupants;
£ A time fuse which would function wi t h absolute
certainty but without any audible ticking.
As G 2 o f t h e army g r o u p , I h ad under me a - counter-
int elligence unit ( commanded by Colone l Herrlit z, later
a p risoner o f t h e Americans), Se ction I I o f wh ich (commanded
by Colone l Hetzel) \ ? a s re sponsibl e for such equipment. I n
t h eir storeroom, whi ch was managed by a Lieutenant Buch holz,
I looked over all available types o f e xplosives and fuses.
I decided on Engli sh plastic explosive, an Eng l ish magne t ic
mine, and an Engl i sh chemical f u s e . These devices h ad be en
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dropped by enemy aircraft over Germany for use in sabotage by
agents and foreign workers , and had been systematically
collected by u s . None o f t h e available German devices \ 7 e r e
suitable, being either too large or too conspicuous. I took
the English apparatus with m e , with t h e statement that I
wanted t o show i t t o t h e commander in c h i e f .
Tresckow made many tests with these devices. The p o v r e r
o f the explosive s eemed quite satisfactory, although natural
ly i t was impossible t o make tests with living beings. T h e
fuse \ v a s especially suitable because o f its rod form and its
simple operation (crushing o f a foil capsule). There were
fuses v < r i t h a time delay o f 1 0 , 3 0 , 1 2 0 , and 3 6 0 minutes.
Experiments showed that t h e surrou nding air temperature
affected the time delay; a t less than room temperature t h e
time delay could be increased by a s much a s 100 per c e n t .
I have gone into detail here because an as sassination
attempt made by m e on 1 5 i l a r c h 1943, giving every promise
o f success, failed becaus e t h e time delay x v a s t o o great, and
because the attempt o f 20 July 1944 was carried out with the
s a m e apparatus and yielded such disappointing results.
Tresckow required more and more material for his research
and i t was not easy t o think up new explanations t o satisfy
the officers o f t h e counterintelligence unit. I was fully
aware o f the danger in which I , above all others, would be
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placed in case t h e assassination attempt failed. Once he h ad
convinced himself o f their effectiveness, Tresckow manufactured
several " b o m b s .
T h e first assassination attempt was carried out by
Tresckow on the occasion o f Hitler 1 s visit t o the Army G - r o u p
headquarters in Smolensk. Tresckow personally brought Hitler
from the airfield and had planned t o place a bomb i n the side
pocket o f the automobile, next t o the place Hitler was t o
occupy. But i t was n o t possible t o " plant the bomb i n . advance
s i n c e , although Hitler himself traveled by train, he always
had his personal car and driver sent on a h e a d . He never s a t
in anyone else's automobile. Even though, t o avoid attention,
Hitler had only a few S3 men present, t h e attempt failed
becaus e o f their ceaseles s vigilance. I t proved impossible
for Tresckow t o approach t h e car unwatched.
Several subsequent attempts were undertaken but most o f
them were dis rupted in their early stages. A t that t i m e ,
Tresckow was trying either t o carry out the assassination
personally or t o have i t carried out in t h e Fuehrer's
headquarters on t h e occasion o f t h e so-called "situation
conference." During a report on Army Group Center, either
Tresckow or one o f us was t o ignite t h e bomb in a brief case
or in t h e pocket o f a garment. T h e advantage here was that
wi th good fortune Goering or Himmler, or both, might also
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be caught by the explosion. The disadvantage was that
several others who could not be warned would also be endan
g e r e d . However, Tresckow, w h o always carried t h e affair
forward with the greatest energy, felt that t h e death o f a .
few innocent persons would be justified by the fact that
Germany and the world would be freed o f . t h e greatest
criminals in history.
Through his acquaintanceship wi th Hitler1 s
chief
adjutant, General Schmundt, who also headed the Army
Personnel Office in t h e winter o f 1942-1943, Tresckow
succeeded in getting certain trusted people into important
staff positions without Schmundt's learning anything about
the enterprise. T h u s , for example, Colonel ( G S G ) Schultze-
Buettger was placed a s G 3 on the staff o f Army Group S o u t h .
A trusted member o f t h e conspiracy, 1st Lieutenant Stahlberg,
was already available there a s Field Marshal von Manstein 1 s
assistant staff officer. On the occasion o f one o f Hitler 1 s
visits t o Army Group South, Schultze-Buettger attempted t o
carry through the assassination attempt but was unsuccessful.
I have n o knowledge o f why the attempt failed. But I would,
like t o emphasize again how extremely difficult i t was t o
approach Hitler and t o strike the blow without the danger
o f premature discovery.
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I V . MX' ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT OF 15 MARCH 1943
A r r a y Group Center - h a d prepared in t h e armory I n Berlin
a n exhibition o f captured Russian a r r a s and equipment, war
pictures, models, etc., and a few days prior t o 1 5 March 1943
General Schmundt gave put the information that Hitler would
personally open the exhibition on the occasion o f Heroe's
Memorial Day. Since Goering'and Himmler, a s commanders o f
their respective organizations, were always present a t this
celebrat ion, this was a n opportunity which might never
repeat itself. Upon Tresckow's request, I declared myself
ready t o make t h e assassination attempt. Inasmuch a s my own
staff division had organized the exhibit, i t was not difficult
to have myself sent t o Berlin. Field Marshal von K l u g e . sent
Field Marshal Model a s his re presentative.
In the last hour two new problems a r o s e . First, Field
Marshal von Kluge, who a t that time was not yet a party t o
the plot, wanted his wife t o take part in t h e ceremony, a n d ,
second, a t t h e moment the only available fuse had a time
delay o f less than ten minutes. The former problem was
solved when Tresckow ta lked t h e Field Marshal out o f his
Intention. T h e latter was solved by arr anging for 1st
Lieutenant von Schlabrendorff t o be sent after m e in a
special airplane and t o give m e the required material in
D
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j i r
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the H o t e l Eden on the night before the ceremony. Together
with Fie ld Marshal Model, I was f l o w n t o Be r l in \ v h e r e I
lear ne d fr om General Schmundt that, after Hitl er's address
in the glass-roof e d court o f the a r s e n a l , , he wou ld spend
about half an hour g o i n g ' through the exhibit (accompanied by '( J e e r i n g , H immler, Doenitz, and several aides) and wou ld then
carry out the traditiona l review o f the guard ho n o r battalion.
Schmundt inf or m e d me in the strictest confiden ce that
the official time o f the ceremo n y had Just been change d by
several hours. I n g iving me this information, Schmundt had
no idea that he was c ontr ibu ting t o the possible success of
an a s sa s s ina tion attempt. This incident was indicative of
the security measures that were ne c e s sa r y t o protect the
h e ad of the state.
After in v e s tiga tin g the layout o f the arsenal, I c onclu d e d
that the actual attempt could only be made durin g the time
that Hitl e r 1 s party was going th r ou gh the exhibition. Con
struction wor k in preparation for the ceremony was still in
progress in the glass-roofed courtyard. The speaker 1 s
r o s tr um s tood off by itself, maki ng it impossib le to plant
a bomb there secretly. Moreover, in that p os ition there
wou ld have been littl e opportunity to set off the fuse. That
the tour th r ou gh the exhibit wou ld last a t least twenty min
utes was a fact of decisive importance, since in the unheated
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rooms o f t h e arsenal t h e temperature was only a few degrees
above zero and I was therefore forced t o calculate on the
basis o f a fuse time o f 15-20 m inutes. I was also mindful
o f t h e great height o f t h e rooms, which meant that t h e explosion
would n o t be appreciably confined and that consequentl y its
effect would be reduced.
Tresckow had asked me t o use any favorable opportunity
which promised absolute success. Since all elements involved
i n the conspiracy were t o b e forewarned once i t was determined
that the actual assassination would take place, I was t o Inform
Schlabren dorff o f t h e state o f affairs o n the evening preceding
the attempt. I told him that I intended t o s e t off a bomb in
each o f r n y coat pockets during the time that Hitler passed
through the exhibit, but stressed that I was dependent upon
the above-mentioned conditions t o assure my su c cess.
I was never a bl e t o learn whether or not this warning
was passed o n . A s Hitler, together with Goering, Himmler,
Doenltz, von Bock, and three or four a ides, entered the room,
General S c h r n u n d t came up and told m e . t h a t there were n o more
than eight minutes available for the t o u z n o f t h e exhibition.
T h e possibility o f assassination was g o n e , since even a t
normal room temperature t he fuse would have required ten
minutes t o s e t of f t h e bomb. This last-minute change o f
schedule, indicative o f t h e extreme precautions that Hitler
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t o o k , was responsible for saving his life once again. Tresckow,
who had been waiting by a radio i n Smolensk, knew that i t had
been impossible t o carry out t h e plan.
V . .THE C O N SPIRACY ACQUIRES A BROADER BASIS
Before flying t o Berlin, I had asked Tresckow t o tell
m e whether the coup . d 1 etat could be successfully carried out
once Hitler had been assassinated. Since I did not expect t o
surv ive, I wanted t o know i f r a y a c t \ y o u l d be justified in the
eyes o f history. A t that time Tresckow told m e t h at an
organi zati on already existed and would g o into action imme
diately; that arrangements had already been made with t h e
Western Powers; and that t h e enterprise was the only chance
t o s a v e G - e r m a n y from complete destruction. Other than t h i s ,
I knew only that Tresckow w a s in close contact with various
branch chiefs i n th e A r r a y High Command (Including General
Heusinger, Operations Branch; Colonel Stieff, Organization
Branch; and General Pellgiebel, Chief Signal Officer).
During t he course o f 1943 th e existi ng organization was
gradually and caut iously placed upon a broader basis. In t h e
summer o f 1943 Tresckow was successful i n gaining th e complete
support o f Field Marshal von Kluge. But i t was only after
difficult inner struggles and l ong conversations w i t h all o f
us that t h e Field Marshal finally reached his decision. After
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pledglng himself wholeheartedly t o the cause, von Kluge
held discussions with Beck, Halder, Hoeppner, von Witzleben,
and ot h e rs. H e received numerous letters from Goerdeler and
P opitz ' b e g g i n g him t o t a l c e action, t o overt hrow the regime,
and t o assume leadership himself. A t that time Field Marshal
von Kluge was among those considered for t h e new head o f
s t a t e .
Since a meet ing o f two field marshals who were bot h
commanding troops a t the front was likely t o arouse suspi
cions i n the mistrustful leaders, von Kluge s e n t m e in t h e
summer o f 1943 t o consult t h e commander o f A r - ? n y G - r o u p South,
Field Marshal von Manst ein, in order t o coordinate their
ideas. Concealing my real mission by a discussion o f propos
als for changes i n top-level organization, I v ? a s t o ascertain
von Manstein 1 s attitude with regard t o t h e proposed coup d ' e t a t ,
Manstein was then being considered for t h e future chief o f the
general s t a f f . Field Marshal von Kluge had authorized m e ,
in case I saw f i t , t o explain the entire conspiracy and t o
present letters from Goerdeler and Popitz which contained
political and economic information. I n long conversations
with von Manstein, I determined that he held the s a m e views
a s von Kluge. H x n v e v e r , h e refused t o commit himself premature
ly since the foreign press had labeled him a s a "dangerous
man" striving for power. In addition, h e refused t o enter
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RESTRICTED
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into any political action and raised doubts about the conduct
o f t h e A r r a y in the event o f a coup d'etat. For those reasons,
I refrained from confiding in hi m all t h e details o f t h e plot.
I f a coup d'etat were effected, h o \ v e v e r , w e were assured t h at
von Manstein would be completely a t our disposal.
During the fall and w int e r, Trescko w t ook a long leave
o f absence i n Berlin and Potsdam before returning t o t h e
Eastern F ront , where h e assumed command o f a regiment and
later became chief o f st aff o f t h e Second A r m y . I n the mean
t ime Lieutenant Colonel ( G S C ) Count Stauffenberg had joined
the conspiracy. After being severely wounded, h e w as employed
on t h e staff o f t h e commander o f t h e Replacement Training
Army. Count Stauffenberg was an eminently qualified general
st aff officer, an outspoken individual, and a devout Catholic,
w h o , o n the basis o f his moral and religious convictions and
his ardent patriotism, had decided on vigorous action. I n
Tresckow, Count Stauffenberg found a man whose ideas coincided
with his o w n . Although a desire for personal glory was alien
t o t h e m , these t w o men were called upon t o play a n important
role in t h e struggle for a better Germany. Both men now
began t o work out the military, and in p art, the political
preparations for what they hoped would lay a h e a d . W o r k i n g -
day and nig h t , orders for a l l headquarters o f the fi el d and
home armies were prepared, handbills and proclamations for
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the troops and the civilian copulation were drafted,.
and the exact timing o f all the operations was decided.
All preparations were made, in consultation with Field
Marshal von Witzleben, Generals Beck and Hoepnner, and the
civilian grouo.
For some time Tresckow had been in contact with the
Wehrmacht Counterintelligence Office, whose head, Admiral
Canaris, was deeply involved'in the conspiracy. Here
one o f our trusted men, General Oster, had " b e e n employed
for some time a s branch chief. Moreover , the heads
of Sections I and I I (Procurement of Information and
Sabotage), Colonels Hansen and Baron von Freitag-
Loringhoven, were also cooperating n o v . 1 in the organization
of the plot. At that time Baron von Freitag-Loringhoven
procured explosives and fuses o f the same type that I
had provided in Smolensk; and i t was with these that
the assassination attempt o f 20 July 1944 was carried o u t .
VI. TKS ORGANIZATION OF THE CONSPIRACY
During the winter of 1943-1944 the plot Was organized
.approxim ately a s follows:
This information was gathered by combining what I knewthen with what I learned later. (Author)
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Fiel d Marshal v on V/itzleben
Generalo berst Hoeppner
G e n eraloberst Halder ( ? )
Colon el (GSC) v on Tresckow
Colonel ( G S C ) Count von S ta uffenberg
Uehrmacht Coun e r i n t e 11 g e nee Of 1 c e
Admiral Canaris
Colonel ( . G S C ) Hansen
Colonel ( G S C ) Baron von Freitag-Loringhov en
C o mmand^ aridEa_s: e r i 1 rpn t
General Zeitzler (chief o f the General Staff) ( ? )
Major ( 1 S C ) S r a e n d
General Heusinger (Operations Branch)
G e n e r a l \ 7 a g n e r (Chief Supply and Administration Officer)
General Stieff (Organization Branch)
L l a j o r (GSC) Klamroth (O rganization Branch)
Colonel (GSC) Freiherr Roenne (Foreign Armies Branch)
General Fellgiebel (Signal Communications)
Y / e _ s tern Front
Field i l a r s h a l v on Kluge (Commander in Chief West) .
Colonel (GSC) Fink (Supply and Administration)
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Fiel d Marshal Rommel (Army Group B )
General Seidel (Army Group B )
General von Stuelpnage l (Military Government, France)
General von Falkenhausen (Military Government, Belgium)
Re placement Training
General Olbrich
Colonel ( G - S G ) Count von Stauffenberg
C o l o n e l ( G - S C ) I l e r z von Quirnheim
(There were also reliable officers in various corps
headquarters. Colonel Kodre, fo r example, was w i t h the
XVII Corps headquarters in Vienna)
l i e ado ar e r in the F ie ld
There were reliable officers in nearly all of the
important army and army group staffs.
Be r l in
Count Hell o rf (Police President)
S3 Obergruppenfuehrer Nebe (Reich Criminal Office)
C ivil ia n Circles
Gener al von Haase (Commandant of Berlin)
Oberbuergerrneister Goerdeler
Prussian Mi n is te r P o u i t z ,
D
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UNCLASSIF IED
.MS # A-855 -24-
Ambassador von Hassel (Foreign Office)
(Others in political and economic circles).
The above list lays no claim t o completeness. But i t shows
that the organization embraced the compete nt people in
almost the whole o f the military command structure and that
it also ha d a large civilian base. In v i e w of this fact,
v i e can h a r d l y b e charged with lack of preparat ion. In my
personal v iew the r e pr o a ch i s un j us ti fi e d i f o n l y b ecause
of the participation o f men like Beck, Tresckow, and Stauffen-
berg.
VII. T f T E ATTEl'IPT
Reliable eye-witness reports on the actual assassination
attempt of 20 July 1944 are available. I myse lf was a t the .
Wester n Front a s a corps commander but, in accordance with a
discussion \ v i t h Tresckow, I h e l d myself ready for call.
In my own opinion the coup d'etat failed only because the
most important s t e p , the assassination o f Hitler, was unsuccess
ful. The assassin, Count Stauffenberg, flew to Berlin with
the impression that .Hitler wa s dead. An d while the pl ans
were carried out by persons who also b e l i e v e d Hitle r was dead,
all those who k n e w differently fa i l e d to a c t . Therefore,
measures w hich were d ecisive fo r the success o f the c o u t > d'etat
^ C L A S S I F I E D
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were not carried out. The " b e s t example was the fact that the
communication system v / a s never t ak en over, since General
Fellgiebel and his chief o f staff, Colonel Hahn, had seen for
themselves " t h a t the assassination attempt had failed. Only
for this reason did the radio remain completely in the hands
o f the Nazi government Even telephone communication b e t w e e n
Berlin and Hitler 1 s headquarters continued without difficulty.
The various outlying headquarte rs (as, for example, a t corps
level) sup-oosedly took their orders . . . f r o m S t a u ff en b erg but,
thinking that the decisive a t t e n r o t would not be carried out,
were uncertain and adopted a waiting attitude. Moreover, there
v / a s almost no forewarning, since Stauffenberg' s decision to
make the attempt had be en sudden. Time and again other
assassination a t t e mp ts had gone wrong or had been postponed
to a more suitable occasion. On the other hand there was
little time to lose because o f the imminent Allied invasion.
I t became necessary t o prove to t he W es t ern Powers, before a
break-through, that there were men in Germany who condemned
the Nazi system and were willing to act in accordance with
their convictions. Hence, i t was understandable that Stauffen
b e r g seized the sudden opportunity for personal contact with
Hitler and attenuated the assassination. Who knew when s u c h '
a chance might occur again? Because of his haste, however,
it had b e e n impossible to \ v a r n , according to prior agreement,
^CLASSIFIED
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" U N C L A S S I F I E D
MS # A-855 ' -26-
those conspirators who were also t o take part in the
"situation conference" on 20 July-
In the last analysis, t h e ? / e a k explosive effect of the
bomb, which even a good engineer could probably not have
predicted, was the reason for the failure o f the whole
enterprise. After the unsuccessful attempt o f 20 July, there
were no further opportunities to overthrow the regime. Almost
all o f the conspirators were sentenced t o death or committed
suicide. The survivors, I believe, can be counted on the
fingers of one hand. They owe their lives to stringent
securi ty measures, and t o the silence of t h e spiritual leader
of the whole conspi racy, General von Tresckow. After the
collapse of his life 1 s goal, Tresckow sought and found a
soldier's death on the field o f battle.
In closing, it must be said that the conspiracy of
20 July was the only active effort to overthrow the National
Sociali st government and t o remove the chief criminals. I t
should be emphasized that this only attempt was planned and
executed by members o f the officer corps and that the dominant
role was played by the General Staff, the nobility, and the
large landowners.