1903 Lord Curzon in India 1898-1903 by Lipsett s.pdf

8/10/2019 1903 Lord Curzon in India 1898-1903 by Lipsett s.pdf

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Phot

y

Elliott

Fry

H E THY K ; H T

H O N O U I ~ A I 1 L E .L. RU C U P I O N

l l i

l i lS1)LIISTC)h. ( \ LCI


8/163

BY

H. CALDWELL LIPSETT

A U T H O R

O F

W H B R B

I IIE

A T L A N T I C M E E T S T H E L AN D ,

< A FRONTIER OFFICER, BTC.

With an Appendix containing Lord

Curaon s

Speech

justifying the Delhi Durbar.

Zonbon

R. A. EVERETT CO.

4

ESSEX STREET STRAND W.C.

19 3

[ ll

rights

resewed ]


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C O N T E N T S

CIIAI .

I LORDCURZON S IMS

11.

RUSSIA FGHANISTANND

PERSIA

111. THE

INDEPENDENTRIBES

IV.

THENEW

FRONTIER

ROV~NCE

V I. I R R I G A T I O N A N D

RAI LWAYS

VII .

BRITISHRULE

N

INDIA


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I L L U S T R T I O N S

H E TH

RIGHTHONOURABLEORDCURZON

WAITING OR DEATH a Scene in Native

State ,


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Lord Curzon

in

ndia

C H A P T E R I

LORD CURZONf Icedleston is at once one of

the youngest and most succeasful Viceroys that

ever guided the destinies of our Indian Empire.

His selection for so high an ofice a t the early

age of thirty-nine was a universal surprise.

Lord Dalhousie, who assumed the same post

at the age of thirty-six, was his only pre-

decessor of fewer years. But Lord Curzon

has amply vindicated the claims of youth to

be the time of courage and initiative, of high

ideals and strenuous performance; and now at

the end of the first four out of his five years


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LOR

C U R Z O N

IN INDIA

term of office he has won for himself the

repu tat ion of a n able ancl conscientious adminis-

t ra tor second to none in the Empire .

T h e gre at Coronat ion Du rbar a t Delhi ,

which

is t o be held on J a nu a r y l s t , wh ich Ihe Du ke

of Co nna ugh t at ten ds a s th e represeniative of

the Royal Family , which has a t t racted a

considerable portion of t he English a ristocracy

to Ind ia , and a t which Lord R i tchener wi ll

hold a review of th e Indian ar m y a s i ts

Commander-in-Chief, h a s aw n th e eyes of th e

Empire to Ind ia a t the p resen t moment , and

has th rown a blaze of ligh t on th e good w ork

which i t s Viceroy has been quiet ly doing for

years past. Unless some entirely unforeseen

occurrence arises, the present ceremony m us t

prove the culminat ion and the crowning moment

of Lord Curzon's Indian career. His remain ing

year of office can only be spent in w ind ing u p

th e threads w hich ha ve a l ready been prepared.

Therefore

a

bet ter opportuni ty th an th e present

could not be conceived for examining the results

of his cnormous an d untir ing in dustry .


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LOR CURZON S A l M S

Lord Curzon, as is well-known, passed through

searching preparation for his present post, and

one tha t was apparently designed in especial

for th at particular end. Thoug h a coniparative

stripling, he wa s no t ncw either t o office or t o

th e East when he took over the rulership of th e

300

millions of our Ind ian Em pire. T h e son

of Lord Scarsdale, the Vicar of Kedles ton,

Derbyshire, he passed through a brilliant career

a t Eto n an d Balliol. To a first in Mods, he

added th e Lo thian ttnd Arnold prize essays,

and eventually a Fellowship a t All Souls. T h e

office of President of the Union prepared him

fo r his later labours i n the House of Commons.

On leaving the Univers i ty he went in for an

extensive course of Eastern travel, in the course

of which he visited Cen tral Asia, Pe rsia,

Afghanistan, the Pamirs , Siam, Indo-China and

Korea. H is knowledge of se veral of these

countries h as since been of use to him i n hi s

official position. H is Erst publication,

ussia in

cntral

Asia was produced in 1889 n t h e

au tum n of th e same year he wen t to Persia as


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LORD URZON IN

INDI

Special Correspondent to the

Ti ilnxes,

and three

years later issued his monumental work upon

that country. While in Persia lie formed strong

opinions on the Persian Gulf problem and the

question of railways in Persia, which have

sensibly affected the foreign policy of India

during the past few years.

In addition to Nasr-ed-Din, t11e late Shah

of Persia, Lord Curzon also became personally

known to Abdur Rahman, the late Amir of

Afghanistaa, who gave the following interest-

ing

pen picture of his visitor in his auto-

biography

:

I

received a letter from the Right Eonourable

Mr George Curzon now Lord Curzon), saying

that as he was travelling towards Chitral and

the Pamirs, and was anxious to make my

acquaintance, he would wait for my permission

t o come and see me.

I

accordingly invited him,

and he was my guest at Kabul for few days.

Several friendly conversations took place

between us, for though he did not understand

Persian, and

I

did not understand English, we

were able to communicate through Mir Munshi

*

The

ife

o

bd zc~

Rahman

London

John

Murray.


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L O R D

C U R Z O N IN

INDI

for Foreign Affairs. In th e last two posts h e

acquired an invaluable fam iliarity w ith th e

affairs of Ind ia, and the inte rna tion al politics of

Europe. His parliamentary reputatio n is still

fresh in men s minds. H is ability w as univerrt-

ally recognised, while his somewhat superior

ma nner made him enemies, as i t has since do ne

in India. Th e surprise occasioned by his

appointment a s Viceroy w as

s

much due to

th e inte rrup tion of a promising career in hom e

politics as to Lord Curzon s yo ut h and lack of

administrative experience. B ut it is safe t o

say th at this f resh depar ture was as for tu nat e

an experiment for Lord Curzon himself as for

the Empire a t large. H e proved himself th e

ma n for the post a t an anxious t ime in o u r

national affairs, and by so doing increased his

reputation more even

than if he had remained

a t the centre of attention a t home.

Thu s forged into fine weapon by hi s exp eri-

ences, Lord Curzon entered upon the charge of

our Indian Empire . He took up tho task wi th

a full recognition of his responsibilities, of the


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LORD CURZON S AIMS

grea tness of h is ciuties, and of his opportunities,

At the

dinner given to him by his old Etonian

schoolfellows before he left London, he quoted

the words of Carlyle

:

I

have sometimes thought what a thing it

would be could the Queen in Council

pick

out

some gallant-mind ed, stou t Cadet, and sa y to him,

Young fellow, if there do lie in you potentialities

of governing, of gra dually guiding , leading , an d

coercing to a noble goal, how sad it is thcy should

be all lost. See, I have scores on scores of

colonies. One of these you shall ha ve as vice-

king. Go you and buckle w ith it in the name

of Heav en, an d let us see what you will build

it to.

Lord Curzon has ha d the op po rtuni ty of

Carlyle s imagin ary Cadet, and has used

t

to

show that he had in him the potentialities of

governing, and that it would indeed have been

a pi ty ha d those potentialities been wasted. B ut

to th is forecas t of his own career Lord C urzon

added a pictu re of w h a t th e iciectl Viceroy should

be.


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L O R D C U R Z O N

IN

INDIA

"

What then he asked) is the conception of his

duty that an out-going Viceroy should set before

himself? have no new 07: sta~t l ingdefinition

to give, but the light in which it presents itself,

to my mind, is this. I t is his duty, first and fore-

most, to represent the authority of the Queen-

Empress, whose name, revered more than the

name of any other living sovereign by all races

and classes from Cape Comorin to the Himalayas,

is in India both a bond of union and the symbol

of power; and to associate with the personal

attribntes that cling about that name the con-

viction that the justice of her Government is

inflexible, tha t it s honour is stainless, and that its

mercy is in proportion to its strength. Secondly,

he should tr y to remember that all those people

are not the sons

of our own race, or creed, or

clime, and that it is only

by

regard for their

feelings, by respect for their prejudices-I will

even go so far as to say by deference to their

scruples-that we can obtain the acquiescence as

well as the submission of the governed. Thirdly,

his duty is to recognise that, though relatively

far advanced in the scale of civilisation compared

with the time of Lord WeIlesley, or even Lord

Canning, India is still but ilI-equipped with the

national and industrial and educational resources

which are so necessary to her career, and so to


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1

L O R D C U R Z O N

N

l N D I A

str atu m of trut h. Fa m ine has greatly handi-

capped India dur ing the pas t four years ; bu t

Lord Curzon has done what in him lay to en-

courage a n d develop th e resources of th e c oun try.

Un der the fourth an d final head his wo rk has been

perhaps t h e most clifficult thou gh least obtrusive.

Three years ago India was called upon to save

South Africa for the Em pire b y sending the f irs t

reinforcement of 6000 m en to N ata l and a lmost

ever since sh e ha s been upw ards of 10 000 men

short of her proper garrison.

t

is hardly too

much t o sa y th a t the single personali ty of Lord

Curzon ha s supplied t h e place of those 10 000

Brit ish soldiers; th a t b y h is mingled moderation

and firmness he has prevented all manifestation

of un re st w ithin th e boun daries of H ind usta n and

so discounted t h e dan ger of affording a n y en-

couragement to our watchful enemies beyond its

confines.

Turning now to the detai ls of his government

in h is second Bu dge t speech delivered i n March

1901 Lord Curzon gave a l ist of twelve im po rtan t

reforms which i t had b een his intention ever since


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LORD

CURZON S

A I M S

he came t o In d ia to carr y into effect. The follow-

ing is th e complete list :

1.)

A

sta ble Frontier Policy.

(2.)

T he creation

of

th e new Fro ntier Province.

3.)

A

Reform of th e Tr an sfe r and Leave Rules

in tlze Indian Civil Service.

(4.)

diminution of Report Writing.

5.) A

stabla Rate of Exchange in th c Currency

System.

(6.) T h e increase of R ailways.

(7.) T he encouragement of irrigation.

8.)

A cure for Ag ricultura l Indebtednees.

(9.)

A reduction of the Telegraphic Rate

be-

tween In d is and Europe.

(10.) T h e preservation

o

Arch~ological emains.

(11.) E du catio nal Reform.

(12,) Police Reform.

This list covers practically the whole field of

Lord Curzon s act ivi ty, and i n th e subsequent

chapters of this book i t will be sho wn wh at he

has done to carry

O L I ~

these ideals also.


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C H A P T E R I

RUSSIA,

FGH NIST N AND

PERSIA

INDI

s surrounded on three sides b y t he sea, an d

on the other

by

w h at Lord Rosebery h as called a

cac tus hed ge of m oun tains, It is one of the

manifold duties of the Viceroy to see that this

hedge is n o t pierced from outside b y th e enemies

of t h e Em pire. Incide ntally also th e hedge itself

occasionally requires trimm ing: I t s inha bitants, th e

independen t tr ibes, th ou gh useful as a defence, ar e

sometimes troublesome a s neighbours. O n th e other

aide of th e h ed ge ar e fo u r countries, T hib et, Asiatic

Russia, Afgh anistan an d Persia , from on ly one of

wh ich, Ru ssia of course, is a n invasion of B ritish

India to be feared.

S ta r t in g on tho ex t r eme nor th -emt wi th th e

Th ibe tan border, invas ion is practica;lly impossible

from th is quarter . Th ere have been rumo urs

I


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RUSSIA FGH NIST N

N D

PERSIA

3

lately of a Russian treaty wit11 Thibct; but even

if the whole country fell into the hands of Russia

that would not matter to us. Thibet is a poor

country commercially unprofitable and the roads

across the border are mere mountain tracks

difficult enough for the individual traveller and

impossible for an army. Similarly across Gl~e

Pamirs near Gilgit the only point at which

Russian territory is actually conterminous with

British we have nothing to fear beyond the possi-

bility of a few dribblets penetrating into Eashmir.

t Chitral no menace to India itself is involved;

but if we had not occupied that small State

Russia would have done so and would thus have

come in direct contact with the turbulent tribes

upon our border and havc been in position to

foment trouble among them.

Afghanistan has hithcrto been regarded as the

wcak spot in our defences.

Every invasion of

India from the north known t o history has come

through Afghanistan and that gate of India the

Khyber Pass. But the conditions of modern war-

fare have changed many things and Afghanistan


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LORD CURZON IN INDI

should now be an easy country to defend.

Its

inhabitants are fierce and fanatical and before

their resistance to a Russian advance was over-

come the British army would have time to choose

the most favourable position to meet the invader.

According to modern military science our best

position is the Kabul-Kandahar line. Kabul com-

mands all the passes that debouch from the north

and i t is only seventy miles from our outposts near

Peshawar. Similarly Kandahar blocks the

Russian line of advance from Kushk through

Herat to Quetta and is only seventy miles from

our railway terminus at New Charnan. I

The Russian railway terminus a t Kushk is about

the same distance from Herat.

There are about

4

miles between Herat and Kandahar; thus

Russia would have little more than time to seize

Herat before we could occupy both Kabul and

Kandahar and check her advance.

It

is practi-

cally certain that

if

Russia should ever invade

Afghanistan the British army also would cross

our border and advance to meet her. For political

reasons

we

could not afford to wait inactive on


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RUSSIA AFGHANISTAN AND PERSIA 5

our frontier and risk a rising in the inte rior of India.

B ut th e Boer W ar has shown th at modern arms of

precision have so increased th e advantage s of t h e

defending side t h a t th e 100,000 men we could pour

across th e border a t th e thre at of danger w ould be

able to deal with any Russian arm y th a t survived

the difficulties of commissariat and transport across

the Afghan mountains.

At the extreme western end of the line

comes Persia, w l~ ic hhas been gradually rising

in international importance of recent years.

From her present base in this direction Russia

could no t possibly a tt a c k India.

In

addition

to th e whole wid th of Persia the re ar e

500 miles of Baluchistan between the

Russian frontier an d Quetta. B u t Russia s

policy of insidious but unresting advance is

too familiar for us to rest easy upon that score.

Recent history seems to show th a t sh e is

now directing he r attention to acqu ire complete

control of Persia and its railways. W it h

a

l ine

of rail u p to th e Baluchistan border, th e

grtmaries of Kh ura san and Seistan beh ind


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LO RD C U R Z O N I N I N D I A

he r, and only th e Baluch desert between her

nd

Quetta , Russia would be in a very different

position to t h a t which she a t present occupies,

a n d the physical features of t he country la y

India more open

to

at tack at th is point than

anywhere else along the whole line of our

north-west frontier.

Turn ing to the internal condition of th e two

countries which form

buffer St ate s between

us and Russia, Lord Curzon's term of office has

been signalised by th e occurrence of a n event

in

Afghanistan which had long been anticipated

b y students of Cen tral Asian politics a s like ly

to provoko a crisis in the antagonism between

us

and Russia. T h a t was th e death of Abdur

Rahm an, the s trong b u t cruel ruler, w hom we

recognised as Amir when after the second

Afgh an W a r he showed himself able to hold th e

thro ne aga inst all comers. So long as Ab dur

Rah m an lived th e policy of preserving Afg hanistan

in

its entirety was both obvious and simple.

T h e wily old Arnir w as no t entirely loyal to

us. He

w s

not averse to causing us annoyance


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RUSSIA, AFGHANISTAN AND

PERSIA 7

when he wished t o display his own power, fo r

instance b y writing his book, th e

Talcwim-u din.

preaching a

jeh d

against th e infidels, or b y

encouraging th e Afridi mullahs to stir up th e

tribes aga inst us. B ut he was too good a

judge of his own interests to intrig ue deeply

with Russia. A s his autobiograp hy shows, he

knew ve ry well th at in th e last resul t our interest

is to preserve Afgh anistan an d Russia's is to

dismember it.

A w eaker or less cra ft y rul er

m ay no t recognise t h a t point so clearly. B ut

th a t is not all. Afgh anistan is a mere aggreg a-

tion of provinces; i t is, like India , China, or

Asiatic Russia, ra th er a geographical tract o

country inhabited b y different and alie n tribes

tha n a homogeneous na t io n, He rat was only

annexed to the Afghan kingdom in the last

year of

Dost Mshomed's life, Ballrh and the

rest of T urk est an tw o or three ye ars earlier,

K an da ha r n ot long before that. Th e different

provinces a re only held together y the s ingle

thr ea d of a man's life, Afghanistan is s

one m an Power. Consequently ther e wa s


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LORD URZON

IN

INDIA

the danger that, if Abdur Rahman s successor

did not prove as strong a man as himself, Kabul,

Kaudahar, Ghazni, Herat, the Hazareh high-

lands, those of the Aimaks and the Usbeg

provinces along the Oxus might all fall to

pieces and disintegrate. Abdur Rahman waB

too w a ~ y and suspicious openly to appoint

his successor during his own lifetime; but

short of that he did all that he could to

secuye the succession of his eldest son,

Babibullah Khan. During the lest years of

his life he gave Habibullah complete control of

the domestic affairs of the kingdom, and chose

him wives from all the most influential families

in the country. These measures proved un-

expectedly successful and though Habibullal~ is

not a strong a man as his father, he has held

the throne of Afghanistan now for a year, which

is no mean feat. But as Abdur Rahman chose

the moment to die when we were at war in

South Africa, and India was denuded of all

available troops, we may be sure that Lord

Cnrzon had soms anxious moments.


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R US SIA , A F G H A N I S T A N A N D P E R S I A 2

Persia is in much the same distracted state as

Afghanistan. Like Abdur Rahraan, the late Shah,

Nasr-ed-Din, was a strong and far-sighted ruler.

He knew better than to allow Russian influence

to obtain a hold upon his country but the present

Shah, Muzaffar-ed-din is a weak and self-in-

dulgent monarch, who in order to obtain the

funds to enjoy himself in Europe has tied his

country to the chariot wheels of the Tsar. This

he did by means of the Russian Lonn of 1900,

which is secured upon the Persian customs, and so

makes Russia's trade interests paramount in Persia.

This is the picture which the latest traveller in

Persia draws of the Russian Octopus. *

No railway can a t this moment be constructed

in Persia; the new Custo~qs ariff cannot be com-

pleted or passed into law until approved by Russia

turnpike tolls-by no means scarce-are all in the

hands of Russia; no vehicle can enter Kasvin (on

the high road from Europe and the Caspian Sea)

without paying toll to a Russian company; the

entire country between Julfa (on the Russian

eastelm frontier) and Tabriz-a distance of 200

f ~ c

truggle

f o r Pevsia

by

Donald Stu art M ethuen).


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LORD CURZON

IN

INDIA

miles-and between Tabriz and Teheran-a dis-

tance of

4

miles-has quite recently been surveyed

by

Russian officials with the ostensible purpose of

making roads the entire route between Resht and

Anzali, on the Caspian Sea (and the direct road

from Europe to Teheran), is in the hands of Russian

companies, both as regards post-carts and post-

stations; the Shah cannot purchase a rifle with-

out the approval of the resident Cossack General,

and as to raising money by a foreign loan or

by

the granting of concessions for mining or any other

purpose known to free agents, i t is simply pro-

hibited in accordance with a bushel of protocols,

treaties and conventions between the two high

contracting powers.

In short, Persia

is at

this moment in everything

but name a Buspian province.

During his term of

office, Lord Curzon has done his best to encourage

British-hdiun trade with Persia. He has opened

up the Quetta-Seistan trade route, even to the point

of extending the railway seventy miles along it

from Quetta to Nushki, and he has appointed

Captain Chenevix Trench to watch British interests

as Resident i n the southern province of Persia,

which most concerns us. But against the in-


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RUSSI A, AFGHANI STAN AND PERSI A

3

fluence of th e Russian loan Lord Curzon ha s been

able to do but little.

Russia's main purpose in th us ge ttin g Persia

into her power is believed to be the acquisition

of a po rt on th e Pers ian Gulf.

In accordance

with t h e lege ndary will of Pe ter th e Great,

she is alw ays strugg ling for an ice-free outlet

on the sea. S h e has late ly obtained one east-

wards a t Po r t A r thu r ; and now she wants

one sou thw ard s on th e Persian Gulf. As

Captain Mahan has recently pointed out,

this is a question that intimately concerns

Bri tish in terests in India . Th at gre at s tra tegist

gives the following three reasons why Britain

should dis t rust such a .move :-

First, her security in India, which would be

materially aff'ected by an adverse change in

political control of th e C u lf ; secondly, th e

safety of the great

sea route, commercial and

mil itary , to India and the Fu r th er Eas t , on

which British shipping is still actually th e

chief trave ller, thou gh with a notable comparative

The

Perfjian ulf and

International

Relations, by Captain

kIahan

ational

ezdew

for

September

1902.


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4 LORD CURZON N INDIA

diminution that demands national attention;

and thirclly, the economic and commercial wel-

fare of India, which can act politically only

through the Empire, a dependence which greatly

enhances obligation. The control of the Persian

Gulf by a foreign State o l considerable naval

potentiality, a fleet in being there based on

a strong military port, would reproduce the

relations of Cadiz, Gibraltar and Malta to the

Mediterranean. It would flank all the routes

to the Further East, to India, and to Australia,

the last two actually internal to the Empire,

regarded as a political system; and although a t

present Great Britain uncluestionably could

check such

a

fleet, so placed, by a division of

her own, i t might well require a detachment

large enough to affect seriously the general

strengtl~of her naval position.

On the same point Lord Curzon says in his

book on Persia

:

The safety of India, which is the first duty

of Great Britain, the Pax Britannica that now

reigns in the Southern Sea in consequence

of

her temperate control, the sacrifices that have

been made by her i n pursuance of that end,

the utter absence of any Russian interests for


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RUSSIA,

AFGHANISTAN AND

PERSIA 5

tlloussnds of

miles

t h e perfect abili ty of Persia

in these parts t o l o o k after herself, are in-

controvertible a r g u m e n t s against an y such ag-

gression. t can o n ly b e prosecuted in the tee th

of interna tjone l m o r a l i t y , in defiance of civilised

opinion, and

wiijh the

ultimate certainty of

a war with th i s c o u n t r y th a t would r ing from

pole to pole.

*

I t i s t o be tha t Lord C un on ib of

the saine opinion still, and he is credited with

having stiffened the beck of the Hom e Govern-

ment on this su bj ect

by

h is o5c ial representations.

T he recent sa n ct io n given by th e Sultan of

Turkey to th e B a g h d ad Rai lway has raised

the question of overland communication between

India and Eu rope . Th ere a re two a lternat ive

courses, to lin k u p t h e I n d ia n sy ste m w ith t h e

Russian Tr an s-C asp ian sy ste m across Afghanistan,

which only requires some

500

miles of lin e fro m

Que t ta to Kushk;

and

the very much longer

s tretch from Q u e tt a t o th e Persian Gulf, which

is dependent on t h e com pletion of th e Germ an

line to Koweit.

Lord Curzon, however, is know n

Persia

y

Hon.

G

urzon

(Longmans

8

Go.).


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L O R D CURZON I N IN D IA

to favour the latte r plan, The danger of coming

in to close connection with Russia in A fghan istan

is too great. I t means vast armaments on the

scale which a conterminous frontier entails

upon France and Germany in Europe; and

India is too poor to afford vast armaments.

Besides, the line thro ugh Persia an d th e

Eu ph rate s Valley proceeds on interio r lines to

th e Trans-Caspian system, an d would with-

dra w much of the fre igh t an d passenger traffic

from that line. It would also block

a

possible

Russian line from the Trans-Caspian system

t o th e Pe rsian Gulf. S i r Thomas Holdich,

however, the great au tho rity on th e Indian

borderland, say s th at this la tte r line is practically

im p o s~ ib le owing to geographical difficulties.

I t would cross all the mountain rang es in

Persia a t rig ht angles. B ut the extension 01

th e Q uet ta l ine through Ke lat and Kirm an to

Teheran is perfectly feasible. I t would proceed

d o n g th e watershed of the rang es a t a height of

3

feet, without ever encountering a serious

he

ndian

Bo t ~d 8~ lmd

y

Sir

T

Holdich

Mothuen).


40/163

RUSSIA AFG HAN ISTA N AND PERSIA

2 7

obstacle. Still there is no good in our being

able to reach Teheran until the German line

rcacl~es Koweit, and that all depends on the

Sultan and his guarantees.

It is of course possible that Russia has no

desire or intention of invading India a t any

time, and that all these precautions to preserve

buffer States and avoid railway connection are

unnecessary. It is even quite probable that the

periodic famines of recent years have opened the

eyes of Russia to the real poverty of India, and

that she does not desire a country which would

afford no outlet for her surplus peasant popula-

tion, and would require a class of educated

administrators which she does not possess. But

we cannot reckon upon any such indifference.

Whatever else is uncertain, this is certain, that

whether Ilussia desired India or not, she would

always demonstrate against it as a lever to aid

her schemes in China, Persia or elsewhere.

We

must depend, not on Russia s forbearance, but

on our own strength or inaccessibility. The

fact, which has just been revealed, that she


41/163

8 LORD CURZON

I N INDI

took advantage of the Boer War to push her

own schemes in Afghanistan shows that this is

one of the main problems in international

politics that must trouble the rest of the

ndian Viceroy.


42/163

C H A P T E R

I

TH

INDEPENDENT TRIBES

IN he in ternal affairs of India th e most d i5 c u lt

and never-ending problem is furnished by the

turbulent

and blood thirsty P at h an tribes on

our north west frontier , who are within our

sphere of influence,b u t have never been thoroughly

controlled by , us. I n tha t, however, we ar e only

in th e same case as previous rulers of Ind ia,

w h o

one a nd all , Mogul, Sikh , or A fghan, found these

ha rd y mountaineers too warlike and the ir

fastnesses too inaccessible to m ake th ei r sub juga-

tion possible. Since th e time of Lord La wrenc e

our treatm en t of these independent tribes ha d

followed two distinct and varying lines, entitled

respectively th e forward policy and th e

close-border system. The views of th e fo rw ard

9


43/163


44/163

T H E IN D E P E N DE N T T R I E S

subjection of these tribes as desirable, but con-

sidered the immediate realisation of that object

as too costly for the resources of India. t was

all

a

question of expense. The advocates of the

forward policy were chiefly military men

who

desired active service and medals, and did not

trouble about ways and means. The advocates

of the close-border system were mainly civilian

administrators, who wanted all the money that

could be spared for the clevelopment of their

districts in the interior of India, their protection

against famine and so on. These men regarded

military adventures on the frontier as a waste

of

public money.

But both schools have equally been put out of

date by the measures initiated by Lord Curzon

during his

term

of

office. When Lord Curzon

landed a t Bombay in December 1898, the 'firah

campaign, following upon the .great frontier

coailagration of 1897-98 had only just been

finished, and the whole question of the pacification

of the bloody border was under consideration,

Sir William Lockhart, the commander

of

the


45/163

3

L O R D C U R Z O N

IN

INDIA

T ir eh E xped ition, had proposed th e retention of

Ti rah , th e summer home of th e hfridis, a s a

sanatorium for our troops; and though that

proposition had been vetoed,

it

had practically

been decided to take th e Khy ber Pass from the

Afridis a nd hold i t by means of a for t in the

midd le of the Pass itself a t Ali Masjid, an d

another g re at place of arms at Landi Kohat, a t

t h e A fghan end of th e Pass. Lord Cureon, by

his speeches in t h e Hou se of Comm ons, prac tically

stood committed to th e forward policy. I n his

speech in the big Indian debate at the opening

of P arliam ent in

1898

he said, It is clear that

a t some time or other we m ay have to advance

t o the extern al frontier of which

I

have been

speaking (the Oxus), or a t an yrate to ta k e up a

forward, although a

less

forward position, on the

lin e of Kabul, Ghazni an d Kandahar. H is

appointm ent as Viceroy, therefore, was g enerally

regarded as a distinct tr iumph for the forward

policy. B u t Lord Curzon has too much force to

allow himself to be bound by the spoken word.

H e immediately set t o work to examine and


46/163

THE I N D E P E N D E N T T R I B E S

revise his preconceived opinions in the l ig h t of

the fresh evidence t h a t was s e t before him.

T h e result of th is process m ay be seen in th e

Butlget speech to which reference has ~ l r c a d y

been m ade and which h e delivered a li tt le over

two years af ter he reached India. H e the n

said :

It ha s alway s seemed to me t h a t a sur vey of

the whole situation in the ligh t of ou r experience

our pledges our armaments and our general

resources ought to be productive of a code of

frontier policy which could w ith consistency an d

w ithou t violent interruptio ns be applied to th e

whole line of o ur no rth-w est fro nt ier Prom th e

Pamirs to Bd uchis tan. Such

a

code me have

endeavoured to evolve. I t s uain features consiat

in the withdrawal of our ~ c g u l n r roops from

ndvonced positions in tribal terri tor y an d th eir

concentration in posts upon or ne ar t o the In d ia n

border their replacement in triba l trac ts by

bodies of t ~ i b a l evies trained up by British

officers to act as a m ilitia in defence of th eir ow n

native valleys and hills;

in

other words the

subs titu tion of policy

of

frontier garr isons

draw n from the people themselves l o r th e

costly esperimenl of large forts and isolated posts

C


47/163

L O R D C U R Z O N I N INDIA

thrown forward in to

a

turbulenl; and fanatical

country. The policy has t o just ify i tse lf; an d

tha t i t can only do i n time. do not sa y th a t

i t will save us from frontier w arfar e or fro m

occasional expeditions, or fr om chronic an xi et y.

All claim for i t i s th a t it is

a

policy of

m ilitary concentration a s again st dis pe r~ ion , nd of

triba l conc iliation in place of exasperation.

Now let us see how t h is general principle

was applied in details.

Beg inn ing a t the nor th -

east end of the frontier, and proceeding west-

wards, we come first t o th e Swatis, who i n 189 7

attacked the Malakand camp.

t

was neces-

sary to bold this position, because

it

commands

th e Chitral road, and C hitral had to be

retaine d fo r political reasons. Acco rdingly, t h e

Malakand was strengthened

by

a l igh t f ron t ie r

rai lway from Peshawar to Dargai , and a flying

column was instituted there to reinforce that

pa r t of the frontier . A t the same t im e th e

regular garrison in C hitr al was reduced, ou r

troops were concentrated a t Drosh, i n close

proximity to tho Dir-Chitral l ine of communica-

t ion, and our mil i tary s trength in that countl .y


48/163

TH I N D E P E N D E N T T R I E S

was

supplcmentecl by native levies drarvn frorn

the Melitar s subjects.

Next

come the Afridis, who rtttaclrcd the

Rhyber Pass lldd

by

the Khyber Rifles in August

1897

I t liad been proposed to tolie the Pass fro111

them and n~ake he Rhyber a British liighrvay.

L o ~ dCurzon quashed that praposal, and also

tile projected British forts. He withdrew the

whole of t l ~ c egular troops, both British and

i

native, froin all positions in the Pass, and

re-

placed them by two baltalions of reorganisecl and

enlarged Rhyber Rifle3, with ail increased

number of British officers and an improved scale

of

pay.

He abandoned the plan of laying

railway through the Afridi country up to thc

Afgllnn border, ntld instead only extended it

to Jctinrud, at the British encl of the Pass, which

was

strengtllened by the provision of another

flying column.

South of the Afridis come the Orakznis, who

with the Afridis were the objcct of the Tirall

Expedition in

1898.

They were provided for

by

the construction of a cart road through the


49/163

6 L O R D C U R Z O N I N I N D I A

Ko hat Pass f rom Peshaw ar to Kohat an d the

construction of ano ther l igh t f ro nti er l ine froin

Kushalgarh on th e Indus to Thall a long t h e

flank of th e Saina rla ridge. A force of tribal

militia

450

strong largely recrui ted f rom t h e

Oralczai I ribesmen an d enti tled th e Sam an a

Rifles was raised

as

an extra baltal ion of

the B order Military Police a n d replaced t h e

regular garr isons on th e Sam ana range which

were w i tl ldrawn a nd concentrated a t Ro ha t .

I n th e Ru r r am Vall ey a lso th e Kur r am Mi litia

wns augm ented and reorganised in tw o battal io ns

under British officers ancl replaced the regular

Br i ti sh garr ison F ur th er south again come

the g reat t r ibe of the W aziris and f rom them

two battalions of Waziristan Militia 8

each were raised the one for the Tochi Valley

or Nor thern W aziris tan th e o ther for th e Goinal

Valley or So uthern W azir is tan. O ur troop s

were withdrawn froin the Tocll i Valley and con-

centrated a t Bannu but fur the r developments in

this direct ion were checked b y the m isconduct

and subsequent blockade of t h e M ahsud


50/163

THE INDEPENDENT TRI ES

W aeiris. Finally, th e supervision an d con trol

of th e whole front ier was provided for b y

th e creation of th e new Fro ntie r Province, which

requires

a

chapter to i tself.

T h e only interrupt ion to th e peace of th e

fr o n tie r du rin g Lord Curzoa s term of office ha s

been the

bloclrade of the Mahsucl W azir is. The

greul t r ib e of the W aziri s a re th e la rgest and, wi th

th e exception of th e Afridis, lh e m ost powerful

tri be on th e north-wost fron tier of Ind ia. Th ey

nu m be r in all some 40,000 fighting m en, of whom

a slllall portion resicle in Afghan terr i tory.

The

remainder inha bit w h at is nonlinally Bri t ish

t e r r i t o ~ y , ho ug h

it

has ncvor been thoroughly

subjug ated by us. T h e W szir i s on th e Bri ti sh

side of th e border a re divided into t h c Darwesll

T


51/163

8

LORD C U R Z O N I N IN D IA

bounded on the north by the Tochi River, and on

the south by the Gomal River. The R Iahsud

country is intersected in all directions by ravines.

The narrowest part of these is where the water

has had to pierce it s way through a range crossing

its course at right angles. Such gorges, called by

the natives tangis are the points usually selected

to oppose an enemy. As inay be supposed, they

form an exceedingly difficult country for military

operations.

This last is the fourth time that we have been

obliged to punish the Mahsuds on a large scale for

their raiding proclivities. In 1860 an expedition

was sent against them under Brigadier-General

Chamberlain, followed by a two years blockade.

In 1881, again, after the Afghan War, they were

punished by an expedition under Brigadier-

General Kennedy.

But it was in November

894

that the Mnhsuds performed their most notable

feat of modern times in the night attack upon the

camp a t Wans, in which a charge of 1500 tribes-

men very nearly succeeded in sweeping a British

brigade off its camping ground. This was followed


52/163

T H E I N DE P EN D E N T T R IB E S

by a pu ni t ive expedi tion under S ir W ill iam

Lockhar t in 1595.

D urin g the frontier outbreaks of 1897-1898 th e

W azir is were t h e on ly t r ibe on ou r border w ho

did not break in to open revol t , and therefore

did no t undergo punishment. I n consequence of

th is the y began to g ive t rouble , and

in

November

1900 t.hey were summoned by tho Go vernm ent t o

pay an acculnulated fine of

l kh

of rupees

36666) for pe st misdeeds. Th is th e y refused t o

do, an d in consequence blockade was be gu n,

which lasted for over a year. T h e blockade con-

sisted of a cordon 300 miles in le ng th of troops,

mil i tia, an d border police d raw n roun d the M ahsud

country.

They were not al lowed

t o

i ivport

or

expor t any th ing f rom Br i t i sh te r r i to ry , and as

the ir coun try is n ot sel f-suppor ting i t was hoped

i n t im e to s tarve them into submission.

O n t h i s

d u t y 1800 ex tr a troops an d 360 police, besidea the

normal gar r isons of Tochi and W m a , am oun t ing

to some 3000 regulars, were employed, and also

t h e tw o newly-raised militia batta lions of W aziri-

stan . Th e cost of s u c l ~ blockade is on ly abo ut


53/163

4 3

LOR

CURZON I N I N D I A

l o 0 a d a y ; a n d

it

i s possible to blockade a t r ibe

fo r th r ee yea r s fo r th e same sum as

a

la rge ex-

pedit ion would consume i n sixteen days.

I

In

th e middle of J u n e 190 1 abou t Rs.70,000

o u t of the fine of R~i.100,000 ha d been p ai d in

246GG out of EGGGG l eav ing

a

balance of about

S2000 owing. B u t

all

th e respectable men

anlongs t the Mahsuds had a l read y pa id th e i r sh are

and th e ba lance w as owed by the poore st and

most independent sect ion, who refused t o p ay th e

remainder

At t he same t ime, band s of M ahsud s

bro lre ou t and a t tacke d o u r mi l i t ia posts , r eapin g

several small successes. U nd er these circum stance s

th e Government p lanned

a

series of counter-raids,

which was successfully inibiatecl in the la st w ee k

of November 1901. P o u r columns un de r th e

com ma nd of C olollel D e n in g mad e

a

s imul taneous

a t ta ck o n the Mahsuds f ro m four d if fe ren t d i rec -

tio ns. T h e c olu m u s s t a rt e d f ro m D a t t a K l ~ e l n

th e nor th , nnd from Ja i ldola, Snrweka i an d W an a

on the sou th , and conve rged on Makin in the

centre of th e Mahsud coun try. Th is combined


54/163


55/163

4 LO RD C U R Z O N I N IN D IA

Mshsuds has been successfully invaded, an d t h e y

received an e xceedingly s h a rp lesson.

The special point a bou t these operat ions w a s

th e mi~lgled economy an d efficiency w i th w h ic h

they we re conducted . They were an a m a l g a -

mat ion of th e two t radi t ional puni t ive m et h o d s

of an expedit.ion a n d a blockade. Of tlle,se t w o

rival policies Lord C urzon said in his B u d g e t

Speech of Alrarch

1902

:

I

observe t h a t t h e policy of a blockade arouses

al n ~ o st s conflict ing emotions in th e bosoms

of

frontier crit ics as used t o do, for instance, th e

frontier policies of Lord Lawrence and Lord

Lytton.

Those w ho pre fe r t he d rast ic m e tho ds

of an expedition denounce a blockade , and do

the ir best to p rove t h a t i t is e ither a fa i lu r e

r

a

~l ia rn . Those who from th e experience of p a s t

expedit ions, with their shocking disproport ion

of cost to resu lt , d is tr u st t h a t method of

pro

cedure, as s t rongly favour a b lockade. F o r m y

own pa r t r ega rd th e two as a l te rna tive m e tho ds

of coercing

a

hostile or rebellious enemy,

and

th e dist inct ion between the m a s one of po licy

ra ther than of ethics.

These words of L o ~ d urzon 's were a reference


56/163

T H E I N D E P E N D E N T T R IB ES

to certain cri t icisms expressed in India, not

aga inst th e success or economy of t h e op eratio ns,

bu t aga ins t the suppos i t ion tha t as they mere

called a blockade or

a

counter ra id , th e

troops concerned would no t be enti t led to the ir

medal and ex tra pa y fo r act ive service. T h is

supposition, however, w as declared b y L or d

Curzon to be purely gratui tous, in a let ter to

the

Pioneee

date d 31st M ay 1902, i n t h e course

of which he said :

Anyone reading these sentences would un -

doubtedly der ive the i lnp re~s io n th a t in respec t

of dispatches, gratuities

nnd

medals these troops

had been o r were to be fo rgo t ten , and th a t

their legitimate expectations were to be sacrificed

to a verb al defini tion. Th ere is not , an d there

h a s a t

n o

stage been, the s l ightest foundation

for the insinuation.

Thus the Army go t its medals and th e Mahsuds

go t th ei r beating, a nd every body w as satisfied.

I n t h e course of th e same speech Lord Curzon

remarked th a t th e whole cost of t h e operat ions

was less than 16 la l~ h s , which would ap ly


57/163

L OR D C U R Z O N I N I N D l A

have lasted an expedition on the old scale for

sixteen daj7s. I n word, Lord Curaon has

showed in his aclministration of the frontier

that, while desiring to be conciliatory, he can,

on occnsions where i t is necessary to support

the dignity of the Empire, show firmness and

enterprise; and that even in the operation of

punishing the Empire s enemies he is not forget-

f u l of t l ~ c lnpoverishcd co~idition of India s

finances.


58/163

C I I A P T E R V

TH E NEW FRONTIER PROVIN E

TEE idea of separating the unsettled from tlle

settled districts

o

India, and mnlring the

whole of the border tracts into a single province,

with an Adn~iaistrator and staff of aflicers of

its own, is as old as tho time of Lord Lyttozl.

Thc justification lor such a course is obvious.

On the one hand, the change woulcl be ~clvart-

tageous for the settled districts of the Punjt~b,

because i t would leave the Lieutenant-Governor

free to devote his whole attention to them,

instead of being continually distracted by border

ci imes ,n,nd outbreaks. On the other hand, it

would be good for tlie unsettled tracts,

because i t would provide a class of officers

specially trained in the frontier school, and

with nn expert knowledge of the tribes, amongst

4


59/163

6 L O R D C U R Z O N IN

I N D I A

whom they would spend thei r l i fe . I n h is

minute, dated 22nd Apri l 187 1, Lord Lyt ton

put the case for a separate frontier provillce in

words

whicli cannot be improved upon, even

in the light of all ' that 11ns since hqpened :

T h e Viceroy, (lie said), would b y m cans of

this arrang em ent command th e services of his

own specially selected A ge nt, in whose hands

th e thr ea ds of all

ou r border poli tics and tr ibal

relations would be conce ntrated. T h e tim e of

such a n A gent could be devoted almost entirely

to purely frontier duties; and hc would be

better able th a n an y Lieutenaat-Governor of

th e Punja b can possibly be to visi t with

ade qua te frequency, free dom of m ind, an d single-

ness of in terest, al l pa rts of th e fr o n ti e r; thu s

making himself personally and thoroughly

familiar with the social facts , individual

characters and local sentiments which claim

incessant and concentra ted a t tent ion in the

successful administration o border politics.

T h e political and ad m ini str ati ve conduct of th e

frontier would be in th e same hands, a n d pass

th ro ug h th e same channels. All division of

responsibility and all antagonism of schools

and systems would thus be avoided.


60/163

THE NEW

F R O N T I E R P R O V I N C E 47

This idea

w s

approved by nearly every

frontier authority from that time onwards.

I t

was supported by such experienced executive

officers

as

S i r Bartle Frere, Sir Henry Durand,

Lord Roberts, Sir James Browne, Sir Robert

Warburton, Sir h b e r t Sandeman, and Sir

William

Lockhart; and by such tried adminis-

tra tors a s Lord Lytton, Si r Cha.rles Bitchison,

Sir George Chesney, and Lord Lausdowne. In

addition t o Lord Lytton a opinion, i t will be

sufficient

to

quote that of

Sir

Robert Warburton,

who

w s

Warden of the Rhyber for eighteen

yesrs i n t h e transition period immediately pre-

ceding Lord curzon s advent, and

who

only

handed over charge of the Pass

a

few days

before the Afridis broke into open revolt in

1597,

This experienced officer said ,-

The on ly wa y to prevent future wars on the

frontier, and

to create a

friendly impression on

the wild

m n

of the independent hills is to alter

the system which has proved useless for thirty-

Egg teen

cars

n the K?~?/bcl ,y

Sir Robert Warburton John

Murray) .


61/163

8 LORD CURZON I N INDI

five yea rs. Replace i t by the scheme which His

Excellency Lord Lytton intended carrying out

when h e wa s Viceroy of In d ia , an d w hich met

w ith tlie app rov al of th e M arquis of Sa lisbu ry

and the Government th en in power. L e t there

be Chief Commissioner or officer on special

duty (no matter what name he may be ca l led

by), one well u p in Persian an d Pas htu , and able

to visit every spot wherever his presence is re-

quired. Let him be supplicd with a sufficieat

staff to carry on the higher civil, criminal and

reveillue details, so as to give

him

sufficient leisure

for his ha rde r wo rk. L e t Dcpn ty Commissionera,

Assistant Commissioners, etc., do purely and solely

the civil wo rk of thcir districts. And , las tly ,

have political and police officers to u a d e ~ ta lc e he

trans-border police duties. L e t

l

these be

selected officers, with fair pay nncl promotion,

passing their entire service on th a t fron tier , w ith

no d a i~ g c r of transfel- to Cis-Indus charge.

Give this scheme, vhicll has tllus been briefly

noticed, fair t r ia l , and th e re is every cer ta inty

of a v ast iinprovement of th e relations between

the Indian Government and the independent

hillinon quiclrly following.

This is th e scheme which has been practicnlly

carr ied out

in

i t s en t i re ty by Lord Curzon;


62/163

THEN E W

F R O N T I E R P R O V I N C E

9

the only opposi t ion to i t came f rom past or

present Lieutenant-Governors of th e Punjab who

regarded it as a blow to th e importance of th e

province with which th eir nam e an d career were

associated.

T he new province which is enti t led the

Nor th-W est F ront ie r Province an d was brought

in to be ing by Lord C urzon in Fe bru ary 1901

consists of th e who le of th e T ran s-In du s dis tric ts

of th e Punjab as fa r south as an d including

Dera Ismail K ha n. T h e officer a t th e head of

th e new province is a n Agent to the G overnor-

General a n d a Chief Comm issioner of equa l

rank and posi t ion with tYe Agent to the

Governor-General and Chief Commissioner of

13aluchistar.1 a n d his ch arge con sis ts of th e

fou r dis t r ic ts ol Peshawar Ro hat Bannu an d

Dera I smai l Khan wi th the t r iba l cou nt ry

beyo nd t he ir limits an d also of the five

Political Agencies of D ir Sw at C h it rd of

the K hyb er of the K ur ram Valley a n d of

Nor th en d South Wazir is tan th a t i s to say

Wana an d th e Tochi Vhlley. The Agen t has


63/163

5

L O R D C U R Z O N

IN

INDIA

been given both

a

Revenu e an d a Jud icial Com-

missioner to assis t him in t l ie adm inistrat ive

and judicial work of t h e new province an d the

officers employed in it have been br ou gh t on

to th e l is t of th e Polit ical De partm ent of the

Government of India . Th us t h e ne w Province

can draw th e men best su i ted to i t s par t icular

duties from the cream of t h e In di an Civil

Service.

t i s es timated th a t th e a rea de tached f rom the

Punjab Prov ince by th is arrangem ent approximates

to one -fou stee nth of it s tot al are a one-fifteenth of

i ts tota l revenue a n d one-eighteenth of i t s popula-

t ion. This sub tract ion can not be rega rded as of

serious importance t o the Pu njab i tself because th e

populat ion revenue and we alth of th e Cis-Indus

Punjab have la rge ly increased dur ing the las t

tw en ty years The province has grow n an d de-

veloped in every direct ion in common w ith the

rest of India and

in addi t ion

it

has received the

benefit of th e gr e a t schem es of canalisation con-

nected wi th th e Chenab a n d Jhelum Rivers which

arc a l ready br inging

a

large increase of cult iva-


64/163


65/163

S LO R D C U R ZO N I N IN D IA

As

tile

new province has not yet been in worlr-

ing order for two years it is still too early to

pronounce a final juclgment upon the realisation

of

l

these predictions. But at least

in

found-

ing it Lord Curzon showed tha t he had the

eneTgy and courage necessary to carry out

reform that had been discussed and approved

for thirty years without ever going any

further.

The first Agent of the new Frontier Province is

Colonel Deane who was Political Officer with the

Chitral Expedition in

1895

and was in charge of

the Dir-Swab-Chitral Agency at the timc of

the outbreak in Swat in

1897

Colonel Deane is

an experienced frontier officer who is thoroughly

acquainted with the character of the tribes. He

is a strong and capable administrator and the only

defect with which he has ever been charged is a

tendency to interfere too much in the internal

affairs of the tribesmen. But certainly that

tendency has not been observable in his new

o5ce. Colonel Deane had already taken over

charge of the frontier a t the time of the


66/163

THE

N E W

F R O N T I E R PR O V I N E 5

Mahsud Woairi blockade and he helped largely

to bring those operations to their

successlul con-

clusion. Lord

Curzon said in his last Budget

speech that the new arrangement had resulted in

the quicke~ espatch of business in Waziristan

As has been said i t is yet too early to speak

with certainty but it seems probable that the

grcater stability and continuity of our frontier

policy brought sbout by the new province the

extension oE trade and intercourse caused by the

frontier light railways the increase of discipline

bred

by

the flsontier militias and the growth of

recruiting among the tribesmen for the ranks of

our Native Ariny will gradually but surcly bring

these waste places of the earth within the pale of

civilisation.


67/163


68/163


69/163


70/163

F A M I N E

A D M I N I S T R A T I O N

unprecedented to tal of co nsid erab ly over

6

million

persons. I t affected a n a re a of over 400 000

squ are miles a n d a p op ul at io n of 60 millions of

whom 25 mill ions belonged to Bri t ish India

and

t he r emainder to N a t i ve S ta t es . Nearly

a

qu arter of the e n ti re po pu lat ion of India came

within th e ran ge of rel ief operat ions. On a

cautious es t imate t h e to ta l product ion of the

country was a qu ar t e r if no t a th i rd less tha n

usual. Th is rep res en ted a loss of over 350 000 000

s ter l ing to which mus t be added the value of

a t l eas t

4

million

o

cattle.

It

must also be

remembered th a t th i s loss w a s no t spread over

th e whole of In dia b u t con centrated i n one por t ion

of th e con tinen t

a

la rg e p a r t of wh ich had suffered

severely in the previo us fam ine.

The wor s t po in t abou t t h i s Grea t Famine was

that the complete fa i lure of the monsoon caused

not only

a

crop fa i lu re b u t a l so

a

fodder and

water famine on an enormous scale .

Agriculture

is practical ly

{ he

on ly ind us t ry in I nclia an d the

agr icultur is t invests a l l h is ca pi ta l in the purchase

of p lough-catt le an d milch kine. This fodder


71/163

s

LORD CURZON N I NDI A

famine therefore a lmost annihila ted t h e w orkin g

capita l of t h e ag ri cu lt u ra l classes. T h e loss of i

human li fe in Bri ti sh Ind ia a lone i s e s t imated a t

7

1Q million persons of whom quarter of a million

belonged to N ativ e States b ut died in Brit i sh

terr i tory. I n a co un try the size of India in-

habited by

an

igno rant an d secre t ive populat ion

2

i t is ilnpossible to rely o n th e f igures furnish ed

i

b y th e natives. T he only possible method is to

take th e to ta l mor ta l ity of the year sub t rac t

1

from

it

the average morta l i ty for th e pas t decade

and

the excess i s roughly the number who have

died from f amine.

Th e following is t h e complete

table from which t h i s

reclroning

is

talren :-

I

I

Central Provinces

Province

Tuta l

eaths

Decennisl

re orded uemge of

in

1900 Death.

in


72/163

FA MIN E A D M I N I S T R A T I O N

But of this

l a

million i t

is

k n o w n that 230 000

persons died of cholera a n d smallpox brought on

by famine conditions.

This

leaves million

persons that died of ac tua l starvation. But

these figures only relate to Bri t i sh India. Even

to arrive at such

a

rough es ti ma te as this you

have to be sure that at l e a s t ell the deathe are

recorded. There is no su c h sure ty about a

Native State. There are n o reliable statistics

in

a

Native State at all no m e a n s of ascertaining

the mortality there.

In the recesses of these ill-

administered little principal it ies careless of

human life the people die o ike flies

wit

no

eye to marl; them ncl

no

British official to

record them. The only

means of

tracing their

disappearance is in the decennial census which is

taken for the whole of India.

The Census of 1901 te l ls s terrible tale of

human suffering and wholesale loss of life which

had hitherto been successfully burked. During

the decade 1891-1901 the to t a l population of Indin

only increased by some mill ions which was

a

grea t deal less than

it

should have been.

But


73/163

8 LO RD C U R Z O N I N I N D I A

the population of Br itish I ndia inc reas ed

by

&bout

104

millions, wbich leaves an actual

dec rease of some 3 1 ini l l ions in the Native

States . B ut th a t is not all. On prop ort ion ate

figures, instead of th ei r being a decrease, there

sllould have been an increase of ab ou t millions.

That inel ins that n ten years some

1

Inillion

persons disappeared out of these Nn tive S ta te s

mitllout leaving a trace behind them . T he ir bones

are probably r ot t ing unregsrded in th e jungle.

In the Eajputana Agency alone tlie population

fell by about

4

millions out of

1 2

millions,

r a te oE over 1 9 per cent. 1s i t a n y wonder

th at in his famine statem ent of October 19

Lorcl Curzon said i do not sp ea k of the

mortali ty in the Nat ive S tates , which ha s in m n i ~ y

crtscs beer1 sho ck ing , because th e G overn m en t of

Ind iu cannot be llelcl responsible f o r sy st e m

wliich it does not control.

But Lord Curzon's own famine record is no t

entirely above criticism.

During the f i rs t few

months of th e fam ine th e Go vernm ent of In di a

issued Circular Letter t o th e local Go vernm ents,


74/163

F A M I N E A D M I N I S T R A T I O N

call ing their at tention to the exceptional circum-

stances of th e s i tuation, and suggest ing grea ter

s t ringency in famine tes ts , Tl ie reason for th is

action was t h a t the fam ine of 1897 had wenkenecl

th e resis tance of th e people, an d h abitua ted th em

to Government relief, and numbers of persons

we nt on th e relief wo rks who were n ot in a s ta te

of des titution , or w ho could ha ve obtained cre dit

to t id e them over t i ll bet te r t imes. L or d Curzon

said :- he ar in some qua rter s of ,village abou rers

going on to th e w ork s simp ly to 611 tlie slack tim e

until th e cultivation of th e fields be gin s in t h e

spring. hea r in othe rs of wages f ixed under th e

Fam ine Commission scale which exceed t h e

prevail ing ma rk et rates. I t wa s to prevent such

occurrences as this , and to avoid sapping the

moral fibre

o

th e nation b y wholesale pauperisa-

t ion , that the Circular

was

issued. In princ iple,

perhaps , i t ma y have been justif ied. I t wa s a t

a n y ra te wel l- in tentioned. B ut in practice i t

turned out unfortunately.

T be effect of su ch a recom mendation depencls

of course larg ely on th e sp irit in which

it

is


75/163

6

LORD URZON

N INDI

interpreted

by

the local Government. In the

Central Provinces, which were caught unprepared

by the famine of

1891

and suffered in con-

sequence a heavy mo~tality,he local authorities

had learnt by bitter experience. They turned

a

deaf ear to the Circular, went on calmly with

t h e i ~ illage works, never allowed the wages to

fall to the penal minimum, and were rewarded

by coming out of the ordeal with flying colours.

Lord CurzonJ8 Government afterwards said that

their liberal policy of relief savecl thousands of

lives. But in Bombay, whose administration

obtained

an

unenviable notoriety for hard-

heartedness throughout the famine, the Circular

fell upon stony ground, and did immense harm.

Gujarat, which had hitherto been known s the

garden of India, is situated in the Bombay

Presidency. The rainfall there is so regular and

so abundant, that scarcity had not been known for

a

century, and the peasantry were among the most

prosperous in India. Upon this smiling lancl the

drought descended in its full force. The people,

instead of having

a

reserve of sta,mina, as was


76/163

F A M I N E A D M I N I S T R A T I O N 6

expected ha d become soft-fibred b y pro spe rity

and collapsed a t once un der th e unaccustomed

strain. T h e y died off l ik e flies from hunger a n d

on t h e top of t h a t came a wave of cholera whicli

heightened tenfold th e horror of t h e s ituat ion.

In Broach the month ly dea th - ra te rose f rom

2.96

p lr

ntille in October 18 99 to

24 83

in May 1900.

In the Panch Mahals the dea th - ra te o f

May

was

46.60

p lr

mille. Th ese distr icts were rava ged by

cholera; but in August 1900 one d is t r ic t of

G u ja ra t yielde d deatltl.1-rate of 15 21 per nziZle

exclusive of epidem ic disease. T he se figures

cannot; of course be en tirely attri bu ted t o th e

Circular ; but i t undoubted ly encouraged the

Bombay G overnm ent in minimising t h e gr av ity of

the s i tua t ion un t i l i t w as too la te

B ut a s soon as Lord Curzon realised the il l

effects t l lat his Circu lar wa s producing in Bombay

lie took imm ediate s teps to remedy them. I n

his Famine Statement

of

October 19 he

said

:

G uj ar at supplies an oth er installce of th e degree


77/163

6 L O R D

C U R Z O N

I N

I N D I A

i n which we have accen tua ted a nd added to the

flexibil i ty of th e Palnine Code. W he n th e g r e a t

outb rea lr of cholera hacl disorgsnised t h e la rg e

relief worlrs, an d ha d drive n th e tort if ied w orke rs

aw ay to the i r homes, an d when ex t raord inar i ly h igh

dea th-rate s revealed th e existence of v ery w ide-

spread des t i tu t ion and sugering, the Government

of Ind ia d id no t hes i ta te t o adv ise th e Bombay

Government to meet th e s itua t ion by en larg ing the

custo m ary bounds of gr atu i to us relief, and b y

opening pet ty vil lagc works to take the place of

t h e clesertecl public w or ks relief camps.

If th e Bom bay Gov ernmen t h ad hacl sp ar k of

energy o r humani ty in i ts composit ion, i t would

no t have wai ted fo r th i s adv ice to t ak c measures

t o save the people wh o were dy ing by thousands

on i ts hands . As i t was, t h e process in numberless

ins tances amounted t o lock ing the s tab le door a f te r

t h e s teed had been s to len , and a n appreciable

am ou nt of this excessive mo rtal i ty m ust be a t tr i-

buted to the act ion of th e Circular.

Nevertheless ,

in spit e of th is object-lesson, Lord C urzon con-

t in ue d to defend th e ini t ial policy of his G ove rn-

m e n t, a n d t o m a i n ta i n t h a t

it

was jus t i f i ed by

re ga rd for t h e morail fibre of t l ie famine-suEerers


78/163

P M I N E D M I N I S T R T I O N

6

and the pockets of tho taxpayers. Continuing the

mine speech, he said

:

should like to adrl that, in

my

opinion, there

tvas no inconsistency between the position talcen

up

by

the Governlncnt of Inclia in the first months

of thc famine, and their subsequent atti tude in

permitting a vast extension of gratuitous relief

during the rains in the Central Provinces, and in

counselling the Qovcrnment of Bombay

to

relax

the conditions of relief in Qujarat when cholera

had clisorganised the large worlru. Conditions are

raclic,zlly different at the beginning and at the

height of a famine; and a degree of firmness a t

the outset is essential, which would, a t a later stage,

be altogether out of place.

f

this be borne in

mind, our policy will on examillation prove to have

been consistent throughout.

n

the one hand,

we have set our face against indiscriminate and

pauprising charity, and havo endeavoured to in-

sist on relief being administiered with the care and

method which we owe to the taxpayer and to the

exchequer.

On

the other hand, we have been pre-

pared to accept any expenditure of which i t could

be s11o~m hat i t was required to save life, or to

mitigate genuine distress.

These are specious words, but no words can ex


79/163

plain a w ay or pallia te th e loss of those quarte r of

a

million lives. Lo rd Curzon s most valid defence

is th a t the responsibil i ty for the harsh applicat ion

of his Circular did not real ly rest with him but

with ohhers; and that when he discovered i ts

misapplication he a t once revoked h is own policy.

I n t h i s

and

other instances

he

has shown the

elastic instinct

of

the s ta tesman to learn by

i

failure.

B u t w ith t h e single exception of th is i ll-

oinened Circular Lord Curzon did everything

that was possible to mitigate the effects

of th i s unp arallele d fam ine. Th e scheme of

relief w as modelled on th e recom m enda tion of

the Famine Commission of

1898

which laid

stres s on th e necessity for sta rti ng relief before

th e people h ave run down, of exte nd ing the

area of g ra tu ito us relief, especially in th e form

of k itc he n relief fo r ch ildre n and old people, of

meting out special t rea tm en t to aboriginal and

fore st tribes, a n d of startin g sm all village

relief w ork s in special cases in preference t o

large w orks. Lo rd Curzon s Governm ent foun d


80/163

FAMINE A D M I N T S T R A T I O N 6

th e Comm ission s scale of wages too high, au d

its recomlnendations for gratuitous relief too

generous ; but that a id was not rea l ly grudged

where nece ssary is sho w n by coinparison

betw een th e fam ine of 1900 and th a t of 1897.

I n 1900 th e hig h w ate r m ark of relief was

mill ions as aga inst

4

in the previous

fa m in e; t h e rat io of relief was 18 per cent, as

against 1 0 per cent. in 18 97; while in the small

dist rict of M erw ara ac tu all y 75 per cent, of th e

population came on relief. I n the two years

1599-1900 an d 1900-1901, the Government sp en t

~1 0,0 00 ,00 0 s te rl ing on famine re lie f. I n the

ag gre gat e 1,135,353,000 people were relieved-a

total no t remotely removed from th e estimated

population of th e world. These a re eloquent

figures,

Ow ing to th e Boer W ar being in progress in

1900, and the demands upon pr ivate char i ty

i fo r th e relief of th e d istressed Uitlclnders an d

th e ass istanc e of our ow n wounded soldiers, tlie


81/163


82/163

F A M I N E A D M I N IS T R A T I O N

which ha s a lmost reached point a t which th e

soil refuses t o support a n y more. Th is

is

sufficiently sh ow n by th e great decline in the ra te

of increase of th e population observable i n t h e

Census of 1901. I n ordinary yearfi a la rg e

proportion of th is population live on the bo un ty

oE t h e e a r t h ; b u t t h e y liv e fro m h a n d t o m o u t h

an d have no reserve . Direc tly the ra ins fa i l an d

a drought comes starvation stares them

in

the

face. In di a depends fo r it s chief harv est of

the year on the monsoon rains which last from

Ju ly to September . These in t ur n depend on the

monsoon currents which cross the Indian Ocean

from So ut h Africa and afte r leaving Ind ia proceed

onw ards to Australia . I n recent years th e

Gov ernment of In d ia hav e started a Meteorological

D epartm ent which w it h th e assistance of th e

Observatory st th e Cape issues an annu al forecast

of the incidence of th e rains. On th e whole th es e

are moderately accurate. T he fact t h a t the recent

sequence of famine y ea rs in I nd ia has exa ctly

coincided with the severe drought which has

:

1 J


83/163

L OR D C U R Z O N

I N

I N D I

wrought such injury to stoclr in Australia, shows

thnt botG countries depend on the same set

of conditions for their rainfall, and that those

collditions have recently been unfavourable. The

*death of sheep in Australia is translated in to the

death of human beings in India, because the

population there lives so near the margin of

subsistence. I n considering the general question

of famines, however,

it

is not sufficiently re-

cognised that India has no Poor Law system.

Every year in England we spend ovcr 10,000,000

on poor relief, and think nothing of it. I n an

exceptional year in India we spend half that sum

on a population nearly ten times as greet, and

marvel a t the necessity for

it.

It is to be hoped

that

we

are now a t the end of the rccent cycle

of lcan years in India. The drought in Australia

has broken and in his last speech Lord Curzon

said tha t the timely end beneficial rains had

removed all danger of another famine, and brought

him the happiest weeks that, he had spent in

India.


84/163

F A M I N E A D M I N I S T R A T I O N

Fina lly, i t must be placed to Lord Curzon s

credit th a t a t t h e worst period of th e famine, and

a t th e most scorching pa r t of th e h ot weather, he

left the heights of Sirnla, thing neve r done b y

any Viceroy before, an d went for tour roun d

th e famine camps i n order t o see for himself

the condition of th e people a nd do w h a t h e could

to al leviate i t . T hi s one act of h um an ity an d

consideration w as w or th more to t h e people of

I n d i a t h a n m a n y l e k h s o rupees.


85/163

C H A P T E R

V I

I RRI G A TI O N A N D RA I LWA Y S

TIILR s a fre qu en t tendency am ong critics of

the Government of In dia to regard irr iga t ion-

canals and ra i lways as a l ternat ive and opposing

methods for mit igat in g t h e horrors of famine.

Th is tendency, of coul se, is m erely a n ac cide nt

clue to t h e lim ited financial resources of In d ia ,

and to the fac t th a t money which is spent on

one of these purposes is ips facto w i t h d r a w n

from t h e o ther . Right ly regarded, however

canals

anti

ra i lways are complementary to each

other in a comprehensive scheme of famine

prevention . Bu t s ta r t in g f rom th e beg inn ing , i t

was necessary that ono should take precedence

of th e other i n th e m atter of

construction.

U p

to the present, the pride of place has been

7


86/163

l R R I G A T I O N A N D R A I L W A Y S

7

held

by

rai lways. As the Famine Comlnisaion

of 1901 said , T o p u t the food-supply u t h e

country in circulat ion was necessari ly the firs t

object of a wise fam ine policy; to pro tec t an d

develop th e supp ly itself should b e its second

object; an d this is the function of agric ultura l

development generally and of irrig atio n in pa r-

ticular. .

But there a re s igns tha t the ra i lway develop-

ment of India is nearing completion, and that

there wil l soon be more t im e an d money t o

spend on th e co nstruction of canals, wells an d

tanks . A t p resent there a re 25 529 miles of

railwa y in India,* of which 3000 miles we re

added. du rin g Lord Curzon's firs t thr ee ye ar s

of office, while 2000 more are under construc-

t ion. The to ta l cap i ta l out lay on al l In di an

railways up to March 1901 was ;E215,668,637,

I

yielding a percentage of 4.71, a s ag ain st o n ly

1

$22,714,721 on irrigation works, yielding a per-

Parliamentary Peper-East Iudia Aocoants and Estimnteu,

1902-1903


87/163

7

L OR D C U R Z O N I N l N D IA

centage of

7 33

This g ives th e m easure of the

disproportion in t he o utlay between the tw o

forms of protective works. B ut now th e Fa m ine

Colnmission says that the t ime has come for

t ~

new departure in famine policy w hich would

place irr igat ion w orks in th e place t h a t pro-

tective railways have hitherto occupiecl in the

famine insurance programme.

Lord Curzoil du rin g his tcrm of ofice has

encouraged irr igat ion more than his predecessors ,

bu t he does no t p in h i s fa i th to i t a s

a

means

of regenerat ing th e fu tur e of India . H e has

raised the ann ual out lay on i t t o crore

(,E666,000) f rom about three fo urth s of th a t

su m ; and dur ing the p resen t year the to te l

outlay including famin e w orks is

139

lakhs , or

292'7,000.

But in his Budget Speech of

1900

Lord Cureon gave the following exposition of

the irrigation policy of his Government

:

N o w h a ve h a d

a

very carefu l es t imate

made out for me of the extent of fr sh g r o u n d


88/163

IRR IG TIO N ND R ILW YS

i

the whole of India which we are likely to

be able to b~ingunder cultivation, either

by

new irrigation projects or by extensions of ex-

isting systems. Under the head of Productive,

that is works

whicli may be expected to yield

a net revenue that will more than cover the

interest on the capital outlay, the estimated in-

crement is about

4

million acres, and the

estimated outlay between .63,000,000 and

S9,000,000 sterling. Under the head of Pro-

tective works, that is works which will not

pay, and which inasmuch as they coilstitute a

Documents

1903 Lord Curzon in India 1898-1903 by Lipsett s.pdf