1/7/80 [2] Folder Citation: Collection: Office of Staff …...MOBE THAN 40 NATIONS HAVE PETITIONED THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 8. TO CONDEMN THE SOVIET UNION 9. AND TO DEMAND

1/7/80 [2]

Folder Citation: Collection: Office of Staff Secretary; Series: Presidential Files; Folder: 1/7/80 [2]; Container 145

To See Complete Finding Aid: http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/findingaids/Staff_Secretary.pdf

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/findingaids/Staff_Secretary.pdf

.,

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

1/7/80

Rick Hutcheson --

Sequence of drafts from first "Presidential· notes and draft" to original speech text-re address to nati�n on US-USSR relationship/Afghanistan.

(Does not include teleprompter script)

Susan Clough

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. '' < ' ' . :.' : .-.:. PR.ES I DENT' JIMMY ;CARTER . : ' -- · ,•

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1. I tOME TO YOU TH1S EVEN.lNG ·,· .

TO DISCUSS. THE'· EXTREMELY .IMPOWfANT

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. JANUARY 4; 1980

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AN�� R�PI_DL� .. CHANGING CIR�UMSTANQES IN SOUTHWEST ASIA. 2. I co�ni NUE TO SH_A.RE W ITH·.·YOU -THE. SENSE .. oF Q�TRA.GE :AND- .iMPATIENCE 3. BtCAUSE-OF THE :KIDNAPPI'NG OF INNOCENT AMERICAN·-HOSTAGEs_':: .

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4. AND THE HOLDING 'OF tHEM.�BY' MILITANT TERRORISTS· · :. :·:./ . - - . . . .. . .

· . ' .. . _· . . . WI TH;;.:n�·E s Uf�PORI?&.?JXPBROVAU·,op I RANlAN !OFF I C fAES: . :_�

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S. OUR PURPOSES CONTINUE TO BE 6. THE PROtECTION OF THE LONG-RANGE.INTERESTS OF OUR NATION

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I AND THE SAFETY OF THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES I

.8. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO ·sECURE THE RELEASE OF THE AMERICANS · · 9. THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE� THROUGH· THE UNITED NATIONS) . 10. AND THROUGH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE n'TPLOMATI C EFFORTS.·

·:11. WE ARE DETERMINED TO ACCOMPLISH THIS GOAL. ll. WE HOPE TO DO SO WITHOUT BLOODSHED 13,; AND WITHOUT FURTHER DANGER· TO THE LIVES OF: OUR 50 FELLOW AMERICANS. 14. IN THESE EFFORTS WE CONTINUE TO HAVE THE STRONG SUPPORT OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY •..

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1. THE UNITY AND COMMON SENSE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

UNDER SUCH TRYING CIRCUMSTANCES

2. ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF OUR EFFORTS.

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3. RECENTLY THERE HAS BEEN ANOTHER VERY SERIOUS DEVELOPMENT

4. WHICH THREATENS THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE IN SOUTHWEST ASIA.

5. MASSIVE SOVIET MILITARY FORCES

HAVE INVADED THE SMALL NON-ALIGNED) SOVEREIGN NATION OF AFGHANISTAN)

6. WHICH HAD HITHERTO NOT BEEN AN OCCUPIED SATELLITE OF THE SOVIET UNION.

7. 50)000 HEAVILY ARMED SOVIET TROOPS HAVE CROSSED THE BORDER)

8. AND ARE NOW DISPERSED THROUGHOUT AFGHANISTAN)

9. ATTEMPTING TO CONQUER THE FIERCELY INDEPENDENT MUSLIM PEOPLE OF THAT COUNTRY.

10. THE SOVIETS CLAIM FALSELY THAT THEY WERE INVITED INTO AFGHANISTAN

11. TO HELP PROTECT THAT COUNTRY FROM SOME UNNAMED OUTSIDE THREAT.

12. BUT PRESIDENT AMIN)

WHO HAD BEEN THE LEADER OF AFGHANISTAN BEFORE THE SOVIET INVASION)

13. WAS ASSASSINATED -- ALONG WITH SEVERAL MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY --

14. AFTER THE SOVIETS GAINED CONTROL OF THE CAPITAL CITY OF KABUL.

15. ONLY SEVERAL DAYS LATER WAS THE NEW PUPPET LEADER

EVEN BROUGHT INTO AFGHANISTAN BY THE SOVIETS.

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.1. _·THiS INVASION IS AN EXltREMELY·:SERlOLlS_.':THREAt�TO PEACE ---

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. 2;.- .;'BECAUSE OF THE -THREAT ··OF" FURT�Ef{ .'sovfE:T:[xPAN-SION :..

. : :·lNTO:�:NtiGHB,oRlN·�-<'c68�TRIES IN SOUTHWEST ASIAJ

3. AND ALso BEcAusE:�_§ucH· :AN:·:XGGREs.si\IE ·MILITA�v :;PoLl cv .. ·

-.· · >- ·-.- :.·::�-:\.; I'·s:_�uNiETTLING.)To·:··:oTH�-R.'· PEOPLES· THROUGHouT THE wo�LD.

)4. n IS A CALLOus vioLAfib wB�'rN1�RN�TloNAL tAW 'AND THE UNITED NATIONs CHARTER. ' ' . . ·_; ·. �: . . . . . . . . .

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(5. IT IS A DELJ.BERATE E-FFORT OF k·P'DWERFU(ATHEISTIC GOVERNMENT l • .

. . . . . � " . ' ' TO SUBJUGATE AN INDEPENDENT ISLAMIC PEOPLE.

"�-6. HE MUST RECOGNIZE THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF AFGHANISTAN TO STABILITY & PEACE. ·i. -

'?· A SOVIET OCCUPIED AFGHANISTAN-THREATENS BOTH IRAN AND PAKISTAN _8. AND IS A STEPPING .STONE TO. (ba:k]POSSIBLE CONTROL

OVER MUCH OF THE WORLD'S OIL SUPPLIES .

. 9. THE UNITED STATES WANTS ALL NATIONS IN THE REGION

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TO BE FREE AND TO BE1NDEPENDENT.

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1. IF THE SOVIETS ARE ENCOURAGED IN THIS INVASION BY EVENTUAL SUCCESSJ

2. AND IF THEY MAINTAIN THEIR DOMINANCE OVER AFGHANISTAN

3. AND THEN EXTEND THEIR CONTROL TO ADJACENT COUNTRIES --

4. THE STABLEJ STRATEGICJ AND PEACEFUL BALANCE OF THE WORLD WILL BE CHANGED.

5. THIS WOULD THREATEN THE SECURITY OF ALL NATIONS

INCLUDINGJ OF COURSEJ THE UNITED STATESJ OUR ALLIES & FRIENDS.

6. THEREFOREJ THE WORLD CANNOT STAND BY

AND PERMIT THE SOVIET UNION TO COMMIT THIS ACT WITH IMPUNITY.

F • t= ·ry 7. MOBE THAN 40 NATIONS HAVE PETITIONED THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

8. TO CONDEMN THE SOVIET UNION

9. AND TO DEMAND THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN.

10. WE REALIZE THAT UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

11. THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS

MAY VETO ACTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ..

12. IF THE WILL OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD BE THVJARTED IN THIS MANNERJ

13. THEN AN IMMEDIATE ACTION WOULD BE APPROPRIATE

IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Electrostatic Copy Made for Preservation Purposes

WHERE NO SOVIET VETO EXISTS.

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· �.s::� . · , ··I. :< .. TN:d THE MEANTIME} NEITHER THE·, UNITED s'TAiES ·NOR ANY OTHER NATION 2 . . :WHICH IS COMMITTE�''TO.·WORLD

.�PEACE ANDSTAB'lLITY

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3. CAN coNTINUE To Do1·Bus iNEss J\s·_usuAL WITH THE soviET UNION.· . :._ ·: ·. �. . � .

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' 4. I HAVE ALREAIJY:·:RECALLED-THE' UNITE

.D STATES AMaASSADOR FROM MOSCO�! TO WASHINGTON, :, / � •, • ..._ , ' · '

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s. HE IS. woRK ·iN� WITH. ME. AND:MY ·aTHER SENIOR. AD�ISERS ·

6. IN AN IMMEn'iATE''AND :COMPREHENSIVE· EVALUATION.

' ·. z. oF THE wHoLE RANGE �oF· ouR

.'RELATI6N�r ,.wiTH TH{ 'soviET uNioN.

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8. THE SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION OF THE "SALT I I" TREATY 9. HAS BEEN. A · MAJOR GOAL AND A MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS ADMINISTRATION --·. , .

. 10. AND WE AMERr'CANSJ THE PEOPLE OF THE SOVIET UNIONJ AND -INDEED THE ENTIRE WORLD li. WILL BENEFIT FROM THE SUCCESSFUL-CONTROL OF STRATEGlC.NUCLEAR WEAPONS . . . . . 1� • . THROUGH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THlS CAREFULLY NEGOTIATED TREATY.

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1. HOWEVERJ BECAUSE OF THE SOVIET AGGRESSION

2. I HAVE ASKED THE UNITED STATES SENATE

3. TO DEFER FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE "SALT II" TREATY

4. SO THAT THE CONGRESS AND I CAN ASSESS SOVIET ACTIONS AND.INTENTIONS

5, AND DEVOTE OUR PRIMARY ATTENTION TO THE LEGISLATIVE AND OTHER MEASURES REQUIRED

TO RESPOND TO THIS CRISIS.

6. AS CIRCUMSTANCES CHANGE IN THE FUTURE

7. WE WILLJ OF COURSEJ KEEP THE RATIFICATION OF "SALT II" UNDER ACTIVE REVIEW

8. IN CONSULTATION WITH THE LEADERS OF THE SENATE. Tnt. S"cv" I cT.s .N\I.LSI U,.J)l::es-rA..JJ> ou..e J6�P (l,o,JC.trf,..l_- �

9. WE WILL DELAY OPENING OF ANY NEW A�1ERICAN OR SOVIET;cQNs'ULAeoRFACI

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.TIESJ

10. AND MOST OF THE CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC EXCHANGES CURRENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION

WILL BE DEFERRED.

11. I HAVE DECIDED TO HALT OR REDUCE EXPORTS TO THE SOVIET UNION

12. IN THREE AREAS THAT ARE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO THEM.

13. THESE NEW POLICIES WILL BE COORDINATED WITH THOSE OF OUR ALLIES.


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:1;. --I HAVE DIRECT�D TH�T: Na·:;�uis@ HIGH>.TECHN.OLOGY OR OTHER STRATEGIC ITEMS

2�· . . ,WILL BE LICENSE·D.FOR·SALE.TO TH·E . . SOVlET UNION._. UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE ..

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·WHILE WE REVISE ·OUR LICENSING POLICY.

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3·. --FISHING PRfv iLE'f]ES · F.OR TH� ·SOVIET :_uN;ioN I N .·UNITED STATES· WATERS

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·WILL BE ·SEVERELY CURTAILED. .- · . . . . .

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4. --THE 17 MlLL{CJN :�:tdNS ·oF GRA·r'N· OR�ERED BY . . JH[.·SOV I E�-- UNION . . ·

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IN EX.cEss;···oF·.:·tM.AT.: AMOUNr·_�Hi tH · w�

:·)�RE·

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To sELL·.

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.. . . UNDER A FIVE--'YEAR AGREEMENT

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S. THIS GRAIN" WAS NOT INTENDED FOR HUMAN CONS8MPTION

WlLL�NOT BE DELIVERED.

'6. BUT WAS TO,-BE USED FOR BUILDING UP SOVIET LIVESTOCK HERDS.

·,r: I AM DETER�fNED TO MINIMIZE ANY ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE AMERICAN FARMER FROM THIS ACTION •

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8· · THE UNDELIVERED GRAIN WILL BE REMOVED FROM THE MARKET 9; THROUGH STORAGE AND PRICE SUPPORT PROGRAMS

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10; AND THROUGH, PURCHASES AT MARKET PRICES • . ·,:· ..

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lL WE WILL ALSO USE INCREASED AMOUNTS OF GRAIN 12� TO ALLEVIATE HU.NG�R. IN .

·POOR .CQUNTRl.ES ..

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i; .. �'::(AFTER CONSULTAllON···wt-rH :.:oTHE� ·:pkrNc:I PAL:GRAlN EXPORTING NATIONS_, i;:::.··.J "AM CONFIDENT .THAT>THE)l

·��ILL N-��; "REPLACE JHESE QUANTITIES OF GRAIN ' . "'' ;. ,, . . . . . . , ·. 3,. BY ADDITIONAL SHIPMENTS· .ro·:rHE' sovtET UN ION.

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·' . . •. . ·.i_ 4 ; : "THESE ACTIONS -WILL ,REQUIRE. SOME SACRIFICE ON THE PART .·oF ALL AMERICANS.� -. ·-· •,'

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5.--�, BUT THERE---"lS·NO�DOUBT THAT'"THESE ACTIONS�·�.<· ·:: .. .· "·· · 6.�:: ARE .·iN .'JHE··tNTEREST �OF wo'RLD ,:PEACE 'ANPi:T�E �:SEtU_RIT'/ ·oF -OUR· OWN NATION_, 7. AND .�ARE ALS"O COMPATIBLE"- WlJH ACTfONS· BtiNG TAKEN:" ; .· '

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8. BY ouR: OWN -MAJoR· TRADtNG-:.:PArnNERs· AND.OTHE.RsNM=fo�s ' -' . •.'':· . - . ' . . . . , , ,' . •' . 4,: ·. �r:i WHO SHARE OUR DEEP· CONCERN ABOUT THIS NEW SOVIET THR.E�"T'TO WORLD STABILITY I <>. �-�<- .

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10 I ALTH,OUGH. THE UNITED STATES WOULD PREFER NOT TO \�ITHDRAW . . - . . · . ' '

'tl. FROM.THE: OL�lMP·TC GAMES SCHEDULED IN MOSCOW THIS SUMMER.� "'12. THE SOVIET UNION MUST REALIZE THAT ITS CONTINUED AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS ' '.. ' . . .. .

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·· 13. WILL ENDANGER BOTH THE PARTICIPATION OF ATHLETES

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: !4. AND THE TRAVEL TO MOSCOW BY SPECTATORS WHO WOULD NORMALLY WISH .·�

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' ' TO ATTEND THE OLY�1PIC GAMES I ·� . . '. . . . . �

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i� WE WILL PROVIDE MILITARY . EQUIPMENT�·-� FOOD:,

·· AND OTHER ASSISTANCE --

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·3. TO HELP PAKISTAN-DEFEND ITS INDEPENDENCE· AND,_NAT10NAL SECURITY .

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. 4. AGAINST THE'SE.R lOUSLY 'INCREASED THREAT lt "NOW: FACES FROM\THE NORTH • . ; . . . . . . . . , . - � . '-... :'.

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5.". · THE,.UNlTED·::.STATES ALSO STANDS READY TO· HELP OTHER· ·NATIONS' lN. THE .REGION . �

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6. NEITHER OUR;ALClES·. NOR:OUR _POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES

7 I SHOU.LD �AVE:::;TH('SLFGHT.EST .. DO UB"Ft,'_.:,:=··. � . .

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�. i . . - . : . : . -.' - ·-. . . -----a: ABour·buk .. WlLLINGNESSJ OU R DETERMINATION� AND OUR CAPACITY 9. ' TO TAKE

'···tH•t 'MEASURES" I HAVE OUTLINED. . .::..·· , ·j - - .

>10. I HAVf:J&N�.pLJED WITH THE LEADERS OF CONGRESS . . .

� 11 . . AND AM·-C,QNEIDENT THEY WILL SUPPQRT LEGISLATION THAT MAY .BE REQUIRED

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TO CARRYOUT THESE MEASURES.

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1. HIsToRY TEACHEsJPERHAPs::.�FEw.;tLEAR.t£ssoNs. ' ' • ' , · -,,•, <"' , • ,. ,I • . ' . .

2. ·. BUT SURELY ONE sutif;tESS6N LE:ARNED llY T�E WORLD AT GREAT COST �; : . +s THAT AGGRESSJ ON ·UNQPPOSEn:.:BECOMES A,�toNTAG I o·us DISEASE • . . .. . . ', . :>1: . :.r._ j -.. !· _ ;.; . ' - _;. '·;·'· _- .. .. .. '

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8. WE WILL DETER AGGRESSION�·. ·PROTECT OUR NATION'S SECURITY�

AND PRESERVE THE PEACE. • , ,

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THE UNITED STATES WILL MEET ITS RESPONSIBILITIES. ·.""·,··

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,

President Jimmy Carter

VERY ROUGH DRAFT

January 4, 1980

I i .J._

I come to you this evening with an extremely important

and sober explanation of the rapidly changing circumstances in

s�") f � fR ltlul ,4-s ; CL

c�he._.E.er.sian-GtlH--and-Soti·'hllwes t As-ian-region -·e :E-the__wor.l.a.:�r

I continue to share with you the sense of outrage and

impatience because of the kidnapping of innocent American hostages

and the holding of them by militant terrorist s [�J:l--I:ra�j with

the support and approval of Iranian officials.

·lr' / ,·L( � Our purposes continue to be the protection of;long-range

interestsof our nation and the safety of the American hostages.

Through the International Court of Justice, throu_gh the

United Nations, and through public and private diplomatic efforts

---·--------( we are at tempting to secure the release of the hostage�-·

)l�nd-the-ir '-..... -----·-·

-----·- -·---··--·-- -- ------- if)e {l.!L('. d � .. \ CtVl" ,�e) return-hom� and

., to accomplish this goal without bloodshed

I

which would further endanger the lives of our 50 fellow Americans.

Elecilosiatlo Copy llrimiW for PreseMBtlon PufPOS88

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ille.ga-±--ae-e-ien-by Iran·;··-and---to-secure-.. the--release of---our·-hostag�-�1

we continue to have the strong support of the world community.

The unity of the American people and your patience

Cl�CZ...

under stuch trying circumstances ��J an integral part of the

success of our effort.

Recently there has been another very serious development

which threatens the maintenance of peace in Southwest Asia.

In a drastic departure from recent policy of the Soviet Union,

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ASoviet military forces have invaded the small non-aligned,

sovereign nation of Afghanistan, which had hitherto not been

an occupied satellite of the Soviets. \��assiv:�j�ov-ie:G-mi-:1.-i-tary

fprc�"ij�ave

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eros sed the �o��r , noW--">Qrnp�-i�ingfo 0 , 0 0 0 hea�i�� armed

(.fclfft�P� . .

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(-\-•\1\ d_ . ��se-Sevi�E-I6rc�� are now dispersed throughout

� ( C. o; '!·'"( u o.) Afghanistan, �-o�J attempting to st1:B-j-�·a-te the fiercely independent

Muslim people of that country.

1:1� topylnade for Preservation Purposes

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In our efforts to maintain peace, to condemn this

illegal action by Iran, and to secure the release of our hostages

we continue to have the strong support of the world community.


under stuch trying circumstances is an integral part of the



which threatens the maintenance of peace in Southwest Asia.


Soviet military forces have invaded the small non-aligned,


an occupied satellite of the Soviets. Massive Soviet military

forces have crossed the border, now comprising 50,000 heavily armed

troops.

These Soviet forces are now dispersed throughout

Afghanistan, now attempting t o

Muslim people of that country.

(Lo-n.

he fiercely independent

li:uecvotriaiDc (;upy IV'Iade

for Preserva�lorn Purposes

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The Soviets claim falsely that they were invited into

Afghanistan to help protect that country from some unnamed

outside force. But President Amin, who had been the leader of

Afghanistan before the Soviet invasion, was assassinated,

along with several members of his family -- while the Soviets

controlled-the capitol.

Only later was a Soviet puppet leader even brought

into Afghanistan by the Soviets.

This Soviet invasion is an extremely serious threat to

peace -� both involving danger of further Soviet expansion . - -.. _ · .-{"

into neighboring countries, danger to Soutwest Asia, and also

unsettling to other peoples throughout the world.

It is a callous violation of international law and the

United Nations Charter.

government

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an independent Islamic people.

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. .. . . .. � . · .. -

. ;

. ·. - &:uecirustatoc tiuPY Mellie

�or Pr<aservatlon Purpo�a

' · .·,; .

.. .

-

••• ' i ·.

� J',' . :·· :� .......... � 1•'{1':•·,' . . . ;•.·�·:::.: ,.

:,.:. , ... ·�

···=.-s ·-:-� :·;.,·- · �

.··-·. ·' :: , .·.·-

.. . . . .. �·: : . �- .'�· ... : � �· ......

.. - 4 -

We must recognize the strategic importance of Afghanistan.

The United States wants all nations in the region to be free,

and to be independent. If the Soviets are encouraged in this

do�')') , Mwvt c e..._ tv-�

invasion by eventual success and maintain theirGi't;at�-o·f-

Afghanistan, and then extend this kind of action to other parts

of the region -- the stable, strategic and peaceful·balance

of the world will be changed. This would threaten the security

of all nations, including,of course,the United States, our allies

and friends.

Therefore, the world cannot stand by and permit the

Soviets to commit this act with impunity.

We and more than 40 other nations -- large and small,

Eastern and Western, Christian and Muslim -- have petitioned

the United Nations Security Council to condemn the Soviet Union

and to demand the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet troops

from Afghanistan.

ifiectrcatatic �opy Mace

felrr Prssarvetlon Purpose9

' . ' ..

- 3 -



lt��o rrl--outside �ore�. But President Amin, who had been the leader of

Afghanistan before· the Soviet invasion, was assassinated,�--·-

along with several members of his family -- while the Soviets

() ..

controlled the capi t9lx (J.,·/11 "

-- � (�( L.

Only later was \f-1 ,\� puppet leader even brought

into Afghanistan by the Soviets.

This �ovie� invasion is an extremely serious threat to

).> t t(' ( .LC I) · rf,0 __ ·J C.u_{l t peace -- l�et�\ invel-ving-,�nEJ�_i:{ of further Soviet expansion

I h... l into neighboring countries,\ dangeJ:----to Soutwest Asia, and also

.t.:<r (_�t€({2-C J�rr /, 41t c<j1"''-"U>?·-.('"; /,J?/� �}.:7 _/<:· � r y I r

unsettling to other peoples throughout the world.

It is a callous violation of international law and the

United Nations Charter.

It is a deliberate effort of a powerful atheistic

government to subjugate an independent Islamic people.

�iec�atic f(.;upy Wliaae fcv Presentation Pu�

' .

' . ' '

- 4 -

We mus_t re

/cognize the strategic importance of Afghanistan/'

c!ir tl cf .c/?.�t< .. f.c7 t"�"f?'(""/ /e/fc"e ,..,-7 .... �,;_; .·'l y> �'--� ;::-? ,:;:;;: "'�···?/u·;.:'� The United States wants all nations in the region to be free

and to be independent. If the Soviets are encouraged in this

I r ·ric-</ invasion by eventual success and maintain their subj ugation of

) -�

AfghanistanK and then extend this kind of action to other parts

of the region -- the stable, strategic and peaceful balance

of the world will be changed. This would threaten the security

of all nations, including,of course,the United States, our allies

and friends.



We and more than 40 other nations C""'-..... large-··and-£mall,

Easterrr-and-We"Srei"ft7-Chr±st::i-an···and·Muslim _,....::J have petitioned . . -

· ..

the United Nations Security Council to condemn the Soviet Union


from Afghanistan.

i:iectrrOJ>tri:aDtiC Giopy mac:8a �or Pli'®&®rvetlon !fl>uvpcaes

- 5 -

We realize that under the United Nations Charter

along-wH�:e:�;:�n:� ::;;;;�;� - ;��:� have the right

------------�--- ------ - ---- --

to veto action of the Security Council. If the will of the

Security Council should be subverted in this manner, then an

''"-immediate action�ay the General Assembly of the United Nations

' I

---� _:-··=-------------------- -�

where no Soviet veto �x-i�-t� �;ould be approp�'j_-;;tfe:·') , �-----------------..... ....... ........ ·

In the meantime, we and other like-minded nations

who are committed to world peace and stability cannot continue

business as usual with the Soviet Union.

I have already recalled the United States Ambassador J - tJ) I 1 (..__

, s {.<··�·· J::.l ··r \_:o-t.he-Soviet-un-i6�1 from Moscow to Washington. He /o j-eins me and

0 'fl�U'-

my1senior advisers in an immediate and comprehensive evaluation 'I r

•. , fl..l..'_ t-t-)ll'k /\Cir!-�f'C <"" \.--

Of; �ur relations wi�h the Soviet Union. r� wiH-eonsider

sp�_qJJi..cal.ly-and--rigereY.sl-y--the-whole"":tahge' or · u -: s ; =soviet

iEiectrusriatlc Gopy Mace for Pressrv�t�orn Purposes

- 6 -

The successful negotiation of the SALT II Treaty has

been a major goal and a major achievement of this Administration

c\ltd W�, the Soviets, and indeed the entire world will benefit

from the successful control of Strategic Nuclear Weapons through

the implementation of this carefully�negotiated Treaty.

tC f7't(• > s- / .n-,

However, because of the Soviet p.r-egression and the

impossibility of ratification of the Treaty at this time, I have

asked the lM.a-:)e-r-:i:-t�a:aer-o-r-tti� United States Senate to defer

(!_ . , 1 r; Vl H--U�-for the time being �he-Se-na-t;e-!-s�J consideration of the SALT II

Treaty.

As circumstances change in the future, we will, of course,

keep the E_at±er of o�_1 ratification of SALT II under active

review and consultation with the leaders of the Senate.

ii:beetrosiatlc �vpy Made

for Preservation Purpo�Gs

- 7 -

1'f/!�

We will delayA

opening of new Embassy and Consular

facilities, and will insist on strict reciprocity in the number

of diplomats assigned to each country, travel restraints on

visiting officials, and media representation.

Commercial trade with the Soviet Union will be severely

c.l..

restricted, And I have directed that no sales of high technology

items to the Soviet Union will be licensed.

Fishing privileges for the Soviet Union in United States

waters will be severely curtailed.

All but the most essential cultural and economic exchanges

currently under consideration with the Soviet Union will be

either deferred or suspended.

6�"1 r,;,;.-1 /n �''-"" .:_ t:'fi

Agric..ul.tuJ;a.Lpr.oduG-'E& ordered by the Soviet Union @ ince

C.j 7/(� / 4/Jlc:tol / & /tJ(J,,_;( /(J'(' d!r r1.-../l1/)7/;0,/ /.:, .J'?// /'47-r�..,_. �r /'>·� .. �;:A-·'-,

Qc..t.obe�) will not be delivered. This involves a substantiai·( "(J•-C:.f.. ,.,aM .. /

n ... ,� ,t ·t.-.... ---

Jn· IIOJ·tJ'. (.IIJ � . ....

quantity of grai��which was �� destined for human consumption

but was to be used for feeding livestock.

tti&G�auc �PY wsade fov Preservation fu�

I • •'

- 8 -

of all Americans -- those involved

those who are taxpayers required to

r£{'u'c.<,.(/r.,.-. .... r/ . . . � (I 1n J. trade and commerce, �(.to• ···

"j ),· ,., <.J.[ /. ./(I; , ·110)7 Ito / /fl.( , .•. {1' '

finance1budget expenditures.

But there is no doubt that these actions are in the interest

of world peace and the security of our own nation, and are also

compatible with actions being taken by our own major trading

partners and other nations who share our deep concern about

/tt'? �Ji.-� )t(.l<J / / / r::.

the.,soviet threat� to peac� ��c�.,../�{ rk. ;;/,?t-;/

At this time we do not contemplate withdrawing from

the World Olympics scheduled in Moscow this summer; )u.l�

c---· aut . the Soviets must realize that their continued

aggressive actions will endanger both the participation of

athletes E_-n-±h.e._O.lympie�J and the travel to Moscow by spectators

who would normally wish to attend the Olympic games.

&:.bectwsiarilc tiupy Mattile forr Preservation Pu�

- 9 -

We will work with other nations to provide military

equipment, food, and other assistance to Pakistan -- to help

that nation, which borders on Afghanistan, �l deal effectively

with the seriously increased threat it faces from the North .

. --<E--�·- The United States fs-t�nds read;hl�� to help other nations

in the region in similar ways.

--.,.. About 0.ur willingness, our determination, and our capacity ---------7 (- :� take the measures I h�ve

_

outli

_

ne�Jei ther ��; :;:��::--:�-o;;;- )

--·

( potential adversaries should have the slightest doubt\. ./ "-.. --�-

History teaches perhaps few clear lessons. But surely

one such lesson learned by the world at great cost is that

aggression unopposed becomes a contagious disease.

The response of the international community to the

.... ,it '{/\ f._.,, ... I .. · ..

Soviets' attempt to S-l:lb-jugate Afghanistan must match the

gravity of the Sovieti.

action. The United States [�cn;-+t-s-par�I

will meet its responsibilities.

ileeiwwnoc (iQpy Made for PNaemttton Purpcaes

.. .

. ;; .

- 9 -

We will work with other nations to provide military

equipment, food, and other assistance to Pakistan to help

that nation, which borders on Afghanistan, to deal effectively

with the seriously increased threat it faces from the North.

The United States stands ready also to help other nations


About our willingness, our determination, and our capacity

to take the measures I have outlined neither our allies nor our

potential adversaries should have the slightest doubt.




The response of the international community to the C''""--"- "'

gravity of the Soviets action. The United States for its part

will meet its responsibilities.

�iectll't»lri:atlc �upy ftiliaoe

forr Prsae!l'Vetlon Purposes

.. -..

- 10 -

--------·· c��r commitment�-)-�/t6/�:et these /ns ibi li ties

peacefully, in>

.. c6��eration with oth//peace-loving nations

d · /d/

· h · . t / 1 law'_:-J"·· an 1n accOr<ance w1t 1n er��1ona

./

.. / d·11 .

With the support of the American people11

we will deter

aggression, protect our nation's security, and preserve the

peace.

# #

�iectt�c Gopy Mace

few Pueservation 'urpoaesa

#

i 0 .

•

;I ·Gresident···k 2nd Draft.::6

President Jimmy Carter Draft -- January 4, 1980

I come to you this evening with an extremely important

and sober explanation of the rapidly changing circumstances

in Southwest Asia.

I continue to share with you the sense of outrage and

impatience because of the kidnapping of innocent American

hostages and the holding of them by militant terrorists with

the support and. approval of Iranian officials.

Our purposes continue to be the protection of the

long-range interests of our nation and the safety of the

American hostages.

We are attempting to secure the release of the hostages

through the International Court of Justice, through the

United Nations, and through public and private diplomatic efforts.

t�;' c lt.c I c I<.· d C· s· o

We are determined to accomplish this goaltwithout bloodshed

C� , ... J ul1 H,o� \-__

·-\ o

�hich-wou±G.� further �):langer,, the lives of our 50 fellow Americans.

Electrostatic Copy Made

for Preservation Purposes

.,

- 2 -

In these efforts we continue to have the strong support

of the world community.


under such trying circumstances are an integral part of the



h. h h h . .

f . /,. . w 1c t reatens t e ma1ntenance o peace 1n Soutwest As1a.


massive Soviet military fobes have invaded the small non-aligned,


an occupied satellite of the Soviets.

Fifty thousand heavily armed Soviet troops have crossed

the border, and are now dispersed throughout Afghanistan,

attempting to conquer the fiercely independent Muslim people

of that country.



- 3 -



outside threat. But President Amin, who had been the leader

of Afghanistan before the Soviet invasion, was assassinated

,.fl;.-. �-

along with several members of his family -- �hile \ the Soviets

" ro pd .. .

control�� the capital city of Kabul.

S<:.V(t!"tL£ dlLy.s .,e. .• .J�

Only�later was the�puppet leader even brought into

Afghanistan by the Soviets.

This invasion is an extremely serious threat to

peace -- because of the threat of further Soviet expansion

into neighboring countries in Southwest Asia, and also because

such an aggressive military policy is unsettling to other

peoples throughout the world.


- 4 -

It is a callous violation of international law and

the United Nations Charter.

It is a deliberate effort of a powerful atheistic

government to subj ugate an independent Islamic people.

We must recognize the strategic importance of Afghanistan

-k l<ano-:::o'IJ stability and peace in this region of the world.

The United States wants all nations in the region

to be free and to be independent. If the Soviets are encouraged

in this invasion by eventual success, and if they maintain

their dominance over Afghanistan and then extend th-is----k-ind-

--C7U-�_ r.cdi(l<-<'.1 . .._( ('ot.<l'' �r;!'S

[<:>,·f-ac-ti--on=t:�J}?_ther-·-Parts ... o:f-�the. regio�! -- the stable, strategic

and peaceful balance of the world will be changed. This would

threaten the security of all nations including, of course,

the United States, our allies and friends.





- 5 -

We and more than 40 other nations have petitioned the

United Nations Security Council to condemn the Soviet Union


from Afghanistan.

We realize that under the United Nations Charter

• vtlt '(

the Soviets and other permanent members L�a-ve-the-ri-g-ht·-to_j

veto action of the Security Council.

1/;>t/,·t 1./r ,-/ If the will of the Security Council should be subver-ted

in this manner, then an immediate action would be appropriate

in the General Assembly of the United Nations where no Soviet

veto exists.

!)(, f-(Ll-� tt' ( C·'-· n /-{;,.� In the meantime,

/' we \.�?d· ot:her-1-i-Jce..,.rni-nde�) nations

who are committed to world peace and stability canto:t/ continue

business as usual with the Soviet Union.


- 6 -

I have already recalled the United States Ambassador

from Moscow to Washington. He is working with me and my other

senior advisers in an immediate and comprehensive evaluation

of the whole range of our relations with the Soviet Union.

The successful negotiation of the SALT II Treaty has been

a major goal and a major achievement of this Administration --

and we, the Soviets, and indeed the entire world will beneiit

from the successful control of Strategic Nuclear Weapons through

the implementation of this carefully negotiated Treaty.

However, because of the Soviet aggression [�nd the

impossibility of ratification of the Treaty at this timei1

I have asked the United States Senate to defer for the time being·

any further consideration of the SALT II Treaty.

As circumstances change in the future we will, of course,

keep the ratification of SALT II under active review l�oo) , •·"'

consultation with the leaders of the Senate.



- 7 -

We will delay any opening of new Embassy and Consular

/, 1.,. /_, .,, .. , ,, ...... . - ., I'')' r , l> � �"-'1

facilities, and will insist on strict reciprocity inJ-t;he number

,,

of diplomats assigned to each country,1travel restraints on

visiting officials, and media representation.

Commercial trade with the Soviet Union will be severely

restricted, and I have directed that no sales of high technology

items to the Soviet Union will be licensed. These new policies

will be coordinated with those of our allies.

Fishing privileges for the Soviet Union in United States

waters will be severely curtailed.

All but the most essential cultural and economic exchanges

currently under consideration with the Soviet Union will be

either deferred or suspended.

-1 /·/ /7 /7'-')/� ''·" /',·n.>' f' 'I , ,. v

'J,,, ,1_ • . r.7 I ;'t· . · .

,

Grain ordered by the Soviet Union in excess of that ,1

amount which we are committed to sell under a five-year agreement

will not be delivered. This involves a substantial quantity



. ' .

- 8 -

of grain -- none of which was destined for human consumption

/_11Al,·:·r ty; s�v�u.{ ,

.

but was to be used for f-eedi.ncr livestock A'.RA� . '::) )\

We will take action through price support and

reserve storage policies of the Department of Agriculture

to remove this grain from the market.

The use of grain for gasohol fuel production and to

alleviate hunger in poor countries will minimize any adverse

effect on the American farm community.

After consultation with other principal grain exporting

nations, I am confident that they will not replace these quantities

of grain by additional shipments to the Soviet Union.

'I'hese actions will require some sacrifice on the part

of all Americans -- those involved in agriculture, trade and

commerce, and those who are taxpayers required to finance the

additional budget expenditures.

E1ectrostatic Copy Made for Preservation Purposes

- 9 -

But there is no doubt that these actions are in the

interest of world peace and the security of our own nation,

and are also compatible with actions being taken by our own

maj or trading partners and other nations who share our

deep concern about this new Soviet threat to world stability.

/) / / .• u-/7/- c

r�t this

/It�' ·z:./r /'1-:r-;//t-"' )�(: /. �: __

time we do not contemplat_� wi thdraw�n.�( from the

World Olympics scheduled in Moscow this summer, but the Soviets

must realize that their continued aggressive actions

will endanger both the participation of athletes and the

travel to Moscow by spectators who would normally wish to attend

the Olympic games.

C l (-')

.c �-1 J•\ ,....._.�

We will work with other l_I1ation�j to provide military

equipment, food, and other assistance to Pakistan -- to help

that nation, which borders on Afghanistan, deal effectively

E1ectrostatic Copy Made


- 10 -

with the seriously increased threat it faces from the North.

The United States also stands ready to help other nations


Neither our allies nor our potential adversaries should

have the slightest doubt about our willingness, our determination,

and our capacity to take the measures I have outlined.




The resonse � the international community to the

Soviet attempt to cru�h Afghanistan must match the gravity

o f the Soviet action. , The United States will meet its /

. _ ........ �, responsibilities.

With the support of the Americanpeople and working

\

\

\ with other nations, we will deter aggression, protect our

/!:_:--------- ..... -- - ------nation's )

/

security, and preserve the peace.

# # f1ectrostatic Copy Made wr Preservation Purposes

. ' .

M_EMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FRO M:

SUBJ ECT:

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 4, 1980

THE PRESIDENT

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZIN SKI� ·

Speech Additions

Here are s ome minor additions to the original speech draft from which you worked. You might consider adding them or rewording the appropriate passages.

At the early afternoon meeting I will bring with· me the more important wording recommendations on commercial and agricultural relations, and I will have with me comments by Stu, Lloyd and others on the original draft (though ·many of them may now be OBE). If you want those comments earlier, I will rush them to you.

�iectrusriatHc (iopy M8111iie

fofi' Presarvatlon Purposes

' .,

PARAGRAPH ON ALLIED RESPONSE

We are in close touch with our allies, to make sure that

our actions are supported and that no advantage is taken of the

sacrifices we are making for the sake of peace and our common

interests. I have been encouraged by their initial responses.

We will continue to stress that international solidarity is

essential in meeting this Soviet threat to international peace

and stability.

'•,

' · ' .,

ADDITIONAL OR AMENDED PARAGRAPHS

l. P .1, second paragraph:

"By moving fifty thousand Soviet troops into AFghanistan;

by its complicity in the murder of that country's President; by

fighting and attempting to overwhelm Afghanistan's armed forces;

by forcibly installing a puppet regime in the capital; by con-

tinuing its military actions to this day; and by attempting to

obscure the facts about its aggression, the Soviet Union has laid

bare its intention to destroy the independence of Afghanistan:

to hammer a small but sovereign country into the new shape of a

captive state."

2. Fisheries:

(Changes underlined)

"I have also directed the Department of State to withhold

any further allocations to the Soviet Union for fishing rights

within the U.S. 200-mile fishery zone. This action will result

in the immediate loss to the Soviet fish industry of approximately

360,000 tons, an amount equivalent to approximately 5% of their

total fish catch around the world."

3. Vice references to levels of Soviet diplomatic personnel

and Soviet press, substitute:

"I have directed that the necessary steps be taken to insure

that strict reciprocity is enforced with regard to the numbers

of Soviet diplomatic representatives and media personnel in the

United States. And we will also act.on the basis of strict

reciprocity in restrictions on official Soviet travel in this

country."

. .

, .

- 2 -

4. New paragraph on aid to Pakistan:

"I am asking the Congress to remove restrictions on American

assistance to Pakistan. The United States Government must be able

to provide the military equipment, food and other assistance to

Pakistan that is necessary to help that nation, which borders on

Afghanistan, � deal effectively with the seriously increased

threat that �it faces from .the north. I believe that we can develop,

together with the Congress, a means of balancing our continuing

concerns about Pakistan's nuclear activities with the urgent need

to respond, in a clear and credible manner, to the Soviet challenge

to peace in Asia."

5. Suggested addition at conclusion:

"The United States, for its part, will meet its responsibilities.

This will require certain sacrifices on our part. I am determined

that the burdens of this sacrifice be carried, as fairly as possible,

by our society as a whole. I am certain that our nation, as a

whole, will bear this burden courageously and in unity. I am

confident our allies will join us in our efforts.

"We have sacrifice�before, to oppose aggression. Our

position in the world, and our pride, cannot be sold at any price.

We will never place our profits ahead of our freedom. This is

what has always made our nation strong. It makes us strong today."

.

' ...

Consultation�/Notification Plan for Presidential Speech

Overall Timetable

1/4/80 4:00 pm

January 4, 1980

2:30 pm

2:45 pm

3:30 pm

5:00 pm

6:00 pm

9:00 pm

Market closes

Arrangements meeting to complete and implement consultations/notification plans

CL Consultations with Congressional Leadership begins

Cabinet and Senior Staff meeting

Notification calls begin to agreed lists

Speech

January 5, 1980

am

2 :.00 . pm

Supplemental press briefings at Commerce, Agriculture and State

Q&As due to McDonald from State Commerce STR Agriculture Labor (available to State by late afternoon for

transmission to U.S. Embassies abroad)

-�

January 7, 1980

pm Constituency meetings at Commerce and Agriculture

il:iec'tros'i:atrc (iopy Mad;·-.·. for Preservation Purposes·

... Notification Groups/Responsibilities

1. Cabinet and Senior Staff: Watson arranging; meeting at 5:00 pm

2. Congressional Leaders WH CL coordinating; consutlation calls begin following mid-afternoon clearance

3. Farm Groups: Department of Agriculture

Notification calls begin after receipt of talking points at 6:00 pm

Suggested Activities: "Hot Line" for special inquiries on details from 8:30 am Saturday

4. Business Groups:

Saturday am briefing for agricultural press

Monday pm constituency meeting to explain details

White House: Calls to Chairman of President's Export Council )Jones); US/USSR Trade Council (Verity)

State: Calls to selected business leaders (e.g., Shapiro, Murphy, Carey, Hammer, Eaton)

Treasury: Calls to key bank officials (e.g., Clawson, Rockefeller, Wriston, Weatherstrom)

Follow up activities: "Hot Line" for inquiries after speech from 8:30 am Saturday

Saturday briefing for business/ financial press

Monday pm meeting with constituency . groups

5.. State and Local Officials:

Combined notification team coordinated by Watson

Planned Activities: Askew to call Busbee and governors involved in the Export Committee

Bergland to cal� key grain state . governors

Watson to handle calls to other� as needed

6. Labor Leadership: Landon Butler coordinating_ calls (with Secretary Marshall)

·-: �,

7. Political Leadership: Jordan to cover by telephone

8. ·Foreign Policy Groups: State handling calls (e.g., Kissinger, Rusk, Rogers, Harriman, Ball and Bundy)

9. Former Presidents: Dr. Brzezinski to telephone former Presidents Ford and Nixon

10. Presidential Candidates: State to contact for individual briefings, principals only, from Saturday am

11. Interested Ethnic Groups: Wexler coordinating calls

Notification calls

1. Select group of key influence leaders only. Calls to begin from 6:00 pm following prior agreement on lists.

2. Talking Points (from NSC) for 5:00 pm Cabinet meeting

Other Activities and Follow up

--Materials for constituency mailings next week (Commerce, Agriculture, STR and Labor at their discretion)

--Special WH Operator shift for Friday night/Saturday

--Q&As due 2:00 pm Saturday to McDonald from

--State --Commerce --STR --Agriculture --Labor

(available to State by late afternoon for transmission to U.S .. Embassies abroad)

·�

- .. :::::::···.:.: .. - ..

. .

' • ,- I '

·.

' .

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 4, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM AL MCDONALD� SUBJECT: Commercial Sanctions

As you take your difficult decisions today I know you are trying to avoid short term responses whose long term consequences could be disproportionately damaging to our country and practically irreversible except over many years.

This is why the use of commercial policy as a foreign policy tool is so dangerous and questionable except for direct defense items and in case of war. It is impossible to estimate in a few hours or even a few days the long term consequences worldwide of dramatically shifting our commercial policy with the USSR. For this reason, I strongly recommend simply a temporary suspension of shipments (e.g., for 90

days) during a period of general reassessment of our relationship with the Soviet Union. This suspension could apply across the board covering all agricultural and industrial products. Its short term nature could mean only interruption without necessarily severing important commercial relationships either by design or de facto through the moves of others.

Our aim is clearly to hurt the Soviet Union and to teach them a lesson. Our people are willing to pay an appropriate price for that result. After their initial enthusiasm, however, they will not support sacrifices that appear to be greater to us than the direct harm caused by these moves to the Soviets. Our only defensible criteria are that (a) these moves clearly hurt the Soviet Union and (b) they are effective. If they do not meet these tests, or if they are offset by the actions of other countries, public reactions will boomerang negatively.

In the long term, a major, lengthy discontinuance of trade indefinitely with the Soviet Union could require a decade or two to get back to our present situation. This is far more important for foreign relations reasons than commercial ones since our main hope for a peaceful coexistence between our two peoples with such different political systems is the continuity of commercial exchanges. Social and cultural ones cannot do the job, and we have no prospect of bridging our political system.

· �iecvustatuc Gcpy Maaie fort Presertletion !Purposes

. : ·,:�·.... ...

. 1 ... 'I • )

· .

·� • ..··;.. c

.' • , . 2

From our domestic viewpoint, the-continuity of our strong economic base, ·tl:le preservation ·-c:)f the ·dol'la:r;- and our standard of living are hSavil� dependent· on .. otir· �bility to e�port to cover petrolen.im. imports during the next dec ad¢· or longer. This is not' a: spigot we can turn on ·and off ori •

· a· short_:-term

basis�- In agriculture, the most critical success· factor ·.is long-term supplier reliability for foodstuffs. ·we;havenot yet .·full-y r_ecovered, even with good friends like·. Japan, 'from the.· soybean embargo of 1973. On the industrial·· side, the ,_· _

markets are typically not of the short term, bid��u-ction �. ·

co:rnnlodity. type� · The most attractive one_s deman:d.:yea::rs of ··.: development· and, investment through collaboration-on -design'� and testing· of:. product, quality and' supplier; :reiiability : ·.

· .

befo��' rea9hln'<i. stabtlity_�--· . '

' .. > '

. . ' . .�

Consequently, unless "V?e def.irte carefully the. limits a�d place our actions in_··_a temporary context, -I -b�lieve .the negatives will soon outweigh any short term benefits from th�se actions, i;e.: · · ·

1. As the long term consequences become better appreciated, your critics will question whether this was indeed an act of�· a "calm, thoughtful leader" or a precipitous-and ill-consid��ed set of overly quic�··reactions. . ..

-2. We may have changed our long term relationship with the ·

Soviet Union onto a ir:reversible path for many years t() come, returning to _the sam� 'low levels of comrriunicat�ori'and interchange that. existed during the earlier Cold War. years.-

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3. Our people wili'�{ew the cost of our sacrifices as far

greater than the harm done to the Soviet Union, thus a bad deal.

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4. Finally,· the public. does not appreciate the. importa,nce of the Soviet action: rior will it:. au_tomatical·ly prqvide' · sustained · .support for· .cdstly countermoves. · Attacking Afghanistan, a country few o'f our·citi'zeris:.cari. s'pell, is not the·same iri their mfn·d·s. as attacking: Pearl· Harbor., They .will need· a lot of educating and bringing al·ong.whichwe·may'well be able to do· during ·the' course of a; 90-day: reassessment"o:f' our basic relationship with the Soviet Union·._·

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A .temporary. suspension for.

a genera� ·- :re�atioris:hip reassessment could avoid these long-te:J:;"rit consequenqe's·� · · ·

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·.THE WHITE HOUSE

·WASHINGTON

January 3, 1979

PERSONAL AND ·ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: STU E� ZENSTAT � SUBJECT: Proposed Grain.Embargo

After reviewing the facts, circumstances, and history surrounding a proposed grain embargo, I wot;ld like to recommend strongly against your proposing s�ch action. I will be prepared to describe my reasons in detail at this afternoon's meeting, but I would like to list them briefly in this memorandum:

1. The U,nited States has never imposed a grain embargo to accomplish international political objectives. On one prior occasion, the Indian�Pakistani War in the mid-1960's, President Johnson threatened a cutoff of P.L. 480 shipments to both countries and, I am told, had shipments temporarily stopped. Food is not, in my opinion, an appropriate weapon to use in the international political arena. You specifically excepted food from your Iranian export embargo. If you were to establish such a precedent with Russia, there would be, I am con�inced, a strpng reaction -- in the Third World, among international groups concerned �ith hunger, ·in the U.N. -- against your using the f6od weapon (especially when none of your predecessors has done so in circumstances at least as alarming) .

2. In your c.ampaign.you.made commitments, announced in Iowa and other places throughout the Midwest, against imposing a grain embargo, unless. our national security was at stake. My understanding is that this campaign commi tment".was one of the ·many r�a�6ris on which·yo� based your decision not to use the fbod weapon against Iran� W� can debate ekactly what was meant by your national ·secuiity excepti6n, brit I think the public and the farm belt will bel�e�e the exception is being stretched unduly to permit an embargo in the· current.circumstances. There may be foreign policy·but n6t national security reasons for this action.

Obviously,·a campaign promise is not conclusive, but it should be given weight. You made the·promise in the context of criticizing Ford for his grain ,e!Ilbargoes. Three weeks from today, when the public'.s:attentiori is no longe� on Afghanistan, and that is certainly possible, I .believe we would likely see a repetition of the same anger against you which they directed against President Ford •

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3. The effect of an embargo on our trade balance would clearly be adverse. Agricultural products are our biggest export, and grain is our most important agricultural export. We are now on the verge of having our current accounts balanced for the first time in many years. That goal would be very difficult to meet if we lose $3-$5 billion in foreign sales. Furthermore, this decline in our exports may have some perceptible effect on the dollar's value in foreign markets.

4. It now appears that almost all of the 25 million tons is under contract. Originally, it had been thought that some 7 or 8 million of the tons was not under contract to Russia because no final destination had been set for those tons. The review which has now been done indicates that perhaps 70 percent of those 8 million tons is under contract. In other words, to accomplish a grain embargo at this time, it will be necessary for the government to violate contracts. That is not a precedent we should b� setting, even though it may be legal (above the base amount of 8 million tons). Court challenges would be brought, as well.

5. Any effort to mitigate the impact on the farm belt of this action will be very expensive in budget terms and may leave an overhang in the market which will depress wheat and corn prices. Yet some action to offset the drop in farm income would be necessary if an embargo were imposed. This drop in income would come on top of an expected 20% drop in farm income projected for next year. If we were to purchase the grain for the government (for resale or redistribution elsewhere), the.cost would be very

expensive ($1.75 billion).

6. A grain embargo would force the Soviet Union to look elsewhere in the future for its grain needs. The Soviets will not soon view us as a reliable supplier, and they can be expected to develop arrangements with other countries to meet their needs. This will, in time, contribute to a decline in foreign markets for our agricultural exports. Similarly damaging might be the effect on other nations. Our credibility as a supplier will be diminished, and our ability and willingness to fulfill international contracts will be questioned. As a result, we can expect some adverse effect on our efforts to promote exports in the 1980's.

7. The impact on the Soviets is unclear. They could replace the wheat portion elsewhere and some (but not all) of the corn. They could liquidate their herds to offset the loss of feedgrain. I believe the political downside is significant. Farmers are very patriotic and are interested in helping in a time of crisis. But when they begin to feel, as they will in a few weeks, the impact on their own households, I think you can expect very severe reaction against a grain embargo. The reaction that Ford met is a reaction you should expect.

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8. Any decision you make to ban or limit agricultural exports, if done on "foreign policy" grounds, is subj ect to a two-house veto. A veto threat can be avoided only by a finding of "national security" grounds. Therefore, advance Congressional consultations on something as unusual and as extreme as a grain embargo are essential. In additidn, there is a statutory directive to consult "before imposing export controls".

If you decide to go forward with an embargo, I recommend as strongly that you not do so tonight. I recognize the need to move quickly, and the importance of not appearing hesitant at this time.

But we need to fully think through the economic and legal impacts of an embargo. We should not act prematurely before the facts are all in and fully absorbed.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20250

January 3, 1980

Lloyd N. Cutler, Esquire Counsel to the President The White House Washington, D. C.

Dear Lloyd,

Enclosed is the memorandum you requested on the legal authority for the President to embargo shipments of grain to the Soviet Union. Also enclosed is the memorandum you requested summarizing the current law governing price supports and reserve policies for corn and wheat.

Howard Hj ort will be providing the latest economic data directly to Charlie Schultze.

Sincerely,

' .

v� If�niel Marcus

U .8. 'freat.£cs and Other lntcrnatinwd .<l urecmcnf.s

AGREEMC:;T B!::TWEE:--1 THE GOVER:::.-,ENT OF THE UlliTED S7A7ES OF i>J�ERICA l•ND

THE GOVER.W!E!<T OF THE UNIO:: OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE SUPPLY OF GRAIN

The Government of the United States of America ("USA") and the

Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ("USSR");

Recalling the "Basic Principles of Relations Between the

[:!GUST

United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics"

of May 29,. 1972; [1]

Desiring to strengthen long-term cooperation between the two

countries on the basis of mutual benefit and equality;

Mindful of the importance which the production of food, parti-

cularly grain, has for the peoples of both countries;

Recognizing the need to stabilize trade in grain between the

two countries;

Affirming their conviction that cooperation in the field of

trade will contribute to overall improvement of relations between

the two countries;

Have asreed as follows:

J..RTICLE I

The Government of the USA and the Government of the USSR hereby

enter into an Agreement for the purchase and sale of wheat and corn

for supply to the USSR. To this end, during the period that this

Agreement is in force, except as otherwise agreed by the Parties,

(i) the foreign trade organizations o= the USSR shall purchase from

private con�ercial sources, for shipment in each twelve month period

beginning October 1, 1976, six million metric tons of wheat and corn,

in approximately equal proportions, grown in the USA; and (ii) the

Government of the USA shall employ its good offices to facilitate

and encourage such sales by private co"�ercial sources.

1 Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1972, p. 898.

TIAS 8206

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2G UST) U.S.S.R.-Grain-Oct. 20, 191"5

The foreign trade organizations of the USSR may increase this

quantity without consultations by up to two million metric tons in

any twelve month period, beginning October 1, 1976 unless the

Government of the USA determines that the USA has a grain supply of

less than 225 million metric tons as defined in Article V.

Purchases/sales of wheat and corn under this Agreement"will be

made at the market price prevailing for these products at the time

of purchase/sale and in accordance with normal co��ercial terms.

ARTICLE II

During the term of this Agreement, except as otherwise agreed

by the Parties, the Government of the USA shall not exercise any

discretionary authority available to it under United States law to

control exports of wheat and corn purchased for supply to the USSR

in accordance with Article I.

ARTICLE III

In carrying out their obligations under this Agreement, the

foreign trade organizations of the USSR shall endeavor to space their

purchases in the USA and shipments to the USSR as evenly as possible

over each 12-month period.

ARTICLE IV

The Govern�ent of the USSR shall assure that, except as the

Parties may otherwise agree, all wheat and corn grown in the USA and

purchased by.foreign trade organizations of the USSR shall be supplied

for consumption in the USSR.

ARTICLE V

In any year this Agreement is in force·when the total grain

supply in the USA, defined as the official United States Department

of Agriculture estimates of the carry-in stocks of grain plus the

official United States Department of Agriculture forward crop

TIAS 8206

2973

. ; '

2974 U.S. Treaties and Other lnlcnwUoual.·larccmcnls [ "2!i UST

estimates for the com�ng crop year, falls below 225 million metric

tons of all grains, the Government of the USA may reduce the quantity

of wheat and corn available for purchase by foreign trade organiza-

tions of the USSR under Article I(i).

ARTICLE VI

Whenever the Government of the USSR wishes the foreign trade

organizations of the USSR to be able to purchase more wheat or corn

grown in the USA than the amounts specified in Article I, it shall

immcdiately.notify the Government of the USA.

��enever the Government of the USA wishes p�ivate cc�.ercial

sources to be able to sell more wheat or corn grown in the USA

than the amounts specified in Article I, it shall immediately notify

the Government of the USSR.

In both instances, the Parties will consult as soon as possible

in order to reach agreement on possible q�antities of grain to be

supplied to the USSR prior to purchase/sale or conclusion of con-

tracts for the purchase/sale of grain i� ��o�nts above those

specified in Article I.

ARTICLE VII

It is understood that the shipment of wheat and corn from the

USA to the USSR under this Agreement shall be in accord with the

[1] provisions of the American-Soviet Agree:c.ent on xaritime Matters which

is in force during the period of shipments hereunder.

ARTICLE VIII

The Parties shall hold co�sultations concerning the implementation

of this Agreement and related matters at intervals of six months

beginning six.

months after the date of er.try into force of this

Agreement, and at any other time at the request of either Party.

'TIAS SHl;J; ante, p. 2767.

TIAS 820G

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2G UST] U.8.S.R.-Grain-Oct. 20, 1.975 ·

ARTICLE IX

This Agreement shall ente� into force on execution and shall

remain in force until September 30, 1981 unless extended for a

mutually agreed period.

DOHE at MOSCO'-', this ;}.$ ("..._ dzy of October, 197 5,

in duplicate, ih the English and Russian languages, both texts

being equally authentic.

[SEAL]

1 Charles v.·. Robinson '::-\. Patoliche,·

FOR THE GOVER."lMENT OF THE t:NION OF SOVI�LI[�

J:

[SEAL]

2975

TIA� :-:200

76-562 0 • 77 - 30

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U.S. DEPART!..iENT OF AGP.ICULTDHE

SUPPLY LEVEL SET UNDER U.S.-USSR GRAINS AGREEMENT

Lindell (202) 447-7115 JenKins (202) 447-4026

WASHINGTON, Oct. 3--The U. S. Department of Agricult ure today issued the

following statement:

"O f ficials of the United States and the Soviet Union met here today for

the eighth session of regular semiannual consultations under the current US-USSR

grain supply agreement. The agreement covers trade in wheat and corn for the

period Oct. 1, 1976, through Sept. 30, 1981.

"Based upon supply availability in the United States and anticipated Soviet

-import requirements, it was agreed that the supply level for U.S. wheat and corn

. . ) could be up to 25 million tons for the current year of the grain supply agree-

ment between the two countries without the necessity for f urther consultations.

"Under terill.S of the agreement, now in its fourth year, the S()viet Union

buys at least 6 million tons--half wheat, half corn--of u.s. grain in each of the

five years of the agreement. The agreement also requires that purchases above 8

million tons must be preceded by agreement between the t wo countries on an increased

supply level for. the year concerned.

"Under Secretary of Agriculture Dale E. Hathaway headed the U.S. delega-

tion at today's consultation. The delegation from Hoscow was led by Boris S •

�rdeev, Soviet deputy minister of foreign trade.

"At today's session, Soviet officials confirmed that their purchases for

the fourth year already total about 8 million tons, and that more purchases are

anci.;::Lpated. It was indicaced that the year's total volume would probably be as

-more-

USDA 2331-79

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high or higher than that of the past two yeers, which ·..,ere: abuut 14. l> million l•Jn::>

in 1977-78 and about 15.7 million tons in 1978-79.

"Although purchases that go above the minimum 6 million ton level may

c�nsist of any proportion of wheat and corn, it was indicated that corn would

again likely represent a substantially larger portion. ·

"Hathaway said that the new agreed supply level of 25 million tons takes

into account current U.S. supplies and export availabilities as well as anticipated

USSR import requirements for the 1979-80 season.

"He said the new supply level does not imply a particular USSR purchase plan

at this time, since the actual volume of purchases will depend upon progress of

shipments, possible logistical constraints, market conditions, any adverse weather

developments that may affect shipping, and other factors.

"Hathaway also indicated that the new supply level and the anticipated

crease in shipments to the USSR this season, are expected to have little or no

significant impact on the general level of grain prices, since world markets have

already recognized a probable rise in world trade and USSR imports from all origins

in the year ahead.

"Even if the volume ·of fourth year trade were to reach the full amount of

the newly-agreed supply level, supplies on hand will be adequate to meet other

anticipated domestic and export requirements, and maintain sufficient carryover

into the 1980-81 season, Hathaway said.

"It was agreed that the two sides would remain in close contact during the

interim prior to the next regular session of semi-annual consultations next s pring,

an1 that additional consultations would be arranged during the interim if at any

time this appeared necessary.

6354 USDA 2331-79

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UNITED STATES DEP/\RTMENT OF ,\GRICULTURE

FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE WASHI:�GTON, D.C. 20250

October 5, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR TIE RECORD

FROM: David M. Schoonover})t:of SUBJECT: US-USSR Grain Consultations, October 1979

At grain consultations in Washington on October 3 between delegations ied by USDA Under Secretary Dale E. Hathaway and USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, Boris S. Gordeev, the Soviets were advised that they could buy up to 25 million metric tons of u�s. wheat and corn during 1979/80 without further consultations. The Soviets said that they would buy more grain than in the past •

Following discussions of U.S. supply situation, principal Soviet concerns evidenced were related to the degree of finality of U.S. 1978/79 and 1979/80 grain and soybean supply and demand estimates and whether special preparations had been made for handling and transport of the expected record quantities of U.S. exports. The principal point by the Soviets concerning their supply situation was that the crop would be better than expected earlier, despite problems in some areas, especially the Ukraine. Deputy ��nister Gordeev said that the first reasonably exact assessment of the USSR crop usually is made in early November, but likely will be available about mid-November this yea::- owing to the delayed maturity.

Despite several questions from the U.S. delegation related to the Soviet grain crop outlook, Mr. Gordeev insisted that better information simply was not available .

Under Secretary Hathaway concluded the discussion of crop situations by noting that the U.S. Government feels strongly that sharing of the maximum amount of information on crops is of significant value in enabling the U.S. as prospective suppliers to meet Sovi3t needs. He expressed �ope i� the support of the So\iet delegation in working with officials of the USSR Ministry of Agriculture to develop crop forecasts and to share this information.

U.S. and Soviet data on grain shipments during 1978/79 and Soviet

purchases for 1979/80 next were co�9ared. Discr�pancies in the shil.)IH.!nt ciuta for scme i'lOI:t:hs were noted, although the annt;a.l totals in the two 6ate1 sets did not greatly a1=re::-. ?he Soviets

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\ offered to make availabl� by the end of Oc � obcr a detailed list of ships and tonnages thfit could be used in checking the data.

2

It was agreed that the c�ryvover of �rain which had been purchased for shipment in 1978/79 -- the third year of the agreement -- but which remained unshipped, '.·:ould be counted in data on the third year. . Dr. Ha tha\vay not.� a, h•.:-·..;ever, that the U. S. would like to examine the data on car�::::Jv�C:r a.:nounts after they had been determined and would be co�cerned if they were excessive or unusually .large in relation to purc�ases.

Dr. Hathaway noted that scheduled grain shipments for OctoberDecember 1979 were relati•.'ely low in ·relation to U.S. expectations of Soviet purchases durin(J ':.:1e fourth year of the agreement. The Soviet side said that t�e shipment program for the quarter would be increased either by new purchases or by moving up shipments planned for the first q��r�e� of 1980.

Concerning the reported E million tons purchased by the Soviets for 1979/80, Mr. Gordeev noted that they already had purchased about the maximum level of corn permitted prior to consultations. He said that there was no misunderstanding concerning the offer that had been made in the .su�er to permit larger wheat purchases before additional consultations •

Despite U.S. efforts to obtain any indication of Soviet import intentions during 1979/80, the Soviets declined to provide any signals prior to the U.S. offer of grain availabilities. Deputy Minister Gordeev said that:

(1) they did not know USSR crop results and how much they would need to buy from the u.S.;

(2)

(3)

it would not be in their commercial interest to tell the U.S. their buyin� intentions, especially if the quantities were large; the USSR is not co�mitted under the agreement to provide this information.

Deputy Minister Gordeev said· that the USSR would abide by the terms of the agreement. If the U.S. did not offer additional quantities, the USSR would abide by the limits and buy grain elsewhere.

Under Secretary Hathaway said that based on the U.S. supply and demand situation and world narket condition�, the U.S. believes it would be possible for t�'1e Soviets to buy up to 25 million t.ons of r.:.s. whe<.:t ;o_r:C. co'_-,. v:ithout further consultations. He

CS;)eCi2}.l-.' . -s.::·s,_.;;lc:s t�o.t there \·:auld be special

co:1sult�tio:::s as suc·n '-!:::: :.:;c faces ar-e known.

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Deputy Minister Gordeev responded that it is difficult to say to

what extent the USSR will utilize the offered 25 million tons, but that he was confident the offer would enable the USSR to purchase more than on earlier occasions. r.e said that Soviet needs would be determined in the not-too-distant future and that he understood well that if more grain is needed that additional consultations are required.

3

Mr. Gordeev strongly emphasized Soviet approval of the U.S. Government position in implementing the grain asreement. He expressed gratitude for the offer of additional quantities of grain.

Dr. Hathaway said that the agreement is an i::nportant element enabling the U.S. to stabilize trade. He said that the exchange

of information is useful and expressed hope that it can be improved. He noted that it is important for the U.S. to have adequate information as a basis for determining the domestic farm program. It is the U.S. Government's goal to manase the programs in a manner that will provide reasonable returns to U.S. farmers .

Dr. Hathaway completed his statement by expressing appreciation for the confirmation that higher availability will lead.to higher trade because this enables the u.s. to determine farm programs for the next year. .: ..

The session concluded with a brief discussion of.grain quality issues and was followed by a more detailed discussion at the

technical level. Deputy Hinister Gordeev said that he would like the delegation heads to hear a report on the technical discussions. Dr. Hathaway responded that u.s. policy seeks to ensure that customers receive the quality they pay for and that he will discuss with Assistant Secretary Smith measures to deal with any problems that are found.

The delegation heads agreed that the next scheduled meeting will be held next May in Mosco�.

' . . ·

MEMORANDUM: Price Suoport, Target Price, and Grain Reserve

Price support for wheat and feed grains as well as other \

crops such as cotton, rice, peanuts, tobacco, and dairy

pr-�ducts is made available to farmers under the Agricultural

Act of 1949, as amended. Provision is also made in the

statute for target price payments for wheat, feed grains,

rice, and cotton.

In the case of wheat and corn, the commodities of concern,

price support must be made available through loans and

purchases at rates not less than the specified statutory

minimum [ $2.00 per:bushel�·in 'the case 'of. corn and $2.35 per

bushel in the case of wheat] and any applicable maximum

prescribed by law [100 percent of parity in the �ase�of

wheat]. The level of support for each crop for each crop

year is determined by the Secretary taking into consideration,

among other things, the total stock of such grains and the

demand therefor, particularly in export markets. For the

1979 crops, those now being marketed, the level of price

support is $2.35 per bushel for wheat and $2.00 per bushel

for .co:rn, The loan rate for 1980 crop wheat has been

es:tablished at $2.50. No level of support has been announced

for 1980 crop corn but it will be not less than $2.00.

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Under the program farmers can obtain non-recourse loans on

wheat and corn from Commodity Credit Corporation at the rates

indicated or they can enter into purchase agreements under

which Connnodity Credit c:mporation agrees to buy these grains

at price�support level when offered to Commodity Credit

Corporation by the farmers. The loans generally mature

eleven months·after they are made. Under present market

conditions loans are usually paid off before they mature

because market prices have ranged above the loan rates. For

the same reason few purchase agreements are being entered

into by farmers. If, however, prices should drop below the

level of price support rates the wheat or feed grains could

be forfeited to Connnodity Credit Corporation in full satis

faction of the loans or delivered under purchase agreements.

In such event grain stocks held by the Government would increase

substantially.

Target price protection is provided for wheat and corn [as

well as well as other feed grains] at levels higher than the

levels e�tablished for price support purposes. Target prices

for these crops are determined from mandated baselines

adjusted to reflect changes in cost of production as provided

in a statutory formula. Target prices for the 1980 crops of

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wheat and corn have not yet been finally determined. If the

statutory formula were applied, it is estimated that in the

case ·of wheat the target price for 1980 would fall in a range .I

between $3.05 and $3.15 per bushel. In the case of tor� the

1980 target price would probably be between $2.05 and $2;.12

per bushel. However, in the case of both crops legislation

which has passed the Senate and is probably going to be enacted,

would raise the target price for 1980 to $3..63 per bushel in ;and

the case of wheat;,

to $2.35 per bushel in the case of corn.

Under the program if the average market price received by

farmers during the first five months of the marketing year

involved is greater than the applicable target price, no

payments are made to the farmers. If the average market price

for the five month period is less than the target price but

greater than the loan rate a payment is made to participating

farmers in the amount of the difference. If the average

market price for the period is below the loan rate for the

grain involved, then: a payment is made to eligible farmers for

the difference between the loan rate and the target� price.

Thus, a. participating farmer may receive price protection up

to the · target price level by parti.cipat:Lng in both the loan

or purchase program and the target price sy.stem, If acreage

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- 4 -

restrictions are in effect under the set-aside program,

farmers must reduce their acreages planted to non-conserving

crops to be eligible for loans, purchase agreements and target

price payments.

In order to help maintain price levels above the target prices

when there is surplus production of wheat or feed grains

congress has directed that the Secretary operate a farmer-held

grain reserve program. In general, the program offers farmers

the opportunity to obtain extended loans of three years

duration at price support rates on wheat or feed grains

committed to the reserve. Most grain enters the reserve after

it has been placed under price support loan. On entry into

th� re�erve the farmer is paid storage charges at the rate of

$0.25 per bushel per year on the quantity in the reserve. By

committing the grain to the reserve, the farmer agrees that

he will not redeem the grain from the program until the market

price for the kind of grain involved reaches the release

level specified for that kind of grain. Breach of this agree

ment may result in the imposition of liquidated damages.

Currently, the release level for wheat is 140 percent of the

current loan rate or $3. 20 per bushel. The current �.release

level for corn is now 125 percent of the current loan rate

or $2.50 per bushel. In order to induce redemption once the

.. . . . ' \ ....

- 5 -

price reaches these levelfi ,storage payments stop.

If the price of wheat, for example, does not decline after

it has reached the release level but continues upward,

it may reach the call level. At that point the loans

become immediately due and payable and, if not redeemed, the

grain would be forfeited to Commodity Credit Corporation.

Currently, the call level for wheat is 175 percent of the

current loan rate or $4.11 per bushel. The call level for

corn is 140 percent of the current loan rate or $2.80 per

bushel.

Neither corn nor wheat is present�y being marketed by

farmers at prices above the - ':.calL, levels. \.fuile there is

no statutory limit on the quantity of feed grains which may

be placed in the reserve, the quantity of wheat in the

reserve may not exceed 700 million bushels.

MEMORANDUM: Legal Authority to Embargo Grain Shipments to the Soviet Union

The Export Administration Act

The President has very broad powers, acting in

conjunction with the Secretary of Commerce. under the

Export Administration Act of 1979, to restrict or embargo

the export of goods, including agricultural commodities.

Exports may be embargoed for three reasons: (a) national

security; (b) foreign policy; and (c) short supply in the

domestic economy. If goods are embargoed for national

security reasons, the statute does not require prior

consultation with Congress or subsequent reporting to, or

approval by, Congress. However, if the embargo is imposed

for foreign policy reasons, the President is directed "in

every possible instance" to consult with Congress before

imposing export co�trols and to report to Congress immediately

after imposing the controls as to the basis for his action.*

*The statute requires the President to "consider'' a number of factors in deciding whether to impose export , controls for foreign policy purposes: whether controls will achieve their intended purpose; their compatibility with overall foreign policy objectives; the reaction of other countries; the likely effect on the export business of the u.s.; the ability to enforce the controls; and the consequences of not imposing controls.

2

In addition, in the case of an embargo on exports of

agricultural commodities for foreign policy reasons, the

statute provides a 30-day period after the President acts

within which Congress may, by action of both Houses, overturn

the embargo. Of course, the embargo would be effective unless

or until Congress acted.

Thus, under the Export Administrati-on Act, the President

may act promptly -- either for national security or foreign

policy reasons -- to impose an embargo on the export of

goods to the Soviet Union.

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Grain Agreement

In the case of shipments of grain to the Soviet Union,

however, this generally clear picture is complicated by the

provisions of the 1975 agreement between the United States

and the U.S.S.R. on the supply of wheat and corn to the

Soviet Union. On October 20, 1975, the two countries

entered into an agreement relating to the sale of wheat and

corn to the U.S.S.R. for a 5-year period from October 1976

through September 1981.

Under the basic provision of the agreement (Article I),

the Soviet Union agrees to purchase (from private commercial

sources) 6 million metric tons of U.S. wheat and corn

annually, in approximately equal proportions, and the

United States agrees to facilitate and encourage such

sales from private commercial sources. In addition, the

Soviet Union at its option may purchase up to 2 million

additional metric tons of wheat and corn a year without

additional consultation with the United States (unless

there is a short supply situation in the United States).

Article VI of the Grain Agreement contemplates that

the two countries may agree to additional supply levels in

3

a particular year beyond the 8 million tons covered by

Article I. Such a supplementary arrangement was entered into

in October of 1979 when as a result of discussions

between representatives of the two countries -- it was

agreed that the United States would facilitate the purchase

by the Soviet Union of an additional 17 million tons of

wheat and corn (for a total of 25 million tons) during the

year beginning October 1979. No limitations were placed on

how the additional 17 million tons of purchases would be

divided between wheat and corn, but it was understood that

the bulk of Soviet purchases would be corn. Current expectations

are that the Soviet Union will purchase about 18 million tons

of corn and 7 million tons of wheat during the current year

(October 1979-September 1980). As of January 1, approximately

4 million tons had already been shipped, with a total of

more than 17 million tons already covered by contracts.

4

In terms of a possible embargo on shipments of grain

to the Soviet Union, the important provision of the 1975

agreement is Article II, which provides that the government

of the United States "shall not exercise any discretionary

authority available to it under United States law to control

exports of wheat and corn purchased for supply to the U.S. S. R.

in accordance with Article I. " The main purpose of Article II

may well have been simply to assure that exports to the

Soviet Union would not be singled out for embargo in a short

supply situation. But it seems clear from the language of

this provision, as well as contemporaneous explanations,

that Article II represents an undertaking not to use any

authority under the Export Administration Act to embargo

shipments of wheat and corn to the Soviet Union -- up to

the 8 million tons of annual purchases guaranteed by Article I.

Both the State Department and the Agriculture Department view

this limitation as applying only to the base purchases of

8 million tons annually, and not to additional purchases

agreed to under Article VI of the Agreement, such as the

additional 17 million tons covered by the October 1979

discussions.

Since the 1975 wheat agreement is not a treaty of

the United States, it does not modify or affect domestic

United States law. Accordingly, it is the view of the

State Department and the Agriculture Department that even

as to the base amount of 8 million tons, an embargo would

not result in a violation of United States law as such or

create any rights in private parties enforceable under U.S.

law. However, an embargo affecting the base amount of

5

8 million tons might constitute a violation of an international

obligation of the United States under the 1975 wheat agreement,

unless it could be justified under some supervening principle

of international law. In any event, however, the agreement

would not be violated by an embargo affecting the 17 million

tons of additional shipments covered by the October 1979

discussions.*

*A 1977 amendment to the basic farm legislation requires that price supports be raised to 90% of parity if exports are restricted because of a short supply situation in the United States. This provision would not be triggered, obviously, by an embargo imposed for national security or foreign policy purposes. But it does reflect a Congressional concern about the impact of embargoes on farm prices and makes it likely that any embargo action would generate pressure to invoke this provision or to take other action to raise price supports.

. ... • J ••• e• • •

EYES ONLY

MEHORA.NDUH FOR:

FRO.l'-1

SUBJECT

ut:l\lt:K/4L �UUI\.I::tt:L Ul"" I Ht: · UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Washington. D.C. 20230

Januarv 3, 1980

Stuart E. Eizenstat

Horner E. Hoyer, Jr. � Maritime Implications of Grain Embargo

The attached memo su�marizes the extent of U.S. maritime participation in grain shipments to the Soviet Union and the recent history of longshoremen refusals to load cargo destined for Communist countries.

In a word, the impact of halting grain shipments o n American shipping would be minimal. !·'iore irr.portantly, time is of the essence on a decision on a grain embargo, for a decision by the longshoremen could effectively preempt the President and make his decision in some· respects moot.

cc: Joseph Onek, Esq.

D.l:<A.J:'T

. . . .. , ...

!>'J.EMORANDUM FOR:

Subject: Maritime Considerati ons Involved in Halting Grain Shipments to the U,S,S,R,

In considering various options relating to the curtailment of

grain shipments to the U.S.S.R. two areas of inquiry should be

pursued. The first is the status of such shipments and the impact

any curtailment would have on the U,S.; U.S.S.R. and third-country

fleets. And, secondly, the history of some of the boycott

actions of the International Longshoremen1s Union (ILA) in certain

trades and the likelihood of such activity in the future.

Status of Grain Shipments to the U,S,S,R,

Between January and September 1979, the u.s. shipped a total of

13,738,349 metric tons of grain to the U,S,S,R, Of this total,

321,466 tons (2�3%) were carried by u.s.�flag vessels; 2,853,212

tons (20.8%) by Soviet flag ships; and1 10,563,671 tons (76,9%)

by third-flag carriers. Similarly in 1978 , a total of 14r415,800

metric tons of grain were shipped to the Soviet Union. U.S.-flag

vessels carried 505,500 tons (3,5%); Soviet flag vessels carried

3,192,000 tons (22,1%); and, third�flag vessels carried

10,718,300 tons (74.4%). Prior to 1978, u.s.�flag vessels had

generally carried more grain to the Soviet Union than did Soviet

vessels. Hoi-leVer, demands for U.S,.,...flag tanker tonnage in the

Alaskan trade saw a shift in employment of u,s.�flag vessels to·

that trade, thus leaving the carriage of grain in the Soviet grain

trade mainly to Soviet and third�flag tonnage,

f

I I __

. .. .......

The current contracted sale of 23 million tons of grain to the

U.S.S.R. form approximate�y 12.8% of that country's 1979 pro-

2 •

duction and is a significant demand which the Soviets would seek

to have met elsewhere if shipments were terminated. From a shipping

standpoint, t hird-flag vessels currently employed in its trade

would have to seek employment elsewhere, as would Soviet vessels

presently engaged in the trade, This displacement could have a

significant impact on the world charter market. The result would

likely be unemployment for many vessels and substantially depressed

world charter rates. Much of the third-flag tonnage, perhaps as

much as 25% -30% , currently employed in this trade is time

c hartered to the Soviet Union until June 1980, Should g rain ship-

m�nts be halted, therefore, the Soviets, not the owners of these

vessels, would suffer severe financial losses. There would be

little impact on U.S.-flag operators resulting from any curtailment

of shipments. Furthermore, the stoppage of sales to the U.S.S.R.

would not violate any provision of the U . S .- U . S . S . R . maritime

c. greement .

3oycott of Soviet Grain Sales by the ILA

In the 1963-64 sales of gr ain to the Soviet Union, the most

' troublesome roadblock to shipping wheat to the Soviet Union was

the r efusal of the International L ongshoreme n 1 s Union liLA). to

load such cargoes in u.s. Gulf and East Coast ports, The ILA, ·

\·:hich historically maintained a strong anti -Cormnunis t position 1

3.

demonstrated this refusal in late January 1964 after the

Continental Grain Company had asked the !-1ar i time Adininistration

to waive the U.S.-flag requirement on the sale of grain to the

Soviets, claiming it had been able to contract l ess than half of

494,000 long tons of U.S.-flag vessels that were needed to comply

with a 50% U.S. -flag requirement, American shipm·mers and labor

unions strongly opposed the waiver requests and the ILA called

a boycott on loading Soviet cargoes. Finally after a month of

negotiations, Federal officials and labor leaders reached agree-

ment and shipments were allowed to proceed,

Similarly in June 1971, just prior to the rescission of the 1963

Presidential Order requiring the use of U,S.-flag vessels in the

carriage of grain sold to the U,S.S,R,, James Gleason, President

of t he ILA, told White House officials that the ILA would not load

any vessels bound for the Soviet Union, Gleason obtained the

support of other U.S. maritime leaders and secured a protest

letter from George !>leany, then President of the AFL.-ciO 1. which was

sent to the President on June 15, 1971, FinallyK in early

:�overr�ber 1971, h7hite House and maritime labor leaders agreed on

a plan to seek the negotiation of a cargo sh iring agreement with

the Soviet Union and the ILA lifted its opposition to the shiF�ent

of grain to the u.s,s.R.

In July 1975 the ILA delegates at their national convention voted

to refuse to load &�erican and Canadian grain on vessels destined

to the Soviet Union, In August 1975, George Meany said that

-

;.""-:�er ican longshoremen would not load any more grain on ships bound

4.

for the So�iet Union until steps w ere taken "to protect the

A.ITterican consumer and· also. the American shipping industry".

Longshoremen walked off the job in B eaumont, Houston and New

Orleans. On August 19, 1975� a u.s. District Court judge signed

a t emporary restraining order directing longshoremen to resume

loading the wheat in West Gulf ports. On September 51 1975, a

U.S. District Court judge in New Orleans issued a permanent

in junction concluding that the boycott was a v iolation of the

collective bargaining agreement bet\o.;een the ILA and the steamship

associa tion. Finally, on September 9, 1975, Mr. Meany agreed to

end th e boycott . It should be noted that in a d ifferent . but

related situation involving the ILA's refusal to load a British

flag ship (TULSE HILL) in Baltimore in 1964 because the vessel

had been to Cuba, a Federal court judge ruled that the Ih� action

was appropriate because longshoremen couldn't be required to do

work they considered obnoxious , even for political reasons ,

The ILA has historically taken unilateral action with respect to

boycotts that comple:-nented the views of it:s n-;el · ·�rshipr such as

action �hich is currently underway with respect to shipments to

Iran (see Attachment l) • One cannot discount' the possibi lity that

such action could occur in the present instance, especially in

vi�w of the fact that little economic harm would come to the u,s.�

flag merchant fleet from a boycott, Obviously such unilateral

I!

( ... _. .. s.

labor action would not yield the po litical benefit to the

Administration that might result from the stoppage of grain sales

to the U.S.S.R. by the U.S. Government. In light of this fact,·

any decision concerning termination of grain movements to the

U.S.S.R. should be considered at the earliest possible time.

.·

4/13/60

1961

1962

10/17/62

10/13/62

11/63

1/21/64

2/17/64

2/25/66

3/5/66

2/2 :±/68

1968

1971

1975

1979-80

LONGSHORE (ILA) BOYCOTTS

Longshoremen refused to work the United Arab Republic vessel CLEOPATRA. Vessel picketed by the SIU in retaliation for boycotted and blacklisted vessels carrying Israeli cargo or calling at Israeli ports.

.ILA refuses to handle any cargo shipped either to or from Cuba.

ILA boycotted the Spanish vessel GUADALUPE because of dealings with Cuba and the Soviet Union.

ILA refused to unload Soviet made cargo abroad the Finnish flag vessel "FINNPULP. "

ILA i nstruct e d its members not to load any Orient Mid-East vessels in u.s. po r ts because some �ere engaged in Cuban trade.

IL..Zl. Loca l 824 refu sed to handle Soviet cargo a broad the JOH. GORTHON, a Swedish-Flag vessel.

IL..� refused to load the S,S. TULSE HILL, the former Cuban - trad ing ship when i t stopped in Ba l timore (bound for England) .

ILA s topped loading wheat for shipDent to the Soviet Union despite u r g ent appeals from Washington.

IIA Local 824 picketed Cunard Piers 92-94 - New York. Pro tested English sn1ps carryi ng cargo to North Vietnam. (QUEEN :·1ARY a t 92 and .'\LAUNIA at 94.)

ILA picketed French L ine Pier S� protesting French ships carrying cargo to North Vietnam.

Lo n g s ho remen supported the striking AFL-CIO copp e r unions by refus ing t o handle copper im?orts.

In int.erview wi th Journalist, Victor Riesel, IL.Zl. President Thom a s Glea son a llegedly advocated labor a c t i on against Swedish cargo and vessels because of Swed i sh acceptance and h a n dlin g of A�erican deserters.

ILJ:I. i n dicated intention to boyc o tt Soviet g rain sal es.

ILA announced refusal to load Sovie t vessels and lo�gshoremen walked off job in Beaumon t, H o us ton and New Orleans.

ILA i�plemented de facto boyco t t of cargoes destineJ for Iran.

Documents

1/7/80 [2] Folder Citation: Collection: Office of Staff …...MOBE THAN 40 NATIONS HAVE PETITIONED THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 8. TO CONDEMN THE SOVIET UNION 9. AND TO DEMAND