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Resources and border disputes in

Eastern AfricaWafula Okumu

a

aInstitute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa

Version of record first published: 28 Jun 2010.

To cite this article: Wafula Okumu (2010): Resources and border disputes in Eastern Africa, Journal

of Eastern African Studies, 4:2, 279-297

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Resources and border disputes in Eastern Africa

Wafula Okumu*

Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa

(Received 28 September 2009; final version received 30 December 2009)

This article argues that there is a likelihood of inter-state disputes in EasternAfrica as natural wealth is discovered in the borderlands. After providing anoverview of the current state of Eastern African borders the article points out thatthe escalating trans-boundary resource disputes are due to the colonial boundary-

making errors, undefined and unmarked borders, poor or lack of bordermanagement, poor governance, and population bulge. Besides using a numberof case studies to contextualise trans-boundary resource conflicts, the articleconcludes by recommending establishment of a regional mechanism to addressborder disputes and a regional framework for managing and sharing trans-boundary resources.

Keywords: trans-boundary resources; border disputes; Eastern Africa

There are heightened tensions and increasing potential for inter-state conflicts in

Eastern Africa due to growing discoveries, or rumours of existence, of natural

resources on borders or in borderlands. The price boom of commodities between2001 and 2008 due to the rapid industrial development of Asian countries, mainly

China, and their efforts to access African minerals, led to a new scramble for

African natural resources.1 This new scramble took place when the populations

were burgeoning while governments were increasingly becoming incapable of

meeting their most basic needs. With unreliable foreign aid, most governments

furiously sought other sources of income to meet the demands of their growing

populations. This inevitably increased the values of territories that were hitherto

neglected and marginalised as governments partitioned the land into concessionary

blocks that were awarded to Chinese and Western companies to hunt for natural

resources. Many of the most highly prized minerals, including hydrocarbons,

iron ore, bauxite/alumina, copper, manganese, molybdenum (moly), uranium, zinc

and platinum group metals (PGMs), have been found in Eastern Africas

borderlands.

Since the eruption of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea over their common

boundary in 1998, and the subsequent failure to demarcate it, there has been a

growing concern that there could be more inter-state disputes in Eastern Africa as

natural wealth is discovered in the borderlands. The recent (2009) standoff between

Kenya and Uganda over the ownership of Migingo Island in Lake Victoria, the 2008

border incident between Eritrea and Djibouti, the continuing Somali nationalism in

the region, and border skirmishes between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of

*Email: [email protected]

Journal of Eastern African Studies

Vol. 4, No. 2, July 2010, 279 297

ISSN 1753-1055 print/ISSN 1753-1063 online

# 2010 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/17531055.2010.487338

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the Congo (DRC) over the oil-rich Lake Albert region, all indicate that border

disputes are on the rise. In addition to the potential for armed conflict,

undemarcated, indefinite, porous, and unmanaged boundaries are being used for

illegal cross-border activities that threaten national sovereignties and destabilise

regional politics. This paper argues that among the sources of current border

disputes in Eastern Africa are the improperly delimited and poorly demarcated

colonially inherited borders, the procrastination of post-independent governments to

correct the colonial errors, poor border administration and management, increasing

populations, and discoveries of mineral wealth in the borderlands and frontiers.2 The

first part provides an overview of the current state of Eastern African borders.

The second part explores the history of the Eastern African borders by highlighting

the colonial boundary-making errors. The third part explores the factors that

contribute to border disputes in the region such as poor, or lack of, border

management, poor governance and population bulge. The fourth section contextua-

lises the discussion in trans-boundary resource conflicts in the Albert basin, Lakes

Victoria and Malawi, and the Ruvuma delta basin. The paper concludes by pointingout that trans-boundary resource disputes can be prevented by delimiting,

reaffirming, demarcating, and managing regional boundaries, as well as developing

regimes for trans-boundary resource management and use.

Overview of Eastern African border hotspots

Sharing more than thirty boundaries, each of the countries in Eastern Africa has had

at least one border dispute with a neighbour. These disputes are mainly over

territorial claims, and are most frequently caused by the lack of clearly defined and

marked boundaries, the availability of trans-boundary resources, and security-relatedmatters. At present the hottest border spots are on the Ethiopia Eritrea border, the

EritreaDjibouti border, the SomaliaEthiopiaKenya borders, the SudanKenya

border, the Uganda DRC border, the SudanChadCARDRCUganda borders,

and the KenyaUganda border. In the second tier of disputes are the Tanzania

Mozambique, TanzaniaMalawi, TanzaniaUganda, UgandaRwanda and the

KenyaEthiopia borders.

Although disputes over trans-boundary resources have drawn attention only in

the last five years, border security has been the main focus in border relations

throughout the region over many years, with cattle rustling, drug trafficking, human

trafficking, gun smuggling, and auto theft all featuring in the economy of the

borderlands. Other security issues relate to terrorist activities, illegal and undocu-

mented immigrations through illegal border points by communities that have

relatives on both sides of the border, and illegal cross-border activities, such as the

use of herd boys as informers for human traffickers and monitoring the movements

of the patrol teams.

The borders of Kenya and Ethiopia with Somalia are the most insecure in the

region, being populated by Somali-speakers who have, since the 1960s, nursed

irredentist tendencies that have resulted in border and insurgency wars. With

increased exploration for hydrocarbons in north-eastern Kenya and the Ogaden

region of Ethiopia, both predominantly occupied by Somali-speakers, their common

borders with Somalia present a continuing but evolving security challenge. Althoughsecessionist and irredentist tendencies are currently low due to Somalias internal

problems, there are fears in Nairobi and Addis Ababa that continued marginalisation

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of the Somali regions will sow the seeds of further radicalisation and further

insurgencies. One such insurgency is currently being mounted by the Ogaden

National Liberation Front (ONLF) in Ethiopia, a movement suspected to have links

to Islamist militias in Somalia. ONLF also claimed responsibility for attacking and

killing 64 Ethiopian and 9 Chinese oil workers at Abole, in April 2007.3 Elsewhere in

the region, a similar situation has emerged around the Tutsi populations spreading

across the DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda. The Rwandan invasions of eastern DRC in

1998 and 2009, in the guise of protecting the Tutsi population or pursuing the former

genocidaires, have more recently been reinterpreted as being functional to the

exploitation of the Congos mineral riches.4

Borderlands where mineral resources are being explored or exploited are

experiencing increasingly frequent disputes over land claims, delimitation disputes,

lawlessness, security alerts, and bitter political exchanges between governments.

Recent examples include the Albert basin straddling the UgandaDRC border, the

Elemi Triangle that is contested by Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia, and Migingo Islandin Lake Victoria. Border conflicts in such areas seem bound to escalate if local

communities are denied the opportunities to benefit from exploitation of the natural

resources in their locality. Exclusion, or anxiety about its likelihood, can easily fuel

increased illegal and criminal cross-border activities, and might foment support for

insurgencies feeding on local grievances relating to political marginalisation and

exclusion. The potential for conflict in borderlands is real.

Apart from the bloody EthiopiaEritrea border war of 19982000 and the

SomaliaEthiopia war of 1978, there have not been major conflicts over borders in

the region prior to 2000. However, with an abundance of hotspots on the regions

borders, rumours or beliefs that the boundary areas contain natural resources hasserved in recent years to magnify disputes.5 A parallel can be seen historically in West

Africa, with the Agacher strip, which was rumoured to hold oil reserves, when armed

clashes between Burkina and Mali took place in 1974 and 1985; the Bakassi dispute

between Nigeria and Cameroon; and the ongoing dispute over Western Sahara. The

phosphate deposits in Western Sahara have influenced Moroccan claims over

the region, as have oil in the dispute about offshore islands between Cameroon

and Nigeria. Reviewing this experience, Englebert, Tarango and Carter contend: In

general, unequal resources including water, oil and other minerals, fisheries, and

access to the sea seem to promote conflict.6

A border dispute within Eastern Africa that has drawn keen attention in therecent past has been the determination of the boundary between North and South

Sudan in the Abyei area.7 Drawing a firm North South border is one of the biggest

challenges facing Sudan, as the line has implications for the control of oil-rich areas.

The delimitation and demarcation has been a divisive issue in both the south and the

north, with several groups, notably the Dinka Ngok and the Misseriya, expressing

suspicions that the governments in Khartoum and Juba have manipulated local

populations to promote their respective interests. Although the Permanent Court of

Arbitration issued a ruling in July 2009 that placed the oil wells in the north, tensions

have remained in the border area. In an area where border politics are already

inflamed by long-standing disputes over the grazing rights of the so-called MisseriyaArabs, the question of an equitable sharing of oil wealth has added a further

dimension to an already volatile situation.

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Historical legacy and errors in Eastern Africa boundary-making

Boundary-making in Eastern Africa was a very deliberate and elaborate process. The

current borders in the region were cartographic feats of the colonial powers

Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Portugal whose main objective was

to enhance their respective imperial interests. The borders of the region are areflection of how these interests played out between 1885 and 1925. The Kenya

TanzaniaUgandaRwanda borders, for instance, reflect the British obsession to

control the source of the Nile and the colonial intrigues to gain access to the mineral

wealth of the present eastern DRC.

Examples of borderlands that became sources of profound political intrigue were

the Rwenzori, Semliki and Mahagi areas, which were rumoured to have the biggest

gold deposit in the world, and where the British tried to outwit the Belgians. The

Anglo-Belgian Agreement of 1894 defined the international boundary in the area

between Lakes Edward and Albert. According to Kibulya, the drawing of the

boundary on the 308E meridian

revealed the ignorance of the colonialists as far as the geography of Africa wasconcerned. It was easy to write down the meridian on paper at a conference in Brussels,but when it came to the demarcation and delimitation of the boundary on land, thecolonial administrators in the Congo and Uganda could not easily trace the meridian onthe ground. In Uganda, the Rwenzori were for six years regarded as the western limit ofthe Protectorate while in Congo the Belgians did not know that their territory extendedfar east of Beni.8

The territory and people in between, as shown in Figure 1, belonged to neither the

British or Belgian colonial administration until 1900.

An attempt by the British administrator and explorer Sir Harry Johnston in 1900to address this issue created further problems. The area occupied by the Bwamba

people on the Congo side of the border remained outside the jurisdiction of the

Belgian colonial administration, despite the work of the Uganda Congo Boundary

Commission of 190608. Confused efforts by Belgian administrators to demarcate

the border persisted until 1924. The boundary was supposed to follow the course of

the Lamya River, but the Belgians mistook it for the Semliki River. When they

discovered their mistake 10 years later, they placed the border at Rwamya River,

about 10 miles west of Kamango.9 It was not until 1920 that this further error was

corrected and the present border was established. As Langlands observes:

the CongoUganda boundary reveals in particular the difficulty of using astronomicallines for boundary definition especially in unexplored country and indicates that a laterconcern for national frontiers was also beset with problems and had produced resultsunsatisfactory from many points of view.10

The colonialists (British, Belgians and Germans) heavily relied on the lakes in the

region and the 308E meridian to define boundaries in Eastern Africa. The British and

Germans divided East Africa using a line from Kilimanjaro direct to the Eastern

side of Lake Victoria Nyanza which is intersected by the 18S latitude. Using the

hinterland doctrine, which stated that there should be no annexation of the others

sphere (particularly unoccupied regions by the other without consent), the British andGermans claimed territories between Kilimanjaro and Lake Victoria up to the 308E

meridian. While these two claimed the rights to own the land in what is the present day

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East Africa, the Germans reached an agreement with the Belgians to claim the land up

to 308E and Lake Tanganyika. However, the British and Belgians had no agreement

on the boundary between Uganda and Congo, although King Leopold II of Belgium

had the intention of claiming the whole of the Congo basin up to the 308E meridian.

Thus, despite the 1887 BritishGerman agreement, a major controversy arose as to

whether 18S also applied to the delimitation of the border west of Lake Victoria. The

British and Germans entered an agreement on 1 July 1890 to define this border as follows:

(a) point on the eastern side of Lake Victoria Nyanza which is intersected by the firstparallel it follows the parallel to the frontier of the Congo Free State where it terminates.

Figure 1. The Bwamba area, not administered until 1920.

Source: Kibulya and Langlands.


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It is however understood that the west side of the lake the sphere does not compriseMount Mfumbiro; if that mountain shall prove to be south of the selected parallel, thisline shall be deflected so as to exclude it but shall nevertheless return so as to terminateat the above-named point.11

The challenge of using natural features to delineate boundary points is illustratedhere in the reference to Mount Mfumbiro. Mfumbiro is of course not a single

peak, but a range of mountains also stretching south of latitude 18S and west of

longitude 308E. With only a vague understanding of the local geography, both parties

to the 1890 agreement assumed that the mountain lay east of 308E. This effectively

placed Mfumbiro within the British area, but when the actual geographic position

was plotted this was found to be in contravention of the agreements with the Belgians

that established their boundaries at 308E. This was not the only geographic

ambiguity in the 1890 agreement, with the precise location of Lake Edward being

acknowledged as uncertain but expected to fall between Congo and British

spheres of influence.12 Border delineation in this area has continued to be a bone of

contention from the early 1900s to the present.

Another area that has a current potential for natural resource conflict and a long

history of contestation is the KenyaTanzania border, which was defined by two

Anglo-German agreements. The first section of the border between Ras Jimbo

(Vanga) and Lake Jipe was delimited in the Anglo-German agreements of 25 July

1893 and 14 February 1900, while the second section, from Lake Jipe to Muhuru

Bay, was described in the draft Anglo-German agreement of 1914 but this was never

signed. These agreements effectively divided the Maasai peoples between the two

countries, each of which subsequently developed differing national policies on

pastoralist communities and natural conservation. This border also has serious

implications on the annual north south wildlife migrations.The current dispute over the ownership of the Migingo Island can also be traced

to the limitations of colonial boundary-making using natural features as markers.

The KenyaUganda boundary was established by the 1926 Kenya Colony and

Protectorate (Boundaries) Order in Council, that states in schedule 1 that the

border should run from 18 south latitude, through Lake Victoria to the mouth of the

Sio River. The full text of the schedule reads:

Commencing in the waters of Lake Victoria on a parallel 18 south latitude, at the pointdue south of the westernmost point of Pyramid Island; thence the boundary follows astraight line due north to that point; thence continuing by a straight line, still northerlyto the most westerly point of Ilemba Island; thence by a straight line, still northerly, tothe most westerly point of Kiringiti Island; thence by a straight line, still northerly, tothe most westerly point of Mageta Island; thence by a straight line north-westerly to themost southerly point of Sumba Island; thence by the south-western and western shoresof that island to its most northerly point; thence by a straight line north-easterly to thecentre of the mouth of the Sio River.

Like other parts of the Kenya UgandaTanzania border, that used natural features

and latitude 18 south, this part of the KenyaUganda border used pillars on land and

islands in the Lake Victoria as markers. Other features, including other islands, lying

between those points named in the schedule, were not clearly delineated in this

agreement, and do not even feature on the colonial maps produced during the inter-war period (see Figure 2). This somewhat incomplete boundary-making between the

two countries might be explained by the fact that both colonies were British ruled,

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and thus there was little prospect of any serious dispute arising. Indeed, between

1902 and 1970 a number of territorial transfers were made between Kenya and

Uganda. In 1902, all of eastern Uganda, between the present border and

approximately 368E longitude, was transferred to Kenya (then the British East

Africa Protectorate). The reasons for these boundary re-alignments ranged from

maintaining tribal unity to administrative convenience officials thought it desirable

to keep the Kavirondo ethnic group (the present Luhya) under a single administra-

tion, and were also keen to bring the Turkana and Pokot under effective control.Colonial border adjustments were also sometimes made to accommodate local

interests, as in 1924 when residents of Kissaka district petitioned the Permanent

Mandates Commission of the League of Nations to correct the mistakes of the

previous MilnerOrts Agreement and to be reintegrated into Rwanda in 1924.13

Through these many adjustments, large and small, the colonial powers in Eastern

Africa continued to trade in boundary politics well into the 1930s.

However, contrary to many claims, not all the boundaries of Eastern African

countries were arbitrarily drawn. Detailed surveying was used to define some

boundaries, and there are cases where considerable efforts were made to avoid

dividing communities or to guarantee rights to water and grazing land to thepastoralist communities. But it remains apparent that wherever colonial political

interests were seen as paramount, local interests were totally overlooked. One such

Figure 2. The KenyaUganda boundary in Lake Victoria.

Source: War Office, 1938 Kenya Colony Map.


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case was an order issued in 1912 to transfer the southern potion of what was then

known as the Lado Enclave from Sudan to Uganda, thus enabling Uganda to control

both banks of river Nile.14

Colonial boundary-making errors were perhaps understandable given the lack of

detailed maps for much of the region before the 1940s. For all of Africa, only 200,000

square miles of territory had been surveyed in detail by 1914, when some 3.8 million

square miles remained unexplored by Europeans.15 This meant that mapping of the

newly acquired colonial territories was a key requirement of effective administrative

control.16 Although the British had prior experience of demarcating their North

American colonial possessions, they faced severe logistical problems in Africa,

where the boundary demarcation parties often had to carry out surveys in areas that

were largely unexplored by Europeans and were . . . either sparsely inhabited or

uninhabited. Demarcations were complicated further by the fact that many

boundaries had to be delimited in the absence of any real knowledge of what

existed on the ground.17 However, the presence of mineral and other natural

resources made a big difference on the pace and precision of the demarcation

exercise. For instance, it is clear that the British paid more attention to the western

boundaries of their East African colonial possessions, where mineral wealth was

believed to be located, and to areas relevant to then control of the Nile waters.

War played a major role in prompting the colonial powers to make proper maps

of their African possessions. Lessons were learned from the huge British reversals in

the Second Anglo-Boer War that were partly attributed to the poor quality and lack

of detailed maps available to the British military. Motivated by the need to ensure

that proper mapping was available for the Army in future African wars, the British

therefore formed a Colonial Survey Committee to produce maps of Africa. This

Committee had the primary function of promoting imperial interests andpreparing maps to be used for the defence of the colonies.18 Military activity,

wherever it took place in Africa, generally contributed to an improvement in the

maps available for that area.

But when the military was involved in drawing up maps of border areas, a lack

of scientific knowledge, technical deficiencies and simple carelessness could have

contributed to serious errors and misunderstandings. To the military, a map of

features could be more important than a detailed and accurate demarcation of a

boundary. This could partly explain the sloppiness in early map making. A notable

case of sloppiness in boundary-making is surely the MalawiTanzania border.

Reviewing this example, John Donaldson has commented that rigorous demarcationwas much less of a priority than survey and mapping.19 The boundary commission

delineating this colonial border placed emphasis on the use of natural features, except

for six straight lines comprising of 29 miles out of the 250-mile boundary. The

predominance of natural features allowed the commission to use only 23 pillars as

markers along this entire boundary.20 Natural features such as streams and rivers were

preferred simply because they required fewer boundary pillars and made the work of

the commission easier and speedier. Thus, expediency and cost were critical factors in

such demarcations. Colonial officials might also be reluctant to undertake complete

demarcation in remote and inaccessible areas, and frequently complained of the

destruction of boundary pillars by local populations. In practical terms, survey mapsutilising natural features presented a better tool for the busy administrator asked to

resolve a boundary dispute on the ground. As Donaldson adds:

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(the) rigorous marking of colonial boundaries would have required regular maintenancefrom local colonial surveyors or administrators who were not often available in theseperipheral areas of the Empire, particularly in the early decades of colonial adminis-tration. It was far easier and more cost-effective for British colonial administration tosimply know or imagine the extent of colonial territory in Africa through boundarymaps than to make those boundaries evident on the ground for local borderland

populations.21

Colonial boundaries on the ground were thus seldom as precise as they appeared on

the maps that purported to delineate the extent of territorial sovereignty. These were

the same maps inherited and largely accepted by Africas independent states.

Poor and lack of border management/administration

The poor management or lack of respect for borders might also be partly explained

by the resilience of traditional African relations to land. To Europeans, boundaries

denote ownership of land and the exclusive use of property by the owner and othersauthorised for its use. In many traditional African societies, in contrast, land was

neither individually owned nor used, giving a quite different meaning to an imposed

physical boundary. While communities had a general understanding of the span of

the area in which they could either grow food and/or graze animals, this was

mediated by demographics and was inevitably fluid. Europeans arrived with an

ideology of private ownership that changed this fluidity, fixed boundaries, and

limited claims to land use. Although many Africans were forced to embrace this

ideology of ownership, they generally did not discard the pre-existing notions of

rights of access and use based on cultural practices of reciprocity that allowed use

of others land when needed so long as it was not a permanent occupation. Thisattitude towards borders might account for the poor maintenance and management

of national boundaries by Africas independent states, but the failure to accept

colonial territorial definitions was most powerfully displayed at the local level where

communities purposefully exploited undefined or ill-defined boundaries.

Although well aware of the imprecise character of Africas colonial boundaries,

the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), fearing to open a Pandoras Box of

territorial claims, merely took the easy way out by adopting the legal finality of

colonial boundaries (uti possidetis juris) in July 1964, when it adopted resolution

AHG/Res.16(1) at the Cairo Summit. This resolution bound African states to

respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence.22 For

over 45 years, this OAU decision has maintained a false peace over border disputes,

for although the resolution is apparently widely accepted and is frequently quoted,

numerous border disputes have continued to rumble on between African states. More

recently, the African Union, (AU) has elected to maintain the illusion of the

sovereignty of colonial boundaries and keep the lid on Pandoras Box by adopting a

principle that calls on its member states to respect borders inherited on achievement

of independence.23 This statement is aimed at reducing conflicts, but does not

address the continuing difficulty posed by boundaries that remain undefined or ill-

defined. The OAUs resolution, endorsed once again by the AU, is in fact based upon

a faulty understanding of the correlation between peace and borders. Victor Owhotu

asserts that the concept of border is a dynamic and highly volatile issue since it isrelated directly to fundamental aspects of identity, sovereignty and jurisdiction, and

self-preservation.24 State boundaries are defined by sovereignty. Laremont argues


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that there is a likelihood of instability and civil wars breaking out when states are not

consolidated, lack effective political institutions and nationalist projects remain

incomplete. Consequently, adds Laremont, stable governments are most often built

after more or less stable boundaries have been established.25

This has very real implications for the present politics of the region.

Undemarcated, indefinite, porous, and unmanaged boundaries now present a serious

security challenge to all the countries of Eastern Africa. Unconsolidated borders area reflection of weak states that lack the capacity and/or the political will to correct

colonial errors. The marginalisation and lack of governance of frontier territories in

Eastern Africa has engendered instability, seen at its worst when combined with

irredentist or secessionist aims. The presence of mineral wealth in these border

territories only intensifies this instability. At the end of 2009, it is apparent that most

countries in the region are not in total control of their territories or their populations.

Besides their inability or unwillingness to stabilise borders, governments in the region

also face enormous difficulties in maintaining law and order and providing public

services and goods. Stabilising and legitimising boundaries would surely contribute

to the development of more effective state institutions, but without effective stateinstitutions it is not easy to stabilise and legitimise boundaries. The relative neglect of

borderlands by Eastern Africas states has amounted to a diminishment of

sovereignty. Accordingly, state sovereignty must be re-established beyond the capital

cities and major urban areas. In remote border areas marginalised communities need

to be reconnected with the state. Warlords such as Laurent Nkunda, for example,

have not only exploited the political vacuum left by a government that has failed to

extend its authority over a neglected territory with natural resources, but also uses

the border to exploit these resources to wage war.

But are governments in this region capable of controlling their borders? As

populations have grown in the region, governments have struggled to meet basicneeds such as education, health and infrastructure. Of the 5 countries with East

African Community (EAC) membership, and according to Tables 1 and 2, Uganda

Table 1. East African population in millions: 19502010 actual.

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Uganda 5 7 9 13 18 24 33

Kenya 6 8 11 16 23 31 40

Tanzania 8 10 14 19 26 35 42

Source: Author

Table 2. East African population projections in millions.

2010 2020 2030 2040

Uganda 33 48 67 94

Kenya 40 48 54 60

Tanzania 42 50 57 62

Rwanda 11 14 17 21Burundi 9 12 16 19

Source: Africapedia (http://www.africapedia.com/wiki/index.php?content_id0113)

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faces the most daunting challenge. Ugandas population, with an annual rate of

3.3%, is the fourth fastest growing in the world. In order to meet the basic needs of

this population, the economy will have to grow by at least 10% per year. Table 3

shows that while national wealth is only modestly growing, the population is

skyrocketing with a consequent impact on settlement density. This population bulge,

especially acute in the cases of Uganda and Rwanda, is likely to impact very directly

on border areas, with increasing cross-border mobility and likely in-flows to areas

where resources appear more abundant. It is doubtful that Eastern Africas

governments are equipped to tackle the challenges of service provision and political

control that this population bulge will create.

Resources and emerging border conflicts

We will now consider several cases where resource explorations and initialexploitation are already fomenting border conflicts in the region. So far the most

critical case is the Lake Albert basin, which is shared by the DRC and Uganda. In

this section we will take a closer look at how this dispute and similar conflicts on

Lake Victoria and Lake Malawi have developed recently.

Lake Albert basin

The UgandaDRC border is a hotspot due to the mineral riches of diamonds, gold,

coltan and oil that have attracted fortune hunters, militias, rebel groups, and armies

to the eastern DRC. The ecstatic announcement by the Uganda government in May2006 that it had discovered oil deposits in the Lake Albert region was met with

nervousness by some people who feared that this discovery would turn out to be a

curse rather than a blessing. These apprehensions appeared well founded, when in

August 2007 a border dispute erupted between the two countries over the

strategically placed Rukwanzi Island in Lake Albert. The incident resulted in violent

skirmishes between troops from the two countries, leading to the death of a

contractor of the Heritage Oil Company and six civilians on a Congolese passenger

boat on Lake Albert. Conflict blew up again in October 2008, when Ugandan Police

arrested 11 Congolese fishermen at Kaiso warf on lake Albert in Kabwoya with

illegal fishing gear, immature fish in their boats and with sharp and pointed objectsostensibly for self-defense purposes. This incident was widely interpreted as a

further political provocation.26

Table 3. East Africa profile in 2007.

Population

(growth)

Population

(millions)

Land surface

(sq km)

Pop

density

GDP

(billions)

Uganda 3.3 31 241,000 129 12

Kenya 2.6 38 580,000 66 24

Tanzania 2.4 40 947,000 42 16

Rwanda 2.8 9.7 26,000 373 3.3

Burundi 3.9 8.5 28,000 304 1

Source: World Bank (http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/ddpreports/)

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Rukwanzi Island, which is sparsely populated but strategically located in the

southern tip of Lake Albert, was generally unknown and unattractive until oil was

discovered in the Lake Albert basin. Since the discovery, Uganda has tried to own

every inch of the lake and moved with lightening speed to exploit the oil deposits

estimated at more than 2 billion barrels, and without seeking any cooperation fromthe DRC. For their part, the Congolese are now deeply concerned that Uganda is

purposefully enlarging its territorial claims in order to secure mineral rights and in

Figure 3. The UgandaDRC boundary in Lake Albert.

Source: FAO.

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the process seeking to exclude the DRC from any claim to oil deposits in the Lake

basin. The Ugandans insist that the continuing lack of governance in eastern DRC

has not only contributed to its own insecurity, but now threatens to delay plans to

exploit the black gold of the lake basin. Ugandan political determination over this

intensified as the world market price for oil soared to over $150 per barrel in mid-

2008. According to one Ugandan newspaper, the decision taken at that time to push

ahead with the early Production Scheme, despite the lack of serious oil exploration

activities on the DRC side, only increased suspicion between the two countries.27

Uganda is exasperated that, despite entering into an agreement with President

Mobutu Sese Seko in 1990 to jointly explore and exploit the trans-boundary mineral

wealth, especially oil, the government of Joseph Kabila has not been able to

consolidate its power in the east of the country, giving rise to continuing militia and

rebel activities across the common border with Uganda. But there are also suspicions

in Kinshasa that Uganda would like to keep north-eastern DRC unstable and would

prefer to have a weak central government that cannot contain the insurgency. This

would then conveniently allow the Museveni government to exploit the trans-boundary oil without sharing the revenues.

Although Museveni and Kabila met in May 2008 and agreed to cooperate in

remarking the border, the dispute has not been completely resolved, as demarcation

has not taken place. A joint technical committee was set up on 8 September 2007,

after the Arusha meeting between Presidents Joseph Kabila and Yoweri Museveni.

This technical committee met in Bunia, eastern DRC, from 16 to 20 January, and

from 10 to 24 March in Entebbe, Uganda. At these meetings they examined

supporting documents, and conducted a preliminary survey of Rukwanzi, including

border points at Mahagi and Vura, northern district of Ituri, in DR Congos

Orientale Province.28

In September 2008, Uganda claimed, through its militaryspokesperson, Major Paddy Ankunda, that a survey had been carried out and that

Rukwanzi was found to be about 2 to 3 kilometers within Ugandan territory.

Ankunda claimed further that the Congolese authorities had accepted the verdict.

This, however, turned out not to be true, as the Congolese immediately dispatched

senior military officials to Kampala to lodge a protest. The Ugandan authorities

subsequently withdrew the claims and profusely apologised for the faux pas of its

military spokesman. As Uganda now moves ahead with its plans to extract oil from

the Albert basin, this dispute remains unresolved.

Lake Victoria

The critical issue relating to Lake Victoria is how the three countries bordering the

lake can manage it as a common resource for the benefit of the region. For the past

five years, there has been a serious dispute between Uganda and her neighbours over

the cause of a drop in the water level of the lake by 1.5 metres between 2004 and

2006. While Tanzania and Kenya have blamed Uganda for causing the decline by

over-draining the lake for hydroelectric production, Uganda has attributed the drop

to climate change.29 Uganda was also in July 2008 accused of entering into a secret

agreement with Egypt to release more water into the Nile to meet Egypt s increasing

needs. This was regarded by Ugandas neighbours as a violation of the Nile Basin

Initiative (NBI), the negotiated agreement that seeks to forge closer cooperationbetween the riparian countries of Burundi, the DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya,

Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Tanzania and Kenyas concerns were


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prompted by Ugandas construction of a parallel hydropower station, the 200-

megawatt Kiira plant, besides the old 180-megawatt Narubare (formerly Owen Falls)

plant in 2000.30

The disputes in Lake Victoria are an illustration of the lackof regional arrangements

over the sharing of trans-boundary natural resources (water and fish). Beginning in

2003, the exploitation of lake resources has become increasingly contentious, with

several incidents resulting in the harassment and arrest of fishermen accused of

trespassing in the territorial waters of their neighbours. The lake is a chief source of

livelihood for many communities in all three countries, hence there is a recognised need

to find a jointly managed solution for the lakes resources, but it is also appreciated that

defining and marking clear boundaries on the lake itself presents very real problems.

The fisheries ministers from Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania held a meeting in November

2008 in which they agreed to demarcate the boundaries in Lake Victoria using bright

beacons, but little progress was made until the eruption of hostilities over Migingo

Island almost brought the two neighbours on the brink of war in 2009.31

When the ownership row over Migingo Island began, most observers quickly saw

it as a scramble for the Nile perch.32 Measuring a mere half an acre of land, filled

with barren rocks, Migingo Island is neither the largest nor the most resourceful of

Lake Victorias many islands; however, it is located in a part of the lake that is rich in

fish and provides a major source of livelihood for several thousand Kenyan

fishermen from the communities in western Kenya bordering Lake Victoria. The

island has been used by these fishermen for both the transit and drying of the fish

catch, and a thriving industrial fishing community has grown up on this small,

barren rock. Tables 4 and 5 below show how lucrative Nile perch exports has become

over the years, and indicate why Migingo and other islands like it are so important in

the local fisheries business.Of the three countries, Ugandas Nile perch exports have been increasing while

those of Kenya and Tanzania have been declining. Uganda managed to double its

earnings from these exports between 2003 and 2005. But the amount of tonnage

exported has also doubled within 10 years, leading to overfishing of the lake and a

significant decline in the fish stocks. By 2008, Ugandas fish export earnings

dropped by $5.2m (Shs 10,244bn) to $112.2m (Shs 221,034bn) from $117.4m (Shs

231,278bn) the previous year. This is far less than the US $150bn (Shs 300bn) the

industry exports topped in 2005, signifying a continuous downward trend.33

Uganda and Kenya have yet to agree on demarcating Lake Victoria and

establishing on which side of the border this tiny island of Migingo lies, but thequarrel over the location and ownership of Migingo has drawn attention to those

questions already highlighted in this paper the history of boundary-making, the

poor definition of Eastern African boundaries, the challenges of managing and

Table 4. Nile perch exports to EU countries (in tonnes).

Origin 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Kenya 7488 2447 1121 30 2747 3972 5086 6737 5176

Tanzania 9015 12,506 4581 26,857 23,063 23,119 26,965 30,813 23,880

Uganda 8621 8894 2731 3451 14,776 12,213 13,062 18,539 23,793Total 25,124 23,846 8433 30,338 40,586 39,303 45,113 56,089 52,849

Source: Eurostat

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sharing trans-boundary resources, and the lack of mechanisms to address border

disputes in the region. Lake Victorias wider boundary problems and resource

disputes also remain to be resolved, and Migingo serves as a timely example of how

these issues can so easily erupt into serious conflict.

Lake Malawi (Nyasa)

Though less widely publicised, a similar and outstanding dispute over the

demarcation of boundaries on Lake Nyasa continues between the governments of

Tanzania and Malawi. This case highlights one of the most blatant colonial

boundary-making errors. The Anglo-German treaty of 1890 placed Lake Nyasa

exclusively in Malawi. This was contrary to the common practice of sharing water

resources among contiguous states. After gaining independence, Tanzanians

contested the colonial definition of the border, asking Why . . . were other great

African lakes, such as Victoria, Tanganyika, Albert, and Edward, divided, more or

less equally, between neighbouring states, while Nyasa alone forms the exception?

34

Tanzanias claims are controversial, however, since President Julius Nyereres

government had made a commitment to respect the uti possedetis principle in 1964

despite pressures from local chiefs to seek economic control of lake resources.

Nevertheless, relations between the two countries soured in 1967 when Tanzania

accused Malawi of cartographical aggression in seeking to claim the entire lake.

When Tanzania then set down a formal claim over half the area of the lake, Malawi

retaliated by claiming ownership of the lake andthree Tanzania districts lying to the

north and west.35 A flurry ofnote verbale exchanged between the two governments in

the 1970s made no progress in settling the dispute. Subsequently, the conflict has

become more complex due to the settlement of Tanzanian citizens on the islands in

the lake. The dispute now seems likely to draw in Mozambique, should Malawi

formally stake a claim to the islands of Likoma and Chizumulu. If Tanzanias

argument about the division of the lake carries the day, Mozambique could also

claim that these islands are within its waters. Historically, these two islands were

only recognised as Malawian territory due to the fact that they were occupied by

Anglican missionaries based in Malawi. Malawis ownership of these islands and

the whole of northern portion of the lake is a factor of colonial power relations. The

British, who colonised Malawi, grabbed the two islands from the Portuguese and the

northern portion of the lake from the Germans using the same skills that were used

to carve out the Rwenzori district and acquire total control over the Nile waters.

There are two challenges posed by the boundaries disputes in Lake Nyasa. First,settling boundaries on the lake is made more problematic by large fluctuations in the

lake water level. Second, as on Lake Victoria, fishing rights are the most likely flash

Table 5. Nile perch exports to EU countries (in Euro).

Origin 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Kenya 26,109 6589 4539 125 13,062 19,375 19,134 23,433 19,087

Tanzania 26,491 42,899 15,699 110,667 99,170 114,235 99,701 99,510 89,723

Uganda 31,892 32,544 11,305 14,649 62,930 60,679 51,049 69,491 101,318Total 87,491 82,032 31,543 125,440 175,163 194,289 169,884 192,434 210,128

Source: Eurostat


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point in this dispute. The lake has several economic species, such as the cichlid, that

are important export commodities for the three countries that share the lake. Among

the boundary hotspots in the lake are the islands of Hongi, Lundo, and Mbamba.

And in all of this the historical documents are unlikely to be of much help. Although

the 292-miles TanzaniaMalawi border was defined by a joint British and German

boundary commission in 1898 and the Anglo-German Agreement of 1901, it is not

determined in detail. Aware of this, Tanzania has challenged the delimitation,36

arguing that the boundary was wrongly set and should have started from the mouth

of the River Songwe, and then followed the median line of the lake to a tri-point withMozambique.37 This is not an interpretation that Malawi is likely to share.

Figure 4. Lake Malawi.Source: CIA.

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Conclusion

There are many other border hotspots in this region that seem likely to generate

political problems in coming years. The Elemi triangle seems among the most volatile

and unstable, and could yet see a dispute between four protagonists Kenya,

Uganda, Ethiopia and Southern Sudan

especially if rumours of oil discoveries inthis long-disputed area prove to be well founded. Uganda has also been accused by

Kenya of tampering with their common border north of Mt Elgon, again in the

context of mineral exploration and rumours of valuable deposits. Kenyas border

with Somalia will surely continue to be tense and experience trans-boundary

insecurity given the political circumstances in Jubaland, and here, too, rumours of

oil deposits in the Mandera area and the current (2010) mineral explorations

throughout Kenyas north-eastern region seem likely to add weight to Somali

territorial claims while also making the Kenyans more anxious to ensure border

security in this area.

Oil discoveries also threaten to increase conflict in the Ruvuma basin, whereTullow Oil has concessions to explore and exploit gas and oil concessions on the

Tanzanian portion.38 The Ruvuma Delta Basin, which is shared by Tanzania and

Mozambique, is regarded by Tullow to be geologically analogous to some of the

great delta systems being developed today, such as the Niger Delta, Mahakam

Delta and the Gulf of Mexico. This extensive area, Tullow claims, provides

large-scale exploration potential for hydrocarbons which are being eyed by

major oil and gas companies.39 There is no publicly available information as to

whether the two countries have an agreement on joint exploration of these natural

resources. The exploration of these resources could be complicated by the changing

boundary that is based on the river estuary, which has changed courses on manyoccasions.

Boundary disputes in Eastern Africa commonly pre-date the discovery of mineral

resources, but they have certainly been intensified by the recent flurry of explorations.

This article has shown that there is a high potential for border disputes in Eastern

Africa as a result of discoveries or increased exploitation of trans-boundary

resources. Border incidents, such those over the Rukwanzi and Migingo Islands in

Lakes Albert and Victoria, are a harbinger of trans-boundary conflicts, as weak

states fail to provide for the basic needs of the bulging populations. There are no

established or functioning regional mechanisms yet in place to address such conflicts.

Besides the need for states to strengthen their governance structures and for leadersto wisely use national resources for the benefit of the populace, bodies such as the

AU, the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the EAC also

need to build or strengthen their capacities to handle trans-boundary disputes in the

region. These institutions, along with the governments, should take proactive

measures of delimiting and demarcating borders in the region as a conflict

prevention measure.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Drs Jakkie Cilliers and Epaminondas Bellos for their insightfulcomments on the paper, and Jimmi Lutete Larsen for his research assistance.


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Notes

1. Cooney and Nanto, Minerals Price Increases and Volatility.2. Richard Devetak defines borders as lines drawn to demarcate state boundaries (or

establish sovereignty), and frontiers as marginalised peripheral areas of a state where thepopulation feels excluded from the centre. Devetak, The Project of Modernity, 2730.

3. Scores Die in Ethiopia Oil Attack, BBC News, April 24, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6588055.stm.

4. United Nations, Report of Expert Panel on Illegal Exploitation, and ICJ Ruling on CaseConcerning Armed.

5. Kum, The Central African Subregion, 4971.6. Englebert, Tarango and Carter, Dismemberment and Suffocation, 1098. Also, Asiwaju,

West Africa, 7299.7. Deng, Justice in Sudan.8. Kibulya, Geographic Contrasts, 11.9. Ibid., 2.

10. Langlands, The UgandaCongo Boundary, 57.11. Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, 64252.

12. Ibid., 70.13. Brownlie, African Boundaries, 983; McEwen, International Boundaries, 1545.14. Brownlie, African Boundaries, 1003.15. Collier, The Colonial Survey Committee and Mapping of Africa.16. Ibid.17. Ibid. Boundary-making is an expensive endeavour that has radically evolved over the

years. In the old days surveying was done on foot then later four-wheels and helicopters,and now by satellite technology. See Smith, The Backbone of Colonial Mapping inEastern Africa.

18. Colonial Survey Committee, Surveys and Explorations of British Africa.19. Donaldson, Pillars and Perspective, 477.20. Ibid., 485.21. Ibid., 486.22. Africa Union, From Barriers to Bridges.23. African Union, Constitutive Act, Article 4(i).24. Owhotu, Borderland Equilibrium in Africa, 248.25. Laremont, Borders, States and Nationalism, 2.26. 11 DR Congolese Fishermen Arrested in Uganda, African Press Agency, October 26, 2008.27. Monitor Reporter, Involve Locals in Oil Deals Civil Societies, Daily Monitor,

September 8, 2008.28. Kinshasa, Kampala Discuss Efforts to Demarcate Common Border, Xinhua, June 11,

2008.29. Who is to Blame for Falling Lake Victoria Water Level? The New Vision, January 27, 2009.30. A point openly acknowledged by the Tanzanian Director of Water Resources in the

Ministry of Water and Irrigation, Washington Mutayoba.

31. Wekesa, Old Issues and New Challenges.32. Matshanda, The Scramble for Fish in Lake Victoria.33. Habati, Politics of Fish.34. McEwen, International Boundaries, 200.35. Ibid.36. Brownlie, African Boundaries.37. Anderson, International Boundaries.38. See http://www.tullowoil.com/tlw/operations/af/tanzania/39. http://www.artumas.com/html/mnazi_bay.aspx

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