166880_Land Reform 6

Land-Reform Politics in South Africa’sCountrysideLUNGISILE NTSEBEZA

The post-1994 South African government introduced a land reform in order

to address racial land inequalities inherited from colonial rule and apartheid.

White settlers appropriated more than 90 percent of the South African land

surface. The extent of land dispossession in South Africa has no parallel in

other African countries. The process began in the mid-seventeenth

century, and was finalized in legal terms when the 1913 Act was promul-

gated. It destroyed black farming that, as Archie Mafeje and Colin Bundy

argue, adapted to commodity farming where Africans became the most

dynamic agricultural producers in South Africa. In some parts of the

country, the colonial government and missionaries went further and estab-

lished a class of African farmers.

With the discovery of minerals, particularly gold in the 1880s, the

colonial strategy shifted from promoting a class of African farmers

to compelling Africans to becoming wage laborers. The legal instrument

used in this regard was the Natives’ Land Act of 1913. This Act confined

black Africans to the reserves and forbade them from buying and owning

land outside the seven percent of the land that was reserved for their occu-

pation. It also abolished the sharecropping system and labor tenancies that

were alternative strategies blacks used to access land outside the reserves.

These developments, according to Bundy, accounted for the fall of the

peasantry in South Africa. Over time, a significant number of rural people

became fully proletarianized, but others remained in the rural areas of the

reserves and became migrant workers with a tenuous link to land.

As colonialists were undermining African agriculture in the reserves,

they also promoted large-scale commercial farming. Unlike the reserves,

where land was legally owned by the state, commercial farms were charac-

terized by the ownership of land on a freehold title basis by white farmers.

This division of South Africa’s countryside has led some commentators

to argue that before 1994, two forms of agriculture existed in South Africa:

so-called subsistence farming in the reserves and white commercial farming

Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 19:33–41

Copyright # Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

ISSN 1040-2659 print; 1469-9982 online

DOI: 10.1080/10402650601181857

33

in white-claimed South Africa. Subsistence farming, however, never took

root in the former reserves. It crumbled mainly due to overcrowding in

these areas and the fact that men were forced to be migrant workers. At

the dawn of democracy, state social grants were the dominant source of

rural existence.

Both residents in the reserves and farm workers were subjected to

atrocious conditions. In the reserves, tensions and conflicts manifested them-

selves between traditional authorities, which operated under the direct

instructions of the apartheid regime in a system widely known as indirect

rule. These authorities were given powers of administering land in these

areas. They implemented policies such as the conversation measurements,

known as the Betterment Scheme, which advocated the culling of stock

and limiting the size of land, among others. The majority of traditional auth-

orities also abused their powers of allocating land by imposing illegal taxes

on applicants.

On white-claimed farms, workers lived with their families on privately

owned land. The majority would have lived on the farm for generations

without having links with land outside the farm. This made them extremely

vulnerable. This was largely due to massive and substantial state subsidies

and, crucially, the availability of cheap black labor. Not only were

workers exploited by white farmers, they were often abused and beaten.

A question might arise as to how farm workers and rural residents in the

former reserves reacted to the conditions they found themselves. When the

colonial and apartheid regimes introduced the Betterment Scheme, there

were rural revolts, the best known of which was the Mpondo revolt that

Govan Mbeki, the father of the South African president, wrote about. But

these revolts were put down largely because the rural struggles were

isolated and not linked with other similar struggles in those urban areas. A

powerful tool that traditional authorities used after suppressing the revolts

of the 1960s was detention and deportation. It is, however, worth noting

that by the late 1980s and early 1990s, resistance against traditional auth-

orities re-emerged, a situation that prevailed until 1994.

Farm workers were by far the most marginalized. The fact that they

resided on land that was privately owned made it very difficult for them to

organize and be organized. Added to this was the size and scattered nature

of farms. No trade union in South Africa has been successful in organizing

farm workers for precisely these reasons, and the fact that the meager

wages earned by farm workers made it impossible for them to pay subscrip-

tions that would employ organizers, as is the case with urban unions.

When the ANC-led government instituted its land reform program, it had

to contend with a number of constraints. The transition to democracy in South

Africa in the early 1990s took place at a time when the global order was

LUNGISILE NTSEBEZA34

dominated by neo-liberal capitalism. This put the ANC in a dilemma.

Although not a communist or socialist organization, the Communist Party,

which was in alliance with the ANC for decades, had a significant influence

on the organization. This is clear from some of the clauses of the Freedom

Charter, the leading manifesto of the ANC and its alliance partners, around,

for example, the nationalization of big industries and the redistribution of land.

The rhetoric of the Freedom Charter increasingly became difficult to

sustain during the political negotiation process, with the fall of the

Soviet communism. Discussions within the Congress Alliance (which incor-

porated the ANC, SACP, and COSATU—the trade union federation) showed

deep divisions over what would replace the apartheid system if the ANC

were to come to power. The international climate favored the pro-capitalist

forces within the ANC. For example, when the ANC launched its election

manifesto on the eve of the first democratic elections in 1994, there was a

reversal of the Freedom Charter’s call for the nationalization of land.

Although the manifesto had redistributive elements, it equally committed

the ANC to a market-led land reform. Two years later, an ANC-led govern-

ment embraced conservative neo-liberal economic policies. In the same year,

the Property Clause that protected property rights originally acquired

through colonialism and land dispossession was entrenched in the final

constitution.

With regard to land reform and its implementation, government commit

itself to a willing-seller–willing-buyer policy framework. This was despite

the fact that this principle had, by the mid-1990s, proved to be a failure in

neighboring Zimbabwe. The justification for the shift is often couched

along similar lines as elsewhere where these turnabouts have been made:

“there is no alternative” (TINA) to global capitalism. Some analysts have

commented, though, that this marked a victory for the more conservative,

capitalist-inclined forces within the ANC, according to Hein Marais.

South Africa’s market-led approach to land reform is, however,

nuanced. First, there is a sense that the state is, in terms of the South

African Constitution, expected to take active steps to ensure that citizens

who are in need of land should gain access to it. Second, the protection of

private property and the entrenchment of the willing-seller–willing-buyer

condition in policy must be balanced with the Constitutional provision that

gives the state the power to expropriate land with compensation.

In keeping with the spirit of the Constitution, legislation has been pro-

mulgated to address tenure problems affecting farm workers and dwellers on

commercial farms on the one hand, and residents in the rural areas of the

former Bantustans. There are doubts, however, about how successful these

laws are in dealing with problems and conflicts in rural areas. With regard

to the former Bantustans, recent legislation effectively give unprecedented

LAND REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA’S COUNTRYSIDE 35

powers to apartheid created Tribal Authorities, now referred to as Traditional

Councils, that are dominated by chiefs and their appointees. Under these

laws, these Traditional Councils are given administration powers over

land, and may even acquire ownership of the land. This state of affairs is

most likely to lead to renewed conflicts between traditional authorities and

rural residents on the one hand, and tensions between traditional authorities

and post-1994 democratically elected structures. It is, however, worth noting

that traditional authorities are increasingly finding it difficult to impose their

despotic form of rule, probably partly because they fear embarrassment if

exposed.

The same cannot be said of farm workers and dwellers. Despite the new

democracy and legislation that is supposed to protect their land rights,

they remain the most vulnerable and marginalized sector. In this regard,

two illuminating studies are worth reading: a study conducted by the

Human Rights Watch and published in 2001, and another by the Social

Survey Africa and Nkuzi Development Association released in 2005. Both

studies show that despite the laws that were supposed to provide farm

workers and dwellers with secure tenure rights, the position of workers

has not improved. If anything, conditions have become worse for a signifi-

cant portion of farm workers. For example, farm owners evict workers

even in situations where there is no alternative land that they have been

offered.

According to the Human Rights Watch study, evictions of farm

dwellers are often accompanied by violence perpetrated by white farm

owners and their managers. Examples of ill treatment and serious abuses

against farm workers and dwellers range from casual blows with fists to

serious physical violence, including murder. The study also reported cases

of rape against farm workers by white farmers and other farm residents.

The position of farm dwellers is made worse by the difficulty they have in

accessing the criminal justice system, even in the new democracy. Farm

owners often prevent them from obtaining legal representation to enforce

their rights. In most cases, farm dwellers are afraid to report their bosses

for fear of reprisals. All of this encourages farmers and their managers to

commit violence with impunity. The reports also show that there have

been cases of attacks against white farmers; evidence seems to suggest

that the majority are of a criminal nature, although there is a possibility

that a few might be revenge attacks on the part of evicted farm dwellers.

A question that arises is how those living in the countryside and land

activists representing them have responded to the aforementioned abuses.

Since the suppression of rural revolts in the early 1960s, the organized

voice “from below” in the land sector was through a group of land-based

NGOs that established a network referred to as the National Land


Committee (NLC) in the 1980s. These organizations adopted a confronta-

tional stance toward the apartheid regime and openly identified with rural

communities, particularly those who were evicted out of farms. They

abandoned this approach when the ANC took control of government.

Despite the fact that the ANC had adopted a market-led land reform,

there seems to have been a sense among many in these organizations that

the ANC government was somewhat committed to redressing historical

injustices and that this would somehow be done within the limits of

neo-liberal capitalism. Endorsing the protection of existing property rights,

the unilateral decision by the ANC leadership to adopt the conservative set

of macro-economic policies under GEAR, as well as the entrenchment of

the market-based “willing-buyer–willing-seller” principle as the basis for

land reform, clearly did not discourage land activists in the NLC and its affili-

ates from supporting the ANC-led government. As a result, the NLC

resolved to support the ANC-led government in its efforts to formulate

and implement the land reform program. Some members resigned from

their organizations and joined the Department of Land Affairs (DLA).

Those remaining in the organizations took it upon themselves to support

the DLA.

In addition, NGOs were under pressure from their donors who often pushed

the NGOs to collaborate with government. Some of these funding agencies

began to channel their funding through government agencies and expected

NGOs to do commissioned work for government. A combination of these

factors partly contributed to the weakening of NGOs and, more importantly,

to an almost total neglect of rural mobilization, on both farms and the former

bantustans. This was particularly the case in the first few years of South

Africa’s democracy.

The end of the 1990s and the beginning of the twenty-first century,

however, marked a major turning point in the relationship between the

state and civil society. On its part, the NLC and its affiliates found them-

selves in an increasingly difficult position; they were drawn into implement-

ing the limited land reform program while they were also confronted with

growing pressures from below. Ongoing abuses on white farms described

earlier and the escalating anger of black tenants over these abuses added

to the pressure. Although not as prominent as in urban areas, there was

also growing dissatisfaction and irritation among rural residents and their

NGO supporters with government policies and their lack of impact. The

unimpressive track record of the state put pressure on the NLC and its

affiliates.

Inequality in land, the limitations of the land reform program, and

conditions on white-claimed farms created conditions for mobilizing

around the issue of landlessness. In this regard, the formation of the LPM


was the most significant resistance to the resurgent land sector in South

Africa at the start of the twenty-first century. The Landless People’s

Movement (LPM) was established in July 2001. Events in neighboring

Zimbabwe in 2000 had an impact on the LPM. At the LPM inauguration

in Johannesburg, President Mugabe of Zimbabwe received warm praises

for his “gallant actions . . . to return stolen land to the people of Africa.”

This was despite the fact that organizations such as COSATU, the giant

South African Trade Union Federation, were critical of Mugabe’s undemo-

cratic methods of implementing “fast track” led reform.

Apart from developments in Zimbabwe, the formation of the LPM was

preceded by land occupation on a farm in Bredell, outside Johannesburg, in

early July 2001. Committing itself to mass mobilization around land, the

LPM, at the time of its launch, called on government to urgently hold a

land summit. The NLC played a critical role in the establishment of the

LPM. Some would argue that the contacts that the LPM established with

international organizations, such as the Brazilian MST and La Via

Campesina, were largely forged by the NLC on behalf of LPM.

There were two other major events that helped promote the LPM: the

United Nations World Conference on Racism and the World Summit

on Sustainable Development. In the run up to the United Nations World

Conference on Racism, held in Durban in August 2001, the LPM threw its

lot with a number of established organizations. These organizations

embarked on a “Landlessness¼Racism” campaign to highlight the plight

of the landless in South Africa and elsewhere. They came together under

the banner of the Durban Social Forum.

A year later, at the World Summit on Sustainable Development held

in Johannesburg, the LPM was one of the prominent organizations behind

the “Week of the Landless.” This time these organizations came under the

umbrella of the Social Movement Indaba (SMI). Toward the end of the

Summit, the organizations led a huge march to the venue of the Summit,

demonstrating against the negative effects of neo-liberalism and landlessness

in South Africa. Apart from these two major events, the LPM in Gauteng also

joined forces with movements protesting water, electricity cut-offs, and rent

evictions.

There is little doubt that the formation of the LPM marked a major shift

in the form of land organization and agrarian movement in South Africa, and

the methods used in the demand for land in the post-1994 scenario.

Additionally, this was the first time since the 1950s and early 1960s that a

movement having the potential of a mass base, led by those directly

affected was emerging. Rural resistance from the 1980s was led by urban-

based NGOs with left-wing white activists, lawyers, and researchers

playing prominent roles. The LPM, at least in theory, was a social


movement with membership drawn from the grassroots of landless rural

people themselves. In this regard, the LPM followed the tradition of the

powerful land and agrarian movements in Latin America and Asia.

The land and agrarian movement in this period was further strengthened

by the entry into the land struggles and debates of the Trust for Community

Outreach and Education (TCOE), a network, like the NLC, with a number

of affiliates below. The TCOE was established by community-based organiz-

ations from various regions of South Africa. TCOE’s roots are in the Black

Consciousness movement after the death of Steve Biko, and in Liberation

Theology. At a time when the NLC and LPM were garnering most of the

publicity and attention, TCOE and its affiliates were involved in lower

profile although deep rural organization. Their initial programs were in

response to the education crisis following the students’ protests and

boycotts against “gutter education” in the 1970s and early 1980s.

In the transition to democracy, TCOE resolved to move away from the

“welfarist” approach that characterized the 1980s to a more “developmen-

tal” way of working with communities. The TCOE adopted an approach,

developed in Bangladesh, called People’s Participatory Planning (PPP),

emphasizing the need to involve poor communities in all aspects of their

development, including planning. TCOE has, over the years, built locally

based Community Development Committees (CDCs) in its areas of

operation. There was a strong focus on the “poorest of the poor,” building

capacity and local leadership with a stress on community ownership of

development initiatives. Since 2000, the focus of TCOE has been on

issues of land, local government, and basic needs. To mark its twentieth anni-

versary, TCOE organized a People’s Tribunal on Landlessness in Port

Elizabeth, Eastern Cape, in December 2003.

At the same time that the TCOE was gaining momentum in its land

struggles, there were, by 2003, signs that the NLC and LPM were in

disarray. Part of the explanation for this decline were tensions within the

NLC and its affiliates on the critical issue of how civil society organizations

should relate with the state, on the one hand, and social movements on the

other. The formation of the LPM deepened these tensions. Prominent

activists in the NLC were critical in the establishment of the LPM. Yet,

there was no unanimity within the NLC on the involvement of the organiz-

ation in the struggles of the LPM. Some affiliates of the NLC were against the

involvement of the NLC in the struggles of the LPM, which grew increas-

ingly confrontational. These affiliates argued that support of the LPM

would harm relations with the state. Some commentators strongly suggest

that the formation of the LPM was premature.

Tensions within the NLC reached a peak in the period following the

World Summit on Sustainable Development. The organization never


recovered from these tensions and ended up disbanding as a network, with

affiliates pursuing their own independent existence.

In the midst of all this, yet another actor emerged on the land scene: the

South African Communist Party (SACP). In 2004, the SACP launched its

“Red October” campaign with a focus on the land question. In a bid to

win among rural people, the SACP established an ambiguous relationship

with the LPM. Both organizations supported the need for a land summit.

ALand Summit (organized by the DLA) was held in July 2005. Shortly

before the summit, ALARM (Alliance of Land and Agrarian Reform

Movements) appeared, a new consortium of movements, including TCOE,

LPM, and some affiliates of the former NLC, pressing for land reform.

ALARM’s stated mission is “for a people-centered rural transformation

rooted in a rapid and fundamental transfer of land to the poor and the

promotion of security for those living and working on the land.”

Far-reaching resolutions were taken at the Summit. The principle of

willing buyer/willing seller came under major attack from several

different quarters—and, for the first time, ANC government officials

appeared to be backing away from it. In his State of the Nation address to

Parliament in February 2006, President Mbeki referred to the Summit resol-

ution that the willing-seller–willing-buyer condition should be revisited. It is

still not clear how things will develop after the land summit.

Land-based organizations in South Africa remain very weak and unor-

ganized. The demise of the NLC and the reported divisions within the LPM

are some of the examples. Other Indications point to serious discussions and

conflicts within ALARM. The key issue around these tensions seems to be

how these movements should relate to the democratic state. Indeed, this is

a challenge that has confronted most organizations in post-colonial/indepen-

dence Africa. It is an issue that has yet to be resolved. We have seen how in

the case of South Africa, organizations such as the NLC have moved

backwards and forwards between collaborating with the state (the period

roughly between 1994–1999) and adopting a more confrontational

approach at times (during the Mbeki Presidency). These are, of course,

broad generalizations as some organizations continued their collaborative

role with the state, whereas others favored a much more confrontational

approach where the mobilization of the landless themselves would be a

key strategy.

Another issue the formation of the LPM raised is the relationship

between NGOs and “grassroots” social movements. Here, some of the key

questions and issues revolve around how to build an autonomous people-

centered organization that can contest powerful forces that support global

capital; who should build this organization; what is the relationship of the

poor to those who support them; who should determine the agenda, and so on.


Where does this leave us regarding the South African land reform

program and the extent that it has contributed to the resolution of

conflict and violence in the South African countryside? It seems fair to

conclude from the earlier discussion that despite the good intentions of the

constitution and the land reform program, very little has changed in the

lives of rural people. In the former Bantustans, rural residents will

continue to be ruled by unaccountable traditional authorities on the adminis-

tration of land. But it is on white-claimed farms where conditions of farm

workers have not improved. The two studies cited in this paper paint a

gloomy picture of the conditions of farm workers and dwellers, and the

abuse that is handed to them by white farmers and their managers. These

are enormous challenges that ask critical questions about the meaning of

democracy in South Africa’s countryside.

RECOMMENDED READINGS

Bundy, Colin. 1988. The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry. Cape Town: David Phillip and

London: James Currey.

Human Rights Watch. 2001. Unequal Protection: The State Response to Violent Crime on South African

Farms. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Mafeje, Archie. 1988. “The Agrarian Question and Food Production in Southern Africa,” in Kwesi K.

Prah (ed.), Food Security Issues in Southern Africa. Selected Proceedings of the Conference on

Food Security Issues in Southern Africa. Maseru January 12–14, 1987.

Southern Africa Studies Series No. 4. Institute of Southern African Studies. National University of

Lesotho.

Marais, Hein. 1998. South Africa, Limits to Change: The Political Economy of Transformation. London:

Zed Books Ltd.

Ntsebeza, Lungisile. 2006. Democracy Compromised: Chiefs and the Politics of the Land in South Africa.

Leiden: Brill.

Weqeriff, Marc, Russell, Bev, and Grunding, Irma. National Evictions Survey. 2005. Social Surveys

Africa and Nkuzi Development Association. www.nkuzi.ory.za and www.socialsurveys.co.za

Lungisile Ntsebeza is Associate Professor and Head of the Land and Governance Research Group

(LGRG), Department of Sociology, University of Cape Town in South Africa. E-mail: ntsebeza@

humanities.uct.ac.za


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166880_Land Reform 6