Lamaadar, Alia. (2004) War or Peace From Weapons Technology: Examining the Validity ofOptomistic/Semi-Optimistic Technological Determinism. The McGill Journal of PoliticalStudies. 2003/2004.

If I could invent a machine, a gun, which could by its rapidity of fire enable one man to do asmuch battle duty as a hundred, than it would, to a great extent, supersede the necessity of largearmies, and consequently, exposure to battle and disease be greatly diminished. I thought overthe subject and finally this idea took practical form in the invention of the Gatling Gun. (Dr.Richard Gatling in Edwards, 1962, 233)

In 1877 Dr. Richard Gatling invented a 250 shot per minute hand-cranked black powdermachine gun. Not unlike Alfred Nobel, the creator of dynamite, or Dr. J Robert Oppenheimer,the scientist credited for the atomic bomb, Gatling hoped that he was creating a weapon thatmight bring humanity closer to peace. The theory of a weapon creating peace is not asparadoxical as it first appears and theories that explain major social phenomena as aconsequences of technology abound. In the cases of war and peace, these theories are referred torespectively as pessimistic and optimistic technological determinism. Technologicaldeterministic theories relating to the concepts of war and peace are contentious. The dichotomyof arguments range from those theorists who believe that technology drives war, to those whobelieve that the same forces have the potential to create peace. Immediately following the 1945detonations of nuclear devices in the context of war, arguments in support of a technologycapable of creating peace proliferated in tandem with these weapons.

However, many of these theorists unwilling to embrace the polarized belief that technologydetermines global pacific tendencies, have adopted a more moderate stance. This view, hereinreferred to as semi-optimistic technological determinism, concludes that new technologies suchas information warfare and precision weaponry are creating more peaceful wars; wars with lesscollateral damage, and more humane doctrines. When Gatling designed his machine gun he wasquoted as saying that, “the inventor of such a machine would prove a greater benefactor of hisrace, than he who should endow a thousand hospitals” (Edwards, 1962, 233). Ironically, morethan a century later Michael Smith, commenting on the tremendous ways in which this gun hadshaped the nature of war, instead referred to it as “the first weapon of mass destruction” (Smith,2003, 108).

Those theorists who view weapons as catalysts for peace or, by the same token, as mitigationsto the atrocities of war, often ignore the symptomatic effects of technology: those qualities whichinstead serve to confound the possibilities of peace. While stopping short of pessimisticdeterminism, this paper hopes to disseminate the numerous ways in which technology,specifically military weapons and their supporting systems, impede peace and compel wars.These products of technology include arms races, unpredictable enemy responses to technology,and human disengagement from war. Each of these symptoms serve to denounce the idea thatweapons alone have the ability to create peace or more peaceful wars. Closer examinations ofthese forms of technological determinism reveal that they may, in fact, undermine more fruitfulendeavors for peace.

Theories of Optimistic Technological Determinism

Supporters of optimistic technological determinism have grown exponentially in the decadesfollowing August of 1945, marking the American use of nuclear devices in Hiroshima andNagasaki. Since this time these supporters have fallen into two distinct categories. The firstgroup, were those theorists whose beliefs were shaped by the dramatic recency of the eventssurrounding World War II. These individuals held the myopic belief that nuclear weaponsrepresented the infamous pinnacle of military achievement—an unfair weapon of war and thedenouement of modern weapons evolution. Nuclear weaponry was thus considered too heinousto ever be used again and too destructive to be bested by any future technology, leaving peace asthe only conclusion. The position of the second group, is described by the “father of the atomicbomb” Dr. Robert J. Oppenheimer as, “two scorpions in a bottle, each capable of killing theother, but only at the risk of his own life” (Garnett, 1999, 36), and is often referred to as ‘MutualDeterrence Theory’.

The conjecture that nuclear weapons represent the fulfillment of mankind’s age-old prophesyof a weapon so terrible and unfair that it deters war (Roland, 1997), is preceded by a long line oftechnological ancestors. In reality, “every historical period seems to have had its share of unfairweapons…usually the objection brought against these weapons was that they caused‘unnecessary’ suffering” (van Creveld,1989, 71). Historically the most common reason for aweapon to remain unused in Western civilizations was that it enabled their users to kill from adistance and from behind cover, thus obscuring the vital distinction between acts of war andsimple murder. Early examples of this include the crossbow, red hot cannon balls, and explosivesdropped from balloons (ibid). The latter was argued to be too dreadful for use because it killedboth soldiers and civilians indiscriminately. Similarly, nuclear weapons allow for both distancefrom a target and indiscriminate damages to soldiers and civilians. The deaths of an estimated100,000 in Hiroshima and 35,000 in Nagasaki (The Manhattan Engineer District, 1946), as wellas the immeasurable number of people injured and the damages incurred, testified to theseemingly unsurpassable destructiveness of atomic weapons. This consequently justified beliefsthat a human fear and repulsion of this technology should result in a dead-end for weaponevolution and war.

We human animals have built-in fear reactions […] These reactions help us to protect ourselves[...] Fear can be transmuted into constructive planning and policies […] Through fear, ordinarypeople can be motivated to pursue constructive means for sustaining peace, or at least forlimiting the scope of violence. Similarly, in exchanges between world leaders on behalf ofpreventing large-scale conflict, a tinge of fear—sometimes more than a tinge—enable each tofeel the potential bloodshed and suffering that would result from failure (Lifton, 2001, 26).

To those theorists immersed in the searing recency of atomic war, no worse scenario orweapon could be imagined and therefore peace became an inevitability driven by the moral fearof society’s own capabilities. This hope for peace was obliterated in November of 1952, whenthe first hydrogen bomb vaporized the Pacific island of Elugelab, a mile in diameter. Its powerwas equal to 10.4 million tons of high explosive, or about 700 times the power of the atomicbomb dropped on Hiroshima (Broad, 2001). It became apparent that weapons development had

not only continued, but had succeeded in creating a weapon with the potential for destruction farsurpassing that of the atomic bomb.

Confronted with the failure of their peaceful prophesy to be realized, many theoristsabandoned the hope of weapons creating peace. Oppenheimer who had originally led theManhattan Project at Los Alamos in the hope for peace, later reversed his opinion and contestedthe production of the H-bomb for the reason that “mankind would be far better off not to have ademonstration of the feasibility of such a weapon” (Wolverton, 2002, 41). While faith in thenotion of a technology so atrocious that it morally necessitates peace has largely beenabandoned, the realist presumption of mutual deterrence continues to thrive.

As a theory of technological determinism, mutual deterrence is based on a historical trend inconjunction with the realist supposition of actor rationality. Ruth Sivard documents thishistorical trend in her analysis of military history, World Military and Social Expenditures.Sivard compares global war casualties throughout the past five centuries and comes to theconclusion that with the invention of gunpowder, worldwide deaths in warfare quadrupled froman estimated 1.5 million during the sixteenth century to 6.2 million during the seventeenth.Compounding these figures was the occurrence of the industrial revolution which skyrocketedworldwide deaths in war to 20 million until midway through the twentieth century (Sivard,1996). At this juncture Sivard observes a noticeable deviation to the trend; more than 84 percentof the casualties from war in the twentieth century occurred before 1950. The explanation for thistrend, asserts Alex Roland and other optimistic technological determinists, is purely to the creditof technology.

Had there been conventional war in the second half of the twentieth century on the scale seen inthe first half, we could have expected more war deaths than occurred throughout recordedhistory up to the twentieth century. Extrapolating from Sivard’s figures, we can reasonablyproject that another world war […] could have killed 250 million people […] these people livedbecause of nuclear weapons (Roland, 1995, 68).

This argument stems from the realist conviction that due to the unprecedented power of atomicand hydrogen bombs, there can be no effective defense against them. Thus, the only rational useof these weapons by a nation would be for the purpose of deterrence and preventing war, aposition often referred to as ‘mutually assured destruction’ or ‘the balance of terror’. Thesetheories solidified and found momentum during the Cold War, as tensions between the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union resulted in a substantial nuclear armament on both sides. Mutualdeterrence was not a relationship that either the US or the soviets actively sought, rather itdeveloped as a paranoid response to each developing a powerful nuclear arsenal. However, onceit existed strategists and statesmen began to appreciate some of its virtues. Churchill expressedthe sentiment that “it may well be that we shall, by a process of sublime irony, have reached astage in this story where safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother ofannihilation” (Garnett, 1999, 36). And so these prophesies of technological determinism havebeen self-fulfilling and decades after the Cold War has ended, states continue to rely on nuclearweapons to ensure their security.

Aside from failing to account for Murphy’s Law of probability, which posits that in any givensystem, if something can go wrong, it will, theories of optimistic technological determinism failin a more significant way, demonstrated dramatically by Dr. Alex Roland:

Now the cold war is over. What it has wrought may finally be viewed without the passions bredby fear. The great bloodletting engendered by the industrial revolution has peaked. We need toacknowledge this blessing and preserve the relative peace that it has brought—even if the priceof that peace is to live in apprehension, even dread, of our own capabilities for destruction.(Roland, 1995, 69)

This statement inadvertently begs a question of tantamount importance to the theory ofoptimistic technological determinism: By what criteria does it evaluate the condition of ‘peace’?If evaluated as meaning the absence of war, certainly wars have continued to be fought in formsincluding, but not limited to the Falkland War, the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf Wars, and the war inBosnia. Roland categorizes these tragedies as “localized conflicts with relatively limitedcasualties,” but it is unacceptable to marginalize the loss of life and social implications of suchconflicts. The only relatively convincing argument that can be made in favor of technology atthis point in human history, though it has been less than sixty years since Hiroshima, is that therehave been fewer large-scale conventional wars and a decrease in their subsequent casualties. Inturn, this argument can no longer be reasonably described as optimistic technologicaldeterminism and is more appropriately referred to as semi-optimistic technological determinism.

Theories of Semi-Optimistic Technological Determinism

On a spectrum of hard and soft determinists, the semi-optimists lie somewhere in the middle-range. While these theorists do not hold that technology and military weapons have the ability tocreate peace, they do ascribe to notions of ‘cleaner’ and more peaceful wars as a result oftechnological advancements. Just as atomic warfare spawned a new generation of optimistictechnological determinists, the advent of information warfare and precision guided munitions hasrenewed theories of semi-optimistic technological determinism. More than 2500 years ago theChinese strategist and philosopher of war, Sun Tzu, embraced an approach to warfare based onthe principals of superior intelligence, deception, and knowledge of the mind of one’s enemy(Henry, 1998, 123). While Tzu may have penned these principals thousands of years before theinvention of the microchip, they are remarkably similar to the tactics of ‘information warfare’.Definitions of this term vary, but for the purposes of this paper an intentionally expansivedefinition has been adopted. Thus, information warfare is described as “activities by a state ornon-state actor to exploit the content or processing of information to its advantage in time ofpeace, crisis, or war, and to deny potential or actual foes the ability to exploit the same meansagainst itself” (Toffler, 1993, passim). Thus Tzu’s goal of winning wars in the imaginary systemof the mind, is parallel to information warfare’s goal of triumphing within information systems.

Current theorists therefore promise more bloodless wars fought in cyber-spaces, as well asprecision weapons directed at the enemy’s decisive points at critical moments throughinformation superiority, thus accruing far less collateral damage.

The accuracy of PGMs [precision guided munitions] promises to give us a very different age,perhaps a more humane one. It is odd to speak favorably about the moral character of a weapon,but the image of a Tomahawk missile slamming precisely into its target when contrasted with thestrategic bombardments of World War II does in fact contain a deep moral message and

meaning. War may well be a ubiquitous part of the human condition, but war’s permanence doesnot necessarily mean that the slaughters of the 20th century are permanent (Friedman, 1996, xi).

Unlike optimistic technological determinism these views do not contend that technology willin any way result in peace, instead they recognize the intrinsic challenges to peace in theinternational system and instead hope to lessen the destruction of inevitable conflict. In thissense, these theories attempt to present a more realistic portrayal of technology while notabandoning optimism. However a more thorough critique of the effects of weapons technology,reveals that although semi-optimistic technological determinism may have its basis in the idealof a more peaceful international system, as a military doctrine it has the potential to impede thepossibility of peace. There are no less than three devices by which technology may underminethe possibility of peace by compelling the reality of war. Well documented examples of armsraces throughout history have demonstrated several means by which these processes gain theirown momentum, thus increasing the likelihood that states will go to war. Additionally whenstates find themselves in direct technological competition with an enemy there is an increasedlikelihood of unpredictable and provocative enemy responses. Finally, the very nature of newtechnology and its focus on distance from the enemy results in a social disengagement from warconducive to further conflict.

Technological Momentum in Arms Races

The development of weapons technology has become an intrinsic component of Westernmilitary doctrine. General John Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the American Joint Chiefs ofStaff, declared that his 1996 directive, Joint Vision 2010, provides “an operationally basedtemplate for how America’s armed forces will channel the vitality and innovation of our peopleand leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting” (Dunlap, 1999, 25). Thus more ‘effective’ war fighting technologies take shape in theform of such novelties as information warfare and PGMs. The level to which technologicaldevelopment has become ingrained as strategy and has become self-propagating in the form ofarms races, is idiomatically referred to as the ‘Frankenstein drive’. Robert McNamara haspointedly defined this autonomous impulse as having “a kind of intrinsic mad momentum of itsown” (Thee, 1981, 102). Most of the arms races before 1945 were primarily quantitative racesand although the previous two centuries were marked by tremendous qualitative innovation, thelife cycles of these weapon systems was considerably longer than those after 1945 (Senghass,1979, 120). The traditional, and even intuitive, explanation for arms races asserts that “particulararmament measures of one side are directly geared to the armament measures of the opponent”(Senghass,1979, 120), however the reality of arms races is much more disconcerting. Instead it isoften internal technological forces which drive arms races. The impulse to technologicalcompetition stems from the very size, expansion and goal setting of military research anddevelopment. Unlike any time period before it, modern warfare invades all scientific disciplinesand environments—land, sea, deep-sea, space, jungles, desserts, and even cyber-environments—a pervasiveness which dictates that hundreds of thousands of scientists andengineers working on parallel problems, should be competing among themselves in theinvention, development and perfection of new arms and weapon systems (Thee, 1981, 102). The

internal arms race is further sustained through the selective allocation of funds granted tomilitary research and development, as well as the structured rivalry between the differentmilitary services (army, navy, and air force) and various independent laboratories. Thesemechanisms ensure sustained internal competition which dictates optimum weapons efficiency,dramatic results, an immutable drive to continue and the fuel for other nations to rationalize theirown internal competition. The dangers of this system were first given name by Dwight D.Eisenhower in his farewell Presidential address:

This conjuncture of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in theAmerican experience. The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in everycity, every State House, every office of the Federal Government […] We must guard against theacquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrialcomplex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist (Thee,1981, 106).

The threats to peace of this so-called ‘military industrial complex’ are numerous. Midwaythrough the Cold War, military research and development was absorbing the talents of anestimated half a million scientists around the globe, and military expenditures on technology andits development continued in the name of security and deterrence (ibid). Empirical evidencesuggests that the consequence of this trend is that conflicts marked by a military build up, morefrequently go to war (Sample, 1998). Eisenhower again elaborated on this dilemma in 1953:

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired, signifies in the final sense atheft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. The worldin arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of itsscientists, and the hopes of its children (Shuckman, 1996, 233).

The greater the amount of finite resources dedicated to military technology, the greater the desireof the nation to justify their use. Thus, regardless of the nature of these technologies, be they‘more humane’ or not, their development will necessitate their use, a fact made all to clear by theevents of 1945. “In this way of looking at things the form of the technology does not matter. Ifyou have a cornucopia in your grasp you do not worry about its shape. Insofar as it is a powerfulthing, more power to it” (Winner, 1986, 45). Arms races have nevertheless been justified as themeans by which more civilized weapons are created. Precision engagement for example is toutedby Joint Ventures 2010 as a means to “lessen risk to [US] forces, and [to] minimize collateraldamage.” However, the enemy’s interpretation of these weapons may well prove to be verydifferent.

The Unpredictability of an Adversary’s Response to High-Tech Attack

Peaceful crisis management requires that each side maintain an accurate perception of theother’s intentions and military capabilities (Cimbala, 1999, 121). Even ignoring the role oftechnology, this becomes difficult in times of crisis due to the effects, not the least of which arepsychological, of a competitive relationship and a threat-intensive environment. The complexityof and mutual ignorance surrounding new forms of high technology further aggravate this

situation. As previously indicated, PGMs are considered by semi-optimistic determinists as thekey to more humane warfare, however the notion of a ‘humane’ bomb may fail to be appreciatedby the adversary that it is used against. In the ensuing period the enemy’s response may beunpredictable and aggressive, especially for those nations for whom high-tech weaponry issimply not economically feasible. Such nations may come to believe that nuclear weaponsprovide the best answer to the challenge posed by conventionally armed PGMs. Historically,Russian generals in particular have feared that in a general war Western nations might use thesemunitions to degrade Russian strategic forces. As a result Russian generals have indicated thatRussia “should enjoy the right to consider the first use of [enemy] precision weapons as thebeginning of unrestricted nuclear war against it”(Dunlap, 1999, 27). This statement indicatesanother danger of high technology in war, namely that it may unintentionally lower the thresholdof conflict. By providing the capability to employ coercion though means of non-lethal and low-lethal technologies such as information warfare and PGMs, an unpredicted response of a target tosuch actions, may lower the threshold of conflict. There is no clear definition of what constitutes“aggression” in information warfare, and what would therefore represent a breech ofinternational law. Current UN Charters traditionally interpret “aggression” in the context ofarmed conflict and would therefore seem to allow peacetime data manipulations. Of course anadversary, not sharing this view, may react violently, thus initiating the cycle of violentescalation. (Bond, 1996, passim)

Further, the possibly problematic co-mingling of military and civilian high-tech facilities andthe infusion of civilians into formerly military positions, is a trend principally motivated by adesire to conserve defense expenditures. The ever-increasing sophistication of the technologiesof war require the military to obtain external civilian expertise. This is reflected by 1997 USDepartment of Defense figures which estimate that 70 percent of their information technologytransactions were being sourced to civilian vendors (Silverberg, 1997, 38). The increasedmilitary reliance on civilians presents an additional argument against technology as a means formore peaceful armed conflict. It has long been recognized that new technology which requiressubstantial civilian inputs has the unintended consequence of clouding that principal which isvital to laws of armed conflict: “the requirement to distinguish between combatants who could belegitimately attacked and, non combatants who could not” (Dunlap, 1999, 27). An unintendedenemy reaction to high technology could be the assertion that civilians involved in this capacityare justified victims of war either in the context of offensive strikes or possibly as human shields.“Several potential US adversaries appear prepared to use non combatants to blunt the power ofhigh-tech weaponry…when Western military action seemed imminent, Saddam Hussein coveredhis palaces…with non-combatant civilians in order to discourage PGM attacks by WesternForces (Slavin, 1997, 13A). The argument that PGMs will limit collateral damage, subsequentlyresulting in less bloody wars is a very simplistic and unrealistic portrayal of this technology.After all, precision has one meaning when applied to the field and quite another when applied toheavily populated urban areas.

Social Disengagement from War

“If disengaged from war’s harsh realities, a society can more easily indulge in the fiction of aclean war” (Shurtleff, 2002, 108). The term disengagement, in this context is attributable toAlbert Borgmann’s device paradigm (1984, 40-48). It is the process by which technology

transforms “things” into “devices” by splitting the means and the ends. In that transformation,machines begin to provide the means, and the ends thus adopt the role of a commodity (Shurtleff,2002, 101). Stated less philosophically, the process of disengagement from war occurs whenmachines begin to be viewed as the devices by which peace is created. As a result, the notion ofpeace becomes commodified and subsequently quantifiable. The theory of semi-optimisticdeterminism demonstrates the effects of disengagement by its belief in technologies that maycreate more peaceful wars. Disengagement is not merely a byproduct of weapons development --often it is the exact point. Disengagement, especially in the form of distancing, has the effect ofmaking war safer for one’s own soldiers. Thus munitions which can be launched from a distance,and information warfare which is usually conducted without ever leaving the safety of one’s ownsoils, protects soldiers. However this distancing comes at a very high price. “That is to say, aswar becomes safer and easier, as soldiers are removed from the horrors of war and see the enemynot as humans but as blips on the screen, there is a very real danger of losing the deterrence thatsuch horrors provide” (ibid). The deterrence referred to here is not a socially constructed one like‘mutually assured destruction’, rather it is the innate human aversion to killing another humanbeing. This aversion is best demonstrated by trigger pull studies taken from various historicalarmed conflicts. Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman, an army psychologist contends that inearlier wars a large number of soldiers were not firing at the enemy. “Grossman tells of musketsrecovered during the US Civil War which were filled with layers of ‘buck and ball,’ suggestingthat soldiers may have wanted to pretend to shoot, and so kept loading but faked firing” (ibid).As a means to combat this human aversion, the military forces have developed techniques ofdehumanizing the enemy and weapons that distance the soldier from his victim.

Disengagement has become more pervasive as history has progressed, especially whencompared to Greek warfare as depicted in Homer’s the Iliad: “And he pitched Pisander . . . ontoearth/ And plunged a spear in his chest—the man crashed on his back/ As Hippolochus leptaway, but him he killed on the ground,/ Slashing off his arms with a sword, lopping off his head/And he sent him rolling through the carnage like a log (Homer, 87). This comparison of hand tohand mortal combat, versus that of ‘push-button wars’ make it plain to see that as the militaryadopts a semi-optimistic approach to technological determinism, it is increasingly disengaged bytechnology; as such the most powerful deterrent to war is being lost. Even, Clausewitz was eagerto emphasize that “war is not waged against an abstract enemy, but against a real one” (vonClausewitz, 1976, 161).

Conclusions

“I am tired and sick of War. Its Glory is all moonshine. It is only those who have never fired ashot, nor heard the shrieks and groans of the wounded, who cry aloud for blood, morevengeance, more desolation. War is Hell!” (Sherman, 1879). Weapons by definition inflict harm,and are the appendages of war. The notion of weapons development for peace belies and evensabotages fruitful endeavors for peace by fueling the instigators of conflict. Of even greaterconcern is the disengagement bred by technology, for while weapons harm, disengagementallows. By no means does this paper wish to convey a sentiment of pessimistic technologicaldeterminism, asserting that technology definitively results in war. Rather the aim is to elicit amore paced and considered interpretaion of technology's role in this complex socialphenomenon. A comprehensive literature review of technological determinism finds a noticeable

repetition of the phrase “without anybody chosing it,” in reference to the effects of arms races,mutual deterrence, the centralization of systems, and qualitative weapons development to name afew. The most frightening aspect of technological determinism is the corrosion of hindsight andimpotence it engenders. From Clausewitz derives the adage that, “no other human activity is socontinuously or universally bound up with chance [as war]” (von Clausewitz, 1976, 83).The variability of conflict ensures that no theories of determinism will ever completely elucidatethe processes of war and peace. Instead, it is necessary to assert control over the scientific andsocial phenomenon that contribute to aggression and bloodshed. The creator of the hydrogenbomb once stated, “what we should have learned is that the world is small, that peace isimportant, and that cooperation in science…[can] contribute to peace” (Wolverton, 2002). Thisnotion of science and technology as a means of cooperation rather than competition holdspromise. As weapons technology has served to confound peace, other malignant forms oftechnology have served to destroy global health and the environment, both of which must now beinternationally repaired. If goals could be found by which technology and science could becomemutually assured benefits to all nation states, cooperation might compel peace; ‘peace’ that ismore appealing than the type bread by mutually assured destruction.

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